The Palestine human rights movement and its advocates in the U. S. are under a growing pressure because of their criticism of Israel’s oppressive and deadly policy against the People of Palestine.1 The BDS campaign was the last straw that led to a coalition, which uses all available means to suppress freedom of speech. Since the BDS movement gained momentum, a network of organizations, public relations firms, think tanks, billionaires such as Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban, and the all-powerful Zionist Lobby, coordinated by Israel’s embassy in the U. S. – have intensified their efforts to stifle criticism of Israeli government policies.

BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) intends to end the occupation, guarantee equal rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and respect the right of refugees to return to their homes. Especially on college and university campuses, the protest against Israel’s rights abuses has intensified and spread widely. In addition to the dynamic on campus, other groups have joint the movement. Hundreds of grassroots groups have started an information campaign on the situation on the ground in Israel and Palestine that the U. S. fawning media ignore should it be detrimental to the image of “beautiful Israel”.

Political activists from the U. S. often go to Palestine to show solidarity with the people under occupation, some have been severely injured or even killed like Rachel Corrie or Furkan Dogan. The U. S. government did not lift a finger, not to speak of demanding justice or to conduct an independent investigation. The BDS movement is also supported by several Jewish groups such as Jewish Voice for Peace, Jews say No, the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network, and Open Hillel. Other organizations such as American Friends Service Committee, American Muslims for Palestine, and the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation are supporting the quest for justice in Palestine.

Instead of engaging in a dialogue, this network took a heavy-handed approach. They not only blamed the critics “anti-Semites”, “Holocaust Denier”, “supporters of terrorists” or in the case of the Jewish supporter “self-hating Jews”, they started a campaign using classical Zionist methods of blackmailing institutions by threatening them with the withdrawal of financial support, which always works in the U. S. The following set of measures against the critics have been used: False and Inflammatory Accusations of Anti-Semitism and Support for Terrorism, Official Denunciations, Bureaucratic Barriers, Administrative Sanctions, Cancellations and Alterations of Academic and Cultural Events, Threats to Academic Freedom, Lawsuits and Legal Threats, Legislation and Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions.

This network of Israel supports has put tons of money in this slanderous campaign to crack down on the right of freedom of speech. The Netanyahu’s government discussed legal measures against the “delegitimization” that was seen as a threat, which had to be fought against. In 2015, the infamous Israeli Reut Institute came out with a proposal to highlighted the need to “out-name-shame the delegitimizers” as a strategy to fight BDS, recommending the use of “all available firepower – financial, social, legal, etc.”

Besides the huge support Israel has among the U. S. political class, starting from President Obama down to the unknown state governors, there are groups that run anonymous websites, which publish names, photos, biographical information, and links to Facebook profiles for dozens of students, professors, and other activists in order “to expose individuals and groups that are anti-Freedom, anti-American and anti-Semitic” to schools and prospective employers. Such an infamous website is “Canary Mission”.

Nobody knows who hides behind this vicious and denunciative website, except Daniel Pipes, the notorious Islamophobic “expert” on Middle Eastern Affairs who admitted it to journalists Max Blumenthal and Julia Carmel. Pipes himself instigated “Campus Watch” that called on students in Middle Eastern Studies to report “analytical failures, the mixing of politics with scholarship, intolerance of alternative views, apologetics, and the abuse of power over students.” According to the New York Times, Pipes is “perhaps best known” for this democratically questionable project. In the meantime, over 1,000 academics have signed a petition to condemn “Canary Mission Blacklist”.2

The Palestine Solidarity Movement and BDS are perceived an “existential threat” to the Zionist occupation regime in Israel and for the image of the State of Israel otherwise the “willing executioners of the Zionist Lobby would not invest that much money and relay also on activities of groups that are beyond the pale.

In Germany, similar things are happening but on a much smaller scale. The Zionist lobby and their German accomplices have not reached this level of criminal proficiency. There biggest and only argument is “anti-Semitism”. Against almost every exhibition or critical lecture on Israel’s crimes against the Palestinian people, the lobby goes wild and yells “anti-Semitism”. The problem in German is not the “all-powerful” Zionist lobby but the guilt-ridden German political and media class. After the Zionist lobby stigmatizes an organization, exhibition or individual as “anti-Semitic” the German bureaucrats cave into the pressure. This subservient behavior shows that Germany’ democracy lacks real true democrats, which should not surprise those who understand the German national traits. The latest incident happened in Munich where the city and later the catholic church withdrew already granted rooms to the Jewish editor-in-chief of the website “the Semite” (der Semit). The powerful Zionist lobby in Munich was behind this slanderous campaign. There is a certain irony in the fact that in the year 2016 Jews are not allowed to speak their mind in front of an audience without the permission of the Zionist lobby. But as things get worse, we will one day catch up with the terrible situation in the U. S.

Notes:
1. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/548748b1e4b083fc03ebf70e/t/560b0bcee4b016db196d664b/1443564494090/Palestine+Exception+Report+Final.pdf
2. http://againstcanarymission.com/

Former Israeli Prime Minister and President, Shimon Peres, was a very successful brand. He was presented to the world as stately, wise, a relentless advocate of peace, and a sane voice amidst a conflict deemed senseless and unending.

Now that he is dead at 93, international media are rife with touching tributes and heartwarming eulogies of the Nobel Peace Prize winner, one of Israel’s most sagacious ‘founding fathers’, who was also seen as a ‘giant among men’.

These attributes were mostly based on sentiment rather than fact, however, full knowledge of the man’s legacy certainly lingers among many Palestinians, Lebanese and advocates of peace and justice in the Middle East.

The truth is, Peres was never truly a peacemaker – he never labored to achieve fair and just political compromises that would preserve the dignity and rights of the Palestinians, along with securing the future of his people. In fact, he was a maximalist, a man who blatantly shoved his ideas forward in order to achieve his goals, no matter what the method or the price.

Nor was he a leader with a specific qualities that allowed him to excel in particular fields of politics. Instead, he was the embodiment of the archetypical Israeli politician who swapped roles, and rebranded himself as the occasion or role required.

“Over seven decades, Peres served as prime minister (twice) and president, though he never actually won a national election outright,” wrote Ben White in Middle East Monitor. “He was a member of 12 cabinets and had stints as defense, foreign and finance minister.”

He was also characterized as a ‘warrior’ at home, and a peace ‘dove’ in global forums. He came across as kind and stately, and Western media often embraced that erroneous image with little questioning.

But for many people, Shimon Peres was a false prophet. Like Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert and others, he was a ‘peacemaker’ by name only, and only by those whose ideals he fulfilled.

Fearing that his reputation as ‘too soft’ to lead Israel – which is often led by battle-hardened generals – would affect his standing among voters, Peres often meted out severe punishment on the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. His history was rife with brutal war crimes that went unpunished.

Although he is remembered for his ordering of the bombing of a UN shelter in the Lebanese village of Qana in 1996 – which killed and wounded hundreds of innocent people – the list of war crimes associated with his name is as long as his career. He remained, until the very end a staunch supporter of the Israeli right-wing government’s wars on Gaza and the perpetual siege on that impoverished, forsaken region.

Even as a ‘peacemaker’ he failed terribly. He championed the Oslo Accords as a political treaty that would entrench the Israeli occupation and turn the little that remained of historic Palestine into disjointed Bantustans, as was the case, if not to a worse extent, in apartheid South Africa. Yet he certainly never took responsibility, or expressed any remorse for the resultant plight of the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the brand of Shimon Peres is an old one. It spans over the course of his long career, starting with him joining underground Zionist militias prior to the establishment of Israel on appropriated Palestinian land. His militant group, the Haganah, was entrusted with the implementation of Plan Dalet, which essentially aimed at the ethnic cleaning of the Palestinian population of its historic homeland.

As one of the ‘disciples of David Ben-Gurion’, the first Prime Minister of Israel, Peres “spent his long political career in the public spotlight,” although “his greatest successes were engineered in the shadows,” according to Yaron Ezrahi, a politics professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, as quoted by Jonathan Cook.

One of these ‘successes’ was the nuclear bomb. Although various Middle Eastern countries, most notably Iraq and Iran, are often derided for nuclear weapons they never possessed, Peres was the founding father of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

“Peres, like his mentor, believed an Israeli bomb was the key to guaranteeing Israel’s status – both in Washington DC and among the Arab states – as an unassailable Middle East power,” Cook wrote.

Dodging American protests, Peres enlisted the clandestine support of Britain, France, Norway and other countries to realize his ambition.

Yet throughout his career, Peres never ceased speaking of ‘peace.’ His rhetoric and rehearsed face of ‘sincerity’ suited even his political rivals very well, for the juxtaposition of peace-loving Peres vs, for example, warmongering Ariel Sharon presented Israel as a country with healthy, democratic institutions.

The true mockery though is that the differences between Peres and his rivals, who also included former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, were barely even apparent, and only relevant within Israel’s own political and historical contexts.

For example, Shamir, who led the government between 1983–84 and, again between 1986–1992 was a member of the terrorist Zionist paramilitary group, Lehi, also known as the Stern Gang, at the time when Peres was a member of the Haganah. Throughout their militant and political careers, both collaborated on the subject of ethnic cleaning, waged wars, expanded illegal Jewish colonies, and entrenched the military occupation of Palestinian land after 1967.

However, ‘stately’ Peres chose his words carefully, and was indeed a cunning diplomat, while Shamir was a blunt and disagreeable character. As far as practical differences are concerned, however, the end results of their policies were practically identical.

A particularly poignant example of this was the unity government in Israel in 1984 which had a most peculiar leadership arrangement that included both Shamir of the rightwing Likud party and Peres of the Labor party – who was at the time in the early phase of his reinvention as ‘dove.’ (Yitzhak Rabin was appointed to the post of Defense Minister.)

These two individuals who stood at the helm of the Israeli leadership constituted the worst possible combination from the point of view of Palestinians in the occupied territories. While Shamir and Peres served the role of the hard-liner and peace-seeker respectively before the international community, both men and their governments presided over a legacy saturated with violence, illegal annexation of Palestinian land and settlement expansion.

The number of Jewish settlers who moved to the occupied territories between 1984 and1988, rose considerably, contributing to a policy of a slow annexation of Palestinian land and predictably, the ethnic cleansing of more people.

In October 1994, Peres, along with Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. While Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish extremist and Arafat died from suspected poisoning, Peres lived to be 93, advocating Israel’s interest at the expense of Palestinians to the very end, justifying Israeli wars, siege and military occupation.

The Israelis and many in mainstream Western media may very well praise Peres as a hero, but for Palestinians, Lebanese and a multitude of others he is another war criminal who escaped any accountability for his countless misdeeds.

By Peter Certo

In her first debate with Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton delivered one of her more memorable one-liners when she quipped, “I think Donald just criticized me for preparing for this debate. You know what else I prepared for? I prepared to be president.”

Debate rules be damned, Clinton’s supporters in the room cheered loudly, and the line quickly ricocheted across social media.

Indeed, Clinton was well prepared, especially compared to her blustery rival. Yet on one issue — trade — she seemed surprisingly caught off-guard.

Early on, when Clinton praised her husband’s economic record, Trump shot back that Bill Clinton had signed the North American Free Trade Agreement — NAFTA, for short — which the GOP candidate called “the single worst trade deal ever approved in this country.”

It was a serious charge, since Hillary has often embraced Bill’s business-friendly trade policies. So it was disappointing when the best response she could offer was, “Well, that’s your opinion.”

Seriously?

Trump’s not known for his factual precision, but worthier critics have tallied up NAFTA’s extensive failures since it became law two decades ago.

The first Clinton administration promised that NAFTA would create hundreds of thousands of jobs. In fact, the consumer rights group Public Citizen noted in a 2014 report, the deal killed a million U.S. jobs in its first decade alone, and created strong downward pressure on wages for what jobs remained.

Rust Belt states like Ohio and Michigan were especially devastated. Trade deals liquidated over half a million manufacturing jobs in those two states alone between 1994 and 2015. No wonder Trump mentioned the pair twice.

NAFTA also uprooted over a million Mexican workers, leading to an immigration crisis that seemed to pit low-wage Americans and low-wage Mexicans against each other. Meanwhile, it won big corporations some $360 million in judgments against public interest regulations like labor laws.

In short, deals like NAFTA accelerated the job losses, immigration tensions, and spiraling inequality that created the social rot Trump is exploiting today. Yet Clinton still defends the pact’s legacy.

Pressing his advantage, Trump turned to the Trans Pacific Partnership, or TPP — a 12-country trade pact negotiated by the Obama administration that critics have called “NAFTA on steroids.” Consumer groups and labor unions are lobbying hard against it.

And, as he courts blue-collar voters, so is Trump.

“You were totally in favor of it,” Trump accused Clinton — correctly. Though she denied it at the debate, Clinton once called the TPP “the gold standard in trade agreements,” even as rights groups raised serious concerns about the power it would give corporations over everything from drug prices to food safety laws.

Mysteriously, the former secretary of state changed her mind about the TPP during the Democratic primary, announcing last year that she could no longer support it. Had she become a skeptic of corporate-friendly trade deals, or was she buckling under pressure from Bernie Sanders, who’d been hammering away at the TPP for years?

Nothing Clinton said in the debate gives any clue. But when Trump promised to “renegotiate” NAFTA, Clinton refused to follow suit.

If she still supports NAFTA, though, how can anyone trust her to block “NAFTA on steroids”?

For many of Clinton’s supporters, it’s enough that she simply isn’t Donald Trump. But if she fends him off, she’ll need to think long and hard about whether deals like these have any place in the “broad-based, inclusive growth” she says she wants for our country.

If she gets it wrong, the social cancers of job loss and xenophobia will only continue to fester. And we may yet see a “Trump on steroids” rise from the ashes.

*Peter Certo is the editorial manager of the Institute for Policy Studies and the editor of OtherWords.org.

The recent inaugural Indian Ocean Conference (IOC 2016) while well-timed and successful in projecting India’s soft power, failed to come up with concrete recommendations to re-energise trade within the region. This should be a key focus of IOC 2017.

By Pradumna B. Rana*

The recent India-led inaugural Indian Ocean Conference (IOC 2016) held in Singapore on 1-2 September was well-timed – just when mistrust of China has increased in the region because of its actions in the South China Sea. It was also successful in projecting India’s soft power in the East Asian region. However, although an entire session was devoted to “commerce” (international trade and investment issues), the Conference failed to come up with concrete recommendations to re-energise trade integration among the 21-member Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). This should be a key focus of IOC 2017 to be held in Sri Lanka.

As is well-known, in the bygone era the Indian Ocean was an active thoroughfare of commercial and religious traffic. Subsequently during the colonial period, trade on the Indian Ocean was fragmented. Presently, intra-regional trade among the IORA members is about 25 per cent of their total trade. But a large chunk of this is trade between ASEAN and Australia: Trade among other IORA members is relatively low. How can intra-regional trade among IORA members be re-energised?

From Look East to Act East

India’s Look East Policy (LEP) was initiated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s as part of the country’s economic reform package. The objective of the Look East Policy was to promote India’s economic linkages with the 10-member ASEAN. The policy was successful. India’s trade with ASEAN has surged and the country participates actively in various fora initiated by ASEAN such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit. India also holds summit-level dialogues with ASEAN.

In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi upgraded the LEP to the Act East Policy amidst much fanfare. The Act East Policy has the strategic dimensions which the LEP did not have. Also the coverage of the Act East Policy is broader as it covers not only ASEAN but also Korea, Japan, Australia and the Pacific Island countries. But what more? If an answer cannot be provided, then the move from Look East to Act East could simply mean a change in nomenclature, nothing more.

At the IOC 2016, India’s Foreign Secretary, Mr S. Jaishankar, emphasised that “For the Indian Ocean to attain its true potential, it is imperative that India which is the centre of gravity, should be a facilitator rather than an obstruction. That requires a smoother movement of goods and people within India but also to its immediate neighborhood and beyond”.

What should be the components of India’s Act East Policy and what type of trade policies should India’s neighbouring IORA members in South Asia, the Gulf region and Africa adopt in order to re-energise trade integration in IORA? The findings of my on-going research provide some answers.

Paradigms of Trade

Under the traditional theory of trade, developing countries produced labour intensive goods which they then exchanged for relatively capital and skill intensive goods produced by the more advanced countries. All separate tasks involved in producing a good were done entirely at home. But now the way many goods are produced and traded around the world is no longer the same as before.

Production is sliced and diced into separate fragments and production of parts and components are spread around the world linked together as production networks or supply-chains. Nike is a well-known example of this phenomenon. While research and design of shoes remain in the United States, most of Nike’s production is in developing countries. Nike relies on production facilities in around 50 countries mostly in Asia and Latin America.

East Asia is dense with production networks. It is estimated that East Asia accounts for nearly 45 per cent of global production network or supply-chain trade with China and the ASEAN countries in the lead. To benefit from these developments in East Asia, India and its neighbouring IORA members should (i) link themselves to production networks in East Asia; and (ii) develop production networks in manufacturing and services within their own region. Such actions would allow the IORA region to benefit not only from the static complementarities of the traditional trade theories but also the dynamic complementarities associated with the new international trade theory.

Trade Policies in India and Neighboring IORA members

The Act East Policy in India and trade policies in India’s neighbouring IORA members should comprise the following five, sometimes overlapping, components:

• First, these countries need to improve the environment facing the private sector through governance, regulatory, labor market, and legal reforms so that their scores in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index would increase.
• Second, these countries should improve their information and communications technology (ICT) systems so that supply chains can be coordinated and managed efficiently.
• Third, India and neighbouring IORA members should strive to reduce logistics costs including trade facilitation at the border. With product fragmentation, efficient logistic service is a key determinant of a country’s competitiveness.
• Fourth, these countries should support on-going efforts to enhance physical connectivity within the region as this would reduce trading costs and enhance trade competitiveness. The Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan Project, the Mekong-India Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor projects should be supported. Maritime connectivity within the IORA region should also be improved.
• Finally, a Trans-Indian Ocean Partnership among the IORA members should be established. This would complement the ASEAN-driven Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and be the IORA’s answer to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the EU-US led Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

*Pradumna B. Rana is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the International Political Economy Programme in the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

By Angshuman Choudhury*

On 27 August 2016, Tamim Ahmed Chowdhary alias Abu Shaykh Al-Hanif – the mastermind of the recent Gulshan attack in Dhaka – was killed in a raid by Bangladeshi security forces in Narayanganj.

Chowdhary’s identification, and the statements made by Dhaka thereafter, strengthen the arguments presented in Parts I and II of this series; and corroborate the conclusion that the Gulshan attack reflects some degree of Islamic State (IS) penetration into Bangladesh.

This analysis looks deeper into Chowdhary’s role in the Gulshan attack, the nature of the new terror modules, and the significance of his killing. It outlines the contours of the new form of ‘hybridised’ terror in Bangladesh – a fusion global and localised terror modules – and identify the potential paths ahead.

Tamim Chowdhary and ‘New JMB’

Tamim Ahmed Chowdhary was a Canadian-Bangladeshi from Windsor who is purported to have been radicalised sometime between 2009 and 2012. He is said to have subsequently travelled to Syria in 2012/2013 to join the IS, and then return to Bangladesh as the organisation’s ‘coordinator’ in the country. It is understood, from an interview published in the April 2016 issue of the IS’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq, that his operational agenda was to execute a series of terror attacks in Bangladesh and link them to the IS. This must be viewed in the context of statements made by Bangladesh’s police chief after the raid, which linked Chowdhary to not only the Dhaka and Sholakia attacks but also all the previous attacks in northern Bangladesh (Pabna, Kushtia, Tangail, etc).

Chowdhary’s well-timed presence in Bangladesh had a galvanising effect on existing local extremist networks, and particularly on the Jamat ul-Mujahideen (JMB). The fact that he was an expat returnee trained by the IS-central in Syria might have lent some degree of credence to his role as a terror mobiliser. However, it would be misleading to believe that Chowdhary single-handedly created an actionable terror network in Bangladesh.

By the time he was back in Bangladesh (2013), the older JMB cells had already undergone a phase of renewed recruitment and mobilisation. Chowdhary’s entry, and the corresponding influence of IS’s ‘Caliphate’ brand, only crystallised this process. The regrouping culminated in the creation of ‘New JMB’ – a rearranged offshoot of the original JMB that might have eventually absorbed other local groups, including but not limited to al Qaeda affiliated Ansar al Islam. Although the latter has claimed several of the hacking attacks separately, the recruitment might have been carried out under Chowdhary’s management.

Thus, it is certain that Chowdhary did not act alone. Nevertheless, multiple sources have identified him as the key planner of the Gulshan attack, and also the personal overseer for arms procurement, recruitment, and financial mobilisation. In this, he was assisted by four local JMB operatives – Nurul Islam Marjan (reconnaissance), Jahangir Alam Murad (militant trainer), Sohel Mahfuz (explosives supplier), and Mawlana Abul Kashem (remobiliser of old recruits). Murad was killed by the police on 02 September and the others are on the run.

Furthermore, evidence points towards the usage of transnational networks of mobilisation. Not only did Chowdhary obtain the arms (including the AK-22) through the porous West Bengal-India border, but a significant part of the planning took place in the Indian state of West Bengal. A suspected IS-affiliate, former JMB member, and Indian national called Mohammad Masiuddin alias Abu Musa served as the local accomplice in West Bengal. He is currently in custody of Indian officials.

What After Tamim Chowdhary?

Chowdhary’s death is bound to have a disruptive effect on IS operations/plans in Bangladesh. However, it would be a mistake to believe that Chowdhary cannot be replaced by another returnee or local leader. On 10 September, an individual later identified as Tanvir Qaderi killed himself following a raid by security forces at his compound in Azimpur. He is suspected to have been the designated successor to Chowdhary. Additionally, on 29 August, two other JMB operatives, Khalid Hasan alias Badar Mama, and Ripon, were neutralised. Both were alleged to have been involved with hacking attacks in the past.

Some sources hint at the formation of a new IS franchisee outfit in Bangladesh called Jund al-Tawheed wal Khilafah (JTK), believed to be the prime recruiter of fighters for IS-central in Syria/Iraq. The New JMB too remains largely operational as a supergroup. Hence, capacities for terror mobilisation and recruitment remain strong.

Therefore, the post-Chowdhary interregnum is a valuable window for Bangladesh, which must focus on degrading the capacities of local cells. Additionally, keeping Marjan, Mahfuz, and Kashem on the run or apprehended will prevent the transmission of organisational knowledge and prolong the period of instability within IS in Bangladesh. The ongoing tracking of emigrants and immigrants with IS proclivities or links must be intensified and made systematic unlike the ad hocism currently in play.

Finally, plugging the West Bengal-India border – along the western districts of Chapainawabganj, Naogaon, Rajshahi, and Kushtia – remains vital. Notably, on 27 September, the Kolkata Police Special Task Force (STF) arrested six JMB operatives, including the purported chiefs of the outfit’s Bengal and Northeast India units, from various places in West Bengal and Assam. This directly reflects the fluid territoriality of JMB’s operational agenda.

Chowdhary’s killing is a short term success for Bangladesh. The recent neutralisation and apprehension of several key leaders and mid-rank operatives has already had a calming effect on the country’s terror landscape, resulting in a stark decline in localised attacks. However, the government still needs to pursue the suspects on the run, as their continued operation ensures a continuity of the vicious ‘new JMB’ module.

*Angshuman Choudhury
Researcher, SEARP, IPCS
E-mail: angshuman.choudhury@ipcs.org

Among a group of older women, self-reported caffeine consumption of more than 261 mg per day was associated with a 36 percent reduction in the risk of incident dementia over 10 years of follow-up. This level is equivalent to two to three 8-oz cups of coffee per day, five to six 8-oz cups of black tea, or seven to eight 12-ounce cans of cola.

“The mounting evidence of caffeine consumption as a potentially protective factor against cognitive impairment is exciting given that caffeine is also an easily modifiable dietary factor with very few contraindications,” said Ira Driscoll, PhD, the study’s lead author and a professor of psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. “What is unique about this study is that we had an unprecedented opportunity to examine the relationships between caffeine intake and dementia incidence in a large and well-defined, prospectively-studied cohort of women.”

The findings come from participants in the Women’s Health Initiative Memory Study, which is funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. Driscoll and her research colleagues used data from 6,467 community-dwelling, postmenopausal women aged 65 and older who reported some level of caffeine consumption. Intake was estimated from questions about coffee, tea, and cola beverage intake, including frequency and serving size.

In 10 years or less of follow-up with annual assessments of cognitive function, 388 of these women received a diagnosis of probable dementia or some form of global cognitive impairment. Those who consumed above the median amount of caffeine for this group (with an average intake of 261 mg per day) were diagnosed at a lower rate than those who fell below the median (with an average intake of 64 mg per day). The researchers adjusted for risk factors such as hormone therapy, age, race, education, body mass index, sleep quality, depression, hypertension, prior cardiovascular disease, diabetes, smoking, and alcohol consumption.

Fierce criticism of Singapore by China’s spokespersons for allegedly stirring up tension over the South China Sea at international forums reflects a pattern of interference in ASEAN’s deliberations; this suggests that Beijing is embarked on a hegemonic trajectory in Asia.

By Mushahid Ali*

Recent criticism of Singapore by Chinese scholars and pundits over South China Sea tensions further underscores a noticeable turning point in China’s assertiveness as a rising power. The turn is all the more significant because it involves a sharp dip in the highly publicised warm relationship between the two countries particularly in the economic and political domain as symbolised by their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

It is therefore incongruous that Beijing’s media pundits and defence scholars should deem it fit to take Singapore to task for allegedly stirring the pot of South China Sea tensions. They even cited fabricated reports of what Singapore was said to have done at the recent Non-Aligned Summit in Venezuela, contrary to the official record of what it stated, and threatened to punish Singapore for it.

Chinese intervention in NAM

At the recent Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit, Chinese diplomats prevailed on the Host Country and the NAM Chair, Venezuela, not to allow regional states to follow the established practice of settling the relevant regional paragraphs in their own way. ASEAN, which was always responsible for the Southeast Asia portion of the communique, was prevented from updating the Southeast Asian situation because China did not want reference to the ASEAN Summit paragraphs on South China Sea.

The Chinese intervened through their allies and pushed for retaining the old paragraphs of about two years old which seemed to serve China’s interests. In so doing China displayed the classic behaviour of a hegemonic power in securing its interest over the objection of regional states.

Chinese leaders talk often about mutual respect, win-win cooperation and equality of states. They do not seem to mean what they utter but expect other countries to follow their wishes. They have resorted to the use of proxies to pressure Singapore to subordinate its long standing relations with the United States, Japan and other ASEAN countries, to what Beijing desires.

Amazingly while the Chinese excoriate everyone else to fall in line, cowing the smaller and younger ASEAN member states in the process, Beijing continues to cozy up to the Americans and deal with them on various fronts.

China to dominate East Asia?

Is China seeking to dominate East Asia by asserting its historical rights to the region, insisting on its claims to almost all of the South China Sea and disregarding the legal rights of neighbouring countries based on international law? Does China aspire to be a great power that ignores the legal rights of other countries and refuses to subscribe to the established rules of international behaviour, respecting the sovereignty and interests of its neighbours? Or does it care only for the goodwill and respect of other major powers like the US and Russia?

If China wants to be respected as a major power and its views of regional and international affairs given due regard in the current world order, should China not pay equal regard to the views and interests of other Asian powers like Japan, India and ASEAN, instead of insisting on the untrammelled rights of a rising power that has yet to fulfil the requirements of a super power in economic and military terms?

With a heritage of 5,000 years of history should China not conduct itself as a civilised nation in its behaviour towards its regional and international partners instead of treating them as inferior subordinates? Or is it just seeking to ape the power politics of Europe and America, seeking hegemony by asserting its historical rights? Or is China seeking to overturn a century of humiliation by western imperial powers by seeking a rebalance to ASEAN and exhibiting imperial tendencies over its Asian neighbours?

China and Singapore

The Chinese want Singapore to take into account their interests but they would not accept Singapore’s interests in upholding the rule of law and the principle of rules-based regime for the conduct of inter-state relations and maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight of the South China Sea.

Singapore and its ASEAN partners have to respond to the calumny of Chinese armchair generals and media pundits in their attempt to divide and conquer ASEAN and intimidate its small neighbours to submit to the Chinese viewpoint of regional disputes and international affairs.

Singapore and other states of ASEAN have to assert their sovereignty and freedom to maintain a friendly relationship with China and other major powers based on the principles of equality and mutual interest. They cannot and will not accept a relationship based on differentials of economic and military power or population and prosperity, regardless of their being in Asia, America or Eurasia.

*Mushahid Ali is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

By Reggie Kramer*

(FPRI) — Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), exists unsure of its place in the world. To its west, across the Dniester River, lies the breakaway region’s parent state, Moldova, and, beyond that, European Union (EU) member Romania. To the east are Ukraine, Russian-occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea. Pulled between east and west, resurgent Russia and western-minded Moldova, the region is of significant strategic importance for a Western alliance looking to prevent the realization of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s imperialist goals. But how did we get to this point?

During the 19^th century, present-day Moldova was part of the Russian Empire, which the Ottoman Empire had ceded to Russia. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Moldovan Parliament quickly formed and, in 1918, voted to join the Kingdom of Romania. The newly-formed Soviet Union (USSR) did not recognize Romania’s political control of what it considered Russian territory. In 1924, the USSR created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic out of the territory that it still controlled: the land east of the Dniester, modern Transnistria. During and after the Second World War, the USSR regained control of all of present-day Moldova; it maintained control over this area until 1990.

In that year, Moldova, still part of the Soviet Union held its first free elections since becoming part of the USSR. The Popular Front of Moldova, a pro-Romanian ethnic nationalist party, won. Its policies demoted the status of the Russian language in Moldova and discriminated against ethnic minorities, who made up more than half of the population of Transnistria, by promoting the joint Moldovan-Romanian culture as the “national culture.” Many of the ethnic Moldovans in the region were also native-Russian speakers. Upset by these developments and fearing that a Moldova-Romania union would further marginalize them, Transnistrians declared their region independent of Moldova and named it the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Pridnestrove means Transnistria in Russian). The Popular Front government mobilized popular militias to combat separatists in Transnistria and Gagauzia, the other region of the country with a significant ethnic minority population. Small-scale incidents broke out with ethnic Moldovans attacking ethnic minorities—the government turned a blind eye to such incidents. In 1991, the Popular Front government in Chișinău declared Moldova independent of the USSR. Transnistrians did the same with their capital in Tiraspol.

War on the Dniester

The newly independent Moldova, eager to assert its sovereignty over all of its claimed territory, tried several times between 1990 and 1992 to send its own government officials and police forces across the Dniester River. Each time, PMR militias rebuffed them. Armed, trained, and supported by former Soviet troops now loyal to the new Russian Federation, these militias composed a capable and well-equipped, albeit decentralized, military force.

The murder of a militia leader in the village of Dubăsari on March 1, 1992 sparked the Transnistria War. PMR leadership blamed the murder on policemen loyal to Moldova. Together with Russian Cossack volunteers, militiamen besieged the police precinct and held 26 Moldovan policemen hostage. Battles broke out between Moldovan loyalists and PMR militias; the Popular Front government ordered the bulk of Moldova’s fledgling military, made up primarily of police officers and volunteers, to cross the Dniester by ferry. In the area around Dubăsari, the Moldovan forces and PMR militias engaged in trench warfare. In June, Moldovan troops stormed the city of Bender (the only PMR-claimed territory west of the Dniester), and during the ensuing battle, Moldovan forces destroyed three Russian tanks fighting alongside the Transnistrian separatists. In response, the Russian 14^th Guards Army launched an artillery attack that devastated the Moldovans stationed outside of Bender. The Russian government subsequently threatened to order its army into the fighting if Moldova continued its attempts to assert political control over Transnistria. A ceasefire agreement was signed in July 1992. It created a joint peacekeeping force consisting of five Russian battalions, three Moldovan battalions, and two PMR battalions. While nominally governed by this joint force, Transnistria is, to this day, a de facto autonomous state ruled by the PMR—though it is internationally recognized as Moldovan territory.

Why Transnistria Matters

Given the recent reemergence of Russia as a regional aggressor, the United States and its European allies are hard-pressed to contain Russian expansion. Already, Russian influence and military forces have moved westward; pro-Russian separatists control a significant stretch of Ukraine; and Russia itself has annexed the Crimean peninsula. Russia could easily look to Transnistria as the next target of its aggression.

Transnistria is another region, like Crimea, that is a majority Russian-speaking and ethnic-Russian enclave within a non-Russian speaking country dominated by non-ethnic Russians. Russia has deep, uninterrupted historical ties with the area, which date back more than 200 years. It openly supported the PMR during the Transnistria War and has maintained close political ties since. Russian military forces remain in Transnistria as a part of the joint peacekeeping force, and Moldova is not a member of NATO; therefore, a Russian occupation of Moldovan territory would not automatically lead to Western retaliation. The opportunity for Russia to annex Transnistria exists, especially after the Transnistrian Parliament asked the Russian Duma in 2014 to make it a federal subject of Russia. This request came in response to the Moldovan government’s plans to sign an association agreement with the European Union; Transnistrians fear that closer relations with the EU could lead to Moldovan-Romanian reunification, which would make them even more of an ethnic and/or linguistic minority.

The Russian government has taken slow but steady steps at consolidating its control over Transnistria giving rise to the concerns that Putin has his eyes set on it. During Duma elections in 2011, Russia opened voting stations in Transnistria to allow its soldiers and the many dual citizens in the region to vote, and it plans to do the same for the 2016 Duma elections in September. The Moldovan government has protested, but it seems as though Russia will go ahead with opening these stations anyway. Russian state media reporting on these events seems to imply that this move is designed to legitimate Russian governance of the region in the absence of direct Moldovan control.

The continued presence of Russian military forces in Transnistria since 1992 has worried Moldova and the West. Moldova has continually asked that Russia remove these troops from its territory and that an international peacekeeping force come in, but Russia has resisted. These troops have carried out several military exercises in Transnistria, including on the bank of the Dniester River. Moldova has condemned these exercises as violations of its sovereignty and a tactic of intimidation. Like its administration of voting stations in the region, these exercises are attempts to assert Russia’s control of Transnistria.

Also, there is worry that the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria will cause further Russian aggression in Ukraine. In 2015, the Ukrainian government suspended a military cooperation deal with Russia that allowed troops and supply convoys destined for Transnistria to travel through, so now, Russian soldiers in Transnistria are effectively stranded there. Even if Russia wanted to remove these troops, it would have difficulty doing so. If Putin feels that the soldiers are threatened, he could order Russian forces to create a land corridor to Transnistria to get them out. It is worth noting that in the two years since the annexation of Crimea, many policymakers have predicted that Russia would seek to create a land corridor between its own territory and the peninsula, but Russia has yet to do so. Any conflict in Eastern Moldova would likely spill into Ukraine’s Odessa Oblast creating even more chaos in that country.

Furthermore, Russia has employed propaganda and disinformation to gain further influence over Transnistria. Russian-language media dominates the landscape because under-funded Transnistrian and Moldovan television stations regularly rebroadcast Russian programming. A survey in 2015 found that nearly 40 percent of Moldovans receive most of their information from Russian sources. These sources publish videos outlining plans for Romania and Moldova to unify and subsequently fight a war against Transnistria, with the help of Ukraine; it is hardly surprising that Transnistrians, almost all of whom consume exclusively Russian-language media, should gravitate towards Russia. Even if they are not completely besotted with Putin’s Russia, they certainly fear Moldovan-Romanian unification.

Finally, Moldova’s (lack of) energy security and the geographic importance of Transnistria, especially in regards to oil and gas transportation, is a cause of concern. Russian energy giant Gazprom formerly had a complete and total monopoly on supplying gas to Moldova and Transnistria, and it continues to own 50% of Moldova’s domestic gas distribution system. Russia claims that the Moldovan government is responsible for the four billion dollar debt Transnistrian consumers owe to Gazprom. Russia could use this debt as a means of influencing Moldovan politics. In addition, a large amount of Russian-produced natural gas bound for Europe goes through pipelines that cross Transnistria. Moscow is sure to keep a close eye on Transnistria for that reason; any action that might threaten Russian pipelines risks inflaming Putin’s temper.

What’s Being Done and What Could Be Done?

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland, Moldovan Defense Minister Anatol Şalaru asked for assistance in removing Russian troops from Transnistria. In 1999, Russia had agreed to remove its military from the territory, but it has yet to follow through. To complicate matters even more, NATO leadership has been unwilling to risk further exacerbating tensions over a separatist conflict in a non-member state. Romania, Moldova’s neighbor and cultural cousin, could ostensibly provide help, but is unlikely to do so. With its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has territory—and military forces, including the Black Sea Fleet—just over one-hundred miles from Romania. Therefore, it would not want to risk provoking Putin.

The EU has taken steps towards further integrating Moldova into the West, via its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In 2014, Moldovans gained visa-free access to travel in the EU, which also extended to Transnistrians, who are considered Moldovan under international law. This policy could have the effects of encouraging Transnistrians to identify more with Europe. As an ENP partner, Moldova committed itself to making political reforms to reduce corruption and increase civic participation, including among Transnistrians. Greater cooperation between Moldova and the EU could therefore mean greater cooperation between Transnistria and Moldova, which could serve to shrink the space for Russian involvement. Moreover, Moldova does have a strong relationship with NATO even though it is not a member. It belongs to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and has an Individual Partnership Action Plan. It regularly participates in NATO summits and meetings of NATO bodies making it the only non-member country to do so. Moldova’s participation has, in fact, become so commonplace that it is referred to as the 28 members + Moldova format. The level of Moldova-NATO integration, even though not a relationship of membership, should still serve as a deterrent to Russian intervention in territory internationally recognized as Moldovan.

As it stands now, a rushed attempt at incorporating Moldova into NATO to warn Russia off from militarily intervening in Moldova and Transnistria appears to be off the table. Putin has made it quite clear that Russia will respond aggressively to NATO expansion—the situation in Ukraine proves this point. Given Putin’s paranoia, the Kremlin is likely to see a provision of troops or advisors to Moldova as an offensive act as well. Also, Moldovan law makes it unlikely to join NATO in the near future; the country’s constitution prevents it from joining a military alliance. While reunification between Transnistria and Moldova proper is an admirable goal and would thwart Russian ambitions towards the region, it seems unlikely to happen in the near future. Nevertheless, there are policy options that are being discussed:

1. Grow economic ties between Transnistria and Moldova and the European Union:

Fifty-five percent of Transnistria’s imports come from Moldova and the EU, and those same actors make up 81.6 percent of the market for Transnistrian exports. Opportunities exist to further increase these numbers: the Transnistrian economy has increasingly pivoted westward over recent years due to Moldova’s signing of an association agreement with the EU in 2014. That agreement gave Transnistria tariff-free access to the European market and spurred European investors to invest in Transnistria, which Moldova has allowed (unlike Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Even if closer economic ties between Transnistria and Moldova and the EU do not lead to closer diplomatic or political ties, they still may give the government and people of Transnistria pause before siding with or inviting in Russia. A closer economic relationship could provide the West with a source of leverage on the PMR.

In addition, from 1992 to 2015, about ten percent of Transnistria’s GDP came from direct Russian financial assistance. In 2016, Putin suspended payments to the PMR government due to his growing personal frustration with Transnistrian President Yevgeny Shevchuk, who has been accused of skimming from economic assistance. The West could seek to replace that money through either trade or direct assistance (which seems unlikely) and thus gain further influence in Transnistria at Russia’s expense.

2. Twist the sanctions knife:

It is well documented that Western-imposed sanctions on Russia, first implemented in the wake of the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, have negatively affected the Russian economy in significant ways. According to a report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the sanctions are an important reason for why Russia hasn’t already taken military action in Transnistria. “A useful effect of the sanctions,” the report states, “is that, even if they do not help the EU much in its policy on Crimea, they do minimise the risk that Russia will seek to openly destabilise other parts of Ukraine or, say, Moldova and Georgia.” Increasing the sanctions could further minimize that risk.

3. Hybrid warfare—Fight fire with fire:

Russia’s hybrid strategy has been successful at gaining support from local populations in Russian ethnic and linguistic enclaves. While the Western alliance has tried to counter Russian military actions—NATO deploying more troops along the Russian border is a prime example—it has not even attempted to fight an information war in places like Transnistria. In “Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House wrote of Transnistria’s media:

The media environment is restrictive. Nearly all media are state owned or controlled and refrain from criticizing the authorities. The few independent print outlets have small circulations. Critical reporting draws harassment by the government, which also uses bureaucratic obstruction and the withholding of information to inhibit independent media.

The PMR government determines what information its population receives. Much of this information is pro-Russian. For example, in June 2016, the Shevchuk government passed legislation criminalizing criticism of Russia’s peacekeepers. Moreover, almost all opposition media is in Romanian—meaning that ideas contrary to those of Russia and the PMR government are only reaching those Transnistrians who already agree with them. There is a dearth of Russian-language opposition media and even unbiased news. The West could provide Moldova and Transnistrian opposition activists with financial and technical support to create pro-Western (or unbiased) Russian-language media outlets in Transnistria. Romania has already begun to do just that. Eroding public support for Russia and the pro-Russian PMR would be a victory because it would give Putin less of an opportunity to intervene. This strategy of supporting Russian-language media for Russian-speaking minorities has been supported in order to combat Russian influence in other post-Soviet areas, most notably Estonia.

The Moldovan government has tried to limit the influence of Russian media propaganda by banning Russian journalists from entering the country and by regulating which Russian programming Moldovan television channels can rebroadcast. These policies have been met with resistance even from pro-European Moldovans because these people fear that these policies could be used to silence critical coverage of the Moldovan government. Furthermore, they have little effect on propaganda in Transnistria due to Moldova’s lack of enforcement capability there.

4. Fall back and consolidate:

All of the above three policy options can co-exist with one another. This fourth one cannot. In fact, it directly contradicts them. Yet, it remains on the table: Moldova could cut its losses and renounce its territorial claim to Transnistria. An independent Transnistria could potentially reorient away from Russia having achieved its goal. However, even if this scenario does not come to pass, and Russia annexes or otherwise gains control of the region, Moldova without Transnistria could be more easily defended and integrated into the Western alliance and the EU or it could unite with Romania, which would have the effect of causing Moldovan territory to fall under the purview of  NATO. At this point in time, Russia seems unlikely to invade the undisputed territory of a NATO member state thus triggering Article 5 and a full-scale conflict. Also, ceding Transnistria could be presented as an act of good faith—one that could potentially placate Putin for long enough to allow Moldova to regroup and work with the West or to join Romania. In either such a scenario, Moldova would become the furthest bulwark against Russian expansion. Russia’s sphere of influence would diminish, and any Western-Russian conflict would take place further from the economic and cultural heartland of Europe and be less costly as a result.

This decision would be a highly risky policy decision and only worth employing if there was concrete evidence that Russia was planning to imminently annex Transnistria and threaten Moldova. Even in that case, it could further embolden rather than deter Russian regional aggression, and Transnistria could become the next Sudetenland. In addition, Romanian-Moldovan unification, should it come to pass, could potentially spark conflict in Moldova’s Gaugazia—primarily inhabited by a Turkic ethnolinguistic minority—and Taraclia—primarily inhabited by a Bulgarian ethnolinguistic minority—regions. Both regions have ties with NATO member states (Turkey and Bulgaria, respectively), which could further complicate the situation.

A Stuck Region

Russia’s long history of dominance over Transnistria, coupled with the region’s ethnolinguistic makeup and the presence of Russian soldiers, makes it a potential target for Russian intervention. The inconclusive end to the Transnistria War has left this area in limbo for quite some time: a strip of land de jure part of Moldova but de facto independent and supported by Russia. Since the end of the war, Russia has had significant influence on Transnistria, but it has attempted to further consolidate its power through a combination of political, military, and informational tactics. The West must prevent these tactics from succeeding; a stronger Russian presence in Moldova means a greater threat to the EU and to peace and security in post-communist Europe, particularly in Ukraine. Several policy options have been enacted, such as beginning to integrate Moldova (and Transnistria by extension) into the West via deals with the EU or discussing to increase sanctions on Russia. Only time will tell if any of these scenarios will be successful.

In the short term, what is almost certain is that nothing is likely to change with regards to the situation in Transnistria. No party with a stake in the peace and security of Eastern Europe wants to risk unfreezing the conflict. That is why Russia did not annex Transnistria even after it was asked to; why NATO has not taken steps towards the forceful removal of Russian troops from the region; and why Moldova is unlikely to unify with Romania any time soon. The outcome of Moldova’s presidential election, scheduled for October 2016, may clarify the picture and inform the policies towards Transnistria chosen by all relevant actors. Until then, Transnistria remains an important, but hardly pivotal, region in global politics.

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Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi has asked member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Sept. 30 for “constructive support” in resolving the crisis in the nation’s religiously divided Rakhine State, reports RFA.

“We are working to build understanding, harmony and trust between communities while standing firm against prejudice, intolerance, and extremism,” Suu Kyi told ASEAN members at the body’s Inter-Parliamentary Assembly which met Sept. 30-Oct. 3 in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw.

“In doing so, we ask for the constructive support of our regional neighbors,” Suu Kyi said.

“Progress in every field will not be possible overnight, but we are determined to persevere to bring about positive change in Rakhine State as in other areas of our country affected by conflict,” she said.

Rakhine is home to 1.1 million stateless Rohingya Muslims who Myanmar’s majority Buddhists refer to as “Bengali” implying that they are illegal migrants from neighboring Bangladesh.

The Rohingya people have been denied citizenship, freedom of movement, health care and education since 2012 violence erupted between them and the Rakhine Buddhists that left scores dead.

More than 120,000 Rohingya still remain in squalid camps in apartheid-like condition

Suu Kyi’s government has established an advisory commission led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who visited the country last month. The commission was tasked with finding a solution to religious strife in Rakhine.

By Elise Harris

In his latest prayer video Pope Francis dedicates the month of October to praying for journalists – specifically that their work would always be motivated by strong ethics and respect for the truth.

The video, released Oct. 4, opens showing scenes of a television studio, recording studio, writing desks and satellites, which flash across the screen as the Pope speaks.

Addressing viewers in his native Spanish, the Pope says he often wonders, “How can media be put to the service of a culture of encounter?”

“We need information leading to a commitment for the common good of humanity and the planet,” he said, and, as the faces of different journalists around the Vatican flashed across the screen, asked if viewers would join him in praying for those who work in the field of communication.

Specifically, he prayed “that journalists, in carrying out their work, may always be motivated by respect for the truth and a strong sense of ethics.”

The video closes with the Pope asking viewers if they can help him with the request, a question to which the journalists featured each respond one by one saying, “yes.”

Among the journalists featured in the video is Alvaro de Juana, a Rome correspondent for CNA’s sister-agency ACI Prensa. Originally from Spain, he has been working as a journalist for 12 years.

In comments to CNA, de Juana said having strong ethics and a high respect for the truth are always important, but moreover carry special weight in today’s society.

“For years there has been talk of an economic crisis, but the Church and concretely Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI and Pope Francis have said on many occasions that there is also a crisis of values,” he noted.

Within this crisis, “ethics and morality have been forgotten and have been discarded in many environments and in important questions,” de Juana said, explaining that because of this, a journalist “has the duty to respect ethics and morality.”

“There is no journalism without ethics,” he said, explaining that if ethics were removed from the equation, “it would be to dirty and undermine this profession that has the truth as its foundation.”

Communication also plays a fundamental role in evangelization, he said, noting that “the Church is universal and we could say that communication is, too.”

Christ used words and actions to make God’s love known to the people, and in doing so communicated, de Juana said, adding that communication is “a very important instrument” that can be used to reach those far from the Church.

When asked how journalists themselves can collaborate with the Pope in helping to ensure his prayer is answered, de Juana said the answer is simply “being faithful to this principle of the truth” and by carrying out one’s work with the conviction that “not everything goes.”

“The Pope asks that all journalists and people who work in communication to be faithful to these principals,” regardless of whether or not they are Catholic or not.

The theme Pope Francis chose for 2017’s World Day of Communications was released late last month, and is titled “’Fear not, for I am with you’ (Is 43:5): Communicating hope and trust in our time.”

In the communique published alongside the theme, the Vatican’s Secretariat for Communications said the theme was “an invitation to tell the history of the world and the histories of men and women in accordance with the logic of the ‘good news.’”

Shortly before the announcement of the theme, Pope Francis had a Sept. 22 audience with journalists, during which he reflected on the importance of respect for human dignity, telling them that their profession can never be used as a destructive weapon, nor should it be used to nourish fear.

“Certainly criticism is legitimate, and, I would add, necessary, just as is the denunciation of evil, but this must always be done respecting the other, his life and his affect. Journalism cannot become a ‘weapon of destruction’ of persons or even nations,” the Pope said at the Vatican’s Clementine Hall.

“Neither must it nourish fear in front of changes or phenomena such as migration forced by war or by hunger,” he said.

An initiative of the Jesuit-run global prayer network Apostleship of Prayer, the Pope’s prayer videos are filmed in collaboration with the Vatican Television Center and mark the first time the Roman Pontiff’s monthly prayer intentions have been featured on video.

The Apostleship of Prayer, which produces the monthly videos on the Pope’s intentions, was founded by Jesuit seminarians in France in 1884 to encourage Christians to serve God and others through prayer, particularly for the needs of the Church.

Since the late 1800s, the organization has received a monthly, “universal” intention from the Pope. In 1929, an additional missionary intention was added by the Holy Father, aimed at the faithful in particular.

While there are two intentions, the prayer videos are centered on the first, universal intention.

His intentions this year have so far focused on themes he speaks out about frequently, such as interreligious dialogue, care for creation, families in hardship, the elderly and marginalized, and respect for women.

Francis’ prayer intentions for the rest of the year are listed on the organization’s website and center on other themes close to Francis’ heart, such as prayers for countries receiving migrants and refugees, and an end to child-soldiers.

A decision from the Criminal Court of the Supreme Court ratified the acquittal of the owner of a bar located in an illegal mining area who hired adolescents to work in the establishment to accompany customers to consume alcohol and occasionally engage in sexual activity with them.

In 2008, according to the General Attorney’s accusation, Elsa Cjuno Huillca took a 14 year old girl to work every day in her bar from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. as what is commonly known as an “escort girl.” The Public Ministry presented a demand against Cjuno Huillca for the crime of human trafficking to the detriment of the minor, but in 2014, a court of the eastern department of Madre de Dios acquitted the accused under the argument that she was not aware that she was committing a crime despite the fact that the victim had declared that her work “consisted in accompanying the drinking customers” and that she did not know the amount of her salary because for each drink she served, she received a token, and her earnings depended on the number of tokens she had obtained by the end of the night.

Also, the young girl stated that the bar owner instructed her to make “come-ons”; that is, to engage in sexual intercourse with the clients, for which she would get paid a gram of gold.

After the decision of the court in Madre de Dios, the General Attorney’s Office filed an action of annulment that had to be heard and decided by the Criminal Court of the Supreme Court, chaired by judge Javier Villa Stein. The action of annulment stated that the crime of human trafficking under the modality of sexual and labor exploitation “is a fact that has been proven, making it fit to declare the sentence invalid.”

However, Villa Stein and the other four magistrates that made up the Criminal Court dismissed the action of annulment, saying that “to be an escort girl, and we understand this as a person who just drinks along with customers without having to perform any other activities, does not present itself as a type of work that would exhaust a worker” and to engage in sexual relations with the customers “was not the original intention of why she went to work at the bar, but only in one occasion the accused suggested the victim to do that. Thus this was an isolated event and not the reason why the accused took the minor to work at the bar.”

“For it to be deemed a sex trafficking crime, this has to be the primary reason for which a person is taken there from the start,” states the decision of the Criminal Court.

Unprotected victims

Although the decision came in January 2016, it was revealed in early September following complaints posted through the social networks. The Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP) called the sentence as “dangerous and deplorable” and that it has elements that violate fundamental rights.

“The arguments to exonerate the accused, part of the court ruling, establish a dangerous legal precedent to deal with sexual or labor exploitation of children and adolescents in the future, by requiring that the trafficker had made their intention clear to the victim as a condition to legally file a demand,” the MIMP points out in a statement. “This is a precedent for impunity in similar and future cases in which the trafficker will not be imposed a sanction and thus leaving unprotected the children and adolescents in our country.”

For Carmen Barrantes, a lawyer and researcher for the humanitarian organization Terre des Hommes Suisse, the decision actually legitimizes trafficking because “none of the young girls from Cusco or Huancavelica who they recruit to work in the bars are told from the start that they are going to be sexually exploited; this does not happen anywhere in the world.”

“These girls are offered work opportunities as waitresses or cashiers; they are never told that they will be escorts girls or that they will have to drink liquor; this comes later on, after they cannot refuse and say no,” she said to the La República newspaper, adding that the court decision is not in accord with Peruvian law and international treaties dealing with human trafficking. “The law states that just the act of recruiting or luring one person constitutes the crime of human trafficking.”

So far, the National Council of the Judiciary, the entity in charge of the selection, appointment, evaluation, ratification and of destitution of judges and prosecutors in Peru, made public that an investigation has been opened against the judges who handed down the sentence.

According to the Walk Free Foundation, based in Australia and dedicated to the fight against modern slavery, Peru is the country in third place in Latin America, after Mexico and Colombia, with the highest number of trafficking victims. Between January and September of this year, the National Police recorded 243 trafficking complaints, allowing law enforcement to rescue 957 victims, of which 919 were women and 115 children and adolescents.

The US vice-presidential debate was a big plus for the campaign of Republican candidate Donald Trump, who is widely considered a loser in the initial presidential debate. Trump’s running mate, the Indiana Governor Mike Pence clearly outperformed his rival, Virginia Senator Tim Kaine, whose impulsive constant interruptions seriously undermined his performance and his image on national television.

By projecting a calm, confident, and well-informed conservative stance on various domestic and foreign issues, Pence scored big with the American viewers, many of whom are unsure of Trump’s ability to act presidential given his much-criticized temper. Although Kaine pressed hard on Trump’s various incendiary statements, Pence performed admirably by fending off those criticisms and assuring the republican voters in particular that his ticket had a robust position that elevated the much-needed certainty regarding Trump’s candidacy.

Not only that, Pence was convincing on casting questions on Clinton’s “pay for play” scandal with the Clinton Foundation and the unhappy results with the “Russia reset” policy of the Obama administration that is in pieces today. A clear winner on the issue of style, Pence definitely appeared more “vice-presidential” than Kaine, whose dozens of interruptions of Pence cost him dearly with the viewers.

In all likelihood, Pence’s commanding performance will put a mini-brake on the downward slide of Trump in the recent weeks, turning the needle of voter sympathy toward Trump some. Pence’s ability to put up a rational discourse, perfectly logical from a conservative stand point, was a timely antidote to the Clinton-driven Trump-bashing successes that have resulted in the recent polls putting Clinton ahead by a comfortable margin.

Also, on foreign policy, Pence articulated a sound criticism of Obama-Clinton’s complicity in the Iraqi vacuum that led to ISIS’s rise, without ever receiving even a half-convincing rebuttal by Kaine, whose comforting assurances about American being more secure today is probably viewed with skepticism by many Americans.

With all the talks of “facts-checks” after the debate, what matters most about this VP debate is less whether or not Pence’s denial of some statements attributed to him, e.g., on Russian President Putin, holds but rather the public perception of a likeable and trustworthy republican candidate with long prior record in US Congress, who was able to project the image of a seasoned, mild-mannered, legitimate politician who met the basic criteria of the status quo.

Pence repeatedly criticized Putin and blamed Clinton and Obama for Russia’s resurgence, thus putting to rest the concerns of many Americans that the Trump presidency would stand up to Putin. Much like other republican politicians, Pence drove home the point about the American strength and revitalizing the US military, avoiding any amateurish hawkish missteps that Trump is famous for.

Boosted by Pence’s outperforming Kaine, Trump now faces the challenge of the next debate on Sunday, which is formatted as a town meeting, potentially benefiting the populistic Trump, who is more comfortable in “street politics” than podium debate.

Should Trump be able to provide more convincing answers on the issue of his tax returns, then it is perfectly possible to see a more perceptible move of the voter needle in his direction. But, Trump may also prove his own worst enemy by targeting Bill Clinton and raising the issues not germinal to this year’s elections. A more issue-oriented Trump can compensate for the flaws of the first debate, which was log-sided by a pro-Clinton moderator, who essentially gave her a pass by failing to ask Clinton any tough or troubling questions. Pence’s ability to withstand the Kaine’s provocations to lose his cool is a precious lesson for Trump that must be taken to heart by Trump if he wants better results than the first debate.

The US representative to the United Nations, Ambassador ‘Ranting Sam’ Samantha Power, accused the Russian and Syrian governments of ‘barbarism’, claiming Moscow or Damascus had attacked an unarmed United Nations humanitarian convoy delivering aid to civilians in Aleppo.

“What Russia is sponsoring and doing [in Syria] is not counter-terrorism it is barbarism,” said Samantha Power, US Representative to the United Nations

The US representative to the United Nations, Ambassador ‘Ranting Sam’ Samantha Power, accused the Russian and Syrian governments of ‘barbarism’, claiming Moscow or Damascus had attacked an unarmed United Nations humanitarian convoy delivering aid to civilians in Aleppo. No evidence was presented. Rants and threats do not require facts or proof; they only require vehement emotional ejaculations and compliant mass propaganda organs.

‘Barbarians’, to be clear, evoke images of leaders and groups, which abjure all civilized norms and laws. They only respond to armed force.

In the present context Power’s charges of barbarism against Russia and Syria was used to justify the US aerial bombardment of a Syrian army outpost, which killed and maimed almost 200 government troops engaged in combating ISIS terrorists and jihadi invaders.

In other words, accusing Syrian soldiers of ‘barbarism’ was Ambassador Power’s cynical way of dehumanizing the young victims of an earlier and deliberate US war crime.

Let’s analyze the appropriate context for the use and abuse of the language of ‘barbarism’ – and its rightful application.

Barbarism: the Deed

Over the past decade and a half, the US and its allies have invaded, occupied, killed, wounded and dispossessed over ten million people, in countries from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Military and civilian officials have systematically destroyed entire economies, fostered ethno-religious wars, undermined ancient community and family ties and placed corrupt political puppets in power.

Promoted by the US, torture, arbitrary arrest and incarceration have become the norm creating lawless and chaotic societies, which had once been productive and stable. The shredding of social structures has provokes massive population flight, with millions of desperate refugees fleeing invasions, wars and total society breakdown. The result of these deliberate imperial policy decisions has been emptied cities and neighborhoods, broken families, destroyed lives and futures for many millions of young Arabs and Muslims.

As the human toll mounts and Western Europe is flooded with the results of US aggressive wars, the imperialists have sharpened their shrill rhetoric, labeling all of their adversaries and critics as ‘accomplices in war crimes’, and ‘barbarians’.

The greater and more sustained the policy of wanton imperial pillage, the more intense the frustration of its leaders over its ultimate failures, and the greater the recourse of its ‘diplomats’ to vituperative language.

Barbarism in Search of Barbarians

The barbarism underlying the US and EU imperial wars of conquest in the Middle East is unmatched. The principal adversaries to US aggression, Russia, China and Iran, have not invaded any sovereign countries, nor have they provoked the desperate flight of millions of refugees. Russia was invited to aid its Syrian government ally confronting an invasion of terrorist mercenaries who are intent on dividing the country. Crimea peacefully re-joined Russia via elections. Moscow rejected playing any military role in support of Western wars against Iraq, Yemen and Libya. None of this rose to the level of US-EU barbarism.

In Asia, the West has invaded and devastated Viet Nam, the Philippines and Afghanistan. Japan, now a US ally, had invaded China, Korea and Southeast Asia. China for its part has not engaged in any imperial war of conquest for centuries.

Iran has not invaded any country in modern times. On the contrary, Iraq invaded Tehran in the 1980’s with US support and waged a decade-long war which caused millions of casualties.

In truth, if waging wars, staging invasions, destroying whole societies and causing millions of deaths are the measure of barbarism, then the US, Europe and Japan have been clearly barbaric.

To claim otherwise and follow the ranting script of Ambassador Samantha Power is to enter into a tunnel of hallucinations where the language of liberal values embellishes truly barbarian acts.

The entire language of politics has been perverted and converted into an artifice of self-delusion. Terrorist militias are re-packaged as ‘rebels’ and ‘moderates’, spreading barbarism from the imperial Western center to the periphery. The deliberate spread of terrorism is itself a barbaric deed, which degrades the status of Western powers.

Conclusion

In ancient Greece, the barbarians were those outside of the empire who did not speak the language of civilization. They were savage invaders seeking to pillage the wealth and culture of the empire. Today the barbarians emerge from inside the empire and spread outward. The imperial leaders have engaged in serial wars of destruction and pillage, even as their own societies and economies wallow in ignorance, misery, debt, addiction and criminality. Imperial barbarians devastate whole cultures, erasing the great historical legacy of ancient civilizations like Iraq and Syria, while imposing their culture of morons, drugs and electronic gadgets, which has already infantilized its own population.

The empire of barbarians is infested with moneychangers and corrupt speculators. They have debased the entire legal system and legislative bodies. The public space has become a private latrine for the elite, closed to any real public discourse and debate.

Electoral spectacles, rather than reasoned debates, undermine republican principles. Imperial conquerors, enmeshed in a military metaphysic, cannot reconstruct a devastated society into a productive colony, nor can they learn or benefit from the best and brightest among its captives, as Rome did with Greece, because it has sown such destruction and salted the very soil under the feet of its conquered peoples.

The barbarian-imperial world order is constantly at war with ‘others’ and can never assimilate and learn from the precious human treasures it has so wantonly destroyed. It rules by terror abroad and deceit at home. As so crudely displayed by the imperial rants of Ambassador Samantha Power, its oratory at international forums reflect the hysteria of mediocre functionaries: mindless barbarians raving among themselves in marbled echo chambers.

In the end, the imperial barbarians will be besieged by their own fleeing vassals and puppets. When they finally confront their own decay and internal dissolution they have to decide whether to engage in a last global conflagration or dismantle the imperial barbaric order and choose justice, law and civilization.

Two Tunisians formerly held in secret United States Central Intelligence Agency custody have described previously unreported methods of torture that shed new light on the earliest days of the CIA program, Human Rights Watch said today. The two men, Ridha al-Najjar, 51, and Lotfi al-Arabi El Gherissi, 52, independently recounted being severely beaten with batons, threatened with an electric chair, subjected to various forms of water torture, and being chained by their arms to the ceilings of their cells for long periods.

The United States repatriated the men to Tunisia on June 15, 2015, after 13 years in custody without charges or trial. Neither was provided compensation or support for their wrongful detention or the torture they endured, nor to help them cope with the physical and mental harm incurred. Today they are destitute, unable to work, and experiencing the consequences of serious physical and emotional trauma they believe is a direct result of their treatment in US custody.

“These terrifying accounts of previously unreported CIA torture methods show how little the public still knows about the US torture program,” said Laura Pitter, senior US national security counsel at Human Rights Watch. “The release of these two men without the US providing any assistance or redress for their torture and suffering also shows how much the US still needs to do to put the CIA torture program behind it.”

Human Rights Watch last interviewed al-Najjar and El Gherissi in August 2016. They are among the 119 men the US admitted having held in secret CIA detention when the Senate Intelligence Committee, in December 2014, released a scathing 499-page summary (Senate Summary) of a 6,700-page, still-classified report about the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. The Senate Summary contains an inadequate description of the two men’s treatment while in CIA custody, Human Rights Watch said.

Al-Najjar’s and El Gherissi’s first-hand accounts shed light on CIA mistreatment during the earliest days of the CIA program, before Afghan Gul Rahman died in CIA custody on November 20, 2002. In response to Rahman’s death and other abuses, the CIA issued its first formal guidelines for detainee interrogations, though detainees continued to be brutalized.

US and Pakistani forces apprehended al-Najjar on May 22, 2002, in the southern port city of Karachi, and El Gherissi on September 24, 2002, in the northern town of Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan. The Senate Summary says that the CIA identified al-Najjar as a bodyguard of Osama bin Laden. El Gherissi said his interrogators constantly accused him of being a member of Al-Qaeda or of having connections to terrorism. The US has not publicly provided information supporting these allegations, which al-Najjar and El Gherissi both deny and said they repeatedly denied to their interrogators.

The CIA then took custody of them and held them in several locations in Afghanistan. The one in which both said they suffered the most abuse is referred to as “Cobalt” in the Senate Summary but al-Najjar and El Gherissi called it the “Dark Prison” – as have other former prisoners held in the same facility. US authorities eventually transferred both to US military custody at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.

Neither al-Najjar nor El Gherissi have previously publicly described their ordeal. US restrictions on communications at Bagram effectively prevented the two from communicating with the outside world while they were in military custody. The US transferred al-Najjar and El Gherissi to Afghan custody on December 9, 2014, and repatriated them to Tunisia six months later, on June 15, 2015. Tunisian authorities briefly detained the men, releasing both by the end of the month.

While the men were at Bagram, Tina Foster, executive director of the International Justice Network, sought to have a federal court review the lawfulness of their detention. But the courts denied her petition for habeas corpus, siding with the US Justice Department, which argued that Bagram was beyond the jurisdiction of US courts. Foster appealed to the US Supreme Court but the appeal was rejected as moot after the two men were released. Foster said that the entire time she represented the two detainees, the US government never permitted her to speak to them.

Human Rights Watch interviewed each man in separate locations using an Arabic language interpreter. Though the two spoke to each other at times while in US custody, they said they did not know each other prior to being apprehended, have not spoken in detail with each other about their mistreatment, and have not had contact since they were released from Tunisian custody.

One can begin from a very neglected possibility of a corruption-free Afghanistan and conclude it is a holistic reality. The neglected possibility of corruption-free Afghanistan is that the tasked entities at local and national levels are dysfunctional and the holistic reality is that the country is “fantastically corrupt.”

The Afghan government’s new commitments to international community in September 2015, based on Self-Reliance through the Mutual Accountability Framework are summed up as fight against corruption, good governance, rule of law and human rights, as well as fiscal sustainability and public finance management. To some extent, the National Unity Government has fulfilled its commitments in fiscal sustainability and public finance management endeavors, for instance, a 22 percent beyond expectation increase in national revenue. However, the government lags in the anti-corruption struggle, protection of human rights, good governance and rule of law.

One of the reasons that the government lags in anti-corruption is a lack of engaging people at local levels to create demand for accountability and transparency. This is possible through, peoples’ participation, especially through functioning entities to be enhanced and improved by capacity building programs, developing guidelines and providing them with adequate resources to fulfill their mandates.

I do not derogate from anti-corruption efforts carried out by Afghan government in this regard, such as establishing anti-corruption justice center, setting up institutional arrangements in procurement and developing public finance management roadmap. Besides, the government has detained some high ranking officials from urban development ministry, acting mayor for Kabul city and a number of middle ranked government officials and suspended the duties of some officials in defense ministry as well. However, the government has failed to fulfill its anti-corruption mandates. One of its commitments was to dissolve high office of oversight and establishing anti-corruption commission instead, clarifying the mandates of anti-corruption institutions including high council against corruption which is led by president himself. More importantly, the anti-corruption and counter corruption measures by the government have not reached the local level to increase government legitimacy.

On  October 5, the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan is to happen which is considered as a platform for the government of Afghanistan to set out its goals and introduce its reform agenda. For this, the Afghan government has developed the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework that will be presented in the Brussels Conference and is hopeful to garner international support. A full implementation of this framework will remain a myth unless the local entities, both governmental and people-run organizations cooperate honestly. Besides, a gradual decentralization in planning and budgeting in consideration of provinces liability will also increase peoples’ participation in ensuring transparency and accountability at local levels.

Outdated mechanisms, corrupt officials, the existence of powerful vicious circles inside and outside government and lack of honest monitoring and watchdog institutions are considered as main causes of corruption in Afghanistan.

As far as corruption at a local level is concerned, there are local watchdog and monitoring bodies such as provincial councils, civil society organizations and media to address corruption remonstrance at sub-national level.

It is a general fact that grass roots participation in key decision-making process such as prioritizing local needs, planning and monitoring the government run projects and service delivery, is the cornerstone in a burgeoning democracy. In an Afghan scenario, one of the competent institutions which represent grass roots participation at local level is provincial councils which are constitutionally elected bodies. The members of these councils are elected by the residents of each province every four years. According to provincial councils’ law, these elected bodies are considered as watchdogs at local levels that have full legal support to have an eagle-eye on local administrations’ activities in order to ensure transparency and accountability.

Out of fourteen main responsibilities of provincial councils, oversight and monitoring is the most important ones.

Notwithstanding the fact that local government administrations consider provincial council as discontent, hindering entity hampering their daily tasks, but these councils proved to be one of the outstanding mechanisms to decrease corruption at sub-national levels if it functions according to its law and procedure, and in collaboration with civil society organizations.
In addition, the president of Afghanistan has signed a decree which allows provincial councils to oversee and monitor the service delivery and developmental activities of local government administrations. In order to actualize this, independent directorate of local governance; a governmental entity which administrates and supports local governance including provincial councils, has prepared oversight guidelines which facilitates and speeds up the process.

Currently, a great number of provincial councils are dysfunctional due to lack of clarity in their law and procedures, inadequate operational resources to carry out their assigned tasks, lack of cooperation with civil society organizations and media, security threats on themselves and their offices and existence of fraud members among themselves. It is upon independent directorate of local governance and provincial councils both to overcome the aforementioned challenges collaboratively and work out at political and administrative lines to actualize the peoples’ agenda on eradication of corruption in the country.

Fighting corruption is the basic responsibility of Afghan government to carry it out by hook or crook, but the people should also shoulder the burden. The provincial councils and civil society organizations as two independent entities at both national and local level can address corruption and ensure transparency and accountability to a great extent.

People’s participation will bring an end to the agony of corruption in the country and avoid a calamitous collapse of Afghan state’s dignity and prestige, if both governmental and watchdog organizations at local as well as national level, cooperate and reach to a common understanding in addressing the corruption agony together. This can happen through developing mutual action frameworks at local as well as national level.

*Nassir Ahmad Taraki lives in Kabul. He is a university lecturer and Can be followed on twitter @NassirTaraki

Generally speaking the functional utility, efficacy and relevance of Nuclear Supplier Group with today’s time and needs and its efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, make it imperative for the states to actively pursue its membership. First and foremost it is believed to provide the member states with a receipt for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This also allows them to legally carry out nuclear related trade and commerce, since in doing so the NSG members are obligated to abide by the guidelines that have been suggested by the IAEA.

This particular aspect enhances the appeal of this elite group as once the member, not only these provisions can be exercised but it directly adds to the general profile of the state making it come across as a more responsible, capable, trustworthy, and dependable when it comes to the peaceful use and transfer of nuclear technology. One of the prerequisites for inclusion in this cartel is to be the member of the NPT. This further means that the member states voluntarily forego their right to develop, and agree to dismantle their already existing nuclear weapons, especially because the NSG itself commits to providing for ones’ such requirements. Hence this nuclear cartel of 48 states enjoys a unique privilege where the nuclear trade is freely being done among the members but at the same time the proliferation of nuclear weapons is curbed and remained under strict control and check.

No wonder the states take it as a privilege to be part of the NSG. The leverage to augment the nuclear capability and competence that one could incur through this cartel is in itself tempting enough for the states. The freedom and ease of nuclear trade and exchange of technology openly sanctions ones status as a legal entity to be receiving and sharing nuclear merchandise. Hence it opens great commercial and economic avenues for the nuclear weapon states and also satisfactorily addresses the basic concern of non nuclear weapon states to actively indulge in peaceful usage of nuclear energy.

However there is a procedure involved which stipulates that only a consensual voting by all the member states would make it possible for a new state to acquire membership. Such a mechanism while on one hand promotes the coequal status of the members, it also endorses that the reservations of any kind by even a single state will not be brushed under carpet or superseded whether it is a nuclear weapon states or not, thus adding to the credibility and transparency in the functioning of this group. By principle, no country can be accommodated under the ploy of favoritism nor any preferential treatment can be extended to anyone. This very characteristic if maintained, will augment and keep the NSG’s reliability and integrity intact among the states.

However this doesn’t seem to be the case in real especially if one closely scrutinizes the US-India equation and the efforts by the US to include India into the group. While on papers and in documents the guidelines of NSG validates it credibility but the biased and totally prejudiced dealing in India’s case by the US, largely undermines the very essence of its main principles.

Nonetheless this appears to hardly be the US concern that is not leaving any stone unturned in its effort to make India part of this cartel. The underlying objective and motives are obviously not hidden, where in lieu of its own aspiration in Asia Pacific; the US is eyeing India as the pivot to its policies in the region. This is the reason why rules have been tempered; concessions and exemptions have continuously been made in India’s case, whether it was the 2001 NSG waiver or the recent efforts for its inclusion. Despite the fact that the group itself was created in response to India’s testing of weapons in 1970s, the very “proliferator” back then is now being considered the most “eligible” candidate is just too ironic. Not just that, but India still doesn’t fulfill the criteria to be taken onboard.

The NPT still remains unsigned; the NSG waiver that was given back in 2001 was exploited to the maximum by massive uranium acquisition with 13 different states, and by also signing of a reactor contract. Since there is no efficient mechanism to keep a check whether the uranium would strictly be used for peaceful purposes, India’s vigorous acquisition of uranium raises legitimate apprehensions about its motives. India’s aspirations clearly go beyond the peaceful use of nuclear energy and are more strategic in nature. While enhancing its own regional and global standing on one hand, the NSG membership if given to India will allow it to veto Pakistan’s inclusion in the group.

Hence the argument that both Pakistan and India should be given simultaneous membership holds a lot of ground. Or on the other hand a uniform, merit based criteria instead of a country specific one should be followed not just to appease the apprehensions of Pakistan but in order to avoid damaging the credibility and trust in the NSG. Even though not a binding on the states but the elitism of NSG will not be bothersome if an unbiased, impartial and neutral approach is adopted by the member countries, otherwise it will lose its very purpose of existence, specifically in case of South Asian region where the chances of arms race and proliferation would increase manifold if the country specific criteria is implemented.

*The author, Sadia Kazmi is a Senior Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. She is pursuing a PhD in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad. She can be reached at sadia.kazmi.svi@gmail.com

Regular users of cannabis are less aware of their own mistakes, and they are not good at creative thinking. This is the conclusion drawn by psychologist Mikael Kowal from his research on the effects of cannabis. PhD defence 6 October.

Kowal conducted experiments on 40 regular users of cannabis. The control group of 20 non-users were given a placebo. Kowal studied the direct and chronic effects of cannabis on dopamine-related functions, such as creative thinking and the ability to recognise one’s own mistakes. The brain chemical dopamine is important for the proper working of the brain and also plays a role in learning performance.

Less good at brainstorming

Kowal’s research showed that cannabis users were less able to brainstorm, a mental process that is crucial for creative performance: “There is a widespread belief among users that these drugs enhance creativity. This experiment disproves that belief.”

Poor at recognising mistakes

Kowal also demonstrated that for chronic users the brain processes involved in monitoring mistakes also work less effectively. A high dose of cannabis seems to influence both the unconscious processing of mistakes and also the later and more conscious stages of error processing.

According to Kowal, “It is important that we gather more knowledge about the effects of cannabis on a person’s ability to detect mistakes. This can help with putting together a treatment programme for drug addiction.”

The research also indicated clear long-term effects: cannabis disrupts the activity of dopamine in the brain. With chronic users a significant reduction was seen in the frequency of spontaneous eye blinking, an indication of a reduction in dopamine production.

The conclusion from other scientific research is that regular cannabis use does not necessarily have disastrous effects for the take-up of dopamine. It may well be that the age at which cannabis is first used is a crucial factor, Kowal suggests. The type of cannabis and the way neurobiological processes interact with one another can also result in individual differences.

Kowal said, “More research is needed on the effects of cannabis and on the individual consequences it can have on mental functions.”

The exhaustion of China’s old economic model based on investment and manufacturing has had, at least, one positive outcome: a ‘new normal’ development pathway that is less energy and emissions intensive. Although much remains to be done by China (and others) to set the world on a climate-bearable path, China’s efforts are significant and its ratification of the Paris Agreement ahead of the G-20 meeting is a key step for the entry into force of Kyoto’s successor.

By Lara Lázaro and Mario Esteban*

China’s double-digit economic growth rate of the past three decades has brought with it economic, social and environmental problems. In addition to fostering a profound restructuring of the Chinese economy, these problems are at the core of the country’s shift in domestic action against climate change. Arguably, they have also motivated, at least in part, China’s uptake of a prominent role in international climate negotiations. This paper will briefly discuss China’s climate-change policy. It will be argued that, although impressive in pace and scale, Chinese climate commitments are not consistent, at present, with limiting global mean temperatures to 2ºC compared with pre-industrial levels. Given this outlook, some policy recommendations for future action will also be suggested.

Analysis

Context

The ‘Kaya identity’ shows the main drivers of CO2 emissions globally. These include: population, economic growth, energy intensity and CO2 intensity. Data for China for each of these variables justifies the critical role the country has in the fight against climate change. With a population of 1.3 billion, over half of which lives in cities, China is the world’s most populated country and its second-largest economy. The 13th Five-Year plan (henceforth 13FYP) establishes an average annual economic growth rate of 6.5% between 2016 and 2020. China is the world’s largest energy consumer (accounting for 23% of global energy consumption currently, compared with 10% in 1971), producer and importer. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), China’s energy intensity was just under four times that of the US and approximately six times that of Japan, so energy efficiency gains are still feasible.

Additionally, China’s primary energy consumption is overwhelmingly fossil-fuel based (see Table 1 below) with coal, the highest CO2 emitter per unit of energy, overwhelmingly dominating the energy mix. A positive development, however, is the recent evolution of carbon intensity in the power sector, which has been decreasing since 2005.

International and domestic commitments

China emitted over a fifth of greenhouse gases (GHG) globally in 2011 according to the World Resources Institute, making it a key player in the climate change arena.

Internationally, China has been involved in climate negotiations since 1992. In fact, it was one of the first countries to ratify the United Nations Convention on Climate Change. This does not mean, however, that China has historically been a leader in climate action. Its developing-country status, its argument that countries should act according to common but differentiated responsibilities while taking into account their capabilities and national circumstances, and its perennial focus on economic growth have, until recently, relegated the country to a peripheral role in international climate action.

In Copenhagen (COP15) China’s peripheral stance on international commitments started to shift as it pledged to reduce its carbon intensity between 40% and 45% below its 2005 level by 2020. This was the first time China made international climate commitments. Additionally, it pledged to increase forest cover by 40 million hectares by 2020 compared with 2005 levels and to augment its forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic metres by 2020 compared with 2005 levels.

In November 2014 a joint announcement was made by the US and China on climate change by which China, for the first time, accepted GHG mitigation targets ahead of developed countries. China also stated its intention to reach its peak in CO2 emissions by 2030 and strive to reach this peak earlier, a first for a developing country. On 30 June 2015 China submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). This voluntary commitment reiterates China’s mitigation target of reaching a peak in CO2 emissions around 2030 (aiming to peak earlier). It also pledges to reduce its carbon intensity by 60% to 65% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to increase its forest stock by 4.5 billion cubic metres by 2030 compared with 2005 levels. More recently, a day ahead of the G-20 summit, China ratified the Paris Agreement (as did the US). Being the top two emitters, the Chinese and US ratifications will, in all likelihood, be the tipping point for the Paris Agreement entering into force shortly.

Domestically, climate change was not a priority for China until 2006, when it became the world’s largest GHG emitter, which increased both international and national pressure to step up Chinese climate action. From 1992 until 2006 climate actions were driven by the co-benefits from fighting other environmental problems such as air pollution. During this period, civil society (especially in urban areas) put pressure on the government via social media and demonstrations to curb air pollution. Institutionally, climate change was dealt with at a scientific level rather than at a political level via the Chinese Meteorological Administration (CMA). Moreover, broader environmental issues were addressed through a government agency rather than through the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which was created in 2008. Additionally, it was not until the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) that climate change was mentioned in development guidelines. This greater concern for climate change is the result of the Chinese authorities’ increased awareness, under the aegis of Hu Jintao, who sought to ensure the sustainability of China’s economic model in order to sustain the regime.

From 2007 onwards climate change institutions were developed in China, aside from the pre-existing and science-focused CMA. Climate governance structures and regulations were also developed post 2007. More recently, the 13FYP (2016-20) includes targets for the reduction of both China’s energy intensity per unit of GDP and carbon intensity per unit of GDP. China also pledges to increase the proportion of non-fossil fuels in its primary energy consumption to 15% by 2020. The main targets in the 13FYP are shown in Table 2 below.

The good, the bad and the ugly

The good news for climate change comes from the exhaustion of China’s old economic model and from the profound restructuring of the Chinese economy as a result. The current weight of investment and heavy industry (very intensive in GHG emissions) in China’s economic structure is being reduced in favour of consumption and services (less intensive in GHG emissions). Overcapacity in highly polluting industries is being managed by the Chinese government through supply-side structural reforms. Capacity cuts are taking place in the steel and coal sectors. For instance, a reduction of 100 to 150 million metric tonnes in yearly crude steel capacity (13% of current capacity) by 2020 was announced earlier this year. Similarly, a cut in coal output of 500 million metric tonnes (9% of current capacity) will take place in the next three to five years. Local governments are being asked to cooperate in the provision of information to develop plans for capacity cuts and penalties are being announced for non-compliers. As a result, the first six months in 2016 have seen a 1.5% drop in steel production and an 8.5% drop in coal production. These developments have, inter alia, led to what is known as China’s ‘new normal’ economic development.

Other elements that are also providing the basis for a structural shift towards China’s low carbon green growth include: slower expected GDP growth and energy demand; China’s push for competitiveness –through the promotion of high value added industries, including renewables (see the significant growth in Graph 1 below)–; and a greater focus on environmental protection and energy efficiency, plus its Ecological Civilisation concept. The latter is an extension of the concept of sustainable development whereby nature and mankind must co-exist harmoniously.

Climate change action seems to be aligned with China’s development priorities. Climate policy has not hindered economic growth in China to date. China’s energy transition could have moderate or even negative costs (benefits) in terms of GDP, according to Stern and others. Climate policy can furthermore help advance China’s ‘war on pollution’, tackling concerns about citizen’s health. In the international arena, climate action (eg, the ratification of the Paris Agreement ahead of some developed countries such as the EU) can grant future leadership status to China. It should not therefore come as a surprise that the Chinese leadership is increasingly committed to tackling climate change, if only to further its future economic growth and its international clout, retain political legitimacy among its citizens and appease existing competitiveness concerns.

When evaluating China’s efforts towards decarbonisation some experts believe Chinese action is ambitious. This position could be further backed by the fact that embodied emissions, which refer to emissions generated in the production of exported goods, account for a significant proportion of the country’s emissions. Some studies even contend that emissions associated to exports are eight times higher than emissions associated to imports. Graph 2 below shows an analysis of per capita territorial CO2, consumption CO2 footprint, and exports and imports of CO2 for different GDP levels from 1960 to 2008 in the US, the EU and China.

Analysis by Climate Action Tracker, on the other hand, states that China’s Copenhagen commitment and its INDC are rated as ‘medium’, except for the energy intensity target in China’s INDC that is rated ‘inadequate’. The medium rating awarded to China’s commitments is on a par with those awarded to the EU and to the US.

The ‘good news’ is that, although medium ratings will not ensure having a likely chance of limiting mean global temperatures to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, China is known for under-promising and over-complying, and the profound restructuring of the economy will help it in doing just that. In fact, China’s peak coal is said to have already been reached, with a drop in coal consumption (in volume) of 2.9% in 2014 and 3.6% in 2015, while the economy grew by 7.3% and 6.9% respectively. Given the above data regarding China’s energy mix, its post coal growth could be seen as a welcome development.

An additional positive development in terms of collective action is that China and the US seem to be cooperating rather than competing in other climate-related areas. In addition to the ratification of the Paris Agreement, China and the US have agreed to collaborate on the amendment of the Montreal Protocol, aiming to eventually phase out hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s) and to participate in the pilot phase of a market-based mechanism in the aviation sector, should it be agreed upon in the upcoming ICAO conference.

The bad news come from a global analysis of commitments. China’s commitments are insufficient to limit climate change to a bearable level. For instance, Climate Action Tracker’s analysis of INDC’s warns that with current commitments global mean temperatures will miss the 2ºC target by about 1ºC. Only mitigation pledges submitted by Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Morocco and The Gambia are rated as sufficient by Climate Action Tracker, although together they account for less than 1% of global emissions. This sufficient rating means that commitments by these countries are in the stringent part of the 2ºC range, although commitments have to be effectively implemented. If other governments undertook similar efforts, there would be a likelihood of limiting global average temperatures below 2ºC compared with pre-industrial levels.

Transition costs, implementation, uptake of market instruments and development of a well functioning nation-wide emissions trading system are part of the ‘ugly’ in the Chinese mitigation equation. As regards the latter, the seven pilot emission trading systems (ETS) in China are heterogeneous in their coverage and rules, they lack penalties, they are argued to suffer from legal uncertainty and, to date, there is no futures market. These characteristics could lead investors to shy away from the national Chinese market that will operate from 2017 onwards (Luca Taschini, personal comment).

An additional challenge is China’s focus on economic growth (remember the Kaya identity), coupled with the energy security needed to deliver this growth and the fact that energy is still heavily fossil-fuel based. Breaking the fossil dependency is expected to be a slow process.

The potential for reducing emissions in the industrial sectors is diminishing and policies for tackling emissions in the diffuse sectors are still evolving. The challenge is to engage all stakeholders in future emission-reduction policies as the economic model shifts towards consumption.

Although China has become a powerhouse in renewable energy manufacturing, domestic deployment has been slower. Ramping up deployment and integrating it with existing infrastructures and institutions will be a complex task, especially when local authorities receive more revenues from coal-fired power plants than from renewable alternatives.

Finally, if China is gradually reducing its role as the world’s manufacturer due to the exhaustion of its old growth model and its ageing population, other countries with lower wages will take this role. Hence, global climate mitigation policies will have to take into account broader macroeconomic trends.

Recommendations

As regards China’s energy sector, its weight in global energy consumption, which is mostly fossil-fuel based, calls for interfuel substitution and greater uptake of low carbon technologies. China therefore needs to further cap coal consumption and keep advancing on renewable energy deployment. In addition to reducing CO2 emissions, these measures help advance China’s goal of increasing energy security and independence while tackling health problems derived from air pollution.

The global market for green technologies is expected to double (or treble) by 2020 (up from the €1,000 billion per annum estimated in 2012 by the EU). Investment in low-carbon technologies and a greener growth model bodes well with China’s goals of being an innovation-driven country that strives for sustainable development.

Economy-wide emission targets coupled with a continuously increasing carbon price are needed to guide investment and consumption towards a low carbon pathway. These policies are expected to nudge China’s energy efficiency, which is currently low vis-à-vis other countries. Increases in energy efficiency are of interest to the Chinese authorities as they can also bring financial savings. Care should, however, be taken to avoid a rebound effect that would increase energy demand. Improvements in China’s monitoring, reporting and verification system are also recommended in order to ensure a well-functioning climate policy.

In addition to the use of market and non-market based instruments, a change in local priorities is a must. While local governments continue to be fixed on the growth bandwagon, well-being and low carbon development will be difficult to achieve. In this respect, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (November 2013) discussed the possibility of evaluating local governments according to new criteria (ie, in addition to economic performance) so that they were incentivised to protect the environment. The effective implementation of evaluation criteria that take environmental performance into account is of paramount importance in China’s effective engagement with a low-carbon economic model.

Guidance from the central government as regards the downscaling of the low-carbon transition is required. Related to changing local governments’ priorities is the issue of urbanisation, one of the key trends in the 21st century. Considering the long-lasting effects of urban planning on greenhouse gas emissions, compact, connected and coordinated cities are needed in China (and elsewhere).

Conclusions

China’s GHG growth has been fuelled by several factors. Its population, the breath-taking pace of its economic growth, and energy and carbon intensity are the key elements of China’s emissions. Economic growth, in turn, has been powered by cheap and emission-intensive energy, pre-eminently coal.

External factors such as the 2008 crisis as well as internal factors such as the restructuring of the economy, and health and environmental concerns (eg, air pollution), are the main elements that have reduced the pace of Chinese GHG emission growth. In the energy sector these internal and external factors have resulted in a reduction in the use of coal, an increase in energy efficiency, increases in the deployment of renewable energy and a substitution of gas for coal.

China’s climate change efforts are significant. However, as with other large greenhouse gas emitters, the US and the EU included, its efforts are not enough to limit global mean temperature increases to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. China’s energy transition will be shaped by its macroeconomic policy, development guidelines, and energy and environmental policies. Following the Chinese (and US) ratification of the Paris Agreement, the spirit of Paris seems to live on. The litmus test will come when implementation and increased ambition are gauged against the 2ºC yardstick.

*About the authors:
*Lara Lázaro, Senior Research Fellow, Elcano Royal Institute | @lazarotouza

Mario Esteban, Senior Analyst (Asia-Pacific), Elcano Royal Institute | @wizma9

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

The Russian embassy in Damascus fell under mortar shelling Monday, October 4. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the shelling came from areas controlled by the al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman militants, the International Business Times reports.

In a statement cited by Russian news agency Sputnik, the ministry said: “The Russian diplomatic mission came under mortar shelling on October 3. One of the mines exploded on the embassy area near its residential department. Fortunately, no one was wounded. The diplomatic mission sustained material damage. Another two mines went off next to the embassy.”

The ministry also called for a coordinated approach to counterterrorism.

On Monday, the United States and Russia ended a fragile cooperation on Syria after the U.S. said Russia failed to live up to its commitments, which were part of the deal between the two countries.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry said of Monday’s shelling: “We view this shelling of the Russian embassy as a consequence of actions of those who, like the U.S. and its allies, provoke the violent conflict in Syria, flirting with militants and extremists of different sorts.”

East-West Center report identifies five trends in Asian reactions on anti-trade stances of US presidential candidates.

By Satu Limaye and Robert Sutter*

Just a month before the US election, the US presidential campaign and debates have already left enormous and largely negative impacts on US-Asia relations. Asians hold acute and largely negative concerns, and the election’s outcome is likely to have an outsized impact on America’s relations with the region.

The campaigns that began more than a year ago promised little new on Asia policy. An establishment field of Republican candidates plus a New York businessman who has never held elective office confronted a small Democratic field led by a former Secretary of State in the Obama administration, Hillary Clinton, who authored its Asia “pivot,” and a socialist senator from Vermont.  Few analysts expected anything different than mainstream prescriptions on Asia policy, and initially that’s what the country mostly received – calls for US leadership, broad questions on the efficacy and sustainability of the “Asia rebalance,” commitments to strength in Asia-Pacific alliances, harsh criticisms of Chinese trade policies and behavior, and a sanctions-first policy towards North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.

As the campaigns unrolled, however, the “outlier” candidates, Senator Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, drove more extreme stances. Sanders was outspoken with his critiques of trade agreements, specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership which brings together 12 Asia-Pacific countries, including the United States, and he was subsequently joined by Clinton. Trump’s shared and heated antipathy towards TPP aroused the electorate. Also, his sui generis proposals on alliance cost-sharing, nuclear proliferation and openness to dialogue dealing with North Korea’s leader have challenged the center-line of US Asia policy, shaking this more than it has been since the end of the Cold War. Sure, debates have focused on Asia policies before – including the Vietnam War, the presence of troops in South Korea, and competition from Japan and China. The current campaign is another major milestone in the often difficult path of charting effective policy in this dynamic region. It notably challenges US-Asia policy “fundamentals” such as free trade, alliances, handling rising powers and addressing threats.

Two major impacts resulted from this unprecedented Asia policy debate.

First, initial discussions among the candidates and policy professionals about the Asia rebalance and China’s rise and assertive actions gave way to a focus on anti-trade and anti-TPP sentiment. Trump’s radical proposals calling for allies to pay more for US alliance protection, openness to allies procuring nuclear weapons to ensure their own security, and willingness to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to discuss his nuclear weapons program shook expectations for Asian allies. The candidates treated China consistently, disapproving of many Chinese policies, but ranking China lower than in the recent past as an economic threat and viewing China’s military as less threatening to US interests than terrorism, nuclear weapons development in North Korea and Iran, various conflicts in the Middle East, climate change, refugee flows and infectious diseases.

Debate on policy fundamentals is good and useful. But the anti-trade and anti-alliance postures adopted during this presidential campaign are skewing what the United States has traditionally considered to be its key challenges: how to extend considerable US advantages in Asia and address the challenge of an assertive China. In addition, the intense personalization, politicization and crude theatrics of this year’s electoral debate are overshadowing consideration of the serious issues at stake.

A second major impact is the demonstrated resistance to Trump’s controversial proposals and disagreement among Republicans and Asia specialists in the US Congress, think tanks, and bureaucratic elite such as diplomats and military officers.

Asia’s reactions are mixed and wide-ranging, according to consultations with nearly 100 Asians in Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea as well as in workshops in Washington, DC, as conducted by the authors for the report America’s 2016 Election Debate on Asia Policy and Asian Reactions. Across Asia, responses to specific issues, whether TPP or the maintenance of alliances, reflect domestic politics and traditional divides. Some common themes emerged:

First, consensus exists that the election discussion politicizes US foreign policy and weakens the American leadership position in Asia – resulting from both the substance and style of a campaign that features personal attacks, gross language and salacious accusations. The low level of debate has degraded America’s image and provides fodder for Chinese and others who point to the weaknesses of the US and its democracy.

Second, many in Asia fear that election debates have made it more difficult for the future president to define and implement coherent American policy in the context of recently growing tensions in US-Chinese relations and varying responses by regional governments to China’s assertiveness.

Third, Asians see a muddled picture of American leadership sustainability and worry about not just US policy in Asia, but future US foreign policy in general.

Fourth, many Asians express astonishment that Sanders and Trump managed to make the anti-trade, anti-TPP position so central to the campaign, ensnaring even Secretary Clinton into the shared stance.