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Thucydides Trap In Asia: The Sino-Indian Conflict – OpEd

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By Abir Chattaraj

At the battle of Pylos (Seventh year of the Peloponnesian War, ), the Athenians won a major victory over Sparta. In consequence of their loss, Sparta sent envoys to Athens to offer a peace treaty. The Spartan envoys enjoined the Athenians to “treat their gains as precarious,” and advised that “if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the system of revenge and military success… but when the more fortunate combatant waives his privileges and, guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity and accords peace on more moderate conditions than expected.”Unfortunately this age old wisdom pervades the Chinese in Asia.

The Greek historian Thucydides theorised that when an established power encountered a rising power, a conflict between them was inevitable. Today China, Asia’s established power and India, a rising power are heading towards this very own Thucydides trap.

China today perceives India as an adversary. Its very actions are geared towards this objective. One-third of Chinese naval power is being deployed to the Indian Ocean Region. The Chinese are building a ring of alliances under the “String of Pearls” doctrine with countries around India’s periphery: from Myanmar to Pakistan. It has interposed itself in India’s land disputes in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan; accused India of propagating the Tibetan movement, covert attacks and espionage and human rights violations; excluded India from the China-sponsored Maritime Silk Road and the Quadrilateral Dialogue with US on Afghanistan, blocked India’s NSG bid and openly supported terrorist Masood Azhar in the Security Council.

Chinese military moves to contain India has become more robust and overt in recent months.

These include: support for Pakistan’s militarization; the constant irritant stationing of Chinese naval forces in the Sri Lanka & Gwadar In Pakistan Occupied Balochistan; aggressive naval patrolling in the Indian Ocean Region; ever closer defense cooperation with and supplies to Pakistan, Bangladesh; joint naval and military exercises with Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh; an agreement with most Indian neighbours for Billions of Dollars worth of soft loans.

The recent ex-parte award against China on the South China Sea islands dispute by The Hague Arbitration Tribunal ,could bring the growing Sino-Indian tensions to a climax. China vehemently opposes any assistance given to Vietnam in any form whatsoever, contests Indian drilling of Offshore Oil reserves by ONGC in legitimate Vietnamese waters and holds maritime naval exercises on South China to reassert its territorial Claims.

The invidious actions of China are likely to result in more heartburn in Indian diplomatic circles.

Beijing’s stance towards India-Japanese co-operation is also likely to harden. The US-Japan-India military exercises could be countered by joint China-Russia naval operations in the North China Sea.

The escalating Sino-US rivalry will compel Pakistan to align itself even more closely with China. Consequently, Pakistan will face even greater US pressure and coercion, including on Afghanistan, terrorism, nuclear and missile issues.

The impact of a Sino-Indian confrontation would be global. Russia-China defense and economic cooperation would intensify which is most likely to include hue fundings for the ailing Russian oil Sector. The One Belt, One Road project will link China with Europe through Russia, greatly hampering the choke points in the Straits of Malacca. Africa could divide between Western, Indian and Chinese blocs. In Latin America, some other states may be open to closer relations with China to counter India’s growing reputation. The Sino-Indian economic relationship which currently is geared vehemently favorably towards China, would decline sharply, slowing growth in both countries and the world economy and possibly igniting another global economic crisis.

Of the nearly 15 historical cases reviewed by Dr Kissinger of established powers encountering rising rivals, 10 resulted in conflict. Both China and India could yet back away from the Thucydides trap. The onus for doing so rests with Beijing. Unfortunately, the anti-India populism reflected in the current Chinese diplomatic moves does not augur well for the triumph of restraint and reason.

This article was published at Modern Diplomacy.


Documented Accelerated Glacier Melting In West Antarctica

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Two new studies by researchers at the University of California, Irvine and NASA have found the fastest ongoing rates of glacier retreat ever observed in West Antarctica and offer an unprecedented look at ice melting on the floating undersides of glaciers. The results highlight how the interaction between ocean conditions and the bedrock beneath a glacier can influence the frozen mass, helping scientists better predict future Antarctica ice loss and global sea level rise.

The studies examined three neighboring glaciers that are melting and retreating at different rates. The Smith, Pope and Kohler glaciers flow into the Dotson and Crosson ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment in West Antarctica, the part of the continent with the largest decline in ice.

“Our primary question is how the Amundsen Sea sector of West Antarctica will contribute to sea level rise in the future, particularly following our observations of massive changes in the area over the last two decades,” said UCI’s Bernd Scheuchl, lead author on the first of the two studies, published in the journal Geophysical Research Letters in August.

“Using satellite data, we continue to measure the evolution of the grounding line of these glaciers, which helps us determine their stability and how much mass the glacier is gaining or losing,” said the Earth system scientist. “Our results show that the observed glaciers continue to lose mass and thus contribute to global sea level rise.”

Scheuchl’s team compared radar measurements from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 mission and data from the earlier ERS-1 and ERS-2 satellites to identify changes in each glacier’s grounding line – the boundary where it loses contact with bedrock and begins to float on the ocean.

The grounding line is important because nearly all glacier melting takes place on the underside of this floating portion, called the ice shelf. If a glacier loses mass from enhanced melting, it may start floating farther inland from its former grounding line, just as a boat stuck on a sandbar may be able to float again if a heavy cargo is removed. This is called grounding line retreat.

UCI and NASA researchers found that the Smith Glacier’s grounding line had retreated 1.24 miles (2 kilometers) per year since 1996. The Pope Glacier’s grounding line receded more slowly, at 0.31 miles (0.5 kilometers) annually since 1996. And the Kohler Glacier’s grounding line, which had gradually retreated, actually readvanced 1.24 miles (2 kilometers) since 2011.

Scheuchl credits the Sentinel-1 radar mission with changing the way scientists look at polar ice sheets. “It’s a two-satellite constellation with funding for more than 20 years, and Europe is committing resources for regular ice sheet data acquisitions,” he said. “Our work shows that the data collected is very well-suited for ice sheet science, and we can combine it with other satellite and airborne data sets to establish a more detailed record of these glaciers.”

For a separate study, the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Ala Khazendar – a co-author of Scheuchl’s paper – measured ice loss at the bottom of the three glaciers, which he suspected might be influencing the changes in their grounding lines. His work, published today in the journal Nature Communications, involved gauging the thickness and height of the ice via radar and laser altimetry instruments utilized in NASA’s Operation IceBridge and earlier NASA airborne campaigns.

Radar waves penetrate glaciers all the way to their base, allowing direct assessment of how the bottom profiles of the three glaciers at their grounding lines differed between 2002 and 2014. Laser measurements of surface elevation were used to infer changes in the thickness of the floating ice shelves.

Previous studies using other techniques estimated the average melting rates at the bottom of the Dotson and Crosson ice shelves to be about 40 feet (12 meters) per year. Khazendar and his team, analyzing their direct radar measurements, found stunning rates of ice loss from the glaciers’ undersides on the ocean sides of their grounding lines. The fastest-melting glacier, Smith, lost between 984 and 1,607 feet (300 and 490 meters) in thickness between 2002 and 2009 near its grounding line, or up to 230 feet (70 meters) per year.

Those years encompass a period when rapid mass loss was seen around the Amundsen Sea. The regional scale of the decline made scientists strongly suspect that an increase in the influx of ocean heat beneath the ice shelves must have taken place. “Our observations provide a crucial piece of evidence to support that suspicion, as they directly reveal the intensity of ice melting at the bottom of the glaciers during that period,” Khazendar said.

“If I had been using data from only one instrument, I wouldn’t have believed what I was looking at, because the thinning was so large,” he added. However, the two IceBridge instruments, which employ different techniques, both measured the same rapid ice loss.

Khazendar said Smith’s fast retreat and thinning are likely related to the shape of the underlying bedrock over which it was retreating between 1996 and 2014, which sloped downward toward the continental interior, and oceanic conditions in the cavity beneath the glacier. As the grounding line receded, warm and dense ocean water could reach the newly uncovered deeper parts of this cavity, causing more melting.

As a result, Khazendar said, “more sections of the glacier become thinner and float, meaning that the grounding line continues retreating, and so on.” Smith’s retreat might slow down now that its grounding line has reached bedrock that rises farther inland of the 2014 grounding line. Pope and Kohler, in contrast, are on bedrock that slopes upward toward the interior.

The question remains whether other glaciers in West Antarctica will behave more like Smith or more like Pope and Kohler. Many glaciers in this sector of Antarctica are on beds that deepen farther inland, like Smith’s. However, Khazendar and Scheuchl said, researchers need more information on the shape of the bedrock and seafloor beneath the ice, as well as more data on ocean circulation and temperatures, to be able to better project how much ice these glaciers will contribute to the ocean in a changing climate.

Can Edible Bugs Replace Beef?

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The idea of eating bugs has created a buzz lately in both foodie and international development circles as a more sustainable alternative to consuming meat and fish.

Now a report appearing in ACS’ Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry examines how the nutrients — particularly iron — provided by grasshoppers, crickets and other insects really measures up to beef. It finds that insects could indeed fill that dietary need.

Edible bugs might sound unappetizing to many Westerners, but they’ve long been included in traditional diets in other regions of the world, which are now home to more than 2 billion people, according a report by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.

The report also notes that about 1,900 insect species have been documented as a food source globally. That they’re a source of protein is well established, but if the world is to turn to bugs to replace meat, the critters will need to offer more than protein. Iron is a particularly important nutrient that is often missing in non-meat diets, causing iron-deficiency anemia, which can lead to lower cognition, immunity, poor pregnancy outcomes and other problems. In light of these concerns, Yemisi Latunde-Dada and colleagues wanted to find out whether commonly eaten insects could contribute to a well-rounded meal.

The researchers analyzed grasshoppers, crickets, mealworms and buffalo worms for their mineral contents and estimated how much of each nutrient would likely get absorbed if eaten, using a lab model of human digestion. The insects had varying levels of iron, calcium, copper, magnesium, manganese and zinc. Crickets, for example, had higher levels of iron than the other insects did. And minerals including calcium, copper and zinc from grasshoppers, crickets and mealworms are more readily available for absorption than the same minerals from beef.

The results therefore support the idea that eating bugs could potentially help meet the nutritional needs of the world’s growing population, the researchers said.

One Click At A Time: The Change Agents Of The Middle East – OpEd

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By Nadia Oweidat*

(FPRI) — The Arabic-speaking world, extending from Morocco in the east to Oman in the west, is changing rapidly. The Arab Spring was but the first chapter of this change. Despite ongoing violence in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere, in much of the Arab world the most powerful force for change is nonviolent activism. Millions of people are pursuing creative, peaceful ways to effect political change, even as both extremists and dictators, continue to assert their power using their proven means: violence.

Take the example of Aramram, a Jordanian WebTV platform. Its videos provide unprecedented civic education for young Jordanians, in easy-to-follow language. It also provides videos on economic issues.  In one of their programs called, “209 King Hussein Street,” named after the address of the Parliament building, they discuss every bill proposed or passed by the members of the parliament, acting as a Jordanian C-SPAN. While this doesn’t raise an eyebrow in America, for a country where most votes are cast to support one’s tribe or religious affiliation, this kind of civic education aims at fundamentally changing voting patterns and creating, for the first time, a state-based citizen, rather than a tribal citizen, with expectations of an accountable government. Aramram’s productions meet a hunger for such knowledge as their videos have been viewed millions of people and shared by hundreds of thousands. For a small country like Jordan, that is a significant percentage of the country.

Or take the example of Sami al-Hourani, a brilliant Jordanian medical doctor who decided to leave a fellowship at Stanford University to dedicate his time to a platform he created to help his fellow young men and women find opportunities around the world for training and fellowships. His website, Fursa, Arabic for opportunity, receives more than ten thousand visitors a day. His Facebook page is even more popular. He is not stopping there. Among other initiatives he created is Fadfid, which means vent in Arabic. He distributed blank pieces of white paper to young men and women in Jordan and asked them to list their grievances. He then translated these into charts and data, an effortless task for someone who started coding in seventh grade. His goal is to find creative solutions for these grievances, as he did with Fursa.

Like many of his peers who are providing a much-needed service, al-Hourani’s company is severely lacking in funding. He told the author on a recent trip to Amman that if things do not change for him in a year, he would have to go back to Stanford. The hundreds of thousands who rely on his service to obtain professional opportunities would join the millions of unemployed young men and women in the Middle East and North Africa region who constitute the highest regional unemployment in the world. Perhaps some would consider joining violent groups that promise change more forcefully. Although “CVE”, or countering violent extremism, is not their primary purpose, civic-minded innovators like Sami al-Hourani are providing services that meet the needs of the vast numbers of educated, unemployed Arab youth. Without an alternative, these young people are vulnerable to the lure of extremism. Don’t people like Sami al-Hourani deserve some of the vast funds the west is pouring into the Arab world in the effort to promote stability and counter violent extremism?

Stand-up comedian Fahad al-Butairi is another example of creativity and influence. Born and raised in, arguably, the most conservative country on earth, Saudi Arabia, Fahad is one of tens of thousands of Saudis who are also Western educated. To meet the needs of his fellow young Saudis for candid debates on the challenges they are facing, Fahad created political satire shows aimed at raising awareness among his peers. His videos went viral on YouTube, attracting millions of followers. In fact, his YouTube channel competes, and even surpasses at times, the viewership of well-financed conventional satellite television stations, which are mostly government owned, and often push a more conservative agenda. In his satire, he mocked political, social and even religious norms. For example in one episode, which was watched by over five and a half million viewers, he tackled the negative impact of the kingdom’s internal conservative rules and its severe gender segregation policies.

The Arabic speaking world has thousands of young men and women who are empowering their peers to be pro-active citizens, and  to push for meaningful change through peaceful means. In age of violence and disruption, these young innovators are  providing  the “ammunition” through the peaceful means of  information, knowledge,  and awareness to bring  about the essential transformation of  the Middle East into a region of  opportunity  and justice. The question is, when will policy makers in the US and the rest of Western world pay attention to these change agents who are impacting millions of their peers?

This article is drawn from a presentation the author made at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Competitive Soft Power and Engagement Seminar entitled “Arts, Culture, and the Media in the Contemporary Middle East: Competitive Soft Power and Engagement in the Arab World” held in Washington, DC on October 4, 2016.

About the author:
* Dr. Nadia Oweidat
is a Middle East fellow at New America. She holds a D.Phil. in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford. She is currently working on a book on social media and positive change among Arabic speakers. Her doctoral research focused on the challenges facing liberal Muslim intellectuals who attempt to update Islamic thought and bridge the gap between modern values such as secularism and women’s rights and Islam.

Source:
This article was published at FPRI.

Nanoscience To Improve Our Health And Lives In Coming Years

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Nanoscience research involves molecules that are only 1/100th the size of cancer cells and that have the potential to profoundly improve the quality of our health and our lives. Now nine prominent nanoscientists look ahead to what we can expect in the coming decade, and conclude that nanoscience is poised to make important contributions in many areas, including health care, electronics, energy, food and water.

Significant progress has already been made in nanomaterials, report authors Paul Weiss, who holds a UC presidential chair and is a distinguished professor of chemistry and biochemistry at UCLA, and Dr. Andre Nel, chief of nanomedicine at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA. In the journal ACS Nano, Weiss, Nel and their colleagues say the following:

  • Nanoparticles can be designed to target infectious disease. Nanomaterials may target the lungs to deliver potent antibiotics and anti-inflammatory drugs could fight bacterial and viral infection.
  • Nanoparticles may lead to more effective treatments of neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease and Alzheimer’s disease, as well as arthritis.
  • The emerging field of immuno-oncology is likely to produce advances that will activate the body’s immune system to attack tumor cells. Important advantages of nanoparticles are that they can bind selectively to receptors over-expressed on tumors and may be delivered to the same cell at a predetermined dose and timing, although significant scientific challenges remain.
  • The microelectronics industry has been manufacturing products with nanoscale structures for decades — a market currently valued at approximately $500 billion annually. The researchers say there is still plenty of room for major improvements, including many opportunities in creative design of devices for data processing and information storage.
  • Nanotechnology is likely to capture, convert and store energy with greater efficiency, and will help to safely produce sustainable and efficient large-scale energy production to meet the increasing worldwide demand for energy.
  • Nanotechnology principles are being used in water desalination and purification, and nanotechnology is poised to make major contributions to supplying clean water globally.
  • Technology is likely to become increasingly widespread, with the proliferation of “nano-enabled smart devices” in such areas as telecommunications, consumer staples and information technology.
  • Nanoscience advances may lead to advances in food safety and reductions in food contamination. Sensor technologies may be designed that exploit changes at the surface of nanostructures so they can detect disease-causing pathogens before they spread. Nanoscale sensor technologies also may lead to improvements in agrochemicals.

The researchers discuss the need to safely implement new nanomaterials and present ideas for doing so. They also call for researchers to communicate their research with the public.

Nanoscience has brought together scientists, engineers and clinicians from many fields, and will continue to cross many academic boundaries.

“The field is poised to make contributions far beyond the nanoscale worlds that we have explored so far,” said Weiss, who is also a distinguished professor of materials science and engineering at UCLA. “This is the age of discovery for nanoscience and nanotechnology.”

The researchers advocate strong federal support for nanoscience, and predict significant progress toward major scientific goals will be achieved by the end of this decade. They also advocate basic research to produce currently unforeseen discoveries.

Hungarian Official To Discuss Pakistani Christian Asylum Seekers

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The chairman of the British Pakistani Christian Association has met with the Hungarian embassy official in Thailand to discuss the issue of Pakistani Christian asylum seekers.

Alexandra Peto, the consular at the Hungarian Embassy in Thailand, has confirmed that a 567 page report on persecution in Pakistan and about the UNHCR in Thailand had been submitted to her foreign and home office counterparts in Budapest, reports the Pakistan Christian Post.

Wilson Chowdhry, chairman of the British Pakistani Christian Association, who met Peto, asked her if it might be possible to meet with top officials in Budapest to ensure that Pakistani Christians are not forgotten during the allocation of Christian asylum seekers for their new quotas.

Peto said that the Hungarian embassy is very aware of the increasing levels of persecution of Christians across the globe.

“Since we have started to take emailed copies of UNHCR asylum cards from Christians in Thailand we have been overwhelmed by the numbers of potential applicants from Pakistan,” she said as reported by Pakistan Christian Post.

Site Of Christ’s Transfiguration Desecrated

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Suspected burglars’ desecration of the Church of the Transfiguration has prompted outcry from leading Christians in the Holy Land.

“The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, together with all Churches and the Custody of the Holy Land, condemn this desecration as a heinous crime and an act that violates the sanctity of the Holy Sites,” the patriarchate said Oct. 25.

“We also ask the police to conduct an investigation, to seriously look into the matter and apprehend the perpetrators who are culpable of these disgraceful actions.”

The Church of the Transfiguration is on Mount Tabor, near the Sea of Galilee in Israel. In the care of the Franciscans, it is held to be the site of Christ’s Transfiguration.

Unknown burglars robbed the church Oct. 24. They destroyed the tabernacle, desecrated the Hosts, and stole the ciborium after throwing the Hosts on the floor.

Icons were damaged, chalices were stolen, and the donation box was robbed.

Although Jewish extremists have targeted some Christian churches and holy sites for vandalism, church officials told Agence France Presse they believe robbery was the motive in this instance. There was no graffiti painted on the church.

The church is a major pilgrimage site for Christians. At the Transfiguration, Christ went up the mountain to pray and his appearance was physically changed. He conversed with the prophets Elijah and Moses, according to the gospels. The Transfiguration revealed Christ’s divinity to his disciples Peter, James, and John.

UK Sends Tanks, Drones, Troops To Estonia To Deter Russia

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Britain is sending tanks, drones and 800 troops to Estonia as part of the biggest military build-up on Russia’s borders since the Cold War – after the Kremlin completed a nuclear drill for 40 million people, the Daily Mail reports.

The soldiers will be sent to the Eastern European country and will be joined by forces from Denmark and France, according to Defence Secretary Michael Fallon.

The United States hopes for binding commitments from Europe to fill four battle groups of some 4,000 troops.

France, Denmark, Italy and other allies are expected to join the four battle groups led by the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada to go to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, with forces ranging from armoured infantry to drones.

Tensions are high between Russia and the West after an escalation in posturing between President Vladimir Putin and Western leaders.

Last week Putin sent an aircraft carrier on a bombing mission to Syria in a fleet that passed through the English Channel. In the past week, Britain has deployed RAF fighter jets to intercept Russian bombers nearing UK airspace twice in four days.

Yesterday, Russia unveiled chilling pictures of its largest ever nuclear missile – Satan 2 – which is capable of destroying an area the size of obliterating the UK. Earlier this month the Kremlin evacuated 40 million people in drills to prepare for nuclear war.


Messed-Up Trial Of The Century: Lawdragon’s Exhaustive Report On 9/11 Pre-Trial Hearings At Guantánamo – OpEd

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The military commissions at Guantánamo, as I have been reporting for ten years, are a shamefully deficient excuse for justice, a system dreamt up in the heat of America’s post-9/11 sorrow, when hysteria and vengeance trumped common sense and a respect for the law, and it was decided, by senior Bush administration officials and their lawyers, that prisoners seized in the “war on terror” and subjected to torture should be tried in a system that allowed the use of information derived through the use of torture, and swiftly found guilty and executed.

Military prosecutors, however, soon turned against the system and pointedly resigned, and in 2006 the Supreme Court ruled the whole system illegal. Nevertheless, the Bush administration, with the enthusiastic support of Congress, revived the commissions in the fall of 2006, followed by further resignations (see here and here), and a third version of the commissions ill-advisedly emerged under President Obama in his first year in office (see here and here). The commissions have been tweaked to be less unjust, but they are still a Frankenstein’s Monster facsimile of a working trial system, full of so many holes that it is difficult for them to function at all, and at their heart is the specter of torture, which the government endlessly tries to hide, while the prisoners’ defence teams, of course, try constantly to expose it, as no fair trial can take place without it being discussed.

In recent years, my coverage of the commissions has been less thorough than it was between 2007 and the summer of 2014, largely because it seemed to me that the commissions were so broken and were going round and round in circles so pointlessly that it was no longer even worth trying to follow what was — or, more often, what wasn’t — happening. In one way, this was a fair reflection of the futility of the commissions’ efforts to secure anything resembling justice, but the more fundamental reality was that, however broken the proceedings may have been, pre-trial hearings were still taking place, however little they were being reported, which, one day, would constitute a damning indictment of America’s post-9/11 flight from justice and the law, and its embrace of torture and indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial. As a result, the commissions really ought not to be allowed to drop off the radar.

Last month, Lawdragon Magazine, in the US, published a major report on the military commissions, based on a year of its reporter, John Ryan, attending pre-trial hearings for the five men accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks — Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Walid bin Attash, Mustafa al-Hawsawi and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were all held and tortured in CIA “black sites” for several years before their arrival at Guantánamo in September 2006.

Below I’m cross-posting the entire 18,000-word article, because it provides such a detailed analysis of, and commentary about, this hugely important topic. As Lawdragon describes it, the article is “[a]n inside look at the government’s epic attempt to prosecute the five accused 9/11 plotters in an untested military system at Guantánamo Bay – and defense lawyers’ efforts to prevent the government from executing the men they say are torture victims.”

This is such a long article that I don’t want to attempt to summarize it here, but I will mention a passage that struck me as important — when David Glazier, “a formal Naval officer turned academic who is critical of the system” (and is a law professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles), described the military commission system as “court-martial lite” and said it “abounds with opportunities for legal challenges.” As he put it, “In federal courts and courts-martial, the procedures are well settled; judges and attorneys know how to conduct those trials expeditiously. In the commissions, in contrast, literally every aspect is untested; judges are having to make almost everything up as they go, with attendant challenges by one side or the other to almost everything that they do.”

The article also, of course, provides a detailed profile of the defence teams, the prosecutors and the judge, and the significance of torture — which “has hovered over the case since the beginning and will remain through its final days” — and, perhaps most clearly towards the end, indicates that possibly the only way forward for the commissions to function at all is for the death penalty to be dropped — as death penalty litigation has so many more demands than non-capital cases. Personally, I’d still rather see the entire trial system scrapped and the 9/11 trial moved to federal court, as Barack Obama and Eric Holder intended back in 2009, until the heat from critics got too much for Obama and he gave up on it, but no one knows if that will be on the cards under a new president — whoever that will be.

So as we wait and wonder what is coming next, I hope you have time to read this article about the last year at the commissions — including an overview of their entire broken history — and to share it if you find it useful. Please note that, with a couple of exceptions, the links below are ones that I have added, and were not in the original article.

Pretrial of the Century: the Sept. 11 Case at Guantánamo Bay
By John Ryan, Lawdragon Magazine, September 21, 2016

I. Torture v. the Sept. 11 Attacks

The main reason Ed Ryan took the podium on May 31 was to convince the judge, Army Col. James Pohl, to allow the government to preserve the testimony of aging or infirm family members of the victims of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks – those who may not make it to trial as witnesses. Since the May 2012 arraignment, the pretrial phase has crawled forward, leaving any trial at least a few years away; jury selection could last months, the trial itself more than a year. Already, two witnesses the government planned to call have died.

Prosecutors wanted to take the pretrial depositions in open court during the scheduled October 2016 session at Guantánamo Bay, in the presence of the five defendants. Defense attorneys objected, claiming that taking the public testimony would prejudice the five defendants – all of whom face the death penalty – before the trial even begins.

During arguments, it became clear that Ryan had another motive: He wanted to refocus attention to Sept. 11, 2001, when orchestrated terrorist attacks killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field. And he wanted to let anyone watching know that prosecutors were a little sick and tired of what has become a frequent refrain of all five defense teams – that the past torture of their clients should undermine, at every possible turn, the government’s efforts to bring these men to justice. All five defendants spent multiple years at CIA black sites and were subjected to what the Bush Administration gently termed “enhanced interrogation techniques” before they arrived at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006.

“Since the proceedings began in 2012, the word torture has been used over 500 times in this courtroom,” Ryan told the judge. “By comparison, the phrase September 11, or 11 September, or 9/11, about 200 times.”

No one from the defense side of the room challenged these numbers. Torture has hovered over the case since the beginning and will remain through its final days, whenever that may be. The December 2014 release of the executive summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on CIA interrogation practices, commonly referred to as the “Senate Torture Report,” declassified a significant amount of information about abusive practices inflicted on terrorism suspects. Army Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, who is Ryan’s boss and the chief prosecutor of the military commissions, said publicly after the report’s release that it should positively impact the case by allowing for greater transparency of the proceedings.

It also provided a flood of vivid torture references in court by defense attorneys. Waterboarding, slapping, confinement inside a coffin-like box, wall-slamming, rectal hydration, rectal feeding, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold temperatures, prolonged isolation, being deprived of sunlight for years at a time, being hung from chains in diapers without use of a toilet – all of these receive mention in court.

The case’s docket has close to 4,500 filings. The government’s count of motions that deal with substantive legal issues totals about 220; these have generated thousands of pleadings as the five defense teams and the prosecution have litigated each motion back and forth. In many of these documents, the defense teams have challenged the legitimacy of the military commissions system, the current conditions of their clients’ confinement at the top-secret Camp 7 detention facility on Guantánamo Bay and the government’s moral authority to execute the defendants.

Defense attorneys see evidence of past torture as not only relevant to many of these arguments but also as the key weapon in their arsenal. They also believe the government is prosecuting their clients in this new and untested forum instead of a federal court or court-martial in order to hide Bush-era abuses.

Walter Ruiz, the lead attorney for defendant Mustafa al Hawsawi, who is accused of providing money to the hijackers, occasionally argues in court that the government is still torturing his client by refusing to provide adequate medical care or any rehabilitation for past CIA mistreatment. Newcomers to the viewing gallery of Courtroom II at Camp Justice may wonder why al Hawsawi often decides not to attend court and, when he does, sits gingerly on a pillow in a chair next to his team. Ruiz says that his client, as documented in the Senate report, suffers from anal fissure and rectal prolapse, which the attorney links to “sodomy” disguised as medical treatment during the black site years [Note: see update here].

“My client has to choose between eating and defecating,” Ruiz explains, referring to the pain and blood associated with bowel movements. These and other details may surprise or alarm those who haven’t read the Senate report, but in the context of the 9/11 proceedings they have become somewhat mundane.

Ryan reminded the judge during his argument that “We even got to watch movies” about torture, referring to Feb. 19, 2016, one of the case’s more unsettling and surreal days. James Connell, the lead defense attorney for Ammar al Baluchi, screened torture scenes from “Zero Dark Thirty” featuring a character based on his client. Connell wants more information about the CIA’s treatment of his client, which he claims was given to filmmakers but not defense lawyers. Their backs to the viewing gallery, the five defendants watched Hollywood’s rendition of their torture in silence. [For more on the disgraceful distortions of the truth in Kathryn Bigelow’s “Zero Dark Thirty,” see Steve Coll here and Glenn Greenwald here].

Prosecutors, too, have some powerful facts at their disposal, as Ryan’s oral arguments made clear that Tuesday morning.

This court system, established by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, is based on rules and procedures from the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as well as regular federal courts. Both prosecution and defense teams benefit from a mix of military and civilian lawyers and staff. From the civilian side, Ryan is a longtime award-winning federal prosecutor with stints in North Carolina and Southern Florida. Very friendly in casual conversation outside court, Ryan can be an imposing presence during arguments, with his tall frame and booming voice.

Ryan explained to the judge that the 10 prospective witnesses would all be “victim-impact witnesses” – those not called at the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial but during the sentencing phase, if there is a conviction. He asked that their testimony be taken in October and preserved for later use.

“Our submission to you is that the testimony of people saying, ‘My child meant the world to me,’ or ‘My husband meant the world to me,’ and ‘Their loss has devastated me,’ that won’t be anywhere near a point of jeopardizing a fair trial,” Ryan argued.

The prosecutor added that one witness would have “a dual role” as both a victim-impact witness and as a fact witness to the attacks. Lee Hanson, age 83, lost his son Peter, daughter-in-law Sue, and granddaughter Christine – “the youngest victim of 9/11,” Ryan said – when United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the South Tower.

Ryan explained that Peter had placed a harrowing call to his dad during the hijacking.

“Stabbings of flight attendants, flying erratically, people screaming, hijackers claiming they had a bomb,” Ryan recounted. “That phone call ended with Mr. Peter Hanson saying to his father, ‘Oh, God, ‘Oh, God,’ – and the plane crashed into the South Tower.”

Ryan’s delivery was a punch in the gut. There was audible discomfort in the viewing gallery, which seats the media, NGO observers and victim family members chosen by lottery to attend the proceedings. Sobs could be heard as a curtain was drawn to give the family members privacy.

Defense attorneys later acknowledged the power of Ryan’s presentation, and his skills as an advocate, but not everybody in court was pleased.

Later that afternoon, after Ryan finished his plea for public depositions, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed surprised the courtroom by telling Pohl that although he had been “neutral” in the argument, he now wanted to speak. The accused plot mastermind, Mohammed is the best known of the defendants and sits at the front table, closest to Pohl. According to the charges, Mohammed first began hatching the plot – referred to by the defendants as the “Planes Operation” – with Osama bin Laden in 1996 and then guided it to its conclusion five years later.

The judge admonished Mohammed to pipe down and threatened to remove him from the court – but not before the defendant uttered something about a “nuclear bomb,” according to the court’s Arabic-to-English translator. After Mohammed settled a bit, Pohl told David Nevin, his lead attorney, to talk to his client.

It wasn’t exactly clear what Mohammed was trying to say. Those in the viewing gallery watch the proceedings in real-time through a wall of glass, while the audio and video feed arrives on a 40-second delay allowing the judge and his security officer to prevent the spill of classified information. The disjointing experience is made worse in these situations: Pohl and Mohammed spoke over not only one another but also trampled the simultaneous translator. The transcript for that day records that Mohammed said: “He needs to know that this is a nuclear bomb in the world.”

In addition to a live Arabic translation for the court record, which is provided by a translator not present in the courtroom, the defendants each have interpreters that sit at their tables to provide additional assistance. But Mohammed hadn’t had his team interpreter in about a year; for reasons that were still not exactly clear but extremely frustrating to Nevin, this person had lost his security clearance. Nevin had unsuccessfully sought to postpone the proceedings until the interpreter was restored. (Prosecutors often point out that Mohammed seems to speak pretty good English. He earned a mechanical engineering degree from North Carolina A&T University in 1986.)

Nevin explained to Pohl that the lack of a team interpreter contributed to Mohammed not fully understanding what was happening in court when Ryan was talking about the Sept. 11 attacks. Nevin said that Mohammed also was bothered by the fact that both Nevin and Cheryl Bormann, the lead attorney for co-defendant Walid Bin Attash, who sits directly behind Mohammed, had objected to a few of Ryan’s statements on the grounds the prosecutor had mischaracterized the defense’s opposition to the depositions, but Pohl overruled them.

“Well, that’s the way the system works,” Pohl said.

Later that evening, Nevin, a prominent criminal defense attorney and name partner at Boise, Idaho-based Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett, stopped by the media center at Camp Justice to explain to reporters his view of what happened. The nuclear bomb statement may have been a reference to U.S. aggression in the world, he said, such as the use of atomic weapons against Japan in World War II.

More generally, his client was bothered that Ryan seemed to be giving a closing argument in the case, and Pohl seemed to be helping him out by overruling the defense objections. Nevin described Ryan’s argument as “compelling and effective.”

The following day, when victim family members met with the media, there was great satisfaction among those who spoke on the record: Finally, they said, the proceedings had returned their focus to the 9/11 attacks.

“About damned time,” said Kenneth Fairben, who attended with his wife Diane. The Fairbens lost their son, Keith, a 24-year-old paramedic who died while helping victims in the South Tower. They have set up the Keith Fairben Memorial Scholarship Fund to pay for medical and paramedic training courses for applicants in Nassau County, N.Y. – one of a countless number of charitable efforts launched by victim family members.

Fairben said that most of his and his wife’s friends are now becoming grandparents for the first time. But Keith was their only child.

“That’s something we will never have,” Fairben told reporters.

Several weeks later, Pohl issued a written ruling that the government could depose two witnesses, but the process would take place outside of court, in the Washington, D.C. area, during December, and result in sealed testimony to be used at a possible sentencing phase. After a government motion to reconsider, Pohl issued another order allowing two additional witnesses for D.C.-area depositions, for a total of four, including Hanson. Pohl added that any testimony by Hanson on the merits of the case – not the sentencing – would have to take place before the accused, unless the defendants waived their right to be present. (More recently, the government filed a notice withdrawing its request to depose the witnesses, with the exception of Hanson.)

Of course, it’s hard to tell when a sentencing, or even the trial itself, might take place. Chief prosecutor Martins regularly declines to estimate when the trial might start. Defense teams have estimated that a trial is several years away, with Ruiz last Fall having provided the most dire prediction by saying it might be 10 years out.

The proceedings will resume next month, and run from Oct. 10 to 14 [Note: I will be writing about these hearings soon]. They will be the 18th pretrial session, occurring shortly after the 15th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks and before a presidential contest between two candidates with different views of what to do about Guantánamo Bay. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has supported President Obama’s efforts to close the detention facility, while Republican nominee Donald Trump has said he would expand the detention operations. Congress has blocked the transfer of detainees to U.S. soil.

But even closure of the detention operations at Guantánamo Bay would not itself terminate the military commissions system. Moving the case to federal court, where the Obama administration had wanted it to take place before abandoning the plan under political pressure, would be a separate decision. The 2009 MCA limits the military commissions’ jurisdiction to “alien unprivileged enemy combatants” – foreign terrorists and war criminals – but doesn’t say they have to be prosecuted at Guantánamo Bay.

“Military commissions, like courts-martial, can be convened wherever you can securely hold a trial,” Martins told Lawdragon after the February pretrial session, before the plane ride back to Andrews Air Force base. “That can be many places.”

II. Case Focuses on Defense Access to CIA Interrogation Evidence

Though Ryan may have scored a moral victory of sorts at May’s end, past torture of the defendants remains the dominant theme in the pretrial phase. Martins wasn’t even in court to hear Ryan argue; he was back in Washington, D.C., partly to participate in oral arguments before the military commissions appellate panel in a separate death penalty case against Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, who is accused of masterminding the USS Cole bombing in October 2000. (The third active military commission in pretrial hearings is against Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, who faces a life sentence for alleged war crimes as an al Qaeda commander.)

The other reason Martins stayed in D.C. was to push forward the discovery process related to the CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) program as the government seeks to determine what information about their clients’ treatment at black sites should be given to the defense. Before the hearings, Martins talked by phone to reporters at Guantánamo Bay to explain his absence. At that point, the case’s “center of gravity” was in D.C., not at Guantánamo’s Camp Justice, given the looming discovery deadline of Sept. 30 for CIA black site evidence – a date proposed by prosecutors and agreed to by the judge earlier in the year.

Martins became the chief prosecutor in September 2011 after commanding a Rule of Law task force in Afghanistan. He graduated first in his class from West Point in 1983 and became a Rhodes Scholar. Through the Army’s Funded Legal Education Program, he attended Harvard Law School and graduated in 1990. The school awarded him its highest honor, the Medal of Freedom, in 2011, for his distinguished career as a lawyer and soldier.

The commission’s work is largely done away from Guantánamo. While prosecutors trudge through discovery, defense teams travel around the world to prepare their cases. Both sides file lots of pleadings related to pending motions, and Pohl rules on matters that have been fully briefed and argued. That last part is the domain of Guantánamo trips – with oral arguments there reserved for motions that have been fully briefed. They take place every other month or so, parceled into one or two weeks at a time.

Martins has published academic articles and taught at the Army Judge Advocate General’s School. He can come across as professorial when explaining aspects of the military commissions system to the media; that is similar to his reserved style in court. He typically meets with reporters before each court session and holds a formal press conference at the end. During the two-week trips, he’ll also hold a press briefing on the middle weekend. He and his staff are happy to find a pleading or citation relevant to a reporter’s inquiry. They also provide DVDs of all the commission pleadings and transcripts. (Defense teams are also generous with their time to the traveling reporters.)

Martins is patient responding to repetitive questions, the most common being: Why is this case taking so long?

Cordial as he is, the general can sound a bit irked – you can sense his blood pressure rise – when he’s asked to respond to defense allegations that the government is skirting its discovery obligations with the CIA black site material.

In July, the court spent half a day sifting through defense claims that the government improperly destroyed evidence from a CIA black site.

“Allegations that can be wild and extreme should not be confused with serious allegations,” Martins said at the press conference concluding those hearings.

His mantra? That his team is working on discovery “24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days of the year, including holidays.” He also underscores that prosecutors will not use any evidence from coercive CIA interrogations. He is more than well versed in his topic. Before he was deployed to Afghanistan, Martins co-led President Obama’s Detention Policy Task Force and helped draft the 2009 Military Commissions Act, which reformed the Bush Administration’s 2006 MCA. Among the reforms in the Obama version was a clear bar against the use of evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

Martins also typically adds that the government has already turned over its case in chief to the defense, including some 300,000-plus pages of unclassified evidence and thousands more pages of classified material, and that the CIA black site evidence is small by comparison.

The government has nevertheless acknowledged that black site evidence is relevant to various defense efforts. One is mitigation – the defense will continue to argue that past torture should bar the government from executing their clients. The more the defense teams learn about this past treatment, presumably the stronger their mitigation arguments will become. The evidence will also assist defense motions to have the case dismissed for outrageous government conduct. Beyond that, the defense teams will challenge the admissibility of their clients’ statements made after they arrived at Guantánamo Bay from the black sites. Defense attorneys say that these interrogation sessions are not “clean” – even if they did not employ the earlier brutal methods – and are instead tainted by the past torture, and should thus be suppressed by Pohl.

How much the defense will learn about this past treatment is the critical legal question in pretrial litigation over discovery. The only public portion of the Senate torture report is the 500-page executive summary, which itself has redactions. The still-classified report itself is 6,700 pages, and it was based on about six million pages of underlying documents. Defense lawyers have said that a massive “document dump” of all that material is at least theoretically possible because they and other members of their teams have top security clearances allowing them to view this information. Under the Brady v. Maryland principles, they add, the defense is entitled to all information that is favorable to the defendants.

Under Brady, discovery always begins with a presumed good faith effort by the government to provide information to the defense. However, the government can invoke a “national security privilege” that allows it to withhold certain information that, if released, could jeopardize national security. In such situations, prosecutors can propose substitutions or summaries of the underlying information in a process that requires cooperation with the “original classification authority” – the authority or agency that first classified the information – whether it’s the CIA or another agency that has a stake or concern in the material’s distribution. It’s then up to the judge to determine if the proposed substitutions and summaries are fair and give the defense “substantially the same ability” to make its arguments as if it had the original classified material.

This process by the military commissions system mimics the procedures used in federal court cases under the Classified Information Procedures Act, or CIPA. Martins has described the process as “interactive” between the judge and the government. Earlier this year, Pohl adopted the government’s plan to provide, by the proposed Sept. 30 deadline, ten categories of CIA black site information, including a chronology of where the defendants were held; details of how they were treated; summaries of interrogations; the identifications of interrogators, guards and medical staff at the black sites; and official documents on the use of the enhanced techniques, among other areas.

Some evidence – including classified photos of the detainees at the black sites – has already gone to the defense teams. But most material is either with, or on its way to, Pohl, along with the prosecution’s proposed summaries and substitutions.

The commissions system incorporates CIPA procedures and also a standard from U.S. v. Yunis, a D.C. Circuit decision from 1989, which held that, in situations in which the national security privilege is invoked, the defense is not entitled to the evidence based “on a mere showing of  theoretical relevance.” According to commission rules, the judge has to determine that the information is “noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally cognizable defense, rebuttal of the prosecution’s case, or to sentencing.”

What makes a certain piece of evidence “cumulative,” or redundant or repetitive, and therefore not discoverable, is a disputed area between defense attorneys and prosecutors. Also disputed is who gets to make the initial cumulative determinations – the judge or the prosecutors.

During February proceedings, Pohl referred to cumulative as the “word of the day” as defense attorneys argued for access to correspondence and memos between the White House, the Department of Justice and the CIA on the controversial Bush-era rendition and interrogation program.

Connell presented an elaborate slide illustrating the Yunis and Brady requirements when arguing to Pohl why the defense was entitled to “distribution channels” of torture memos between various arms of the government.

Another key reform in the 2009 MCA was that all defendants facing the death penalty receive government-paid “learned counsel” with experience in capital cases, in addition to military defense lawyers. The lead attorneys for all five defendants are civilian attorneys who contract with the Department of Defense.

Connell was a federal public defender before going into private practice, where among other cases he handled the appeal of John Allen Muhammad, the so-called “D.C. Sniper” who was executed in 2009. Connell is big on slides and often will make the most in-depth presentation on a legal topic in defense of his client, who is a nephew of Mohammed and accused of providing money to the hijackers. (After finishing his argument, he was pleased that Nevin also wanted to refer to his Yunis and Brady slides. “It’s my proudest moment, your Honor,” Connell remarked before ceding the podium.)

His point to Pohl was that the defense needed to know not just the content of the memos, which could arguably be cumulative, but also who had received them.

“Noncumulative is who got it,” Connell argued.

Pohl came at the discussion from a different angle, asking if the government’s conduct is more outrageous simply because more people know about it.

“Absolutely,” Bormann responded. The Chicago-based defender generally eschews Connell-style formal presentations in favor of exasperated critiques of the fledgling commissions system compared to the tried-and-true of federal courts.

“This is by far the most restrictive discovery regime of my career,” Bormann said.

Previously, Bormann had been best-known for running Illinois’ Capital Trial Assistance Unit, a state agency that assisted defense lawyers on death penalty cases. In that role, she was part of a coalition of lawyers and activists that convinced the state to abolish the death penalty in 2011, a victory that made her job at the time, in a sense, cumulative. She told the New York Times in 2011 that maybe she would go to “another state” to fight the death penalty, not yet knowing she would soon be fighting its application at Guantánamo Bay.

Bin Attash, her client, is accused of running an al Qaeda training camp attended by two of the hijackers, and he also allegedly conducted some of the initial tests of the operation by bringing razor knives on planes. He lost his right leg fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and wears a prosthetic.

Bormann asked Pohl to think back to the paper trails of Nazi officials that were revealed during Nuremberg trials after World War II.

“The number of people that know about illegal conduct, or what I would characterize as war crimes, and cover them up, and the further those fingers stretch into various components of the United States Government, I would say that makes it more outrageous,” Bormann argued.

The defense teams told Pohl that it is he – not the prosecution – who must decide what is cumulative, given the judicial role in determining what versions of classified information the defense gets after the government has invoked its national security privilege.

But Martins disagreed. He argued that prosecutors always get a “first cut” in discovery and make the initial cumulative decisions.

“We categorically reject this notion that we have to present every duplicate we have to you so you can sort out which is cumulative and which is not,” Martins told Pohl.

The cumulative debate is relevant not only to how many copies of memos are produced but also to the level of detail that defense teams receive about interrogation techniques – details they later hope to present to the panel of military officers who will be charged with deciding the defendants’ guilt or innocence, and then their sentences if there are convictions.

In the February session, Nevin told Pohl that maybe it would be “the 403rd blow that was delivered against Mr. Mohammad” that would make a difference to the panel members, “only one of whom has to say execution is not right here.”

That level of detail “may feel cumulative” if the panel has already learned that some abuse took place, Nevin argued, but “one more event may be important to one of these jurors who will have Mr. Mohammed’s life in his hands, if we get to that point.”

In the arena of discovery about past torture, the Yunis cumulative arguments did not exactly fall into the category of riveting courtroom drama. That excitement was reserved for arguments about the government’s alleged destruction of CIA black site evidence.

Three defense teams want both Pohl, who is alleged to have improperly colluded in this effort, and the prosecution team removed from the case; a fourth, led by Connell, wants the prosecution removed but to question Pohl about his possible involvement; and a fifth, led by Ruiz, wants the judge and prosecutors to remain on the case. Ruiz also sees improper evidence destruction but wants to pursue different remedies later in the litigation.

In July, the issue was somewhat narrow: If Pohl should hear the motion for his recusal or farm it out to another judge – the recusal before the recusal, if you will. But the arguments got nasty, with the prosecution and defense each calling the other “despicable.”

The courtroom translators who provide the English-to-Arabic translation for the defendants regularly tell attorneys to “slow down,” with Connell being the most common offender. It does not happen with Nevin, who is deliberate, meticulous and sometimes slow-moving in his style. He also has an admitted anti-authority streak and does not shy away from expressing outrage in court. One source in an ABA Journal profile of Nevin described the veteran defense attorney as “a velvet shiv.”

Nevin outlined what he saw as a troubling sequence of events: Earlier in the case, Pohl had issued a “do not destroy” order related to evidence at overseas detention facilities. In good faith, defense teams had relied on the order. But then, in June 2014, Pohl issued a secret “destruction order” after an ex parte or unilateral presentation by the government, without giving defense teams a chance to challenge it. In fact, defense teams did not learn about the destruction order until 20 months after it was issued. Nevin said that he deduced from the events that Pohl had not first seen the original evidence to assess the adequacy of any substitutions proposed by the government before he made his ruling.

“We have lost the ability to put our hands on some of the most important evidence in this case,” Nevin contended.

Prosecutor Robert Swann shot back that Nevin was “not Sherlock Holmes.” The government has conceded that the failure to provide the June 2014 order to the defense teams in a timely manner was “regrettable.” Swann blamed it on miscommunication between the prosecution and Pohl as to whether the judge or prosecutors were responsible for distributing the document.

Otherwise, Swann argued, the government followed the CIPA-like procedures that allow prosecutors to seek to provide substitutions or summaries for classified evidence. In this situation, the substitutions were photographic evidence provided to the defense. He said that both the defense and prosecution are allowed to make ex parte presentations to the judge – nothing fishy about that, contrary to what Nevin said.

Swann, a civilian Department of Defense lawyer and former Army judge advocate colonel, worked on the 9/11 case during the Bush years, as did Ryan. (The defendants were initially charged under the 2006 Military Commissions Act before the Obama Administration temporarily halted, and then reformed, the commissions system.) Swann also served as chief prosecutor of the military commissions from 2004 to 2005, the first version of the system that Bush created by executive order in 2001. That version was in 2006 determined to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a decision that prompted the passage of the original Military Commissions Act later that year.

Swann can be surly and occasionally funny in his jabs to the defense. Like Ryan, he is more prone to display hints of anger and frustration in court than Martins. On this day, he was clearly angry that Nevin had insulted the integrity of the judge.

“They can’t manufacture a recusal by distorting the truth,” Swann told Pohl. “Their needless comments, their sarcasm, their pompous condemnation are all undignified and lack civility.”

Written pleadings filed on this dispute in the weeks before the July session had also turned unusually bitter. The government accused Nevin’s team of “shrill antics” and filing a “hatchet-job of a motion” unfairly attacking Pohl after 35 years of honorable service. Mohammed’s team responded that prosecutors were predictably relying on “jingoistic histrionics” and had an “overarching priority of covering up the wide-ranging governmental conspiracy in criminal wrongdoing.”

After oral arguments, Pohl ruled from the bench that he would not recuse himself from deciding whether he and the prosecution team should be removed from the case. He is expected to hear arguments on that issue later in the year.

Since that hot July day, the government and Pohl have made progress on their “interactive” process of deciding what classified information on the CIA interrogation program will be produced to the defense. In August, Pohl ruled that the government’s “proposed substitutions and summaries” were adequate for the first two categories of discoverable information – the chronologies of where the defendants were held from their capture to their arrival at Guantánamo Bay, and the descriptions of how the defendants were transported between the various locations. The remaining eight categories apparently remain a work in progress.

Pohl – also the chief judge of the commissions system – does not appear to be merely rubber-stamping the government’s proposed versions of the evidence. In July, he informed the defense teams in court that he had been reviewing the prosecution’s proposals and had sent “virtually all of it” back for additions. Defense attorneys were somewhat heartened by this disclosure.

What happens if Pohl wants “additions” – more detailed evidence – about past abusive treatment that the prosecution can’t get the original classification authority, the CIA, to provide? Conceivably, the judge would have to abate the proceedings until the government complies with his order to provide additional evidence. What appears to be the more likely scenario is that the defense will receive the Pohl-approved substitutions and summaries, determine them to be insufficient, and then file motions contending the government needs to provide additional discovery.

The judge told defense attorneys back in February – when he signed off on the government’s proposed 10-category framework – that he would not stop them from filing additional discovery motions, including in areas that may fall outside the 10 categories.

“I’m going to remind you of that somewhere down the line,” Bormann told him.

III. Why is This Case Taking So Long?

The oral arguments over CIA interrogation evidence are a relatively new development in the case, starting in earnest this February and continuing into the spring and summer. Connell often serves as the defense-side explainer-in-chief for the media and traveling NGO representatives, and even sometimes for the parties in court, given his savant-like knowledge of the ligation. He said the focus on interrogation discovery marked a “new phase” in the case.

Martins generally avoids such labels but acknowledged the obvious importance of moving forward with the process. “Once discovery is done, we’ll be able to seriously set trial milestones, leading to a selection of a jury panel of officers,” he said in an interview following the February session.

The case already has taken a long time to get to this point. Not surprisingly, there is some finger-pointing between the defense and prosecution about which is more responsible for the pace of litigation. Many people who have not been following the goings-on at Guantánamo Bay are surprised to hear that 15 years after the attacks the government is still trying to prosecute alleged 9/11 conspirators.

In fairness, though, the longest delays in putting the accused through a trial have little to do with the present case, which is the second attempt at a military commission for the five defendants. The first attempt took place during the Bush era.

The Bush administration’s decision to prioritize intelligence-gathering from suspects over prosecuting them delayed any trial from the outset: The defendants, all captured in 2002 or 2003, were not charged in the Bush-era military commissions until June 2008. The first commission, brought under the 2006 Military Commissions Act, seemed like it would move quickly. The five defendants sought martyrdom and rejected their defense attorneys at the arraignment. (The 2006 MCA only provided defendants with military defense lawyers, but the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers launched the John Adams Project to hire civilian lawyers to assist in the defense.)

In a December 2008 hearing at Guantánamo Bay, the five defendants said they wanted to plead guilty. However, the judge on that first commission, Army Col. Stephen Henley, determined that bin al Shibh and al Hawsawi could not make decisions about their own cases, due to questions about their mental competency. Mohammed, bin Attash and al Baluchi told Henley that they would wait until those issues were resolved before entering pleas. (Henley also asked the prosecution and defense lawyers to brief whether the commission could accept guilty pleas for capital offenses and, if so, whether the death penalty could be imposed, given that the 2006 MCA required a conviction “by the concurrence of all” the panel members before a death sentence.)

The defendants never got the chance to enter their pleas. Obama took office the following month and immediately suspended the military commissions system, which included the 9/11 case and several other cases involving accused terrorists and war criminals held at Guantánamo Bay. Eventually, Obama decided that he would develop a new-and-improved military commissions system that was more credible in his eyes, with bans on evidence from cruel treatment and enhanced defense rights to counsel.

“Military commissions have a long tradition in the United States,” Obama said on May 15, 2009. “They are appropriate for trying enemies who violate the laws of war, provided that they are properly structured and administered.”

However, even with the passage of the 2009 Military Commissions Act later that year, the Obama administration decided to hold the Sept. 11 case in lower Manhattan federal court, a short walk from the site of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers. This further delayed a trial, as Attorney General Eric Holder’s plan fell apart under intense political pressure. In April 2011, Holder announced that the case would be sent back to Guantánamo Bay, and the government’s prosecution would start afresh under the new commissions system.

Under the system, commission prosecutors draft charges and send them to the Convening Authority, who in addition to an overall management role decides whether to refer charges for trial. Ret. Navy Vice Adm. Bruce MacDonald, then the convening authority, referred death penalty charges in April 2012, and the defendants were arraigned in court at Guantánamo Bay about a month later, on May 5, 2012.

That widely covered 12-hour session marathoned through defendant prayer breaks; defense teams’ voir dire of Pohl to probe for potential judicial bias; and a defense-side request to have the entire charge sheet read, which took about 2-1/2 hours. Defense attorneys also lodged numerous objections to the fairness of the proceedings that previewed written motions in the months and years to follow.

In fact, defense teams began filing motions the month before the arraignment. One motion attacked the government’s proposed “presumptive classification” guidelines that would make any defendant statement classified unless cleared by an original classification authority, which defense attorneys claimed was both unprecedented and unworkable. The government later abandoned this position as Pohl fashioned his protective order for how the parties are to handle classified information in the case. But that order – now in its third amended form – has remained a subject of litigation. Three of the defense teams did not sign the order’s “memorandum of understanding” regarding the handling of classified information until late 2015, and they did so with written reservations preserving their objections for appeal.

Another pre-arraignment motion sought to have the case dismissed for “defective referral.” The motion alleged that the convening authority did not give the defense teams enough time and resources to meet with their clients and assemble information to make mitigation arguments against the referral of death penalty charges. Defense teams did not present their final arguments on the motion – armed with supplemental information from the Senate Torture Report – until Oct. 30, 2015. Pohl denied the motion on Dec. 29, 2015.

The presumptive classification and defective referral motions were the earliest from the defense teams. By the time the Mohammed team filed its motion alleging improper destruction of CIA black site evidence, in May of this year, the number of defense pleadings and supplements were so far into the thousands they were hard to track. In their response pleading to the destruction allegations, prosecutors accused the defense of “a scorched litigation strategy.”

“Their goal is not acquittal in this case; their goal, and their entire defense strategy, is that the case never, ever be tried,” prosecutors wrote. “They seek to advance this goal by attacking and litigating every possible thing imaginable.”

Some litigation does seem far afield from the case’s core issues, at least at first glance. This has bothered observers, including traveling victim family members, who have generally been impressed by Pohl but wondered if he is being a bit indulgent. The record for appellate review will be enormous. Any case with a guilty verdict goes to the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review. Either side can then appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Significant parts of the past year were consumed by witness testimony and oral arguments on a defense motion to ban female guards of Joint Task Force-Guantánamo from touching the defendants on their way to legal meetings and court. Pohl issued a temporary ban in December 2014 and defense lawyers wanted him to make it permanent, claiming that the touching by female guards violated their clients’ religious beliefs and reminded them of sexual humiliations from past torture. Pohl eventually sided with the government and lifted the ban this year.

A few victim family members compared the defense teams’ painstaking witness examinations and presentations on the topic to, well, torture. Robert Regg, a retired New York City firefighter severely injured when the twin towers collapsed, said at the February session’s concluding press conference that he felt “emotionally waterboarded” by the defense efforts. (He overall praised his experience of attending the hearings.) Prosecutor Swann said during his closing argument that the defense was engaged in “a lame effort” to “drown out the realities of Sept. 11.”

From the defense perspective, however, the female guards issue cut to a core of the case by directly relating to the past torture of the defendants, as well as to the current conditions of confinement that negatively effects their ability to participate in their defense.

“Mr. Swann’s trivialization of the tenets of one of the great religions of the earth is almost breathtaking,” Nevin told Pohl in his closing argument on the female guards issue.

The female guard motion is one of several in which the specter of “unlawful influence” has been raised, as senior Department of Defense officials – including Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter – publicly criticized Pohl’s temporary female-guard ban. Defense lawyers saw a clear example of Pohl’s superiors in the military attempting to influence the case. (Pohl left his ban in place a little longer as punishment for what he termed “entirely inappropriate” comments.) Unlawful command influence is a common legal concept in U.S. military law; it has been referred to as “the mortal enemy of military justice” by the military’s appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The Uniform Code of Military Justice bars anyone subject to the code from attempting to influence a court-martial.

The 2009 MCA similarly bars “unlawful influence,” but defense lawyers say such behavior has been rampant in the 9/11 case. Defense lawyers first filed a motion to dismiss for unlawful influence shortly after the 2012 arraignment, and updated it numerous times during its pendency, incorporating allegedly prejudicial comments against the defendants from President Obama and other officials. Mohammed’s military defense lawyer, Marine Maj. Derek Poteet, argued during oral arguments last December that too many “plainly inappropriate and reckless” comments have piled up – the bell cannot be “un-rung.” Poteet told Pohl that this case will be looked to for decades for “what is acceptable in military justice.”

Ruiz, whose arguments can be colorful, compared the 9/11 case to a well of toxic waste that has been poisoned by repeated interference from a host of government officials and agencies.

“We should not drink from that well,” he argued.

Pohl rejected the unlawful influence motion to dismiss in April. He nevertheless agreed that some public statements could “taint the panel” of military officers that will eventually decide the case at trial. As a result, he will allow “expanded voir dire” and “liberal challenges” during the panel-selection process – which is what prosecutor Swann had proposed in his arguments.

More generally, defense attorneys say they have an ethical and sacred obligation to litigate as aggressively as possible on behalf of any defendant facing the death penalty. They also see the system as fundamentally unfair and confusing, often noting that it’s even unsettled whether the Constitution applies to the proceedings. Two months after the arraignment, defense attorneys filed a motion asking Pohl to find that the Constitution “is presumed” to apply to the commission. The judge ruled in January 2013 that the issue was “not yet ripe for decision,” agreeing with the government’s position.

David Glazier, a formal Naval officer turned academic who is critical of the system, describes the system as “court-martial lite” and says it abounds with opportunities for legal challenges.

“In federal courts and courts-martial, the procedures are well settled; judges and attorneys know how to conduct those trials expeditiously,” Glazier, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said in an interview. “In the commissions, in contrast, literally every aspect is untested; judges are having to make almost everything up as they go, with attendant challenges by one side or the other to almost everything that they do.”

Critics of the commissions system also take issue with the admissibility of hearsay evidence and are skeptical that statements by the defendants and other witnesses taken without Miranda warnings are truly free of coercion.

On these issues, Martins echoes his commander-in-chief by praising the federal courts as the best option in most situations but not appropriate for certain cases involving terrorists captured overseas. In these situations, Martins says, commissions can fill “a narrow but important role.”

“The Miranda and confrontation requirements in federal court are appropriate rules in domestic trials of alleged domestic criminals and terrorists,” Martins says. “But such rules are not only unprecedented in situations of genuine hostilities; they are not wise in such situations.”

Beyond these constitutional issues are a quagmire of more practical constraints. Defense attorneys, for example, feel burdened by their inability to talk on the phone with their clients, a restriction that requires in-person client meetings at Guantánamo Bay. The teams have to balance these meetings and oral arguments with investigative trips to various regions of the world to prepare their clients’ defense. They also oppose the prosecution’s motion to prevent the defense teams from distributing client statements – what the government views as potentially constituting “propaganda” – to third parties. Defense lawyers say this will significantly inhibit their ability to work with nongovernmental agencies and experts that might be able to assist their clients.

More than anything, the defense teams contend that many delays – and much of the litigation – have stemmed from government intrusions into the functioning of the defense teams. They have made regular complaints that the Joint Task Force guard force has improperly seized privileged attorney-client materials. Early in 2013, the defense teams also learned that the attorney-client meeting rooms had listening devices disguised as smoke detectors. (The listening devices were removed, and prosecutors said they never eavesdropped on conversations.)

Attorneys and Pohl alike were troubled by an infamous episode, from a January 2013 hearing, that highlighted the murky layers of intelligence that may continue in the courtroom and legal proceedings. In the “red light incident,” the courtroom’s security light went off as Nevin was discussing a motion to preserve evidence in overseas detention facilities. But Pohl and his security officer had not pressed the censor button, which cuts the audio and video feed to the viewing gallery, leaving many to assume the CIA did it remotely. (Pohl later said an “OCA” had cut the feed and that such outside control would not be permitted in the future.)

The most problematic event for the proceedings was an FBI criminal investigation into the team led by Buffalo-based attorney James Harrington, who represents Ramzi bin al Shibh, also alleged to have funneled money to the hijackers. According to the charges, bin al Shibh also wanted to be a hijacker but later became Mohammed’s “main assistant” for the plot after he was denied numerous visa requests for travel to the U.S.

The FBI investigation into bin al Shibh’s team looked into information that defense members provided to their client and relayed from him to an outside party. Harrington learned in April 2014 that federal agents had turned one member of his team into an informant. The unlikely twist also caught Martins off guard. He assigned a Justice Department special trial counsel, which grew to a full “Special Review Team,” to handle the inquiry. Prosecutors were “walled off” from the proceedings and not permitted in court whenever the Special Review Team attempted to hash out with Pohl and the defense lawyers what was going on with the probe.

The investigation effectively stalled any real progress in the case for over a year – from about April 2014 to October 2015 – when the Special Review Team finally convinced Pohl that the investigation into Harrington’s team had been closed, without any charges being filed. One especially bizarre hearing during that phase came in February 2015, when bin al Shibh and three of his co-defendants recognized the interpreter at his table as someone who worked at a CIA black site. The hearing was cancelled as it began. A defense motion to compel the government to produce the former interpreter for a deposition is pending.

Marine Brig. Gen. John Baker became the chief defense counsel in July 2015. In this role atop the Military Commissions Defense Organization, Baker does not represent any of the defendants but rather supervises and consults with the teams and helps get them resources from the convening authority. That dynamic itself is a problem, he says, in that the authority responsible for referring charges also makes decisions about how defense teams are staffed and what experts they can hire. (Defense teams also sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the convening authority’s role involves an unconstitutional mix of prosecutorial and judicial functions; Pohl denied the motion in 2014, holding that the convening authority’s role is “executive in nature.” He denied a defense motion to reconsider his ruling in August of this year.)

Baker sees the intrusions into the defense function as the biggest problem in the case.

“Everybody talks about how this is perhaps the most important criminal trial in United States history,” Baker said in an interview at his Guantánamo Bay office in June. “You would think that if we are going to put our system of law on display internationally, we would want to demonstrate how fair we are. And we certainly aren’t.”

The two-week session in October 2015 proved to be productive by moving past – at least for the time – the potential conflict-of-interest issue resulting from the FBI investigation, which had been the biggest roadblock in the case. But even that set of hearings began with an “only in Gitmo” series of events and delays when bin Attash told Pohl that he might want to represent himself.

Though allowed for by the 2009 MCA, going pro se is almost never a good idea. The challenge is heightened in a death penalty commission at Guantánamo Bay. Defendants do not have access to crucial classified information or to a law library, and they cannot pick up a phone to talk about legal issues with whomever the judge appoints as standby counsel.

Bin Attash complained to Pohl that his lawyers did not adequately explain to him what the self-representation process would entail. But Bormann said you couldn’t exactly blame her.

“This is like no other court,” Bormann explained. “So I can’t possibly advise Mr. bin Attash of his rights because I, frankly, don’t know what they are.”

Pohl concluded that he would need to draft a very strongly worded admonishment for bin Attash about the perils of self-representation, which the judge would use for a colloquy with the defendant and any other who might later consider going pro se. The next day, after Pohl had distributed his proposed “trial conduct order,” the government expressed satisfaction with the document, offering just a few minor proposed revisions.

Another of the defense counsel, Connell, saw a problem. He told Pohl that he had previously been briefed by the government on a top-secret program, referred to as an Alternative Compensatory Control Measure (ACCM), that he believed would be relevant to a detainee’s ability to represent himself.

Connell had a classified filing in his hand that he wanted to submit to the court on the topic, but Pohl had not been “read into” the program, nor had the other defense teams.

“Your Honor, could I double-wrap the document and submit it to the trial judiciary to be kept in a safe?” Connell asked.

Pohl didn’t want it: “We will get to it when we get to it, but I don’t want to take custody of a document I’m not authorized to read.”

The judge and other defense teams were briefed, or “read into,” the ACCM that week, which led to additional revisions of the bin Attash admonishment. (The Miami Herald later reported that the program appeared to involve extensive surveillance within the Camp 7 detention facility. “You must assume anything you say in Camp 7 is not confidential and will be disclosed to the U.S. Government,” Pohl edited into the admonishment.)

Naturally, because this is Guantánamo, the ACCM read-ins created yet another sub-issue: Putting aside the oddity of a defense counsel but not the judge having been read in, what members of the defense teams can be read into the program?

On Oct. 22, after the additional read-ins, Ruiz told the judge that the government was refusing to read-in certain members of his team, even though they had the full security clearances and signed the “memorandums of understanding” to the judge’s protective order. Martins told Pohl that not every defense team member gets read into this particular ACCM, that it was based on a “need to know” standard.

Ruiz was flabbergasted at what he saw as another government intrusion.

“That gives the government a direct reach into the defense and into defense strategy as to who has and who needs to see this information,” he argued. (Litigation over who can get read into ACCMs relevant to the case is pending.)

Defense teams have also made numerous complaints over the past year that some team members have not yet received the required top-secret and special access program (SAP) clearances to review all case information and meet with their clients. As a result, these lawyers and support staff can only perform limited duties on the case.

“The length of time that it takes to get a security clearance is unacceptable,” Baker said. “I have talked to everybody that I know about this, but it is like talking to a wall.”

Ruiz has wrapped up many of the perceived interferences and other complicating factors into a somewhat global “motion to dismiss because national security considerations make a fair trial impossible.” He first filed the motion last year and has updated it since, including recently with the allegations over the allegedly improper destruction of CIA black site evidence.

As it turned out, bin Attash decided not to represent himself. Instead, he has made repeated efforts to fire his lawyers and have new ones appointed. Pohl has met privately with the defendant and his team and determined that bin Attash has not met the standard of “good cause” to sever the attorney-client relationship.

After one such order, at the start of the two-week session in February, Bormann surprised the courtroom by approaching the podium to say that she herself wanted to withdraw from the case.

“The trust has been completely eroded,” Bormann said of her relationship with bin Attash. She cited his past torture and the litany of government intrusions, all of which had irreparably damaged the attorney-client relationship.

Bormann added that her team had failed to get bin Attash a phone call with family members, even after his mother died.

Pohl interrupted her, saying she was getting into another “global attack on the system.”

“I understand that, but understand me here,” Bormann said. “We are talking about little pebbles, each little pebble being added into a glass of water so eventually there is no more water left.”

Pohl denied her request, but the issue lingers. In the July session, bin Attash reacted angrily to the presence of Bormann and her co-counsel, Michael Schwartz, and had to be removed from court one day. The solution agreed to by the lawyers, Pohl and the government was that bin Attash’s lawyers would sit at the back of the court whenever the defendant was present.

Few observers believe that Bormann actually wanted to leave the case, or that Pohl would seriously entertain the request that day. Instead, her plea was widely seen as an expression of sympathy for her client – an apology of sorts for the system – and another opportunity to assert that government interferences were preventing effective assistance of counsel, as defense teams have also argued in written motions. Many of the defense lawyers have grappled with the same fundamental question of whether to participate in a system they see as illegitimate and unfair, or to leave, which would be a principled stand but likely put their clients in worse positions.

The other four defense teams currently have more cordial working relationships with their clients, but establishing and maintaining trust has been a challenge for all of them. That is the common motivation underlying many of the motions brought by defense lawyers, and why those sympathetic to their often unpopular work view them as bringing greater legitimacy to the system.

Occasionally, in their own way, prosecutors faintly echo this sentiment, as Ryan did when he stood up to register the government’s objection to Bormann leaving the case – and to reject any notion that this was a situation of ineffective assistance by defense counsel.

“For four years, no one in this courtroom – no one – can say she has not been a very zealous and competent counsel on behalf of Mr. bin Attash,” Ryan said.

IV. The Scene

The defendants refused to enter pleas or answer Pohl’s questions at their chaotic May 2012 arraignment. It was not clear if they would participate in their defense or if they would adopt their approach from the Bush-era commission, when they welcomed their martyrdom. In one pro se filing from that case, the defendants said that they accepted the charges as “badges of honor.” But the biggest difference from the 2008 commission has been their decision to work with their lawyers and see this case through; even bin Attash, in his current disgruntled state, continues to meet with some members of his team.

Not a whole lot is known about the conditions of the Camp 7 facility that houses the 15 high-value detainees, all formerly held by the CIA, including the five 9/11 defendants. As of this writing, the U.S. is holding a total of 61 individuals on Guantánamo Bay as law-of-war detainees. Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, or JTF-GTMO, which runs the detention facility, has conducted media tours of Camps 5 and 6 (Camp 5 was recently consolidated into Camp 6 with the reduced detainee population), but Camp 7 is off limits. Defense attorneys and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can visit Camp 7.

Court testimony has established that each detainee at Camp 7 has a personal recreation yard on the back end of his cell, and that detainees can talk to each other in raised voices. They also get time in a common rec area and a media room.

But it’s clear the defendants enjoy coming to court, which gives them an opportunity to socialize. Pohl requires the defendants to attend the first day of each session, at which point they are advised of their right to skip subsequent days. Al Hawsawi, with his discomfort in transport and sitting from the rectal injury, is the most likely to stay at Camp 7.

Members of the guard force typically begin bringing the defendants in, one at a time, shortly before 8:30 a.m., entering on the left side of the courtroom when facing the bench. Guards walk on either side of the defendants, holding their shoulders and wrists, and walk them to their chairs on the outer left side of the defendant tables. At their seats, the defendants are not shackled to the floor, though the court has that capability. Mohammed, at the front, followed by bin Attash and then bin al Shibh, generally prefer to wear paramilitary-style camouflage jackets or vests (their right to do so was litigated). Al Baluchi, at the fourth table from Pohl, and al Hawsawi at the back closest to the viewing gallery, wear loose-fitting tunics or robes.

As the official court time of 9:00 a.m. approaches, the large courtroom has the feel of a friendly office party, particularly on the crowded defense side of the room, as staff and defendants greet one another and chat amiably among themselves and their clients. The exception these days is bin Attash. But even on July 21, when he was removed from court, the defendant seemed to be having a pleasant conversation with Mohammed before his attorneys approached the table.

The defendants talk to each other regularly during the proceedings. Pohl allows this, though attorneys acknowledge it can be distracting.

“Mr. Mohammed, I don’t mind you discussing with your co-accused,” Pohl said during one of the October sessions as Connell was trying to give oral arguments. “But please keep your voice down.”

“Thank you,” the judge added. Pohl always sets the lunch break based on the scheduled prayer time.

The courtroom was built to accommodate six defendants, as the government also initially sought charges against Mohammed al Qahtani, a Saudi national who was suspected of being the 20th hijacker. But Susan Crawford, the convening authority in 2008, was convinced that he was tortured and refused to refer charges for trial. Al Qahtani remains in detention at Guantánamo Bay. The extra table and chairs at the back of the court, behind the al Hawsawi team, come in handy for overflow defense staff and, more recently, for bin Attash’s lawyers. That’s also where chief defense counsel Baker typically sits to observe proceedings.

Reflecting the hybrid nature of the commissions system, both sides of the room have a mix of men and women in military uniform and civilian business attire. Female civilian members of the defense teams will wear head coverings if their clients are in court. Bormann wears a black abaya (a full-body cloak) at all times, except on the rare days when none of the defendants is in attendance. Gary Sowards, a longtime death penalty lawyer from California who assists on the Mohammed team, stands out by going tie-less. Harrington, the elder statesmen of the crew, might show up to court in a bowtie, then later appear at the post-hearing press conference in sandals and shorts.

Those who work on the commissions have ample opportunity to run into each other outside court. Pohl, his staff, the prosecution and defense teams, victim family members, NGOs and the media all take the same three-hour chartered flight out of Joint Base Andrews, in Maryland, to Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. The judge and the victim family members sit in first class; the media sit in the far back; the other groups are in between. Everybody except the judge takes the same 20-minute ferry ride from the Leeward side of the base, which has the air terminal, to the Windward side, which provides access to the main parts of the base and Camp Justice, where the court proceedings are held. (Pohl takes a fast boat.)

Large numbers of the prosecution and defense teams – including the bosses, Generals Martins and Baker – sleep in trailers on Camp Justice, while media and NGOs stay in nearby tents on the complex. Other lawyers and staff and victim family members stay in townhouse or hotel-style lodging elsewhere on the base.

Camp Justice itself has become the subject of litigation over concerns that the area, a former airstrip, has too many cancer-causing agents. Baker temporarily halted his staff from sleeping in the FEMA-like trailers when elevated formaldehyde levels were disclosed, then rescinded the order once he was convinced that base staff had improved the airflow within the trailers.

The bin Attash team has litigated, so far unsuccessfully, to halt the proceedings until the Navy completes a full health assessment of Camp Justice.

“I’m not comfortable being in this room and I’m not comfortable bringing a team of typically 12 to 15 people and asking them to be here on behalf of my role as a defense attorney and on behalf of Mr. bin Attash,” Schwartz told Pohl on June 1.

Anyone getting sleepy during Schwartz’s long presentation likely became wide awake when he said that an initial health report found a potential high frequency in soil samples of a type of benzopyrene that he referred to as “a highly carcinogenic, nasty material that causes scrotal cancer.”

The naval base itself has existed since 1903 and has all the comforts of a small town: cafeterias, fast food, a Wal-Mart like store called the NEX (Navy Exchange), a bowling alley, an athletic complex, two movie theaters and a handful of bars and restaurants, not to mention a nice marina and opportunities for snorkeling and fishing. JTF-GTMO is a relatively recent tenant, leasing its space from the Navy. With about 4,000 service members and civilians on the base who are not part of the task force or the court, it is occasionally possible for temporary guests to blend into plain sight. Court participants and observers can avoid each other outside of the court complex, though it takes some effort and planning.

One could walk into the base’s Irish bar, O’Kelly’s, on any given evening and see a series of tables – one with defense team members, another with prosecutors, then NGOs, victim family members and one with the media. Given the intensity of the case’s subject matter, the environment can feel a little claustrophobic – and that’s for a one- or two-week hearing. A number of people who work on commission cases are concerned that a long trial could feel overwhelming for some participants. They point out that a small town can be a clever backdrop for courtroom drama in novels and movies, but even fictional small town trials don’t wrestle with the worst attack on U.S. soil in history and details of torture during the day, then send their participants to the same bars and restaurants at night.

The different components of the traveling court system also meet with each other intentionally on the island. The prosecution meets separately with the media, NGOs and victim family members, and defense teams will do the same. Defense lawyers say they get the full range of emotions and comments from victim family members, from “we understand and appreciate what you’re doing” to palpable anger.

At the end of the hearings, all groups take the same chartered flight for the return to Andrews, though some defense attorneys will stay on to meet with their clients. On one return flight this past year, defender Ruiz and prosecutor Ryan could be seen standing opposite each other in the aisle, several feet apart. Ruiz had to move forward; Ryan had to head back to the toilets. Who was going to move? Who finds a partially empty row to slide into to let the other pass? Ryan has a height advantage, but Ruiz is younger and a serious athlete. Both intimated that they weren’t moving. Then they chuckled and slid by each other, each patting the other on the shoulder.

Welcome to the reality of a traveling court system.

V. Harrington and His Client’s Vibrations

No one who travelled to Guantánamo Bay for the two-week session in October 2015 – the first to be held in several months – was especially confident that the case would finally move forward. Bin Attash’s surprise inquiry about self-representation was a distraction from the real issue that the session eventually settled into: the status of the FBI’s criminal investigation into the bin al Shibh defense team, led by Harrington, which apparently focused on how his team handled information going to and from the defendant.

Remaining “walled off,” Martins’ team was not in court as a representative from the Justice Department’s “Special Review Team” told Pohl that the investigation into Harrington’s team was closed, without any charges being filed. The case could move forward after nearly a year-and-a-half of delays, according to the Justice Department team.

“If we have indeed established, as we believe we have, that there is no investigation and not even a security-access issue, there cannot be a conflict,” attorney Fernando Campoamor-Sanchez said.

Harrington and other defense lawyers had their doubts that the matter was so simple. Harrington pointed out to the judge that the government’s document attesting to the closed investigation contained the worrisome caveat “at this time.”

Each defense team has a “defense security officer,” or DSO – a security specialist that advises the team on how to properly handle case information. In April 2014, the FBI met with the Harrington team’s DSO and entered into a confidential relationship with him. The DSO, an employee of SRA International – which contracts with the commissions – told Harrington of the meeting a few days later after consulting with his SRA supervisors. Harrington fired him, and the defense teams filed a joint emergency motion to abate the proceedings until they figured out what on earth was going on.

“Where counsel’s duty of loyalty is potentially divided because counsel himself is under investigation, courts have not hesitated to critically examine the nature of the investigation and its impact upon the attorney-client relationship,” the defense teams wrote in their motion.

Defendants are entitled to conflict-free counsel, which is potentially comprised if an attorney being investigated could be suspected of pulling his or her punches to curry favor with the government. The motion noted that the FBI asked Harrington’s DSO about all of the defense teams. Lawyers said that the investigation would have “a chilling effect” on the functioning of the teams.

Later in 2014, Pohl ruled that a potential conflict did not exist for four of the defendants, but he held out bin al Shibh as a possible exception, given that the FBI had directed the bulk of its investigative efforts at his legal team. The FBI had also interviewed a linguist for the Mohammed team, but Pohl found that this could not have affected “trial strategy or intensity of effort” because the defense team did not know about the meeting until after that investigation was closed. Bin al Shibh’s situation required “further examination,” Pohl ruled. (He had earlier even decided to sever bin al Shibh from the case, citing both the conflict issue and pending litigation concerning the defendant’s mental capacity, but prosecutors convinced Pohl to hold off until the issues were resolved.)

By the time the October 2015 session rolled around, both Harrington and Connell argued that they should receive more detailed discovery about the investigation – even if it was closed – before Pohl ruled on whether a conflict or a potential conflict existed.

The judge sided with Campoamor-Sanchez, however: With the investigation closed, he could make a finding of no-conflict on the spot and the case could move forward. But Pohl ordered the Special Review Team to provide additional discovery on the past investigation, and he added that any of the affected teams, not limited to Harrington’s, could file new conflict motions in the future. (The judge also ruled during that session that bin al Shibh was competent to stand trial.)

Reuters broke the story of one aspect of the investigation with an article explaining how a member from Harrington’s team relayed a message from bin al Shibh to his nephew in Yemen. Investigators were apparently concerned that the message to bin al Shibh’s nephew was “coded” but later determined it to be harmless.

Nevin referred to the article in court during the October session, telling Pohl it was especially disturbing because defense lawyers have to meet with defendant family members in order to do their jobs.

“It was found that Mr. Harrington wasn’t doing anything wrong, but I don’t know what the basis for that finding was,” Nevin said. “I don’t know how close Mr. Harrington was to a line. I don’t know what it would have taken for him to have been judged to have been on the other side of that line.”

Over the past year, Harrington and his team’s lead military defense lawyer, Army Maj. Alaina Wichner, have been receiving discovery on the investigation into their team, per Pohl’s order. Harrington has not been shy in telling both Pohl and the media that what they are learning about the FBI’s infiltration into his team is alarming, and that the issue is far from over.

In a meeting with reporters during the Spring session, Harrington and Wichner explained that the Reuters story covered one facet of the investigation. They added that investigators had also infiltrated their team to probe any improprieties with information going in the other direction – to bin al Shibh. In total, five members of the team – all long since fired – gave privileged information to investigators.

Harrington said that there is a lot of “gray area” in the area of national security when it comes to deciding what information the client can see. None of the information given to bin al Shibh was classified, but apparently several team members were concerned enough to cooperate with the FBI.

The investigation was obviously traumatic for the team and a major distraction to actual case preparation. Harrington said he credits Wichner with keeping what was left of the team together and also rebuilding with new additions to create an environment of trust. (As on other teams, some members continue to wait for security clearances that are required to meet with the client and see all case information.)

Wichner has encouraged members of the team to express any concerns they have about security issues or the handling of information.

Baker, the chief defense counsel, said the FBI investigation lingers over not just the bin al Shibh team but his entire office.

“The people that work for me, their security clearance for many of them is their livelihood, and the idea that if they don’t follow the rules they can be justifiably held accountable is something that makes us extra cautious in what we are doing,” Baker said. “That very justifiable anxiety is made much worse by the fact that we have still never received the official guidance about what is classified and what is not that we are entitled to under the regulations.”

No one wants to get fired, or go to jail and be disbarred, which is what happened to defense attorney Lynne Stewart after passing on information from Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, her convicted terrorist client, to third parties.

References to the “chilling effect” will occasionally find their way into the proceedings. During witness testimony over the female guards, in December, Nevin probed the then-commander of the detention center, Army Col. David Heath, about instances in which female guards are given different roles than their male counterparts. Heath acknowledged that it’s true that female guards cannot watch a detainee shower. Heath then told Nevin that, similarly, a female guard would not be allowed to see the defense attorney unclothed.

“It makes me a little uncomfortable that you imagine me as a detainee,” Nevin responded.

Despite the gravity of the case, almost every court session has some exchange that leads to laughter in the viewing gallery – and that was one of them. But Nevin wasn’t smiling.

Harrington has quipped a few times that FBI agents must have been excited about the possibility of nabbing a veteran defense attorney, particularly one representing a 9/11 defendant. But it’s unlikely many people who work for the traveling court system would enjoy seeing Harrington go, not least of all Pohl, who seems to get a kick out of the affable and proudly Irish-American partner of Harrington & Mahoney, based in Buffalo. Harrington has been practicing since 1969, after graduating from the law school at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Harrington has generally left the long and technical, or long and impassioned, arguments to the other lead attorneys, and is more likely to take his turn at the podium offering a relatively brief complementary argument. During the female guard litigation, Harrington compared his client’s religious beliefs to his Irish-Catholic parents banning the family from eating meat. Pohl corrected him: You mean just on Fridays, right?

“Yes, we did eat meat on other days,” Harrington said. “Every other day I should say. Overcooked.”

“We are Irish,” Pohl observed.

“That’s the only way to eat it, Judge,” Harrington said.

Then he made his point: We cannot fully understand all fixed religious beliefs in the world. He said that his mother found it “heartbreaking” when he merely inquired why he couldn’t eat meat on Fridays, and she struggled with the issue when the Church lifted the Friday ban.

“It doesn’t matter whether we agree with the reasons behind it,” Harrington argued. “It’s a religious belief, and we are not here to make that kind of a judgment.”

Bin al Shibh also seems to want Harrington to stick around, given that the attorney is relentlessly litigating his concerns over his treatment at Camp 7. Though he often stays in the background, Harrington has played a starring role in two of the more exciting court days this past year: on Feb. 24, when his client testified in court about alleged mental torture at the Camp 7 facility; and on June 2, when fellow Camp 7 detainee Hassan Guleed (who is not charged before the commission) testified to support bin al Shibh’s claims.

Those days highlighted another of the case’s long-pending litigation series, that involving bin al Shibh’s claims that the JTF guard force is subjecting him to noises and vibrations as a continuation of the torture from the CIA black sites. Harrington’s team filed the first motion complaining about the alleged mistreatment in April 2013.

Prosecutors have suggested that the defendant is hallucinating, lying or hearing normal construction and maintenance noise in the detention facility. Pohl ordered the government and the guard force to stop the disruptive noises and vibrations if they were in fact happening. But Harrington has begun several court days over the past year telling Pohl the abuse is continuing, that his client is suffering badly and that he is often in a distracted state for court proceedings. A pending motion now seeks to hold the government in contempt for allegedly violating Pohl’s order.

Most observers seemed to side with the government on this one, and assume that bin al Shibh may be suffering from the aftereffects of the black sites; his claims sound a little wacky. But Harrington has tried to chip away at the assumptions, alluding not only to the past torture at the black sites but also to all the unknowns about what might go on at Camp 7. In October, after Connell alerted everyone about the top-secret ACCM they needed to know about involving Camp 7 surveillance, in response to bin Attash’s pro se inquiry, Harrington told Pohl this program could be related to what’s happening to his client. Maybe the guard force didn’t even know about the sounds and vibrations, Harrington said.

How could that be? Pohl wondered.

“They may be very sophisticated,” Harrington said. “They may be very low level. They may be just enough to set him off, just the same kind of things that happened to him years ago.”

He added: “It’s a very, very sophisticated program, and it’s something that the ordinary person, such as a guard outside the cell with a steel door or something like that, may well not know anything about.”

On Feb. 24, bin al Shibh walked to the witness stand, flanked though untouched by guards. Pohl ordered that he would remain free of shackles on his short walk to the witness box on the judge’s left side. Harrington later said that it was the first time his client has walked freely – with so many unshackled steps – since his capture on the one-year anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks in Pakistan, in 2002.

Bin al Shibh spoke calmly in accented but clear English during quick-moving direct examination by his lead defender. Harrington used the Senate Torture Report as the basis for a brief exchange about bin al Shibh’s past treatment, which included noises and vibrations at the black sites, before moving into how the treatment has continued at Guantánamo. (Bin al Shibh testified that the Senate report did not document all that was done to him.)

At 10:08 a.m. the courtroom’s red security light began flashing. The video monitor switched to a “Please Stand By” message and all observers were ushered out of the viewing gallery for about a minute before open proceedings resumed. The last audio to reach the gallery before the interruption involved bin al Shibh starting to compare structural characteristics of the black sites with Camp 7. The testimony thereafter went smoothly, without the censor button being pushed.

“Make all my life terrible, make it upside down,” bin al Shibh testified of the alleged noises and vibrations. “You cannot concentrate, you cannot read, you cannot sleep, you cannot pray, you cannot do any of this because of living with this condition day and night, 24 hours a day.”

Bin al Shibh said that the noises take different forms – from banging on the walls of his cell to buzzing – while the vibrations feel like “sitting in a car with the engine on.” He said it’s common for the guard force to wake him swiftly after he appears to fall asleep, and that guards are often proudly defiant of Pohl’s order. He also said that the treatment can get worse when he complains.

Harrington focused a series of questions on how the disturbances affect bin al Shibh’s ability to participate in his defense. The defendant testified that disruptions occur as he tries to work on his case and that they get worse in the days before and during legal meetings and commission sessions. He said he has cancelled legal meetings and decided not to go to court as a result of his sleep deprivation and anxiety.

Among those not buying his claims was Clay Trivett, a counterterrorism prosecutor with the Justice Department’s national security division. Of the prosecutors who do most of the arguing in court – including also Gen. Martins, Ryan and Swann – Trivett is the most boyish of the lot. But he brings a deep amount of experience, having been first assigned to the military commissions in 2003. He is also a Reserve JAG Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy.

Under cross-examination, bin al Shibh rejected Trivett’s suggestions that the sounds may not be happening or perhaps are natural sounds from pipes. The prosecutor also raised the idea that bin al Shibh was lying to harass the guard force and to continue his jihad against the United States; the witness acknowledged that he views himself as an enemy of the U.S. He also acknowledged making abusive statements, such as calling female guards “sluts,” and breaking security cameras.

In what seemed a non-sequitur, Trivett asked bin al Shibh if he remembers his dreams when he sleeps. The witness answered “sometimes.”

“Do you dream about the people killed on Sept. 11th?” Trivett asked.

Pohl sustained Harrington’s objection before bin al Shibh could answer.

Trivett elicited detailed testimony from bin al Shibh about the workings of the detention facility. In the defendant’s view, the facility is a giant machine that allows guards to send noises and vibrations to almost any area, including cells, attorney meeting rooms, recreation areas and the media room.

This might sound farfetched to some. At the hearing’s concluding press conference, however, Harrington said that he can feel trace effects or sensations of what his client is experiencing at the Camp Echo complex, where he meets with his client. Of course, by then, anybody directing vibrations to the room would stop to make it seem like bin al Shibh was imagining the whole thing, so Harrington was possibly just feeling mild aftershocks.

The 9/11 commission, like other long cases, progresses like a movie being filmed out of sequence, with scenes seldom occurring in a logical order to the casual observer. A motion might come up in one set of hearings and finish up with oral arguments in the next session, or maybe two sessions later, particularly if witnesses are required, which requires logistical preparations. And so the dispute over the alleged vibrations simmered from the end of February until the Spring session. That week in court was among the most highly anticipated of the past year due to the planned testimony of fellow Camp 7 detainee Abu Zubaydah, who was expected to support bin al Shibh’s claims.

The Palestinian is one of the better-known detainees due to his repeated mention in the Senate’s Torture Report. The report described Zubaydah as “the CIA’s first detainee” to go through the enhanced interrogation program. For Zubaydah, that reportedly included 83 rounds of waterboarding and a long list of other abuses, including being confined inside a coffin.

The guard force transported Zubaydah and the other corroborating witness, Hassan Guleed [aka Guleed Hassan Ahmed or Gouled Hassan Dourad], to Camp Justice on June 2, with Guleed scheduled to testify first. But there was a problem with getting Zubaydah to the stand: Unlike Guleed, he is one of the detainees who has been considered for prosecution and was represented by counsel. Zubaydah waited just outside the door of the courtroom (unseen by observers in the gallery) as his lawyer, Navy Cmdr. Patrick Flor, told Pohl that he would object to any line of questioning that could incriminate his client. This created an impasse given that Pohl had decided that the prosecution could probe Zubaydah for bias, including questions about his terrorist ties.

Harrington and Flor agreed that the testimony could not move forward. Flor left the court to update Zubaydah before he was transported back to Camp 7. After the session ended, Flor told reporters that his client was disappointed but that he looked forward to testifying at some point.

Still, Guleed, a 43-year-old Somali who testified in English, had held the gallery’s attention during lively direct examination by Harrington and cross by prosecutor Ryan. He testified that he has been subjected to offensive “smells” as well as to noises and vibrations.

“We have mental torture in Camp 7,” Guleed said.

The witness said that he decided to testify to help his “brother” (the two men are not related) and because his complaints to the guards – which he stopped making years ago – had not helped.

Guleed also testified that a second 9/11 defendant – “Brother Mohammed” – also has experienced disruptions. He said that he and Mohammed are separated from each other by a cell but are able to communicate when both are in their individual recreation areas behind their cells. He described a situation when he and Mohammed both heard a banging noise – like a “hammer on a roof.” (In one prior session, when Harrington updated Pohl about the continuing abuse of his client, Nevin stood up to add that his client, Mohammed, had also recently reported to him a similar experience.)

Ryan suggested that Guleed told multiple lies on the stand out of a continued devotion to al Qaeda, an affiliation the witness denied.

“Is America your enemy?” Ryan asked.

“No,” Guleed responded. He testified that he sees Americans as his friends because they provide him with his food at Camp 7.

Both Harrington and Guleed complained that Ryan was cutting the witness off during his cross examination, and Pohl told Ryan to slow down. Ryan told Guleed he would not cut him off.

“You did already, eh?” the witness said, sounding almost Canadian.

Evidence on the vibrations continued later in the session, when a former Camp 7 commander, who was not identified by name, testified by video that both he and his predecessor had inspected areas of the facility and found no evidence to corroborate bin al Shibh’s claims. He said that roof repairs, air conditioner maintenance, installation of insulation and other activities could create loud noises. He said the guard force always notifies the detainees of such repairs in advance.

But the public did not learn all that the former commander had to say. That’s because, on occasion, witness testimony is bifurcated, with some being given in open court and the rest in closed session when classified information may be involved. The commander repeatedly refused to answer certain questions about Camp 7 during Harrington’s cross-examination, explaining that he’d rather address those inquiries in the closed portion.

The witness did testify in open court that he never asked to see the schematics of Camp 7 or inquire what company built the facility. He also testified he did not have any special training in mechanical or electrical engineering, plumbing or construction, and that when conducting his inspections he was looking for something that would have appeared unusual to him. He did not, for example, inspect the wiring that went into the defendant’s cells.

“I did not look inside the walls,” the former commander told Harrington.

“We’ll ask about the walls in a little bit,” the attorney said, pointing to the closed session scheduled for that afternoon.

Zubaydah may yet testify, whether at the scheduled October hearings or after. Harrington made a request to the current convening authority, Paul Oostburg-Sanz, to grant Zubaydah a limited “testimonial immunity,” so that prosecutors could not use what he says in court against him. Oostburg-Sanz denied the request, but the defense has asked Pohl to reconsider. Even if Pohl sides with the convening authority, Zubaydah could choose to testify after conferring with his attorneys.

VI. Case Moves Forward on Island Time

Pohl has a standing rule that all defense teams are presumed to have automatically joined each other’s motions, unless they move to unjoin. One reason why the litigation can proceed slowly through a single issue is that all defense teams may want to question a witness or give oral arguments on a motion, perhaps to make a point specific to their client or that the other teams may not have focused on. But the rule nevertheless makes sense, as the teams have similar positions on many issues and unjoining happens only on occasion.

Apparently, this rule can create confusion if a third-party files a motion. That happened earlier this year when a consortium of news organizations challenged the government’s redaction of parts of the transcript for the Oct. 30, 2015 hearing, when a Camp 7 guard testified in the female guard dispute. The entire hearing was held in open court. Lawdragon and other media representatives were in the viewing gallery, and Miami Herald reporter Carol Rosenberg live tweeted the hearing from the media center, which has the court feed. After the hearing, the government nevertheless decided to redact from the published transcript information related to guard staff and operations that it deemed sensitive and did not want on the web. The media consortium claims the censorship is unconstitutional; the litigation is pending.

Dave Schulz, a longtime media lawyer at Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, travelled from New York earlier this year, for the oral arguments on Feb. 22. Without the necessary security clearances, Schulz could not be in court except to make his arguments; he had to watch defense and prosecution arguments from the gallery. With the 40-second security delay, Schulz also was able to watch the last several seconds of his own presentation on the video feed after he took his seat with the rest of the observers behind the glass.

A side issue was how automatic joinder might work when a third-party files a motion that at least some defense teams support. Three defense teams had filed joinders to the media motion. Nevin told Pohl told he was joining the defense teams who joined the motion, but had not necessarily thought of himself as joining Shulz’s motion. Pohl understood, using his catchphrase: “I got it.”

“You are joining the joinders,” the judge said.

“Unless I unjoin,” Nevin confirmed.

Gen. Martins wasn’t exactly upset about this, but he arose to say that the approach didn’t seem to follow the rules of the court because the automatic joinder rule applied to joining motions, which have “content,” not to joining a mere notice of joinder.

Pohl said that he would be lenient in this instance, as it appeared that a few teams thought they had “automatically joined the joinder.”

“But in the future going forward, if it’s a third-party motion, I need affirmative joinders of the motion, not joinders of the joinder,” Pohl said.

Though Martins was satisfied, Bormann then stood up. She pointed out that the joinder to the media motion filed by Connell’s team wasn’t simply a “pro forma motion,” it had “subsequent legal argument” by adopting Shulz’s arguments and adding supplemental points. That is why her team thought they had already – and automatically – joined that particular joinder, which was really more of a motion in its own right.

“We are spending way too much time on this issue,” Pohl concluded, perhaps stating the obvious.

The parties also can spend a significant amount of time simply talking about which pleadings they are referring to in court, as there are thousands of them. Each motion is assigned a number with the letters AE, for “appellate exhibit,” so the hundredth motion is AE100. Then each subsequent pleading within the series is given a letter, so AE100A is followed by AE100B and, when the series moves past Z, the next in line is AE100AA. Lawyers sound the letters out in court using the military phonetic, so AE100BB will be talked about as “100 Bravo Bravo” or “100 Double Bravo.”

The pleadings in the AE292 series – dealing with the potential conflict of interest from the FBI investigation into the bin al Shibh defense team – proved particularly confusing to sort through. Naturally, it was up to Connell to try to straighten out for the commission which motions were pending.

“Separately pending is 292 Quadruple Yankee, which is our request to unseal the long series of classified and unclassified but all under-seal pleadings by the Special Review Team,” Connell explained at one point on Oct. 25. “Connected to that, a sort of footnote to 292 Quadruple Yankee, is that the Special Review Team has filed 292 Quintuple Delta, which was although styled as a notice, is really a motion to approve redactions without, in our opinion, complying with the requirements of M.C.R.E. [Military Commissions Rules of Evidence] 506.”

Connell added that 292 Quintuple Delta “could be seen as an unauthorized supplement to 292 Quadruple Yankee, or it can be seen as its own issue.”

He told the judge that he needed to resolve those issues before moving on “to the question of resolving 292 Romeo Romeo, the government’s motion to reconsider, and 292 Sierra Sierra, the defense motion to reconsider.”

Connell continued, “Now, 292 Sierra Sierra, the defense motion to reconsider, contains within it essentially two components. One of those is the ruling in 292 Quebec Quebec regarding AE 292 Lima…”

And on it went.

Despite the joinders, if there is one defense team that tries to distance itself a little bit more from the others, it’s the al Hawsawi team, which sits in the far back, often without the client present. Ruiz is not necessarily likely to unjoin other motions – he often takes the lead with impassioned omnibus attacks on the system, such as with the defective referral or unlawful influence motions – but he also contends that the case doesn’t have a whole lot to do with his client. Ruiz first filed a motion for severance back in May 2014 and has supplemented his position in pleadings since.

“The prosecution’s case against Mr. al Hawsawi, as well as his criminal culpability, if any, is disproportionate when compared to his co-accused,” the motion states, referring to al Hawsawi’s alleged role in providing money to the hijackers. His lawyers argue that he had little contact with the other defendants, and that a joint prosecution severely prejudices him because the panel that decides the case with be likely to transfer guilt from the others.

Prosecutors counter that the defense motion mischaracterizes al Hawsawi’s role in the plot.

“Mr. Hawsawi ran many necessary errands, and he ran them with willingness and knowledge that an operation to take American lives was underway,” the government wrote in its response brief.

To be sure, the media often lumps “the five 9/11 defendants” together when covering the case by not always detailing the allegations specific to each accused. Much of the general public probably knows that Mohammed, or KSM, as he’s broadly referred to, is the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; beyond that, they all are conjoined as the accused plotters.

Ruiz believes that the government intentionally groups the defendants together, even when defense teams advance different arguments. That was evident in July in defense motions over the alleged evidence destruction of CIA black site evidence, when Ruiz declined to join parts of the motion that sought to remove both the judge and the prosecution from the case.

Ruiz told Pohl that he was bothered that trial counsel, Swann, had criticized the “entire left side of the room with the same broad brush.” Ruiz argued that a military judge like Pohl could “cut through the weeds” to see the distinctions, but a jury may not have that ability if the prosecution kept stepping “away from individualized determinations based on legal positions and relative roles in the case.”

Pohl asked Ruiz if he was supplementing his motion for severance, then caught himself: He didn’t want to encourage another pleading.

“Yes, we have information that we can add,” Ruiz said. “And you don’t have to encourage me, judge, on this issue, I think you know that.”

Pohl acknowledged that al Hawsawi deserved “an answer” on the pending motion at some point.

For the first half of the case, Ruiz was a Naval Commander and wore his uniform in court. With his extensive experience as a state and federal public defender before his most recent stint in the Navy, Ruiz for a time actually wore two hats on the 9/11 case as both the learned counsel and the military counsel for al Hawsawi. He is now a reservist and in civilian clothes. He has two military lawyers at his table, Marine Lt. Col. Sean Gleason and Army Lt. Col. Jennifer Williams, and another civilian lawyer, Suzanne Lachelier.

As the case has dragged on, Ruiz is not the only attorney to step out of uniform. The second civilian attorney for bin Attash, Schwartz, has been with Bormann since the 2012 arraignment. He was an Air Force Major through the fall of 2015 before becoming a civilian to stay on the case, as he was scheduled to rotate to another assignment. Schwartz showed up to the February 2016 hearings in civilian clothes for the first time, and also with a beard. It was a bit of a cruel move when bin Attash later decided he wanted to fire both Bormann and Schwartz. The government supported Schwartz’s removal from the case because, as additional civilian counsel, Schwartz was not “statutorily required” to be present as learned counsel Bormann was. But Pohl included Schwartz is in his order that bin Attash did not have “good cause” to fire his lawyers.

Army Maj. Wichner, for bin al Shibh, also will be returning to civilian life later this year in order to stay on the case with Harrington. Chief defense counsel Baker says the rotation of military personnel is also an ongoing issue for the military paralegals, analysts and investigators who play crucial roles on the teams, and who have to choose between staying with the case and remaining competitive for promotion. He believes that the teams are vastly underresourced and is seeking additional civilian and military staff, recently securing funding for additional paralegals from the convening authority.

But Baker says it makes more sense to staff the case with civilian attorneys, when possible. The biggest change observers of the case may see is the addition of a second learned counsel for each 9/11 defendant. If the government is going to move forward with the trial of the century, he says, it had better put its money where its mouth is.

“The legal standard on capital cases is very clear,” Baker explained. “Counsel are essentially required to investigate and litigate two simultaneous cases: one to determine the guilt of the client and one for mitigation if the client is found guilty. If we really want to try these cases, there needs to be a second learned counsel on each team.”

Not surprisingly, the arrival of the 15th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks renewed discussions of whether the case would be better off in federal court, even if the steps to get there (transferring detainees) are presently barred by Congress. The most commonly expressed critique of the commissions system is that it’s unnecessary given that federal courts have successfully processed hundreds of terrorist cases, typically ending in conviction.

Only one detainee case, that of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was moved to federal court from Guantánamo Bay before Congress banned transfers of detainees to U.S. soil. In 2010, Ghailani was found guilty in New York federal court for his role in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam and received a life sentence – another success, perhaps, for the civilian side. But supporters of the military option also cite the case as a dangerous near-failure, given that Ghailani was convicted of just a single conspiracy count and acquitted of hundreds of murder and terrorism charges. U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan excluded a key witness from testifying after learning he had been through the CIA’s coercive interrogations. Of course, a military judge at Guantánamo Bay might have to make a similar call under the 2009 MCA’s provisions.

The convictions by military commissions include three during the Bush era (one by guilty plea) and five under Obama (all by guilty plea). They generally have resulted in short sentences, with all but three of the convicted detainees long since transferred out of Guantánamo Bay to their home countries. In addition, the D.C. Circuit has overturned convictions on charges of providing material support for terrorism and conspiracy – charges used in federal court cases all the time – because they were not recognized war crimes at the time the defendants engaged in the conduct. The government has challenged the D.C. Circuit’s invalidation of the conspiracy charge in the case against Ali al Bahlul, who received a life sentence and remains at Guantánamo; a ruling is pending [Note: see my update on this, coming very soon].

For a military tribunal, the Sept. 11 case is on much firmer ground because the allegations include established war crimes as attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, murder and destruction of property in violation of the law of war, terrorism and hijacking.

And, of course, by this point so much has transpired in the case that starting over in a new jurisdiction is difficult to imagine – even if imagining this commission’s conclusion is equally difficult. The case has finally built some semblance of momentum. Pohl always sets the hearing docket based on the motions that have been fully briefed. During the Spring and Summer sessions, the judge and the lawyers were pleasantly surprised that they made it through everything available for argument.

“As I’ve said on many occasions, I’m more optimistic than realistic,” Pohl told the court on June 2. “But actually this week we got a lot of things done, much more than I anticipated, and we’ve kind of exhausted what’s on the docket.”

He called an early recess for the day.

Critics of the military commissions often invoke the victim family members, who must wait for justice. In the area of war crimes and international justice, the long wait for justice is a recurring theme for victims and their families, particularly in new court systems that attempt to account for mass atrocities. In one of just many examples from the past few decades, earlier this year the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, based in The Hague, finally convicted Serb wartimes leader Radovan Karadzic for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity tied to events that unfolded in the early-to-mid 1990s. In the eyes of some observers, like former Attorney General Eric Holder, who claimed nearly three years ago that the five defendants would be on death row if they had been prosecuted in federal court, the difference is that the wait for 9/11 justice is self-inflicted, not mandated by an existing court’s inability or unwillingness to handle a case.

At the press conference concluding the most recent session in July, Harrington said that the fastest way to move the case along would be “to take the death penalty off the table.”

“The government ought to seriously consider that at this point,” the attorney said.

But family members who have travelled to Guantánamo Bay don’t often criticize the government for the pace of the case, resenting instead certain defense tactics. It’s hard to generalize on these topics, as some family members said they would have preferred a federal court trial. But most who have spoken on the record are deeply appreciative of the effort put forth by Martins and his team and say they are willing to wait as long as it takes at the Guantánamo military tribunal. Where critics see a farcical system stacked against the defendants, these observers see a system willing to bend over backwards for the defendants, to cross every “t” and dot every “i” to prove that Americans do things right.

When he took the job of chief prosecutor, Martins requested the assignment to be his last in the military to avoid any consideration for a promotion. He was scheduled to retire back in 2014 before receiving a three-year extension. He believes in continuity, and the long view.

“We’re going to do this for however long it takes,” Martins told Lawdragon earlier this year. “Another benefit of meeting with family members is that many of them take a long view, too. They inspire us.”

Syria, Where Foreign Involvements Are Barring Meaningful Solution – OpEd

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Syrians have been passing five consecutive years under fierce conflict and there is yet no sign of peace.

However, the failed meetings and the “talk-shop” conferences among local and regional parties led by the global powers have been continuing in usual intervals. Questions arose as to how long will it take to reach “peace”? How much more blood will be spilled? How many refugees had to risk their lives into Europe? How many more meetings and conferences in lavish vicinities are required to agree to life by disagreeing deaths?

UN RESOLUTION 2015: TOO AMBITIOUS TO REVOLVE INTO REALITY

Meetings, conferences and ceasefire-agreements have been taking place since the beginning of Syrian war, without any success. Last December (2015), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed a road map for a peace process in Syria, adopting unanimously the resolution 2254 (2015). The resolution called for an immediate ceasefire, endorsing a non-sectarian government in Syria within “6 months”, and set a schedule and process for the drafting of a new Constitution. The resolution also endorsed for UN-monitored elections within “18 months” pursuant to the new Constitution, reiterating the call for the Syrian people to decide the future of Syria.

However, although 10 months have already gone-by since the UN resolution, the formation of the said non-sectarian government in Syria still seems far away. Furthermore, it appears from the current conflict-rattled Syrian scenario that the expected new Constitution and the UN-monitored elections that were projected in the abovementioned UN resolution are just too ambitious to be taken seriously, atleast not in near future.

PROLONGED SYRIAN WAR

The Syrian civilian mass have been suffering a prolonged brutal war. The prolonging of the war was possible because of certain factors: (i) almost all sides have foreign support in order to prolong the war, (ii) the sides are well matched and (iii) each faction has sufficient willpower and resources to continue the war for a longer period.

Indeed, each side is truly well matched. If one side’s willpower is at the peak, the other sides have either the best military resources or financial resources or foreign backup to fill up their lacking in other aspects. While groups like al-Nusra and ISIS (and Hezbolla as well), who are driven by the thought of paving their way to paradise, lack no determination or willpower to continue the war, the ‘Sunni Arab’ rebels have backups from regional powers (mainly Saudis, Qataris and Turks) to carry on their part of the campaign. The ‘socialist kurdi’ rebels (within Syria) are backed by the West (mainly the U.S.). On the otherside, the Assad regime, which is largely manpowered by its army’s Alawite (shia) fighters and Lebanese shia-oriented armed organization Hezbolla, has the blessings of Russians and Iranians to continue its part.

IRAQ: OCCUPATION, DESERTION OF SUNNIS & RISE OF ISIS

Foreign involvements in the Middle Eastern region are nothing new. The U.S. led foreign involvement (occupation) in Iraq – by using the excuse of saving the world from Saddam Hossain’s chemical weapons – is a burning example of what the impact of a foreign intervention could look like for any Middle Eastern country.

When the U.S. was largely leaving the occupation, they, instead of leaving a harmonized Iraq, left an Iraq that was unstable, sectarian and chaotic.

During US’s full-fledged Iraq occupation, the U.S. troops, with the help of Iraqi ‘Sunni Arab’ tribes, largely defeated Al-Qaeda in Iraq (now ISIS) by 2008. But the desertion of the ‘Sunni Arab’ tribes by the U.S. (on its large departure of troops from Iraq) in the hands of a shia-oriented sectarian government caused the tribes to lose their trust completely on the U.S. and the Iraqi regime. Out of the widespread tortures that they faced from the sectarian Iraqi regime and out of their distrust for the regime, one large part of the ‘Sunni Arab’ population in Iraq started to vision for an independent state or, atleast, for an autonomous region for their own. For this reason, even before the rise of ISIS, they had been aiming to form a separate ‘Sunni Arab’ state, which would be completely independent from Iraq. Right before the emergence of ISIS, the continuous protests in places like Fallujah (a city within Anbar province of Iraq) and the breakout of armed protests every now and then increasingly showed their frustration towards the sectarian regime in Bagdad. The uncompromising nature of those protests portrayed that they won’t settle down unless they earn their independent state or, atleast, an autonomous ‘Sunni Arab’ region for their own within a reformed non-sectarian federal Iraq.

Although this part of the ‘Sunni Arab’ population did not work for any state or non-state actors in primary, their desperation towards independence (or atleast autonomy) had pushed them for searching helping-hands in achieving their purpose. In other words, this portion of ‘Sunni Arab’ population seemed to be ready to help any groups or sides whosoever could help them back with their vision of independence.

After the rise of ISIS, this portion of ‘Sunni Arab’ population had started to collaborate with the militant organization for fulfilling their own purpose, without accepting and embracing the ideology of the militant organization. On the otherhand, the other part of the Iraqi ‘Sunni Arab’ population, which was exceptionally frustrated from the tortures by the shia militias, had directly jointed ISIS after accepting and embracing their ideology. Thus, it appears that the U.S. occupation of Iraq, followed by the desertion of the ‘Sunni Arab’ tribes by the U.S. in the hands of a shia-oriented sectarian regime of Iraq, had caused the ‘Sunni Arab’ population (largely) to walk in line with the ISIS strategy.

RUSSIA & U.S. IN SYRIA: SEEKING NOT A SOLUTION, BUT OWN INTERESTS

Such a situation in Iraq, where both the parts of ‘Sunni Arab’ population are either collaborating with ISIS or directly working under ISIS, is impacting occurrences in Syria as well. This is because, ISIS operates in both the countries, with recruits and resources of ISIS in Iraq taken to Syria every now and then for military operations.

Moreover, the recent increased military operations all over Iraq against ISIS are signalling that a more alarming imperial vision is in making. The U.S. has been backing the Iraqi troops and shia militias across Iraq in order to push ISIS out of the Iraqi cities towards the Iraqi borders with Syria. The ongoing operation in Mosul, which seems to have started without taking adequate time for military preparations or sufficient time for removing the civilians out of the area, is another of such imperial vision where the U.S. is hastening to push the ISIS fighters out of Iraq towards Syria, so that it becomes easier to weaken the Assad regime further in line with the imperial vision of the U.S. While it is true that the Assad regime has committed atrocities across Syria, this does not legitimize the U.S.’s attempt of using ISIS against the Assad regime.

On the other side, out of its adamant ambition of keeping Syria under its geopolitical influence, Russia is utterly backing Assad’s army, which has been massacring villages after villages and bombarding civilian areas indiscriminately by the excuse of fighting rebels and, in some cases, militants.

While both the coalitions, one led by Russia and the other by the U.S., claim to be working to find a solution for the Syrian conflict, the reality appears different from their actions. The U.S.-led Western alliance, the Saudi-led Sunni alliance and the broader coalition between these two alliances could not deliver any set plan for Syria in last five years. On the otherhand, the other coalition – involving Assad regime, Iraqi regime, Iran and Russia – claim that they have a plan. Though, no one else otherthan themselves knows what the plan is!

SCHEMES IN IRAQ & SYRIA

The Middle East is of strategic importance to the world, particularly because of its supply of oil. Many analysts believe that the U.S.’s plan is to engineer a conflict between the two major regional foes, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, in order to make accessibility of the region risky for adamant Russia and energy-starved China, both of which are trying to reshape the current global order that is led and dominated by the U.S. On the otherhand, many other analysts say that it is Russia, not the U.S., which wants to engineer such a conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and then get the U.S. embroiled into the mess and drive up the cost of oil, benefitting Russia that is suffering from lower global oil price.

There is another analysis regarding the regionwide conflict in the Middle East. The Western powers want to redraw the map of the region in such a way that serves their current-day interests. There is a widespread view that a Kurdish state, which would be carved out of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, is within the western powers’ working desk. Moreover, a comparatively smaller number of analysts believe that two further states, a Sunni Arab state and a Shia Arab state, might as well emerge out of Iraq, making Iraq obliterated as a nation state from the world map. However, all these analyses, and perhaps willingness, might go into vein as two regional countries, namely Turkey and Iran, might put their full efforts into spoiling such abovementioned attempts of carving out new nation states for the sake of their own national territorial integrity and their greater regional geopolitical interests.

WRAPPING UP

One reality-check regarding any international involvements in an independent country is that foreign interventions themselves are the real problems. One burning example of ‘problems brought by the foreign involvements’ in the an independent country could be found in the rise of ISIS in Iraq, which, as mentioned earlier, was caused by the U.S.’s occupation of Iraq and its subsequent desertion of the ‘Sunni Arab’ tribes.
The actions and apparent intensions of the global and regional powers with regard to Syria clearly show that foreign involvements in the country are doing more damage than solving problems. Infact, foreign involvements are solving no problems at all. Rather, the prolonging of the Syrian war seems to be largely caused by the foreign engagements in the country.

Because of such foreign involvements, the ongoing destructive process in Syria reached the point of no return. No efforts can save Syria if foreign involvements are not completely eliminated. Continuation of such involvements will only be followed by the final disintegration of the country.

Therefore, would it not be better to end all sorts of international interventions by all international parties in Syria? Would it not be better to leave the Syrians alone to solve their own problems? Innocent people in Syria and Iraq are suffering from the ongoing conflict. The influx of refugees in Europe is a sheer reflection of this reality. These sufferings will only end when the U.S., which is backing one warring side, and Russia, which is backing the other side, will end their interference in the country. The country is better off without foreign involvements. Let Syrians solve their own problems. Let the international powers – Russia, the West and the Middle Eastern powers – not interfere anymore in Syria. Only then a constructive, meaningful and permanent solution could be reached sooner.

*Bahauddin Foizee, primarily associated with law practice, is an analyst & columnist on international affairs, and specializes on Middle Eastern, Asia-Pacific & European geopolitics.

Belarus Trying To ‘Leave Russian World On The Sly’– OpEd

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A Russian commentator who insists that Belarus and the Belarusian language do not exist despite efforts by Poles, Trotskyites, and Russophobes to promote them says that at present Belarus is “leaving the Russian world on the sly” by promoting pre-school instruction in Belarusian “ by hook or by crook.”

In terms that recall some of the worst and most ignorant memes of Soviet propaganda, Alla Bron says that this tactic is part of Minsk’s effort to try to “overcome the irredentist attitudes of Belarusians, the absolute majority of whom want to reunite with their big Motherland, Russia” (regnum.ru/news/polit/2196715.html).

According to Bron, only three groups of people in Belarus speak Belarusian: broadcasters, instructors in Belarusian language, and the Russophobic opposition. “The first two do so only at work, and the third only when people are watching. When ‘the Moskali’ aren’t listening, they speak Russian.”

“In certain regions of Belarus,” the Regnum commentator continues, “there exist at the village level particular Belarusian dialects which the Russophobes consider a language. But Belarusian dialects vary from one region to another, and they in no way come together to form a separate language.”

According to her, “by their lexical content, the Belarusian dialects do not have any relationship to the literary Belarusian language overfilled with Polonisms that was created in the 1920s and 1930s under the leadership of the Trotskyites who later were cleansed from power by Stalin.”

Bron says that “the very idea of a separate Belarusian nation appeared [only] at the end of the 19th century” when Poland was interested in promoting a halfway house between Russians and Poles and when the earlier religious halfway house, Uniatism, was declaring in importance in the region.

She insists that before 1917, “the idea of a new nation existed only in narrow circles of the Russophobic intelligentsia. After the Polish-Soivet war, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine became part of restored Poland.” But in the eastern portions of Belarus and Ukraine, apologists of the new ‘nations’ found protection from the Trotskyites who wanted to divide and destroy the Russian nation as too ‘conservative.’”

Given that these “’Belarusianizers’” cooperated with the Germans during World War II, Stalin “destroyed them and stopped Belarusianization. But after the collapse of the USSR,” those who took book in Minsk “began again their black work” against Russia, Bron argues.

“Many suggest that Lukashenka began active Belarusianization approximately three years ago after the Maidan in Ukraine. But this is not the case,” Bron says. In fact, “Belarusianization began immediately after the formation of a separate Belarusian state.” That is “absolutely logical,” she says.

According to her, “any system acts like a living organism and struggles against any threats to its existence. For the Belarusian state, such a threat is that the Belarusians are not a national group but only a local identity within the Russian people. In a national state, it is unthinkable not to have nation building.”

Lukashenka initially froze this out of the hope that he could take power in Moscow and later because he needed Russian money to survive. But Belarusianization was taking place even then. It only became more intense and more obvious in the last three years, however many people in Russia “refuse to believe this.”

Minsk’s policies, Bron says, have created what she calls “an idiotic formula” in which Belarusians say that Russian is a foreign language and Belarusian is a native one even though they do not want to study it because it leads nowhere. Consequently, the most Russophobic of the Belarusians are promoting the study of Belarusian in pre-school institutions.

Parents should move their children out of such institutions, Bron says. Otherwise, there is a risk that their children will never learn Russian well or will speak it with an accent and always be viewed as somehow marginal and second-rate. Belarusian, she suggests, isn’t a real language and isn’t going to survive.

“In the era of the Internet, old and really existing languages are disappearing one after the other. Even many European languages several decades from now will cease to exist,” she says. “What then can one say about the prospects of those that have come into existence only recently?”

Bron concludes: “The Belarusian language is needed only for those for whom it was thought up in the first place, for the gradual transformation of Russians into Poles. If you are a Russophobe,” she says, “study Polish now,” not Belarusian. There really is no need for this “intermediate step.”

Russia Beefs Up Baltic Fleet With Cruise Missile-Armed Whips

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(EurActiv) — Russia is reinforcing its Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad with two small warships armed with long-range cruise missiles to counter what it sees as a worrying NATO build-up in the region, Izvestia reported today (26 October).

There was no official confirmation from Moscow, but the report will raise tensions in the Baltic already heightened by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and is likely to cause particular consternation in Poland and Lithuania, which share land borders with Kaliningrad.

The reported deployment comes at a time when NATO is planning its biggest military build-up on Russia’s borders since the Cold War to counter Moscow. Russian military analysts said the move looked like a direct response to NATO.

Izvestia cited an unnamed military source as saying that the two ships, the Serpukhov and the Zeleny Dol, had already entered the Baltic Sea and would soon become part of a newly formed division.

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation said earlier this month that the two ships had left their Black Sea base to join Russia’s naval force in the Mediterranean.

The Buyan-class corvettes are armed with nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles, known by the NATO codename Sizzler, which the Russian military says have a range of at least 1,500 kilometres (932.06 miles).

Though variants of the missile are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the ships are believed to be carrying conventional warheads.

Sweden worried

Izvestia said Russia’s Baltic Fleet, which is based in its European exclave of Kaliningad, would probably receive a further three such small warships armed with the same missiles by the end of 2020.

It said the Baltic Fleet’s coastal defences would also be beefed up with the Bastion and Bal land-based missile systems. The Bastion is a mobile defence system armed with two anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 300 km (188 miles). The Bal anti-ship missile has a similar range.

Sweden’s Defence Minister said his country was worried by the presence of the warships in the Baltic Sea, complaining the move was likely to keep tension in the region high.

Sweden’s military confirmed the two vessels had entered the Baltic, but declined to give further information. Russian defence officials were not immediately available for comment.

“This is … worrying and is not something that helps to reduce tensions in our region,” Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist told Sweden’s national TT news agency. “This affects all the countries round the Baltic.”

Swedish media said the Kalibr missiles had the range to hit targets across the Nordic region. The Russian Defence Ministry said in August that the two corvettes had been used to fire cruise missiles at militants in Syria.

Earlier this month, Russia moved nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles into Kaliningrad leading to protests from Lithuania and Poland.

Pentagon Chief Announces Deterrence, Defense Buildup n Europe

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By By Terri Moon Cronk

As NATO faces new challenges from the east, south, north and from within, the United States will continue to strengthen deterrence by sending troops to Europe, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told reporters in Brussels Wednesday.

Carter is attending a conference of NATO defense ministers during the last stop on an overseas trip that also has included visits to Turkey, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and France.

“We are contributing a persistent rotational armored brigade combat team,” the secretary told reporters at NATO headquarters. “It’s a major sign of the U.S. commitment to strengthening deterrence here.”

Noting that the United States also is positioning an armored brigade combat team’s worth of equipment in Europe in addition to two brigades already in Europe, Carter said, as part of the European Reassurance Initiative.

“The $3.4 billion of funds in this fiscal year, … that’s quadruple what we had allocated last year,” he said.

First Deployment in February

The first rotational brigade will come from Colorado and will deploy to Europe in February, he said.

“It will have an initial exercise in Poland. After that, the brigade will send company-sized units to Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states,” Carter told reporters. “Companies will then remain in the Baltics until the NATO battalions arrive.”

In June, the brigade will conduct exercise Saber Strike in Poland and throughout the Baltic states, and in July, it will move to Bulgaria and Romania for exercises Swift Response and Saber Guardian, during which one tank company will transit the Black Sea to Georgia to participate in exercise Noble Partner, he said.

The secretary said he appreciate the countries that will host the brigade. “Together, we’re strengthening deterrence here,” he said.

U.S. to Lead Battalion in Poland

Carter said the United States will also lead a battalion in Poland as part of NATO’s new enhanced forward presence.

“This was a decision made by the alliance leaders in Warsaw,” he explained, referring to NATO’s July summit meeting in the Polish capital. “The United States will lead a battalion in Poland and deploy an entire battle-ready battalion task force of approximately 900 soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which is based in Germany. It will have a headquarters element; three Stryker-equipped maneuver companies with a mobile gun system; an artillery battery; and anti-tank, explosive ordnance disposal, and engineer capabilities.”

Romania and the United Kingdom will provide companies that enhance the U.S. battalion’s combat power and its survivability as it performs its forward-stationed deterrence mission in Poland, he added.

The U.S. battalion will arrive in Poland in April and will be positioned near the city of Orzysz in northeastern Poland, Carter said.

Control Transfer to Supreme Allied Commander for Europe

To ensure its readiness, the United States will immediately upon the onset of the deployment transfer operational control of the U.S. battalion to NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe and place it under the tactical control of a Polish brigade, the secretary said, adding that this transfer is “significant.”

Carter said the United States is encouraging others to make the same kind of command-and-control arrangements with NATO.

Bolstering Deterrence, Defense in Southeast

The defense ministers also discussed how the alliance can bolster deterrence and defense in the southeast in particular, Carter said.

“We also made a commitment, as the United States, to a battalion from our rotational armored brigade combat team to associate and train with the Romanian multinational brigade as part of the enhanced tailored presence oriented towards the southeastern portion of NATO.”

Later today, he said, discussions would center on how to continue to adapt NATO to ensure it is ready for the challenges not only of today, but tomorrow. “I’m sure we’ll talk about NATO’s southern flank,” he added, including the effort to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

The secretary said he had several useful bilateral and trilateral meetings, including one with his Turkish colleague, whom he visited in the Turkish capital of Ankara during his trip.

“Turkey’s a very strong ally, of course, of NATO, so we talked about a number of alliance issues. And of course, we talked, as we did in Ankara, further about the coalition’s activities against ISIL, a coalition of which, of course, Turkey is an important part,” he said.

“We all want to keep ISIL under sustained pressure — that’s the key — and defeat it in both Iraq and Syria, and everybody shares that objective,” Carter said.

Interest Builds On UK PM May’s Upcoming Visit To India – Analysis

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By Ashok Sajjanhar

Prime Minister Theresa May of the United Kingdom has taken a leaf out of her predecessor David Cameron’s book in that she also decided to make India the first country of visit outside Europe after taking over the mantle of PM in July this year. While Cameron came calling to New Delhi within 10 weeks of his anointment in July 2010, May will undertake her visit to New Delhi next month (Nov 6-8), about 15 weeks after taking over this position.

This signals continuity in policies pursued by Cameron in particular and UK in general in forging vibrant ties with India. In the preceding decade, four Prime Ministerial visits from UK to India — by Gordon Brown in 2008 and by David Cameron in 2010 and twice, in February and November, in 2013 — had taken place with a return visit by Prime Minister Modi in November last year.

During May’s tenure as Home Secretary from 2010 onwards, she visited India once and Pakistan three times. Officials claim this is not because she has any affinity for Pakistan but because she knew where the problem of terrorism lay and needed to be confronted. Soon after becoming Home Secretary in 2010, May had banned the entry into Britain of the controversial Indian preacher Zakir Naik, who was much in news recently in connection with the Dhaka terrorist killings.

May is reported to be well known to both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab. Another connection between Theresa May and Pakistan is that she was introduced to her husband by Benazir Bhutto in 1976 when all three were students at Oxford and Philip May, her future husband, was President of the Students Union.

On assuming the charge of prime minister, PM Modi had called May and congratulated her on her new responsibility. Later the two leaders met on the margins of the G20 Summit in China in last September.

May’s coming visit to India is far-reaching. Because of the vibrant historical, cultural and linguistic linkages and strong business ties between India and UK, there cannot be a better partner for the UK than India. The visit significantly raises stakes for the UK to emerge with a successful outcome. May’s discussions in New Delhi will be watched with keen anticipation and some anxiety not only by the Indian industry but equally so by business, and policy and law makers in London and Brussels. It will be a test case for May whether the UK is able to forge decisive links with major global economies post-Brexit.

Making India as the first port of call makes sense for May as India is the third largest world economy in PPP terms — GDP of US$ 8 trillion — with highest growth rate of 7.6% while most other large economies are witnessing an economic decline or stagnation. India’s healthy macro-fundamentals, low current account deficit and growing foreign direct investment make it an attractive economic partner.

A 160-member strong business delegation drawn from regions across the UK as “examples of the best of British business” will join May to construct a strong partnership.

Modi and May will inaugurate the India-UK Tech Summit in New Delhi on November 7. This will be an opportunity for the two sides to strengthen business-to-business engagement in the areas of technology, entrepreneurship and innovation, design, IPRs and higher education. The two sides had agreed to hold the summit during Modi’s visit to the UK last November.

May will be accompanied by Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade who will also attend the Joint Economic and Trade Committee where UK and Indian leaders, innovators and entrepreneurs will meet to discuss ideas to take the bilateral partnership to next level.

With the impending exit of Britain from the European Union, it is unlikely that the UK will continue to hold the same attractiveness for Indian companies as it has held so far. Thus far Indian companies have viewed Britain as a spring-board for their entry into EU member-states. It is likely that the role and significance of London as the financial hub of Europe will see a decline. Indian companies will have to start relocating to Germany or France or Belgium or Netherlands for a smooth, seamless access to the European market. They might need to establish manufacturing bases and service platforms on the continent to maintain their competitive edge. This might witness a reduction in the number of Indian companies that are currently operating out of Britain.

Contours of Britain’s relations with the EU in coming years are not clear thus far. It will be a while before these become evident. While the UK will negotiate tough to maintain its access to EU market in goods, services, investment etc without giving in to demands for inward migration, negotiators from EU appear equally determined to ensure a ”hard Brexit” in which the UK will not be allowed to cherry-pick areas of interest to it. No deal on bilateral trade between the UK and a non-EU country can be finalised till the UK continues to be a member of the EU. May has declared that Article 50 of the EU Lisbon treaty for UK’s exit from the grouping will be invoked in March next year. From then on, the UK will have two years to conclude talks and agree to a deal with the EU for severance of its links with it.

UK will attempt to commence talks on bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with interested countries so that deals are implemented as soon as dissolution of the UK’s ties with the EU are confirmed. It has been suggested by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) that it will be easier for India and UK to conclude an FTA unlike the EU-India Bilateral Trade and Partnership Agreement (BTIA) which has been languishing without significant forward movement for the last nine years. Issues like automobiles and spare parts, alcoholic beverages etc which have held up talks in recent years would not figure prominently in discussions between India and the UK. However, the subject of Mode 4 (temporary movement of skilled professionals) will continue to be a sticking point as the fundamental reason for Britain’s ”Leave” Vote was the people’s dissatisfaction with the increasing number of migrants — both from within EU and outside coming to UK. May has also committed that she will bring migration levels down to a sustainable level of below 100,000 per year. Currently it is about 330,000 per annum. This is one area where May as Home Secretary did not succeed. She had set the annual target as 200,000 but could not come anywhere close to it!

Another issue that is likely to receive considerable attention is Britain’s position on cross-border terrorism against India emanating from Pakistan. Because of internal vote-bank politics and the presence of large number of Mirpuri Pakistanis in the country, Britain has been ambivalent in its response to Pak-engineered terrorism. In fact, in response to a Public Petition after the Uri terrorist attack which attracted more than 20,000 signatures, the British government maintained that it recognises the significant sacrifices of Pakistan in confronting terrorism. It would be accurate to state that Pakistan has also suffered at the hands of terrorists, but it is equally, if not more true, that that these terrorist networks have spawned as a result of Pakistan’s own policies. As Hillary Clinton said in her discussions with Hina Rabbani Khar in 2011, ”if you nurture snakes in your backyard, don’t think that they will bite only your neighbour. They will bite you also.” Only unequivocal condemnation and isolation of Pakistan can force it to change its policies. Otherwise, the Pakistan government, its army, its spy agency as well as terrorist groups will think that the international community is condoning their activities.

Visas for students, businessmen, academics and short-term tourists is an area of continuing disagreement between the two countries. May in her capacity as the Home Secretary was not agreeable to remove students from the list of long-term migration category. This issue on which negotiations have been going on for a while could witness some progress. It is expected that May might at least announce the extension of a pilot initiative currently underway in China to offer easier, longer and cheaper visas to Indian tourists. Under the pilot, a UK visa valid for two years is offered for £87; for the same fee, Indians get the visa for a maximum of six months. A two-year visa for Indians costs £330.

Besides her programme in Delhi, May is also likely to visit Bengaluru to familiarise herself with potential for bilateral collaboration in IT, infrastructure, innovation etc.

Modi has called the India-UK relationship an unbeatable combination and talked about how the two countries can come together to create a leading global partnership.

Theresa May’s three-day visit to India will be watched with considerable hope and interest. A successful outcome has the huge potential of providing a shot in the arm to bilateral partnership in diverse areas, including strategic, political, economic, business, social and cultural spheres.

Russia Energy Profile: Largest Producer Of Crude Oil – Analysis

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Russia is a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas. Russia’s economic growth is driven by energy exports, given its high oil and natural gas production. Oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 43% of Russia’s federal budget revenues in 2015.1

Russia was the world’s largest producer of crude oil including lease condensate and the third-largest producer of petroleum and other liquids (after Saudi Arabia and the United States) in 2015, with average liquids production of 11.0 million barrels per day (b/d). Russia was the second-largest producer of dry natural gas in 2015 (second to the United States), producing 22.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), according to Russian Energy Ministry data.2

Russia and Europe are interdependent in terms of energy. Europe is dependent on Russia as a source of supply for both oil and natural gas, with almost 30% of European Union crude imports and more than 30% of natural gas imports coming from Russia in 2015. Russia is dependent on Europe as a market for its oil and natural gas and the revenues those exports generate. In 2015, almost 60% of Russia’s crude exports and more than 75% of Russia’s natural gas exports went to Europe.3

energy_consumptionRussia is the third-largest generator of nuclear power in the world and has the fifth-largest installed nuclear capacity. With seven nuclear reactors currently under construction, Russia is second to China, in terms of number of reactors under construction as of August 2016.4

Russia consumed 30.52 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) of energy in 2013, the majority of which was in the form of natural gas (53%). Petroleum and coal accounted for 22% and 14% of Russia’s consumption, respectively (Figure 1).

Effects of sanctions and lower oil prices

Sanctions and lower oil prices have reduced foreign investment in Russia’s upstream, especially in Arctic offshore and shale projects, and have made financing projects more difficult.

In response to the actions and policies of the government of Russia with respect to Ukraine, in 2014 the United States imposed a series of progressively tighter sanctions on Russia.5 Among other measures, the sanctions limited Russian firms’ access to U.S. capital markets, specifically targeting four Russian energy companies: Novatek, Rosneft,6 Gazprom Neft, and Transneft. Additionally, sanctions prohibited the export to Russia of goods, services, or technology in support of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects.7 The European Union imposed sanctions, although they differ in some respects.8

In recent years, the Russian government has offered special tax rates or tax holidays to encourage investment in difficult-to-develop resources, such as Arctic offshore and low-permeability reservoirs, including shale reservoirs. Attracted by the tax incentives and the potentially vast resources, many international companies entered into partnerships with Russian firms to explore Arctic and shale resources. ExxonMobil, Eni, Statoil, and China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) all partnered with Rosneft in 2012 and 2013 to explore Arctic fields.9 Despite sanctions announced in March 2014, Total agreed in May to explore shale resources in partnership with Lukoil. However, Total halted its involvement in September 2014, as additional sanctions were announced later in the year. ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and Statoil also signed agreements with Russian companies to explore shale resources. Virtually all involvement in Artic offshore and shale projects by Western companies has ceased following the sanctions.

Arctic offshore and shale resources are unlikely to be developed without the help of Western oil companies. However, these sanctions will have little effect on Russian production in the short term as these resources were not expected to begin producing for 5 to 10 years at the earliest. The immediate effect of these sanctions has been to halt the large-scale investments that Western firms had planned to make in these resources.

At the same time as the United States and the European Union were applying sanctions, oil prices fell by more than half, from an average Brent crude oil price of $109/barrel (b) in the first half of 2014 to just $52/b in 2015 and to $40/b in the first half of 2016. Both the sanctions and the fall in oil prices have put pressure on the Russian economy in general and have made it more difficult for Russian energy firms to finance new projects, especially higher-cost projects such as deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale projects.

With lower oil prices, Russian state revenues from oil and gas activities have declined dramatically, and the state’s budget deficit has grown. In response, the Russian government has implemented or proposed various measures to increase revenues. The Russian government has changed the minerals extraction tax and export taxes on hydrocarbons several times over the last couple of years. The most recent changes and proposals for upcoming changes all tend to raise the taxes paid by oil and gas companies.

In addition to taxes, the Russian government also collects dividends from oil and gas companies in which the state is a shareholder. In April 2016, the Russian government directed state-controlled companies to pay out a minimum of 50% of 2015 net income as dividends, nearly double the dividends companies would normally pay.10 Oil companies have objected to both the tax and dividend increases, arguing they divert money from capital investment programs. Based on similar arguments, Rosneft negotiated a lower dividend payout.

In January 2015, the Russian government announced its intention to sell some of its shares in several Russian companies, including Bashneft and Rosneft. Bashneft was one of Russia’s 10 largest oil producers. In October, the federal government sold its 50.08% controlling stake in Bashneft to Rosneft for $5.3 billion. The Russian government currently owns 69.5% of Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft. It intends to sell up to 19.5% of the company, retaining a controlling interest.

Oil

liquid_fuels_supply_consumptionMost of Russia’s oil production originates in West Siberia and the Urals-Volga regions. However, production from East Siberia, Russia’s Far East, and the Russian Arctic has been growing.

Russia’s proved oil reserves were 80 billion barrels as of January 2016, according to the Oil and Gas Journal.11 Most of Russia’s reserves are located in West Siberia, between the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau, and in the Urals-Volga region, extending into the Caspian Sea.

In 2015, Russia produced an estimated 11.03 million b/d of petroleum and other liquids (of which 10.25 million b/d was crude oil including lease condensate), and it consumed about 3.5 million b/d (Figure 2). Russia exported more than 7 million b/d in 2015, including roughly 5 million b/d of crude oil and the remainder in products and other liquids.

Exploration and production

Most of Russia’s oil production originates in West Siberia and the Urals-Volga regions (Table 1),12 with about 12% of production in 2014 originating in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East (Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Yakutia, and Sakhalin). However, this share is up from less than 5% in 2009.13 In the longer term, Russia’s eastern oil fields, along with the largely untapped oil reserves in the Russian Arctic, may play a larger role. The Russian sector of the Caspian Sea and the predominantly undeveloped areas of Timan-Pechora in northern Russia also may hold large hydrocarbon reserves.

A number of new projects are in development. Some of these new projects may only offset declining output from aging fields and not result in significant output growth in the near term. The use of advanced technologies and the application of improved recovery techniques is resulting in increased oil output from some existing oil deposits. Fields in the West Siberian Basin produce the majority of Russia’s oil, with developments at Rosneft’s Samotlor field and Priobskoye area fields extracting more than 1.5 million b/d combined in 2015.14

Table 1. Russia’s oil production by region, 2014
Region Thousand b/d
Western Siberia 6,326
Urals-Volga 2,297
East Siberia and the Far East 1,211
    Krasnoyarsk 438
    Sakhalin 335
    Irkutsk 259
    Yakutia 179
Arkhangelsk 309
Komi Republic 263
North Caucasus 60
Kaliningrad 26
Total 10,491
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on Eastern Bloc Research.

Russia’s oil- and natural gas-producing regions

West SiberiaWest Siberia is Russia’s main oil-producing region, accounting for about 6.3 million b/d of liquids production, more than 60% of Russia’s total production in 2014.15 One of the largest and oldest fields in West Siberia is Samotlor field, which has been producing oil since 1969. Samotlor field has been in decline since reaching a post-Soviet era peak of 635,000 b/d in 2006. However, with continued investment and application of standard enhanced oil recovery techniques, decline at the field has been kept to an average of 5% per year from 2008 to 2014,16 and to about 3% in 2015.17 These declines are significantly lower than the natural decline rate for mature West Siberian fields of 10—15% per year.18

Other large oil fields in the region include Priobskoye, Mamontovskoye, Malobalykskoye, and Prirazlomnoye. The newest of these fields is Prirazlomnoye, which was discovered in 1989, but only began production in 2014. The field lies in the Arctic offshore, and is being developed by Gazprom. Production from Prirazlomnoye field is expected to peak at about 100,000 b/d.19

The Bazhenov shale layer, which lies under existing resource deposits, also holds great potential. In the 1980s, the Soviet government tried to stimulate production by detonating small nuclear devices underground. In recent years, the government has used tax breaks to encourage Russian and international oil companies to explore the Bazhenov and other shale reservoirs. However, Russian firms have made little progress in developing shale resources because sanctions and low oil prices have hindered shale projects.

Urals-VolgaUrals-Volga was the largest producing region up until the late 1970s when it was surpassed by West Siberia. Today, this region is a distant-second producing region, accounting for about 22% of Russia’s total output. The giant Romashkinskoye field (discovered in 1948) is the largest in the region. Tatneft operates the field and produced about 300,000 b/d in 2013. 20

East SiberiaWith Russia’s traditional oil-producing regions in decline, East Siberian fields will be central to continued oil production expansion efforts. The region’s potential was increased with the inauguration of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline in December 2009, which created an outlet for East Siberian oil.

East Siberia has become the center of production growth for Rosneft, the state oil giant. The start-up of the Vankorskoye (Vankor) oil and natural gas field in August 2009 has notably increased production in the region and has been a significant contributor to Russia’s increase in oil production since 2010. Vankor, located north of the Arctic Circle in Russia’s Krasnoyarsk region, was the largest oil discovery in Russia in 25 years. In 2015, the field produced about 440,000 b/d. 21

There are a number of other fields in the region, including the Verkhnechonskoye oil and gas condensate field, the Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye field, and the Agaleevskoye gas condensate field. 22

Yamal Peninsula/Arctic CircleThis region is located in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous district, and it straddles West Siberia. This region is mostly known for natural gas production. Crude oil development is relatively new for the region. In the near term, the region is facing transportation infrastructure constraints, although the construction of the Purpe-Samotlor pipeline lessened some of these constraints. Transneft also is constructing the Zapolyarye-Purpe pipeline, connecting the Zapolyarye gas and condensate field to the Purpe-Samotlor pipeline.

In addition to the Zapolyarye natural gas and condensate field, the area is home to the Vostochno Messoyakha and Zapadno Messoyakha, Suzun, Tagul, and Russkoye oil fields, all of which will benefit from the additional transportation capacity. Gazprom’s Novoportovskoye field, on the Yamal peninsula, is not waiting for pipelines to bridge the considerable distance between it and existing infrastructure. In May 2016, Gazprom began loading production from the field at a new Arctic terminal for seaborne delivery to Europe. Production from Novoportovskoye field is expected to peak at about 125,000 b/d by 2018.23

North CaucasusThe North Caucasus region includes the mature onshore area as well as the promising offshore North Caspian area. Lukoil has been actively exploring some of the deposits situated in the North Caspian, and in 2010, Lukoil launched the Yurii Korchagin field, which produced about 30,000 b/d in 2014.24 By the end of 2016, Lukoil is scheduled to launch the Filanovsky field, which should reach production of 120,000 b/d in 2017. Other discoveries in the area include the Khvalynskoye and Rakushechnoye fields. The development of the region is highly sensitive to taxes and export duties, and any change or cancellation of tax breaks may negatively affect development.

Timan-Pechora and Barents SeaTiman-Pechora and the Barents Sea are located in northwestern Russia. Liquids fields in these areas are relatively small, however these areas have well-developed oil infrastructure. Two liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects have been proposed for the area, Gazprom’s Shtokman LNG and Rosneft’s Pechora LNG, both of which have the potential to yield significant quantities of hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGL). However, both projects have been delayed indefinitely.

Sakhalin IslandSakhalin Island is located off Russia’s eastern shore. The offshore area to the east of Sakhalin Island is home to a number of large oil and natural gas fields with significant investment by international companies. Many of Sakhalin’s oil and natural gas fields are being developed under two production-sharing agreements (PSA) signed in the mid-1990s. The Sakhalin-1 PSA is operated by ExxonMobil, which holds a 30% stake. Other members of the PSA include Rosneft (through two subsidiaries), Indian state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh, and a consortium of Japanese companies.25 The Sakhalin-1 PSA covers three oil and gas fields: Chayvo, Oduptu, and Arkutun-Dagi. Production started at Chayvo field in 2005, at Oduptu field in 2010, and at Arkutun-Dagi field in January 2015.26 Sakhalin-1 mainly produces crude oil and other liquids, most of which are exported via the De-Kastri oil terminal. Most of the natural gas currently produced at Sakhalin-1 is reinjected, with small volumes of gas sold domestically.

The Sakhalin-2 PSA covers two major fields—the Piltun-Astokhskoye oil field and the Lunskoye natural gas field—and it includes twin oil and gas pipelines that run from the north of the island to the south end of the island where the consortium has an oil export terminal and an LNG liquefaction and export terminal. The Sakhalin-2 consortium members include Gazprom which owns 50% plus one share, Shell with 27.5%, Mitsui with 12.5%, and Mitsubishi with 10%.27 When the PSA was originally signed, the consortium did not include any Russian companies and, compared with most PSAs, the terms were heavily weighted in favor of the interests of the consortium over the interests of the government. Sakhalin-2 produced its first oil in 1999 and its first LNG in 2009. The project incurred significant cost overruns and delays, and these issues were part of the justification the Russian government used to force Shell, which at the time owned a 55% interest in Sakhalin-2, and the other consortium members to sell a controlling interest in the consortium to Gazprom.28

Russia’s oil grades

Russia has several oil grades, including Russia’s main export grade, Urals blend. Urals blend is a mix of heavy sour crudes from the Urals-Volga region and light sweet crudes from West Siberia. The mixture and thus the quality can vary, but Urals blend is generally a medium (about 31°) gravity sour (about 1.4% sulfur content) crude oil blend and, as such, is generally priced at a discount to Brent crude. Siberian Light crude is a higher quality and thus more valuable when marketed on its own, but it can also be blended into Urals crude because of limited infrastructure to move it to market separately.29

Sokol grade is produced by the Sakhalin-1 project and is a light, sweet crude with an API gravity of 36.0° and 0.30% sulfur content.30 Sakhalin blend includes crude produced from the Piltun and Astokh fields under the Sakhalin-2 PSA as well as condensate produced from Gazprom’s Kirinskoye gas and condensate field under the Sakhalin-3 license.31 Sakhalin is a light (45.5°API), sweet (0.16% sulfur content) blend.32 Sakhalin blend is loaded at the Prigorodnoye port, on the southern tip of Sakhalin Island.

The Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend came on stream in late 2009 and is a mix of crudes produced in several Siberian fields. The grade is exported through the recently constructed ESPO Pipeline to China as well as through Russia’s Pacific coast port of Kozmino to other Asian countries. ESPO blend is a fairly sweet, medium-light blend, with a typical gravity of 35.6°API and 0.48% sulfur content.33

Gazprom Neft’s two Arctic fields, Prirazlomnoye launched in 2014 and Novoportovskoye launched in 2016, produce very different grades of oil. Arctic Oil (ARCO) grade from the Prirazlomnoye field is a medium-heavy (24° API), sour (2.3% sulfur content) crude,34 and Novy Port grade is a medium-light (30-35°API), sweet crude (0.1% sulfur content).35

Sector organization

Domestic companies dominate most of Russia’s oil production (Table 2).36 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia initially privatized its oil industry, but Russia’s oil and gas sector has gradually reverted to state control over the past few years.

Starting in the late 1990s, privately-owned companies drove growth in the sector, and a number of international oil companies attempted to enter the Russian market, with varying degrees of success. More recently, the Russian oil industry has consolidated into fewer firms with more state control. Five firms, including their shares of joint venture production, account for more than 75% of total Russian oil production, and the Russian state directly controls more than 50% of Russian oil production. Smaller firms have generally had higher production growth than larger firms, but smaller firms could be less resilient in the face of lower oil prices. 37

In 2003, BP invested in TNK, forming TNK-BP, a 50-50 joint venture and one of country’s major oil producers. However, in 2012 and 2013, the TNK-BP partnership was dissolved, and the state-controlled Rosneft acquired nearly all of TNK-BP’s assets. For its share in TNK-BP, BP received cash and an 18.5% share of Rosneft.38 In the previous decade, Rosneft emerged as Russia’s top oil producer following the liquidation of Yukos assets, which Rosneft acquired.

A number of ministries are involved in the oil sector. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment issues field licenses, monitors compliance with license agreements, and levies fines for violations of environmental regulations. The Ministry of Energy develops and implements general energy policy. The Ministry of Economic Development supervises tariffs, while the Finance Ministry is responsible for hydrocarbon taxes.39

Russia has two main hydrocarbon taxes: the minerals extraction tax (MET) and the export tax. The export tax varies for crude oil and for different products. In 2011, Russia changed product export taxes so that export tax rates on all products were lower than the crude oil export tax to encourage investment in refining capacity. In recent years, the government has also offered special MET rates or MET holidays for difficult-to-develop resources, such as Arctic offshore and low-permeability reservoirs, including shale reservoirs. Recent increases to the MET rate have increased the value of these previously agreed MET discounts for difficult resources.

On January 1, 2015, hydrocarbon tax rates changed again. Previously, the export tax was about twice as high as the MET. This tax maneuver raised the MET and lowered export taxes for 2015 and set out additional changes for 2016 and 2017 which would further raise the MET and lower export taxes. The increases in the MET were designed to roughly balance the decreases in the export taxes, so that they would be roughly revenue neutral, neither increasing nor decreasing overall taxes on the energy industry.40

On January 1, 2016, the MET increased in accordance with the previously enacted tax maneuver. However, in late 2015, the Russian government adopted a new law that postponed the corresponding decrease in export taxes. This law also substantially increased the MET on natural gas produced by Gazprom in 2016. Throughout 2016, there have been several proposals to raise taxes on the oil and gas industry again beginning January 1, 2017. Proposals have included extending the special tax on Gazprom for another year, further postponing planned decreases in export taxes, or lowering the threshold at which the MET is applied.

Table 2. Russia’s oil production by company, 2014
Company Thousand b/d
Rosneft 4,041
Lukoil 1,724
Surgutneftegaz 1,223
Gazprom (including Gazprom Neft) 997
Tatneft 528
Slavneft 334
Bashneft 355
Russneft 313
PSA operators 287
Novatek 120
Others 567
Total 10,491
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on Eastern Bloc Research.

Refinery sector

Russia had 39 oil refineries with a total crude oil distillation capacity of 5.5 million b/d as of January 1, 2016, according to Oil and Gas Journal.41 Rosneft, the largest refinery operator, owns nine major refineries in Russia.42 Lukoil is the second-largest operator of refineries in Russia with four major refineries.43 Many of Russia’s refineries are older, simple refineries, with low-quality fuel oil accounting for a large share of their output. Previous tax changes have, with modest success, encouraged companies to invest in upgrading refineries to produce more high-value products such as diesel and gasoline. The tax changes introduced in 2015 will negatively affect the refineries that have yet to be upgraded.44

Oil exports

In 2015, Russia had roughly 7.6 million b/d of petroleum and other liquids available for exports, including almost 5 million b/d of crude and condensate exports. The majority of Russian crude oil exports (70%) went to European countries, particularly Germany, the Netherlands, Belarus, and Poland (Figure 3).45 Revenues from crude oil and products exports in 2015 accounted for 46% of Russia’s total export revenues.46 Additionally, 43% of Russia’s federal budget revenue in 2015 came from oil and natural gas activities.47 While Russia is dependent on European consumption, Europe is similarly dependent on Russian oil supply, with almost 30% of European Union crude oil imports in 2015 coming from Russia.48

crude_oil_exportAsia and Oceania accounted for 28% of Russian crude exports in 2015, with China and Japan accounting for a growing share of total Russian exports.49 Part of the increase in Russian crude exports to China has been growing exports to independent teapot refiners in China. Russian ESPO crude does not have to travel as far as Middle East crude to reach Chinese ports. This allows Russian crude to be shipped in smaller volumes and with more flexible scheduling, which makes it more desirable to independent refiners. Russia’s crude oil exports to North America and South America have been largely displaced by increases in crude oil production in the United States, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, in Brazil, Colombia, and other countries in the Americas. Russia’s Transneft holds a near-monopoly over Russia’s pipeline network, and the vast majority of Russia’s crude oil exports must traverse Transneft’s system to reach bordering countries or to reach Russian ports for export. Smaller volumes of exports are shipped via rail and on vessels that load at independently-owned terminals.

Russia also exports fairly sizeable volumes of oil products. According to Eastern Bloc Research, Russia exported about 1.6 million b/d of fuel oil and an additional 960,000 b/d of diesel in 2014. It exported smaller volumes of gasoline (100,000 b/d) and liquefied petroleum gas (60,000 b/d) during the same year.50

Pipelines

Figure 4. Major eastern Russian oil and natural gas pipelines Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and IHS EDIN

Figure 4. Major eastern Russian oil and natural gas pipelines
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and IHS EDIN

Russia has an extensive domestic distribution and export pipeline network (Table 3).51 Russia’s domestic and export pipeline network is nearly completely owned and run by the state-owned Transneft. One notable exception is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, which runs from Tengiz field in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The CPC pipeline is owned by a consortium of companies, with the largest share (24%) owned by the Russian government, whose interests in the consortium are represented by Transneft. KazMunaiGaz (19%), the state-owned oil and natural gas company of Kazakhstan, and Chevron (15%) are the second- and third-largest shareholders in the consortium. Another exception is the TransSakhalin pipeline, owned by the Sakhalin-2 consortium, in eastern Russia (Figure 4).

Table 3. Russia’s major crude oil pipelines
Facility Status Capacity (million b/d) Total length (miles) Supply regions Destination Details
Western pipelines
Druzhba operating 2 2,500 West Siberia and Urals-Volga regions Europe Completed in 1964
Baltic Pipeline System 1 operating 1.3 730 connects to Druzhba Primorsk Port on the Gulf of Finland Completed in 2001
Baltic Pipeline System 2 operating 0.6 620 connects to Druzhba Ust-Luga Port on the Gulf of Finland Completed in 2012
North-West Pipeline System inactive 0.3 500 connects to Druzhba Butinge, Lithuania and Ventspils, Latvia on the Baltic Sea Inactive since 2006
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) operating 0.7 940 Tengiz field, Kazakhstan Novorossiysk, Russia on the Black Sea Planned expansion to 1.3 million b/d
Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline operating 0.1 830 Caspian and central Asia, via Sangachal Port, Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea Novorossiysk, Russia on the Black Sea Completed in 1996
Eastern pipelines
TransSakhalin operating 0.2 500 Sakhalin fields (offshore northern Sakhalin) Pacific seaport of Prigorodnoye (Southern Sakhalin Island) Completed in 2008
Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean
(ESPO) Pipeline
operating ESPO-1 – 1.2 currently,
1.6 by 2020
ESPO-2 – 0.5 currently,
1.0 by 2020
China spur – 0.3 currently,
0.6 by 2018
ESPO-1 – 1,700
ESPO-2 – 1,300
Daqing spur – 660
East Siberian fields and, via connecting
pipelines, West
Siberian fields and Yamal-Nenets region
Pacific seaport of Kozmino with a spur to Daqing, China ESPO-1 (Taishet-Skovorodino) completed in 2009
ESPO-2 (Skovorodino-Kozmino) completed in 2012 Skovorodino-Daqing, China spur completed in 2010
Purpe-Samotlor Pipeline operating 0.5 270 Yamal-Nenets and Ob Basins connects to ESPO Pipeline Completed in 2011
Zapolyarye-Purpe Pipeline commissioning 0.6 (expandable to 0.9) 300 Zapolyarye and Yamal-Nenets region connects to Purpe-Samotlor and ESPO pipelines Commercial operations to begin in fourth quarter of 2016; expected to handle 0.2 million b/d in 2017
Kuyumba-Taishet construction 0.16 440 Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye field and Kuyumba field (startup delayed until 2018) connects to ESPO Pipeline Planned start-up pushed back from 2016 to 2017 as field completions have been delayed
Source: U. S. Energy Information Administration based on Transneft, Sakhalin Energy, Caspian Pipeline Consortium, State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, Orlen Lietuva, European Parliament, Nefte Compass, Platt’s Oilgram Price Report, and Argus FSU Energy.

Ports

At least 20 Russian ports serve as outlets for hydrocarbon exports to various markets, including Europe, the Americas, and Asia. The top four ports (Novorossiysk, Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Kozmino) together accounted for about 85% of Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports in 2015.52

The Primorsk and Ust-Luga terminals are both located near St. Petersburg, Russia, on the Gulf of Finland. The Primorsk terminal opened in 2006 and has a loading capacity of about 1.3 million b/d.53 The Ust-Luga oil terminal opened in 2009 and has a loading capacity of more than 0.5 million b/d.54 Both Primorsk and Ust-Luga receive oil from the Baltic Pipeline System, which brings crude from fields in the Timan-Pechero, West Siberia, and Urals-Volga regions. Ust-Luga is also a major port for Russian coal and HGL exports.

Novorossiysk is Russia’s main oil terminal on the Black Sea coast. Its load capacity is more than 1 million b/d.55

Kozmino is located near the city of Vladivostok, in Russia’s far eastern Primorsky province, and is the terminus of the ESPO crude oil pipeline. The port opened in December 2009 with an initial capacity of 0.3 million b/d. Kozmino initially received crude oil by rail from Skovorodino until the second phase of the ESPO pipeline opened in 2012.56 In 2015, almost 0.6 million b/d of crude oil was exported through Kozmino port, slightly below the current capacity.57

Hydrocarbon gas liquids

Russian output of hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGL) is expected to grow over the coming years. HGL refers to both the natural gas liquids (paraffins or alkanes such as ethane, propane, and butanes) and olefins (alkenes) produced by natural gas processing plants, fractionators, crude oil refineries, and condensate splitters but excludes liquefied natural gas and aromatics. HGL are produced in association with both natural gas and petroleum products.

Changes in Russia’s export taxes have spurred investment in refining capacity to produce higher quantities of gasoline and lighter distillates, in lieu of the high share of heavier fuel oil and gasoil the country’s refiners previously exported. The increasing use of fluid catalytic cracking and hydrocracking units is expected to result in increased HGL production at refineries. A further boost to HGL supply will come from natural gas processing, as Russian natural gas producers develop richer natural gas resources and as more associated natural gas production (which is currently flared) is connected to gas processing plants.

With a surplus of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)—a mixture of propane and butane—on the Russian market, major producers have targeted the export market along with the development of HGL-fed petrochemical capacity as outlets for their growing production. Traditionally, the main outlet for Russian LPG exports had been shipments to Europe by rail. In mid-2012, Russia’s first modern LPG export terminal came online in Taman on the Black Sea. With a design capacity of approximately 30,000 barrels per day (b/d) of pressurized cargo, the port handled, on average, just under 17,000 b/d in 2015,59 all brought in by rail. In mid-2013, Sibur, Russia’s largest LPG producer, shipped its first LPG cargo out of Ust-Luga, near St. Petersburg.60 In a first for Russia, the Sibur-operated terminal is also capable of handling both pressurized and refrigerated product, and it is currently undergoing a capacity expansion from nearly 50,000 b/d to about 75,000 b/d.61 The Ust-Luga terminal, like Taman, is capable of receiving LPG by rail. Additional volumes of LPG are produced on-site at the Novatek-operated Gas Condensate Fractionation and Transshipment Complex.62

In addition to direct exports, Russian companies are seeking to use domestically produced LPG in petrochemical manufacturing, which would capture more of the value and minimizing their export tariff exposure. In December 2014, Sibur commissioned its propane dehydrogenation (PDH) facility at the Tobolsk-Polymer complex in West Siberia,63 which is capable of producing 510,000 tons per year of polymer-grade propylene from an estimated 33,000 b/d of propane feedstock. The company is planning to further increase its liquids consumption at the Tobolsk site with a proposed 1.5 million ton per year ethylene cracker,64 which is expected to be in operation by 2021. The $9.5 billion plant’s feedstock is expected to consist primarily of propane and butane. Some ethane will also be used to produce ethylene, propylene, and butylene/butadiene that will then feed into the production of derivative products, including high- and low-density polyethylene and polypropylene.65 Rosneft is also planning a major petrochemical complex at Nakhodka, on Russia’s Pacific Coast, near the Kozmino oil terminal. The new complex will include a refinery and a petrochemical plant with 1.4 million tons per year of ethylene capacity. The petrochemical plant will primarily consume naphtha as a feedstock.66

Natural gas

natural_gas_reservesRussia holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and is the second-largest producer of dry natural gas. The state-run Gazprom dominates the country’s upstream natural gas sector, although production from other companies has been growing.

According to Oil and Gas Journal, Russia held the world’s largest natural gas reserves, with 1,688 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), as of January 1, 2016 (Figure 5).67 Russia’s reserves account for about one quarter of the world’s total proved reserves. The majority of these reserves are located in West Siberia, with the Yamburg, Urengoy, and Medvezhye fields accounting for a significant share of Russia’s total natural gas reserves.

Sector organization

The state-run Gazprom dominates Russia’s upstream natural gas sector, producing almost 70% of Russia’s total natural gas output in 2014 (Table 4).68 While independent and oil company producers have gained importance, upstream opportunities remain fairly limited for independent producers and other companies, including Russian oil majors. Furthermore, Gazprom’s dominant upstream position is reinforced by its legal monopoly on pipeline gas exports.

Much like the oil sector, a number of ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in the natural gas sector. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment issues field licenses, monitors compliance with license agreements, and levies fines for violations of environmental regulations. The Ministry of Energy develops and implements general energy policy and is also charged with overseeing LNG exports. The Finance Ministry is responsible for hydrocarbon extraction and export taxes, while the Ministry of Economic Development supervises tariffs.69

The main regulatory agencies involved in the natural gas sector include the Federal Tariff Service (regulates pipeline tariffs) and the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (oversees charges of abuse of market dominance, including charges related to third-party access to pipelines).

Table 4. Russia’s natural gas production by company, 2014
Company Bcf/d
Gazprom 42.9
Novatek 6.0
Rosneft 5.5
Lukoil 1.8
Surgutneftegaz 0.9
PSA operators 2.9
Others 1.9
Total 62.0
Source: Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, Table 34, p. 14.

Exploration and production

flared_natural_gasThe bulk of the country’s natural gas reserves under development and production are in northern West Siberia (Table 5).70 However, Gazprom and others are increasingly investing in new regions, such as the Yamal Peninsula, Eastern Siberia, and Sakhalin Island, to bring gas deposits in these areas into production. Some of the most prolific fields in Siberia include Yamburg, Urengoy, and Medvezhye, all of which are licensed to Gazprom. These three fields have seen output declines in recent years.

In 2014, Russia was the world’s second-largest dry natural gas producer (20.4 Tcf), surpassed only by the United States (25.7 Tcf). Independent natural gas producers have been increasing their production rates, with non-Gazprom sources expected to continue to increase in the future. Higher production rates have resulted from a growing number of companies entering the sector, including oil companies looking to develop their gas reserves. Russian government efforts to decrease the widespread practice of natural gas flaring and to enforce gas utilization requirements for oil extraction may result in additional increases in production.

Gas flaringIn Russia, natural gas associated with oil production is often flared. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Russia flared an estimated 700 Bcf of natural gas in 2014, the most of any country. At this level, Russia accounted for about 13% of the total volume of gas flared globally in 2014 (Figure 6).72 A number of Russian government initiatives and policies have set targets to reduce routine flaring of associated gas. Also, regulatory changes have made it easier and more profitable for third-party producers to transport and market their natural gas. According to the NOAA estimates, from 2012 to 2014, flared natural gas in Russia declined on average by about 10% per year.

Table 5. Russia’s natural gas production by region, 2014
Region Bcf/d
West Siberia 54.9
   Yamalo-Nenets 50.9
   Khanti-Mansiisk 3.5
   Tomsk 0.5
East Siberia and the Far East 3.6
   Sakhalin 2.4
   Irkutsk 0.4
   Krasnoyarsk 0.5
   Yakutia 0.2
Urals-Volga 3.2
   Orenburg 1.4
   Astrakhan 1.1
   Others 0.6
Komi Republic 0.3
North Caucasus 0.1
Total 62.0
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on Eastern Bloc Research

Natural gas exports

natural_gas_exportsIn 2015, almost 90% of Russia’s 7.3 Tcf of natural gas exports were delivered to customers in Europe via pipeline, with Germany, Turkey, Italy, and Belarus receiving the bulk of these volumes (Figure 7). Much of the remainder was delivered to Asia as LNG. Ukraine’s imports of Russian natural gas in 2015 were less than 30% of the level in 2013, when Ukraine was the third-largest importer of Russian natural gas. Because of a pricing and payments dispute and as part of the wider tensions between the two countries, Ukraine has decreased the natural gas it buys from Russia and increased the natural gas it buys from its western neighbors.

Revenues from natural gas exports in 2015 accounted for about 13% of Russia’s total export revenues.73 While not as large as Russia’s export earnings from crude oil and other liquids, Russia still has a significant level of dependence on Europe as a market for its natural gas. Europe, likewise, is dependent on Russia for its supply of natural gas. In 2015, the European Union received more than 30% of its natural gas imports from Russia.74 Additionally, some countries within Europe, especially Finland, the Baltics, and much of Southeast Europe, receive almost all of their natural gas from Russia.

Since the mid-2000s, natural gas consumption in OECD Europe75 has generally been flat to declining, prompting Russia to look to Asia and LNG as a means to diversify its natural gas exports. U.S. and European Union (EU) sanctions, implemented in 2014, accelerated Russia’s pivot to the east, with Russia signing two pipeline deals with China in 2014 covering exports that could eventually reach 2.4 Tcf per year.

Pipelines

In 2015, Russia’s natural gas transportation system included about 100,000 miles of high-pressure pipelines and more than 20 underground natural gas storage facilities.76 Since the late 2000s, Gazprom has been adding major new pipelines to accommodate new sources of supply, including fields in Yamal and Eastern Siberia, and new export routes, including exports to China and new pipelines to Europe that avoid Ukraine.

The Unified Gas Supply (UGS) system is the collective name for the interconnected western portion of Russia’s natural gas pipelines (Table 6).77 The UGS system includes domestic pipelines and the domestic portion of export pipelines in European Russia, but it does not include pipelines in eastern Russia. In 2007, the Russian government directed Gazprom to establish an Eastern Gas Program (EGP) to expand gas infrastructure in eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far East. The backbone of the EGP is the Power of Siberia pipeline, which is currently under construction.

Table 6. Russia’s major natural gas pipelines
Facility Status Capacity (trillion cubic feet per year) Total length (miles) Supply regions Markets Details
Western pipelines
Yamal-Europe operating 1.2 more than 1,000 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Poland, Germany, and northern Europe via Belarus
Blue stream operating 0.6 750 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Turkey via the Black Sea Started operations in 2003
Nord stream operating 1.9 760 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Germany and northern Europe via the Baltic Sea Started operations in 2011
Nord stream 2 planning 1.9 760 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Germany and northern Europe via the Baltic Sea Planned start in 2019
Urengoy-Ukhta, Bovanenkovo-Ukhta, and Ukhta-Torzhok operating and under construction up to 6.0 more than 1,500 Bovanenkovo field on the Yamal peninsula and Urengoy area fields Western Russia and Europe via Nord Stream and other routes The Urengoy-Ukhta-Torzhok line started operations in 2006. The 1st Bovanenkovo-Ukhta line started operations in 2012.
Soyuz and Brotherhood (Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod) operating more than 3.5 more than 2,800 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area, Russian Urals fields, and Central Asia Western Russia and Europe via Ukraine First major natural gas export lines to Europe, built and brought online during the Soviet era.
Southern Corridor pipelines construction 2.2 Western route – 550 Eastern route – 1,010 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Turkey and Europe via Turkish stream pipeline Construction on the Western route began in 2012
Turkish stream planning up to 1.1 more than 500 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area Turkey and Southeast Europe via the Black Sea Plans cut from 4 lines to 2 lines; first line could start in late 2019 at the earliest
Eastern pipelines
TransSakhalin operating 0.3 500 Sakhalin fields (offshore northern Sakhalin) Sakhalin LNG plant, Prigorodnoye, southern Sakhalin Island Started operations in 2008
Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok operating 0.2 1,120 Sakhalin fields (offshore northern Sakhalin) Eastern Russia with potential exports to Asia via proposed Vladivostok LNG or new pipelines Started operations in 2011. Expandable to 1.1 Tcf per year with additional compression.
Power of Siberia 1 (Eastern route for exports to China) construction mainline — up to 2.2 China spur – 1.3 1,370 East Siberian fields including Chayadinskoye in Yakutia region and Kovytka in Irkutsk region Northeast China with a later extension to connect with the Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok pipeline Deliveries to China scheduled to begin in 2019 or up to 2 years later
Power of Siberia 2(Altai/Western route) planning Initial – 1.1 2,490 West Siberian fields including Urengoy area China 2020 or later; could lay parallel lines in the future, doubling or tripling the initial capacity
Source: U. S. Energy Information Administration based on Gazprom, GazpromExport, Sakhalin Energy, World Gas Intelligence, Nefte Compass, RT, and Reuters.

Third-party access to pipelines

Gazprom is sole owner of virtually all of Russia’s natural gas pipelines. Russia’s 1999 Law on Gas Supply requires owners of all natural gas systems to provide non-discriminatory access to any available capacity with the aim of supplying domestic consumers. Separate regulations established rules for third-party access to the UGS system, but no rules have been established for access to pipelines that are not part of the UGS system. Access to pipeline capacity for exports is not included, as the 2006 Law on Gas Exports grants pipeline export rights exclusively to the owner of the UGS system, which is Gazprom.78

Despite these long-standing laws, independent natural gas producers, including state-owned oil companies, have only recently begun to get access to some of Gazprom’s domestic pipelines. Actions by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS) have helped promote better third-party access. Between 2008 and 2011, the FAS brought 28 infringement cases against Gazprom related to third-party access.79 Third-party gas transported by Gazprom grew from 12% of UGS system inflows in 2010 to almost 21% in 2015.80 The FAS has also proposed new laws that would fix many of the deficiencies in the current laws and regulations, including the current lack of regulations for third-party access to pipelines that are not part of the UGS system. Many of the recent disputes over pipeline access have been related to eastern gas pipelines, which are not part of the UGS system.

To monetize its Sakhalin-1 natural gas resources, Rosneft has proposed to build a Far East LNG export facility at the southern end of Sakhalin Island. However, this proposal depends on Rosneft being able to send its gas through the Gazprom-controlled TransSakhalin natural gas pipeline. Gazprom has repeatedly denied Rosneft access to the pipeline on grounds that there is no available capacity, because Gazprom needs all the capacity to feed its existing Sakhalin-2 LNG plant and the LNG expansion it plans to build. Gazprom, incidentally, would like to buy gas from the Sakhalin-1 project to use as supply for its LNG expansion. Rosneft filed a court case to try to force Gazprom to give it pipeline access, and in 2015 Russia’s Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosneft.

Liquefied natural gas

Russia has a single operating liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility, Sakhalin LNG. This facility has been operating since 2009 with an original design capacity of 9.6 million tons (mt) of LNG per year (approximately 460 Bcf of natural gas). The majority of the LNG has been contracted to Japanese and South Korean buyers under long-term supply agreements. Debottlenecking and optimization of the facility added up to 3.2 mt (150 Bcf) of capacity in 2011,81 with much of the additional LNG sold under shorter-term agreements or on spot markets. In 2015, Sakhalin LNG exported slightly more than 500 Bcf of gas, which went to Japan (72%), South Korea (24%), Taiwan (2%), and China (2%).82

In 2013, Russia modified its Law on Gas Exports to allow Novatek and Rosneft to export LNG, breaking Gazprom’s monopoly on all gas exports. There are a number of proposals in various stages of planning for new LNG terminals in Russia, including a second LNG liquefaction facility that is under construction (Table 7).83 Yamal LNG, which began construction in 2013, is owned by a consortium, led by Novatek with a 50.1% interest. Total and CNPC each have 20% interest, and the Silk Road Fund (an investment fund established by the Chinese government) holds the remaining 9.9% interest in the project. The first of three liquefaction trains is scheduled to be online in 2017. The three trains will each have a capacity of 5.5 mt of LNG per year, and they will draw gas from the South Tambeyskoye natural gas and condensate field located in the northeast of the Yamal Peninsula.84

To transport LNG from its arctic location, Yamal LNG has commissioned the construction of up to 16 ice-class tankers. Exports are mainly aimed at Asian LNG markets, and during most of the year, the ice-class tankers will take cargoes west from the Yamal peninsula directly to Asia, transiting the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Strait. In winter, when the direct route is too ice-bound to be navigable, the ice-class tankers will take cargoes west from the Yamal peninsula to Europe. In Europe, the LNG will be loaded on to regular LNG tankers that will deliver the cargoes to Asia via the Suez Canal.

Table 7. Russia’s liquefied natural gas projects
Facility Area Status Capacity (million metric tons of LNG per year) Announced start year Owners
Liquefaction projects
Sakhalin LNG Pacific coast operating 10+ 2009 Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi
Yamal LNG Arctic coast construction 16.5 2017 Novatek, Total, CNPC, and Silk Road Fund, an investment fund established by the Chinese government
Arctic LNG Arctic coast planning up to 16.5 by 2025 Novatek
Baltic LNG Baltic coast planning 10 post 2021 Gazprom
Far East LNG Pacific coast planning 5 post 2020 ExxonMobil, Rosneft, ONGC Videsh, and SODECO, a Japanese consortium
Sakhalin LNG (expansion) Pacific coast planning 5 post 2020 Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi
Vladivostok LNG Pacific coast planning 15 post 2018 Gazprom
Pechora LNG Arctic coast delayed up to 8 NA Rosneft
Shtokman LNG Arctic coast delayed 30 NA Gazprom
Regasification projects
Kaliningrad LNG Baltic coast planning 2.4 post 2017 Gazprom
Sources: U. S. Energy Information Administration based on Sakhalin Energy, Total, Novatek, Gazprom, Pechora LNG, Barents Observer, Reuters, Argus FSU, and World Gas Intelligence.

Electricity

Russia is one of the top producers and consumers of electric power in the world, with more than 230 gigawatts of installed generation capacity. In 2013, electric power generation totaled approximately 1,000 billion kilowatthours, and Russia consumed 878 billion kilowatthours.

Fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) are used to generate about two-thirds of Russia’s electricity, followed by hydropower (18%) and nuclear (16%). Most of the fossil fuel-fired generation comes from natural gas. Russia’s electric power generation totaled about 1,000 billion kilowatthours (BkWh) in 2013, and net electricity consumption was 878 BkWh. Russia exported approximately 18 BkWh of electricity in 2013 and imported almost 5 BkWh of electricity.

Sector organization

Much like the oil and natural gas sectors, a number of ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in the electric sector. The Ministry for Economic Development supervises tariffs and investment in the energy sector. The Ministry of Energy is in charge of general energy policy, including development of the legal framework for the electric sector. The Ministry of Energy also approves investment plans for Russia’s electric transmission system.

The main regulatory agencies involved in the sector include the Federal Tariff Service (regulates transmission tariffs) and the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (oversees compliance with the unbundling rules and charges of abuse of market dominance in competitive electric markets). The state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, controls all aspects of the nuclear sector in Russia, including uranium mining, fuel production, nuclear plant engineering and construction, generation of nuclear power, and nuclear plant decommissioning.85

Russia has seven separate regional power systems in the electric sector. These systems are: Northwest, Center, South, Middle Volga, Urals, Siberia, and Far East. The Far East system is fragmented with a weak connection to its neighbor to the west, the Siberian system. The Siberian system is also weakly connected with its neighbor to the west, the Urals system. The remaining five systems covering European Russia are well-integrated with one another and connected to systems in neighboring countries.86

The Russian electric sector was restructured in the past decade, and much of it was privatized. The reform required ownership unbundling in the electric sector, separating the industry into largely privately-owned, competitive generation assets and state-controlled, regulated transmission assets. No company is allowed to own both generation and transmission assets. The Federal Grid Company, which is more than 70% owned by the Russian government (directly and through Gazprom), controls most of the transmission and distribution infrastructure in Russia. The grid comprises more than 1.5 million miles of power lines, including slightly less than 100,000 miles of high-voltage cables of 220 kilovolts (Kv) or more. The government has been trying to attract private investment into the wholesale and regional electric generating companies. As part of the market reform, most of Russia’s fossil-fueled power generation was also privatized, while nuclear and hydropower remain under state control.87

Nuclear power

nuclear_operatingRussia has an installed nuclear capacity of more than 27 million kilowatts, distributed across 36 operating nuclear reactors at 10 locations. Nine plants are located west of the Ural Mountains. The only exception is the Bilibino plant in the far northeast.88

Russia’s nuclear power facilities are aging. The working life of a reactor is considered to be 30 years, but Russia has an active life-extension program. The period for extension is established by the government as 15 years, and 24 of Russia’s nuclear reactors, accounting for about 57% of the country’s operating nuclear capacity, are 30 or more years old (Figure 8).89 Eleven of the country’s 36 nuclear reactors use the high-power channel reactor (RBMK) design employed in Ukraine’s Chernobyl plant.90 Russia’s newest reactor, the 789 megawatt electric (MWe) Beloyarsk 4 reactor, was connected to the grid in December 2015, and it is expected to begin commercial operation in 2016.91

Russia’s current federal target program envisions a 45% to 50% nuclear power share of total generation by 2050 and a 70% to 80% share by 2100. To achieve these goals, the rapidly aging nuclear reactor fleet in Russia will need to be replaced with new nuclear power plants. As of October 1, 2016, seven new nuclear reactors were officially under construction across Russia, with 5,468 MWe net generating capacity (5,904 MWe gross). One of the plants under construction is a floating nuclear power plant, which is scheduled to begin operations by 2018.92

In addition to the seven nuclear reactors currently under construction, another 26 units are planned, with a total gross generating capacity of more than 28,000 MWe. These units are planned to be completed between 2018 and 2035.

Coal

by_destinationRussia has sizeable coal reserves and is the world’s third-largest exporter of coal.

With 177 billion short tons of coal at the end of 2014, Russia held the world’s second-largest recoverable coal reserves, behind the United States. Russia produced 394 million short tons in 2014, making it the sixth-largest coal producer in the world, behind China, the United States, India, Indonesia, and Australia. Almost 80% of Russia’s coal production was steam coal, and slightly more than 20% was coking coal.

In 2014, Russia consumed more than 60% of its coal production and exported the rest. Although coal accounts for a relatively modest share of Russia’s total energy consumption, coal is a more vital part of consumption in Siberia, where most Russian coal is mined.

More than half of Russia’s coal production comes from the Kuzbass basin in central Russia. Kuzbass coal must travel long distances by rail (about 2,600 miles) to reach Russia’s Baltic port of Ust-Luga, for export to European countries. The overland distance to Far East ports for export to Asian consumers is even greater.93 This long overland transport generally puts Russian coal at an economic disadvantage to competing sources of coal. Even so, in 2014, Russia was the third-largest coal exporting country in the world, exporting 171 million short tons, seaborne and overland. The top two coal exporters were Indonesia and Australia.

Russia’s coal exports have generally grown steadily since the late 1990s, with exports to Asia growing strongly in the past few years. In 2015, about 45% of Russia’s coal exports went to Asia (Figure 9).94 Russia’s total coal exports have approximately doubled over the past decade. Exports are expected to continue to grow in the future. In the short term, the weaker ruble, caused by sanctions and low oil prices, should make Russian coal exports more price-competitive in both Europe and Asia.

Russia’s coal-exporting ports are geographically located to serve either European or Asian markets. Some of Russia’s major coal ports include Murmansk, Ust-Luga, and Tuapse, all of which lie in the West and handle exports to Europe. Vanino and Vostochny lie in the East and handle exports to Asia.95 China and some East European countries receive imports from Russia directly by rail.96 Russia has plans to expand port capacity to facilitate more coal exports to Asia.

Notes:

  • Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of October 25, 2016.
  • Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

Endnotes:
1Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Annual report on execution of the federal budget, (updated March 22, 2016).
2Soldatkin, Vladimir, ‘Russian oil output hits post-Soviet record high in December, 2015,” Reuters (January 2, 2016).
3EIA estimates based on Eurostat, International trade data and Russian export statistics and partner country import statistics, Global Trade Tracker (subscription).
4International Atomic Energy Association, Power Reactor Information Service, accessed September 16, 2016.
5The United States first announced limited sanctions in March 2014. Additional US sanctions, including broader economic sanctions, were announced over the course of the year, through September 2014. For additional details see U.S. Department of State, Ukraine and Russia Sanctions.
6“Announcement of Treasury Sanctions” http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx, (accessed April 13, 2015).
7“Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions” http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx, (accessed April 13, 2015).
8The European Union (EU) first announced limited sanctions in March 2014, and first announced broader economic sanctions in July 2014. For additional details see European Union, EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis.
9Henderson, James and Julia Loe, “The Prospects and Challenges for Arctic Oil Development,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (November 2014), p. 34.
10Gazprom Bank, “50% dividend payout threshold approved for state-controlled companies,” (April 20, 2016).
11Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” (December 7, 2015) p. 22.
12Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, Table 6 (2015), p. 2.
13Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, “Table 6 Production of oil+condensate by region, mn tons,” (2015), p. 2. Note, the Eastern Bloc Research figures include crude, condensate, and NGL.
14Based on production from Rosneft’s Samotlorneftegaz and Yuganskneftegaz subsidiaries, from Nefte Compass, “Russian Crude Oil And Gas Condensate Production/Exports, 2015,” (January 28, 2016), p. 12.
15Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, “Table 6 Production of oil+condensate by region, mn tons,” (2015), p. 2.
16Henderson, James, “Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (April 2015), pp. 4, 8.
17Based on production from Rosneft’s Samotlorneftegaz subsidiary, from Nefte Compass, “Russian Crude Oil And Gas Condensate Production/Exports, 2015,” (January 28, 2016), p. 12.
18Henderson, James, “Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (April 2015), pp. 4, 8.
19Gazprom Neft, Press Release, “Oil production at Gazprom Neft’s Prirazlomnoye field to increase almost two-fold,” (March 16, 2016).
20Tatneft, Oil and Gas Production, (accessed April 28, 2015).
21Rosneft, Press Release, “Rosneft Oil Company has successfully closed the transaction of selling 15% shares in Vankorneft JSC to ONGC Videsh Limited,” (May 31, 2016).
22Rosneft, Verkhnechonskneftegaz and East Siberian Oil and Gas Company, (accessed August 3, 2015).
23Gazprom, Press Release, “First cargo of Yamal oil shipped from Arctic Gate offshore terminal,” (May 25, 2016).
24Lukoil, Press Release, “Lukoil reaches landmark five million tonnes of oil at Yuri Korchagin Field in the Caspian Sea,” (August 11, 2015).
25Exxon Neftegas Limited, Consortium members, (accessed April 29, 2015).
26Exxon Neftegas Limited, Press Release “Sakhalin-1 Project Begins Production at Arkutun-Dagi Field,” (January 20, 2015).
27Shell, Sakhalin-2 —an overview, (accessed April 29, 2015).
28Krysiek, Timothy Fenton, “Agreements from Another Era: Production Sharing Agreements in Putin’s Russia, 2000-2007,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (November 2007), pp. 19-26.
29Annenkova, Anna, “Russian Benchmarks of Black Gold,” Oil of Russia: Lukoil International Magazine, No. 4 (2012).
30ExxonMobil, Sokol, (accessed August 4, 2016).
31Nefte Compass, “Russia Exports New Crude Oil Grade,” (February 19, 2015), p. 3.
32Argus, Methodology and specifications guide: Argus crude, “Asia-Pacific, Sudan, ESPO Blend, Sakhalin Island assessments,” (July 2016), p. 23.
33Federal Customs Service of Russia and reporting countries’ import statistics, Global Trade Information Service (subscription).
34Gazprom Neft, Press Release, “Almost three million barrels of Arctic oil delivered to Northwest Europe,” (April, 17, 2015).
35Gazprom, Press Release, “First cargo of Yamal oil shipped from Arctic Gate offshore terminal,” (May 25, 2016).
36Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, Table 7 (2015), pp. 3—5. Note, the Eastern Bloc Research figures include crude, condensate, and NGL.
37Henderson, James, “Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (April 2015), pp. 4-7.
38BP, Working in Russia, (accessed August 4, 2016).
39International Energy Agency, Russia 2014: Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries (June 2014), pp. 20-22 and 192-193.
40Henderson, James, “Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (April 2015), pp. 36-48.
41Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide Refining Survey,” (December 7, 2015) p. 2.
42Rosneft, Refining, (accessed August 5, 2016).
43Lukoil, Oil Refining, (accessed August 5, 2016).
44Henderson, James, “Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (April 2015), pp. 44-46.
45Russian export statistics and partner country import statistics, Global Trade Tracker, (subscription).
46EIA estimate based on data from UN Comtrade Database, (accessed August 10, 2016).
47Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Annual report on execution of the federal budget, (updated March 22, 2016).
48European Commission, EU Crude Oil Imports and supply cost, Volumes and prices for monthly and cumulative crude oil imports by country of origin (2013-2015), (accessed August 10, 2016).
49Russian export statistics and partner country import statistics, Global Trade Tracker, (subscription).
50Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, Table 134 (2015), p. 41.
51Table 3: Transneft, Projects; Sakhalin Energy, TransSakhalin pipeline system; Caspian Pipeline Consortium, General information; State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Baku—Novorossiysk oil pipeline; Orlen Lietuva, Terminal and pipelines; European Parliament, Gas and Oil Pipelines in Europe, “Pipelines from third countries,” (November 2009) p. 11; Nefte Compass, “Transneft Seeks to Offset Upstream Delays,” (April 16, 2015) p. 5; Rodova, Nadia, “Capacity crunch threatens Russia’s ESPO oil exports,” Platt’s Oilgram Price Report, (February 4, 2015) pp. 1, 34; and Argus FSU Energy, “Transneft stalls ESPO feeder line,” (January 28, 2016), p. 1.
52Lloyd’s List Intelligence (APEX tanker data).
53Lenmorniiproekt, Oil loading port Primorsk, (accessed August 5, 2016).
54Ust-Luga Oil, Terminal: Production Capacities, (accessed September 14, 2016).
55Kommersant, “New Terminal Project in the port of Novorossiysk…,” (accessed April 28, 2015).
56Transneft Kozmino Port, About the Company, (accessed April 28, 2015).
57Platt’s Oilgram Price Report, “Capacity crunch threatens Russia’s ESPO oil exports,” (February 5, 2015), p. 1.
58Tamanneftegas, Technical characteristics of the complex, (accessed September 15, 2016).
59PortNews, “Oil, LPG throughput at Tamanneftegas terminal jumped 35% in 2015 to 8.5 million tonnes,” (January 28, 2016).
60Sibur, “First gas carrier loaded at the new LPG transhipment terminal in Northwest Russia,” (June 19, 2013).
61Sibur, “RDIF, leading international co-investors and Sibur close deal for investment into marine terminal at Ust-Luga,” (November 3, 2015).
62PR Newswire, “NOVATEK Completes Construction Of The Second Stage Of Ust-luga Complex,” (October 16, 2013).
63Chemicals Technology News, “SIBUR commences propylene production using UOP technology at Russian plant,” (December 18, 2014).
64Sibur, “SIBUR proceeds with ZapSibNeftekhim project,” (September 16, 2014).
65Hydrocarbon Processing, “Winners: Top HPI projects of 2015,” (accessed August 16, 2016).
66Rosneft, “Rosneft and Mitsui & Co., Ltd Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Jointly Develop FEPCO Project,” (April 29, 2013).
67Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” (December 7, 2015), p. 22.
68Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2014, Table 34 (2014), p. 14.
69International Energy Agency, Russia 2014: Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries (June 2014), pp. 20-22 and 192-193.
70Eastern Bloc Research, CIS and East European Energy Databook 2015, Table 33 (2015), p. 14.
71National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Global Gas Flaring Observed from Space, Data Files Download. Note data includes flaring from downstream natural gas operations, downstream oil operations and upstream operations.
72BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, Data workbook, (accessed July 2, 2015).
73EIA estimate based on data from UN Comtrade Database, (accessed August 10, 2016).
74EIA estimate based on data from Eurostat, International Trade Data, (accessed August 10, 2016).
75OECD Europe (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom
76Gazprom, Transmission and Underground Gas Storage Facilities, (accessed August 8, 2016).
77Table 6: Gazprom, Gas pipelines; GazpromExport, Transportation and Projects; Sakhalin Energy, TransSakhalin pipeline system; Nord Stream 2, The Pipeline; World Gas Intelligence, “Gazprom Braces for Yet More Pain,” (January 7, 2015), pp. 2-3; Nefte Compass, “Russia, Turkey to Speed Up Turk Stream,” (August 11, 2016), p. 3; and Argus FSU, “Gazprom revises PoS 1 plans,” (May 19, 2016), p. 11.
78Yafimava, Katja, “Evolution of gas pipeline regulation in Russia: Third party access, capacity allocation and transportation tariffs,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (March 2015).
79Yafimava, Katja, “Evolution of gas pipeline regulation in Russia: Third party access, capacity allocation and transportation tariffs,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (March 2015), pp. 16-17. Gazprom, Transmission, accessed August 8, 2016.
80Gazprom, Transmission, accessed August 8, 2016.
81World Gas Intelligence, “Russia’s New Asian Ambitions,” (March 30, 2011), pp. 1-2.
82BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, Data workbook, “Natural Gas: Trade movements 2015 as liquefied natural gas” (accessed June 8, 2016).
83Table 7: Gazprom, Sakhalin II; Total, Yamal LNG; Novatek, Yamal LNG; Gazprom, Baltic LNG; Gazprom, Vladivostok LNG; Gazprom, Kaliningrad Terminal; Pechora LNG, LNG Plant; Argus FSU, “Gazprom loses Baltic LNG funding,” (February 4, 2016) p 3; Reuters, “Novatek says some Arctic LNG-2 output would go to spot market,” (June 17, 2016); and World Gas Intelligence, “Sanctions, Prices Hit Russian LNG Plans,” (April 8, 2015), pp. 3-4.
84Yamal LNG, About the project, (accessed August 8, 2016).
85International Energy Agency, Russia 2014: Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries (June 2014), pp. 20-22 and 192-193.
86Belobrov, Vladimir, Electricity Markets in Russia, accessed April 27, 2015.
87International Energy Agency, Russia 2014: Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries (June 2014), pp. 183 and 198.
88World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Russia, (accessed September 16, 2016).
89International Atomic Energy Association, Power Reactor Information Service, (accessed September 16, 2016).
90World Nuclear Association, RBMK Reactors, (accessed April 19, 2016).
91World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Russia, (accessed September 16, 2016).
92World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Russia, (accessed September 16, 2016).
93Suek, Our Assets, (accessed April 19, 2016).
94Russian export statistics and partner country import statistics, Global Trade Tracker, (subscription).
95Suek AG, Seaborne Deliveries, (accessed April 24, 2015).
96Suek AG, Railway Deliveries, (accessed April 24, 2015).


Fighting Racism Where White Workers Are Hurting, Too – OpEd

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By Isaiah J. Poole*

Since 2011, Maine’s bombastic Republican governor Paul LePage has given America a taste of what it might be like to live under a Donald Trump presidency.

Like Trump, LePage has made outrageous comments against immigrants and communities of color. They include telling the NAACP to “kiss my butt,” publicly complaining about “guys with the name D-Money, Smoothie, Shifty” selling drugs and impregnating “young, white” girls, and blaming “illegals” for spreading diseases like HIV — all while cutting funding to cities that offered health care and other assistance to undocumented immigrants.

After five years of LePage practicing an extreme form of wedge politics, people like Ben Chin are working to heal the resulting divisions in Maine.

Chin, the 31-year-old grandson of an undocumented Chinese immigrant, has been working with the Maine People’s Alliance to rally support from white working class neighborhoods for a series of progressive ballot measures this November.

Countering the racist and nativist appeals of candidates like LePage and Trump, their goal is to get people to reject the politics of scapegoating immigrants and people of color and to instead focus on the real causes of — and solutions to — their economic distress.

“We’re starting out a conversation in which we’re making it clear we’re on their side,” Chin said in a recent phone interview. “That’s the foundation that gets laid for whatever comes next.”

These conversations are based on the research and experience of a broad range of grassroots organizations that have been struggling to get working-class white voters across the nation to see beyond the color line.

Chin got a personal taste of division politics when he was racially caricatured during his 2015 run for mayor of Lewiston, Maine. During his campaign, a local businessman paid for billboards that said, “Don’t vote for Ho Chi Chin. Vote for more jobs not more welfare.”

Since then, Chin’s turned his political focus to ballot initiatives that include increasing the state’s minimum wage and levying a 3 percent tax on household incomes over $200,000 a year.

Chin and his fellow Maine People’s Alliance members don’t have a “silver bullet” set of talking points that disarms the people they encounter with racist or anti-immigrant attitudes. Instead, they focus on questions that get people to think about their economic anxieties in a deeper way.

One question they ask is, “Why do you think some people are poor and other people are rich?”

That opens up a discussion about the ways a small group of the wealthy and powerful are stacking the economic deck against ordinary people of all colors, with their black and brown neighbors feeling it the most because of America’s history of systemic racism.

Chin said he was particularly struck by a recent conversation with a voter in Auburn, Maine. The voter was undecided about whether to support a referendum that would increase the state’s wage to $12 an hour by 2020.

“One of his ideas was that ‘certain people’ were going to get a wage increase,” Chin said. “We tried to unpack that.”

They talked about his life experiences and whether he really believed that increasing the minimum wage was about helping some “certain” group of undeserving freeloaders.

Chin said that though this voter wasn’t a “raging justice activist” by the end of their conversation, he was more thoughtfully considering the minimum wage.

Conversations like these are happening in many states around the country this election season, as progressives grapple with the mainstreaming of racist and nativist appeals by Trump and other far-right politicians.

These types of empathetic conversations are the nemesis of the conservative-corporate elite who have engineered extreme wealth inequality and, for too many, the disappearance of the American dream.

The last thing politicians who benefit from wedge politics want to see is working people across the nation transcending racial and cultural lines, and realizing those same politicians are the common source of their pain.

*Isaiah J. Poole is the communications director at People’s Action (peoplesaction.org). Distributed by OtherWords.org. 

Missing Issues From US 2016 Presidential Debates – OpEd

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Americans will vote November 8 to decide who will be the country’s next president to lead the nation to a peaceful path without wars and bloodbaths. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have presented a crude irony to the poll that American people have been provided with a choice between not only the two most unpopular candidates, but also the two most reactionary candidates in modern history.

The usual battle for the White House by two-party system is nearing the end point. World is damn sure that irrespective of who win the battle would continue the Bushdom agenda of permanent war on Islam by using many Muslim rulers like Syrian leader Assad.

With capitalism facing serious crakes globally, (notwithstanding the strenuous efforts by World bank and IMF to promote capitalism), imperialism could face obstructions and so US president would strive hard to promote both capitalism and imperialism to phase out the “enemies” and stabilize the “world order” to benefit these anti-humanity features on a permanent basis.

Ritualistic performance?

“They came, performed and disappeared”- this description fits well for the US presidential candidates -Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Donald Trump – who joined the three “joint” debates on the worthiness of their candidature.

Neither the Republican nor the Democratic person has any real vision about USA but in public mudslinging they have outsmarted the third world leaders. When the elected presidents are not duty bound to fulfill all their promises, pledges and programs, now the empty debates make the life easy for the next President too as he or she can be assured of space in NATO permanent war project on Islam for securing energy resources and for reducing Islamic populations. Pentagon led NATO terror wars can be a perfect tool for the president to justify all their illegal actions at home.

Clearly, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, the only two presidential candidates of the permitted parties, viz Republican and Democratic, debated only those useless issues without any substance, without any values for the society and governance, leaving out important issues.

They’re the only candidates that stand a real chance of winning the race, but there are other third-party and independent candidates in the running. The rules around getting on the ballot differ state to state, but most voters will have two main alternatives to Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.

Clearly, there is no clarity in their debates as to how and where exactly these two candidates would differ as the one to replace the incumbent president Obama who is heavily burned with several wars abroad.

The third and final of the Trump- Clinton presidential debates was just as false and intellectually degraded as the first two, characterized by lies by both candidates and mutual mudslinging. Trump and Clinton replied with mutual hatred, first about the allegations of sexual harassment by Trump which have been the focus of a week-long media barrage, then the charges of “pay to play” at the Clinton State Department, with donors to the Clinton Foundation receiving special access.

Both candidates gave themselves the widest possible latitude for escalating the US military aggression throughout the Middle East in the name of fighting “terrorism.” Clinton went on to advocate a wider war in the Middle East while concealing her plans after taking office, claiming she would “not support putting American troops back into Iraq as an occupying force.”

Trump: “Our inner cities are a disaster… I will do more for the African Americans than she will do in 10 lifetimes.” Perhaps most remarkable, however, was when moderator Chris Wallace asked Trump to support the election results. He refused to do so. Trump accused the media of poisoning people’s minds. He said Clinton shouldn’t have been allowed to run for president. It was Trump in a bunker, settling scores and lashing out at enemies real and perceived.

During the debate, Trump called Clinton a liar and hit back that she was a Russian puppet, not him. By the time the topic turned to “fitness to be president”, the stage was set for a total meltdown. He said the woman who has accused him of sexual harassment were in it for the fame and were Clinton campaign stooges.

Consensual candidate?

The final 2016 presidential debate took place on October 19 night, and expectations were not high either. Apparently, both leaders debated only those issues that seemed agreed upon in advance. That has been the practice of US politics cutting across the two-party system. The presidential candidates, therefore, have not been asked questions on some of the critical issues facing the nation that is fighting illegal wars abroad in Middle East on fake pretexts.

US establishment which generally decides who should be the next president and also work for that, is still seen busy with a Hillary win and Trump defeat. Clinton has become the consensus candidate of Wall Street and the military-intelligence apparatus, and, increasingly, of the Republican as well as the Democratic wing of the political establishment. It is significant that Trump never identified himself as a Republican or made any reference to the Republican Party during the debate, while Clinton repeatedly invoked the names of Republican presidents, including Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, and contrasted them to Trump. Hillary is ready to claim to be the next president in January 2017.

Far more rapidly than most people are aware, the quarter-century of war waged by the US since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the fifteen years of the “war on terror,” are metastasizing into a direct confrontation with the larger geopolitical rivals of the United States.

This immense war danger has been virtually excluded from the presidential election campaign and all but ignored by what presents itself as the political “left” in the United States. After a quarter-century of unending war, including eight years under Obama–the first president to serve two full terms with the country continuously at war–there is no functioning antiwar movement.

Donald Trump disgorged more of his predictable and already tiresome tirades. Words poured out in randomly shuffled stacks, like cards dealt by a drunken croupier. One imagines him under the hot lights, reeking of narcissism, Trump “Success” aftershave, and flop sweat. If Trump manages to bring up jobs and trade, he may reprise his only strong moment from the first two debates.

Once again, Hillary Clinton spends far too much time belaboring the rather obvious fact that Donald Trump is a “horrible” human being. Recent Clinton ads attacking Trump have featured everyone from military veterans to obnoxious movie characters.

The Clinton campaign calculates that its candidate is likelier to prevail by ‘disqualifying’ Trump — using ads to make the idea of voting for him socially unacceptable in professional suburbs — among additional well-educated voters … than by holding on to working-class voters tempted by Trump’s populism …” In one sense, it’s hard to blame them for devoting so much effort to dissing the Donald. An old political cliché says, “Don’t interrupt your enemy when he’s in the process of destroying himself.” It must be tempting to take that one step further and offer a helping hand.

Many voters can be persuaded to despise a privileged, bigoted, misogynistic, bullying, lying, pompous, self-regarding jackass. But Trump has undoubtedly convinced most of those voters already.

Clinton could choose to “go high” instead, using the debate platform to offer uplifting proposals around the issues that matter most to voters – issues like jobs, wages, growth, student debt, and criminal justice. When it comes to uplift, moderator Chris Wallace won’t be much help. Wallace made it clear that he plans to abdicate his journalistic responsibility on Wednesday night. He likened the moderator’s job to “being a referee in a heavyweight championship fight,” a statement that trivializes the democratic process.

The phrase “debt and entitlements” reflects a misguided, inside-the-Beltway financial mindset. This is not the first time Social Security has been badly served in this year’s debates. The third most popular question submitted for October 9’s so-called “town hall” debate was, “Do you support expanding, and not cutting, Social Security’s modest benefits?” It became even timelier after this week’s announcement that Social Security’s next cost of living adjustment will be a “measly” 0.3 percent, an average monthly increase of only $5 per month, despite the fact that drug prices and other medical costs have soared.

Issues

Both have very cleverly avoided foreign policy even in the final debate. They have no explanation for the continuation of terror wars even after their “objectives’ have been sufficiently achieved. Nor did they touch upon serious problems affecting domestic policy, they ignored the basic human rights in the most advanced nation on earth.

On every issue of domestic policy raised in the course of the 90-minute debate—democratic rights, immigration, economic policy, social spending—Clinton employed liberal rhetoric, claiming to defend abortion rights, the legalization of most undocumented workers, government-funded job-creation, a rise in the minimum wage, equal pay for women workers, and an increase in Social Security benefits. Clinton aides openly discuss the need to make such bogus promises in order to fool the American people, and Clinton herself reassures her Wall Street paymasters that they should take her campaign promises with a very large grain of salt.
On national security issues she gave a glimpse of the “genuine” hawkish Clinton, the arch militarist who sought to close the deal with the US ruling elite by demonstrating her hard-line defense of imperialist interests around the world.

Speaking for the first time in his entire campaign with some seriousness, Trump touched a number of ultra-right talking points calling for the appointment of Supreme Court justices, for a wall along the US-Mexico border and to deport millions of undocumented workers, and pointing out, correctly, that President Obama has deported many millions already. Trump appealed to the economic grievances of working people, declaring that expelling immigrant workers, renegotiating trade agreements to bar foreign imports and slashing taxes on the wealthy and the corporations would generate an unprecedented economic boom, with annual GDP growth of six or seven percent. He declared that “millions of people are registered to vote that should not be allowed to vote,” then added that Clinton herself “should never have been allowed to run for president because of what she did with emails and so many other things.”

For the first time in any of the debates, the question of a US-Russian conflict in Syria was broached when Wallace asked Clinton directly about her support for a no-fly zone over Aleppo and other contested Syrian cities. A no-fly zone meant war with Syria and Russia, and if a Russian plane violates the no-fly zone, does President Clinton shoot it down? Clinton simply ducked the question, claiming that the no-fly zone, an act of war against Syria and its allies, Russia and Iran, would be the subject of “negotiation.”

Capitalist funds and spending

Immoral act of fund raising from the rich and corporate lords by the party candidates makes the presidential poll a total farce. Those who “offer huge sums” to the candidates obviously expect “return favors” from the next president. The candidates thus spend huge resources on the campaign.

New poll finance reports filed with the Federal Election Commission outlined their dramatically different approaches to the quest for the White House. Trump, while putting more money than ever into advertising, spent a fraction of the roughly USD 66 million Clinton poured into media buys.

Defying his notorious stinginess, Donald Trump more than doubled his campaign spending last month compared to August. He burned through roughly USD 70 million as his standing in polls and among fellow Republicans dropped. His Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, spent even more, almost USD 83 million. Clinton’s payroll topped 800 people, coming in as her second-highest expense of the month, about USD 5.5 million.

Trump paid roughly 350 employees and consultants. He has outsourced most of his on-the-ground voter contact to the Republican Party. The New York real estate mogul has bragged until recently about his low-cost campaign and dismissed the need for television ads and polling services. But in September, he paid USD 23 million for commercials. In August he paid Conway’s The Polling Company 130,000. Last month, he almost tripled his payment to her company, part of USD 1.7 million in September expenditures to five different polling firms.

Another big expense: Long-ago ousted Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski received a total of USD 100,000. Lewandowski was fired in June and quickly became a paid contributor to CNN. That hasn’t stopped him from collecting Trump campaign checks thanks to a contract. In September, his Green Monster Consulting firm collected what the campaign said was its final payout to him. His firm took in about USD 540,000 over the course of the campaign. As a comparison, Clinton’s campaign manager, Robby Mook, has been paid about USD 153,000 so far. One of Clinton’s expenditures causes a double-take. Her campaign reimbursed employees who purchased USD 260 worth of products from Trump International Hotel in New York.

Poll rigged and hijacked?

Commentators point out the US election administration is highly de-centralized, with each state setting its own rules and local officials administering them. In most states, observers keep tabs on poll workers too. Voter ID requirements and voting machines also have huge variations, so widespread rigging would be hard to co-ordinate. “It’s bipartisan, it’s transparent, and there’s just no justification for concern about widespread voter fraud.” Former House Speaker and Republican Newt Gingrich harked all the way back to the Richard Nixon versus JFK 1960 election this weekend, saying no “serious historian doubts that Illinois and Texas were stolen”. His comments refer to allegations that JFK’s operatives – allegedly with the collusion of public officials – fixed tallies in Texas and Illinois, giving him 51 electoral votes, and ultimately winning him the closely contested election.

In 2014, when Obama was reelected to White House, 31 known cases of impersonation fraud were found in one billion votes cast in all US elections between 2000 and 2014. And in 2012, News21 analysis of 2,068 alleged election-fraud cases since 2000 turned up some 10 cases of voter impersonation. The idea that the US election will be rigged is “ludicrous”, and “certainly not stolen in the way that Trump has alleged,” according to Professor Richard Hasen, an expert in election law.

The Trump campaign has made claims of “election rigging” for months, blaming the “dishonest and distorted media” and the “Clinton machine” for the Republican’s slide in battleground states in the polls. But now the rhetoric has reached new heights, with Trump launching a twitterstorm to hammer home his allegations. A third of Republicans say they have a great deal or quite a bit of confidence that votes will be counted fairly, according to the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research.

Donald Trump has alleged that “large scale voter fraud” is occurring in the US, but is it possible to rig the US election? However, studies suggest voter fraud isn’t really a widespread problem in the USA.

In the third debate, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump tried to be restrained, cool and matured- rather ready to assume presidency. He really did calling his previous version as mere gimmicks. During the first section of the third presidential debate, when the topic was the Supreme Court, if you squinted you could almost imagine that this was just another presidential race, with two candidates squaring off and vigorously discussing their public policy positions on abortion and gun control. Even the immigration discussion started reasonably civilly, until Clinton pivoted to turn a question about Wikileaks into an attack on Trump’s relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin.

Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton sparred at debate over gun rights, with the Republican nominee charging that the Second Amendment is “under absolute siege” and would be eroded if his opponent wins. Trump, in the final three weeks, is thought to be zeroing in on several key battlegrounds including Florida, Ohio and North Carolina – but the polls suggest his path to the presidency remains narrow, as even once-reliably red states like Texas are being contested by the Clinton campaign.

Trump, slipping in the polls amid various campaign controversies, said at the last debate that Clinton should be in jail – while moderating a press conference for women who have accused Bill Clinton of sexual assault. Clinton has blasted Trump all along as temperamentally unfit for office.

Trump accused the media of poisoning people’s minds. He said Mrs Clinton shouldn’t have been allowed to run for president. It was Trump in a bunker, settling scores and lashing out at enemies real and perceived.

For a commentator, the irony with the Trump campaign’s remarks about election rigging is most of them suggest there will be in-person voter impersonation on election day, which studies show is the rarest form of voter fraud. He says the most common forms of voter fraud are election official fraud – either in the form of stuffing ballot boxes, or “losing” ballots – and absentee ballot fraud.

Observations

The American political system, in which two right-wing corporate-controlled parties have long enjoyed a monopoly, is staggering toward the finish line under conditions of a global crisis so deep that no one can be certain what the world will look like when the votes are counted on November 8.

With just 20 days to the election, millennials suggest they’d rather die than vote for the two main parties while Canadians try to keep their neighbors’ spirits up.

The candidates’ third and final debate sets the tone for the homestretch of the 2016 presidential campaign – a race that already stands out as arguably the most personal, caustic and unpredictable White House battle in modern politics.

WikiLeaks has embarrassed the Clinton campaign by releasing thousands of hacked emails purportedly from her campaign chairman’s account. FBI files alleging a State Department official sought a “quid pro quo” to alter the classification on a Clinton server email added to the campaign’s – and Obama government’s – woes. Media promote imperialism being represented by Hillary. Since the establishment hawks in USA have already decided to make Hillary the successor of Obama, it would be extremely difficult for Trump to win presidency, but nothing is impossible.

The routine US presidential poll campaign formality is over. The third and final debate is finished! The candidates go their separate ways without a handshake. Clinton walks off stage first. Of course, no love lost there, that’s for sure. What would be the fate of Americans?

To date, the controversies have appeared to hurt Trump more than Clinton, who has gradually expanded her lead over the GOP nominee in recent polls.

Media lords want the terror wars to continue and so the Bushdom agenda being pursued vigorously by Obama. Trump’s vulgarity and demagoguery, together with the media’s insatiable appetite for ratings, have made this campaign a race to the bottom. The night’s biggest question won’t be asked by the moderator. The question is: How low can this race go before it’s over?

With media projecting Hillary as the best choice to promote terror wars and Islamophobia, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have clashed in Las Vegas in final debate. Mrs Hillary Clinton vows to uphold women’s and LGBT rights, while Trump pledges to protect gun rights; Trump said he expects a key ruling that made abortion legal in the US to be overturned if president; She says Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Trump elected because he is his puppet.

Polls suggest Clinton is ahead nationally and in key battleground states.

However, Donald Trump gained on Hillary Clinton among American voters off late, cutting her lead nearly in half despite a string of women accusing him of unwanted sexual advances and the furor over his disputed claims that the election process is rigged, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released on Friday. Clinton, the Democratic former secretary of state, led Trump 44 percent to 40 percent, according to the Oct. 14-20 poll, a 4-point lead, with the Nov. 8 election fast approaching. That compared with 44 percent for Clinton and 37 percent for Trump in the Oct. 7-13 poll released last week.

If the upward swings and shifts continue Trump would land in White House to control the world. USA would wait for some more years to have their first ever woman president who is honest and sincere, unlike hawkish warmongering Hillary who over exposed as a terror inspired US leader.

The poll was a conspiracy and hence questions on Trump’s unwanted sexual advances scandal were asked of 1,915 American adults, including 546 likely Republican voters. It had a credibility interval of 3 percentage points for all adults and 5 points for Republican voters. Trump’s deficit narrowed to what it was before a video surfaced on Oct. 7 featuring him bragging about groping and kissing women. Several women, supporting Hillary, have since accused him of making unwanted sexual advances in separate incidents from the early 1980s to 2007. Trump has denied the allegations, calling them “totally and absolutely false.”

Hillary Clinton has long been the frontrunner in this contest but there have been times where she has looked far from comfortable. The most recent examples came back-to-back in early September. First, she made headlines by labeling half of Donald Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorable”, allowing her rival to conclude it was evidence of her disdain for “hardworking people”.

Mrs. Clinton had been suffering from pneumonia fueling further rumours about her health – rumours that some of her critics have been pushing for months. The news about her “sudden illness” helps Hillary in poll rating. Her poll numbers took a noticeable hit in the days that followed, but they appeared to recover towards the end of September.

While both candidates are unfit to be the US president, now Americans have no choice but to vote for one of them. If by mistake they prefer Hillary that would be their hilarious fate. One still hopes something good emerging out of Trump’s mind that would benefit USA and world at large. Polls suggest Clinton is ahead nationally and in key battleground states.

In order to overcome the high level expectations and manipulations, Trump and his advisers should be prudent enough to understand the under current in the campaigns trying to wean away the votes from Trump camp.

The high light of the final debate is that it has witnessed a reformed Trump performing.

Paying For Peace In Presevo – OpEd

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The recent agreement on providing Albanian-language textbooks for schools in southern Serbia suggests that lessons have been learned from previous relations between Serbia’s Albanian minority, Kosovo, and Albania, and on the role that kin-states can play in southern Serbia’s development.

By Laura Wise*

On October 17th 2016, Alexander Vucic and Edi Rama, the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Albania respectively, met Albanian representatives from Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, during the launch of a new Serbia-Albania business forum in Nis. Following the meeting, the Coordination Body for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja announced that an agreement had been reached on providing Albanian-language textbooks for schools in the three southern municipalities.

Details of who will be providing the textbooks remain unclear, although it is reasonable to expect that they will be imported from Albania. This agreement not only marks the latest effort by local representatives to reduce socio-economic inequalities for the Albanian minority in Serbia, but also Albania’s continued kin-state attention to one of Serbia’s most underdeveloped regions.

The announcement’s modalities and the agreement itself, however, suggest that lessons have been learned from previous relations between Serbia’s Albanian minority, Kosovo, and Albania, and on the role that kin-states can play in southern Serbia’s development.

Breaking the deadlock over minority-language education

Socio-economic development initiatives to prevent conflict in the Presevo valley have been ongoing since the publication of the so-called ‘Covic Plan’ in February 2000, during the armed conflict between the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UÇPMB), and federal Yugoslav security forces. In addition to plans for investment, infrastructure development and measures to improve employment, access to modern textbooks in the Albanian language is cited by the Albanian National Minority Council as a key issue for improving educational standards in southern Serbia, and implementing domestic and international commitments to minority rights.

A previous deal between Belgrade and Pristina’s education ministries to send Albanian-language textbooks to Presevo unravelled in September 2015, when the Serbian government objected to the educational content, claiming that the books taught ‘history from a Kosovo Albanian perspective’. The textbooks were detained by Serbian customs authorities, which led to protests and a class boycott by Albanians in Presevo and Bujanovac, and direct action by Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) activists in Kosovo, who overturned a truck transporting Serbian goods.

Interestingly, rather than attempting to resolve the failed Belgrade-Pristina deal, the Serbian government has now tried to source the missing educational resources from elsewhere, and in particular, from a partner that Serbia recognises as a sovereign state – not considers as its own disputed territory.

Including Albania in minority education provision in Presevo suggests that this is not only more convenient for Belgrade, but also more palatable, as it gives Kosovo’s government fewer opportunities to act as a supportive kin-state to Albanians in neighbouring countries. This is especially important in the case of Presevo, as in 1992 Albanians in the three municipalities voted in a referendum to unify the region with a future independent Kosovo. Although these claims have become more sporadic in recent years, local leaders frequently compare Albanians’ status and territorial position in Serbia with that of the Serb minority in Kosovo’s four northern municipalities, attempting to integrate themselves into the Pristina-Belgrade normalization dialogue. As highlighted by a parliamentary exchange between the Serbian Foreign Minister, Ivica Dacic, and Riza Halimi, the leader of the Party for Democratic Action (PDA), Belgrade does not fully encourage cooperation between Albanians in Serbia and Kosovo, and ultimately has the power to decide who imports what.

Diplomatic lessons and opportunities

The trilateral nature of the Nis meeting, with both Prime Ministers in attendance, is a diplomatic improvement on Rama’s last visit to southern Serbia in October 2014. Following a Belgrade press conference in which Rama vocally supported Kosovo’s independence, he then met Albanian representatives in a well-publicised visit to Presevo. Whilst the visit was supported by Zoran Stankovic, head of the Coordination Body, reports of banners with the words ‘Welcome Mr. Prime Minister’ and Rama’s comments that Albania would “not allow the assimilation of Albanians in this area” led many Serbian media outlets to frame it as a provocative gesture.

Although Rama also emphasized the need for Albanians in Serbia to co-operate with the Serbian government during his 2014 visit to Presevo, Vucic’s attendance this time makes it harder for the domestic press to misrepresent Rama’s presence as whipping up irredentism in a subversive minority.

It also gave Vucic a chance to appear serious about preserving the legacy of the Covic Plan, rather than simply delegating responsibility to the Coordination Body, the Albanian government, and the German Embassy in Belgrade, who pledged support for a Serbian initiative to redevelop a school sports hall in Presevo. In a country where the Prime Minister seemingly has his finger in every pie, and certainly every photo opportunity, his absence from Presevo during Rama’s last visit was noticeable. As the perceived inequality of Albanians in southern Serbia was a grievance expressly linked to the insurgency in 2000-2001, the central government’s commitment to developing and investing in the region is not an insignificant factor for minority leaders’ willingness to participate in Serbian state structures.

Implementation – the proof is in the pudding

The Belgrade-Pristina textbook deal in 2015 was welcome until it wasn’t, with Belgrade waiting until the books were at the border before raising objections over the content. Therefore, the new Serbia-Albania agreement can only really be evaluated once textbooks are actually delivered to schools in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja. However, the inclusion of the Serbian Prime Minister in discussions between Albanian minority representatives and their kin-state shows that the Serbian government is taking a more active role in facilitating the third-party provision of minority rights goods.

Whether this is a new approach to majority-minority relations, or simply a convenient by-product of the Nis forum, remains to be seen; as does whether this latest agreement to support Albanian-language education in southern Serbia will actually come to fruition.

*Laura Wise is a Research Analyst for the DFID-funded Political Settlements Research Programme at the University of Edinburgh. Her research interests include national minorities, kin-state politics, inclusive peace processes, and power-sharing in South-Eastern Europe. You can follow Laura on Twitter – @auttonwise

The views presented in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.

Iran’s Dream Of Becoming Aviation Transit Regional Hub – Analysis

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In February, immediately after the implementation of the nuclear deal, dubbed as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran placed orders to purchase dozens of long-distance European jets in a bid to renew its commercial air fleet. The country announced plans to invest $27 billion in an airline fleet capable of taking on the region’s super carriers.

The orders, which included Airbus A380, the world’s largest jetliner, positioned Tehran as a potential long-term transit center between East and West to rival regional hubs such as Dubai, air officials and analysts said, according to Reuters. Observers said it sent a political warning to Iran’s neighbors not to ignore the Islamic Republic’s emergence from isolation.

Iranian officials openly called for the revival of the country’s historical position as a center for communications in the region, an emphasis that is in retrospect reminiscent of Iran’s position in taking back its pre-sanctions share from oil markets.

Iran’s path to the purchases appeared to be one with lots of ifs and buts. However, the US Treasury Department recently loosened the grip on Iran, even though several months late, allowing Tehran to finalize agreed purchases even from Boeing.

A number of international airlines are also rushing to resume flights to Iran in the hope to tap into increasing opportunities in the country after the recent lifting of sanctions.

Last week, KLM resumed flights from Amsterdam to Tehran after a three-year halt. The resumption, part of a planned Air France-KLM comeback, includes four return flights per week. Paris-Tehran flights have also been resumed much earlier than the previously scheduled date in January.

British Airways has also resumed direct flights to Iranian capital Tehran since July. On September 1, the airline finally made its comeback to Iran after four years. “The new six times a week service…, which opens up exciting new prospects for Iran as a tourist destination thanks to its rich heritage and culture, unique architecture, and world-class food and delicacies,” British Airways said in a statement issued on the same day. The airline will move to daily flights from winter.

German airline Lufthansa has also announced it is ready to step up flights to Tehran and other Iranian cities. Imam Khomeini International Airport says it now hosts 57 domestic and foreign airlines.

Apart from boosting Iran’s tourism and transit revenues, the resumption of European flights is expected to be good news for the country’s expatriates, who have had to travel to Turkey, UAE, and Qatar for connections.

Non-Europeans are also joining. Last month, Thai Airways celebrated its first landing in Tehran. Air Asia reportedly resumed direct flights to Tehran, too. The Malaysian airline is not a first-timer in Tehran, as the route was first introduced in 2010. However, the route was suspended in 2012 due to Iran’s challenging economic and business conditions as a result of sanctions applied by the US. “The recent lifting of sanctions opens up exciting new prospects for Iran as a tourist destination,” said Benyamin Ismail, AirAsia’s CEO.

Iran’s aviation industry has its own concerns. Domestic airliners worry that they may not be able to compete with international giants. However, this does not mean that they will be out of the picture. “The prime cost for domestic airlines is less than for foreign competitors and this gives them more space for maneuver,” says Maghsoud As’adi Salmani, the secretary of the Association of Iranian Airlines. However, he tells Iranian weekly Tejarat Farda (Trade for Tomorrow) that prices are second priority for passengers. “The more service quality is improved, it is more likely for Iranian airways to obtain a larger share of the market,” he said.

Experts say Iranian airliners are decades behind regional rivals when it comes to quality. But their domestic share seems not to be at stake. Iran’s regulations ban foreign airlines from involvement in domestic flights, forcing them to use facilities provided by Iranian opposite numbers, As’adi Salmani said. The prospects of joint ventures between Iranian sides and foreign competitors also appear to be inevitable, given the global decline in demand. As’adi Salmani implies that foreign parties could cooperate with Iranian partners to reduce their costs and help them offer better services, in return. Iranian airliners however eye financial injection on the part of the government and banks for renovation of their fleet and infrastructure. As’adi Salmani says the parliament should intervene in order to allow financing from the National Reserves Fund.

Putting aside weak infrastructure and uncertainty in relations with the West, and economic challenges, Iran has to face cultural issues too. The story of the Air France’s return could be illuminating. The return of Air France came after a row in which the carrier’s female personnel objected to Iran’s rules requiring Islamic coverage when not on board. The Air France solution was to allow objecting female staff to refuse to work the route. Air France’s also plans to offer alcohol on board its thrice-weekly flights, according to the Financial Times. This may also raise objection in Tehran’s orthodox circles.

The second largest economy in the Middle East, Iran is viewed as one the best emerging markets for the West. The Rouhani administration has also reached out to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment to boost its economy. The vision portrayed for post-sanctions Iran by the government is promising, but it takes time to see if external and domestic pressures will allow the government to realize that vision.

Source: Iranian Diplomacy

China Holds Surprise South China Sea Drills In Response To US Patrol

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China’s navy is gearing up for drills near the disputed islands in the South China Sea, less than a week after a US guided-missile destroyer sailed through the waters where Beijing asserted sovereignty in what US called a ‘freedom of navigation’ patrol.

The announcement of an exercise to be held in parts of the South China Sea was posted on China’s Maritime Safety Administration website.

Without disclosing the details of the drills, the maritime authority provided the coordinates for the maneuvers, which are planned for Thursday. It also ordered civilian vessels to stay away from the waters just south of Hainan island and northwest of the disputed island chain in the South China Sea.

The announcement of the drills, which are quite routine in the disputed waters, comes less than a week after USS Decatur conducted a “freedom of navigation” sail-by near the disputed Spratly or Paracel Islands, through which some $5 billion dollars’ worth of trade passes through each year.

“USS Decatur (DDG 73) conducted this transit in a routine, lawful manner without ship escorts and without incident on October 21,” Pentagon spokesman Commander Gary Ross told the Navy Times. “The United States conducts these routine operations on a regular basis around the world, in full compliance with international law.”

The US operation last Friday was the fourth “freedom of navigation” maneuver conducted in the past year by Washington. The move, as always, drew strong response and criticism from Beijing.

According to the Chinese Defense Ministry, as the USS Decatur was “trespassing” by the islands it was approached by at least two Chinese vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy ships repeatedly warned the US warship to leave, as they escorted USS Decatur from waters claimed by China.

Calling the American sail-by a “serious offense” and “aggressive behavior,” China accused the US intentionally sending US warship to Chinese territorial waters “without permission.”

“We strongly urge the US side to respect China’s sovereignty and national security concerns. Do not repeat the mistakes again,” Chinese Defense Ministry said.

At the same time, Beijing vowed to increase military air and sea patrols, as well as to strengthen the defense capacity to better protect the country’s national sovereignty and security.

The Spratly Islands are comprised of more than 750 islets and reefs off the coastlines of Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and China, with all the claimants having their own national names for the archipelago.

China has a strong military presence on the archipelago concentrated around Woody Island, where Beijing maintains a runway and an arsenal of surface-to-air missiles. Beijing continues to claim the reefs in defiance of a Hague International Arbitration Court verdict this summer.

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