By Alireza Rahimi*

Following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, speculations about the policies of his administration and possible outcomes of those policies have turned into a hot topic for political, economic and academic circles. The reactions shown to this issue in Iran have been mostly focused on such issues as the regional policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, state policies in Iran, the issue of Iran’s nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the impact of Trump’s election on the approaches taken to Iran by world powers, the issue of Iran’s regional rivals and enemies, and issues related to civil relations in Iran.

In terms of regional policies, perhaps a clearer outlook has been delineated compared to the past. An issue, which was regularly highlighted by Donald Trump in his election campaign and debates was the priority given to the issue of eliminating the Daesh terrorist group instead of focusing on such goals as toppling the Syrian President Bashar Assad. A show of determination by the United States to eradicate Daesh in the Middle East and lower the priority of such an unrealistic goal as the regime change in Syria through forceful means should be considered as a remarkable progress. Of course, the method to be used by Trump’s government to achieve the goal of eradicating Daesh, and the way that the United States will choose to manage reclaimed territories following the demise of Daesh are all fateful matters and are per se capable of giving birth to new regional challenges.

Trump’s election as the next US president will have different consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of domestic politics. Trump is possible to focus less on Washington’s past human rights claims and concentrate more on domestic issues of the country and this can serve to reduce tensions between the two countries. Nonetheless, possible support for and use of political forces that are opposed to the Islamic Republic, and supporting those groups, which seek to overthrow the Islamic establishment, can render this positive point useless. Political figures named to hold government posts in Trump’s administration and past relations between some of them and such anti-Iran terrorist groups as the Mujahedeen Khalq Organization (MKO) are not good signs and actually portend more tension between the two countries.

Iran’s nuclear deal is another issue, which may pit Trump and his administration against Iran. Although the nuclear deal is an international agreement supported by the United Nations Security Council and discarding it would be incompatible with international rules and regulations, the new US government should be expected to take obstructionist steps in this regard. This is true because the US House of Representatives and Senate will remain under control of Republican figures and will help the government in its effort to put obstacles on the way of the implementation of the nuclear deal. Such limitations may continue and even get worse in the form of banking and trade impediments, investment restrictions and preventing industrial and economic cooperation between entities from the two countries.

In view of Trump’s political, security, economic and trade policies, it seems that the existing gaps between the United States, on the one hand, and the European Union, China and trade partners of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, on the other hand, will deepen. Differences with Europe will be over such issues as the climate change, management of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the best way to contain Russia and, probably on how to go ahead with the implementation of the JCPOA. At the same time, tensions between the United States and China are going to be exacerbated over the two countries’ trade and economic relations as well as rising militarism by the United States in the North Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. All these factors will serve to widen the aforesaid gaps, which can be also translated into reduced ability of the United States to create new international consensus against Iran.

Another aspect of Trump’s foreign policy is the effort that he is possible to make in order to get closer to Russia compared to President Barack Obama’s term. The consequences of this issue can be both promising and concerning for Iran. They could be promising because less US hostility against Russia would mean lower tensions in the region, which would conform to Iran’s norm, which call for taking advantage of political solutions to resolve regional issues. However, more closeness between the United States and Russia can, under specific conditions, cause Russia to drift away from Iran and also cause the existing strategic links between Iran and Russia over various issues, especially in Syria, to be sacrificed in the process of covert political give and take behind the scenes. Therefore, Iran must approach this issue very cautiously.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional rivals and enemies constitute another issue, which will be affected by new policies of the forthcoming US administration. Although Saudi Arabian and Israeli lobbies had taken sides with Hillary Clinton against Trump during election campaigns in the United States, this issue should not lead to the misleading conclusions. As proven by historical experiences, strategic ties between the United States and Israel are so strong that both Democrat and Republican parties feel committed to maintain them. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is considered as the United States’ strategic partner in the region. Therefore, although Trump’s foreign policy orientations may increase tensions between his administration and the Saudi regime, it must not be forgotten that during his election campaign, Trump talked about the necessity for Saudi Arabia to develop a military nuclear capability. Although achievement of this goal seems too unlikely, it is a sign of how unpredictable Trump’s approach to Saudi Arabia can be.

On the whole, relations between civil societies in Iran and the United States will be one of the main losers of Trump’s election and a major reason for this issue is anti-immigration and Islamophobic approaches taken by Trump. Since Trump is not alone in his radical views on these issues and many members of the Republican Party as well as large sections of social groups and people in the American society support his views, one may expect more problems to arise in relations between the two countries’ citizens. It is almost certain that travels by Iranian citizens to the United States, academic scholarships, relations between the two countries’ universities, trade relations and other forms of relations between the two countries’ nationals will be affected by this process.

The above facts show that nobody can decisively talk about advantages or disadvantages of Trump’s election win for Iran, and to pass a judgment on this issue, one must take into account various positive and negative outcomes of this issue. At the same time, it must be noted that these speculations have been brought up in view of the approaches adopted by Trump during his election campaign, and the roles to be played by the Republican Party, the House of Representatives, Senate, and various think tanks, as well as Trump’s deputies and advisors in shaping his executive policies must not be ignored.

* Alireza Rahimi
Doctoral Degree in Political Science

Professor Neil Hyatt, Research Chair in Radioactive Waste Management, is calling for UK plutonium policy to be re-examined to allow swift immobilization of UK’s civil plutonium stockpile to maximize safety, security and affordability for UK taxpayers.

Plutonium was once envisaged as the fuel for a fleet of fast breeder reactors, but the reactor development program was shelved in 1994. Since then, plutonium, recovered by reprocessing of nuclear fuel, has continued to stockpile at the Sellafield site.

At the end of reprocessing operations in 2020, the UK civil plutonium stocks will exceed 140 tonnes – the largest stockpile of plutonium under civil safeguards in the world. Several influential reports have highlighted security concerns associated with indefinite storage of this material.

Current Government policy is to reuse the UK’s plutonium as so-called MOX (Mixed Oxide) fuel in a fleet of new light water reactors. However, an analysis of the troubled US MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, conducted by Professor Neil Hyatt, Director of Sheffield’s Immobilisation Science Laboratory, has identified issues that may also be problematic for a potential new UK MOX fuel production plant.

The USA has all but abandoned completion of its MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, a cornerstone of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement between the USA and Russia, signed in 2010, to eliminate 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium. This lead to Russia suspending implementation of the agreement in October 2016.

Writing in the journal Energy Policy, Professor Neil Hyatt argued, “The heavily over budget and delayed US MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is based on the same reference design as a potential UK plant. So there is an urgent need to review the design basis assumptions and cost data for a UK MOX fuel fabrication plant, in the light of the US experience”.

Professor Hyatt added, “In addition, no owner of a future new nuclear reactor in the UK has yet given a commitment to accept MOX fuel and the commercial appetite is expected to remain weak. For example, the Generic Design Assessment for the Hinkley Point C reactors explicitly excluded consideration of MOX fuels”.

The study concluded Government policy should be changed to commit to immobilising plutonium which is suitable for reuse as MOX fuel, in the event that a MOX fuel fabrication plant is no longer considered a viable proposition.

Professor Hyatt argued that the UK needs to learn the lessons of the US plutonium disposition programme, which was wedded, exclusively, to plutonium reuse in MOX fuel fabrication: “There are significant cost and technical uncertainties in both the MOX reuse and immobilisation and disposal options. We can only mitigate these uncertainties by making a commitment to promptly immobilising all plutonium which is not reused as fuel and developing the necessary technology”.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is right to fear cleric Fetullah Gulen and his Hizmet movement, but the recent failed coup has given him a golden opportunity to crush them for good. Erdoğan never tolerated the continued existence of serious rivals, and the Gulenists had long outlived their usefulness to him. Since being elected in 2003, Erdoğan has systematically co-opted, weakened, or destroyed every alternative power base throughout Turkey. Like other populist authoritarians such as Putin, Erdoğan centralized executive control in the name of nationalism, economic growth, ethnic pride, and an appeal to memories of past imperial and religious glory. This has worked well for him, and, like Putin, he will continue to eliminate any threats to his vision for the state and society, including fighting the Gulenists no matter the cost.

In 2003, after Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) first won national elections, Gulen and his Hizmet movement had been their allies and coordinated to dismantle the threat of the secular military to a more religious Turkish state. Erdoğan was given increased powers, and Gulen’s movement gained followers and influence in the civil service, especially among the judiciary and police. Four times in modern Turkey’s history, the military had led a coup to restore institutional stability or to prevent the Islamification of the state. Erdoğan had been a member of a previous party toppled by a coup in 1997 and saw the military as a threat ever since. Gulen also feared the military and fled Turkey to live in the U.S. shortly after the 1997 coup. Thus, it is no surprise that Erdoğan and Gulen saw the importance of taming the military, which they did with a series of show trials with trumped-up evidence of an alleged coup. Hundreds of officers were sentenced, and the top military leadership was replaced, securing Erdoğan’s control of the armed forces.

Yet, Erdoğan recognized that Gulen constituted the next possible threat to his power and that Gulen’s influence that toppled the military could be used to do the same to Erdoğan and the AKP. Not long after the military was tamed, Gulenists took issue both with several AKP policies, including negotiations with Kurdish militants and the government’s suppression of the Gezi park protests. Soon, those same Gulenist prosecutors began to dig up some real and some forged corruption scandals amongst high AKP officials, including cabinet members and Erdoğan’s family. Erdoğan struck back, removing or arresting many of those same Gulenist civil servants and forcing many private Hizmet-run schools and media outlets to close. The blows and counter-blows continued back and forth until the failed coup on July 15, 2016. That coup, which Erdoğan insists was carried out by Gulenists, and in which Gulen denies any influence, has resulted in a massive purge.

Given the large membership of Gulenists in many Turkish governmental and security forces, it is very likely that they were the leading group behind the coup. Through a combination of happenstance, luck, and the coup’s last-minute nature, it did not succeed, but Erdoğan is well aware it could have. With millions of members, billions of dollars, and reach into Turkey’s bureaucracies, there is no doubt that Gulen’s secretive Hizmet movement was rightly seen as a threat to Erdoğan’s grip on power. Indeed, that threat continues to exist in the opaque and powerful nature of Gulenists’ closed organizational structure and parallel networks throughout Turkey’s society and state. But because the coup failed, Erdoğan has the opportunity to finish them. Like the manufactured charges against the military years before, once again Erdoğan has the excuse and power he needs to purge Gulenists from positions of power. According to Human Rights Watch, since the attempted coup the Turkish government has used a state-of-emergency to arrest 34,000 soldiers, teachers, officers, judges, journalists, and other members of the government or civil society. Additionally, over 70,000 others are under investigation and over 150 media outlets have been closed.

Considering that the Gulenists’ main sources of power were in law enforcement, the judiciary, media, and education, those actions have greatly reduced the capacity of Hizmet to either instigate a further attack or to retaliate. Erdoğan has made vast strides towards reining in yet another rival power base. Erdoğan should be wary, but he also knows he is winning and has the power and excuse to do to the Gulenists what he did to the military. Gulen should be feared, but now not that much.

*John Dale Grover is a Young Voices Advocate and M.S. in Conflict Analysis Resolution candidate at George Mason University.

By Cinzia Bianco and Giorgio Cafiero*

Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Italy has one key partner – the United Arab Emirates (UAE); two economic partners – Kuwait and Qatar; and three third-party partners – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. As Italy grapples with an ongoing financial crisis, officials in Rome view the GCC’s interest in diversifying its web of security partnerships as an opportunity to take advantage of a lucrative defense market and to boost national exports.

Military bonds between Italy and the GCC are taking shape within the context of a Gulf-Mediterranean security nexus. Southern European and Arab Gulf states are forging stronger ties to fortress themselves against the security threats posed not only by militant Islamist extremists but also by the flood of refugees caused by the raging conflicts in the Levant and Maghreb. Although Italy is not mainland Europe’s top arms dealer (France holds that title), the escalating geopolitical instability across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will likely give rise to stronger cooperation in the defense sector between Rome and the Gulf states. Matteo Renzi’s government has provided an unprecedented level of support for Italy’s military industry, which has scored significant achievements in three GCC countries this year.

In March, the UAE – the GCC’s longest-standing purchaser of Italian weapons and the Arab Gulf state with closest ties to Rome – agreed to a USD 355 million deal to buy eight drones from Piaggio Aerospace. Since last year, Mubadala, a public joint stock company and an investment vehicle of Abu Dhabi’s government, has acquired 100 percent of Piaggio Aerospace. This is one of the most strategic among GCC-owned Italian assets, particularly due to Piaggio Aerospace’s plans to develop a line of drones. This deal means that, for the first time ever, a technologically advanced combat item would be GCC-owned since its inception.

The UAE is also an important political and strategic ally of Italy. Rome frequently reaches out to Abu Dhabi for support – first and foremost pertaining to the Libya dossier, and, to a lesser extent, to Egypt’s. Indeed, the frequency of high-level bilateral political visits has increased significantly over the past few turbulent years. Convergence, however, on specific regional crises, especially Libya, comes with limits. Although the UAE unequivocally supports the Tobruk-based government and General Khalifa Haftar’s anti-Islamist forces in the Libyan National Army (LNA), Italy has been pushing for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), brokered by the United Nations in December 2015, and views General Haftar as an important security interlocutor, but not a political one.

Officials in Rome, however, usually set aside these sensitive dossiers with the other GCC members, although several are important economic and defense partners of Italy. In June, for example, Italy’s state-owned Fincantieri secured a USD 4.5 billion contract with Qatar to supply Doha with five warships, which, according to Il Sole 24 Ore, will come with missiles and radar. This landmark deal followed years of conversation between Rome and Doha. The visit of Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani to the Italian capital in January laid the groundwork for the contract, which includes the training of Qatari personnel by Italy’s navy.

In April, Kuwait signed a USD 9.1 billion deal to purchase 28 Eurofighter jets from the EuroRADAR consortium, led by Finmeccanica, marking the largest contract ever secured by the Italian defense giant. The deal includes logistical and operational support, as well as the training of both aircrews and ground personnel, to be carried out in cooperation with the Italian Air Force.

Italy, Qatar, and Kuwait finalized these two contracts only as a result of government-to-government agreements signed between the defense ministries of Rome, Doha, and Kuwait City. They represent a significant upgrade in what were already important economic relations. Whether they will lead to stronger political and strategic cooperation remains questionable.

Finally, there are those relations that are strictly linked to third parties – in this case to Italy’s most important ally, the United States. Italy’s ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman, with whom bilateral relations never truly took off, strengthened only after Washington reached out to its European Union (EU) allies to share security responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

Since the beginning of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, Italians exported approximately USD 62 million in arms, ammunition and spare parts to the Saudis, who fly the Eurofighters jets in their war against the Houthi rebel movement and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Italian-Saudi relations, however, are complicated. On one hand, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government has tried to reach out to the Saudis with two high-level visits to Saudi Arabia in two years. (Renzi visited Riyadh in November and in June Italy’s Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni visited Jeddah.) Indeed, there are a host of Italian firms with a strong presence in the Saudi market; they collaborate extensively with local companies to build infrastructure and petrochemical factories in cities across the kingdom. For instance, Salini Impregilo, a leading constructor, built Riyadh’s Kingdom Tower and is currently working on Riyadh’s subway project.

Yet the numbers are quite small given the country’s size. This is partly because the level of mutual contacts and familiarity between Italy and Saudi Arabia – just as with Bahrain and Oman – has been historically low, and these countries have been traditionally treated as friends of friends, rather than as full partners. In addition, Italy’s geopolitical alignments have often been at odds with Saudi Arabia’s.

Italy’s historically strong connection to Tehran represents the major obstacle in Rome-Riyadh relations. Partners since the 1950s and up until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Italy is a trusted interlocutor for the Iranians, who pushed strongly for Italy to be included in the 5+1 group negotiating on the nuclear file in 2004. In 2013, former Minister for Foreign Affairs Emma Bonino was the first European foreign minister to visit the Islamic Republic following the end of President Mahmood Khatami’s tenure in 2005. At that time, the Italian diplomat was already pushing to include Iran at the negotiating table at the Geneva II conference on Syria.

Since the signing of the nuclear agreement, Italy has been quick to arrange an exchange of high-level political visits with Tehran and to ink significant deals in sectors such as petrochemicals, heavy industry, infrastructure, finance, and defense. In September, Tehran even negotiated a naval exchange deal with Italy for its warships to be berthed in Italian ports and vice versa. This agreement in particular, as well as the general political vicinity of the two countries, represents a red flag for the Saudis, especially in an increasingly polarized region.

A grave concern in Riyadh and other GCC capitals is that Iran’s reintegration within the global economy, as well as Tehran’s improved relations with Italy and other Western states, is paving the way for more NATO states to begin viewing Iran as a useful partner, if not a tacit ally, in the struggle against Sunni Islamist extremism and terrorism.

Indeed, when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani made his watershed visit to Italy in January, Renzi called on Rome and Tehran to cooperate jointly in an effort to defeat the “evil” Daesh (Islamic State). Last year, EU Foreign Policy Chief and member of the Italian Parliament Federica Mogherini hailed the nuclear deal’s passage. She wrote that the watershed agreement could “open unprecedented possibilities of peace for the region, starting from Syria, Yemen, and Iraq”. These statements were poorly received in Arab Gulf states such as the UAE, where officials, certainly encouraged by Riyadh, accused Mogherini of failing to understand their perception of Tehran’s foreign policy in the Arab world as aggressive.

Yet not all members of the GCC are likely to have a negative attitude toward deeper Italian-Iranian ties. Oman, which is the Council’s most independent state and maintains a cordial relationship with Tehran, shares Italy’s view of Iran as a nation with an important and legitimate role to play in resolving international security crises. Although Oman’s relationship with Italy has been so far unsteady – with limited cooperation in fields such as tourism, oil, gas, and construction – Rome is increasingly viewing Muscat as a valuable diplomatic interlocutor. Often dubbed “The Switzerland of the Middle East” and rightfully credited with promoting peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, the Omani perspective can be increasingly valuable at a time when Italian officials grapple with refugee crises stemming from conflicts for which the only solutions are political.

At the same time, there may been reason to expect that Italy and Oman are also exploring a defense partnership. In September Rome and Muscat’s defense ministers, Omani military officials and the Italian ambassador to the Sultanate attended an Omani-Italian joint military exercise in Jebel al-Akhdar. As Oman struggles to achieve its aim of economic diversification, Muscat officials view the Sultanate’s ports such as Duqm as crucial trade hubs with great potential for growth in the shipping and logistics sectors. This would, in turn, offer more Italian firms a stable corner of the MENA region for trade and investment. By aiding the Omani military with joint drills, Italy is perhaps suggesting that it is a stake-holder in the long-term security of the country – as well as of the region.

A final consideration emerges from this analysis. As Italy begins to define its presence in the Gulf region, it must achieve a delicate balance between its relations with Riyadh, Tehran, and the other Arab Gulf capitals. As the GCC nations respond to escalating geopolitical instability and rising sectarian temperatures by asserting a more muscular foreign policy, while becoming less confident in their most important defense partner, the U.S., they are turning to other NATO members to counter-balance their dependence on Washington for weapons deals. They might be exploring the Italian option not only as the world’s eighth largest international arms exporter, but also, potentially, as a country which perhaps could still be persuaded to align with the GCC states on a host of global security issues, especially in the Mediterranean. Then, perhaps, Italy could sway other European countries to follow. For these reasons, this Mediterranean country, until now essentially a stranger in the neighborhood, is likely to play an increasingly important role in the Arab Gulf states’ long-term strategic planning.

Cinzia Bianco is an analyst at Gulf State Analytics (GSA). Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO and founder of GSA.

This article was originally published by Gulf State Analytics on November 15, 2016.

By Irina Slav

Just one day after the IEA warned the world could drown in oil if production does not fall beneath demand sometime soon, OPEC released a new market whammy, offering up the cartel’s production figures, which largely jive with figures reported by the IEA yesterday: OPEC has increased its oil production.

OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report revealed daily oil production for the cartel of 33.64 million barrels for October—up by 240,000 bpd on September—largely confirming the IEA’s report, although the international authority’s figure was a bit higher at 33.83 million bpd.

OPEC’s calculations had the increase over September, on the other hand, a bit higher than the figures published by the IEA.

The OPEC report uses daily output amounts as reported by secondary sources rather than by the members themselves, since the latter are often higher than the former. This output calculation methodology was a bone of contention for Iraq in September when negotiations about an output cap began. Regardless of which production figures are used, secondary or direct, it’s now clear that the global supply glut will not ease during this time of increased production.

On a somewhat brighter note, according to the group, non-OPEC supply this year would be some 780,000 barrels lower than it was in 2015. However, this is expected to rise in 2017 by 230,000 bpd—a figure a bit below the October over September production increase by OPEC members.

In contrast, the IEA predicted a 500,000-barrel increase in oil production outside the cartel for 2017. OPEC’s estimates put non-OPEC production next year at an average daily of 56.43 million barrels. This, added to OPEC’s October rate of production, would give the world almost 91 million barrels of oil per day.

But the interesting breakdown presented by OPEC in this latest report is that demand for OPEC crude in 2017 would stand at 32.7 million barrels per day. With their current production at 33.64 million barrels per day, that’s a net inventory gain of 940,000 barrels of crude per day, based on OPEC supply vs. OPEC demand (or 1.1 million barrels per day if you use IEA figures released yesterday. Even if a freeze does take shape sometime in 2017 using the minimum amount discussed at the Algiers meeting, which was 32.5 million bpd, we’re talking about a 200,000 barrel per day decrease in inventory in the world of OPEC. Between Algiers and now—and likely between now and next year, OPEC is adding to the supply side of that equation daily, which would push out further and further any takeaways from inventory.

Hypothetically—it’s possible that these production figures could result in some easing of inventories in 2017 on a global level, since OPEC expects global oil demand next year to hit 95.55 million barrels of crude per day. If its estimate is correct, the global glut could possibly begin to ease at some point during the year. That said, it remains unclear just how much crude is currently being kept in storage, and how long it will take to get rid of however much that is.

The easing of the global glut-thought by some to be even a shortage at some point in 2017— is more than likely to remain just a hypothetical, given some non-OPEC producers’ intentions, stated directly or in a veiled manner, to continue expanding production, and OPEC’s very own Saudi Arabia’s threat that it would raise production to 11-12 million barrels if all its co-members do not agree to take part in the freeze—notably Iran.

“The Saudis have threatened to raise their production to 11 million barrels per day and even 12 million bpd, bringing oil prices down, and to withdraw from the meeting,” according to an OPEC source, as quoted by Reuters. The comment was denied by OPEC senior officials.

If Iran digs in and refuses to cut, and Saudi Arabia digs in and refuses to take on most of the cutting itself, thereby giving up market share, OPEC will continue to add to the glut, further straining heavily oil-dependent economies.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/OPECs-Bearish-Report-Provides-Little-Hope-Oil-Markets.html

By Arun Mohan Sukumar

At the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting of “Future Councils” in Dubai, lawyers, economists and entrepreneurs have gathered not only to praise, but also bury capitalism. Among global elites, the perception that the liberal, international order is on its last leg is strong, following presidential elections in the United States, and Britain’s exit from the European Union. This sentiment is driven by an assumption — perhaps misplaced — that the West will continue to be the fountainhead of international regimes that ease the flow of trade, people and information. For the UAE, and many Gulf countries, the “de-globalisation” impulse throws their carefully planned embrace of the Washington Consensus into disarray.

On Sunday, Gulf News, the Emirates’ most prominent English daily, carried an editorial calling on the Trump administration not to “ignore” climate change, or the “ground-breaking” Paris accords. That a Gulf monarchy long reliant on non-renewable sources of energy now feels the need to remind the US of its multilateral — and indeed, moral — commitments reflects the concerns in this part of the world. No region is affected more profoundly and immediately by policies articulated in Washington D.C. than West Asia. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, and his successor’s efforts to pursue rapprochement with Iran have singularly changed the political and security outlook of the region. Therefore, it is with some trepidation that elites here see the election of Donald J. Trump. At the WEF, Cabinet Affairs and Future of the UAE Minister Mohammed Al Gergawi suggested that the UAE will help co-create “global governance frameworks” to manage technological disruptions in industry. The appetite for multilateral engagement in Asia stands in sharp contrast to the purported isolationism that emanates from the West today.

The US president-elect’s focus on creating and sustaining jobs is shared by monarchs in the Gulf, who will wonder if the transition to “green” technologies and automated industry chains will spur resentment against their regimes. While US foreign policy under Trump would be difficult to predict, his election itself is a signal to West Asian governments to go slow on their modernisation plans. Decisions made by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the coming months will be a barometer of this political sentiment.

Then there is the matter of Trump’s Middle East policy itself. If his campaign statements translate into policy, the United States could well withdraw — even partially — from underwriting the region’s security. This possibility may trigger an increase in defence expenditure across the GCC — it could also trigger instability in the absence of an arbiter, however partial, of the Iran-Saudi Arabia contest. Receding US influence may nudge Riyadh to seriously assess the benefits of acquiring a nuclear weapon, which will have dramatic consequences for the region’s balance of power. The Trump presidency may, as a result, renew the lifeline of institutions whose legitimacy suffered in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, but will now be needed to establish regional cooperation. One notable case in point is the Arab League. How the US President will engage Russia remains to be seen but the bilateral relationship will be crucial to regional efforts in countering the Islamic State and other terrorist networks.

West Asia’s response to Trump and his foreign policy implicates India’s economic and security interests. Should the major takeaway for Gulf countries from the recently concluded elections be that immigration is a trigger for political upheaval, they may craft policies that limit future economic opportunities for Indians in the region. Indian expatriates mostly contribute to the low and semi-skilled workforce in the Gulf, but this is set to change in response to growing demand for legal, educational and financial services among its wealthy classes. The ‘de-globalisation’ impulse will be strongly felt in West Asia, whose policy consequences New Delhi should prevent by engaging the region’s political leadership. The visit of UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Zayed as the chief guest to India’s Republic Day next year is a timely opportunity to review this development.

The UAE in particular is a valuable partner for India in co-creating and adopting green technologies. The Emirates has pushed hard to reduce its reliance on non-renewable energy, and unlike Saudi Arabia, which has only now sought to divest its economic output, the UAE has made significant investments in its high-consumption sectors to lighten its carbon footprint. Faced with US apathy, the Paris climate accord will stumble, as will India’s efforts to obtain technology financing. In the aftermath of US elections, India should reach out to Asian powers like the UAE, Japan and Singapore with a view to further its climate financing goals.

Finally, the Trump presidency only underscores the importance of India’s consistent engagement with all West Asian powers. After a prolonged period of isolation, the nuclear deal has allowed Iran to come in from the cold, and US isolationism will further tempt Tehran to assert its regional clout. To the Modi government’s credit, it has ramped up ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia — if it’s recent actions in Yemen are any indication, Saudi Arabia’s muscular foreign policy will only be encouraged by a weak US role in West Asia. Extreme consequences such as Riyadh’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will also mend recent strains in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, as the kingdom will seek Islamabad’s help to build its weapons program. All signs lead one to believe that the next four years will be marked by the consolidation of power by the region’s heavyweights, bringing them closer to confrontation. India should be well prepared to face this eventuality, given that the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and Syria have not only set back economic opportunities for expatriates but also triggered radicalisation movements in pockets across South Asia.

About the author:
*Arun Mohan Sukumar heads ORF’s Cyber Security and Internet Governance Initiative, coordinating research projects on internet governance, data protection and international norms. He is the elected vice-chair of the Asia-Pacific Internet Governance Forum.

By Peter Miraglia*

On Wednesday, September 14, 2016, the founding members of the South American free-trade bloc, Mercosur, officially announced that Venezuela would be barred from assuming the organization’s six-month rotating presidency. Instead, a temporary interim team, consisting of appointed officials from Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, will lead the trade organization. These four founding members also threatened to suspend Venezuela if the country fails to comply with the organization’s regulations on free trade and human rights by December 11.[i] In response, Venezuelan foreign minister, Delcy Rodriguez, announced that her country has rejected the announcement, while also accusing the other member states of attempting to destroy the trade body.[ii]

The decision to block Venezuela’s rotation as president wields great influence in the recently revitalized free trade agreement (FTA) discussions between the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur. As explained by Roberto Moritán, the former Argentinian Deputy Foreign Minister, “The European Union has condemned Venezuela for its punitive human rights violations. President Maduro may not be the best face for Mercosur right now”.[iii] Recent rhetoric represents a change in the economic plan of many Latin American countries. Instead of emphasizing the commodity trade with China, the bulk of Latin American governments are now focusing on regional integration and the expansion of private sector markets.[iv]

In the past year, the Venezuelan government has presided over little internal progress, however there have been external efforts, primarily from the Vatican and UNASUR, to mediate the conflict. Installed on October 30, the negotiation table between the United Socialist Party and the opposition in Venezuela was the culmination of six-months of UNASUR peacemaking efforts.[v] On November 11, President Maduro’s administration will be meeting with its opponents, the National Assembly, to discuss an easing of tensions. This glimpse of progress has coincided with recent political discussions with the Vatican’s Archbishop Claudio Maria Celli and U.S. senior diplomat, Thomas Shannon, in Caracas.

Furthermore, the governments of new Brazilian president, Michel Temer, and new Argentinian president, Mauricio Macri, support Mr. Moritán’s statement, as both leaders hold pro – business platforms, diverting Mercosur away from its former leftist direction.[vi] Together, Macri and Temer symbolize an important economic shift in Latin America as they control the region’s two largest economies. Ultimately, the current members of Mercosur should refrain from suspending Venezuela, regardless if they comply with regulations by December 11, because the trade bloc should instead focus on achieving internal stability. Therefore, the trading body should avoid from engaging in the neoliberal trade agenda that is responsible for the regional economic inequality.

MERCOSUR Background

Established by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, Mercosur was intended to create a sub-regional common market and customs union, stretching from the Equator to Antarctica, to compete with other major trading blocs, such as NAFTA, the EU, or CAN (The Andean Community).[vii] In creating the Southern Common Market, the founding members eliminated their trade barriers to encourage cross border investment and trade, the free movement of labor and capital, adoption of a common external tariffs, and further economic integration of macroeconomic policy.[viii] Although experiencing numerous financial crises and failing to develop into the “seamless single market” that its founders had idealized, Mercosur has still spurred an increase in intra-bloc merchandise trade from $10 billion USD in 1995 to $88 billion USD in 2010.[ix]

The flourishing of Mercosur members has attracted the attention of the members of the Andean Community (CAN), a functioning trade bloc since the signing of the Andean Pact in 1969.[x] After merging with CAN to form UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) in 2008, Mercosur considered expanding its membership. A former CAN member, Venezuela, switched over to Mercosur in 2012, following Paraguay’s mandated suspension from the trade bloc due to the controversial constitutional coup against former President Lugo in 2012. Deemed a “coup against democracy” and “a blow against popular will”, Lugo’s impeachment infringed upon the Democratic Clause of Mercosur, which warranted a suspension until democracy was sufficiently restored in the country.[xi] As the Paraguayan Congress had continually blocked Venezuelan membership in Mercosur, Lugo’s impeachment and his country’s subsequent suspension provided the perfect opportunity for Venezuela to join the trade bloc without opposition. However, when the suspension was lifted following the election of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes in 2013, Paraguay claimed that Venezuela’s membership was illegitimate because new members can only be admitted after a unanimous vote, and such a vote should not have occurred during Paraguay’s suspension.[xii] Therefore, the stage was set for internal strife within Mercosur, as Paraguay, a founding member of the trade bloc, opposed recently admitted Venezuela.

The revival of discussions with the EU has coincided with the deterioration of the Venezuelan economy, as well as their rotation as president of Mercosur, which has forced the country into a pivotal position. Since the EU has repeatedly expressed its displeasure with a Venezuelan presidency during the FTA negotiations, the other founding members of Mercosur – Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay – have become hesitant to publically express support for the ailing country. Despite the recent concessions offered by the Maduro administration, Venezuela has aggravated the preexisting faults in Mercosur, such as internal mistrust, an insufficient legal framework, and lack of commitment by its members. For this reason, along with the popular resistance in Brazil and Argentina against the FTA agenda and the failures of NAFTA, Mercosur countries should abstain from signing this FTA with the EU.

Present Situation

Currently, Mercosur possesses a total population of 292 million people and boasts a combined GDP of $2.8 trillion, making it the fifth largest economy in the world.[xiii] Despite its growth, Mercosur has stagnated in recent years due to the dynamic exports from East Asia, resulting in a decrease in intra-regional exports. From 1990-1999, Mercosur intra-regional exports grew at an average annual rate of 24.5 percent, which was almost three times the average 8.7 percent rate of growth of exports to non-Mercosur members.[xiv] In 2016, intra-regional exports consist of approximately 15 percent of total exports, while exports to the rest of the world have grown exponentially.[xv] Evidently, in the past decade, Mercosur has looked outward in search of new trading partners and markets. However, while this strategy has been profitable, it has failed to address the intrinsic weaknesses of this free trade organization, which has hindered the real economic progress of its member states.

In addition to gaining Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador as associate members after its merger with CAN and granting Bolivia full membership in 2015, Mercosur has also signed FTAs with Israel, Egypt, the State of Palestine, and Lebanon in recent years.[xvi] Building off this momentum in signing trade deals, in 2010, Mercosur’s executive body, the Common Market Group, rekindled discussions with EU representatives on the creation of a FTA between the two trade blocs. Since then, there have been nine additional rounds of negotiations between the two groups, all building upon the 1995 Framework Cooperation Agreement that intended to “strengthen existing relations between the parties and to prepare the conditions enabling the creation of an interregional association, which will cover trade and economic matters.”[xvii] Justified by this document, EU foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America has grown from €130 billion in 2006 to €280 billion in 2012, while EU exports to Mercosur members have doubled from €28 billion in 2007 to €57 billion in 2013.[xviii] Despite this increase in trade, there has been an ongoing anti-free trade movement in Brazil and Argentina. Although interest in a FTA with the EU is peaking within the governments of these two Mercosur members, some EU parliamentarians are having second thoughts due to the political turmoil in trade bloc. Together, this internal popular resistance and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Venezuela have made the actualization of this FTA increasingly difficult.

This past August, the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, made a tour across South America, holding meetings with the heads of state from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil. According to former Argentine Foreign Minister, Jorge Taiana, the private meeting in Buenos Aires focused on “the possibilities of integration of the EU and Mercosur.”[xix] Moreover, Mr. Taiana’s comments reflect the announcement issued by Argentinian President Mauricio Macri during his state visit to Belgium, where he called for “a more firm attitude from the EU in order for the agreement to be signed in a few years.”[xx] The Macri administration has placed an increased emphasis on trade with the EU, compared to that of the Kirchner Administration, which has been met with domestic protests. Reflective of his shift to the West, President Macri has also condemned the mounting crisis in Venezuela; “I am critical of the populist movements because we have seen it in Argentina. What they do is raise expectations that do not coincide with reality and that leads to frustration, violence, and destroys the future.”[xxi] His criticism of populism in Latin America undermines the solidarity that Mercosur members should practice with each one another. It is worth mentioning that in recent weeks, the Maduro Administration has made progress towards domestic stability, including the release of five political prisoners on November 1.

During his stop in Bogota, Colombia, Martin Schulz lamented on the dire situation in Venezuela, “What we see in Venezuela is that large majority of the population suffers and that a country with so much wealth has a population that has to fight everyday for survival.”[xxii] Schulz’s stance on Venezuela reflects the sentiment shared by a number of EU officials, some of whom are becoming skittish towards a deal with Mercosur due to the perceived socio-political crisis in Venezuela. From the EU perspective, the current Venezuelan financial situation has resulted in conditions that have enabled human right abuses and the continued turmoil in Venezuelan democracy. Although it seems that the EU’s participation is contingent upon the assurance that democratic values will be upheld within their borders, the other Mercosur members should abstain from criticizing their struggling neighbor and offer resources and support instead.

On October 12th, following weeklong discussions between Mercosur and EU officials in Belgium (excluding Venezuela), Argentine Minister of Commerce Miguel Braun issued a statement, in which he claimed, “in terms of negotiations, I am optimistic we can move forward at a good pace, maybe one or two years.”[xxiii] This constituted as his response to Spanish Secretary of State for Trade Jaime García-Legaz, who stated that he was convinced that the “political will” on both sides would seal the Mercosur-EU FTA by the end of 2017.[xxiv] Although these estimates are very generous, they provide great examples on the levels of enthusiasm for this deal on each side. As the EU is Mercosur’s first trading partner, accounting for 20% (equivalent to $120 billion USD) of Mercosur’s total trade in 2013, this FTA would benefit Mercosur members because the EU provides another large market for the exportation of Latin American agricultural products and raw materials.[xxv] While this FTA would greatly advance the private interests of the wealthy and corporations, it would increase the exploitation of those who have been dispossessed by the West’s free trade agenda in the past.

Conclusion

Despite lying dormant since 2004, the recent political changes in Mercosur countries, especially in Brazil and Argentina, have made the Mercosur-EU FTA a main priority once again. At the recent meetings in Brussels, Miguel Braun, stated “there is now a core agreement that Mercosur has to negotiate significant trade deals”, while Daniel Raimondi, Under-Secretary for Economic Integration in the Americas and Mercosur within the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Argentina, added, “we are more synchronized regarding foreign relations of Mercosur, nowadays compared to the situation of last year for instance.” [xxvi];[xxvii] Referring to the new administrations of Michel Temer in Brazil and Mauricio Macri, Raimondi is correct in assessing that the foreign policies of Mercosur member states are aligned for the first time in years. By sharing a similar capitalistic, pro – business platform, Michel Temer and Mauricio Macri have the potential to increase cooperation between the trade bloc’s first and second largest economies, which would set the foundation for other members to strengthen regional trade integration.[xxviii] Despite the synergy between these two leaders, the anti-FTA popular resistance movements in their respective countries will make it difficult to secure any free trade agreements.

It seems apparent that Venezuela’s profound economic crisis is not confined to its borders, and its repercussions are spreading throughout Latin America.[xxix] Following mediation attempts by UNASUR and the Vatican, the recent visit of a US diplomat, Thomas Shannon, and the incumbent administrations scheduled meeting with the opposition on November 11, it is the prime time for Mercosur member to fix the internal faults of the organization. Mercosur should stand with Venezuela come December 11, and help country fully comply with the Democratic Clause of Mercosur. In the past, the “western ideals” promoted by Europe and the United States has resulted in the subordination of Latin American peoples, by way of slavery, genocide, colonialism, and client states, to foreign corporate interests. By sacrificing Venezuela for a FTA with the EU, the Mercosur member states will not improve regional stability and integration, and instead will enable more exploitation at the hands of the EU and United States

*Peter Miraglia, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[i] Renwick, Danielle, “Mercosur: South America’s Fractious Trade Bloc”, Council on Foreign Relations (2016): accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[ii] EFE, “Delcy Rodriuguez Alega que Venezuela Incorporó más Normas del Mercosur que Otros Países”, El Nacional (2016): accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.el-nacional.com/politica/Delcy-Rodriguez-Venezuela-incorporo-Mercosur_0_930507221.html

[iii] Trevisani, Paulo, “Venezuela Blocked From Assuming Presidency of Mercosur”, The Wall Street Journal, (2016): http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-blocked-from-assuming-presidency-of-mercosur-1473877554.

[iv] Renwick, Danielle, “Mercosur: South America’s Fractious Trade Bloc”, Council on Foreign Relations (2016): accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[v] Rathbone, John Paul, “Vatican Struggles in Role as Venezuela Peacemaker”, Financial Times (2016): Accessed on November 7, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/0d22dbac-a1d7-11e6-82c3-4351ce86813f.

[vi] Renwick, Danielle, “Mercosur: South America’s Fractious Trade Bloc”, Council on Foreign Relations (2016): accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[vii] Fuentes, Juan Pablo, “Why Mercosur Lags the Pacific Alliance”, Moody’s Analytics (2014): Accessed on October 17, 2016, https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/248931

[viii] Fuentes, Juan Pablo, “Why Mercosur Lags the Pacific Alliance”, Moody’s Analytics (2014): Accessed on October 17, 2016, https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/248931

[ix] Fuentes, Juan Pablo, “Why Mercosur Lags the Pacific Alliance”, Moody’s Analytics (2014): Accessed on October 17, 2016, https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/248931

[x] Renwick, Danielle, “Mercosur: South America’s Fractious Trade Bloc”, Council on Foreign Relations (2016): accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[xi] Shifter, Michael and Binetti, Bruno, “Venezuela’s Crisis Embroils Mercosur Tradce Bloc in Internal Turmoil,” World Politics Review (2016): Accessed October 6, 2016, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19805/venezuela-s-crisis-embroils-mercosur-trade-bloc-in-internal-turmoil

[xii] Trevisani, Paulo, “Venezuela Blocked From Assuming Presidency of Mercosur”, The Wall Street Journal, (2016): http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-blocked-from-assuming-presidency-of-mercosur-1473877554.

[xiii] EU, “Countries and Regions: Mercosur”, European Commission on Trade (2016): http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/

[xiv] Kotschwar, Barbara, “Will Venezula’s Entry be Mercosur’s Swan song?” Peterson Institute for International Economics (2012): https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/will-venezuelas-entry-be-mercosurs-swan-song.

[xv] Kotschwar, Barbara, “Will Venezula’s Entry be Mercosur’s Swan song?” Peterson Institute for International Economics (2012): https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/will-venezuelas-entry-be-mercosurs-swan-song.

[xvi] EU, “Countries and Regions: Mercosur”, European Commission on Trade (2016): http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/

[xvii] Trevisani, Paulo, “Venezuela Blocked From Assuming Presidency of Mercosur”, The Wall Street Journal, (2016): http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-blocked-from-assuming-presidency-of-mercosur-1473877554.

[xviii] EU, “Countries and Regions: Mercosur”, European Commission on Trade (2016): http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/

[xix] EFE, “Mauricio Macri hablo de Venezuela: “Cada vez se iolan mas los Derechos Humanos y America Latina no Puede darle la Espalda”, La Nacion (2016): Accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1938011-mauricio-macri-hablo-de-venezuela-cada-vez-se-violan-mas-los-derechos-humanos-y-latinoamerica-no-puede-darle-la-espalda.

[xx] EFE, “Mauricio Macri hablo de Venezuela: “Cada vez se iolan mas los Derechos Humanos y America Latina no Puede darle la Espalda”, La Nacion (2016): Accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1938011-mauricio-macri-hablo-de-venezuela-cada-vez-se-violan-mas-los-derechos-humanos-y-latinoamerica-no-puede-darle-la-espalda.

[xxi] Le Figaro, “Schulz: Democratie en danger au Venezuela,” Le Figaro.fr (2016): Accessed on October 19, 2016: http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/08/24/97001-20160824FILWWW00009-schulz-democratie-en-danger-au-venezuela.php

[xxii] Le Figaro, “Schulz: Democratie en danger au Venezuela,” Le Figaro.fr (2016): Accessed on October 19, 2016: http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/08/24/97001-20160824FILWWW00009-schulz-democratie-en-danger-au-venezuela.php

[xxiii] Reuters, “Argentina: EU – Mercosur Trade Deal Could be Done in Two Years”, Voice of America (2016): Accessed October 19, 2016: http://www.voanews.com/a/argentina-says-eu-mercosur-trade-deal-could-be-done-in-two-years-/3547677.html

[xxiv] Reuters, “Argentina: EU – Mercosur Trade Deal Could be Done in Two Years”, Voice of America (2016): Accessed October 19, 2016: http://www.voanews.com/a/argentina-says-eu-mercosur-trade-deal-could-be-done-in-two-years-/3547677.html

[xxv] EU, “Countries and Regions: Mercosur”, European Commission on Trade (2016): http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/

[xxvi] MP, “EU-Mercosur Trade Deal within Two Years, followed by Negotiations with UK” MercoPress (2016): Accessed October 21, 2016, http://en.mercopress.com/2016/10/14/eu-mercosur-trade-deal-within-two-years-followed-by-negotiations-with-uk

[xxvii] MP, “EU-Mercosur Trade Deal within Two Years, followed by Negotiations with UK” MercoPress (2016): Accessed October 21, 2016, http://en.mercopress.com/2016/10/14/eu-mercosur-trade-deal-within-two-years-followed-by-negotiations-with-uk

[xxviii] Trevisani, Paulo, “Venezuela Blocked From Assuming Presidency of Mercosur”, The Wall Street Journal, (2016): http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-blocked-from-assuming-presidency-of-mercosur-1473877554.

[xxix] Shifter, Michael and Binetti, Bruno, “Venezuela’s Crisis Embroils Mercosur Tradce Bloc in Internal Turmoil,” World Politics Review (2016): Accessed October 6, 2016, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19805/venezuela-s-crisis-embroils-mercosur-trade-bloc-in-internal-turmoil

By Srikanth Kondapalli*

The dramatic win of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the US at the hustings has caught many a nation by surprise given the critical outreach of the country in the economic, political, strategic and military spheres of the world.

Trump’s foreign policies after assuming office from January 2017 have become major debating points in terms of their impact on the rest of the world. While Trump made several disparaging remarks during the heat of the election campaign, in the last three decades, there is a definite trend in the US of a huge chasm between electoral-time barbs and criticism of other countries, and the pragmatic policies followed while in office. If this trend continues, predictable outcomes in US foreign policy towards the rest of the world may be witnessed.

Traditionally, US foreign policy has veered between isolationism till World War II, and off-shore balancing through the hundreds of naval bases and facilities globally through controlled engagement policies or a mix of the latter policies. With over US$18 trillion in gross domestic product and by heading the ‘new economy’ of information and communications technologies, apart from its cutting edge military forces, US policies influence every nook and corner of the Earth, although interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have dented this US profile.
Trump has promised to make the US great again. He has also been critical of its uneven and costly relations with allies, and mounting trade deficits with China and its currency manipulation policies. If Trump expands cooperative relations with Russia as promised during the elections – thus making radical departures in US policy that has so far stressed further isolation in the backdrop of developments in Crimea – then China is likely to face US’ wrath in the coming years.

More significantly, China has been challenging US’ primacy in all the three new security domains – cyber, space, and maritime. This would constrain Trump’s plan to make the US great in the decades to come. While Trump may not flag the Democratic Party’s obsession with human rights violations in China, China’s contestation of US primacy in global and regional affairs is likely to be the flashpoint between the two in the coming years. Domestically, the new leadership in China since 2012 has jettisoned Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “keeping a low profile” and has instead had been following a policy to “accomplish something” – which is protecting China’s interests abroad.

Despite his isolationist streak, Trump understands that China’s advances globally and regionally came at the cost of the US and Russia playing one against the other. Thus China became a swing state in the later part of the Cold War by aligning with the US and contributing to the disintegration of the then Soviet Union. Also, by joining the US-led globalisation process China became the largest trading country, displacing the US and its allies. By staying neutral in the Georgian and Crimean crises, China forced Russia to veer towards Beijing in the light of mounting European sanctions. Trump’s approach towards Russia thus will alter geo-strategic equations and expose Chinese vulnerabilities.

Trump is also aware that China has been attempting to force the US out of Asia since the USS Impeccable was shooed away from the South China Sea in 2009. Comments made by the Chinese President at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in May 2014 on Asian countries looking after their own security rubbed the US the wrong way. Weaning the Philippines and Malaysia away from the US camp has further curtailed US manoeuvrability in the South China Sea. Beijing’s free trade policies vis-à-vis Australia, New Zealand, East Asia and other regions has added momentum towards the nudging of the US from these regions.

China unsuccessfully sold the US the idea of a “new type of major power” relationship at the Sunnylands meeting between Obama and Xi Jinping in June 2013, even as it denied a similar status to Japan and India. China is nudging the US to acknowledge Beijing’s ‘equal’ status with the US – a point Trump will find unpalatable in the coming years.

As a businessperson, Trump also noted in the election campaign the acute asymmetry in US’ trade relations with China. Of the more than half a trillion in trade with China, Beijing has a surplus of nearly US$400 billion with the US. China, with its tight control over Renminbi valuation, artificially kept it as low as over 40 per cent, despite the International Monetary Fund (IMF) accommodating it as a part of the global basket of currency in December 2015. This is hurting the US economy, as Trump noted during the election campaign.

Despite reaching out to Trump soon after the election results were known and despite the outwardly calm, China’s leadership is wary of the unchartered course of its relations with the US under the new presidency. Soon after the election results, while President-elect Trump made statements regarding the pursuit of pragmatic policies during his tenure, including being even in his policies with other countries, China is a concerned country.

* Srikanth Kondapalli
Professor, Chinese Studies, JNU

By Richard Higgott*

So much has been written over the past week on what Donald Trump’s election means for the world economy. Most of it is speculative and based on election-campaign populist rhetoric, not on an understanding of the actual direction US policy might follow after his installation. So, further speculation on the President elect’s more outrageous prognostications will bear little fruit. But while –in the words of another iconoclastic US politician, Donald Rumsfeld– there are always ‘known unknowns’, there are nevertheless some ‘known knowns’ in key areas such as trade policy.

The US must assume that trade policy under a Trump Administration, unless it goes completely against recent trends, will be more protectionist, both by inclination and by design, than in the previous decade. But we need a sense of perspective here. This does not imply a return to 1930s style protectionism. There will be enough smart people around him, from both the business and trade policy communities, to ensure that such a course of action –one that would bring the world economy down– is not on the cards. It should take little time to educate Trump in the basics of economic history and trade theory in order to stanch the possibility of a self-induced meltdown of the global trade system.

But this does not mean that hawkish trade deals will not be pursued by the US. The style and agenda will be very different from those that have driven the two attempts to secure trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic mega-regional deals over the last few years. One clue as to style will be who Trump chooses to appoint as United States Trade Representative (USTR). A protectionist or indeed a libertarian would not augur well for the world trading system. And while we must expect explicit bilateral deals to become the order of the day, this will not be as great a break with the past as might at first sight appear. It is not well understood that most US FTA negotiations are effectively bilateral negotiations anyway.

Bilateral deals are the preferred US modus operandi. And, contrary to populist opinion, they invariably turn out to be asymmetrical in favour of the US. They also tend to be about many things other than simply trade –such as geo-political relationships–. This has been explicitly so since 9/11 and has certainly been the case with the TPP, where the US was in effect in bilateral dialogue with the other 11 partners in pursuit of a deal that was as much about facilitating corporate investment and Obama’s geo-strategic ‘pivot’ to Asia as it was further liberalise trade. But the TPP is effectively dead. The Administration has suspended efforts to win Congressional approval before President Obama leaves office, saying its fate is now in the hands of the Trump Administration.

Trump said nothing negative about TTIP during the campaign. But it too is to all intents and purposes dead, at least in its current form. This turn of events is as much if not more a reflection of the European political distemper as it is of the US one; although Europe’s leaders are reluctant to read the last rites on TTIP just yet. Trans-Atlantic trade conversations will of course continue; they never really stop in such an important relationship. Much of the activity is organic and evolves independently of government intervention. But the conversation with Europe will be a second-order economic priority for the new Administration for several reasons: (1) we can anticipate that a complex, fractious domestic political and economic agenda will preoccupy the new President; (2) similarly, trade will not be the greatest priority in a bulging foreign-policy agenda; and (3), more encouragingly, the trans-Atlantic trade and financial relationship (especially investment) functions well. It is so important to both parties that little will be done that might destabilise it.

Future trans-Atlantic trade talks (I avoid the more formal ‘negotiations’) will see what can be salvaged from TTIP. The big question, especially in Brussels, is whether the UK really will go to the ‘front of the queue’ for any deal. Certainly, Brussels’ immediate invitation to the President elect, spooked by his pre-election campaign rhetoric, suggests this might be the case. What putting Britain at the front of the queue means, though, is not self-evident. Trump’s appeal to Theresa May to be ‘… his Maggie Thatcher to his Reagan’ is toe-curling but revealing. It is more about politics than trade. Moreover, the UK’s ability to make bilateral trade deals will be constrained until it is out of the EU. Any deal could more symbolic than of added practical value to what is already a strong and fairly open economic relationship. Further, Trump has bigger fish to fry in the trade domain.

The immediate big-ticket issues on the trade agenda will be: (1) the future of NAFTA; and (2) the relationship with Asia-Pacific in general and China in particular. Will Trump dismantle NAFTA? Unlikely. Completed and functioning trade relationships are very difficult to undo once in place without disrupting other crucial elements of the policy process. NAFTA is now in its 22nd year. Its future is as much a political issue as a trade issue; it cannot be separated from the sensitive issues of immigration and the Mexican Wall. In addition, Canada’s interests, voice and influence will not be marginal to this conversation. Token modification of NAFTA is likely but termination less so.

Above all, the trade relationship with China will be the most difficult and sensitive issue on the trade agenda. It will also be the issue that casts the widest policy shadows over US geo-economic strategy more generally. The prospect of a ‘trade war’ with China and the introduction of 45% tariffs on Chinese imports, with all its attendant negative –indeed, potentially cataclysmic– consequences should however be remote.

By contrast, the evolution of a ‘hardball’ US trade strategy towards China is extremely likely. Indeed, there is a good historical precedent. If one looks back to the similarly febrile relationship that existed with Japan when it was running massive trade surpluses with the US in the 1980s, the latter implemented (controversial) countermeasures. Notable was the introduction of the ‘Super 301’ clause of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. This clause imposed selective trade sanctions on countries exhibiting market-distorting practices –in this case Japan–. Japan was also ‘encouraged’ to engage in the self-imposition of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) in the face of potential US quotas and the Plaza Accords also ensured the strengthening of the Yen. It would come as no surprise to see this kind of escalatory ‘hardball’ trade policy developed by the US towards Chinese trade and the Renminbi; although demands to strengthen the Renminbi against the dollar are something that, for other reasons, would not presently distress the Chinese.

But the interesting question is whether we should expect the Chinese to be as supine in their response to US pressure now as were the Japanese in the 1980s. Moreover, efforts to limit imports from China would be constrained anyway by a recent WTO ruling against ‘targeted dumping’ tariffs on Chinese goods. The real issue with China now, unlike with Japan then, is not simply a massive US bilateral trade deficit –which seems to be how Trump has viewed it to date–. There is also a battle for influence over the future shape and control of the Asia-Pacific regional economic and political orders.

The failure of TPP will undermine the US’s ‘re-balancing’ or ‘pivot’ strategy of recent years. TPP’s non-ratification would hand intellectual leadership over the regional economic institution-building agenda in East Asia to the Chinese. Its interests rather than those of the US are likely to prevail. The proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), its proposed Free Trade Area for the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and the South-East Asia-China Corridor of China’s One-Belt One-Road Strategy (OBOR) will all receive major boosts from the demise of TPP. Regional opinion from North-East Asia through ASEAN across to Australia and New Zealand is of the view that walking away from TPP will mean a big hit for the US’s credibility and standing in the region.

It is bizarre and tragic that the debate over the benefits of an open liberal trading system needs to be reconvened at the present time. In some ways, the global public and private sector policy communities have only themselves to blame for this. They all too easily assumed that the virtues of globalisation were self-evident rather than that they needed constant explanation to the wider community. They assumed that globalisation’s victims would sort themselves out rather than follow the siren call of anti-globalisation. This gave oxygen to the populist discourse developed by Donald Trump. The future of the global trade regime depends on educating Trump and his supporters that free trade is an opportunity, not a risk, and that the WTO, while no longer a multilateral trade negotiating forum, is still the best place to secure the norms of an open liberal trade system and to regulate and resolve the disputes that inhabit the trade system.

About the author:
*Richard Higgott, Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute’s office in Brussels | @elcanobrussels

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

I’m not sure what to think about the anti-Trump protests following the election. If the protests occurred before the election (and there were some), I’d think the protesters were expressing their views that people should not vote for Trump or support his policies. Now that he’s been elected, that decision is behind us, and Trump has done nothing since the election that warrants a protest. What are they protesting?

They could be protesting the system itself—the electoral institutions that led to Trump’s victory. Probably not, though. Surely they would have been happy with the system had it chosen Clinton. They could be protesting their fellow citizens who voted for Trump. Those voters are the ones who determined the outcome of the election. Trump was just one of their choices.

What I’m seeing in the protesters is an entitlement mentality. A democratic election in which they happily participated didn’t go their way, so they are protesting the outcome that didn’t give them what they wanted. They are acting like spoiled children, maybe because they are spoiled children.

The time to speak out against a candidate is before the election. Afterwards, those who support the democratic process must accept the results. Here’s what Hillary Clinton said:

Last night, I congratulated Donald Trump and offered to work with him on behalf of our country. I hope that he will be a successful president for all Americans…. I still believe in America and I always will. And if you do, then we must accept this result and then look to the future. Donald Trump is going to be our president. We owe him an open mind and the chance to lead.

By their actions, we can see that the protesters don’t agree with their candidate on this point. Why? If they objected to the process by which the president is selected, they should have been demonstrating against that before the election. They just didn’t like the election outcome.

The entitlement mentality that tends to go along with the political left has pushed them to resort to protests and violence when they didn’t get what they thought they deserved.

This article was published at The Beacon

By Ranjit Gupta*

On 17 October 2016, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi announced the commencement of the battle for Mosul. He also said that except for the Iraqi army, police and security forces, “no others will be allowed to enter Mosul;” Iraqi troops have agreed to stay out of Kurdish territory and the Peshmerga have promised they will not enter Mosul. However, the Iraqi government has little political clout or military capability to enforce this eminently desirable restraining measure in respect of non-state groups. Unexpectedly, rapid advances have been made despite Islamic State (IS) fighters putting up fierce resistance. The IS being defeated and Mosul and Nineveh Provinces being recaptured is now a certainty. Though this would mark the welcome end of a savagery infused and blood soaked episode, it is distinctly possible that another, and longer term, unhappy episode in this northern Iraqi region could begin.

The assault on Mosul is led by the Iraqi army, police and special forces, supported by the Kurdish Peshmerga and backed by US coalition led air strikes and special forces. Additionally, Sunni militias, many trained by/proxies of Turkey, and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi, composed of approximately 40 predominantly Shia militia groups many of which have close ties to Iran, are also involved, but outside Mosul. Once the common enemy – the IS – is removed from the scene, the centrifugal and competing forces of sectarianism and separatism will inevitably come to the fore. In fact, this may well start happening while the fight against the IS is still underway, even potentially risking an abortion of a successful outcome of the battle.

Given the deserved ill-repute of the PMF for vengeance attacks on Sunni populations of towns liberated from the IS earlier, it would be a miracle if clashes do not occur between them and others involved in the assault. In early November, they took control of key points on the highway between Mosul and the IS capital Raqqa in Syria and are seeking to take over the strategic town of Tel Afar, near the Syrian border, which is populated mainly by Sunni Turkmens; this could prompt Turkish intervention against them. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders have made it clear that they will protect the Turkmen community and other Sunni populations in the battle theatre wherever needed.

Turkey’s unambiguously stated intent of intrusive involvement is an ominous portent. Brazenly rejecting the Iraqi government’s repeated demands for removal of its forces from Iraqi territory and despite the Iraqi government’s categorical opposition, Erdogan has insisted that Turkey, with 2,000 well-armed and equipped troops stationed near Bashiqa, only 8 kms northeast of Mosul, and more troops and armour in other border regions and just across the border, must and will be involved in the battle for Mosul and must be at the table to decide Mosul’s future since Mosul and Kirkuk, indeed the whole of Nineveh province, are “part of our [Turkey’s] soul,” (incorporated into Iraq, established in 1920, only in 1923/26). Reopening the issue almost a century later, Erdogan has said that “Insistence on (the 1923 borders) is the greatest injustice that can be done to the state and the nation…If everything is changing in the world of today, we cannot consider adherence to the treaty of 1923 a success.”

On 07 November 2016, the Kurdish Peshmerga won back control of Bashiqa from the IS. Despite having cordial political and particularly strong economic relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the Turkish foreign minister very recently said that “If there is a threat to Turkey from Iraq, we will use all our resources and rights, including a ground operation…We aren’t saying this to Iraqis alone, but to the United States and all coalition nations, (and) to the northern Iraqi government” (Kurdish Regional Government).

A century-long struggle for independence for the Kurds may be nearing a turning point. Having enjoyed de facto self-governance for over a decade, they will not easily let go of this new opportunity, keeping in mind its particularly significant role in the fight against the IS. The Iraqi Kurds are savouring a sense of empowerment and self-confidence as never before. In a February 2016 interview to the German newspaper ‘Bild’, KRG President Masoud Barzani, inter alia, said that Iraqi Kurds have been waiting for independence “for too long…..We are not Arabs, we are our own Kurdish nation… If the people of Kurdistan are waiting for someone else to present the right of self-determination as a gift, independence will never be obtained. That right exists and the people of Kurdistan must demand it and put it into motion. The time has long been ripe for it, but we are currently concentrating on the fight against Daesh; as soon as Mosul is liberated, Kurds will meet with ’partners in Baghdad’ and talk about our independence.” If pursued excessively assertively, new conflicts could arise.

The question of who will control/govern Mosul will immediately arise. No plans have been announced, partly because this could unravel the coalition seeking to liberate it. Shia-Sunni clashes and atrocities on different minorities are almost inevitable. Then, almost inevitably, the PMF and the Sunni forces trained by Turkey will also almost certainly enter the fray and in the context of increasing mayhem, direct Turkish intervention is a very distinct possibility and this in turn could bring in other countervailing foreign intervention.

Oil rich Kirkuk is a city that has been particularly hotly contested between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government for decades. The defeat of the IS will reopen the issue of Kurdish control of Kirkuk – the Kurdish Peshmega had taken over after 12 June 2014, when the Iraqi army fled following the success of the IS’ 2014 Northern Iraq offensive. Once the dust settles in Mosul, the central government will seek to reclaim disputed territories and/or recently Kurdish-occupied areas (see map) and Kirkuk in particular – all of which the Kurd leadership has no intentions of withdrawing from. Thus, another conflict is in the making.

Iraq’s misfortunes are unlikely to end with the defeat of the IS.

* Ranjit Gupta
Distinguished Fellow and Columnist, IPCS; former Indian Ambassador to Yemen and Oman; and former Member, National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), India

By Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

The Caribbean island nation of Trinidad & Tobago possesses one of the largest military establishments in the English-speaking Caribbean as well as a large police force. However, for an island state, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), which might be expected to focus on the maritime domain, has a distinct bias towards land operations. This is reflected in the personnel strength of the TTDF which is dominated by the land-forces element – the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment (TTR). The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) and Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard (TTAG) are, by comparison, modest in size despite their importance for maritime operations.

At present, the TTDF, including its reserves, numbers some 5281 personnel. Of these 2680 are in the TTR, 1557 are in the TTCG, 420 in the TTAG and 624 full-time and part-time members in the TTDF Reserves, almost exclusively attached to the TTR. It should be noted that of this force, over 500 personnel are assigned to the TTDF HQ which has become a bloated bureaucratic entity with little ability to direct joint operations.

The TTR has been the senior formation in the TTDF – despite its 1970 mutiny and slow rehabilitation thereafter – and has had a major share of personnel to date. The TTR is organized into four battalions – 2 infantry, 1 engineer and 1 service & support. Lacking either armour (its Shorland armoured cars and personnel carriers are now all derelict) or artillery beyond a single mortar platoon with 81mm mortars which is now reportedly all in storage as no trained personnel exist to operate the mortars, the TTR is an infantry and support force with only soft-skinned vehicles for transport. The TTR lacks any ability to defend Trinidad’s territorial integrity from foreign aggression and is not configured for a dedicated counter-insurgency function either.

In contrast, the TTCG and the TTAG are relatively well-equipped formations with the former possessing 8 modern patrol vessels – 2 FCS 5009, 4 SPa 5009, 2 46m coastal patrol vessels and 1 79 OPV and a fleet of fast 23 interceptors – and the latter, four AW139 helicopters and two C26 aircraft. While neither is able to actively defend against a major attack, the TTCG and TTAG are the primary instruments in ensuring the security of the nation’s maritime borders.

There has long been a recognition in political circles that, ideally, the TTDF should be reoriented towards the nation’s maritime domain with the TTCG becoming the largest formation within the TTDF, with greater resources allocated to the TTAG. Indeed, a wide-ranging 2009-2010 study on the national security architecture undertaken by retired Canadian Major-General Cameron Ross (the Ross Report) recommended that the TTCG assume primacy within the TTDF as the nation’s security needs were largely located in its coastal waters and Exclusive Economic Zone where major oil and natural gas exploration is being undertaken.

Within the TTCG, there is a view that the TTDF should be restructured along the lines of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) which is entirely a naval unit with marine and special forces detachments for land operations, with this view reflecting the views of the Ross Report. In Trinidad’s case, the TTCG holds the view that the economic importance of the off-shore oil and gas installations warrants an adoption of the Ross Report recommendation. This would seem to make sense as Trinidad faces no land-based threat to its sovereignty and, as an island, most of its security challenges, now and in the future, will come from the sea. However, the recommendation to reform and reorient the TTDF along these lines, though nominally accepted by the Cabinet, is one which has not been implemented to date and is unlikely to ever be implemented because of Trinidad’s internal security situation.

Trinidad is plagued by an epidemic of violent crime where well-organized gangs vie for control of inner city areas and the very lucrative narcotics trade which enables them to procure large quantities of weapons. Many of these gangs, it is to be noted, who are affiliated with Islamic extremist groups have secured control over whole swathes of Port of Spain, the capital city. and have begun to expand their zones of influence and control. With private armies nearly the size of infantry battalions, they have begun to exert their power further afield, targeting the populous urban and semi-urban communities, in what is locally known as the “East-West” corridor – a prosperous largely middle-class zone of territory, running laterally eastwards from Port-of-Spain. Their writ runs over whole communities, and government control exists only nominally. Government services and law enforcement agencies operate merely on the surface with actual control resting with the gangs. Other loosely allied criminal groups, operate with virtual impunity in some parts of South and Central Trinidad, openly carrying assault rifles and other weapons. The gangs, by their presence, and the image of power and fear they cultivate, can attract aspiring, impressionable and motivated recruits. Embedded in the urban neighbourhoods of the country and targeting vulnerable youth, the gangs can exert maximum influence over their communities and, as has been noted above, have no problem in recruiting large numbers of “soldiers” to carry out their wishes.

The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) should, with a sanctioned strength of 7500 regular (actual strength is some 1700 short of this total) and 2000 Special Reserves should, in theory, be able to exert control and authority over gang-controlled territory. Furthermore, the TTPS is well armed with assault rifles and submachine guns and is well-supplied with vehicles. However, the TTPS, despite being well-paid, is plagued by incompetence, corruption, lethargy and extreme levels of inefficiency which has left a large proportion of its vehicles unserviceable. Compounding this is an ineffective shift system that ensures that only 23% of the total strength of the TTPS is available on any given day. This unfortunate combination of factors has ensured that whole swathes of territory fall under the sway of criminal gangs.

Into this quagmire, the TTR has been called in to play a major role in bolstering the TTPS by conducting joint patrols. These efforts have stretched its meagre resources to breaking point. Yet, so inadequate has been the performance of the TTPS that even the limited assets available to the TTR are deemed to be essential to efforts to control a spiraling crime situation. The TTR was even tasked to mount deterrent patrols with a view to establishing a presence in crime “hot spots” even without the police, and even though it does not have powers of arrest. The impact of these patrols was such that even the TTCG and TTAG were brought into the ground role and were tasked with mounting patrols of their own, despite their much more limited resources and lack of training in ground operations. Desperation seems to have compelled these extreme measures.

With such an internal security situation, the TTDF finds itself unable to carry out reforms and reorientation that it knows to be necessary. Even the valid argument that a stronger TTCG which can seal-off the import routes for weapons and narcotics and so rob the gangs of their financial resources and “muscle” has failed to make the necessary impact among decision makers. To them, the need to have the visible presence of the TTR in the fight against criminal gangs, owing to the inadequacies of the TTPS, takes priority and, as such, instituting reforms and reorienting the TTDF remains an aspiration that seems unlikely to be fulfilled.

The Trinidad Military, which should be concentrating on the maritime domain, is forced by expediency, to take on internal land operations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/internal-security-challenges-military-reorientation-trinidad-tobago_sbmaharaj_151116

By Amita Batra*

The year 2016 has sprung many a surprise, not the least of which has been the outcome of the US presidential elections. The economic policy stance of the president-elect Donald Trump has been evident in his oft-repeated ‘inward-looking’/isolationist pronouncements in the course of the election campaign. These though, have not been substantiated with any policy detail for a serious analysis. Much commentary therefore remains in the realm of speculation. There is, however, no doubt that the globalisation engendered inequities have been at the heart of Trump’s economic policy declarations. Expectations of a reversal of some of the earlier trade agreements and policies may therefore not be entirely misplaced.

If the expression of an aversion to trade as reflected in the pre-election speeches was to turn into reality then it is possible that the largest trading economy becomes more protectionist in its trade policy. The core elements of trade policy as specified in the course of the election campaign include imposition of higher tariffs on imports from China and Mexico specifically, and a general increase in tariffs otherwise. Mega regional trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) will in all likelihood not be taken forward. Trade agreements in general seen as instruments of unfair concessions breeding inequities may also be subject to re-negotiation; the intention of building a wall between the US and Mexico being most symptomatic of this impending trend. There have also been indications of a US pull-out from the multi-lateral rule making trade organisation, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in case there is any resistance to its imposition of protectionist policies. Other stated intentions have been with regard to changes in immigration policies with a more restrictive visa regime. The broad objective of the policy changes being bringing manufacturing back to the US, greater employment and hence greater prosperity, and in the process, recovery of losses in global trade for the US economy, in particular vis-à-vis the Chinese economy.

As has been predicted by many analysts already, any attempt by the US economy towards the use of protectionist instruments will be countered by retaliatory measures by other economies, including China, with the likely impact being serious in terms of not just the initiation of a trade war with China but that of applying brakes to international trade in general. The WTO has already expressed concern at the slowdown of world trade in 2016 as the pace of growth has been slower than that of the global economy, unlike the trend over the last decade and a half. The US being the world’s largest importer with a share of almost 14 per cent in world imports, the imposition of higher tariffs will naturally be detrimental to world trade. In addition, the US economy may not gain as the attempt to push domestic manufacturing may imply higher costs and inefficient production, as long established comparative advantages will be altered in the process. While aimed at some, costs of the re-adjustment may be spread across to other economies as well. India, for example, will find it difficult for its ‘make in India’ programme to yield substantive benefits in such an adverse global trade environment. Higher tariff walls will be detrimental to manufacturing exports. As the largest export market for India with a share of 15 per cent in India’s total exports in 2015-16, higher tariffs in the US may prove to be a difficult hurdle for India to surmount and to convert its potential comparative advantage through the ‘make in India’ initiative into higher exports.

The US is also a major destination for India’s IT, ITeS and BPO services exports. Together, these accounted for US$ 82 billion-worth of exports in the financial year ending in March 2015, according to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data. If Trump, again as per the campaign rhetoric against immigrants, decides to adopt a restrictive H-1B visa regime, India’s existing comparative advantage in the services sector would be diluted.

The pull- out from the mega regional trade agreement, the TPP, may have multiple effects on the Asia Pacific trade architecture. It is likely that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, which is seen as an alternative trade configuration to the TPP for the Asian economies, including India, may now emerge as the main trade agreement for regional economies. The higher trade standards (WTO plus) of the TPP, it is possible, will now be sought in the RCEP by those economies that are members of both the RCEP and TPP. India, with its persistent stance of differentiated tariff liberalisation offers to the RCEP economies, may then find negotiations more difficult. In the absence of the US-led agreement from the region, there may even be the possibility of China acquiring a pre-eminent position not just in the RCEP but also in the Asia Pacific region, to the extent of pushing forward its own proposal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). In fact, in the absence of the US counter, the China-led FTAAP – first proposed in the 2014 APEC meeting -may even become the lead trade configuration in the Asia Pacific region. India may have to rethink its strategy for participation in the regional trade architecture if this APEC members’ configuration gains traction in the near term. India is not yet a member of the APEC.

A possible alternative, though, to accepting Chinese leadership in global and/or regional trade deals, would be a return to the multilateral system and the rise of the WTO, where it may be difficult for China to emerge as the dominant player. This may even be a favourable outcome for India, a longstanding WTO loyalist. But for this, the WTO needs to reassert itself as the international body that deals with trade issues in a more inclusive manner. Given the dragging of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) now for a decade and a half, this seems like a humongous task. But if developing country coalitions comprising the more dynamic economies could pave the way, this may just be the time for a resurrection of the WTO and the DDA. And, India could actually take the lead in this process.

*Amita Batra
Professor of Economics, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, & Columnist, IPCS

By Jonathan Cook *

While the United States presidential election bitterly divided the American public, most Israelis were sanguine about the race. Both candidates – Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton – were keen to end eight years of icy mistrust between Barack Obama, the outgoing president, and Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Israeli prime minister should – at least on paper – be happier with Trump.

Netanyahu, elected four times, has always faced off with Democratic incumbents. Now he has not only a right-wing Republican in the White House but a Republican-dominated Congress too.

Standing guard over the relationship will be Sheldon Adelson, a US casino magnate who is Netanyahu’s most vocal supporter. It will not be lost on Trump that the billionaire is one of the Republican Party’s main financiers.

Netanyahu was among the first to congratulate Trump by phone. The US president-elect reciprocated by inviting him for talks “at the first opportunity”. And yet Netanyahu is reported to be anxious about a Trump White House. Why?

It is certainly not because of Trump’s stated policies on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

He has backed moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – a move that, if implemented, would make the US the first western state to recognize the city as Israel’s capital. It would effectively rubber-stamp Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem, the expected capital of a Palestinian state.

Previous Republican candidates have made the same promise, but Trump looks like the first who might carry it through. A nervous Palestinian leadership warned at the weekend they would “make life miserable” for him if he did.

A Trump policy statement issued just before the election could have been written by Netanyahu himself.

It dismissed a two-state solution as “impossible”, blaming the Palestinian leadership for rewarding terrorism and educating children in “hatred of Israel and Jews”. It suggested that Israel would have a free hand to expand the settlements.

There were hints too that US military aid might be increased above the record $38 billion over 10 years recently agreed by Obama. And the statement proposed a crackdown on all boycott activities, even those targeting settlements. “The false notion that Israel is an occupier should be rejected,” it concluded.

So why the nerves in Tel Aviv?

However hawkish Netanyahu appears to outsiders, he is relatively moderate compared to the rest of his Likud party and his government coalition partners.

The prime minister has won favour at home by presenting himself as an embattled leader, but one best placed to look out for Israel’s interests against a hostile White House. Now with the battlefield gone, Netanyahu’s armor risks making him look both clumsy and surplus to requirements.

There is another danger. Trump’s advisers on the Israel-Palestine conflict are closer to settler leader Naftali Bennett, the education minister, than Netanyahu. After Trump’s victory, Bennett crowed: “The era of a Palestinian state is over.”

The Israeli prime minister could find himself outflanked by Bennett if the Trump administration approves settler demands to annex most or all of the West Bank.

Netanyahu’s realization of his Greater Israel dream may prove pyrrhic.

Israel’s complete takeover of the West Bank could trigger an irreversible crisis with Europe; the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, forcing the military and financial burden of the occupation back on to Israel; and a full-blown intifada from Palestinians, battering Netanyahu’s security credentials.

The creation of a Greater Israel could also damage Israel by reframing the Palestinian struggle as a fight for equal rights in a single state. Comparisons with earlier struggles, against South African apartheid and Jim Crow in the US deep south, would be hard to counter.

But Netanyahu has an additional reason to fear an imminent Trump presidency.

There were few US politicians Netanyahu had a better measure of than Hillary Clinton. He knew her Middle East policy positions inside out and had spent years dealing with her closest advisers.

Trump, by contrast, is not only an unknown quantity on foreign policy but notoriously mercurial. His oft-stated isolationist impulses and his apparent desire to mend fences with Russia’s Vladimir Putin could have unpredictable implications for the Middle East and Israel.

He might tear up last year’s nuclear accord with Iran, as Netanyahu hopes, but he might just as equally disengage from the region, giving more leeway to Iran and Russia. The effect on the international inspections regime in Iran or the proxy wars raging in Israel’s backyard, in Syria and elsewhere, would be hard to predict.

In short, Trump could kill Netanyahu with kindness, turn Israel into a pariah state in western capitals and leave it exposed strategically.

In addition, becoming the poster child of a controversial and possibly short-lived Trump presidency could rapidly transform Israel into a deeply divisive issue in US politics.

The adage – be careful what you wish for – may yet come to haunt Netanyahu.

*Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books). He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: www.jonathan-cook.net. (A version of this article first appeared in the National, Abu Dhabi)

An Israeli antiquities official says Israel is embarking on a major expedition to find more Dead Sea Scrolls.

Amir Ganor of the Israel Antiquities Authority says a government research team will spend the next three years surveying hundreds of desert caves near the Dead Sea, where the world’s oldest biblical manuscripts were discovered in 1947. The collection is considered the crown jewel of Israeli antiquities.

The official says the expedition will begin in December.

It will be the first large-scale archaeological survey of the area in more than 20 years. Looters have discovered ancient manuscripts in the area in recent years, prompting the government initiative.

Ganor spoke about the project on Monday with The Associated Press.

By Karen Parrish

In the run-up to Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 45th U.S. president, US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said Tuesday that there are two things on which he’s “completely focused.”

In the weeks to come, all government agencies, including the Defense Department, will undergo significant changes as the new presidential administration assumes office. DoD is not taking the responsibility lightly, Carter assured media representatives yesterday during a visit to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms in California.

Carter said his first priority is “continuing to make sure that we’re meeting all of our challenges today, which includes the destruction of [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] in Iraq and Syria, standing strong against the potential of aggression everywhere else around the world, and continuing to build the most innovative and powerful military in the world.”

The defense secretary said his second priority is “helping the president-elect and his team undergo an orderly transition, and I’m responsible for the Defense Department to oversee that transition.”

Carter noted, “We’ve done that before. We’re committed to doing that with the excellence with which our department does everything else, and to help President-elect Trump hit the ground running as our commander in chief in the best way we possibly can. Those are the things I’m focused on.”

Carter is on a multiday trip focusing on warfighter readiness, training and equipment that will also take him to Texas and Florida.

By Trisha De Borchgrave*

So it happened: A bewildered Hillary Clinton conceded defeat, with dignity and graciousness, after the waterboarding of the nation’s values of common decency by a Trump campaign that left Americans choking on its populist spittle.

Trump’s electoral hyperbole exceeded the mistruths of Britain’s EU referendum, though not the bitter taste on the palate of the Remain campaigners. Both losing sides feel betrayed not just by an outcome they do not understand, but by a demeaning and disheartening ethical descent that has left them questioning whether their lives, relationships to their communities and love of their country has been an illusion.

And neither side sees the result as legitimate. Some Remainers continue to seek redress five months later from what the Electoral Administration Act of 2006 describes as the corrupt practice of exercising “undue influence” through “assertions that were knowingly misleading.” And a petition signed by over four million UK citizens for a second referendum has challenged the validity of the Leave vote, which represented less than 60 percent of the population.

Vociferous appeals to fellow Americans to do their duty and fulfill their right to vote still only convinced 55 percent of them to show up, giving Trump a mandate of just over 26 percent of the electorate. Joining those 22 countries, including Australia, Argentina, Belgium and Brazil, that make voting compulsory is becoming more of a compelling argument in favor of the democratic process. In the meantime, many Democrats are left hoping that Trump succumbs to one of the seventy lawsuits pending against him.

Both results, however, are here to stay; Brexit in its hard, soft or marshmallow construct, and Trump now legitimized by President Obama’s welcome into the heart of the Oval Office with a tour and a chat to the background shouts of “He’s Not My President” from New York to Dallas, Miami to Kansas City, and to the home of the future Trump House, Washington, D.C.

Twenty-five years of British headlines such as “150 New EU Laws Ruining Britain,” “New EU Rules Wreck Pensions,” “Ban Shopping Bags Says EU” and “Who Do EU Think You Are?” left disaffected and nostalgic Brits zigzagging like sharks preying on who to blame. For his part, Trump led his voting flock with the persuasive powers of a reformed sinner. When an electorate wants to be duped there is little to dissuade it.

Trump garnered 63 percent of the white American male vote and 52 percent of its female equivalent, who voted with the vehemence of a minority brainwashed on diets of shock-jock conservative radio and brought to life by plant closures and zero job opportunity. And so victory at Trump’s campaign headquarters was celebrated with chants of “lock her up.”

But it does not take intellectual talent, only bacterial gut, for a tyrant to tailor the length of the reins of the mobs he has unleashed. In his acceptance speech, Trump announced that his political opponent, who he had threatened with jail, was now owed “a major debt of gratitude for her service to our country.” And his two-term president was a “very good man,” whom he greatly respects and, we assume, is no longer unworthy of high office by dint of his birth.

Trump’s flip-flop ideology, that has flashed like a stoplight between red and blue twelve times in the last 20 years, will be autocorrected by the Republican House and Senate, and screwed into place by his creationist, evangelical vice-president elect, Mike Pence. Policies up for demolition include most of Obamacare, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Paris climate accords, and the Iran nuclear deal. But making them disappear will just bring the underlying issues back like a heat-seeking Exocet missile.

Britons who voted to banish the EU consume it today with their breakfast cereal, as the 24/7 news cycle reveals the intractability of disentangling them from the 43-year-old political, legal and economic embrace of the single market and its environmental, trade and security policies. As Brexiteers discovered on the day after the referendum result and on every day subsequently, it is easier to repeal than to replace.

Trump’s voters will experience the impacts of reneging on the Paris climate accord to reduce carbon emissions and keep the planet’s cooking temperatures below a 2 percent increase. Nothing educates an uneducated electorate faster than the immediacy of floods, droughts and asthma, and a cabinet of men will be no match for Mother Nature’s punishment of their domestic agendas.

Similarly, snapping sanctions back on to Iran will rekindle the regional arms race, just as cozying up to Russia, in order to combat extremism, will do nothing to dissuade President Putin from pursuing his policies of disinformation, his cyber attacks and his threats against real friends in Europe.

The reality show at White House-a-Lago will soon be enveloped by the secrecy that Trump’s cluelessness needs in order to assure his voters that he is keeping them safe and prosperous. Yup, Brexit all over again.

*Trisha de Borchgrave is a writer and artist based in London. She can be reached at
www.trishadeborchgrave.com and through Twitter @TrishdeB

Given Brexit and Trump, the relationship between Putin and Merkel increasingly will provide the fulcrum of Balkan – and European – security.

By David B. Kanin*

The shock of the recent American election does not seem to be fading much yet, either in the States or worldwide. The President-elect’s relatively benign behavior since winning his big prize has yet to obscure the unique mix of personal slurs and communal insults directed by him and at him over the last year and more. The same pundits who were dead wrong about the election outcome continue to slam the victor and his imagery of border walls, massive deportations of immigrants, and shrinkage of international trade. Pay no attention to them; the plain fact is that no one knows what the next US Administration actually will do, at home or abroad. It is quite possible those inside the nascent Trump management group have little more than a general notion themselves.

Of course, there is no point telling that to Vojislav Seselj, whose effort to pull his Donald Trump T-shirt over his belly created a rather striking image in its own right. Seselj seems to think the American election will somehow enable him and his greater Serbia. Seselj’s celebration was an exaggerated reflection of the distinction between measured post-8 November optimism in Serbia and resigned worry expressed by the US’s erstwhile clients in the Balkans, the Bosniaks and the Albanian universe. By now, it should be clear to anyone paying attention that the Americans rarely think about the Balkans anymore, and that the few diplomats and analysts assigned to watch the region in Washington and European capitals remain at square one when it comes to forcing politicians and patronage bosses to knuckle under to more than twenty years of Western threats and demands.

This will remain the case; Western weakness will be outlined in high relief in the post-election context (to include the results of balloting in France, the Netherlands, and Germany in 2017). The fissure likely will widen between traditional liberal international values held up by fading elite (and elitist) voices in Europe and nativist populism afflicting the various factions in the US Republican party and European counterparts. NATO, already largely a talking shop of declining relevance, would not restore its pride of place even if all its members actually lived up to the ritual pledge to increase defense spending by 2% of GDP and proved willing to maintain their token deployments to the Baltic states. Talk of some sort of EU defense and humanitarian intervention capability makes little sense when so few EU members would be willing to fight anyone. High representatives and other diplomats will continue to talk at Balkan audiences about the path to Europe, but so what?

As the dust in Europe settles (and the Russian military/diplomatic success in Syria reaches a climax –in Idlib? – and settles in), Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel will get down to the business of negotiating their post-sanctions relationship, assuming Merkel can manage her own electoral problems. The rest of Europe (and Turkey) will play close attention. This diplomacy will proceed even if Moscow engineers the capture by separatists of Mariupol and other parts of eastern Ukraine in the next phase of Moscow’s effort to restore its influence throughout “Little Russia.” Germany remains the key to Putin’s effort to lash a Russian-dominated European security zone to a Russian economy that on its own seems likely to permanently under-perform.

Merkel knows her dance partner well. Nevertheless, Britain’s lurch away from Europe and flourishing American atavism leave her little choice but to attempt to draw Moscow into a connection that perhaps will put a limit on Russian efforts to restore its security domination over the former Soviet/Warsaw pact security space. She might even hope to lay the groundwork for eventual revival of something like the clumsy efforts made by US and European officials and academics during the 1990s to promote liberal rule-of-law values inside Russia itself.

This will leave central and Eastern Europe in the lurch. In their own way, Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria already are preparing to accommodate themselves to some sort of a neo-Soviet situation. Romania, having failed to convince Bulgaria and Turkey to at least make a show of a NATO military presence in the Black Sea, may well take the same road (via a firmer arrangement with the Russians regarding Moldova). Poland and the Baltic States, as they watch NATO fail to construct a meaningful Article 5-related military capability, could try to draw the US and UK into a focused security pact, but otherwise will have to fend for themselves the best they can.

For the Balkans, the acceleration of transatlantic dysfunction will shake the stability of the latest of the security caps the various systems sharing the title “the West” have imposed on the region since 1878. The pattern since then has been that each time the international umbrella over the Balkans collapses, the locals fight to secure advantages they seek to maintain once a new combination of international actors intervenes to reorder things.

This time, the Russians will not need stunts like their seizure of the Pristina airport in 1999 to place themselves at the center of international decision-making. At the same time, Putin will lack the advantages Stalin and the Red Army had in 1945, and will have to decide bow deeply he wants to become enmeshed in the various disputes protagonists will bring to him for resolution. Moscow may find it was a lot simpler when all it had to do was meddle in the region while the US and Europeans were confident enough in their creation myths to attempt to impose their coercive utopia. Still, Russia has come a long way in a short time, (albeit not to the extent China has). Whatever the new US President does at home, so far it is not clear he intends to contest that development.

*David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.

King Mohammed VI delivered a major speech at the opening of the “Africa Action Summit”, held in Marrakesh on the sidelines of the 22nd Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22).

Here follows the full text of the speech:

Distinguished Heads of State and Government of African sister nations,

Your Excellency Mr. Idriss Deby Itno, current Chairman of the African Union,

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Kingdom of Morocco, and the city of Marrakesh in particular, are delighted to welcome you to the “Africa Action Summit”, which is being held on the sidelines of the COP22.

We are honored to have you here with us today. Your presence is a testament to your commitment to an African continent that is looking to the future and shaping its own destiny.

I have taken the initiative to invite you to this Summit so that our Continent may agree on a common approach to fighting climate change as well as on actionable measures for sustainable development.

Bringing large-scale regional and transnational projects to fruition is the challenge I am inviting you to take up.

I suggest that we build an African continent that is resilient to climate change and that commits resolutely to sustainable development; an African continent that will use its resources in an optimal way, while respecting environmental and social balances; a continent that will seek to promote inclusive development, in line with the specific features of its identity, particularly the culture of sharing, of fairness and of solidarity.

Before going any further, I would like to raise a fundamental question.

It goes without saying that the concern about the future of our planet and the interest taken in the issue by active civil society organizations are real.

But are there really any common, action-oriented objectives? There are two basic elements I would like to consider with you in this regard.

First, there is a disparity between the North and the South when it comes to culture and the environment. That disparity concerns priorities as well as means.

For this reason, it is important to harmonize, even unify, environmental education efforts. The Moroccan Presidency will seek to achieve that objective during its term.

Do we need to point out that the colonial era is over, and that imposed decisions cannot be productive? Do we need to point out that stakeholders lack neither the commitment nor the goodwill required, though they sometimes lack the necessary means?

We are all aware that what is at stake is the preservation of life, and that we need to work together to protect the Earth. It is precisely for this reason that I would like to see a convergence of views regarding our actions on the ground.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Africa is paying a heavy price in the climate equation. It is, undoubtedly, the continent that is suffering the most.

Rising temperatures, shifting seasons and successive droughts are depleting the biodiversity of our continent, destroying ecosystems and jeopardizing Africa’s progress, security and stability.

And yet, our continent is responsible for only 4% of greenhouse gas emissions.

However, climate change on a global scale is significantly hampering Africa’s development and poses a serious threat to the basic rights of tens of millions of Africans.

As a result, all types of vulnerabilities are concentrated in our continent.

There are already 10 million climate refugees in Africa. By 2020, nearly 60 million people will be displaced because of water scarcity if no measures are taken in this regard.

The immense freshwater reservoir that Lake Chad used to be has already lost 94% of its surface area and is facing the risk of drying up once and for all.

4 million hectares of forest – that is to say, twice the global average – are lost each year.

African agriculture – which consists predominantly of subsistence farming – employs 60% of the African workforce; yet our crops suffer from severe disruptions, and our food security is seriously jeopardized.

Agricultural output in Africa could therefore drop by 20% by the year 2050, at a time when our population will have doubled.

Entire sections of the coastline and almost a third of coastal infrastructure would be submerged.

Water-borne diseases, which kill thousands of people each year, would be eradicated if wastewater treatment plants were created.

Finally, the degradation of land and of natural resources could continue to be the main driver of most transnational conflicts in Africa.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Paris Climate Agreement, which was adopted to the satisfaction of all, enshrines the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

It is important that our continent speak with one voice, demand climate justice as well as the mobilization of the necessary resources and submit concerted proposals in connection with the fight against climate change.

There are four things that need to be done:

• identify measures to gain access to funding in order to organize the continent’s adaptation efforts;
• identify the mechanisms needed to support the implementation of flagship programs;
• ensure institutional capacity building in our continent;
• and finally, seize opportunities and study the implications of low-carbon development in the fields of energy, technological innovation and “green” jobs.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

African stakeholders showed remarkable dynamism during the thematic days of COP22.

In addition to being project promoters, they have joined many Coalitions, Alliances and Networks of the Global Climate Action Agenda.

It is gratifying to see these continental and regional actions. Not only do they increase our continent’s resilience in the face of climate change threats, but they also allow for the common, sustainable emergence of our continent.

My brothers the Heads of State will have the opportunity today to tell us about the projects they are spearheading and championing.

We are duty-bound to lend political support to these initiatives, to mobilize the means and competences required for their implementation, to put them into perspective and to ensure their coherence.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Kingdom of Morocco is a committed actor in the task of consolidating regional security and stability.

In this regard, it is determined to enhance its contribution to defending the vital interests of the continent, alongside sister nations and, soon, within the African Union.

As it implements its ambitious program in the field of renewable energy, Morocco is making its expertise available to its partners.

By being actively involved in projects centered on Africa, the Kingdom of Morocco is, today, contributing to bringing new partners on board, both public and private, as well as structuring governance mechanisms.

My country will also lead an African climate expertise network, through the Climate Change Competence Center based in Morocco.

Aware of the vulnerability of the agricultural sector and of its vital importance, Morocco is actively preparing for the implementation of the “Adaptation of African Agriculture” (Triple A) initiative.

This innovative system promotes the adoption and financing of solutions to increase productivity and ensure food security.

Finally, given the share allocated to Africa in terms of resources to combat climate change, Morocco has made financing a priority issue of the COP22.

In addition to the funding provided for in the Paris Agreement as of 2020, the Moroccan Presidency is keen to see public funding mobilized, financial arrangements diversified and access to climate funds facilitated.

Moreover, Morocco encourages the involvement of Sovereign Funds in order to develop green infrastructure in Africa.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our partners in the South and the North, as well as the international and regional institutions operating in the field of development financing, have a crucial role to play in shoring up Africa’s collective effort.

Doing things ourselves and for ourselves is imperative. And involving our strategic partners has now become a necessity.
By pooling efforts and consolidating cooperation with our strategic partners, I am convinced we can redress the climate injustice affecting our continent.

This twofold action will contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, knowing that twelve of the seventeen SDGs are directly or indirectly linked to climate change.

To conclude, I should like to assure you that my country will undertake all necessary actions and spare no effort to make sure Africa’s voice is heard, both in the formal negotiations and in the implementation of the Global Climate Action Agenda.

I hope today’s meeting will not only be a decisive step and a worthwhile exercise, but will also reflect our commitment, before history, towards future generations.

Thank you for your kind attention

Shock! Disbelief! Total surprise! Those media (and politicians) who have in the preceding election campaign totally uncritically, but systematically supported Hillary Clinton, try by using such words to convince the public opinion (and themselves most probably) that the election of Donald Trump as the next US president is a total surprise (a mistake, almost). But this is not how things really are. This is, simply, not true.

On one hand Trump seems to be a surprise to those who conducted an almost unprecedented media campaign for the former Secretary of State and for those too who allowed to be convinced (if not deceived) by this campaign, but on the other hand Trump’s victory is no surprise at all for those who tried, free of all prejudices, to analyze all elements of the election campaign and its foreseeable result. Of course one could argue about the fact that it is tragic for today’s America and its political scene, dominated by Republicans and Democrats who successfully prevent any “third candidate” to come even close to the presidential race, that in these elections we witnessed the confrontation between an eccentric millionaire, a somewhat dubious businessman and a figure from the reality shows, and a woman directly responsible for destabilizing the whole Middle East and for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. But, there is not one single word about any of this from those who are “shocked” and “surprised.”

The campaign started with the firm conviction that the winner will be Hillary Clinton, former first lady, former senator from New York and former secretary of state. Her victory was, so to say, programmed and she was treated as a favorite in everything and in every moment. This went so far (and we know it thanks to Wikileaks) that the leadership of the Democratic party torpedoed, during the primaries, the campaign of Bernie Sanders who portrayed himself as a socialist and announced a political revolution, thus becoming the most dangerous rival of Clinton. Although not young himself, Sanders and his ideas attracted young voters (some surveys conducted after the election show that in some key states, where Hilary Clinton failed, Sanders would have been victorious over Trump). But, the nomination had to go to Hillary, a favorite of financial circles who financed her campaign either directly, or in advance, paying her enormous fees for lectures in which she said things that she would never repeat in the campaign and before those whose votes she wanted to win. But, besides being a favorite of financial circles, she was a favorite of those political circles too who wanted the continuation of the policy of a “transformed” Barack Obama, a president welcomed with great hopes, who during his first term of office took a starting position, marked by his speeches in Cairo and Prague, only to become the true successor of George W. Bush, bombing even more countries than he did and inaugurating again, after a short intermezzo, interventionism plus confrontation with Russia as undisputed cornerstones of Washington’s foreign policy.

And so Sanders was eliminated and the nomination went to Hillary Clinton, a women whose intelligence and political experience could not be denied, but who was described by the founder of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, as a person who was eaten alive by her own ambition. On the other side there was Donald Trump, climbing towards the nomination for a presidential candidate, financing in the first stage almost entirely the campaign out of his own pocket. His success was not the result of the policy of the party’s leadership, but mostly of the votes of those who were attracted by his very often extremely rude populism, on the verge of open racism (these characteristics will gradually almost disappear during Trump’s campaign that was to follow). And he got the nomination on a very stormy Republican Party’s convention, during which some delegates even left in protest.

And the arena was ready for the confrontation between a political amateur, “racist, sexist and vulgar person” an an experienced politician (although he would say that her experience was a bad one). In this moment the political-media machinery started to work “full speed.” About Trump nothing good could have been said or written, despite the fact that in his first foreign policy speeches, as a presidential candidate, some new and encouraging tones were registered, while at the same time it was not possible (or allowed), at least in the mainstream media, to either say or write anything negative about Hillary Clinton, despite the never brought to end scandal with her using an unprotected server for sending messages as secretary of state and despite the fact that she obviously lied saying she did not erase any of the messages and that not a single one dealt with matters of national security. The curtain was up for a battle between the “evil” Trump and the “good” Hillary. In reality the curtain was up for a mud-wrestling between two candidates who were not selective at all choosing the instruments to destroy each other. And the propaganda machine continued to work full speed. After each TV confrontation public opinion surveys were published showing Hillary was “convincingly better” in comparison with her opponent (there was, as far as we know, only one exception). After that voters opinion surveys were published, all of them giving Hillary great chances to win and Trump almost none.

Thus the stage was set for the final act – the ritual execution of the candidate who refused to accept that everything was over, until he himself comes to the conclusion that it is over – despite his sometimes openly racist statements and their public echo (mainly abroad) and despite his sexual scandals (real or fabricated, most probably both). But, and this is obvious now, Trump was not acting without knowing what he was doing. Repeatedly invoking the silent majority, he played on the card of the Americans (and there are not only a few of them) abandoned by the society and those who feared they could experience the same destiny. It might be a paradox, but it is true: in the eyes of these people the blonde billionaire appeared as some sort of a Robin Hood. In him they saw their last straw. He promised to bring back the factories that fled to “cheap countries,” he announced big projects for modernizing the infrastructure, he spoke about opening new working possibilities and “making America great again.” Former Secretary of State Clinton could not respond to this with her cheap slogan about America being great “because it is good” (most probably her staunchest supporters were afraid that someone could ask people from Libya or Syria what they think about both America and her being good). Above all she made both a strategic and tactical mistake: she did not want to deal with Trump as an unworthy opponent; instead of him she choose as her opponent Russian President Vladimir Putin, degrading Trump to his mere puppet. Consequently her speeches were more and more anti-Russian intoned and Cold War colored, so that Trump with his announcement of talks and deals with Russia (especially in the fight against global terrorism) started to sound moderate and common sense driven (to those who wanted to hear and understand, naturally).

The day of the decision came. And it was, as it was. And we have today president elect Donald Trump, elected with a convincing majority (of electoral votes, popular votes are not decisive, due to the specific American system of electing the president). His first speech after Hillary Clinton conceded in a phone call to him was well calibrated, low key, but not without substance, it was the address of a statesman. The pledge that he will ban all Muslims from entering the USA disappeared from his web page. And while he is preparing to take over in direct talks with the current president who was obviously forced to join the anti-Trump hysteria, proclaiming him totally unfit for the highest position in the state, some media who all of a sudden see clear, or the Russian media, who never openly sided with Trump, but never demonized him either, have fun exposing politicians from the West with their statements before the US elections and after. Just one example, the British foreign minister, Boris Johnson. Before the elections he boasted how he avoids certain streets in New York, out of fear he might bump into Donald Trump. And after the elections he is “looking forward to work with President Trump’s administration.”

It seems realistic to expect that Trump will disappoint both the European extreme rightists (who are overwhelmed by his victory), as well as liberals (not necessarily of left orientation) who are despairing and exchanging messages of condolences. Trump is without any doubt a conservative, but he comes not out of the same nest as the European neo-fascists who are more and more aggressive with every passing day; he played without any scruples the lowest instincts of the voters to get as many votes as possible, but his domestic policy will most probably be similar to those of Nixon and Reagan. These were, one must admit, not the best times for liberals, but neither were they put before committees for investigating anti-American activities, nor were they forbidden to work. In the field of foreign policy, Trump will enter the path of calming down the relations with Russia (that are almost on the boiling point), which is still his “magnum crimen” in the eyes of some European politicians, prisoners of the past; he will enter the path of strengthening (but with Russia and not against it) the fight against global terrorism. Otherwise he will orient America toward itself, putting it in a semi-isolation and giving the U.S. an active role on the international scene only when American interests are in question (and not necessarily interests of the Wall Street). To many he might appear as dangerous, simply because he is an unknown. Potentially he is really dangerous if he insists on denying the global warming and transforms this into American policy. But it seems to us premature and simply not serious to judge him today as a complete negative only because he avoided (in accordance with the law) to pay federal tax for years and because of his sexual escapades (does anybody still remember Bill Clinton, the Oval Office, and Monica Lewinsky?). Equally not serious is to state that his election victory is “a surprise” and “totally unexpected.” This author published in July this year an article under the title “President Trump?”, stating as follows: “The rich businessman whose biggest advantage is that he owes nothing to anybody, because he is until now more or less financing his campaign out of his pocket, presented a mixture of populism, demagogic approach, sounding phrases and pure politics.” Further: “Repeating constantly pledging that he will bring back the sense of security to every American, he openly pledged his support to LGBT community, promising to protect it from any kind of violence (and thanked – as a Republican – the audience for applauding him after this). And he made sure that among his supporters there were representatives of other races (such as ‘Koreans for Trump’).” And finally: “Trump’s first big political speech shows that the battle for the White House will be waged between two at least equal rivals; Trump will without any doubt repeat the slogan used in his speech at the Convention: She says: ‘Everything will stay as it is.’ And I say: ‘Nothing will remain as it is.’ And with some sarcasm, but not without effect: ‘She is asking her supporters to say that they are with her. And I am telling you and the whole of America: I am with you, I will be your voice, I will be your champion.’” Published in July 2016.

In the meantime, the “champion” became president elect. He will take over in mid-January next year. Until then the horror of those who played (for their own interest, but wrongly) on the card of Hillary Clinton, as well as the horror of those who without any real basis believed the she is the God-given president of the U.S., will calm down. Donald Trump, the man who described himself with the words: “I know the system best. So I am the one who can fix it” – 45th President of the USA. So, why not?