Corn farmers in Minnesota and across the northern Corn Belt often must plant in cold, damp spring soils that can slow early season growth. This can impact yield at harvest time — and farmers’ bottom lines.

One way farmers in these colder regions deal with the problem is to apply starter fertilizer directly to their corn seed at planting. This direct application of starter fertilizer is known as in-furrow application. In-furrow application has its own risks. Direct contact with the chemical fertilizer can damage seedlings. Still, in-furrow is a common way that farmers in areas with cooler spring temperatures attempt to beat the cold soil blues. The assumption is that in-furrow allows farmers to plant their corn earlier than they otherwise could. This means a longer growing season and, they hope, greater yield benefits.

But newly published research is challenging that assumption. The research was led by Daniel Kaiser. Kaiser is an extension nutrient management specialist and assistant professor at University of Minnesota’s department of soil, water and climate.

Kaiser was motivated to study the value of in-furrow application in corn partly because growers are looking to cut costs. A successful growing year for a farmer can mean a market glut, and diminishing profits.

“One of the questions I’ve been getting more frequently with the low commodity prices is where farmers can have some cost savings,” said Kaiser.

For many farmers, in-furrow starter application is a cheaper alternative to other starter fertilizers. That’s because other fertilizers often require investments in more equipment. But Kaiser wanted to know whether the in-furrow practice itself makes economic sense for farmers. Does in-furrow application have an economic benefit for farmers planting corn earlier in cool, wet soils?

Kaiser’s team built on research from Wisconsin indicating the answer might be no. That’s what Kaiser found too–in most situations. In the study, the team applied in-furrow starter fertilizer to corn seed with different relative maturities. A crop’s relative maturity is the number of days needed for the crop to be ready for harvest. They then planted the seed at various times in the spring to simulate early, on-time, and late planting.

In-furrow starter application did lead to more early-season growth of the corn. But Kaiser found that its benefits–no matter the planting date or relative maturity–were less apparent later in the season. In-furrow corn silked a couple of days earlier and had reduced grain moisture, Kaiser said. But, he added, “when I looked at it in terms of economic benefits, what we saw in terms of decreased grain moisture would cover the costs of the starter fertilizer we applied, and that was really about it.”

The only conditions that led to an economic benefit from the in-furrow application were in soils that tested low for phosphorus.

The findings could prove important for many farmers who are considering in-furrow starters.

“If you’re looking at using starter fertilizer, I don’t think I would be basing the decision on things like planting date or relative maturity,” Kaiser said. Instead, he suggested basing the decision on soil tests. For this study Kaiser focused on phosphorus. That’s because phosphorus is the biggest nutrient issue in the region. But the decision to use in-furrow starter could be based on any nutrient that might be insufficient in a field, Kaiser said.

“The main thing is really to base the decisions on what the overall nutrient needs are of the field and not on other factors like relative maturity and planting date,” Kaiser said. “There are probably a fair amount of fields that there really isn’t going to be a large benefit from in-furrow starter, and that’s one of the things that growers are going to have to play around with and make the decision on whether it’s worth it or not by doing some on-farm research.”

Finally, Kaiser said that farmers who do decide to use in-furrow starter fertilizers should make sure that they complement any broadcast fertilizers that they use.

“What we’ve been seeing more often than not is that there’s not a great economic benefit to using starter on top of broadcast fertilizer if applied at relatively high rates or in high soil testing situations,” Kaiser said.

As Russians and others approach the 25^th anniversary of the Beloveshchaya accords, many of them are certain to say that that agreement between the presidents of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus was the death knell for the USSR. But in fact, Vadim Shtepa says, they didn’t “destroy” it because it had long since ceased to exist.

The August 1991 coup completed the destruction that became inevitable when the CPSU lost its constitutionally mandated role a year earlier, the Estonia-based Karelian commentator says; and what the three presidents did was to kill any chances for a confederation arising in its place (forbes.ru/mneniya/mir/333893-sng-25-let-spustya-pochemu-na-postsovetskom-prostranstve-ne-vozniklo-obshchego-pr).

In many respects, Shtepa argues, the Beloveshchaya meeting was in reaction to the draft of a call for the creation of a Union of Sovereign States as a confederation that Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed and that was published on November 27. (For its text, see ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Договор_о_Союзе_суверенных_государств_(ноябрь_1991_года).

The Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders viewed this as just another effort by Gorbachev to hold on to power, and they wanted to eliminate that chance by eliminating his position. The Soviet president failed in his efforts because “by virtue of his policy in 1991, he fell between Scylla and Charybdis, between two fires.”

That is because, the regionalist says, Gorbachev’s “previous project of a union of sovereign states as a federation, which was being prepared for signature on August 20, was blocked by the putsch,” while his November project for “the Union as a confederation was cancelled by those who defeated the putschists.”

“The distinction between the pre-August and the post-August projects of a new Union treaty,” Shtepa continues, “consisted in the fact that the first anticipated a more centralized system which gave critics the basis of calling it ‘a remake of the USSR.’” But one aspect of it was especially threatening to the then-powers that be.

The pre-August version declared that “all union posts must be occupied by persons delegated by the republics and not by the former Soviet nomenklatura.” That change, Shtepa says, “can be considered the ‘cadres’ cause of the putsch.”

The post-August variant, in contrast, reduced the central powers to “an absolute minimum,” and although the document didn’t include the term “subsidiarity,” that was what Gorbachev and those who helped him prepare the document clearly were talking about. Indeed, what that document would have put in place would have been something very like the EU.

Moreover, Shtepa points out, “it is interesting to note that in the draft of this Treaty was a direct citation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and a requirement that its signatories bring their legislation into line with the principles of that document. That sets it apart from both the CIS Treaty and the Russian Federal Treaty of 1992, neither of which mention it.

The CIS, he continues, “initially was conceived as a coordinating institution like the European Union, but in fact it turned out to be that only formally and could not prevent any conflicts among the countries of the post-Soviet space or ensure that all its members would follow democratic and legal norms.

Subsequent efforts to build “over the CIS” via structures like “the Eurasian Union” did not have any real results, “but only were evidence that a genuine post-imperial transformation of the post-Soviet space had not occurred.” And that means that up to now, “there has not arisen any common mutually interested project for the future” given that “the actual ‘Russian-centricity’ of this space makes the role of other countries secondary and subordinate.”

That doesn’t mean that the post-Soviet countries won’t cooperate in various ways: they are fated by geography and history to do so, he says. The issue is “only about the model of this cooperation and whether it is based on direct ties and possibilities which a confederation gives or on the subordination to some archaic imperial stereotypes.”

Unlike other post-Soviet states which “began to construct new states, in part build on the experience of their independence after 1917, Russia turned to its pre-revolutionary imperial history and considered itself the direct successor of that.” But such a view gave rise to thinking in categories of “the metropolitan center” and “the colonies” and made real progress impossible.

“This was the historical paradox of December 1991,” Shtepa argues. It seemed to many at the time that “Russia was freeing itself from the Soviet past, but this ‘liberation’ led only to its emersion in a still more distant past, with two-headed eagles, a government role for the church, colonial wars and so on.”

Had the republics agreed to a confederal arrangement, such a restoration of imperial thinking in Rusisa “would have been impossible in principle.” Russia and its neighbors would have been “forced to observe common legal norms as they are observed by EU countries, and the wars with Georgia and Ukraine” would have been unthinkable.

And had that happened, it is likely that “confederal thinking” would have spread across Russia, “significantly raising the role of regional and local self-government” and eliminating the drive for the reconstitution of any power vertical.

Obviously, that didn’t happen, and it appears to be true that “Russian political thought of those years was still not ready for the format of a confederation.” But ideas like this one can spread quickly, Shtepa concludes, noting that in 1989, Soviet police arrested someone for carrying the Russian tricolor, but two years later, that flag had become the official one of Russia.

With much of the debate as to whether Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton would win the election taking place online, people blogging, tweeting or updating social media with their thoughts on the topic provided data researchers with a rich source of information about what people were thinking and feeling about the election race.

Associate Prof Stantic was so confident in the result that he publicly announced his prediction even for the known swing states – and his calculations for all swing states were right.

“My algorithms showed clearly to me that based on past patterns and sentiment in social media that Trump, by November 8, would take over the lead, despite only having a 10 per cent chance to win according to all polls at that time,” he said.

“In a public address on big data the day before I even correctly identified all main states that Trump would win (including Florida, North Carolina and Pennsylvania). Someone in the audience quickly checked online and said according to polls Hilary was 84 per cent favourite.

“I answered that people are likely to be more honest when telling friends rather than answering polls. It is scary how accurate prediction can be done by analysing social media.”

When Griffith’s Big Data and Smart Analytics Lab analysed comments on Twitter towards the end of July, it predicted that if the US Presidential election had been held at that time, Trump would have been the winner over Clinton. Those results were shared at the time in an article on The Conversation.

The same lab using the same method predicted and announced in a public lecture a week before the Australian federal election that the Coalition would win over the ALP.

Over the past several years, presidential elections have served as great testbeds in social media, big data, and analytics, which can go into great detail on how campaigns use this information to find out more about voters. “Such analytics can provide much more accurate information than telephone polling, especially in a day and age where people have caller ID and don’t have landlines,” Associate Prof Stantic said.

“This is why the polls leading up to the election had such inconsistent results.”

“The amount of data that all of us generate is truly staggering, and it is continuing to grow. This publicly available data is secret treasure of information if we know how to discover it.”

Associate Professor Stantic said big data analytics is a discipline faced with the challenge of managing the sheer volume of data and turning it into something useful.

“It makes predictions about the future based on the patterns of the past, and finds relationships buried in the data that no one has noticed.”

Similar predictions about the environmental changes of Great Barrier Reef based on ‘Human Sensors’ and Gold Coast visitor satisfaction have been done on projects funded by National Environmental Science Program and City of Gold Coast.

“To further improve predictive power of Big Data analytics there is a need for smarter and faster algorithms to perform deep learning on the large volumes of data drawn from diverse, and we are working on it.”

By Harsh V. Pant

By Elise Harris

On Wednesday, Pope Francis added world famous director Martin Scorsese to the list of Hollywood stars he has welcomed for a private meeting in the Vatican, following an official Rome preview of Scorsese’s new film “Silence.”

Based on a Japanese historical fiction novel recounting Christian persecution in Japan during the 17th century, “Silence” will hit theaters in December and recounts the story of two Jesuit priests who travel to Japan in the midst of the violence to search for the missing mentor, played by Liam Neeson.

According to a Nov. 30 communique from the Vatican, Scorsese, his wife and their two children were present for the meeting with Pope Francis, alongside the film’s producer and his wife. Msgr. Dario Edoardo Vigano, Prefect of the Secretariat for Communications, accompanied the group.

Described in the communique as “very cordial,” the meeting lasted about 15 minutes. The Pope told his guests that he had read the 1966 novel “Silence,” written by Japanese author Shusaku Endo and which served as the inspiration for Scorsese’s new movie.

Francis then spoke of the “sowing” of the faith by the Jesuits in Japan and of the “Museum of the 26 Martyrs,” which was built on Nishizaka Hill in 1962 alongside a monument commemorating the 100th anniversary of the canonization of the 26 martyrs executed at the site in 1597.

During the brief meeting, Scorsese gifted the Pope with two paintings related to the theme of “hidden Christians.” One of them depicts a highly venerated image of the Virgin Mary painted by a Japanese artist in the 18th century. Pope Francis, on his part, gave his guests rosaries.

Other Hollywood stars Pope Francis has met include Angelina Jolie and Leonardo DiCaprio, who came to the Vatican to speak with the Pope about climate change following the release of Francis’ 2015 environmental encyclical, Laudato si.

A preview of “Silence” was shown Nov. 29 at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, and another preview is set to take place Dec. 1 inside the Vatican’s filmoteca.

Scorsese, who grew up Catholic and spent a year in seminary as a youth, has made other religious films in the past.

His latest was the controversial 1988 movie “The Last Temptation of Christ,” which was based on an adaption of the novel by Nikos Kazantzakis and potrayed Christ as sinful and not inherently divine. The film was heavily criticized as “sacrilegious” by many in the U.S. and abroad, including by several bishops, by St. Teresa of Calcutta and by Mother Angelica.

The Catholic faith arrived in Japan during the 16th century, through the efforts of the Jesuit missionary Saint Francis Xavier (1506-1552). Jesuit outreach to the Japanese continued after his death, and around 200,000 Japanese had entered the Church by 1587.

Religious tensions led to a period of persecution during that year, during which many churches were destroyed and missionaries forced to work in secret. But few episodes of martyrdom took place during this time, and within a decade 100,000 more Japanese became Catholic despite the restrictions.

During 1593, Franciscan missionaries came to Japan from the Philippines by order of Spain’s King Philip II. These new arrivals gave themselves zealously to the work of charity and evangelism, but their presence disturbed a delicate situation between the Church and Japanese authorities.

Suspicion against Catholic missionaries grew when a Spanish ship was seized off the Japanese coast and found to be carrying artillery. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a powerful imperial minister, responded by sentencing 26 Catholics to death.

The group was comprised of three native Jesuits, six foreign Franciscans, and several lay Catholics, including some children. Sentenced to die by crucifixion and lancing, they were first marched 600 miles to the city of Nagasaki.

During the journey they underwent public torture meant to terrorize other Japanese believers in Christ. But all of the 26 held out courageously, even singing the hymn of praise “Te Deum” when they arrived at the hill where they would be crucified.

Three of the best-known martyrs of Nagaki are Saints Paul Miki, John of Goto and James Kisai. Though none were priests, all were associated with the Jesuits: Miki was training for the priesthood, while Kisai was a lay brother and John of Goto was a catechist preparing to enter the order.

By Olha Kosova and Sophie Fernández

(EurActiv) — The turnout at the state funeral of Fidel Castro could perhaps symbolise the state of Cuba’s international relations, as European leaders have mostly decided to stay away.

The loyalty of “friendly” countries, like Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, will be fully on show, while the absence of many European leaders could speak volumes about the generally cold ties the Old Continent had with the former Cuban president.

The only EU prime minister that will show up is Greek leader Alexis Tsipras, who said that the Cuban revolutionary had shown that “the path to socialism is not covered with roses”. France has dispatched its environment minister, Ségolène Royal, to Havana, while most other member states have merely entrusted the task to ambassadors.

Despite politicians and diplomats from the Czech Republic and the Baltic nations expressing their condolences to Castro’s family, they too will stay away from the 4 December funeral. Even the rest of the Eastern European countries, which had privileged relations with Cuba when they fell under the Soviet umbrella, have also decided not to send any representation.

Spain’s delegation will be headed by its former monarch, King Juan Carlos I. Ciudadanos insisted that Juan Carlos is too important a figure to represent Spain at the funeral.

Germany will also send a former leader, in the guise of Gerhard Schröder, the ex-chancellor. Italy has made no announcement about who will represent the country and the United Kingdom said it would find “the appropriate representative”.

The EU walked somewhat of a tightrope in its reaction to the death of Castro. European Commission and Parliament presidents, Juncker and Schulz, both used social media to mark the passing of the divisive former leader. High Representative Federica Mogherini was also very diplomatic in her response.

However, Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström tweeted that she was suprised by the outpouring of grief for a man she labelled as a “dictator”.

In recent years, the EU-Cuba relationship has begun to take off and Castro’s death could be a deciding factor in their future trajectory.

The EU and Cuba formally established their diplomatic ties in 1988, against a complex political backdrop, as the crumbling of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe caused massive upheaval in international relations.

The “Special Period”, an extended period of economic crisis caused by the fall of the USSR, prompted Cuba to seek an agreement with what was then the European Economic Community (EEC). Relations up to that point had been very limited and on a bilateral basis. Each European country had formed their own policy on how to approach the communist island nation.

On 24 February 1996, two ‘Brothers to the Rescue’ aircraft, operated by volunteers dedicated to helping Cuban exiles, were shot down by the airforce in Cuban airspace. This led to the passing of the Helms-Burton Act, which affirmed the United States-imposed embargo on Cuba, indirectly affecting relations with Europe.

The law was controversial in that it stipulated that non-US companies that maintained trade ties with Cuba could be subject to legal reprisals.

One of the EU’s main objectives was to facilitate Cuba’s democratic transition and to integrate the country into the global order. This was mainly driven by former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar and the EU’s Common Position on Cuba was in force by the end of 1996.

However, Havana did not welcome the document and called it an insurmountable obstacle to bilateral relations and was even questioned by some of the member states, including Poland and the Czech Republic.

The conditions of the treaty were reviewed regularly. Relations between the two parties remained distant and cold, influenced greatly by the position of the US. Human rights violations committed by the regime also shaped the bloc’s approach to the island.

Havana maintained that the Common Position was only used by the member states to pressure and discriminate against Cuba.

One of the few useful tools available to both parties was economic relations. Although Cuba only offered relatively small economic returns, the EU was always an important partner for the Caribbean state. Currently, it is Cuba’s biggest exporter and only ranks second behind Venezuela in terms of overall importance to trade.

In the last few years, there have been several attempts to improve relations, but not all have been successful. Between 2003 and 2005, Cuba and the EU experienced one of its most tense periods, as Havana cracked down on Cuban dissidents in 2003, on the basis that many journalists and activists were allegedly working for the US.

In response to the violation of human rights, the EU reduced its participation in many diplomatic events organised by Cuba, invited dissidents to attend formal gatherings and imposed temporary sanctions on Castro’s regime.

In 2005, a Madrid-driven dialogue was renewed between Brussels and Havana. The government agreed to release 14 prisoners and the EU gradually withdrew its sanctions in an effort to repair economic cooperation.

Between 2005 and 2008, Cuba liberated another six political activists, which the EU saw as an important enough step to eliminate sanctions completely. The transition of power between Fidel and his brother, Raúl, also fostered more optimism that relations would improve even more.

Since 2008, high-level political dialogues, initiated by the EU’s rotating presidencies, have been maintained. Now, the Common Position, which is almost two decades old, will cease to be.

The path to normalised relations was first trod in March of this year, and in September, the European Commission submitted a proposal to the Council about signing a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) with Cuba.

At the same time, foreign policy chief Mogherini asked the Council to formally repeal the Common Position.

The objectives of the PDCA are to promote an exchange of views and information, as well as increase mutual understanding.

In terms of individual member states, Spain has undoubtedly been the most influential player in driving the EU’s foreign policy.

In 2005 and 2008, the Spanish delegation, lead by socialist leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, called for the suspension of diplomatic sanctions against Cuba and Spain has insisted over the last few years on the need to encourage the island nation to engage in international dialogue.

In 2015, commercial trade between Cuba and Spain totalled €1 billion, putting Spain only behind China and Venezuela in terms of commerce.

Once the Common Position has expired, Spain will have to try and continue to act as a bridge between Havana and Brussels, without losing its influence in Washington. After the victory of Donald Trump earlier this month, foreign policy and international relations may require a further rethink.

Swiss police raided homes last week as part of a broadening probe into corruption allegations over the awarding of the 2006 World Cup to Germany, prosecutors said Wednesday, November 30, AFP reports.

The investigation targeting members of the 2006 World Cup organising committee, including German football legend Franz Beckenbauer, has been expanded to include Urs Linsi, the former General Secretary of world football’s governing body FIFA, the office of Switzerland’s Attorney General said in a statement sent to AFP.

Switzerland’s top prosecution authority said “that on 23 November 2016 it conducted house searches with the support of the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) at various locations in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.”

The searches were carried out in connection with a probe launched last year into allegations of fraud, criminal mismanagement, money laundering and misappropriation connected with the awarding of the 2006 World Cup to Germany.

The investigation, opened in November 2015, initially targeted Beckenbauer, who headed the committee promoting Germany’s candidacy to host the 2006 World Cup, along with organising committee members Hans-Rudolf Schmidt, Theo Zwanziger and Wolfgang Niersbach.

The attorney general’s office said Wednesday that “a further suspect is Urs Linsi,” who was FIFA secretary general from June 1999 through June 2007.

It added that “the measures carried out on 23 November 2016 relate to Urs Linsi,” who until last week was serving as president of a small Zurich bank.

The statement said the house searches were linked to “a payment of 6.7 million euros ($7.1 million) made in April 2005 by the German Football Association (Deutscher Fussball-Bund, DFB) to Robert Louis-Dreyfus.”

It did not explain further, but the late Louis-Dreyfus, an ex-boss of Adidas, has been accused in media reports of lending the same amount to DFB to help it set up a secret fund to buy votes in support if its bid to host the 2006 World Cup.

Scandal-plagued Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has expressed support for strict Islamic laws in an interview, reports Reuters.

“We want to develop Islam,” Najib said in an interview with pro-government broadcaster TV3 on Nov. 29.

Najib said it was the obligation of the country’s Muslim population to support a plan by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party to adopt hudud, the system of punishment set up by the Quran.

“Non-Muslims must understand that this is not about hudud but about empowering the Shariah courts,” he said.

Last year the federal government rejected hudud. Since then the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party forged closer links with the United Malay National Organization led by Najib, which led to the party expecting a more accommodating stance on the issue.

Christian groups in Malaysia have voiced their concerns over the renewed effort to allow hudud, even if it is applicable to just one religious community.

Observers say that the bill is a threat to the multicultural country’s secular nature and that past leaders — who promoted a moderate form of Islam — would have stopped such moves.

There have been calls for Najib to resign as prime minister over his alleged involvement in a multi-million dollar global misappropriation scandal involving taxpayers’ money.

By Leman Zeynalova

During the Vienna meeting held Nov.30, OPEC members decided to implement a new OPEC-14 production target of 32.5mb/d, said the cartel’s website.

The decision was made in order to accelerate the ongoing drawdown of the stock overhang and bring the oil market rebalancing forward.

The agreement will be effective from January 1, 2017.

It was also decided to establish a High-level Monitoring Committee, consisting of oil ministers, and assisted by the OPEC Secretariat, to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

Member countries, in agreeing to this decision, confirmed their commitment to a stable and balanced oil market, with prices at levels that are suitable for both producers and consumers.

In line with recommendations from the High-level Committee of the ‘Algiers Accord’, the meeting participants also agreed to institutionalize a framework for cooperation between OPEC and non-OPEC producing countries on a regular and sustainable basis.

The importance of other producing countries joining the agreement was underscored during the meeting.

The duration of this agreement is six months, extendable for another six months to take into account prevailing market conditions and prospects.

Meanwhile, Indonesia decided to suspend its OPEC membership. OPEC spokesmen said Indonesia could return to the cartel in the future.

It was decided to hold the next Ordinary Meeting in Vienna, Austria, May 25, 2017.

The short answer to the question framing this session is: where does one start? If things in the Middle East and North Africa were not complicated enough, answering the question has been made even more difficult by the rise of Donald Trump, and the fact that no one, maybe not even he, has an idea about what his policy towards the various crises in the Middle East and North Africa will be, or what his attitude might be towards individual countries in the region.

So, rather than speculate or get bogged down in the excruciating detail of individual conflicts like those in Syria, Iraq, Libya or Yemen, what I would like to do is look at fundamental issues that weave themselves like a red thread through whatever conflict or crisis one looks at. These include the ones named in the title of this session – Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen – as well as the phenomenon of militant political Islam, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Saudi-Iranian struggle for regional dominance and global hegemony in the Muslim world.

Many blame the disintegration of post-colonial nation states like Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, on the drawing of artificial borders by colonial powers as symbolized by the Sykes Picot agreement. If that were true, we would see a similar development across Africa. For much of the second half of the 20th century, many feared that any secession would have a domino effect across the continent. That was the concern with Biafra in the 1960s. Yet, the Organization of African Unity’s recognition of the Frente Polisario, the Algerian-backed liberation movement of the Western Sahara, in the 1980s, and the independence of Eritrea in 1991 after a 27-year long guerrilla war remain isolated events.

Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen are falling apart not because they are artificial constructs created by colonial powers but because they were ruled by autocratic governments who were exclusive rather than inclusive. That is to say, significant segments of the population often defined in religious or ethnic terms had no real stake in society and the state. In fact, that is the state of affairs across much of the Middle East and North Africa. Think of Palestinians, Kurds, Shiites, Christians – just to name a few. Radicalisation moreover is being fuelled by misguided foreign policies as well as repressive, exclusionary domestic strategies that produce social marginalization, huge gaps in income distribution, and dislocation of resources in corrupt autocracies with youth bulges that populate a swath of land stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Indian Ocean. If this sounds familiar, widespread discontent in the Middle East and North Africa is indeed part of a global trend, albeit perhaps its most brutal and violent expression.

One reason for this is that the Middle East and North Africa are populated by regimes that have a demonstrated willingness to defend the essence of the status quo at whatever price. That price can be the destruction of whole countries as in Syria and Yemen. These regimes see their survival in the shaping of the region in their own mould and do not shy away from stoking conflict and aiming for regime change when and where it suits their interest. External powers like the Soviet Union in the past and Russia today as well as the United States were actively or passively supported the policies of their regional allies.

As a result, no Middle Eastern or North African state or external power emerges from this smelling like a rose. In the days of the cold war it was Soviet-backed revolutionary regimes like Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Algeria versus primarily monarchical conservatives. Post-Soviet Union, ideology has made place for pure power plays. The one exception to this rule is the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, one of the 20th centuries few truly popular revolutions.

The Iranian revolution challenged the region’s existing order before and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It represents an existential threat to the conservatives, and particularly to Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al Saud family. The challenge is multi-fold: a republic rather than a monarchy established as the result of a truly popular revolt that toppled a monarch and an icon of US power in the region. Adding fuel to the fire, Iran’s republican version of an Islamic government is legitimized by an institutionalized, albeit flawed, electoral process and a degree of popular sovereignty, that pays lip service to revolutionary goals.

The Saudis were quick to recognize the existential challenge posed by Iran’s Islamic revolution. They decided early on that they had no choice but to confront it aggressively both regionally and globally. If any one conflict has shaped the Middle East and North Africa, its various conflicts and multiple crises as well as the fate of Muslim majority countries beyond the region and Muslim minority communities elsewhere, it is the epic struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony as well as dominance in the Muslim world.

This is not to deny the fact that national governments and non-state actors were and are important actors in the Saudi soft power ploy. The result of this confluence of interests has been devastating. It includes wars like the one between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s that left up to a million people dead; the devastation of countries like Iraq, Syria and Pakistan that are wracked by violence in which sectarian conflict was fuelled by both parties; and the spread of religious, inward-looking, intolerant and supremacist ultra-conservatism that offers the discontent and disenfranchised a refuge and creates an environment that in given circumstances serves as a breeding ground for religiously-packaged militancy.

Iran’s revolutionary zeal, despite the emergence of Hezbollah as a potent trans-national Shiite militia force, past Iranian support of Hamas in Gaza and the Islamic republic’s opportunistic alliance with the Houthis in Yemen petered out in all but word in the first year of the revolution. The Iraqi war against Iran funded largely by Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent smaller Gulf states gave rise to Iranian nationalism. Iran fought its proxy battles with the Saudis primarily in the region itself. For Iran, it was a battle about power and a struggle against an inherently discriminatory ideology that targeted its interpretation of the faith.

For the Saudis, it was one that was ultimately existential and about survival. It was not simply regional for the Al Sauds. It was global given the kingdom’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world based on its custody of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the Al Saud’s power sharing arrangement with an ultra-conservative clergy ideologically committed to spreading its interpretation of the faith.

The Saudi determination to counter the Iranian revolutionary threat by defeating rather than containing it has ever since shaped Saudi policy towards the Islamic republic and towards Shiites. To be sure, Iran repeatedly took the bait with the creation of Hezbollah, political protests during the haj in Mecca, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, to name just a few of the incidents.

Saudi Arabia’s response to Iran’s revolutionary appeal was to make an ultra-conservative worldview that emphasized denunciation of Muslim others like the Shiites, Ahmadis and Sufis as well as a supremacist worldview and arch-conservative family values an influential player in Muslim communities across the globe. The Saudi effort produced the single largest dedicated public diplomacy campaign in history.

Estimates of Saudi spending on the funding of Muslim cultural, religious and educational institutions across the globe range from $75 to $100 billion. This figure does not include the cost of forging close ties to non-Wahhabi Muslim religious and political leaders, militaries and intelligence agencies in various Muslim nations in a bid to ensure that they bought into the geopolitical elements of Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism, first and foremost among which anti-Shiism. It also does not include expenditure on armed groups in Syria, Iraq, Bosnia or Pakistan where Saudi Arabia has funded militant, violent and rabidly anti-Shiite and anti-Ahmadi groups responsible for the deaths of thousands It also does not take into account the financial cost of Saudi-backing of the US-led anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s with its devastating consequences for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On one level, the Saudi campaign has been phenomenally successful. Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism in whatever form ranging from Wahhabism to various strands of Salafism to Deobandism has been embedded in Muslim communities across the world and is an influential political player in the Middle East and North Africa as well as countries as far flung as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mali and minority communities in Western Europe.

Let me illustrate this with an anecdote. The man who was until recently deputy head of Indonesian intelligence and deputy head of Nahdlatul Ulema, one of the world’s largest Islamic movements that professes to be anti-Wahhabi, is a fluent Arabic speaker. He spent 12 years in the Middle East representing the Indonesian intelligence service, eight of those in Saudi Arabia. This man professes in the same breath his dislike of the Wahhabis and at the same time warns that Shiites, who constitute 1.2 percent of the Indonesian population and that includes the estimated 2 million Sunni converts over the last 40 years, are one of the foremost domestic threats to Indonesian national security. This man is not instinctively anti-Shiite, but sees Shiites as an Iranian fifth wheel. The impact of Saudi funding is such that even Nahdlatul Ulema is forced to adopt ultra-conservative language and concepts when it comes to perceptions of the threat posed by Iran and Shiites.

Yet, 40 years since the Saudi soft power grab moved into full gear, its success has become as much a liability as it is an asset with the kingdom moving into the firing line against the backdrop of demands that it live up to its responsibility for creating potential breeding grounds for radicalism and devastating whole countries as with the Saudi military intervention in Yemen. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Al Sauds were not always in full control of the use of monies invested in the campaign. As a result, they have let a genie out of the bottle that now leads an independent life, has in part turned on the Saudis themselves, and that can’t be put back into the bottle.

The Saudi-Iranian battle is further accentuated by uncertainty over US policy. That is certainly true with the rise of Trump who from an Iranian perspective has made comments that spark concern in Tehran as well as remarks that could hearten the Iranians. Saudi uncertainty predates the rise of Trump. US officials for much of their country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia have insisted that the two countries do not share common values, that their relationship is based on common interests.

Underlying the now cooler relations between Washington and Riyadh is the fact that those interests are diverging. The divergence became evident with the eruption of popular revolts in 2011 and particularly US criticism of the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain to squash a rebellion as well as hesitant American support for the toppling of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It is also obvious in the nuclear agreement with Iran that is returning the Islamic republic to the international fold despite deep-felt Saudi objections.

The result of all of this has been with the rise of the Salmans, King Salman and his powerful son, deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, a far more assertive foreign and military policy. Make however no mistake, Saudi Arabia’s new assertiveness is not a declaration of independence from the United States. On the contrary, Mohammed Bin Salman has made that clear in various interviews. It was designed, certainly in the era of Obama, to force the United States to reengage in the Middle East in the belief that it will constitute a return to the status ante quo: US support for the kingdom as the best guarantor for regional stability. The Salmans were operating on the basis of Marx’s Verelendungstheorie: things have to get worse to get better. It is a strategy that may or may not work with Trump.

The Saudi strategy with its pervasive impact on the Middle East and the Muslim world at large long made perfect sense. Saudi regional leadership amounted to exploitation of a window of opportunity rather than reliance on the assets and power needed to sustain it. Saudi Arabia’s interest is and was to extend its window of opportunity for as long as possible. That window of opportunity exists as long as the obvious regional powers – Iran, Turkey and Egypt – are in various degrees of disrepair. Punitive international sanctions and international isolation long took care of Iran.

Ironically, Trump could extend that window if he adopts a hard line towards Iran. That is for the Saudis nonetheless a double-edged sword. Saudi policy makers have come to see restrictions on Iranian nuclear policy even if they are for a period of 15 years at most as an asset. The problem for the Saudis is that Trump at times has also suggested a harder US approach towards the kingdom itself.

A concern for the Saudis that is more fundamental than uncertainty over US policy in the era of Trump is that Iran despite not being an Arab nation and maintaining a sense of Persian superiority has the assets Saud Arabia lacks to secure its position on a level playing field as a regional power rather than a second fiddle state. Those assets no matter how degraded include a large population base, an industrial base, resources, a battle-hardened military, a deep-rooted culture, a history of empire and a geography that makes it a crossroads. Mecca and money will not be able to compete, and certainly not with religious ultra-conservatism playing a key influential role.

Saudi Arabia was shell shocked on September 11, 2001, when it became evident that most of the perpetrators were Saudi nationals. Saudi society was put under the kind of scrutiny the kingdom had never experienced before. The same is happening again today with the rise of jihadism, the war in Yemen and the kingdom’s role in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.

Changing international attitudes towards Saudi sectarianism and its proxy wars against Iran are evident in a quiet conclusion in Western intelligence and policy circles that the crisis in Syria is in part a product of the international community’s indulgence of Saudi propagation of ultra-conservatism. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director John Brennan unsuccessfully tried in 2011 as peaceful anti-regime protests in Syria descended into violence to persuade Saudi Arabia at a meeting in Washington of Middle Eastern intelligence chiefs to stop supporting militant Sunni Muslim Islamist fighters in Syria. ‎An advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recounted that the Saudis ignored Brennan’s request. They “went back home and increased their efforts with the extremists and asked us for more technical support. And we say OK, and so it turns out that we end up reinforcing the extremists,” the advisor said.

In sum, if inclusion rather than exclusion is the fundamental answer to the Middle East and North Africa’s multiple conflicts, countering Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism is one major key to breaking the vicious cycle. That is obviously easier said than done and only part of any successful effort. Islamic ultra-conservatism is often no longer dependent on Saudi funding and has made such deep inroads into societies as well as governments as for example in Pakistan that it would likely take a generation to turn around. Saudi Arabia’s soft power campaign has also sprouted radical groups that see the Saudis no longer as an inspiration but as corrupt deviants to a fundamentally common interpretation of the faith. As a result, Saudi Arabia is both part of the problem and part of the solution. All of this leaves me where I began my remarks: Where does one start in assessing what can be improved in the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia is not the only place, but it is certainly one that together with Iran has its fingers in the region’s key pies.

Thank you.

This was presented at the Geopolitical Situations And Values In The Mediterranean And Middle East Conference in Seville, Spain November 20 and December 1

“In Washington Lord Halifax
Once whispered to Lord Keynes:
It’s true they have the money bags
But we have all the brains.

Anonymous verse, noted in Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy in current perspective (1980), xiii.

Never accuse the former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) of being shy.  In recent days, Nigel Farage has been reiterating to followers and press outlets that his party was instrumental in electing Donald Trump as US president.  Very cocksure is old Farage, and it was confidence that did get a boost from a personal endorsement from Donald Trump that he be appointed Britain’s ambassador to the United States.

“The result of [the EU] referendum has certainly been pretty seismic in terms of British politics.  But I think I would argue it may just have had a bit of an effect on the other side of the Atlantic.”[1]  This, according to Farage, reversed the usual tendency of New York catching the cold, with London sneezing in response. This time, it was London making New York noses run.

This particular observation is amusing on one level, reminiscent of stages in the US-British relationship when the shaded empire, diminishing before the growth of Washington, longed to be recognised as important.  Those in power always hate retiring.

In recent times, students of that relationship have seen the intimacy of the moment forged in the blood and desperation of the Second World War, when a visiting President Franklin D. Roosevelt chanced upon Prime Minister Winston Churchill emerging from the bath soon after the attack on Pearl Harbour. “The Prime Minister of Great Britain,” came the response from Churchill, “has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States.”

What has mattered over the years is the desire, on the part of anxious British policy makers, to convince their US counterparts about the wisdom of their ways. Empire, being their rehearsed and practised domain, was always going to be something to offer in terms of experience.

The current brain box of Britannia, despite failing in Iraq and Afghanistan, is still considered full, happy to offer wise words in a tumultuous, crisis ridden world.  That particular cerebral element proved lacking in 1956, when Anglo-French ambitions over the Suez Canal were thwarted by rank US disapproval. And it refused to come to the rescue of the US intervention in Indochina.  Such is the nature of these relationships, being at times brutal and indifferent.

The long held strategy of Britain’s policy wonks was laid out, to some degree, in September 1917, with the US freshly engaged in the killing fields of Europe.  Lord Robert Cecil’s memorandum expressed the hope that policy makers in Washington would, in time, see the ways of British policy.  There was “undoubtedly a difference between the British and Continental view in international matters”; if the United States were to accept “our point of view in these matters, it will mean the dominance of that point of view in all international affairs.”

What developed was the conscious creation of a myth, not so much from the US side of the bargain as a “deliberate British creation,” to use David Reynolds’ terms words, one “invented as a tool of diplomacy” (International Affairs, 1985-6).

Farage has been the latest flicker in this trend of common thought, another fawning builder of the transatlantic relationship.  Both Farage and Trump insisted on rubbishing an Establishment deaf and even dumb to populism – for Farage, exiting the European Union, for Trump, the smug, bruising those conceited dynastic powers of the Bush and Clinton families. Both electoral aggressors won their victories against the tide of conformism and the polls.

Farage made his excitement for Trump known by venturing across the pond to the United States. He turned up to Trump rallies. He spoke about Britain’s “independence day”.  This has become something of a pastime, an attempt to internationalise his local efforts.  Claiming in big-headed fashion to have secured Trump the White House, he now wishes to achieve similar feats for France’s National Front leader Marine Len Pen.

What threw Farage deeper into the news was the suggestion by Trump that he would, in fact, make a good ambassador to the United States. On Twitter, which has become the first organ of finger itchy communication, Trump expressed the view that, “Many people would like to see [@Nigel_Farage] represent Great Britain as their Ambassador to the United States.  He would do a great job!”[2]

Despite this aside, Twitter has, as yet, to constitute a formal means of appointing ambassadors between the UK and the US.  “There is no vacancy,” came the response form a Downing Street spokesman, a point reiterated by Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson.  “We already have an excellent ambassador to the US.”[3]

Even establishment papers looked with some favour on the Farage-Trump play on ambassadorship. Tim Stanley of The Telegraph suggested that the terrain had so dramatically changed, it was perfectly in order. “We have to ask ourselves what we want in this brave new world of conservative populism. The bromance between Farage and Trump offers opportunities.”[4]

For all of Farage’s confidence, Britain has over the years become even less of an aircraft carrier for the United States.  While the Anglophone tunes continue being played to an empty concert hall, with the Brexiteers keen, on some level, to come even closer to the United States, there is no such state of affairs.  Britain will continue to do Washington’s bidding – for peanuts.  The US, in turn, will do what every hegemon does: dictate terms, and make concessions when required.

Notes:
[1] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-ukip-takes-credit-donald-trump-us-president-a7443771.html

[2] https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/800887087780294656

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/22/nigel-farage-uk-ambassador-us-donald-trump

[4] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/27/nigel-farage-should-britains-ambassador-donald-trump/

Geopolitics, the study of how spatial dimension impacts on and affects states’ politics, may offer an important contribution to analyzing strategies suited to developing rail infrastructures bewteen Italy and the Balkans.

The Balkan idea sets and fixes the concepts and definitions between real and ideological, so as to generate a counterposition of geographical and geopolitical concepts.

While in some cases the term “Balkans” does refer to a mountainous system, in others the definition tends to stretch to indicate the peninsula, or an area of chronic instability, a Europe powder keg or Continent underbelly, to the point of being used to decline a value judgement (consider the expression “Balkanization”, a paradigm used in other geographical contexts characterized by political instability.)

The peculiarity of this space, which was for centuries a vehicle for great migrations, wars, traffic and cultural exchange, is provided by its physical form, which made it a fault, or point of contact, between different areas (Western and Eastern), religious and cultural models (Christianity and Islam, Catholicism and orthodoxy), as well as between two opposing economic models. The Balkans, observing a map, further present a triple “personality” in short distances: Mediterranean and maritime along the coast, Central-European in the Southern plains, Balkan in the continental mass.

The ethnic mosaic, another concept linked to the Balkans, seems, then, to represent a sole aspect linked to a wider context, characterized by being complex and fragmentary.

The counterpositions and tensions distinguishing this area, crossing and subject to external yearning, differently renewed each year till today, appeal to long-term factors in European history, but mainly to insular, peripheral peculiarities and peculiarities of the closed spaces characterizing them. These conditions actually made it hard to create and develop a proto-national awareness based on territorial consciousness deriving from urban, bourgeois culture. In contrast, the varied stratification of urban cultures have given rise to various identifying paths, on which Balkan nationalisms, mainly characterized by elements such as ethnocentrism and xenophobia, were built.

Affirmation of new nations was actually based predominantly on the glue of purification from elements foreign to the natural Group. Such nationalist drives, on which foreign powers ambiguously weave cultural and geopolitical influence so as to erode definitively the authority of the Ottoman Empire and the institutional base it set up, will turn the Balkans into an area for European powers’ rivalries to clash (interposed). In the same way one may remember how the unification of the Balkans was only possible with intervention by the Sultan’s foreign power.

One may indeed state the history of these territories, proceeding in the same direction as geography, characterized by complexity and diversity, reinforced certain peculiar traits such as diffidence towards the State, reinforced cultural identities and weak territorial attachment, mainly linked to the field of the small natural region.

Such phenomena reappeared with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of great multinational entities (the dissolving of the USSR and Yugoslavia), which led to new races to fill empty spaces, hence giving rise to Yugoslav secession wars, which were – not by chance – situated on the ridge of a great geopolitical transition.

Europe – in some way an agent for intervention in the US area to follow its own strategic interests – failed to take concrete action, and this not only hindered the search for a solution, but also furthered the existing conflicts, until one may call the area a “geopolitical hotbed”.

All this went on while the Community in Europe was trying to find a common market and negotiate the Maastricht Treaty to create an Economic_Monetary Union. So this crisis created a threat for the European constituting order, and also represented a failed chance for Europe to show it exists and can act as a great power.

It is clear that if the policy of a dynamic era like this one can exploit the evolved communication system so as to spread or compromise spaces and adopt names, concepts and strategic doctrines that do not correspond to previous geography, it still cannot change geography itself, or what man accumulated on the land for millennia, from an urban, economic, infrastructure, ethnic and political point of view.

Indeed, each strategic representation cannot ignore the powerful bonds created by geography and history. In our age’s geo-history, the “Balkan hinge”, whose borders often divided historians, refers to an idea of a firmly delineated area rather than a great geographical region (is the natural border the Balkan chain or the Danube? Do Rumania or Slovenia belong? Turkey and Greece?) and occupies a European area represented by countries that entered the EU or are have been nominated to.

For simplification, this area’s central core may be represented by the triangle of Belgrade-Thessaloníki-Sophia. Under the strictly geopolitical profile, one may state even today the Balkans do not constitute a unified system, but they are very fragmented in both North-South and East-West directions. With the exception of Slovenia, and partly Croatia – for historical reasons tightly linked to Central Europe – the region may be subdivided into Western, Southern and Eastern Balkans. The first area is geopolitically characterized by the contrast between Serbia and Croatia to spread its influence to Bosnia and Herzegovina; the second by the Albanian issue and influence from Greece; the third has special features and is formed of States bathed by the Black Sea.

Europe has, then, the duty to integrate this area by a development and regional interconnection strategy that focuses on a solid infrastructural transport network, a tool that is fundamentally important in that it is suited to facilitate and raise economic interexchange and the cultural “contaminations” necessary to yield that European spirit of belonging, useful to create consolidated continental awareness, embryo for true, structured political union.

Trans-Balkan circulation (consider the Danube axis, or Via Egnatia, the Ljubljana-Belgrade axis, and Istanbul therefrom) historically represented an element able to unify the region’s various populations, in contrast to country and state atomizing, favoring creation of an integrated whole, unifying the Balkans and linking them to the world. The circulation networks, then, represent a fundamental element, especially in this era of multi-pole geopolitical transition.

It is actually true that planning any infrastructural system can hardly ignore the global geopolitical and geoeconomic picture, even more so in the current context, where continental infrastructures constitute an essential moment for economic rebirth, able to affect both technology modernization processes and foreign policy stability.

In this regard it is important to refer to the fact that it is no accident the economic power developed recently by the Chinese colossus is supported by a series of strategic infrastructural projects useful for accompanying, protecting and raising the Country’s expansion capacity. This certainly involves the great “New Silk Way” project for land and sea, devised by Peking with the main aim of moving China close to the rest of the Euro-Asian continental mass and the Mediterranean, and also developing the inland zone, lagging behind the coastal strip.

But not only China, also other players like Russia, India, Iran and countries from Africa, ASEAN and Latin America are moving to create new communication paths.

So in the face of the activism, experienced globally, it is good for the European front to also approach a development and regional interconnection strategy via a solid infrastructural transport network to involve all Europe and, most of all, the Balkan area. This could arise by simulating innovative initiatives to promote public – private partnership (obviously, no integration form may be painless, and to be held legitimate it must be based on consensus and acceptance by local governments).

This means the development of corridors becomes essential. For Italy in particular, corridors V and VII carry high strategic importance. Corridor V is especially important for Po Valley – Veneto outlets to the North-East. Primarily for the Trieste – Budapest route, which is central to the interests of Austria and Germany, which obviously have the understandable wish to keep intact all the Street and rail traffic using their networks, not least with regard to traffic from Southern France, the Iberian peninsula and Southern Switzerland. These flows would actually be interrupted by Corridor V, should it present better conditions than the current ones.

It must also be added that improved transborder links with the Balkan area could also encourage concrete, real stabilization and integration thereof with Europe’s Western part, freed from the (currently latent) danger of terrorism and crime. Continuing current instability would actually consolidate the proliferation of organized crime and terrorism, making the Balkan fault even more fragmented and unstable and creating an irreparable break with the sparkling Asian area which is living a period of unstoppable growth and expansion.

We must then focus on fully developing the concept of “network” to focus on creating full vertical and horizontal integration of the Europe system. This links could encourage mitigating this fragmentation which, as the opening foresaw, distinguished the history of this region, which could instead reproduce land for opportunity instead of conflict, representing at the same time an element to support Greater European integration.

*Filippo Romeo, Director of the “Infrastructure and Territorial Development” Programme, IsAG Rome.

Trump dismisses TPP, but could pursue another big opportunity – the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty.

By Stephen S. Roach*

The demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is the final nail in the coffin of global trade liberalization. The handwriting was on the wall with failure of the Doha Round, which floundered immediately after its initiation in 2001. But now that US President-elect Donald Trump has signaled his intent to have the United States withdraw from TPP – signed, but not ratified, after eight years of tortuous negotiations among 12 nations – there can be little doubt of the seismic cracks in the postwar global order.

The kneejerk reaction is to presume that China will quickly fill the void. After all, it is the driver of an alternative 16-nation trade agreement – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP. While the RCEP framework stops well short of TPP’s tariff reductions and high standards, it still has the potential to play a catalytic role in fostering greater pan-regional economic integration in the world’s fastest growing region. That would certainly seem to enhance China’s power base.

Moreover, with the next round of negotiations slated for early December in Indonesia, full ratification of RCEP, in conjunction with Chinese-led institution building – notably, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank – would underscore China’s global leadership push. So, too, would China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road, a 60-country cross-border investment initiative, together with the International Monetary Fund’s recent inclusion of the renminbi in its Special Drawing Rights construct. And there is the “Philippines pivot” – the recent move by President Rodrigo Duterte to shift his nation’s primary strategic allegiance from the United States to China. On the surface, these considerations paint a picture of China is stepping into a global role just as the United States steps back.

If it were only that simple. The baton of global leadership rarely passes in such a seamless fashion. Notwithstanding Donald Trump’s “America first” attitude, the United States is hardly walking away from its global responsibilities. Yes, America has learned a painful lesson in the past eight years – that it has become exceedingly difficult to maintain its position as global hegemon in the aftermath of the great financial crisis and recession of 2007-09. An anemic post-crisis economic rebound that has consistently been running at half the pace of earlier recoveries played a big role in fueling the populist backlash giving rise to Trump’s victory. Similar outcomes are, of course, evident in the UK’s Brexit, with rumblings of more to come in continental Europe – especially Italy and France. With economic problems simmering at home, the appetite for global power understandably wanes.

Yet that same lesson should not be lost on China. While the Chinese economy has been on an extraordinary path of growth and development for more than 35 years, it has reached a critical juncture – the need to shift focus from a manufacturing-led producer model to more of a services-based consumer society. This has given rise to increasingly daunting transitional risks, notably the perils of debt-intensive growth, loan quality problems in the Chinese banking system, renewed property bubbles in first-tier cities and “zombie” state-owned enterprises. Even senior Chinese officials are concerned that a failure to address these risks could well lead to a protracted period of weak economic growth that would pose the ultimate challenge to the aspirational global leadership objectives espoused by President Xi Jinping in his vision of the China Dream.

From the US perspective, TPP was always more than a trade deal. By excluding China and, in the words of President Barack Obama, endorsing an agreement that would ensure “China would not write the rules” of global trade, TPP was the strategic lever in America’s so-called Asian pivot – a thinly veiled China containment strategy. Nevertheless, its demise does not mean Chinese leadership, either in Asia or on the broader global stage, is simply there for the asking.

There is a long and tough history to the rise and fall of great powers. Geostrategic overreach, as underscored by Yale historian Paul Kennedy, is doomed to failure if it lacks support from a strong economy. While the United States is grappling with that dilemma today, it does so from a position of strength as a prosperous developed economy. China, by contrast, lacks that strength. It is relatively poor as measured in per capita income terms and faces the dreaded “middle-income trap” – historically, the ultimate stumbling block for most developing economies on the road to high-income prosperity.

As such, ratification of a China-centric RCEP does little to alter the balance of global power in a post-TPP world. China’s outward facing strategic objectives – from trade liberalization and multilateral institution building to the Belt and Road initiative and its more muscular approach in the South China Sea – obviously represent a new phase in its nascent role as a regional hegemon. But it would be premature to conclude that this is a major step on the road to global leadership. That can only happen over time if China stays focused on the reforms urgently required to address the imbalances that have been building in its domestic economy. Global leadership starts with strength at home.

Meanwhile the incoming Trump administration is about to confront a major dilemma in framing its China policy. Its campaign bluster – high tariffs and charges of currency manipulation – is a non-starter, both on merits as well as potential repercussions. The functional equivalent of a tax hike on prices of Chinese imports would only stoke the populist backlash that swept Trump into power. Moreover, as America’s third largest and most rapidly growing export market, to say nothing of being the owner of more than $1.3 trillion in US Treasuries, and as much as $500 billion other dollar-denominated assets, China is hardly lacking in potentially powerful retaliatory ammunition of its own.

But Trump, the dealmaker, actually has the opportunity to draw on his self-professed greatest strength and strike an extraordinary deal – breaking the torturous gridlock on negotiations of a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT. What more could a pro-business president hope for than to open up rapidly expanding domestic Chinese markets to US multinationals? Since 2008, when BIT discussions were formally initiated, there have been 25 rounds of painstakingly slow negotiations. Significantly, there is now broad agreement between both countries on the principles of cross-border investment – especially in terms of transparency, technology transfer, ownership caps and nondescriminaton of “national treatment.”

The hang-up is on the so-called negative list – sensitive sectors including telecommunications, defense, technology, domestic airlines and courier services, and certain financial services that one party or the other wants to exclude from foreign ownership. So far, there have been three revisions to joint negative list proposals, and the differences appear to be narrowing. But if Trump attacks China with aggressive protectionist measures, negotiations will break down and BIT will end up just like TPP. By reversing course and converting the so-called China threat into a meaningful opportunity by concluding negotiations on market access, Trump has the chance for a quick win in his pro-growth agenda. For a growth-starved US economy, there could be no better way of tapping into what promises to be the world’s greatest market expansion in the years ahead.

Most of us have learned never to say never when it comes to predicting the ebb and flow of Trump world. Rather than bemoan America’s loss of global leadership in a post-TPP world, maybe it’s time to rethink the opportunity of a very different approach. The fate of a fair and equitable globalization may well hang in the balance.

*Stephen S. Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is the author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China (2014).

After Hillary Clinton lost the election, she, her staff, and her supporters were sent reeling. Many have yet to recuperate.

In times past, such distraught persons would be attended to by priests, ministers, and rabbis, but today they have been replaced by grief counselors and puppies. Coloring books and playdough were given to soothe the anguish of law students at the University of Michigan, and therapists of every shade of grey were summoned to talk to the afflicted.

Others rioted. They baited the police, beat up Trump supporters, destroyed property, and tied up traffic. Some were pros—veterans of Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter. Others were brats: affluent young men and women so bored with life that they spend most of their waking hours microanalyzing perceived microaggressions against them. For relief, they take to the streets, providing it is not raining or too chilly.

We are now in the third stage of this post-election trauma: the weeping and the violence have given way to hysteria. It is being led by left-wing activists, left-wing politicians, and left-wing media outlets. They are laboring to convince Americans that we are witnessing an unprecedented increase in bigotry, all traceable to Donald Trump.

Since the election, no organization has done more to promote the myth that bigoted offenses are spiking than the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). That its data are weak is incontestable, but that hasn’t stopped the mainstream media from treating its claims as gospel.

On November 28, the SPLC released a report, “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools.” It is being touted by the media as proof positive that Trump has triggered an avalanche of bigotry. But a more sober judgment reveals that the report is so methodologically flawed that it would not receive a passing grade in any second-tier graduate school.

The SPLC says that over 2,500 educators described “incidents of bigotry and harassment that can be directly traced to election results.” The survey, however, is scientifically invalid. To be specific, it was not a random sample of educators; rather, it was a self-selected, and therefore spurious, online survey. Worse, only those educators who subscribe to the SPLC newsletter, “Teaching Tolerance,” knew of it.

“The Trump Effect” is short on hard data and long on anecdote. It lists one uncontested observation after another, most of which undercut its own thesis about the gravity of current conditions. For example, a high school teacher in New Jersey writes, “The day after the election I had a group of Hispanic girls in my homeroom targeted by a boy who told them Trump was going to deport their families.”

If this is proof of how out-of-control matters are—one boy voicing his ignorance—the reporting teacher has nothing to worry about. In Chicago, black kids live in fear of being killed every day, and bigotry has nothing to do with it.

The SPLC is also sounding the alarms over an alleged increase in hate crimes. It says that in the first 10 days after the election, there were 867 “hate-related incidents” across the nation. Not surprisingly, it blames Trump. In actual fact, that number represents offenses submitted by SPLC supporters, all of which lack independent verification. Yet these “findings” are being passed off by sympathetic journalists as if they were dispositive. The SPLC even admits that “many” of the incidents reported “remain anecdotal.”

It is not just journalists who are following the lead of the SPLC, many in government are as well. For example, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman recently held a press conference with civil rights leaders imploring the public to “stand up to hate.” What made his effort such a failure was his decision to enlist the support of Al Sharpton’s National Action Network, an organization known more for promoting hate than combating it.

So where are they getting their evidence, besides the SPLC? Hotlines help. They have recently been set up in New York and Massachusetts, as well as in some cities on the west coast. Who’s calling the authorities? In most cases, it is precisely those demographic groups that have been instructed by educators, over and over again, that they constitute an exploited minority, victimized by white, Christian, heterosexual males.

What exactly are they reporting? Intimidation.

The FBI hate crime statistics for 2015 lists intimidation as the number-one reported offense—it counts for over 40 percent of all such crimes. Yet nowhere does the FBI offer a precise definition of what constitutes “intimidation”; they rely on reporting precincts for the numbers. A standard legal definition says, “Intimidation means to make fearful or to put into fear.”

Given the elasticity of what constitutes intimidation, it is not surprising that hate crimes are reportedly increasing at a time when cultural and political divisions are worsening. What is most striking about this subject, however, is the dishonesty that marks the conversation: the same persons who say that obscenity laws are suspect because they rely on subjective judgments are quick to elevate intimidation to a mantle of objectivity. But if obscenity is in the eye of the beholder, and therefore meaningless, what makes judgments about intimidation meaningful?

The left is very good at playing these games, and no one is better at it than the SPLC. It has perfected the politicization of hate crimes.

By Rahul Manchanda, Esq.*

These television shows glorify complete and total abuses of American civil and constitutional rights by “jack booted thugs,” who always seem to be very attractive but tortured souls who are trying to do good, but in reality they are no different than any common criminal seeking to arbitrarily deprive you of your life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness.

One does not have to be a rocket science to deduce that it feels that 90% of the television shows being broadcast on the American Mainstream Media television/movie/cable networks consist of an avalanche of gritty crime dramas, and in the last decade or so, have become exceedingly technical in nature, lionizing police officers, detectives, special victims unit officers, prosecutors and others, charged with investigating, indicting, arresting, and incarcerating Americans from all walks of life.

But there is an agenda at work here – as part of the National Security State/Military Industrial Complex of the United States which first began to lay its tracks after World War 2, after the US began to accept en masse, hordes of card-carrying NAZIs from Germany and other sympathetic nations, and immediately set to work conditioning and “cattle-herding” Americans from all walks of life into accepting the reality that they were now living in a technocratic police state, constantly under surveillance, and one step away from the “hoosgow” at any given moment, at any time, so they better “stay in line.”

On a daily basis, Americans are inundated, on nearly all of the major channels on their television sets, thanks to re-runs, spinoffs, syndicated licenses, and other mechanisms, disturbing and threatening shows like “Law and Order,” and its many spinoffs therein such as “Special Victims Unit” and “Criminal Intent,” “CSI,” “NCIS,” “The Blacklist,” “True Detective,” “Gotham,” “Criminal Minds,” and scores of others ever since the broadcast of the show “Dragnet” appearing from 1951-1959.

A truly astounding list of “American Police Crime Dramas” can be found here.

This is obviously being done by the Deep State Plutocrat Elite to condition and acclimatize Americans to the perceived reality that they want them to not only accept, for ease of their control, but also to “enjoy their captivity,” with highly entertaining, edge of your seat plot structures, and highly attractive actors with sympathetic character traits, so that in some sort of sick “Stockholm Syndrome” methodology, we begin to fall in love with our captors/oppressors.

This mechanism is highly successful in large part because Americans as a rule remain willfully ignorant and blind to this brainwashing by the American Mainstream media.

The message is clear – Americans are more akin to a “rat in a cage,” susceptible at any time, to stop and frisks, unlawful surveillance, pre-texted criminal arrests and harassment, hanging on by a thread, organized gang-stalking masquerading as “community oriented policing,” and to able to be marginalized and cut out of society at the drop of a hat, if any one within the National Security State/Military Industrial Complex is so inclined.

These television shows glorify complete and total abuses of American civil and constitutional rights by “jack booted thugs,” who always seem to be very attractive but tortured souls who are trying to do good, but in reality they are no different than any common criminal seeking to arbitrarily deprive you of your life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness.

And your anxiety while watching the television shows is expected to give rise to reluctant but willing acceptance, rather than outrage at the blatant propaganda and enslavement being thrust in your face.

The message in these American Crime Dramas is essentially this – “you have no rights, and any rights that you currently enjoy are dispensed at the pleasure and discretion of the Deep State Oligarchical Elite, and can be removed from you within a moment’s notice, at any time that they want.”

Lavrenty Beria, former chief of secret police in Jozef Stalin’s Soviet Police State used to openly brag – “Show me the man, and I will show you the crime.”

Markus Wolf, originator and chief of East Germany’s Stasi Police State, also subscribed to this ideology but took it one step further when he developed the “Zersetzung” methodology of policing, incorporating organized gang-stalking and the recruitment of the targeted individual’s family, friends, colleagues, fellow employees, neighbors, and any others similarly situated, to jointly drive their intended target to madness, suicide, or incarceration.

Few, if any, Americans remember the pre-World War 2 days when freedom was rampant, and people actually believed, lived, fought, and died for their own independence, inalienable human rights, constitutional guarantees, and civil liberties.

The beacons of light and warning as to the changing and metastasizing transformation of America into the technocratic Police State of today are few and far between, and some are getting older and more suppressed by the American National Security/Police State, such as legendary statesman former Texas Congressman Ron Paul and his contemporary, the heroic John Whitehead of the Rutherford Institute.

As the younger generation in America gets older and enters adulthood, their conditioning has been complete – they are no longer even able to break out of their mind controlled way of thinking and even entertain the notion that they are somehow living in a “prison planet” devoid of any stable and God-given rights whatsoever.

Therefore it is incumbent upon all Americans to see and view their oppressors in the naked and bright sunlight, and truly acknowledge the condition that they are in, and recognize that the major media and the 24/7 crime drama show television garbage that they purvey, is truly part and parcel of their enslavement and disenfranchisement in order to become better controlled and ruled by their Deep State Plutocrat Masters.

*Rahul D. Manchanda, Esq, Ranked amongst Top Attorneys in the United States by Newsweek Magazine in 2012 and 2013.

An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind, but what do you do when mutilated bodies of Indian soldiers come back from Pakistan?

Recently in an interview to a private news channel Pakistani Journalist Mehr Tarar was quoted saying that she feels sorry for soldiers dying and that the Pakistani establishment is not working to plot attacks against India. Ms Tarar seems to be far away from ground realities.

Foreign policy in Pakistan has two important tenets namely its relations with the United States (for what it can extract) and its historical conflict with India (which remains its bete-noire). Both these play an important role in what decisions are taken in its domestic sphere.

In the present instance, with the confusion prevalent following Trump’s victory in the US Presidential elections, it may not be entirely clear to policy makers in Pakistan what to expect in the months to come. However, with Trump announcing General Flynn as the National Security Advisor in the transition team, it is evident that he intends to follow his rhetoric about Muslims (during campaigning) even after he takes oath. That may well be a cause of worry to the Pakistani establishment, both military and civilian, as they may not be able to continue sucking the American funds that they have been so used to in the past. It may also be wise to portray normalcy to the world, with the semblance of civilian control over the military establishment. To that end, a smooth transition of the Chief of Army will serve their interests in this projection to the US government.

After the Uri attacks by Pakistan backed terrorists and retaliatory surgical strikes by India on Pakistani terror camps, tensions escalated between India and Pakistan; so much so that a well known Indian producer was stopped from releasing his movie for casting an actor from Pakistan. Nationalistic fervor (read tempers) stands at an all time high, with irresponsible media on both sides gleefully cashing in on the state of affairs as they are. In this game of proxy wars and actual wars is it possible to settle matters amicably?

Earlier this year, following the killing of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen operative Burhan Wani in the Kashmir valley the media was barred from covering the massive protests in the valley against the Indian Army. Though this was done ostensibly to avoid further escalation of violence, yet amidst all the brouhaha, tensions continued to escalate. The war of words on prime time television kept getting louder and none of the parties was willing to confess. The prisoners’ dilemma was evident.

The cancellation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit and the boycott of Pakistan by the members of SAARC was a gigantic move, a statement in itself of the growing clamor for intolerance of any act of terror anywhere in the world. Pakistan stood exposed and the generals had nothing much to offer to the erudite discourses on national television about the cancellation of the SAARC summit.

Some journalists from Pakistan termed it as a propaganda war set in motion by India, which was nothing less than a national joke. Prime Minister Sharif and the Army Chief, General Sharif both have no political or diplomatic face left to show especially after they have been exposed.

Unidentified people have set fire to dozens of schools in Kashmir. The violence has not stopped. “This is very unfortunate and the responsibility is on the separatists, including Mr Geelani and other people are encouraging such elements to burn the schools. Ultimately, the future of the children of Kashmir is in the dark,” said Deputy Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Nirmal Singh.

The K question is a serious bone of contention between India and Pakistan and the Valley is still burning. In the end the sum total of the game between India and Pakistan will be zero with maximum casualties at both ends. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti seems to have maintained a tough stand on acts of violence but nowhere in the near future does the issue appear to be heading towards a resolution. Boycott and isolation of Pakistan is the need of the hour but in a liberal world order isolation may not be possible. Former Chief Minister and National Conference chief Omar Abdullah opined that the attacks on schools was an “abhorrent ploy to destroy the future of the children” and blamed both the state government and separatists, calling the attackers “enemies of our children and the enemies of enlightenment.”

From purely a strategic point of view India continues to draw the attention of international community towards state sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. Theoretical understanding of the new world order through the lenses of functionalism and neo-functionalism needs to be redefined. The Indian Army has taken charge of the situation but several actions by the forces have received severe criticism by the mainstream media.

The valley is burning and so is India. Dialogue may not be the way out. All this violence calls for serious mediation by the international community. With the US increasing its economic and military ties with India as a counterweight to China in South Asia, this may well be sooner than later. Gandhism is no longer relevant today. Non Violence can be understood by those who understand violence.

Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections has been met with shock and surprise from most of the rest of the world, with some of America’s key allies particularly unnerved. In his campaign speeches and during the presidential debates, Trump singled out partners like the NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, and the Gulf monarchies for freeloading off America’s protection. As Trump enters the White House, though, his outlook could change very quickly.

In fact, the unlikely US President-elect may yet find equally unlikely (though cautious) supporters in some of the very Gulf Arab countries he disparaged. Despite the Republican’s criticism, those governments view Trump’s hardline outlook as largely aligned with many of their own concerns, particularly regarding Iran. In that context, Trump’s promise to “tear up” the Iran nuclear deal brokered by President Obama in 2015 could yet be a game-changer for the emirs.

In the deal, technically known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to place limits on its plutonium enrichment capacities by reducing its uranium stockpile, converting enrichment facilities into research centers for peaceful means, and placing all of its nuclear facilities under international supervision by the IAEA. During the presidential campaign, Trump referred to the JCPOA as “the stupidest deal of all time” and warned that it would “give Iran absolutely nuclear weapons.” The most controversial aspect of the deal is the suspension of most sanctions against Iran, but even those that have been lifted can come back into place if Tehran violates the terms of the agreement.

As hardline critics in the US correctly point out, lifting sanctions will enable the Islamic Republic to expand the financial support it provides to Shia militant groups, not just those fighting ISIS in Iraq but also those propping up the Assad regime in Syria and taking over Yemen. Opponents state that many of the limitations the deal imposes come with a sunset clause of 15 years, after which Iran will be able to enrich uranium and develop a state-of-the-art, internationally legitimized ability to do so.

Instead of letting Iran bide its time, these critics have called for new and more severe sanctions that would delay Iran’s development of a nuclear breakout capacity if not prevent it completely. Reverting back to a sanctions regime, however, is more complicated than critics let on. If Trump makes good on his promise to pull out of the JCPOA and is compelled by a Republican Congress to impose harsher sanctions, they will also be doing a tremendous favor to the Iranian hardliners that have opposed the accord from the start.

Conservative factions in the Iranian state have long argued against improving relations with the West, criticizing President Hassan Rouhani for giving up too much for too little in return. Such a move would also provide Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei an excuse to re-launch the nuclear program with a vengeance, confirming his questioning of the trustworthiness of American promises. In other words, Iran could call off the deal, build up its nuclear capacity, and blame Washington for the whole thing.

While Iran’s most strident anti-Americans would welcome the deal’s collapse, it would also be a relief to the Gulf states. Many of the Sunni Arab countries in the Middle East have long been lamenting President Obama’s willingness to turn to Tehran even as it threatens their security and makes power plays in Syria and elsewhere. In the wake of the election, voices calling for Trump to reverse Obama’s Middle East policy and recommit to tried and tested relationships are becoming louder. The threat of a nuclear Iran offers the best incentive for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to re-affirm themselves as reliable partners, not just for the US but for the West as a whole.

For the Gulf states in particular, Trump’s surprise ascendancy is a chance to demonstrate why Washington, London, and Brussels can still count on them in a time of turbulence. Since ISIS declared war on Saudi Arabia and threatened Bahrain and Kuwait for supporting the fight against it in Syria, the West and the Gulf are the lynchpins of the fight against the millenarian jihadists and the struggle for stability in the region.

Economically speaking, the souring of the Washington-Tehran rapprochement would put an end to British and European business ventures there, serving as a reminder that Iran remains too unreliable to be entrusted with Western capital. Both Saudi Arabia and its neighbors already have an eye on convincing Britons and Europeans to see them, and not Iran, as a destination for trade and investment.

That approach is already paying off: Barclays intends to use Dubai as a gateway to massive trade and finance opportunities in the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plans encourage Western and Asian partners to invest in its private sector and reduce the economy’s reliance on crude oil exports. Britain’s then-Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond welcomed the initiative, citing the British capital market as a means to finance Riyadh’s goals and British expertise as a resource to be leveraged in developing Saudi’s chronically underexploited industries. As Brexit proceeds, Westminster will have greater freedom to reach its own accords with the Emiratis and the Saudis.

Despite the Iran nuclear deal casting a shadow on Riyadh’s decades-old security partnerships, Saudi economic planners continue to see their traditional partners as natural fits to help the Kingdom reinvent itself. Even Donald Trump, despite the rhetoric, apparently sees Saudi as a good place to invest his company’s money: during the campaign, he registered eight companies linked to the hotel industry there.

Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia and its neighbors see the prospective scrapping of the JCPOA as a return to the natural order of things. Donald Trump, once he has assumed the presidency, should take close notice of this: the same “freeloaders” he lambasted a month ago could quickly become indispensable allies again.

*David Meijer is a senior security analyst based in Amsterdam specialized in trans-national contraband.

Cypriot-style pottery may have been locally produced as well as imported and traded in Turkey during the Iron Age, according to a study published November 30, 2016 in the open-access journal PLOS ONE by Steven Karacic from Florida State University, USA, and James Osborne of the University of Chicago, USA.

White Painted and Bichrome Wares are Cypriot-style ceramics produced during the Iron Age that may provide clues about trade in the Eastern Mediterranean at that time. Although these ceramics are often assumed to be imports from Cyprus, excavations in southern Turkey have suggested that some pottery was produced locally, challenging previous assumptions about trade in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The authors of the present study analyzed White Painted and Bichrome Wares recovered from three sites in the Hatay region of Turkey: Tell Tayinat, Çatal Höyük, and Tell Judaidah, using techniques which bombarded the pottery with x-rays and neutrons, providing insight into the chemical elements they contained. Imported and local versions of this pottery had different elemental compositions, which helped the authors determine where this pottery was produced.

When compared with existing datasets, the researchers found that Çatal Höyük and Tell Judaidah may only have had access to pottery imported from Cyprus whereas Tell Tayinat may have made Cypriot-style pottery locally as well as importing it.

The authors suggest that feasting practices amongst the affluent in Tell Tayinat may have driven demand for Cypriot-style pottery, resulting in either local potters producing this pottery or Cypriot potters settling in the vicinity. Usually, pottery styles are expected to become increasingly rare the further away they are found from their origin of production, so these findings suggest a complex pattern of exchange in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Iron Age.

“We were surprised to find that locally produced Cypriot-style pottery was consumed at Tell Tayinat but not the other sites included in our study,” said Karacic. “These results indicate complex social and economic interactions between the Amuq and Cyprus that we are only just beginning to understand for the Iron Age.”

Workers have been evacuated from a Louisiana Dow Chemical Plant after a “burp” of chlorine gas is suspected to have leaked out of the plant. Authorities are telling residents to avoid the LA-1 highway as the winds push the cloud west.

Residents have noticed a “strong odor in the area around the plant” according to WBRZ. No injuries have been reported.

North and southbound traffic has been blocked on the LA-1 except for emergency vehicles. Officials told WAFB that HAZMAT has not been requested at this time.

Here’s the fireball rising from the DOW plant near Plaqumine. Evacuations underway, emergency crews responding to chlorine leak. @WBRZ pic.twitter.com/jd27PdGqRu

— Brett Buffington (@BrettBuffington) December 2, 2016

Iberville Parish Sheriff Brett Stassi said that he received reports of a chlorine leak. He also explained that the black clouds coming from the plant were not chlorine but the plant’s turbine failure resulted in hydrocarbon burning plant.
He has no plans for an immediate evacuation but recommended that residents remain indoors with their windows closed.

The fire ball that was released from the plant was actually a flare that occurs normally during shutdowns, WAFB reported.

The DOW Chemical Plant is one of the largest in the Plaquemine Parish area and one of the biggest petrochemical facilities in the state. The plant employs 3,000 people who produce 50 products, including chlorine and polyurethane, according to the Dow’s web-site.

The plant is claiming to have had no injuries and evacuated all non-essential employees, WAFB reported.

Omar Abdulrahman, arguably Asia’s biggest star, was crowned AFC Player-of-the-Year in a glittering ceremony in his home country of United Arab Emirates on Thursday.

The left-sided midfielder and winger is the second Emirati to win the trophy in consecutive years and his award was greeted with a huge cheer in the Emirates Palace Hotel in Abu Dhabi.

The victory was even sweeter as he was nominated last year but lost out to compatriot, Ahmed Khalil.

But he said the trophy would not make up for his Emirati league side Al Ain losing the Asian Champions League final last month to South Korea’s Jeonbuk Hyundai Motors.

“My main ambition was to win the Champions League trophy,” he said.

“The trophy is not only for me but it’s for all my colleagues at Al Ain and the national team.”

Abdulrahman, who once had a two week trial for English side Manchester City, also admitted he would like to play in Europe.

“Every player dreams of playing in Europe,” he said. “If I get a good offer, I wouldn’t mind with a good and big club.”

The award caps a stellar 2016 for the 25-year-old.

Even though he was on the losing side in the Champions League final, he was named the tournament’s best player.

Capped more than 50 times, he also carries the international hopes of the UAE, which has a real chance of qualifying for the 2018 World Cup finals.

Leicester City’s Shinji Okazaki was crowned international player of the year, the award given to those who play in a league outside the AFC.

The Japanese star edged out South Korea’s Son-Heung-min, a fellow English Premier League star, who plays for Spurs.

Women’s player of the year was Caitlin Ford, a former AFC young player of the year. She is the first woman to win both awards.

Ford, who represented the Australian women’s team, the Matildas, at the Rio Olympics, said she was honored to win — but was surprised.

“I wasn’t really expecting this to be honest,” she said.

“My winning this trophy reflects on an amazing year for us Matildas and I have taken this for all of them.”

Australia reached the quarterfinals stage, going out to hosts Brazil on penalties.

Choi Kang-hee of the Jeonbuk Hyundai Motors was awarded top male coach of the year.

The women’s award was won by Chan Yuen-ting of Hong Kong.

The 28-year-old manager of Eastern Sports Club is the first woman to lead a men’s team in a country’s top division to a league championship.

Meanwhile, AFC President Shaikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al-Khalifa confirmed the association’s postponed Extraordinary Congress will go ahead in Bahrain next May, where it will finally elect members for the FIFA council.

The original meeting was postponed in September in protest by AFC members when FIFA disqualified Qatar’s Saoud Al-Mohannadi from standing for election.

Last month, Mohannadi was banned by FIFA for one year for refusing to help in an investigation.

However, his name may appear again on the ballot as Sheikh Salman said all Asian football associations will be free to put forward their own candidate for the vote. “The AFC will not compromise its principles,” he said in a statement.