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Eating Legumes Linked To Lower Risk Of Diabetes

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Legumes are a food group rich in B vitamins, contain different beneficial minerals (calcium, potassium and magnesium) and sizeable amounts of fibre and are regarded as a low-glycemic index food, which means that blood glucose levels increase only slowly after consumption.

Due to these unique nutritional qualities, eating legumes regularly can help improve human health. In fact, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) declared 2016 as the international year of legumes to raise people’s awareness of their nutritional benefits.

Although legumes have long been though to offer protection against type 2 diabetes (which is a significant health problem worldwide affecting more than 400 million adults in 2015), to date there has been little research to confirm this association.

To increase the general level of knowledge in this area, researchers from the URV’s Human Nutrition Unit in collaboration with other research groups in the PREDIMED study evaluated the association between the consumption of the different sub-types of non-soy legumes and the risk of type 2 diabetes among individuals at high cardiovascular risk. They also evaluated the effect of replacing other protein- and carbohydrate-rich foods with legumes on the development of the disease.

Researchers analysed 3349 participants at high risk of cardiovascular disease but without type 2 diabetes at the beginning of the PREDIMED study. After 4 years of follow-up, the results have revealed that compared to individuals with a lower consumption of total legumes — lentils, chickpeas, beans and peas- (12.73 grams/day, approximately equivalent to 1.5 servings per week of 60g of raw legumes), individuals with a higher consumption (28.75 grams/day, equivalent to 3,35 servings/week) had a 35% lower risk of developing type 2 diabetes.

Of the different subtypes of legume, lentils in particular were associated with a lower risk of type 2 diabetes. Those participants who had a higher consumption of lentils during the follow-up (nearly 1 serving/week) compare to those individuals with a lower consumption (less than half a serving per week), had a 33% lower risk of developing the disease. The researchers also found that the effect of replacing half a serving/day of foods rich in protein or carbohydrates, including eggs, bread, rice and baked potato, for half a serving/day of legumes was also associated with a lower risk of type 2 diabetes incidence.

The researchers highlight the importance of consuming legumes to prevent chronic diseases such as diabetes, but state that further research must be conducted in other populations to confirm these results.


Israel-Palestinian Peace: The ‘Regional Umbrella’ Approach – OpEd

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Suddenly the media is awash with reports, rumors and hints about a fresh approach to tackling the perennial Israel-Palestinian stand-off.  Cynics, contemplating the history of the Middle East over the past 70 years, might well conclude that every conceivable method of reconciling the conflicting aspirations of the two parties has already been tried and failed.  But changing circumstances can reconfigure political opportunities.  An initiative impossible in 2007 may have become perfectly viable by 2017.

A series of factors combine to provide the basis for the new approach.

First, it has become clear that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has painted itself into a political corner.  Vying with Hamas on the one hand, and extremists within its own Fatah party on the other, the PA leadership has spent decades glorifying the so-called “armed struggle”, making heroes of those who undertake terrorist attacks inside Israel, continuously promulgating anti-Israel and anti-Semitic propaganda in the media and in the schools, and reiterating the message that all of Mandate Palestine is Palestinian.

The end-result of its own narrative is that now no Palestinian leader dare enter face-to-face negotiations, let alone sign a peace agreement, with Israel. The political backlash that would follow, to say nothing of the personal fear of assassination, have made it impossible.  For any new peace initiative to become a viable possibility, the PA leadership would have to be provided with cover from other Arab states which extends from entering peace negotiations in the first place, to assurances that any subsequent armed opposition from hardline rejectionists would be crushed.

Secondly, the time for achieving widespread Arab support for a reconsideration of the Israel-Palestine situation has never been more propitious.  The Sunni Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia, is united in its opposition to Iran’s naked ambition to dominate the Middle East in both religion and politics. In that, as it is well aware, it is at one with Israel.  Arab interests coincide with Israel’s also in combatting extreme jihadists, including Islamic State, and Israel is collaborating with various states – some still do not formally recognise Israel – both militarily and in the fields of security, intelligence and logistics.

The seeds of a new approach to peace negotiations were laid as far back as September 2014.  Speaking to the UN General Assembly, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said: “A broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world may help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace.”  This is precisely what has come about in the past year or two.  The emergence of Donald Trump as US President seems to have boosted the prospects.

This regional approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace-making is what stood out in Trump’s statement at his joint press conference with Netanyahu on 15 February 2017. The authoritative Middle East journal, Al-Monitor, reports that prior to the Trump-Netanyahu meeting, the US administration held discussions with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan about a “regional umbrella” to possible Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

According to a senior Fatah security official, the PA decided to take Trump at his word about this regional approach and, says Al-Monitor, held “intense deliberations” with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As a result, together with Egypt, it will suggest to Washington the outline of a new regional approach.

This new outline will be based on three principles.

First, that the basis for future peace negotiations is the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002.

Second, that the US administration should shortly hold a summit in Washington with the Arab leadership, chaired by Trump, focused on preparing a regional peace conference with the participation of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, leading to Israel-Palestinian negotiations..

Third. that Palestinian statehood should be pursued through an attempt to reach a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation agreement backed by the Arab League.

According to the Fatah official, such a confederation agreement will be difficult to achieve given the historical suspicion between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, but “at this point, this is the best route to statehood. Historically and demographically we are tied to Jordan and to the Palestinian population west of the Jordan River. It will need the backing of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League.”

Missing entirely from this scenario is the vital matter of Israel’s security. From the Israeli perspective, a Palestinian state created on pre-Six Day War boundaries, however much modified by land swaps, simply will not do.  Almost certainly Hamas, which is intent on Israel’s destruction, would gain power sooner or later, either through elections, or by way of a violent coup as it did in Gaza, and the new state would become a Gaza-type launching pad for the indiscriminate bombardment of Israel. This in itself may not concern the PA leadership overmuch, but what does worry them very much indeed is the prospect of losing power to Hamas. Like it or not, they would need stronger defenses against “the enemy within” than their own resources could provide.
By failing to take into account both Israel’s security needs and those of a new sovereign Palestine, the Palestine-Jordan confederation is an inadequate concept.  A much more robust approach is required. One such might be an initiative, backed by the US, the Arab League and Israel, aimed at bringing two new legal entities into existence simultaneously – a sovereign state of Palestine and a three-state confederation of Jordan, Israel and Palestine.  The area designated “Palestine”, at the time the League of Nations mandated Great Britain to administer it back in 1923, would, in a sense, be legally reconstituted.

What is a confederation?  It is a form of government in which constituent states maintain their independence while amalgamating certain aspects of administration, such as security, commerce, or infrastructure.  In a confederation emphasis is laid on the independence of the constituent states, as opposed to a federation, in which the stress is on the supremacy of the central government.

A Jordan-Israel-Palestine confederation would be dedicated above all to defending itself and its constituent sovereign states, but also to cooperating in the fields of commerce, infrastructure and economic development, to say nothing of administering Jerusalem’s holy sites. Such a solution, based on an Arab-wide consensus, could absorb Palestinian extremist objections, making it abundantly clear that any subsequent armed opposition, from whatever source, would be disciplined from within, and crushed by the combined and formidable defense forces of the confederation.

A confederation of three sovereign states, dedicated to providing high-tech security but also future economic growth and prosperity for all its citizens – here’s where the answer to a peaceful and thriving Middle East might lie.

Russia Stepping Into Void Left By US In Asia And Africa – OpEd

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With the worsening relations with the United States and Western European countries, Russia is seen broadening its economic and trade ties with Asian and African countries.

Sergei Dankvert, the Head of Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control in Moscow, said Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, Uruguay, Chile, Vietnam, Egypt, Tunis, Serbia and Morocco were among countries that had increased deliveries of their products during the effective period of sanctions against Russia.

Over the past few years, Russian authorities have been looking for potential agricultural products exporters in Latin American, Asian and African regions.

As gathered over the past few months, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have shown their preparedness to cooperate and are still looking at the possibility to boost exports of agricultural products especially fruits and vegetables to Russian food market to help fill in the gap after President Vladimir Putin slapped sanctions that severely limit food imports from foreign countries.

South Africa has been a promising partner in Southern African region while Morocco is one of the leading trade partners of Russia in North Africa.

Morocco has already exported some of its agricultural items especially fruits and vegetables to the burgeoning market.

Philip Mundia Githiora, the Minister Counsellor at the Kenyan Embassy in Moscow, pointed out explicitly in an interview that Russia offered a large market for Kenyan agricultural products and that Kenya already exports some agricultural products including cut-flowers, tea and coffee to the Russian Federation.

Nyaniso Isaac Miti, Minister Counsellor in charge of Agricultural Affairs at the South Africa Embassy in Moscow, also stressed that South Africa’s agricultural export basket too is dominated by citrus fruit, grapes and apples, and Russia has stated its readiness to increase the purchase of these products.

The Russian Federation has offered customs preferential depending of the volumes the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) can meet.

The only challenge thus far is the exportation of meat and fish products from South Africa to Russia, the Minister Counsellor in charge of Agricultural Affairs explained.

Elena Nagornaya, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Kenny Group of Companies and Africa Trade Alliance (ATA) said exporters from Europe, America and Asia had long appreciated the Russian market.

“There are a number of Africa countries, especially those in northern, eastern and southern Africa that are present in Russia.

“Amid the embargo, the question of considering a wide-range of imported agricultural products from some African countries is becoming a reality. Now, it is a unique opportunity for raising the agricultural supplies to Russia from Africa,” she pointed out.

Mattis Discusses Security Concerns, Highlights US-UK Ties

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By Lisa Ferdinando

US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis discussed security concerns with his British counterpart in London on Friday, and praised the enduring relationship between the U.S. and the United Kingdom in defending freedom and shared values.

In his first visit to the U.K. as defense secretary, Mattis met with British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon at the British Defense Ministry.

In a joint press conference at a nearby historic mansion, Lancaster House, the leaders said the discussions included enhancing bilateral ties, addressing security challenges, countering extremism and strengthening NATO.

“On behalf of the American people, I thank the people of this country for being with us to confront our foes,” Mattis said. “If necessary, we will follow them to the ends of the Earth to stop their mayhem.”

Mattis later met with British Prime Minister Theresa May at her office at No. 10 Downing St. Those talks, according to May’s office, focused on the strong U.S.-U.K. defense cooperation and how the two nations can work together to tackle shared challenges.

U.S., U.K. ‘United by Values’

The U.S. and U.K. have stood together for generations to defend freedom and shared values, Mattis said. He pointed out that his visit here comes one week after an attack in London claimed the lives of an American and three British citizens.

“It’s good to be standing beside you, especially at this time and place, soon after a senseless murderer killed citizens of both of our countries,” Mattis said. “The United States and the United Kingdom stand together in good times and bad, united by values that took root here so long ago.”

Following the attacks of 9/11, the U.K. stood alongside the U.S., Mattis said, as he honored the British troops who have been killed or wounded in the defense of freedom and shared values since then.

“We see each other on an equal footing in our assessment to the security challenges and in crafting our partnership’s way ahead, because our two nations are bulwarks against the maniacs who think that by hurting us they can scare us,” Mattis said.

He highlighted the U.S.-U.K. cooperation in military-to-military activities, explaining how the two nations continue to this day to defend those values.

“We stand here together today to show that our people are worthy successors to those past generations that defended freedoms we enjoy today,” Mattis said.

U.S.-U.K. Relationship is ‘Source of Strength’

The relationship between the U.S. and U.K. is not a historic artifact, Mattis said, instead, it is a “source of strength today for our two nations committed to standing together in defense of our freedoms.”

Fallon said, “We have no closer friend than the United States. Our relationship endures because it is founded firmly on the values that we share in common.”

The U.S. and U.K. cooperate in a myriad of global efforts, including as fellow members of NATO, with troops who have served alongside each other around the world, and as members of the coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Mattis arrived in London yesterday. He traveled from New York, where he held closed consultations on defense issues at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and at the Council on Foreign Relations.

WikiLeaks Reveals ‘Marble’: Proof CIA Disguises Hacks As Russian, Chinese, Arabic

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WikiLeaks’ latest Vault 7 release contains a batch of documents, named ‘Marble’, which detail CIA hacking tactics and how they can misdirect forensic investigators from attributing viruses, trojans and hacking attacks to their agency by inserted code fragments in foreign languages. The tool was in use as recently as 2016. Per the WikiLeaks release:

“The source code shows that Marble has test examples not just in English but also in Chinese, Russian, Korean, Arabic and Farsi. This would permit a forensic attribution double game, for example by pretending that the spoken language of the malware creator was not American English, but Chinese, but then showing attempts to conceal the use of Chinese, drawing forensic investigators even more strongly to the wrong conclusion, — but there are other possibilities, such as hiding fake error messages.”

The latest release is said to potentially allow for ‘thousands’ of cyber attacks to be attributed to the CIA which were originally blamed on foreign governments.

WikiLeaks said Marble hides fragments of texts that would allow for the author of the malware to be identified. WikiLeaks stated the technique is the digital equivalent of a specialized CIA tool which disguises English language text on US produced weapons systems before they are provided to insurgents.

It’s “designed to allow for flexible and easy-to-use obfuscation” as “string obfuscation algorithms” often link malware to a specific developer, according to the whistleblowing site.

The source code released reveals Marble contains test examples in Chinese, Russian, Korean, Arabic and Farsi.

“This would permit a forensic attribution double game, for example by pretending that the spoken language of the malware creator was not American English, but Chinese, but then showing attempts to conceal the use of Chinese, drawing forensic investigators even more strongly to the wrong conclusion,” WikiLeaks explains, “But there are other possibilities, such as hiding fake error messages.”

The code also contains a ‘deobfuscator’ which allows the CIA text obfuscation to be reversed. “Combined with the revealed obfuscation techniques, a pattern or signature emerges which can assist forensic investigators attribute previous hacking attacks and viruses to the CIA.”

Previous Vault7 releases have referred to the CIA’s ability to mask its hacking fingerprints.

WikiLeaks claims the latest release will allow for thousands of viruses and hacking attacks to be attributed to the CIA.

Trump Says Flynn Should Seek Immunity; Russia Probe ‘Witch-Hunt’

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(RFE/RL) — U.S. President Donald Trump has backed an offer by his former national security adviser to testify about his contacts with Russia in exchange for immunity from criminal prosecution.

In a post on Twitter on March 31, Trump wrote, “Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media & Dems, of historic proportion!”

Earlier, Flynn’s lawyer, Robert Kelner, said that his client wanted protection against “unfair prosecution” in exchange for testifying before the intelligence committees of both houses of Congress.

“Flynn certainly has a story to tell, and he very much wants to tell it, should the circumstances permit,” Kelner said.

Kelner did not mention whether Flynn was offering to talk to the FBI as well as to the committees.

Kelner also called the Russia probes a “witch-hunt.”

Meanwhile, Senator Angus King (independent-Maine), of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said it was too early to talk about granting Flynn immunity.

“This is not a witch-hunt,” King said on CNN. “This is an effort to get to the truth of some very important questions.”

King said that “there is no doubt whatsoever” that the Russians sought to interfere in the election.’

Speaking in the northern Russia city of Arkhangelsk on March 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin vehemently denied the allegations, saying in response to a question about whether Russia carried out any such actions, “Read my lips: No.”

A spokesman for the Senate committee was quoted as saying the body had held a discussion on the immunity issue, while a spokesman for the House committee said they had not received any offer from Flynn.

According to AP, four other people associated with the Trump campaign have offered to speak to the committees in recent weeks. The Senate Intelligence Committee has invited 20 people to testify.

Flynn, a retired U.S. Army general, resigned under pressure from his post as national security adviser in February after it was revealed that he misled the administration, including Vice President Mike Pence, about the extent of his contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak.

The Congressional committees and the FBI are investigating alleged Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election campaign.

Documents also show that Flynn was paid more than $67,000 by Russian companies before the U.S. presidential election.

During an interview in September 2016 with the Meet The Press television program, Flynn was asked about the possibility that Trump’s Democratic rival, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or her associates might seek immunity in connection with an FBI investigation into her use of a private e-mail server.

“When you are given immunity, that means you have probably committed a crime,” Flynn said.

Scotland: Government Asks British PM May For 2nd Referendum

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The Scottish government on Friday, March 31 formally asked British Prime Minister Theresa May for a second referendum on independence, deepening a crisis sparked by the Brexit vote, AFP reports.

“I am… writing to begin early discussions between our governments to agree an Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 that would enable a referendum to be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament,” First Minister Nicola Sturgeon wrote in a letter to May.

Sturgeon, leader of the ruling Scottish National Party (SNP), said: “The people of Scotland must have the right to choose our own future — in short, to exercise our right of self determination.”

The Scottish Parliament voted by 69 votes to 59 on Tuesday for another referendum, but it cannot hold a legally-binding vote without London’s approval.

Scotland rejected independence by 55 percent in 2014, but voted by 62 percent to remain in the European Union in 2016 sparking another constitutional crisis as it was outvoted by England and Wales.

May has insisted “now is not the time” for another referendum, but she now faces a battle on two fronts as she seeks to negotiate a good deal from Brexit and tame nationalist sentiment in Scotland.

Opinion polls show support for independence is broadly unchanged from 2014, but May’s firm stance against discussing a vote now is widely regarded as a gamble as Scots could react unfavourably to London ignoring the will of the Edinburgh parliament.

Sturgeon has already indicated she will take unspecified “steps” for holding a referendum in case her request for one is ignored.

“There appears to be no rational reason for you to stand in the way of the will of the Scottish parliament and I hope you will not do so,” she wrote in the letter.

Sturgeon’s predecessor Alex Salmond frequently threatened to hold a non-binding “consultative referendum” in 2012, before London relented and approved the legally binding poll in 2014.

The Spanish region of Catalonia’s separatist government held a non-binding referendum in 2014, but the 80 percent vote for self-determination was called into question amid reports of a boycott by unionists.

Tories Cut Labour Lead In London To Three Points

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The Labour Party’s support in London has declined by nine points in a year, according to polling commissioned by the Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London (QMUL).

The poll, carried out by YouGov between 24 and 28 March, finds Labour at 37 per cent, just three points ahead of the Conservatives. A year ago the gap between the two parties was 16 points. Labour is now seven percentage points below its share in the 2015 general election.

Support for the Liberal Democrats has doubled since the last London poll in April 2016, and stands at 14 percent.

The Conservatives have gained four points in London, at 34 percent. Support for Ukip has fallen to nine percent, from 13 percent last year.

Most Londoners are happy with the performance of Mayor of London Sadiq Kahn, 58 per cent think he is doing a good job and he has a net favorability rating of +35. This is higher than the last time YouGov asked in July when it was +30.

The poll shows that Khan has broad cross-party appeal. He has support from the majority of Labour voters, and he also attracts support from a majority of Lib Dems. Even among Conservatives more think he is doing well than think he is doing badly.

Philip Cowley, Professor of Politics at QMUL and Director of the Mile End Institute, said, “When people are asked why they approve of Khan, the responses rarely include specific policies. Supportive responses instead focus on his lack of any errors to date, the fact that he isn’t Boris, the belief that it is too early to tell – along with a broader sense that he is saying and at least trying to do the right things for Londoners. Overall, Londoners like him.”

Asked about the Prime Minister Theresa May, 46 per cent said she’s doing well and she has a net favorability rating of +9.

Fewer than one in five voters think Jeremy Corbyn is doing a good job as leader of the Labour Party and 62 per cent think he’s doing badly. Among people who voted Labour in 2015 one in four think he’s doing a good job, while 60 percent think he’s doing badly.

Mr Corbyn has a net negative score among every political or demographic group in the capital, including age, gender, social class, remainer/leaver, inner/outer London, and party support. This includes those who voted Labour in 2015, among whom he has a rating of -35.

Former London Mayor Boris Johnson, scored -14 when Londoners are asked to rate him as a Foreign Secretary.

The findings are the first instalment in Polling London, a new research project from QMUL. The project is led by Professor Philip Cowley, Director of QMUL’s Mile End Institute.

Fieldwork

All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 1,042 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 24 and 28 March 2017. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all London adults (aged 18+). YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council and abide by their rules.


Middle East: Two States Good, One State Better? – OpEd

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By Abdulrazaq Magaji*

Negotiations did not produce the state of Israel. From 1917 when the Jews procured the dubious Balfour Declaration right up to independence three decades later, the Jews conducted themselves in a manner that could have made the murderers of today’s ISIS and Boko Haram look like saints. So, why do some people encourage Palestinians to embrace negotiations as the way to their freedom?

The world has once again been reminded that there was no honesty in the two-state hype as a way round the Middle East crisis. The reminder is yet another wake-up call for Palestinians, as if they needed it, that they have to fight harder than they have done so far if they truly desire an independent State of Palestine. Except, of course, if they wish to hinge their liberation on the Jews’ second bondage in Egypt (Deut 28:68) and confirmed by Jesus Christ (Mathew 21:43)!

It was the fear of ending up like the stateless Gypsies of Europe that forced the Jews to carry out the worst form of terror attack that eventually culminated in their homeland in 1948. In their campaign, the Jews made sure they cut down any object they imagined was an obstacle. Not even prominent United Nations-sanctioned peace envoys who were sent to the Middle East were spared! The Jews never believed any amount of negotiations would get them a homeland. So, why do we encourage Palestinians to see negotiations as the way out?

For two decades now, and as part of its strategies to stall the world, the Israeli establishment has created the impression that it was on the same page with the world on a two-state solution to the Middle East crisis. Then, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in that direction and all hell was let loose! Since then, the hawks in Tel Aviv have been running from pillar to post and calling on their unquestioning allies to stand up to the world and the United Nations.

As usual, unquestioning friends of Israel see nothing wrong with the Janus-faced stance of the Israeli establishment. In the opinion of stiff-necked Jews and their friends, any United Nations resolution in support of the two-state solution rewards enemies of Israel and serves as a tonic for Muslim terrorists to slaughter Israelis. This conforms with the untenable characterization of Israel, the world’s surviving major colonial power, as the oppressed and Israeli-occupied Palestine as the oppressor.

The Middle East crisis is even given a religious undertone as a way of sending the world on a wild goose chase.  As it is, gullible religionists are programmed to look in the wrong place, the Muslim world, in the search for the Antichrist. While the search goes on, history has become a major casualty and desperate effort is being made to consign the crux of the matter to the dustbin of history. No one tells the world that there would not have been a state of Israel as it is known today had ultra-right terrorists in World Jewry embraced negotiated settlement.

Negotiations did not produce the state of Israel. What the Jews did ahead of independence in May, 1948, contradicts their untenable characterization as persecuted lambs surrounded by turban-wearing Muslim murderers. The Jewish independence struggle was not a tea party and the seed of their independence struggle was watered with the blood of Jewish martyrs who killed and got killed. From 1917 when the Jews procured the dubious Balfour Declaration right up to independence three decades later, the Jews conducted themselves in a manner that could have made the murderers of today’s ISIS and Boko Haram look like saints.

In fact, every Hamas and other militant Palestinian group of today had their equivalent in the Israeli terrorist groups, Irgun and Zvai, among others. It was Jewish terrorism, and certainly not any negotiated settlement, that forced the hands of the British, who exercised a United Nations mandate over Palestine, to accede to the creation of the state of Israel. In their quest for nationhood, Christian and Muslim Palestinians will have to replicate what earned their Jewish cousins a homeland. They should know that no amount of hours spent around conference tables in Geneva or New York will give them a home.

In the midst of the criminal Israeli occupation, successive occupants of the White House and their carbon copies in European capitals, desirous of arming and sustaining a strong ally in the strategic Middle East, turn the blind eye and continue to delude themselves that the peace agreement is on course. It has been a dishonesty that encouraged extremist groups in the Arab world, some of them trained by the United States to ‘contain Soviet expansionism’ during the Cold War years, to grab the initiative.

Meanwhile, US president, Donald Trump, thinks he has the cure-all for the ills of America and her lapdog, Israel. Respect for the United States, he believes, is top on America’s problems and this will not come without the big stick. To ‘force the world to its senses’, Mr. Trump has announced a 10 per cent rise in US defence spending in 2018.

Mr. Trump’s coming is a soothing balm on the jaded nerves of the Israeli establishment. On the eve of its departure, Barrack Obama administration caused a one-act-too-late stir when it abstained from a crucial vote on two-state solution at the United Nations. The US abstention was the excuse the short-fused Mr. Trump needed to rave and rant at the United Nations.  There are encouraging signs that the Middle East will play a key role in deciding the success or failure of the Trump presidency.   The world must truly braze up!

The Trump era is a return to the gung-ho years of American imperialism that characterised the administration of many Republican presidents. Mr. Trump is going to dust and upgrade the infamous Monroe Doctrine. This time the doctrine will affect the entire world, not just South America which America considers its traditional sphere of influence. Under Trump, the diplomatically correct language to speak to the world is to whip friends and foes into line.

There are encouraging signs that the Middle East will be Mr. Trump’s main test.  Like his predecessors, Mr. Trump is armed with an agenda to hurt perceived enemies of Israel. As a first step, he has vowed to ensure the relocation of capital of Israel to Jerusalem. Interesting times are here!

At the end of the day, only Palestinians will decide whether they want an independent state of Palestine based on pre-1967 boundaries or forget their homeland and agree to be part of Mr. Trump’s idea of one-state of Israel.

Neither will come peacefully, anyway.

* Abdulrazaq Magaji writes from Abuja, Nigeria, and can be reached at magaji777@yahoo.com.

Inspire, Enlist, And Execute: Islamic State’s Strategy In Southeast Asia – Analysis

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Close to 800 persons from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines are among the foreign fighter network of the Islamic State (IS). The estimate is far larger than the number of Southeast Asians who had travelled to Afghanistan to be a part of the anti-Soviet Jihad. Some of these IS cadres are now in charge of the propaganda machinery that not only asks more people from the region to join the outfit, but exhorts  those who cannot, to carry out attacks at home. Year 2016 saw a number of IS inspires terror attacks in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. With the authorities still in the process of giving shape to their respective national approaches to deal with the resurgence of Islamist radicalism, the IS seems to be making some significant gains within the region using a supportive ecosystem.

Overview

In June 2016, the Islamic State (IS) launched a 20-minute video in which three men- a Filipino, an Indonesian and a Malaysian appeared together. Speaking in their native languages, they urged their countrymen to fight in Syria or the Philippines. Their subsequent message “If you cannot go to [Syria], join up and go to the Philippines”, however, represented a tweak in the outfit’s strategy which till then had focused on finding supporters and extricating them out of the region to either join its war efforts in Syria and Iraq or to simply be a citizen of the pure Islamic state carved out in the Levant region. The message was, thus, clear: ‘If you cannot get out of your country, stay put and act as a true IS agent’. Abu Abdul Rahman al-Filipini, one of the militants who featured in the video went on to pass the following instruction: “Kill the disbelievers where you find them and do not have mercy on them”. The IS had indeed sanctioned expanding its war theatre into Southeast Asia.

In 2016, in the months preceding and after the video was released, a number of attacks were carried out by the IS sympathisers in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The year, thereby, becomes a landmark year when the IS successfully executed all the three components of its overall strategy of expansion into the region: (i) Inspiring Muslims to sympathise with the IS; (ii) enlisting individuals or pre-existing radicalised groups for its future activities; and (iii) carrying out actual attacks. From here, the situation can only worsen, if the affected states do not attach seriousness to the challenge it deserves and evolve policies to strike at the heart of the IS growth.

Indonesia

On 14 January 2016, eight people were killed – including four militants – in a terror attack in front of the Sarinah department store in central Jakarta. It was the first ever attack in Indonesia and for the entire South-east Asian region for which the IS claimed responsibility. It was also the first major attack in Indonesian capital since the 2009 bomb attacks at Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels and the first in which armed gunmen shot at civilians. Seven months later, on 5 July, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle blew himself up after he was stopped by officers from entering the local police headquarters in Solo city in Central Java.

While the overall strategy of the terrorists has been to target the police, they also have carried out attacks on churches. Both represent the IS war on non-believers as well as the state’s instrumentalities.  An attack on a Protestant church in Samarinda in November 2016 killed a toddler, and an attack on a Catholic church north Sumatran city of Medan in August was allegedly inspired by the killing of a priest by IS militants in Rouen, France. In the Medan attack, 18-year old Ivan Armadi Hasugian, wielding a knife-and-axe and carrying home-made explosives, attacked an Indonesian priest during a service, causing minor injuries before being beaten and wrestled to the ground by ­parishioners.

On 21 December three suspects planning a suicide bombing on Christmas Day or New Year’s Eve were killed in an encounter with the police on Jakarta’s outskirts. Investigations revealed that the suspects were planning to stab police officers at a traffic post and then detonate a homemade bomb as crowds gathered. In December, one of the IS cells had plans to attack the Istana Merdeka, the presidential palace in Jakarta with a female suicide bomber, but the plot was foiled by the counter terrorism unit, Densus 88. In addition, couple of plots aimed at avenging violence against Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar were foiled. In November, for instance, Indonesian authorities detained a IS-linked militant for planning an attack on the Myanmar embassy there.

The number of alleged terrorists dealt with by Indonesian police in 2016 was more than double the previous year. Compared to only 82 terrorists in 2015, the year 2016 witnessed 170 terrorists being tackled by the police. Of the 170 cases, 40 militants were sentenced, six were returned to their families, 36 are facing trial, 55 are being investigated and 33 were killed. Similarly, 33 alleged terrorists killed by police in 2016 was also a steep increase from the seven killed in 2015. The 33 dead included the four terrorists in the Sarinah attack and Indonesia’s most wanted Islamist militant, Santoso, who was killed in a shootout in the jungles of Poso in Central Sulawesi in July. In December 2016, Indonesia’s police chief attributed the sharp rise to the influence of the IS and the defeats it is experiencing in the Middle East. Fraudulent transactions linked to terrorism had also doubled from 12 in 2015 to 25 cases in 2016.

Indonesian police claim that this sharp rise in terrorist attacks and plots are directed by Indonesians based with the IS. Authorities further believe that the IS has galvanised militancy in Indonesia again after a largely successful crackdown on terror networks there in recent years. Between 300 and 700 Indonesians are believed to have joined the group in Syria and Iraq over the past two years. In Hasakah province, Syria, they have combined with fighters from Malaysia to form their own unit, Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy, also known as Katibah Nusantara Daulah Islamiyah.

Bahrun Naim, a 34-year old software professional who fled to Syria in 2014 to join the IS is also believed to be a key mastermind of the attacks. According to the Indonesian anti-money-laundering agency PPATK Naim had used online payment services such as PayPal and bitcoins to transfer money to his comrades back home to fund terrorist activities. He used the smartphone messaging app Telegram, to send instructions. Similarly the role of jailed local cleric Aman Abdurrahman, who leads a group called Jamaah Anshar Khilafah (JAK) from prison has also been investigated. The man who carried out the suicide attack in Solo in July, Nur Rohman, is also believed to be a JAK member and to have links to Naim.

The police in response has undertaken Operation Tinombala in Central Sulawesi at capturing all members of the East Indonesia Mujahideen dead or alive. Fifteen alleged terrorists have been killed in Poso in 2016. Santoso, former leader of the EIM eluded capture for years and was seen as a symbol of resistance to the government until he was shot dead in July 2016. IS-inspired cells exist and are a continuing threat, influenced by leaders both at home and abroad.

Malaysia

An estimated 100 Malaysians are part of the IS’ foreign-fighter network in Iraq and Syria. While these people who have used a range of methods to escape the home country, were seen initially as posing no direct threat to Malaysia, such perception has changed rapidly in the past year. According to an estimate, between 2014 (formation year of the IS) and June 2016, the Malaysian police had foiled nine plots to carry out terror attacks in Malaysian soil. Between 2013 and January 2017, 268 terror suspects have also been arrested.

On 28 June, the IS carried out its first successful attack in Malaysia by exploding a grenade at Movida, a night club near national capital Kuala Lumpur. The attack injured eight people. 15 people were arrested in wake of the attack, including the two men who lobbed the bomb. Those arrested also included two policemen. One of the policemen was picked up for harbouring IS elements, while the other was arrested for involvement in robberies to collect funds for the outfit.

What Bahrun Naim is to Indonesia, Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi is to Malaysia. Hailing from Malacca, 26 year old Muhammad Wanndy travelled to Syria in January 2016 with his wife, also aged 26. Assessed to be based in Raqqa, Wanndy, operating under the assumed name of Abu Hamzah al-Fateh, claimed responsibility for the attack on his Facebook page. Muhammad Wanndy has used Telegram application effectively to direct attacks on prominent Malaysians, including Prime Minister Najib Razak and counter terrorism senior police officials. Another attempted attack on a Light Rapid Transit train in Setiawangsa is also attributed to his ‘terror by remote control’- technique. The fact that Wanndy has been able to recruit people online and direct attacks demonstrate a rapid growth of radicalism in Malaysia in support of the IS.

Two of the arrested for the night club attack were hiding in a hut in remote Kuala Krai in Kelantan in wait for new orders from Wanndy to attack a Johor entertainment outlet. An M67 grenade was recovered from them. Another man arrested in connection too had received orders from Wanndy and was to attack the police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, and government complexes in Putrajaya. Among the other chosen targets was a Hindu temple outside Kuala Lumpur. The suspects were planning to use grenades and firearms in the attacks.

Between 13 and 19 January 2017, four people, including three foreigners, were arrested in Sabah and Kuala Lumpur over their suspected involvement in a new IS cell based in the Philippines. The arrested included a 31-year-old Filipino man, two male Bangladeshi nationals aged 27 and 28, and a 27-year-old Malaysian woman. The unemployed woman had been recruited through social media into the outfit by the Filipino man on assurances of marriage. The Bangladeshi men were working in Malaysia as salespersons.

Sabah is emerging as a transit point for IS cadres to crisscross between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines)
Sabah is emerging as a transit point for IS cadres to crisscross between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines.

Malaysian police believe that the IS is attempting to use Kota Kinabalu and Sandakan in Sabah (see map) as a transit point for terrorists from Southeast Asia and South Asia, before they are smuggled into Mindanao in southern Philippines, a hotbed of Islamist insurgency. The cell was formed from an IS cell led by former University Malaya lecturer Dr Mahmud Ahmad, merging with the Isnilon Hapilon faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Mahmud Ahmad used his position as a lecturer to recruit cadres among his students has attempted to unify regional terror groups in Southeast Asia into a branch of the IS.

Continuing with the unravelling of the extent of IS penetration into the Malaysian society, between 27 and 29 January, another three persons were arrested. These included a security guard at Kuantan airport, with full access to aircrafts. Initial investigations found that he was not planning any terror attack, but had plans to go to Syria to join the outfit. Another person described to be of 38 years age had posted a plan to carry out an explosion in Kuala Lumpur in his Facebook page. The third person, an Indonesian with Malaysian residency, was attempting to flee to Syria to join the IS.

The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar has created another push factor for IS symapthisers to plan attacks in Myanmar. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has in the past raised concerns that tens of thousands of Rohingya who are seeking refuge in Malaysia may be exploited and radicalised by the IS. A suspected Indonesian IS follower, who worked as a factory worker in Malaysia since 2014, and was planning to head to Myanmar to carry out attacks was detained in Malaysia in December 2016. He was among seven people arrested for suspected links to IS. He was also involved in a plot to smuggle weapons to Indonesia’s Poso region, on Sulawesi island.

Philippines                        

In Philippines, the IS is riding on the efforts of the existing Islamist separatist movements and individuals like Mahmud Ahmad with an Afghan and al Qaeda past. The alliance is also strategic for it has infused a new lease of life to some of the existing groups who were once struggling for survival. The Basilan based faction of the ASG led by Isnilon Hapilon and the minor Maute group, led by three brothers Abdullah, Omar and Otto Maute, that has been behind years of unrest in the southern part of the country,  have declared allegiance to the IS in January 2016. Other groups include the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Ansar Khilafah, Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad, and factions within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. As a result, southern areas of Basilan, South Cotabato, Sulu, Sarangani, Lanao del Sur, and the northern province of Isabela have transformed into IS’ operational areas.

On 2 September 2016, the Maute Group carried out a bombing at a street market in Davao city, the hometown of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, killing 14 people and wounded dozens. Duterte was in town for a visit. In the wake of that bombing, Duterte put a nationwide “state of lawless violence” in place, leading to an increase in the presence of the military and police around the country. In November the Maute group went on to occupy parts of a municipality in Lanao del Sur province, took over an abandoned town hall and raised the IS flag in the town, necessitating a military operation. Although at least 11 members of the group were killed in the operation, it was a major operation by the group.

Mountains of Lanao del Sur has witnessed some of the recent attacks by the IS.

Hapilon, also known as Abu Abdullah, is on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s most wanted list for his role in the kidnapping of 17 Filipinos and three Americans in 2001 and carries a bounty of US$5 million. He is recognised by the Philippines military as the IS chief for country and consequently has become the target of some of the intense military operations in recent times. In January 2017, for instance, 15 IS militants were killed in air and artillery strikes in the mountains of Lanao del Sur. The military also claimed to have fatally injured Hapilon. According to the Philippine military sources, Hapilon had moved to Central Mindanao in a bid to unify extremist groups such as the Maute and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and to make central Mindanao the base of the group’s activities, overcoming the limitations of operating in smaller islands such as Basilan and Jolo.

CT Moves: Kinetic operations plus

National measures initiated by these three countries to stem the growth of IS-inspired radicalism include launching kinetic operations to eliminate the terrorists; strengthening the legal framework; and also, evolving a counter-narrative to the IS’ version of Islam. In Indonesia, where police have campaigned aggressively against jihadists, killing or imprisoning many leaders, attempts have been made to tighten the existing anti-terrorism laws: to more clearly define terrorism and make it illegal to join militant groups like IS, enable police to detain people who support terrorist groups, and to enable them to hold terror suspects for longer periods. The PPATK too has attempted to tighten its scrutiny of financial transactions from overseas in order to curb terror funding.

In Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte in January 2017 admitted that he could no longer contain ‘extremist contamination’ and appealed to the country’s Muslim separatist groups – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front – to deny sanctuary to militants with links to the IS. This declaration of vulnerability, however, was intended at masking his own preferred way of dealing with all form of ‘illegal’ activities. Duterte went on to warn that a war to checkmate the IS would be an eventuality which would put civilians in danger and there can be no respect for human rights while such an effort is unleashed. Duterte has floated the idea of suspending the writ of ‘habeas corpus’ in response to violence and lawlessness in the country.

Malaysia has added to the capacities of the force centric operations by setting up a new Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Center (RDC3) with assistance from the United States with the objective of winning the ongoing battle against the IS and convincing the world that Muslims have nothing to do with the group’s hateful ideology. Malaysia along with Singapore has also joined the U.S.-led ‘Global Coalition to Counter IS’. The RDC3 is similar to the one the US launched together with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in July 2015, and is designed to counter the IS social media strength and sophistication and present a more positive alternative to the vision the group has outlined. New legislations to counter the IS also include the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the National Security Council Act, a move that has been criticised by human rights groups.

The US assistance is seen as a major capacity building factor among the security agencies in Southeast Asia. A study published in 2015 by the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point noted that the United States had provided $441 million in security assistance to the Philippines, mostly for its military, and $262 million to Indonesia, mostly for its police.

However, several challenges remain that continue to create an enabling ecosystem for Jihadist radicalism to grow. Notwithstanding the fact that the IS growth has been dependent on the efforts of a tiny fringe for the moment, prisons, slums and youth bulge of Southeast Asia remain important part of an ecosystem that breeds radicalism. Even though most Southeast Asian Muslims reject terrorism, the IS seem to be succeeding in attracting a number of persons to its fold, without necessarily looking at creating a mass support base.

In Malaysia, the army has been a worrying source of recruits. The country’s defence minister told parliament in 2015 that at least 70 former members of the military volunteered for the IS. In Indonesia, where the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the al-Qaeda-inspired group responsible for previous attacks has largely splintered, active recruiting appears to have led to a soaring of the JI’s cadre strength to about 2,000. According to estimates, some 800 militants have been imprisoned and 100 have been killed in security force operations since the Bali bombings. But with the deradicalisation and reforms process failing, hundreds of them – some with significant battlefield experience – when released after their prison term in the coming years may form a core of the IS growth in future. About 40 percent of the 400 militants released as of December 2016 have returned to their radical network.

*Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director, Mantraya. This Special Report is published as part of Mantraya.org’s “Islamic State in Asia” project.

References:

Amanda Hodge and Nivell Rayda, ” Indonesia: ‘Terror attack’ at Catholic Church in Medan”, The Australian, 29 August 2016, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesia-terror-attack-at-catholic-church-in-medan/news-story/deba5460f36c55f73e153e28068af6dc

Caleb Weiss, “The Islamic State grows in the Philippines”, FDD’s Long War Journal, 24 June 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-state-officially-creates-province-in-the-philippines.php

Christopher Woody, “11 ISIS sympathizers have reportedly been killed in a siege in the southern Philippines”, Reuters, 28 November 2016, http://www.businessinsider.in/11-ISIS-sympathizers-have-reportedly-been-killed-in-a-siege-in-the-southern-Philippines/articleshow/55655641.cms

Jonathan Edward, “Abu Hamzah, the face of terror, is unmasked”, Malay Mail, 5 July 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/abu-hamzah-the-face-of-terror-is-unmasked

“Malaysia arrests 4 for alleged involvement in new Islamic State cell in Philippines”, Channel News Asia, 24 January 2017, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malaysia-arrests-4-for-alleged-involvement-in-new-islamic-state/3460588.html

“Malaysian militants plan to start ISIS faction in South-east Asia”, Straits Times, 15 November 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-militants-plan-to-start-isis-faction-in-south-east-asia

“Malacca man behind terror plots in Malaysia” The Straits Times, 15 August 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/world/malacca-man-behind-terror-plots-in-malaysia

Marc Lourdes, “Islamic State launches first successful attack in Malaysia”, CNN, 4 July 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/04/homepage2/islamic-state-attack-malaysia/

“Militant Bahrun Naim used PayPal, bitcoin to transfer funds for terror attacks in Indonesia”, Straits Times, 9 January 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/militant-bahrun-naim-used-paypal-bitcoin-to-transfer-funds-for-terror-attacks-in

Prashanth Parameswaran, “Malaysia Hails New Center to Counter Islamic State Messaging”, Diplomat, 27 July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/malaysia-hails-new-center-to-counter-islamic-state-messaging/

Rohan Gunaratna, “Philippines: an Emerging Islamic State Base in Southeast Asia?”, Benar News, 30 January 2017, http://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/asia-pacific-threat-update/is-gunaratna-01302017142823.html

Melting Sea Ice Could Lead To More Life In Sea

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When spring arrives in the Arctic, both snow and sea ice melt, forming melt ponds on the surface of the sea ice. Every year, as global warming increases, there are more and larger melt ponds.

Melt ponds provide more light and heat for the ice and the underlying water, but now it turns out that they may also have a more direct and potentially important influence on life in the Arctic waters.

Mats of algae and bacteria can evolve in the melt ponds, which can provide food for marine creatures. This is the conclusion of researchers in the periodical, Polar Biology.

Own little ecosystems

  • The melt ponds can form their own little ecosystem. When all the sea ice melts during the summer, algae and other organisms from melt ponds are released into the surrounding seawater. Some of this food is immediately ingested by creatures living high up in the water column. Other food sinks to the bottom and gets eaten by seabed dwellers, explains Heidi Louise Sørensen, who is the principal author of the scientific article, continuing:
  • Given that larger and larger areas of melt ponds are being formed in the Arctic, we can expect the release of more and more food for creatures in the polar sea.

Heidi Louise Sørensen studied the phenomenon in a number of melt ponds in North-Eastern Greenland as part of her PhD thesis at University of Southern Denmark (SDU).

Bo Thamdrup and Ronnie Glud of SDU, and Erik Jeppesen and Søren Rysgaard of Aarhus University also contributed to the work.

Food for seals and sea cucumbers

In the upper part of the water column it is mainly krill and copepods that benefit from the nutrient-rich algae and bacteria from melt ponds. These creatures are eaten by various larger animals, ranging from amphipods to fish, seals and whales. Deeper down, it is seabed dwellers such as sea cucumbers and brittle stars that benefit from the algae that sink down.

For some time now, researchers have been aware that simple biological organisms can evolve in melt ponds – they may even support very diverse communities. But so far it has been unclear why sometimes there are many organisms in the ponds, and on other occasions virtually none.

According to the new study, ‘nutrients’ is the keyword. When nutrients such as phosphorus and nitrogen find their way into a melt pond, entire communities of algae and micro-organisms can flourish.

From the Siberian tundra

Nutrients can find their way into a melt pond in a variety of ways, For example, they can be washed in with waves of sea water; they can be transported by dust storms from the mainland (for example, from the Siberian tundra); or they can be washed with earth from the coast out on the ice, when it rains.

Finally, migratory birds or other larger animals resting on the ice can leave behind sources of nutrient.

  • Climate change is accompanies by more storms and more precipitation, and we must expect that more nutrients will be released from the surroundings into the melt ponds. These conditions, plus the fact that the distribution of areas of melt ponds is increasing, can contribute to increased productivity in plant and animal life in the Arctic seas, says Professor Ronnie Glud of the Department of Biology at SDU.

Warmer and more windy

There are further factors that may potentially contribute to increased productivity in the Arctic seas:

  • When the sea ice disappears, light can penetrate down into the water.
  • water. When it gets warmer on the mainland, this creates more melt water, which can flow out into the sea, carrying nutrients in its wake.

Tyrannosaurs Show Their Sensitive Side

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A team of researchers, including UNM Honors College Professor Jason R. Moore, has found a new species of tyrannosaur dinosaur — the most popular of the prehistoric creatures.

After the fossils were pulled out of the muddy banks of a Montana river, the team was able to analyze the texture of the facial bones of the new species. The findings suggest that the face of tyrannosaurs was covered in a scaly protective layer with a high degree of tactile sensitivity, similar to crocodiles.

“Being a tyrannosaur, they had really small arms,” said Moore. “They wouldn’t be able to interact with their environment with their hands the way mammals do — find food, build nests, tend to eggs and young. In order to do these things, Daspletosaurus needed to use its feet or head. The discovery and analysis of the tyrannosaur shows that the dinosaur had a developed face sensitivity similar to the sensitivity in our finger tips, suggesting it could use its snout for all those complex ecological interactions, similar to the way crocodiles do today.”

An investigation by a team of scientists from Wisconsin, Australia, Louisiana, Montana and New Mexico has identified and named the new species of the tyrannosaur clan: Daspletosaurus horneri – “Horner’s Frightful Lizard.”

The species is named for the renowned dinosaur paleontologist, John “Jack” R. Horner, formerly curator at the Museum of the Rockies (MOR) in Bozeman, Montana. The tyrannosaur’s name honors his discoveries of numerous dinosaur fossils and his mentorship of so many students that launched them on to accomplished scientific careers. The name-bearing specimens are stored in the research collections of the MOR.

The fossil resources of Montana, where the new tyrannosaur was found, are central to studies of dinosaur evolution.

“Montana, similar to many Rocky Mountain states, has lots of rock exposed at the right time and right environment to contain dinosaurs,” said Moore. “The fossils are found preserved in ancient river channels and flood plains. If you know what you’re looking for, they are widespread.”

The research is led by Thomas Carr of Carthage College’s Department of Biology in Wisconsin, an expert on the evolution and growth of Tyrannosaurus rex and its closest relatives, collectively called tyrannosaurs.

The family tree

In addition to adding a new species to the tyrannosaur family tree, the team’s research provides new information about the mode of evolution and life appearance of tyrannosaurs, specifically the face.

This latest study, published in Nature Publishing Group’s Scientific Reports, found evidence for a rare, nonbranching type of evolution in tyrannosaurs and that tyrannosaurs had scaly, lipless faces and a highly touch-sensitive snout.

“Daspletosaurus horneri was the youngest, and last, of its lineage that lived after its closest relative, D. torosus, which is found in Alberta, Canada,” said Carr. “The geographic proximity of these species and their sequential occurrence suggests that they represent a single lineage where D. torosus has evolved into D. horneri.”

Moore elaborated, “One of the difficulties in demonstrating this style of evolution is establishing that the different species don’t overlap in time. The new radiometric dates we measured help support this temporal separation between D. torosus and D. horneri.”

The research confirms that the ages of the two species shows that the evolution of the dinosaur was slow–happening over a span of 2.3 million years.

The team’s work literally changes the face of tyrannosaurs, which they found was covered by a lipless ‘mask’ of large flat scales and extensive patches of armor-like skin. This conclusion results from comparison of tyrannosaur skulls with those of crocodylians, birds and mammals, and earlier work by other researchers who had matched bone texture with different types of skin covering.

Jayc Sedlmayr, professor at the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center New Orleans, explained, “Much of our research … was generated from lab based comparative anatomy, where you get arms deep in ‘blood and guts’ dissecting birds–living dinosaurs and crocodilians–their closest living relatives.”

The crocodile connection

“It turns out that tyrannosaurs are identical to crocodylians in that the bones of their snouts and jaws are rough, except for a narrow band of smooth bone along the tooth row,” explained Carr. “We did not find any evidence for lips in tyrannosaurs: the rough texture covered by scales extends nearly to the tooth row, providing no space for lips.”

“However, we did find evidence for other types of skin on the face, including areas of extremely coarse bone that supported armor-like skin on the snout and on the sides of the lower jaws. The armor-like skin would have protected tyrannosaurs from abrasions, perhaps sustained when hunting and feeding.”

The researchers found that, like in crocodylians, the snout and jaws of the tyrannosaurs are penetrated by numerous small nerve openings, allowing hundreds of branches of nerves to innervate the skin, producing a sensitivity similar to that of human fingertips.

This sensitivity is part of a bigger evolutionary story, explained Sedlmayr. “The trigeminal nerve has an extraordinary evolutionary history of developing into wildly different ‘sixth senses’ in different vertebrates, such as sensing magnetic fields for bird migration, electroreception for predation in the platypus bill or the whisker pits of dolphins, sensing infrared in pit vipers to identify prey, guiding movements in mammals through the use of whiskers, sensing vibrations through the water by alligators and turning the elephant trunk into a sensitive ‘hand’ similar to what has been done to the entire face of tyrannosaurs.”

State And Local ‘Sanctuary’ Policies Limiting Participation In Immigration Enforcement – Analysis

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By Sarah S. Herman*

The federal government is vested with the exclusive power to create rules governing which aliens may enter the United States and which aliens may be removed.1 However, the impact of alien migration—whether lawful or unlawful—is arguably felt most directly in the communities where aliens reside.

State and local responses to unlawfully present aliens within their jurisdictions have varied considerably, particularly as to the role that state and local police should play in enforcing federal immigration law. At one end of the spectrum, some states and localities have actively sought to deter unlawfully present aliens from settling within their jurisdictions, for example, by assisting federal immigration authorities in identifying and apprehending aliens for removal.

Sometimes, this has involved state and local participation in federally coordinated immigration enforcement programs.2 Some states and localities have attempted to play an even greater role in immigration enforcement, in many cases because of perceptions that federal efforts have been inadequate.3

Some have adopted measures that criminally sanction conduct believed to facilitate the presence of unlawfully present aliens and have also instructed police to actively work to detect such aliens as part of their regular duties.4 The adoption of such measures has waned considerably, though, after the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Arizona v. United States, in which the Court held that many of the provisions of one such enactment, Arizona’s S.B. 1070, were preempted by federal immigration law.5 Subsequent lower court decisions struck down many other state and local measures that imposed criminal or civil sanctions on immigration-related activity.6

At the other end of the spectrum, some states and localities have been less willing to assist the federal government with its immigration enforcement responsibilities. Often dubbed “sanctuary jurisdictions,” some states and localities have adopted measures that limit their participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, including, for example, prohibiting police officers from assisting with federal efforts to identify and apprehend unlawfully present aliens within the state or locality’s jurisdiction.7 That said, there may debate as to the both meaning and application of the term “sanctuary jurisdiction.”8

Additionally, state and local jurisdictions may have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including for reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal immigration enforcement policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the availability of state or local resources to assist federal immigration enforcement efforts.9

During President Donald Trump’s first month in office, he issued an executive order, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which, in part, seeks to encourage state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement and disincentivize state and local adoption of sanctuary policies.10
This report discusses legal issues related to state and local measures limiting law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities, as well as the federal government’s efforts to counter those measures.11 It begins by providing a general explanation of the term “sanctuary jurisdiction” for the purpose of this report. Next, it provides an overview of constitutional principles underlying the relationship between federal immigration laws and related state and local measures. It concludes with a discussion of various types of laws and policies adopted by states and localities to limit their participation with federal immigration enforcement efforts, which may give rise to a label of “sanctuary jurisdiction,” and federal efforts to counter those measures.

What Is a Sanctuary Jurisdiction?

State or local measures limiting police participation in immigration enforcement are not a recent phenomenon.12 Indeed, many of the recent “sanctuary”-type initiatives can be traced back to activities carried out by churches that provided refuge—or “sanctuary”—to unauthorized Central American aliens fleeing civil unrest in the 1980s.13 A number of states and municipalities issued declarations in support of these churches’ actions.14 Others went further and enacted more substantive measures intended to limit police involvement in federal immigration enforcement activities.15 These measures have included, among other things, restricting state and local police from arresting persons for immigration violations, limiting the sharing of immigration-related information with federal authorities, and barring police from questioning a person about his or her immigration status.16

Still, there is no official definition of a “sanctuary” jurisdiction in federal statute or regulation.17 Broadly speaking, sanctuary jurisdictions are commonly understood to be those that have laws or policies designed to substantially limit involvement in federal immigration enforcement activities,18 though there is not necessarily a consensus as to the meaning of this term.19 Some jurisdictions have self-identified as sanctuary cities.20

For other jurisdictions, there might be disagreement regarding the accuracy of such a designation, particularly if state or local law enforcement cooperates with federal immigration authorities in some areas but not others.21 Any reference by this report to a policy of a particular jurisdiction is intended only to provide an example of the type of measure occasionally referenced in discussions of “sanctuary” policies.22 These references should not be taken to indicate CRS is of the view that a particular jurisdiction is a “sanctuary” for unlawfully present aliens.

Legal Background

The heart of the debate surrounding the permissible scope of sanctuary jurisdictions centers on the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal efforts to enforce federal immigration law, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state action that undercuts federal objectives in a manner that is consistent with the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment.

The Supremacy Clause and Preemption

The federal government’s power to regulate immigration is both substantial and exclusive.23 This authority is derived from multiple sources, including Congress’s Article I powers to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization” and “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,”24 as well as the federal government’s “inherent power as a sovereign to conduct relations with foreign nations.”25 Rules governing the admission and removal of aliens, along with conditions for aliens’ continued presence within the United States, are primarily contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (INA).26 The INA further provides a comprehensive immigration enforcement regime that contains civil and criminal elements.27

The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Arizona v. United States—which invalidated several Arizona laws designed “to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States”28 as preempted by federal law— reinforced the federal government’s pervasive role in creating and enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.29 “The Government of the United States,” the Court said, “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”30

As Arizona highlights, the doctrine of preemption is relevant in assessing state policies related to immigration. The preemption doctrine derives from the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which states that the “Constitution, and the laws of the United States … shall be the supreme law of the land.”31 Therefore, Congress, through legislation, can preempt (i.e., invalidate) state law.32

Preemption can be express or implied. Express preemption occurs when Congress enacts a law that explicitly expresses the legislature’s intent to preempt state law.33 Preemption may be implied in two ways: (1) when Congress intends the federal government to govern exclusively, inferred from a federal interest that is “so dominant” and federal regulation that is “so pervasive” in a particular area (called “field preemption”);34 or (2) when state law conflicts with federal law so that it is impossible to comply with both sovereigns’ regulations, or when the state law prevents the “accomplishment and execution” of Congress’s objectives (called “conflict preemption”).35 Accordingly, any preemption analysis of the relationship between a federal statute and a state measure must be viewed through the lens of congressional intent.

The Supremacy Clause establishes that lawful assertions of federal authority may preempt state and local laws, even in areas that are traditionally reserved to the states via the Tenth Amendment.36 One notable power reserved to the states is the “police power” to promote and regulate public health and safety, the general welfare, and economic activity within a state’s jurisdiction.37 Using their police powers, states and municipalities have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities.38

Yet despite the federal government’s sweeping authority over immigration, the Supreme Court has cautioned that not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted” by the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration.39 Accordingly, in Arizona the Supreme Court reiterated that, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that the historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”40

For example, in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld an Arizona law—related to the states’ “broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State”41—that authorized the revocation of licenses held by state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens.42 Even though the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) expressly preempted “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions … upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens,” the Supreme Court concluded that Arizona’s law fit within IRCA’s savings clause for state licensing regimes and thus was not preempted.43

The Tenth Amendment and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

Although the federal government’s power to preempt state or local activity touching on immigration matters is extensive, this power is limited by the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principles, which bar Congress from “commandeering” state or local governments into the service of enforcing a federal regulatory program.44 Thus, the federal government cannot “issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”45

Several Supreme Court rulings inform the boundaries of the anti-commandeering doctrine. First, in New York v. United States, the Court reviewed a Tenth Amendment challenge to provisions of a federal law that created a series of incentives for states to dispose of radioactive waste.46 The Court concluded that one of the incentives had “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion,” thus violating the Tenth Amendment, by giving states a “choice” between two options concerning their maintenance of radioactive waste disposal, neither of which the Constitution authorized Congress, on its own, to impose on the states.47 Thus, the Court held that the government had run afoul of the principles of federalism in the Tenth Amendment by effectively requiring state legislatures to enact a particular kind of law.48 In so holding, the Court declared that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”49

Then, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed whether certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act50 violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.51 The relevant provisions required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks (and other related tasks) on prospective handgun purchasers.52 The Court rejected the government’s position that a law like the Brady provisions—which directed states to implement federal law—was distinguishable from the law at issue in New York—which directed states to create a policy—and thus was constitutionally permissible.53

Rather, the Court concluded that a federal mandate requiring state and local law enforcement to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers violated the Tenth Amendment.54 Accordingly, the Court announced that “Congress cannot circumvent” the Tenth Amendment prohibition against compelling states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory scheme “by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”55

But not every requirement imposed by the federal government upon sub-federal government entities and officials necessarily violates the anti-commandeering principles identified in Printz and New York. A number of federal statutes provide that certain information collected by state entities must be reported to federal agencies.56 And the Court in Printz expressly declined to consider whether these kinds of requirements were constitutionally impermissible, distinguishing reporting requirements from the case before it, which involved “the forced participation of the States … in the actual administration of a federal program.”57

Additionally, in Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),58 which barred states from disclosing or sharing a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent, subject to specific exceptions.59 The Court distinguished the DPPA from the federal laws struck down in New York and Printz because, in the Court’s view, the DPPA sought to regulate states “as owners of databases” and did not “require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens … [or] enact any laws or regulations … [or] require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”60 The Court declined to address the state’s argument that Congress may only regulate the states through generally applicable laws that apply to individuals as well as states, given that the DPPA was deemed to be such a generally applicable law.61

Accordingly, based on current jurisprudence, federal measures that impose direct requirements on state or municipal authorities appear most likely to withstand an anti-commandeering challenge if they (1) are not directed at a state’s regulation of the activities of private parties; and (2) apply to the activities of private parties as well as government actors.

Finally, Congress does not violate the Tenth Amendment when it uses its broad authority to enact legislation for the “general welfare” through its spending power,62 including by placing conditions on funds distributed to the states that require those accepting the funds to take certain actions that Congress otherwise could not directly compel the states to perform.63 However, Congress cannot impose a financial condition that is “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”64 For example, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) that purported to withhold Medicaid funding to states that did not expand their Medicaid programs.65 The Court found that the financial conditions placed on the states in the ACA (withholding all federal Medicaid funding, which, according to the Court, typically totals about 20% of a state’s entire budget) were akin to “a gun to the head” and thus unlawfully coercive.66

Select State and Local Limitations on Immigration Enforcement Activity

Several states and municipalities have adopted measures intended to limit their participation in federal immigration enforcement efforts. These limitations take several forms.67 For example, some states and localities have sought to restrict police cooperation with federal immigration authorities’ efforts to apprehend removable aliens, sometimes called “don’t enforce” policies.68

Other measures may restrict certain state officials from inquiring about a person’s immigration status, sometimes referred to as “don’t ask” policies.69 Still others restrict information sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities, sometimes described as “don’t tell” policies.70 The following sections discuss some state and local restrictions on law enforcement activity in the field of immigration enforcement along those lines, including the relationship between these restrictions and federal law.

Limiting Arrests for Federal Immigration Violations

As previously noted, violations of federal immigration law may be criminal or civil in nature, with alien removal understood to be a civil proceeding.71 Some immigration-related conduct potentially constitutes a removable offense and also may be subject to criminal sanction. For example, an alien who knowingly enters the United States without authorization is not only potentially subject to removal,72 but could also be charged with the criminal offense of unlawful entry.73 Other violations of the INA are exclusively criminal or civil in nature.

Notably, an alien’s unauthorized immigration status makes him or her removable, but absent additional factors (e.g., having reentered the United States after being formally removed),74 unlawful presence on its own is not a criminal offense.
Some jurisdictions have adopted measures that restrict or bar police officers from making arrests for violations of federal immigration law. In some jurisdictions restrictions prohibit police from detaining or arresting aliens for civil violations of federal immigration law, like unlawful presence.75 Other jurisdictions prohibit police from making arrests for some criminal violations of federal immigration law, like unlawful entry.76 Still others prohibit assisting federal immigration authorities with investigating or arresting persons for civil or criminal violations of U.S. immigration laws.77 And some other jurisdictions have prohibitions that are broader in scope, such as a general statement that immigration enforcement is the province of federal immigration authorities, rather than that of local law enforcement.78

State or local restrictions on police authority to arrest persons for federal immigration law violations do not appear to raise significant legal issues. Even though the INA expressly allows state and local law enforcement to engage in specified immigration enforcement activities,79 nothing in the INA compels such participation. Indeed, any such requirement likely would raise anti-commandeering issues under the Tenth Amendment.80 Moreover, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, it appears that states and localities are generally preempted from making arrests for civil violations of the INA in the absence of a specific federal statutory authorization or the “request, approval, or instruction from the Federal Government.”81

Limiting Police Inquiries into Persons’ Immigration Status

Many sanctuary-type policies place restrictions on police inquiries or investigations into a person’s immigration status.82 Some policies provide that police may not question a person about his or her immigration status except as part of a criminal investigation.83 Others bar police officers from initiating police activity with an individual for the sole purpose of discovering immigration status.84 And other policies prohibit law enforcement from questioning crime victims and witnesses about their immigration status.85 Still other policies more broadly limit officials from gathering information about persons’ immigration status, except for as required by law.86

As explained below in the “PRWORA and IIRIRA” section, two federal laws prevent state or local restrictions on sharing information about a person’s immigration status with federal immigration authorities, but the provisions do not require state or local police to actually collect such information.87 Restricting the authority of police to question a person about his or her immigration status helps ensure that law enforcement lacks any information that could be shared with federal immigration authorities.

Limiting Information Sharing with Federal Immigration Authorities

Some states and localities have restricted government agencies or employees from sharing information with federal immigration authorities, primarily to prevent federal authorities from using the information to identify and apprehend unlawfully present aliens for removal.88 For instance, some jurisdictions prohibit law enforcement from notifying federal immigration authorities about the release status of incarcerated aliens, unless the alien has been convicted of certain felonies.89

Similarly, other jurisdictions prohibit their employees from disclosing information about an individual’s immigration status unless the alien is suspected of engaging in illegal activity that is separate from unlawful immigration status.90 Some jurisdictions restrict disclosing information except as required by federal law91—sometimes referred to as a “savings clause”—although it appears that the Department of Justice has interpreted those provisions as conflicting with federal information-sharing provisions,92 discussed later.

Federal Measures to Counteract Sanctuary Policies

Over the years the federal government has enacted measures designed to counter certain sanctuary policies. Notably, in 1996 Congress enacted Section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and Section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), to curb state and local restrictions on information sharing.

Most recently, the President issued Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which, as relevant here, seeks to encourage state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement and disincentivize state and local adoption of sanctuary policies that hinder federal immigration enforcement. These federal initiatives—and related legal issues—are described below.

PRWORA and IIRIRA

In 1996 Congress sought to end state and local restrictions on information sharing through provisions in PRWORA93 and IIRIRA.94 Neither PRWORA nor IIRIRA requires state or local government entities to share immigration-related information with federal authorities.95 Instead, these provisions bar restrictions that prevent state or local government entities or officials from voluntarily communicating with federal immigration authorities regarding a person’s immigration status.96

PRWORA § 434 bars state and local governments from prohibiting or restricting state or local government entities from sending or receiving information, to or from federal immigration authorities, regarding the “immigration status” of an individual.97 IIRIRA § 642 is broader and more detailed in scope.98 First, it bars any restriction on a federal, state, or local governmental entity or official’s ability to send or receive information regarding “citizenship or immigration status” to or from federal immigration authorities.99 Second, it further provides that no person or agency may prohibit a federal, state, or local government entity from (1) sending information regarding immigration status to, or requesting information from, federal immigration authorities; (2) maintaining information regarding immigration status; or (3) exchanging such information with any other federal, state, or local government entity.100

Related Litigation

Shortly after these measures were enacted, New York City, which had a policy limiting information sharing with federal immigration authorities,101 brought suit challenging the constitutionality of PRWORA § 434 and IIRIRA § 642. Among other things,102 New York City alleged that the provisions facially violated the Tenth Amendment by barring states and localities from controlling the degree to which their officials may cooperate with federal immigration authorities.103 A federal district court dismissed this claim in City of New York v. United States,104 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) affirmed the judgment.105

The Second Circuit observed that, unlike the statutes struck down for violating the Tenth Amendment in New York and Printz, the information-sharing provisions in PRWORA and IIRIRA did not directly compel state authorities to administer and enforce a federal regulatory program.106 Instead, the court reasoned, these provisions prohibited state and local governments from restricting “the voluntary exchange” of immigration information between federal and state authorities.107

Further, the court added, “informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction of a voluntary nature” between states and federal authorities is an integral feature of the American system of dual sovereignty, and, in any event, the Supremacy Clause “bars states from taking actions that frustrate federal laws and regulatory schemes.”108 Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that the Tenth Amendment does not provide states and municipalities with the “untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal programs.”109 The court therefore rejected New York City’s constitutional challenge to the information-sharing provisions of PRWORA and IIRIRA, holding that that they did not facially violate the Tenth Amendment.110

New York City sought to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, but its petition for certiorari was denied.111 A few months later, however, the Court held in Reno v. Condon (discussed on page 8) that another federal statute—the DPPA—which regulated the dissemination of certain personal information collected by state authorities, did not violate the Tenth Amendment.112 While it might be argued that Condon provides support for the constitutional validity of PRWORA § 434 and IIRIRA § 642,113 no court appears to have assessed the implications of Condon to these measures.

Since the Second Circuit’s ruling, it appears that there have been no judicial rulings that have questioned the validity of the information-sharing provisions in PRWORA and IIRIRA. Although some state and local measures that purport to limit officials from sharing immigration-related information with federal immigration authorities remain in effect,114 any attempt by the state or locality to enforce these restrictions on information sharing potentially could be challenged on preemption grounds.

As for the so-called “don’t ask” policies, it potentially could be argued that, even though state or local restrictions on police questioning of persons regarding their immigration status is not expressly preempted by federal statute, these measures are nonetheless impliedly preempted by the information-sharing provisions of IIRIRA and PRWORA. But this argument was rejected by a California state appellate court in a challenge to the Los Angeles Police Department’s restrictions on investigations into persons’ immigration status.115

The federal courts do not appear to have directly considered this issue. Relatedly, though, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court found that a provision of an Arizona statute, which required police to contact federal authorities to verify the immigration status of certain stopped individuals, was not facially preempted.116 In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not suggest that federal law might preempt states or localities from restricting the circumstances in which police might question individuals about their immigration status.117 Indeed, given that Arizona held that state and local police were largely preempted from making arrests for immigration status violations, it seems unlikely that a federal court would find that state or local measures that limited police questioning of persons about their immigration status would be viewed as preempted by the INA.

Executive Order 13768

On January 25, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.”118 As relevant here, the executive order seeks to encourage state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement and disincentivize state and local adoption of sanctuary policies.119

The executive order declares that “[i]t is the policy of the executive branch to ensure, to the fullest extent of the law, that a State, or political subdivision of a State, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”—the U.S. Code provision for IIRIRA § 642.120 To implement that policy, the executive order instructs the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants,” subject to limited exception.121

Finally, the executive order authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate a jurisdiction as a “sanctuary,” and directs the Attorney General to take “appropriate enforcement actions” against “any entity” that violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (IIRIRA § 642) or that “has in effect a statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.”122

Shortly after the President signed the executive order, two California localities filed suit in federal district court seeking to halt the executive order’s implementation on the ground that it violates the Tenth Amendment. In one suit, the City and County of San Francisco have argued, among other things, that the executive order unlawfully commandeers state and local officials to enforce federal immigration law by penalizing jurisdictions that “fail[] to affirmatively assist federal immigration officials,” and as a result, hinders the enforcement of federal law—an activity forbidden by the executive order.123 Santa Clara County has raised similar Tenth Amendment arguments in its lawsuit.124 San Francisco and Santa Clara have also argued that conditions placed on the receipt of federal grants are unlawfully coercive, contending that the loss of grant money would total a significant amount of their respective annual operating budgets.125 In response, the government has countered, among other things, that San Francisco’s claims are premature and therefore nonjusticiable,126 given that the instructions pertaining to sanctuary jurisdictions in the executive order have not yet been implemented.127 At the time of the publication of this report, the litigation is in its preliminary stages.

About the author:
*Sarah S. Herman
, Legislative Attorney

Source:
This article was published by CRS (PDF).

Notes:
1 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and status of aliens.”); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1976) (“Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the States do not possess.”).
2 For instance, under § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is authorized to enter into written agreements with state and local jurisdictions that enable specially trained state or local officers to perform specific functions related to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens, while under federal supervision for a predetermined time. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
3 See, e.g., Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The “Arizonafication” of Immigration Law: Implications of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting for State & Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 85, 88 (2012); Keith Cunningham- Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1674 (2011).
4 Kevin J. Fandl, Putting States out of the Immigration Law Enforcement Business, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 533-35 (2015); Bianca Figueroa-Santana, Note, Divided We Stand: Constitutionalizing Executive Immigration Reform through Subfederal Regulation, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2219-20 (2015).
5 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 704 (2013).
6 See, e.g., Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Arizona statute, which barred the harboring of unlawfully present aliens by certain persons, on preemption and vagueness grounds), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014); United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona; affirming enjoinment of South Carolina criminal provisions for (1) an unlawful alien to conceal, harbor, or shelter him or herself from detection; (2) for a third party to conceal, shelter, or transport an unlawfully present person; (3) failing to carry an alien registration card; and (4) possessing a false identification card for proving lawful presence); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (enjoining several Alabama laws, including those that penalize (1) failing to carry registration documents; (2) working without authorization; (3) concealing, harboring, or shielding an unlawfully present alien from detection; (4) transporting an unlawfully present alien; (5) harboring an unlawfully present alien by entering into a rental agreement with that alien; and (6) deducting as a business expense on state tax filings any compensation paid to unauthorized aliens, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (enjoining criminal provisions in Georgia for (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien; (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien; and (3) inducing an illegal alien to enter Georgia, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona); Sol v. Whiting, No. CV-10-01061-PHX-SRB, 2015 WL 12030514, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2015) (discussing the resolution of legal challenges to various provisions of Arizona immigration enforcement measure in the aftermath of Arizona).
7 See, e.g., Steven Papazian, Note, Secure Communities, Sanctuary Laws, & Local Enforcement of Immigration Law: The Story of Los Angeles, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 283, 290-91 (2012); Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 147-48 & n.91 (2008).
8 See infra section What Is a Sanctuary Jurisdiction?
9 See, e.g., COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, Sanctuary Cities: Hard to Define, https://www.cml.org/brief-sanctuary/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); CBSMIAMI, Miami-Dade Mayor: “We Never Claimed to be a Sanctuary City,” (Jan. 27, 2017 11:25 p.m.), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/01/27/miami-dade-sanctuary-city-gimenez-trump/.
10 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
11 Other CRS products related to sanctuary jurisdictions include CRS Insight IN10653, Sanctuary Jurisdictions: Congressional Action and President Trump’s Interior Enforcement Executive Order, by William A. Kandel; CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1741, Plan to Restrict Federal Grants to “Sanctuary Jurisdictions” Raises Legal Questions, by Brian T. Yeh and Brian T. Yeh; and CRS Report R44118, Sanctuary Jurisdictions and Criminal Aliens: In Brief, by William A. Kandel.
12 For example, in 1979 the Los Angeles Police Department issued Special Order 40, which (1) barred police officers from arresting persons for suspected violations of the federal statute criminalizing illegal entry, (2) prohibited the initiation of police action “with the objective of discovering the alien status of a person,” and (3) established a process and criteria for notifying federal immigration officials when an unlawfully present alien was arrested on criminal charges. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, LOS ANGELES, SPECIAL ORDER 40: UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS (1979), [hereinafter LAPD ORDER], available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf; see also Doug Smith, How LAPD’s Law-and-Order Chief Revolutionized the Way Cops Treated Illegal Immigration, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-special-order-40-retrospective-20170205-story.html.
13 See, e.g., Susan Gzesh, Central Americans & Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era (describing the “network of religious congregations that became known as the Sanctuary Movement” and that provided humanitarian assistance to foreign nationals from Central America fleeing civil unrest in the 1980s).
14 See generally Jorge L. Carro, Municipal & State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297 (1989) (identifying and distinguishing various state and local responses in support of church actions).
15 See Villazor, supra note 7 at 142 (“In due course, what originally began with churches as proactive efforts to provide shelter and food to immigrants led to state and local governmental efforts to assure immigrants that they too will be safe within their borders.”).
16 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, & Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006) (surveying local sanctuary policies and describing them as doing “one or more of the following:
(1) limit[ing] inquiries about a person’s immigration status unless investigating illegal activity other than mere status as an unauthorized alien (‘don’t ask’); (2) limit[ing] arrests or detentions for violation of immigration laws (‘don’t enforce’); and (3) limit[ing] provision to federal authorities of immigration status information (‘don’t tell’)”).
17 The term “sanctuary” jurisdiction is not defined by federal statute or regulation, though it has been used on occasion by federal agencies to refer to state or local entities that have particular types of immigration-related laws or policies. For example, in a 2007 report by the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Justice, the term was used to reference “jurisdictions that may have state laws, local ordinances, or departmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration laws.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT DIVISION, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 7 n.44 (Jan. 2007), available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf (redacted public version) (defining “sanctuary” policies for purposes of study).
18 See, e.g., H.B.C., What are Sanctuary Cities, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ economist-explains/2016/11/economist-explains-13 (“There is no specific legal definition for what constitutes a sanctuary jurisdiction but the term is widely used to refer to American cities, counties or states that protect undocumented immigrants from deportation by limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities.”); Dr. Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 610 (2014) (“The modern concept of sanctuary cities now refers to jurisdictions that have adopted formal or informal policies limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities.” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted)).
19 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 18, at 610.
20 See, e.g., S.F. CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H.1, 12H.2 (declaring San Francisco a “City and County of Refuge” and restricting cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts); Oakland, Cal. City Council Resolution No. 81310 (May 20, 2008) (reaffirming Oakland’s status as a “City of Refuge” for unlawfully present aliens and denouncing certain federal immigration raids); see also Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, Sanctuary Cities Stand Firm against Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2016 5:14 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/sanctuary-cities-trump- immigration-232449 (listing cities where municipal and police leaders have publicly affirmed or reaffirmed sanctuary status).
21 See, e.g., Sanctuary City? Not L.A., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/26/opinion/la- ed-sanctuary-20110825 (disputing characterization of Los Angeles as a “sanctuary” jurisdiction, and noting matters in which local police cooperate with federal immigration authorities); Villazor, supra note 7 (discussing various meanings given to the term “sanctuary” when describing policies towards unlawfully present aliens).
22 See, e.g., Villazor, supra note 7 (discussing the term “sanctuary” as applied to contemporary immigration issues); Kittrie, supra note 16 (discussing and describing various state and local law enforcement “sanctuary” policies).
23 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and status of aliens.”); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1976) (“Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the States do not possess.”); Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Federal authority in the areas of immigration and naturalization is plenary.” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8 cl. 3, 4. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (identifying the Naturalization Clause as one of the sources of federal authority over immigration); Toll, 458 U.S. at 10 (citing the Naturalization Clause and Commerce Clause, along with the federal government’s broad authority over foreign affairs, as three of the primary sources for federal authority to regulate the status of aliens); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-71(1876) (identifying Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce as including the power to regulate entry of persons into the United States).
25 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. See also Toll, 458 U.S. at 10 (identifying the federal government’s “broad authority over foreign affairs” as a component of the federal government’s authority to regulate the status of aliens); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (identifying the powers to “declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship” as authorizing Congress to enact legislation barring certain aliens from admission).
26 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
27 In some cases, criminal and civil enforcement measures may be relevant to similar activities. For instance, unlawful entry into the United States is a criminal offense subject to imprisonment. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326. But the removal proceedings that may follow an unlawful entry (or any violation of U.S. immigration laws) are civil in nature, see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499, designed “to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws,” rather than “to punish an unlawful entry,” see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
28 See ARIZ. S.B. 1070 § 1, amended by H.B. 2162 (2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/alispdfs/council/SB1070- HB2162.PDF.
29 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
30 Id. at 2498.
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015). 33 Id. at 1595.
34 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 35 Id.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). For example, Congress, acting pursuant to its powers granted by the Commerce Clause, may displace state and local laws that were enacted under their police powers. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 291-92 (1981) (“The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.”).
37 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (“The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called a ‘police power.’”); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (“The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police power.”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers.”); Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (“Decisions of this court … recognize the possession, by each state, of powers never surrendered to the general government; which powers the state, except as restrained by its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert not only for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, but for the general or common good, for the well- being, comfort, and good order of the people.”).
38 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, REPORT ON 2015 STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS [hereinafter NCSL 2015 REPORT], available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-2015-state- immigration-laws.aspx (discussing legislation enacted by states in 2015 concerning non-U.S. citizens).
39 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (holding—before the INA was amended to comprehensively regulate alien employment and expressly preempt most state sanctions for unauthorized alien employment—that a state law regulating employment of unauthorized aliens was not preempted by federal law); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-11 (finding many provisions of an Arizona immigration enforcement law preempted but rejecting facial preemption challenge to provision requiring police to verify immigration status of lawfully stopped persons who were suspected of unlawful status); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (holding that federal law did not preempt an Arizona law that authorized or required the suspension or termination of business licenses for employers that knowingly or intentionally hired unauthorized aliens); Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1070-73 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding Arizona law that barred state courts from setting bail for unlawfully present aliens charged with certain felonies).
40 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 41 Whiting, 563 U.S. at 588 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356).
42 Whiting, 563 U.S. at 611.
43 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2); Whiting, 563 U.S. at 587.
44 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 45 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
46 New York, 505 U.S. at 149-51, 169-77 (discussing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, P.L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842).
47 New York, 505 U.S. at 174-76 (“A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”). The Act provided states the options of (1) regulating according to Congress’s direction, or (2) taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste generated within their borders and becoming liable for all damages suffered by waste generators resulting from the state’s failure to timely do so. Id. at 174-75.
48 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000). 49 New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). 50 P.L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
51 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 52 Id. at 902-04.
53 Id. at 926-30.
54 Id. at 933.
55 Id. at 935.
56 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5779 (providing that, when a missing child report is submitted to state or local law enforcement, the agency shall report the case to the National Crime Information Center of the Department of Justice). For discussion of various federal reporting requirements applicable to states, see Robert A. Mikos, Can States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2012).
57 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918; see also id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the Court as having refrained “from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid”). For criticism of the distinction made in Printz between reporting requirements and situations where the federal government directly compels states to administer federal regulatory programs, see generally Mikos, supra note 56.
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 to 2725.
59 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-45 & n.1 (2000).
60 Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.The Court also noted that, even though compliance with the DPPA would require “time and effort” by state officials, this did not mean that the law violated the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principles. Id. at 150. “That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace [situation] that presents no constitutional defect.” Id. at 150-51 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-515 (1988) (upholding federal prohibition on states’ issuance of unregistered bonds in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge)); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that extension of overtime and minimum wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to public transit authority did not violate the Tenth Amendment).
61 Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. For further discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area since the 1970s, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED), Federal Regulations Affecting State Activities and Instrumentalities, http://www.crs.gov/ conan/default.aspx?mode=topic&doc=Amendment10.xml&t=1|2|3.
62 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.”); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327-28 (2013) (noting that the Spending Clause “provides Congress broad discretion to tax and spend for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular state or private programs or activities”); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (“Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the States.”); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (“Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to promote the general welfare.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius [NFIB], 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (“Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over the use of federal funds.”).
63 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 201-11 (1987); Montgomery Cty., Md. v. FCC, 811 F.3d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2015).
64 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
65 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608; see generally CRS Report R42367, Medicaid and Federal Grant Conditions After NFIB v.
Sebelius: Constitutional Issues and Analysis, by Kenneth R. Thomas. 66 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
67 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, What are Sanctuary Cities, & Can They be Defunded?, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/; IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH DEPORTATIONS (Dec. 2016), available at https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1- min.pdf; NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WHAT’S A SANCTUARY POLICY? FAQ ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ACTION ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (May. 2016), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/ sanctuary-policy-faq635991795.aspx; NCSL 2015 REPORT, supra note 38; CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties and State (Jan. 2016), http://cis.org/Sanctuary-Cities-Map.
68 See, e.g., JESSICA SAUNDERS, NELSON LIM & DON PROSNITZ, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS: A PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA, RAND CTR. OF QUALITY POLICING (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP273.pdf (describing types of limited- cooperation policies); Kittrie, supra note 16, at 1455.
69 Kittrie, supra note 16, at 1455. 70 See id.
71 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
72 See INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (providing that an alien is inadmissible and subject to removal if present in the United States without have been admitted or paroled, or if he arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security)); 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
73 INA § 275; 8 U.S.C. § 1325. 74 INA § 276; 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
75 See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CA, POLICE DEP’T DUTY MANUAL 551 (2017) (public version) (“Officers will not detain or arrest any person on the basis of the person’s citizenship or status under civil immigration laws.”), available at http://www.sjpd.org/Records/DutyManual.asp; Washington, DC, Mayor’s Order 2011-174 (Oct. 19, 2011) (hereinafter “DC Mayor’s Order”) (“No person shall be detained solely on the belief that he or she is not present legally in the United States or that he or she has committed a civil immigration violation.”), available at http://dcregs.dc.gov/ Gateway/NoticeHome.aspx?NoticeID=1784041; OR. REV. STAT. §181A.850 (“No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision of the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.”).
76 See, e.g., LAPD ORDER, supra note 12 (barring arrests for federal crime of unlawful entry).
77 TAKOMA PARK, MD MUN. CODE § 9.04.
78 PHOENIX, AZ POLICE DEP’T OPERATIONS ORDER MANUAL 1.4 (rev. 2011) (“The investigation and enforcement of federal laws relating to illegal entry and residence in the United States is specifically assigned to [Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS].”), available at https://www.phoenix.gov/policesite/Documents/089035.pdf.
79 See e.g., INA § 287(g); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
0 See supra section “Tenth Amendment and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine.”
81 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012); see also Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Lower federal courts have universally—and we think correctly—interpreted Arizona v. United States as precluding local law enforcement officers from arresting individuals solely based on known or suspected civil immigration violations.”). Arizona’s discussion of state authority to enforce federal immigration law was related to arrests for non-criminal, immigration status violations. The Supreme Court did not opine on whether state law enforcement agencies are also precluded from making arrests for criminal violations of federal immigration law. However, some lower courts have generally recognized that state and local police are not constitutionally forbidden from making such arrests. See, e.g., United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App’x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The federal constitution allows a state law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal immigration offenses.”); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2013) (observing that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c), a federal statute criminalizing the harboring of unlawfully present aliens, permits state and local law enforcement to make arrests for criminal violations); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1299 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[S]tate law-enforcement officers have the general authority to investigate and make arrests for criminal violations of federal immigration laws.”); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, (9th Cir. 1983) (“We therefore hold that federal law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.”), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).
82 See, e.g., Christina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 602 (2008) (describing New York City’s sanctuary policies).
83 DC Mayor’s Order, supra note 75 (declaring that public safety employees “shall not inquire about a person’s immigration status … for the purpose of initiating civil enforcement of immigration proceedings that have no nexus to a criminal investigation”); N.Y.C. Exec Order No. 34, available at http://www1.nyc.gov/site/immigrants/about/local- laws-executive-orders.page. (“Law enforcement officers shall not inquire about a person’s immigration status unless investigating illegal activity other than mere status as an undocumented alien.”).
84 See, e.g., LAPD ORDER, supra note 12 (“Officers shall not initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a person.”).
85 DC Mayor’s Order, supra note 75 (“It shall be the policy of Public Safety Agencies not to inquire about the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or others who call or approach the police seeking assistance.”); See News Release, City of New Haven, Conn, Office of the Mayor, New Haven Police Issue Executive Order – No Resident Should Be Afraid of Reporting Crime (Dec. 14, 2006) (discussing General Order 06-2, which, among other things, establishes policy of New Haven Police Department not to inquire into the immigration status of crime victims and witnesses), available at http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID={874974A9-AC89-465B- A649-57D122E9FAF9}; N.Y.C. Exec Order No. 34, supra note 83 (“It shall be the policy of the Police Department not to inquire about the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or others who call or approach the police seeking assistance.”).
86 See, e.g., CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 2-173 (declaring that “[n]o agent or agency shall request information about or otherwise investigate … the citizenship or immigration status of any person,” subject to specific exceptions, including as required by law).
87 See 8 U.S.C. §1373(b) (barring state or local restrictions on sending, maintaining, or exchanging immigration status information with federal immigration authorities).
88 See, e.g., S.F. ADMIN CODE § 12H.2 (originally enacted in 1989 and subsequently amended to permit communication with federal immigration authorities regarding aliens who have committed felonies); N.Y.C. Executive Order 124 (Aug. 7, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 New York City Order] (limiting transmission of information about an alien to federal immigration authorities except in certain circumstances, including when the alien was suspected of criminal activity), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.pdf (revoked and replaced in 2003 by N.Y.C. Executive Order 34, as amended by N.Y.C. Executive Order 41, to permit information sharing in a broader range of circumstances, but not on the basis of alien’s unlawful immigration status); Governor of Maine Executive Order 13 FY 04/05, Concerning Access to State Services By All Entitled Maine Residents (Apr. 9, 2004) (limiting the sharing of information about aliens with federal immigration authorities, except when an alien is involved in illegal activity other than unlawful status; rescinded by Exec. Order 08 FY 11/12 (Jan. 6, 2011)).
89 See, e.g., S.F. ADMIN CODE §§ 12H.2, 12I.3.
90 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Exec Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www1.nyc.gov/site/immigrants/about/local-
laws-executive-orders.page.
91 CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 2-173-030 (“Except as otherwise provided under applicable federal law, no agent or agency shall disclose information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any person unless required to do so by legal process or such disclosure has been authorized in writing by the individual to whom such information pertains, or if such individual is a minor or is otherwise not legally competent, by such individual’s parent or guardian.”)
92 See MICHAEL R. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE REFERRAL OF ALLEGATIONS OF POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF 8 U.S.C. § 1373 BY GRANT RECIPIENTS (May 31, 2016), available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/ 1607.pdf.
93 P.L. 104-193, § 434 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1644.
94 P.L. 104-208, § 642 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
95 Whether Congress could permissibly require states and localities to submit collected information to federal immigration authorities has not been definitively resolved. As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Printz distinguished federal laws requiring states to report certain information to federal agencies from instances where it compelled state authorities to administer a federal regulatory program as to private parties, and declined to opine on whether reporting requirements violated the anti-commandeering doctrine. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
96 The provisions expressly apply to restrictions on immigration-related communication between federal, state, and local government entities and employees.
97 8 U.S.C. § 1644.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
99 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
100 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b). Federal immigration authorities are also required to respond to immigration status or citizenship verification requests made by state or local authorities pertaining to persons within their jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373(c).
101 1989 New York City Order, supra note 88.
102 New York City also unsuccessfully argued that the information-sharing provisions in PRWORA and IIRIRA violated the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, by interfering with the city’s oversight of its employees, City of New York v. United States [City of New York I], 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Guarantee-Clause claim was nonjusticiable); City of New York v. United States [City of New York II], 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (assuming that Guarantee-Clause claim was justiciable and concluding that PRWORA and IIRIRA information-sharing provisions were permissible).
103 City of New York I, 971 F. Supp. at 791.
104 Id.at 789.
105 City of New York II, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 106 See id. at 34-35.
107 Id. at 35.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 31.
111 528 U.S. 1115 (2000).
112 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
113 Although the federal statute upheld in Reno v. Condon is, in some ways, similar to the information-sharing provisions in IIRIRA and PRWORA, the statutes are not wholly analogous. Although each statute regulates information collected by states, the statute upheld in Condon was characterized by the Supreme Court as one of general applicability, regulating both states, as suppliers of motor vehicle information, and private parties that resold the information in interstate commerce. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). The information-sharing provisions in IIRIRA and PRWORA, however, appear to address only information collected and shared between government entities. But see Dep’t of Justice, Br. of Resp’t Opposing Pet. for Cert. at 12, City of New York II, 528 U.S. 1115 (No. 99-328) (characterizing the information-sharing provisions of IIRIRA and PRWORA as components of larger regulation schemes that also addressed private activity).
114 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Executive Order 41(2003), available at http://www1.nyc.gov/site/immigrants/about/local-laws- executive-orders.page (restricting disclosure of immigration-related information), A common feature of many state and local information-sharing restrictions is language permitting communication when it is required by law. Arguably, such language could be interpreted to allow compliance with the information-sharing provisions of IIRIRA and PRWORA, as these measures “require” voluntary communication to be permitted.
115 Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Sturgeon involved the LAPD Oder, see supra note 12, which prohibits Los Angeles police officers from initiating police activity for the sole purpose of discovering a person’s immigration status and arresting that person for illegal entry, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722. In upholding the provision, the California court noted that it “does not address communication with [Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS]—which is the heart of the federal information-sharing provisions—but, rather, “it addressed only the initiation of police action and arrests for illegal entry.” 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 731.
116 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508-10 (2012). The Court left open the question whether immigration status investigations by Arizona police could be subject to as-applied challenges. Id. at 2509-10.
117 To the contrary, in Arizona the Supreme Court construed federal immigration law as generally permitting state and local police to play a limited role in immigration enforcement. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (noting that state police were generally preempted from arresting aliens for suspected immigration violations in the absence of an authorizing federal statute).
118 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017). 119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. 122 Id.
123 Amended Compl., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00485). San Francisco is also seeking a declaratory judgment from that court that it is not in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Id.
124 Compl., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017) (No. 5:17-cv-00574).
125 Amended Compl., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, at 22; Compl., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, at 29.
126 Under the ripeness doctrine, claims are not justiciable until they are “ripe for adjudication.” See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 837 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2016). In other words, there is no Article III “case or controversy” for a court to decide if the asserted claim “rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 300; see also Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017).
127 Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Santa Clara v. Trump, at 15-18.

Russia: Sunday Protest Greatest In Places Where Duma Voting Share Lowest – OpEd

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“The greatest protest activity on March 26 occurred in regions which had shown the lowest level of participation the 2016 Duma elections,” according to new big data research by Sigma Expert and reported in today’s Vedomosti by journalist Anastasiya Kornya (vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/03/31/683528-aktivnee-protestovali).

“In nine of the ten cities with the greatest share of participants in the meetings as a percentage of the total number of residents, participation in the elections was lower than for the country as a whole.” Among these cities were Smolensk, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Chita, Vladivostok, and Perm. The exception was the Daghestani capital Makhachkala.

Everywhere but there, elections expert Andrey Buzin says, it has been true since Soviet times that “non-participation in elections was a form of protest.” (For a study confirming that, see Jerome M. Gilison’s “Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent,” American Political Science Review, 62: 3(1968), pp. 814-826.)

Nikolay Petrov of the Committee of Civic Initiatives points out that “the list of cities with high meeting activity to a large extent also corresponds with the top of ‘the tension rating’” compiled by his organization.

This connection is important and explains why Vladimir Putin and his entourage are so focused on ensuring that the Kremlin ruler gets not only a super-majority in the upcoming elections but does so with a high level of participation across the country, the goal being 70 percent on each of these measures.

But Sigma Expert’s use of big data also provides other insights into the ways in which people were mobilized to take part in the protests. “In contrast to the winter of 2011-2012 when Facebook was the main place, in 2017, the VKontakte network was the main instrument of mobilization,” the journalist writes.

And that explains why Navalny’s effort was so successful in reaching out to so many places: Only half of the 20 cities where the largest demos took place have a Facebook presence whereas VKontakte was an is “everywhere.” And that explains something else: the relatively small presence of bloggers in the leadership of Sunday’s actions.

Avid News Watchers More Likely To Be Islamophobic

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New Zealanders — whether liberal or conservative — show both increased anger and reduced warmth towards Muslims if they are more avid news consumers, a new scientific study has found.

The study, which appears in the leading international science journal PLOS ONE, is based on responses from 16,584 New Zealanders from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS), a 20-year longitudinal study led by co-author Professor Chris G. Sibley of the University of Auckland, who leads the project he created in 2009.

Researchers have long suspected that the news media fuels Islamophobia, but these ideas had never been tested on a nation-wide scale.

“People tend to interpret the news in ways that fit with their pre-existing biases, seeking affirmation of their beliefs while discounting conflicting information,” said University of Otago lecturer Dr John Shaver, the article’s lead author. “New Zealand is a good test for speculation about media-induced Muslim prejudice because of its overall highly tolerant people. If anything, tolerant Kiwis might tend to reject intolerant stereotypes, reducing the effect of the media.”

“However we find that the association of prejudice towards Muslims with more media exposure holds across the political spectrum, and is specific to Muslims,” said Dr Shaver. “This indicates that it is widespread representations of Muslims in the news that is contributing to lower Muslim acceptance, rather than any partisan media bias. The media, regardless of politics, tend to publish violent stories because violence sells.”

Professor Joseph Bulbulia of Victoria University of Wellington, also a co-author, noted, “Sadly, there may be real-world consequences for Muslims in this country, people who encounter prejudice across their daily routines, at the workplace, and in their children’s schools.” Despite the study’s bleak message the authors remain optimistic: “Though un-making prejudice is difficult, we hope these results challenge the media to present fairer representations of Muslims.”


Belarus: Media Crackdown Leads To 50 Arrests

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Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned a major crackdown on reporters in Belarus – where at least 49 journalists and bloggers were arrested while covering nationwide protests last weekend and at least five have been given jail sentences – and urges the international community to hold the government to account.

The arrests on 25 and 26 March have brought the total number of arrests of reporters to around 100 since 10 March, in what is a sharp increase in the scale of the repressive methods being deployed by the authorities in response to a massive wave of anti-government protests.

Five journalists were given prison sentences yesterday on charges of hooliganism and participating in unauthorized demonstrations. Like the protests themselves, the crackdown has had no precedent since 2011.

“This brutal and systematic police harassment constitutes a blatant violation of media freedom and the Belarusian public’s right to information,” said Johann Bihr, the head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk.

“We urge the international community to put pressure on the government to immediately release these journalists, who have been arrested just for doing their job, to drop all charges against them and to respect media freedom. These massive abuses underscore the urgent need to strictly condition any rapprochement with Belarus on respect for human rights.”

Mass arrests

Last Saturday will be remembered as a black day for media freedom in Belarus. The demonstration that the Belarusian opposition traditionally holds every year on 25 March, the anniversary of the country’s independence in 1918, gained special significance this year because of the current wave of protests.

The police used force to disperse the protests throughout the country and arrested hundreds of demonstrators. The Belarus Association of Journalists (BAJ), an RSF partner, said at least 26 journalists were arrested in Minsk, four in the southeastern city of Homyel and three in the northeastern city of Vitsebsk

Volha Davydava, Ihar Ilyashyn, Katsiaryna Bakhvalava, Volha Morva and British reporter Filip Warwick were beaten by police while covering the demonstration in Minsk.

More arrests took place during the next day’s smaller demonstrations. At least 16 journalists were arrested Minsk, Vitsebsk, Babruysk, Brest, Homyel and Orsha.

Jailed for doing their job

A court in Minsk yesterday sentenced Alyaksandr Barazenka – a reporter for Belsat TV, a Belarusian exile TV station based in neighbouring Poland – to 15 days in prison on a charge of hooliganism.

The court accepted the testimony of a policeman, although video filmed by Barazenka at the time of his arrest on 25 March while covering a demonstration clearly showed that he was just doing his job and that he had identified himself as a journalist.

After spending the weekend in police custody, Dzianis Ivashyn, the editor of the InformNapalm news website, was sentenced yesterday to five days in prison for “participating in an unauthorized demonstration.”

BAJ members Kanstantsin Mardvintsau and Leanid Svetsik were sentenced in Vitsebsk yesterday to 15 days in prison for “participating in an unauthorized demonstration,” while Artsyom Sizintsau, the local correspondent for Radio Racyja, was sentenced to ten days in prison on the same charge.

The unusually large demonstrations have been taking place in Belarus since late February in protest against a new tax on “social parasitism” applicable to anyone working for less than six months a year.

President Lukashenko suspended the tax on 9 March but ordered the interior ministry to take “extremely severe measures” against the protest movement’s “instigators” and to restore “perfect order.” The police immediately began dispersing the protests with much more force and the authorities are now accusing “foreign secret services” of trying to destabilize the government.

Belarus is ranked 157th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2016 World Press Freedom Index.

India: Tamils Resent Central Imposition Of Hindi – OpEd

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There is a popular saying in Tamil Nadu that approximately says not to waste time on unproductive things, like an idling person having found no employment or work to be busy with, went on to shave a domestic animal. Similarly, some people feeling boredom kept on digging the earth and again filling the ditches with the mud they have dug out.

The Indian federal government at time does exactly that. Now it is eager to impose Hindi in Tamil Nadu by replacing nameplates in English by Hindi versions, angering Tamils and DNK taking up the issue seriously. New Delhi is doing his unproductive work, knowing full well that Tamils in the South oppose Hindu imposition tooth and nail. Year ago DMK spearheaded anti-Hindu agitation to earn their seats in state assembly and parliament and eventually came to power in the state. DMK is a powerful party even without Hindi issue but the Congress-BJP – strong in Hindi belt – is trying to force it to take up the issue so that central government drops its Hindiization of India once for all, for, India has several national languages with equal importance.

English or Hindi or Tamil, or Russian people learn if and when they need it. None can force a language on the people directly or by indirect techniques.

Tamils living in North or elsewhere do learn to perfect Hindi and other North or other regional Indian languages because they need to use local languages. But asking Tamils or any other regions to know and learn Hindi as a compulsory language is ridiculous.

Federal government cannot impose Hindi on Tamils

While the Congress government time and again made strenuous efforts to impose Hindi on Tamils and Kannadigas. But people objected to the central dirty designs of linguistic imposition, the Modi regime is trying impose both Hindi and Sanskrit on Tamils along with Yoga exercise a part of Hindutva ideology- and not as health exercises.

In December 2014, the political scene in Tamil Nadu saw a churning with the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, led by Vaiko, walking out of the National Democratic Alliance.

Among the reasons Vaiko gave for his decision was “a consistent effort by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government to impose the culture of the North on Tamil Nadu.” In particular was the fear that Tamils would be made to learn Hindi and Sanskrit through official means, something that met with violent reactions in the 1960s in the State.

When the Centre wanted government departments to use Hindi in social media, protests erupted immediately in the State. The then Chief Minister, Jayalalithaa, in a letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said the decision was against the spirit of the Official Languages Act, 1963.

Perhaps, one of the major reasons the Congress was shunted out of power in the State in 1967 was imposition of Hindi. The State government brought in paramilitary forces and clamped down on the anti-Hindi agitators, and the party never again came to power.

Back in 1937, when the Madras Presidency government led by C. Rajagopalachari insisted on compulsory learning of Hindi in the State, the Dravidian movement, then in the form of the Justice Party, got a major campaign agenda. For three years till the policy was revoked in 1940, the agitations were sustained in almost every part of the Presidency, in the process making its leader, E.V. Ramasamy (Periyar), the tallest leader of the Dravidian movement.

In 1965, when the 15-year timeframe to make Hindi the only official language was about to expire, Tamil Nadu again led the agitations. By this time, with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) gaining ground, imposition of Hindi was part of the narrative of the Aryan-Dravidian divide — the northern Aryans attempting to invade the cultural space of the southern Dravidians. It took an assurance from the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri that English would continue as the second official language as long as non-Hindi-speaking people wanted it, to quell the protests.

Political commentators argue that years of agitations against Hindi have clearly had an impact on the psyche of the people of Tamil Nadu. A common view is that while the people of the other southern States learn Hindi along with their native language, those of Tamil Nadu are fanatical about their language choice, which is a consequence of the larger political narrative.

However, while Tamil Nadu political parties have consistently opposed the “imposition” of Hindi, the State’s policy, all through the decades, has been to make learning of Tamil “compulsory” in schools.

In 2006, the DMK government passed the Tamil Nadu Tamil Learning Act, through which school students had to compulsorily learn the language from Class I. The year 2015-16 will be crucial as the first batch which began learning the language in 2006 will face the Class X public examinations, making it a test of efficiency of the policy.

But academics feel that with over two decades of globalization and the advancement in learning technology, the animosity against Hindi had mellowed on the ground. So much so that social scientists like C. Lakshmanan of the Madras Institute of Development Studies feel there is a growing interest among the people to learn multiple languages.

While he is opposed to the idea of “imposing” a language, Lakshmanan says the Tamil Nadu’s government’s policies have made it difficult for people to get access to other languages. “Many government schools do not have Hindi teachers. Learning a language outside the school system is a costly affair. So even if someone is willing to learn, the system discourages them,” he says. He says that while the political rhetoric on Tamil has been strong, many had preferred English to Tamil in education, thus helping themselves join the mainstream without the need for Hindi. This was sometimes to the detriment of Tamil. “But Hindi, spoken widely in the country, is a means to power,” he says. In that sense, he feels the BJP will gain if it facilitates learning of the language without imposing it.

Writer A. Marx says politically, the Tamil language issue has ceased to be an electoral issue, though it continues to be an emotive issue. In 1965, the DMK was the only face of the anti-Hindi agitations, giving it the full benefit of the anti-Congress mood. In 2014, all Tamil parties have a common policy on the language issue, giving no one a clear advantage. Marx says the anti-Hindi mood is actually more vigorous in the North than in the South at the moment. “It is people speaking non-Hindi languages in the North who have come down heavily on the BJP this time,” he says.

While the Dravidian parties opposed Hindi, he says, they had a logical language policy nevertheless with the constant emphasis on learning English, ensuring that Tamils were not left behind in the development story.

Tamil Nadu chief minister J. Jayalalithaa challenged a Union home ministry circular seeking to make Hindi the primary language in universities in the southern state, saying the circular is not “legal”. “At a time when I have been emphasizing to the central government that Tamil should be made an official language, and to use Tamil in the Madras high court, they are trying to impose to teach law and commerce in Hindi in Tamil Nadu universities, which is neither right nor legal,” said the chief minister in a press statement published in Tamil.

The University Grants Commission (UGC) sent a circular to Anna University and Aliquippa University on Tuesday saying Hindi should be their main language.
“The decision taken by the Central Hindi Committee in July 2011 would not bind the universities of Tamil Nadu. Chief Secretary Mohan Varghese Chunkath has been directed to advise the government-run universities to inform the UGC in this regard,” Jayalalithaa said.

Earlier, two local constituents of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that rules at the Centre—Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)—had protested against the circular. They called it an attempt by the central government to impose Hindi and sought its immediate withdrawal.

The Official Languages Act, 1963, states that English shall be used for purposes of communication in states that have not adopted Hindi as their official language.
According to the Official Languages (Use for Official Purpose of the Union) Rules, 1976, Tamil Nadu and a few other states fall in what has been categorized as “Region C”. Communication from the central government to non-central government offices or persons in these states shall be in English, according to the rules.

The states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab, and the Union territories of Chandigarh, Daman and Diu, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli come under “Region B”, and any communication from the central government office to them shall be in Hindi. If any communication is issued to any of them in English, it shall be accompanied by a Hindi translation. “Therefore, the UGC circular sent to Tamil Nadu universities will not be applicable,” Jayalalithaa said.

S. Ramadoss, founder of PMK, said just because many universities, including those in Tamil Nadu, received UGC grants, they cannot be used as “tools of Hindi imposition”. He said it was not clear if the Centre had consulted the states on this issue and urged the Centre to “drop” its efforts to “impose Hindi”.

MDMK leader Vaiko alleged that besides the advisory to the universities, central departments including the railways and insurance companies have been asked to promote Hindi. “The Centre’s decision to impose Hindi… will have its own repercussions,” he said while demanding the withdrawal of the latest order.
Hindi is a sensitive issue in Tamil Nadu, with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party under its founder C.N. Annadurai successfully having led a major anti-Hindi agitation in 1965.

Tamil Nadu government said it won’t impose Sanskrit and Hindi on students.
The Tamil Nadu government would not impose Sanskrit and Hindi on students studying in the state, said higher education minister K P Anbalagan in the assembly on Tuesday. Anbalagan was replying to DMK legislator and former school education minister Thangam Thennarasu who wanted to know what steps the state government had taken to prevent the new education policy of the Centre.

“The Centre has not released the entire policy but only a part of the draft policy has been uploaded for suggestions. The draft says that Sanskrit and Hindi will be compulsory for students, and what is the state government’s position on this,” Thennarasu wanted to know. He said according to the new policy all students would be promoted only up to Class 4, instead of the present system of promoting them till they reach Class 8. This would affect students in rural areas, he said and wanted the government to pass a resolution in the assembly against the policy. Leader of the Opposition M K Stalin also wanted the government to pass a resolution in the assembly.

In his reply, the minister said, “The Centre has now asked Tamil Nadu government’s suggestions on the new policy. Only after seeking suggestions from the people in the state we will reply to the Centre. But anyway, Sanskrit and Hindi will not be imposed on Tamil Nadu students, and the government will not in any way help it impose the new policy,” he said.

The reply from Tamil Nadu would be based on factors like local education, culture and state’s powers. The government would ensure that the new policy would not affect education followed in the state, he added.

DMK opposes imposition of Hindi on Tamil Nadu

DMK has repeatedly declared that none has the right force Hindi into the throat of people who are not interested in Hindi. They asked the Federal government o first make North Indian states to let their people learn some South Indian languages before expecting the South Indians to accept Hindi as one of their tongues.
Tamils are not opposed to Hindi but they hate that language being pushed into their throats.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) which split from the Dravidar Kazhagam in 1949 inherited the anti-Hindi policies of its parent organisation. DMK’s founder Annadurai had earlier participated in the anti-Hindi imposition agitations during 1938–40 and in the 1940s. In July 1953, the DMK launched an agitation for changing the name of a town – Dalmiapuram – to Kallakudi. They claimed that the town’s name (after Ramkrishna Dalmia) symbolised the exploitation of South India by the North.

On 15 July 1953, M. Karunanidhi (later Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu) and other DMK members erased the Hindi name in Dalmiapuram railway station’s name board and lay down on the tracks. In the altercation with the Police that followed the protests, two DMK members lost their lives and several others including Karunanidhi and Kannadhasan were arrested.

In the 1950s DMK continued its anti-Hindi policies along with the secessionist demand for Dravidistan. On 28 January 1956, Annadurai along with Periyar and Rajaji signed a resolution passed by the Academy of Tamil Culture endorsing the continuation of English as the official language. On 21 September 1957 the DMK convened an anti-Hindi Conference to protest against the imposition of Hindi. It observed 13 October 1957 as “anti-Hindi Day”.

On 31 July 1960, another open air anti-Hindi conference was held at Kodambakkam, Madras. In November 1963, DMK dropped its secessionist demand in the wake of the Sino-Indian War and the passage of the anti-secessionist 16th Amendment to the Indian Constitution. But the anti-Hindi stance remained and hardened with the passage of Official Languages Act of 1963. The DMK’s view on Hindi’s qualifications for official language status were reflected in Annadurai’s response to the “numerical superiority of Hindi” argument: “If we had to accept the principle of numerical superiority while selecting our national bird, the choice would have fallen not on the peacock but on the common crow

The Anti-Hindi imposition agitations of Tamil Nadu were a series of agitations that happened in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (formerly Madras State and part of Madras Presidency) during both pre- and post-Independence periods. The agitations involved several mass protests, riots, student and political movements in Tamil Nadu concerning the official status of Hindi in the state.

The first anti-Hindi imposition agitation was launched in 1937, in opposition to the introduction of compulsory teaching of Hindi in the schools of Madras Presidency by the first Indian National Congress government led by C. Rajagopalachari (Rajaji). This move was immediately opposed by E. V. Ramasamy (Periyar) and the opposition [Justice Party (India)|Justice Party] (later Dravidar Kazhagam). The agitation, which lasted three years, was multifaceted and involved fasts, conferences, marches, picketing and protests. The government responded with a crackdown resulting in the death of two protesters and the arrest of 1,198 persons including women and children. Mandatory Hindi education was later withdrawn by the British Governor of Madras Lord Erskine in February 1940 after the resignation of the Congress Government in 1939.
Hindi not the sole official language

The adoption of an official language for the Indian Republic was a hotly debated issue during the framing of the Indian Constitution after India’s independence from the United Kingdom. After an exhaustive and divisive debate, Hindi was adopted as the official language of India with English continuing as an associate official language for a period of fifteen years, after which Hindi would become the sole official language. The new Constitution came into effect on 26 January 1950. Efforts by the Indian Government to make Hindi the sole official language after 1965 was not acceptable to many non-Hindi Indian states, who wanted the continued use of English. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a descendant of Dravidar Kazhagam, led the opposition to Hindi.

To allay their fears, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru enacted the Official Languages Act in 1963 to ensure the continuing use of English beyond 1965. The text of the Act did not satisfy the DMK and increased their skepticism that his assurances might not be honored by future administrations.

As the day (26 January 1965) of switching over to Hindi as sole official language approached, the anti-Hindi movement gained momentum in Madras State with increased support from college students. On 25 January, a full-scale riot broke out in the southern city of Madurai, sparked off by a minor altercation between agitating students and Congress party members. The riots spread all over Madras State, continued unabated for the next two months, and were marked by acts of violence, arson, looting, police firing and lathi charges. The Congress Government of the Madras State called in paramilitary forces to quell the agitation; their involvement resulted in the deaths of about seventy persons (by official estimates) including two policemen. To calm the situation, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri gave assurances that English would continue to be used as the official language as long as the non-Hindi speaking states wanted. The riots subsided after Shastri’s assurance, as did the student agitation.

The agitations of 1965 led to major political changes in the state. The DMK won the 1967 assembly election and the Congress Party never managed to recapture power in the state since then. The Official Languages Act was eventually amended in 1967 by the Congress Government headed by Indira Gandhi to guarantee the indefinite use of Hindi and English as official languages. This effectively ensured the current “virtual indefinite policy of bilingualism” of the Indian Republic. There were also two similar (but smaller) agitations in 1968 and 1986 which had varying degrees of success.

In 2014, the Home Ministry ordered that “government employees and officials of all ministries, departments, corporations or banks, who have made official accounts on social networking sites should use Hindi, or both Hindi and English but give priority to Hindi”. This move was immediately opposed by all the political parties in Tamil Nadu. Terming the move on use of Hindi as being “against letter and spirit” of the Official Languages Act the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalithaa cautioned that this direction may “cause disquiet to the people of Tamil Nadu who are very proud of and passionate about their linguistic heritage,” and asked the Prime Minister of India to suitably modify the instructions to ensure that English was the language of communication on social media.

The major opposition party Indian National Congress advised prudence, expressing fear that such directions may result in a backlash in non-Hindi states, especially Tamil Nadu and also said that the “Government would be well-advised to proceed with caution,”. These protests ensured the continuous official usage of English

The anti-Hindi imposition agitations of 1937–40 and 1940–50 led to a change of guard in the Madras Presidency. The main opposition party to the Indian National Congress in the state, the Justice Party, came under Periyar’s leadership on 29 December 1938. In 1944, the Justice Party was renamed as Dravidar Kazhagam. The political careers of many later leaders of the Dravidian Movement, such as C. N. Annadurai and M. Karunanidhi, started with their participation in these agitations. The agitations stopped the compulsory teaching of Hindi in the state.

The agitations of the 1960s played a crucial role in the defeat of the Tamil Nadu Congress party in the 1967 elections and the continuing dominance of Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu politics. Many political leaders of the DMK and ADMK, like P. Seenivasan, K. Kalimuthu, Durai Murugan, Tiruppur. S. Duraiswamy, Sedapatti Muthaiah, K. Raja Mohammad, M. Natarajan and L. Ganesan, owe their entry and advancement in politics to their stints as student leaders during the agitations, which also reshaped the Dravidian Movement and broadened its political base, when it shifted from its earlier pro-Tamil (and anti-Brahmin) stance to a more inclusive one, which was both anti-Hindi and pro-English. Finally, the current two-language education policy followed in Tamil Nadu is also a direct result of the agitations.

Observation

As per federal system, every language in India is national. Tamil is as important as Hindi or any other Indian language.

The Modi government that now feels comfortable with secured majority in both Houses of Parliament for the first time in its political history should comprehend the predicament of and apprehensions by the Tamils and Tamil state over other languages being pushed into curriculum of schools or colleges in the state.

Of course, RSS and BJP are deadly seeking to impose their will on the nation just because they have own elections, while people voted for them in order to avoid the corrupt Congress and in the absence any credible national opposition. The Central government, which has failed time and again, should stop trying to create problems of the unity of the nation.

It is time to end linguistic mischief!

The Russia Hacking Fiasco: No Evidence Required – OpEd

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“So far, no single piece of evidence has been made public proving that the Trump campaign joined with Russia to steal the US presidency – nothing….Stop to let that thought reverberate for a moment.” -— Paul Wood, BBC News, Washington, March 30, 2017

Here’s what bugs me about the Russia hacking story:  Why would the media, whose credibility is already at its lowest point ever, go after Trump when they had no facts to back them up?

Why?

Do the media bosses really think that if they set their hair on fire and run around yelling, “The Russians did it, the Russians did it”, the American people will sheepishly nod in agreement?

And what do they think the Russians actually did?

Why they meddled in our elections, the media tells us.

Okay, but how?

Russia hackers stole damaging emails from the Democrats at the DNC, they tell us.

Alright, but how did that effect the elections?

Well– according to a report on the BBC–

“the stories based on this hacked information appear on Twitter and Facebook, posted by thousands of automated “bots”, then on Russia’s English-language outlets, RT and Sputnik, then right-wing US “news” sites such as Infowars and Breitbart, then Fox and the mainstream media.

…Russia downloads the online voter rolls. The voter rolls are said to fit into this because of “microtargeting”. Using email, Facebook and Twitter, political advertising can be tailored very precisely: individual messaging for individual voters.

“You are stealing the stuff and pushing it back into the US body politic,” said the former official, “you know where to target that stuff when you’re pushing it back.”

This would take co-operation with the Trump campaign, it is claimed.” (BBC)

So the Russians stole the election by bashing Hillary on Facebook? Is that what you’re telling me?

And they needed the Trump team’s help to carry out this nefarious operation?

Is that the nuttiest explanation you’ve ever heard? And yet some people believe this baloney.

Did you know that the FBI opened this investigation in July 2016? That’s eight months ago.

And what have they got to show for it?

Nothing. Not a damn thing.

So far, there’s not a shred of evidence that Russia hacked the DNC computer system or that anyone on the Trump campaign colluded with Russia to steal the election.  They have nothing and they know it. But the farce goes on regardless. It’s all politics.

That’s not to say that their weren’t any connections between the 2016 political campaigns and Russia. There sure were, but the connections were all on Hillary’s side. As Robert Parry reports in his latest piece at Consortium News:

“An irony of the escalating hysteria about the Trump camp’s contacts with Russians is that one presidential campaign in 2016 did exploit political dirt that supposedly came from the Kremlin and other Russian sources. Friends of that political campaign paid for this anonymous hearsay material, shared it with American journalists and urged them to publish it to gain an electoral advantage. But this campaign was not Donald Trump’s; it was Hillary Clinton’s….

Indeed, you have the words of Rep. Adam Schiff, the ranking Democratic member of the House Intelligence Committee, in his opening statement at last week’s public hearing on so-called “Russia-gate.”

Schiff’s seamless 15-minute narrative of the Trump campaign’s alleged collaboration with Russia followed the script prepared by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele who was hired as an opposition researcher last June to dig up derogatory information on Donald Trump.

Steele, who had worked for Britain’s MI-6 in Russia, said he tapped into ex-colleagues and unnamed sources inside Russia, including leadership figures in the Kremlin, to piece together a series of sensational reports that became the basis of the current congressional and FBI investigations into Trump’s alleged ties to Moscow…

Since he was not able to go to Russia himself, Steele based his reports mostly on multiple hearsay from anonymous Russians who claim to have heard some information from their government contacts before passing it on to Steele’s associates who then gave it to Steele who compiled this mix of rumors and alleged inside dope into “raw” intelligence reports….” (“The Sleazy Origins of Russia-gate”, Consortium News)

Get the picture? The whole case against Trump is based on a pile of unverified BS from some ex-MI-6 flunkey trying to make a killing off sexed up rumors of imaginary collusion. (BTW, Steele’s “dodgy dossier” also contained the idiotic claims that Trump hired Russian prostitutes to urinate on him in a swanky hotel in Moscow.)

Parry also adds this revealing comment at the end of his article:

“In the last weeks of the Obama administration, I was told that the outgoing intelligence chiefs had found no evidence to verify Steele’s claims but nevertheless believed them to be true….”

Of course they said they believed it, because they know what side their bread is buttered on. What would you expect them to say; that its all an absurd witchhunt based on nothing but sketchy rumors?  The Intel chiefs are no different than anyone else. They’re just trying to placate their paymasters like any good employee.

Check out this comment that FBI Director Comey made during the recent Congressional hearings on alleged Russian meddling. It helps to expose what a political animal the man really is:

“He (Putin) hated Secretary Clinton so much that the flip side of that coin was that he had a clear preference for the person running against the person he hated so much.

They engaged in a multifaceted campaign to undermine our democracy.

They were unusually loud in their intervention. It’s almost as if they didn’t care that we knew, that they wanted us to see what they were doing.

Their number one mission is to undermine the credibility of our entire democracy enterprise of this nation.

They’ll be back. They’ll be back, in 2020. They may be back in 2018.”

Nice, eh?

So among his other talents,  Comey also knows how to read minds. He knows that Putin hates Hillary and favors Trump. He knows the Russians “engaged in a multifaceted campaign to undermine our democracy”, even though he hasn’t produced a lick of proof to verify his claims.

And he knows that the Russians “number one mission is to undermine the credibility of our entire democracy”, even though– according to a recent survey– the main reason Hillary lost the election was because undecided voters swarmed to Trump en masse after Comey announced he was reopening the investigation of the Clinton Foundation just 11 days before the election.

I guess Comey forgot to mention that part.

The Russia hacking fairytale is the biggest joke in history. I can’t believe we’re even wasting time on it.  Unfortunately, gullible liberals have taken the bait, hook, line and sinker. A recent CBS poll shows that 67% of Democrats think Russia interfered in the election to help Trump, while only 13% of Republicans believe the same. (CBS News)

What does it all mean?  Are Democrats more prone to believe uncorroborated politically-motivated rubbish than Republicans or are they just so blinded by their hatred for Trump that they’ll accept any dirt the media dishes up?

I can’t answer that, but it’s never wise to let one’s emotions cloud one’s judgment.

Albania Sells Ancient Arms To Controversial Bulgarian Broker

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By Lindita Cela, Ivan Angelovski and Maria Cheresheva

Abania’s state-owned arms broker sold 17.5million Chinese-made bullets, 350 mortars, and 40,000 mortar shells in 2015 to Alguns Ltd, a Bulgarian firm which worked on Washington’s programme to train and equip Syrian rebels.

The firm has been linked to a fatal explosion at a shooting range in Bulgaria in 2015 which left a Pentagon contractor working on the Syrian project dead.

Alguns Ltd is owned by Alexander Dimitrov, a former business partner of Bulgarian organised crime figure Boyan Petrakiev Borisov, nicknamed ‘the Baron’ [see “Organised crime links” box].

Details of the sales, worth in excess of 1 million euros, are revealed in confidential arms export documents obtained by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN.

These show how the aging Chinese and Albanian made arms and ammunition were exported to Bulgaria as part of four export licences signed between the state-owned Military Export Import Company of Albania, MEICO, and Alguns in 2015.

At the same time, Alguns was employed as a subcontractor for the Pentagon’s US Special Operations Command, SOCOM, as part of its attempts to supply and train Syrian rebels fighting Islamic State.

Arms experts believe that Bulgaria is unlikely to have been the final destination for the equipment given its age and the fact that Bulgaria has a relatively modern army which is part of NATO. Alguns has declined to comment on expert analysis that countries in the Middle East or Africa were likely recipients.

Alguns linked to deadly blast

Alguns’s role in the Syria programme first emerged in June 2015 when 41-year-old US Navy veteran Francis Norwillo died as a rocket-propelled grenade exploded at a firing range in the village of Anevo, central Bulgaria. The venue is owned by the state-owned arms producer VMZ Sopot.

Emails and contracts obtained by BIRN from a US lawsuit and sources in Bulgaria reveal fresh details about the incident.

Alguns’s involvement in the blast remains hotly contested, but it is not disputed that the company was central in organising sessions at the range in the preceding days.

Norwillo and his injured colleague, Michael Dougherty, had been hired through a $28-million Pentagon contract to train Syrian rebels to fire various Soviet-style weapons. They had travelled to Belarus and then Bulgaria to test the equipment ahead of a training camp in Jordan, according to a lawsuit filed in Florida by Norwillo’s widow and Dougherty.

Court papers against the three US firms allegedly involved in the incident – Purple Shovel, Skybridge Tactical and Regulus Global – detail how the claimants believe the faulty grenade was more than 30 years old, of Bulgarian origin and had been rejected as unsafe by the Pentagon, which was also looking to source ammunition for the Syrian rebels.

Following the tragedy, the Bulgarian authorities identified Alguns as having rented the firing range and providing the faulty rocket.

The firm was fined its 62 500 euros in September 2015 for failing to obtain a permit from the Ministry of the Economy of Bulgaria for the fatal session, but Alguns, which denies the allegations, was later cleared on appeal.

The court ruled the ministry had made significant administrative errors and had failed to prove Alguns had rented the firing range on the day of the accident.

Purple Shovel, the Pentagon’s main contractor on the project, told BIRN in a written statement that Alguns had been brought in by Regulus Global, one of its sub-contractors, to book the sessions and provide the ammunition for the training. It said, however, that the accident took place during a “recreational shoot” at the weekend, after official training had finished.

A timetable of the training obtained by BIRN shows that Alguns had booked the firing range up until Friday, June 5, and also reveals that two Bulgarian state-owned companies, VMZ Sopot and Arcus, were in charge of training the US contractors in a variety of Soviet-style weapons and ammunition.

This included the type of rocket-propelled grenade, OG-7, which malfunctioned, causing the deadly blast.

Skybridge Tactical, which had hired Norwillo and Dougherty for the job, argues in court papers that the explosion occurred during official training, and that the injured parties should be in line for US government compensation as a result.

Regulus Global has dismissed the allegations as lacking in detail.

This incident is not Alguns only brush with the law. The firm was fined 1,000 euros in June 2016 for failing to provide proper documentation related to an ammunition store it maintains in Sliven, southern Bulgaria.

Arms’ final destination ‘Middle East or Africa’

War in the Middle East has sparked an unprecedented flow of arms and ammunition from the Balkans, with Bulgaria playing an important role as a source of weapons and hub for arms brokers.

Asked about the Alguns’ buy-up of Albania’s aging stockpiles, Pieter Wezeman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a leading source of information on arms transfers, believes it is unlikely Bulgaria was the final destination for the munitions given its age.

He said this equipment would likely have ended up in Syria, Yemen or perhaps Africa.

“There are several possible scenarios,” Wezeman explained. “One is that this goes to Syria or Yemen. Another is that some corrupt officials in Africa buy it as part of a fraudulent scheme. Surplus weapons do quite well in Africa for legitimate exports, although corruption is often suspected.”

SOCOM did not respond directly to questions on whether it had purchased Chinese ammunition from Albania as part of its Syrian programme, saying only that reporters should “speak with Alguns about their activities”.

US firms are banned from buying Chinese ammunition, unless a special dispensation from the State Department is obtained.

Alguns refused to explain what it had done with the equipment once it had arrived in Bulgaria.

Purple Shovel told BIRN in a written statement that it has “never knowingly purchased Chinese equipment or components” and “has never done business with Allguns [sic] directly”.

Tirana has a troubled track record with arms exports from its large stockpiles of Chinese ammunitions, supplied in the 1960s and 70s when Beijing was Albania’s main military backer during communist rule.

In 2007, Florida-based arms broker AEY sold millions of aging, Chinese-made cartridges to the Pentagon for use in Afghanistan.  The bullets had been repackaged in cardboard boxes to look as if they had been produced in Albania in order to sidestep a ban on munitions from China. The firm’s owner, Efraim Diveroli, was given a four year jail sentence for the fraud in 2011.

And in 2011, 800,000 rounds of Chinese ammunition which were due to be delivered from Albania to the United Arab Emirates were illegally diverted to Libyan rebels.

Albania’s Ministry of Defence said that Alguns had provided the correct documents to export the weapons to Bulgaria and that it had verified the firm was “not involved in criminal activity”. It added that any re-export of the ammunition required their consent, although it is widely documented that this clause is often not fulfilled.

Alguns ties to Albania appear to go beyond buying up aging ammunition as it also sought to secure a lease to a communist-era weapons factory in the small Albanian town of Polican. But in a written statement given to BIRN, it said it had dropped the plan.

This investigation was produced by BIRN in cooperation with OCCRP as a part of Paper Trail to Better Governance project.

New Ways For Financing Vaccination In Indonesia – OpEd

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During autumn of 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that a vaccine to prevent Dengue Fever was available for people across the world aged 9 to 16 years old. This should have been exceptionally welcome news in Indonesia, where Dengue has affected more than 120,000 people at a cost of roughly US$323 million annually1. Accordingly, in September of last year, Indonesia’s Food and Drug Monitoring Agency approved the Dengue vaccine, making it widely available in the private market.

Unfortunately, the nation of 257 million people living across over 900 islands, continues to see its national coverage rates below the global average. Its vaccine delivery system has been plagued by several major hurdles including a strained public health infrastructure, the lack of a centralized body to manage vaccine procurement and delivery, and mixed public acceptance of immunization campaigns following a recent counterfeit vaccine scandal.

Unsurprisingly, Indonesia’s most significant challenge to vaccine delivery is cost. Although expenses related to the eight compulsory vaccines in Indonesia’s immunization program are covered by universal health care, vaccines for illnesses that fall outside of that program – such as Dengue – must be purchased out-of-pocket, an unaffordable option for many vulnerable, low-income communities.

According to a 2016 WHO report, the Indonesian government funds 83 percent of the total expenditures for routine vaccinations, with external donors like the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) stepping in for the rest. However, as Indonesia grows into a middle-income country, it is set to transition away from GAVI support and achieve full self-financing by 2018.

Today, Indonesia experiences the highest number of Dengue cases per year in the Southeast Asia region. This despite the fact that vaccinations for the disease would cost only US$26 million, a mere 8 percent of the current annual cost of the disease. Gaps in funding, particularly with the transition from GAVI support, could lead to even greater disruptions in scheduled immunizations and ever higher rates of vaccine-preventable diseases.

Innovative Funding Solutions to Overcome Delivery Barriers

Milken Institute Asia is examining potential models to address barriers to vaccination delivery. In a workshop organized in July 2016 by the Institute, health practitioners discussed financing options that introduce new sources of capital and leverage public sector funding to attract private investment, such as pooled procurement funds, development impact bonds, and conditional cash transfer programs. Full details of the solutions discussed are available in the report, “New Models for Financing Vaccination Programs in Southeast Asia”.

A pooled procurement fund engages public and private sources to establish sustained funding for procuring new vaccines that are otherwise too costly to obtain. Donors, such as bilateral and multilateral agencies or foundations, first seed the fund. Various local companies, like natural resource industries with a history of supporting community projects, then match the donations through their corporate social responsibility programs. In addition to their funding commitments, the donors also can use their collective bargaining power to access a stable supply of new vaccines at lower costs.

Development impact bond models can be used to address the shortage of qualified health care workers to administer vaccines. In this model, investors pay an existing intermediary like UNICEF to provide grants to scale up existing programs for the training and retention of health care workers. Those who benefit from the improved effectiveness of vaccination service delivery, such as the government, then pass their cost savings back to the investors. This model is useful when a measurable link can be established between an intervention and its cost-savings outcome. The challenge lies in mitigating the risk for investors who bear the burden of an unsuccessful program.

Conditional cash transfer programs provide cash or in-kind payments such as staple food items to families who bring their children in for vaccinations. This type of campaign, led by both the government and industry, can increase public awareness for and trust in the benefits of vaccinations. These programs incent families to engage in behavioral changes that have positive long-term implications for their children’s health and, potentially, the families’ overall socioeconomic situation.

Catalyzing Action, Now

The continued economic burden of vaccine-preventable disease, compounded by Indonesia’s upcoming transition away from GAVI support, requires urgent action. Philanthropists, private investors, and the government alike must be galvanized into implementing funding solutions along the vaccine delivery chain – and Indonesia’s timely approval of the dengue vaccine may prove to be the much needed catalyst. New and sustainable sources of vaccine financing are needed to pave the way making life-saving vaccines accessible to all citizens.

About the Authors:
Belinda Chng, Lena Sun and Dr. Jarir At Thobar
i are respectively, Director of Policy and Programs, Princeton-in-Asia Fellow at the Milken Institute Asia, and Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Gadjah Mada. This piece is adapted from the Milken Institute’s Financial Innovation Lab report on “New Models for Financing Vaccination Programs in Southeast Asia”. The authors can be reached at bchng@milkeninstitute.org, lsun@milkeninstitute.org and j.atthobari@gmail.com.

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