By Eduard Abrahamyan*

(FPRI) — Montenegro’s recent accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sent an important political message to Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors: NATO’s door remains open to new members no matter the security environment. This signal will likely propel many post-Soviet countries to revitalize their relationships with the Alliance. In particular, it will likely trigger the resumption of discussions over Georgia’s almost two decades-long bid for NATO membership.

Since 2002, close strategic cooperation with the United States and a determined pursuit of NATO membership have comprised the key pillars of Georgia’s security policy. With Alliance membership constituting a top priority objective, Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations have become a critical instrument in its foreign policy decision making. Notably, these aspirations serve as a framework for Tbilisi’s regional relationships: Georgia has cultivated good, neighborly relations with Alliance member Turkey and NATO partners, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Conversely, Russia’s vocal antagonism toward NATO enlargement has contributed to Georgia’s hostile relations with its large neighbor to the north.

Georgia’s threat perception is laid out clearly in two strategic documents: the National Security Concept and the Strategic Defense Review (2017-2020). These documents articulate that Russia’s destructive posture vis-à-vis Georgia’s breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the prospect of a Russian military incursion constitute the country’s chief security threats. While the Georgian government invests in its deterrence and defense capabilities to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the size of Tbilisi’s defense budget ($310 million in 2017, including a $32.5 million loan for arms procurement), does not allow for substantial acquisition of new equipment and advanced weapon systems. The need to restructure personnel also will likely slow the modernization and professionalization of Georgian land forces.

Georgia’s Evolving Role in NATO’s Black Sea Security Architecture

Sharing key interests and core values with its Western counterparts, Georgia spares no effort in becoming a full-fledged member of the West’s political and security institutions. Not only has Georgia made remarkable advancements in its integration with the European Union, but Tbilisi also enjoys sustained support from and comprehensive integration with NATO. At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, Georgia was one of five countries chosen for Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EOP) status under NATO’s newly launched Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII). This effort, intended to deepen NATO’s connections with its valued partners, outlines tailor-made enhanced cooperation opportunities for each selected country. For Georgia, the agreement stipulates the extended presence of NATO military specialists on its soil along with regular political consultations and information sharing with the Alliance. It allows Georgia to host Alliance-sponsored military training facilities and to participate in multi-purpose combat missions by contributing to the NATO Response Force (NRF).

The EOP effectively provides all of the privileges that Alliance members receive except for the collective security umbrella enshrined in Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Thus, while Georgia has yet to become a full-fledged member of the Alliance, it is nonetheless exceedingly considered an important element of NATO’s strategic planning and security concept for its south-eastern European flank. Accordingly, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session held in Tbilisi on May 26-29, 2017, Alliance officials clearly articulated that since security in the South Caucasus is crucial for the Euro-Atlantic community, political and practical support to Georgia must be expanded.

Prior to this session, Georgia similarly hosted the NATO Military Committee in early March 2017 to discuss the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). An initiative endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit, the SNGP entails a set of measures designed to bolster Georgia’s defense capabilities by developing closer security cooperation with members of the Alliance. It comprises support at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels and endeavours to hone Georgian armed forces’ defensive skills via joint training missions, such as the annual “Agile Spirit” military drills. Much of this cooperation takes place under the guise of the Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) in Krtsanisi, Georgia, an element of the SNGP established in 2015. Tbilisi is further set to build additional infrastructure to be utilized as assets for the Alliance in line with training sites in Vaziani and Senaki. In particular, the establishment of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) akin to the same-purpose center operating at the U.S. base in Hohenfels, Germany, was announced in early April. The U.S.-Georgia JMRC will be located at the Vaziani facilities and will be up and running by mid-2018.

The sustained involvement of NATO countries in assisting the reform of Georgia’s armed forces has culminated in the “More NATO in Georgia and more Georgia in NATO” concept, articulated by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at the JTEC inauguration. This concept represents somewhat of an alternative to a Membership Action Plan (MAP)— discussion of which was notably absent during Stoltenberg’s visit to Georgia—insomuch as it provides all of the necessary instruments that the MAP recommends, but avoids a clear strain between NATO members and Russia that the extension of the MAP would entail.

Circumventing concerns about Russian backlash, the implementation of NATO reform programs through the “More NATO in Georgia” concept has received robust support within the Alliance. To date, this approach seems the most foolproof option for underpinning Georgia’s institutional resilience by implementing all the required reforms to conform to NATO criteria. The measures derived from the “More NATO in Georgia” approach have boosted Georgia’s defense and deterrence capabilities; however, it has not mitigated the security challenge presented by Russia’s assertiveness.

With regard to the NATO Response Force initiative, since joining in September 2015, Georgia has carried out the Operational Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme (OCC E&F) that enables troops to be trained and fielded under NRF command. By successfully completing intensive exercises simulated on a mock battlefield, the “Alpha” Company of the 12^th Light Infantry Battalion, the 4^th Mechanized Brigade, and the “Charlie” Company of the 12^th Infantry Battalion, 1^st Infantry Brigade received 2^nd-level qualification to be used in NATO rapid operations for three years. As such, these units, comprised of Georgian personnel, are now at NATO’s disposal and can be deployed to reinforce vulnerable Alliance flanks when needed.

However, above all, Georgia’s progress is exemplified in the evolution of the NATO-Georgia bilateral relationship into a new multilateral format. The NATO-Georgia structure has transformed into an important stage for providing other Alliance partners with sustained access to NATO facilities and training opportunities located within Georgia. By becoming a hub for NATO’s deepening practical collaboration with partners, Georgia has developed into an important platform for the Alliance in the Black Sea region.

During its visit to Georgia in late March 2017, the NATO Military Committee highly praised Georgia’s progress in security sector reforms via the 15 current SNGP projects. The committee’s comments clearly illustrated NATO’s perception of the SNGP as an essential investment in Georgia’s security. After all, Georgia’s enhanced security in recent years can largely be attributed to the almost regular presence of Allied troops in the country for bilateral or multilateral drills.

Just days prior to the NATO meeting, the Georgian Defense Ministry announced plans for the “Noble Partner-2017” multinational drills, scheduled to occur on July 30, 2017. These NATO-backed drills will combine troops from eleven different countries, including Georgia’s neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, pleased with Georgia’s progress to date and aware that the development of Georgia’s infrastructure is inextricably linked to NATO’s Black Sea power projection, the NATO Military Committee announced its intent to increase the number of SNGP projects to 20 by the end of 2018.

At the same time, Tbilisi is progressively adapting to the evolving security environment in the wider region, seeking to be drawn into NATO’s Black Sea maritime initiatives. Since the 2014 Wales Summit, Georgia has emerged as a key participant in NATO’s dialogue about increasing its presence in the Black Sea. Specifically, Georgia is working with the Alliance to discuss strategies for reinforcing NATO’s maritime capabilities in line with the 2016 Tailored Forward Presence initiative in Romania and Bulgaria.

In February 2017, negotiations between Georgian Defense Minister Levan Izoria and Brussels paved the way for Georgia’s concrete participation in NATO’s Black Sea initiatives. These negotiations further granted Romania a “supervisor” role in overseeing Georgia’s involvement. Possibly as a result of Georgian-Romanian consultations, the Alliance has accepted Georgia’s proposal to renovate its Poti seaport to make it accessible to NATO vessels. Georgian Chief of General Staff Major General Vladimir Chachibaia discussed this issue specifically in a news conference on March 2. Speaking of NATO’s potential support for strengthening Georgia’s and Ukraine’s naval capabilities, the Brigadier General emphasized the strategic importance of establishing infrastructure capable of serving NATO vessels given the restrictions outlined in the Montreux Convention of 1936. This initiative, in conjunction with Ukraine’s plan to purchase warships from NATO states, will enhance the strategic value of the Alliance’s partners in the Black Sea. Commending Georgia as one of the Alliance’s most valued partners, during a visit to Tbilisi in May 2017, NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General Rose Gottemoeller underscored Georgia’s critical role in helping the Alliance “form a deep understanding of the security situation in the Black Sea region.”

In regard to Georgia’s military cooperation with the United States, on April 11, Minister Izoria reported that a new round of the U.S.-sponsored “Georgia Train and Equip Program” will be launched in March 2018 with the goal of establishing at least nine NATO-standard rifle battalions. In addition to increased military-to-military cooperation, the political-economic relationship between the United States and Georgia is also deepening.

Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili’s visit to Washington, D.C. this past May resulted in President Donald Trump signing a legislative act that recognizes Georgia’s breakaway regions as occupied by Russia. However, considering President Trump’s uncertain stance on NATO, it remains unclear as to whether the United States will vocalize support for Georgia’s NATO bid during Defense Secretary James Mattis’ expected reciprocal visit to Tbilisi. The visit of Vice President Mike Pence to Tbilisi is now scheduled for late July, suggesting that the Trump administration is paying more attention to Georgia’s role in the region. Though the U.S. president approved NATO’s recent expansion in the Balkans, his unpredictable relationship with the Alliance might present an obstacle to Georgia’s pro-Western path.

For this reason, Tbilisi seeks to demonstrate to the Trump administration that Georgia is not the troublemaker country that it was perceived to be in the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Rather, as the U.S. recalibrates its foreign policy priorities, Georgia has supported U.S. interests in the Black Sea region through its partnership with NATO. While membership in the Alliance remains a distant prospect for Georgia, the “More NATO in Georgia” approach integrates the aspirant country into NATO’s orbit without granting official status.

Rhetoric versus Tangible Support

Considering mounting tensions between Russia and the West, Washington’s historically vocal support for Georgia’s NATO bid has only exacerbated Georgia’s security environment. As Russia asserts itself more aggressively in its Near Abroad, any improper or untimely voice backing Georgia’s NATO accession appears risky and, in some sense, provocative. Given that NATO has expanded exercises in Georgia in response to Russia’s increased presence in the Black Sea, such rhetoric makes Russia uncomfortable about Georgia’s NATO prospects.

Nevertheless, this dynamic does not mean that NATO should retract its political support for Georgia nor abandon Georgia’s membership prospects. On the contrary, the United States should stand firm in its commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty and use its weight in international forums to protect the country’s territorial integrity from Russian aggression. Losing Georgia as an Eastern European democracy and the West’s sole strategic pillar in the South Caucasus would severely impair the United States’ standing in the region and buttress Russia’s strategic advantage. Additionally, authoritarian backsliding in Georgia would advance Moscow’s goal of discrediting liberal Euro-Atlantic values and causing discord within the transatlantic community.

Despite various programs to train Georgian troops and reform the country’s armed forces, no significant measures have been taken to assist in the modernization of Georgia’s military inventory. As NATO’s mission has evolved in the post-Cold War era to focus primarily on peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, the Alliance’s military needs have similarly adapted. Rather than requiring partners to participate in full-scale combat operations, today, the Alliance increasingly needs partners capable of urgently contributing troops to smaller-scale crisis management missions. As a result, less attention has been paid to modernizing Georgian military equipment.

Ultimately, the United States must redefine its approach vis-à-vis Georgia. Specifically, it should adopt the approach that Russia uses to reward its allies in the region, namely supplying technical assistance and state-of-the-art military equipment at non-market prices. Unlike Russia’s allies, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan, who receive low-cost, up-to-date arms from Moscow, Georgia cannot afford to replace its obsolete Soviet equipment, so key NATO members should consider selling discounted defense equipment to Georgia.

Georgia is currently in the process of applying for a costly military loan from France to purchase a Vertical Launch MICA short-range, ground-based air defense system. This loan will place a substantial burden on the country’s relatively humble defense budget. Deals of this sort should be supported by the comprehensive implementation of the U.S.-Georgia 2016 framework agreement on security cooperation. Moreover, the Memorandum on Deepening the Defense and Security Partnership signed by then-Secretary Kerry and Prime Minister Kvirikashvili in July 2016 creates a legal basis for providing substantial aid, including a wide-range of advanced arms, to boost Georgia’s security. Material and technical support under these preferential terms will enable NATO to aid Georgian security in the event of conflict reescalation with Russia and will further instill the Georgian population with pride in being a valued U.S. and NATO partner in the South Caucasus region.

At this critical juncture in Black Sea security dynamics, the United States and NATO must bear in mind that rhetoric alone is futile. Rather, it provokes adversaries and further endangers the West’s valued partners in the region. Instead, NATO should continue to build up its strategic partners, enhancing both troop operability and aiding the acquisition of modern military equipment. By adopting tactics similar to those of Russia in order to shape special relationships with Georgia, and even Ukraine, NATO can diminish the nervousness of its partners. Unlike empty words, these meaningful forms of reassurance will demonstrate to NATO’s Black Sea partners the tangible benefit of standing with the Alliance.

About the author:
*Eduard Abrahamyan is a defense and security policy analyst and doctoral research fellow at the University of Leicester, UK

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

By Scott Englund*

A diverse battlefront runs from nightclubs in Florida and Paris, along the Mediterranean coast of France, through the Bosphorus Strait and among the shadowy discourses of online propagandists. It continues in the sieges of Iraqi and Syrian towns, through the ruins of Afghanistan, and deep in the jungles of the Philippines. While this varied topography presents a challenge, similar threats have been confronted before. Pundits, politicians, academics, and journalists frequently remind whoever may be listening that the United States and its allies face an enemy that is rigidly committed to a radical ideology in which the old political orders of liberalism, democracy, and a system of sovereign states will be torn down and replaced.1 This description, however, could apply equally to the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War 70 years ago and to the present global phenomenon of Salafi jihadism, the ideology that motivates terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State, al Qaeda, and associated groups. Examining the West’s understanding and response to the ideology of communism and the Soviet Union and comparing them to the threat posed by Salafi Jihadism provides a lens that can help shape a practical and credible response to current threats. This article applies the strategy of containment at the beginning of the Cold War to the current threat of Salafi jihadism.

Just as containment was successfully deployed against the threat of Soviet-style communism in the Cold War, it may serve as an effective strategy against the present ideological struggle against jihadist terror organizations. Published anonymously as “X” in a 1947 Foreign Affairs article, George Kennan described a strategy for the ideological battle of his day that later came to be known as containment.2 Applying Kennan’s prescription to Salafi jihadism means persistent, patient pressure and unified resolve to counter perceived Salafist expansionism. In containing an idea, what Kennan called “superfluous gestures” and “outward histrionics” are counterproductive. Such political restraint, however, proved difficult to come by in a super-charged U.S. Presidential campaign. Promises by some candidates to quickly eradicate groups like the Islamic State through large-scale military action may make headlines, but these promises are disingenuous, misleading, and perhaps reveal a misunderstanding of the threat posed by groups like the Islamic State. Even after their inevitable military defeat, jihadi terror groups will still pose a threat to security in the Middle East and elsewhere. This article first reviews Kennan’s containment strategy, then turns to compare Salafi jihadism to the Soviet system that inspired Kennan’s 1947 analysis, noting some critical differences, and then applies containment to the jihadist threat.

Kennan’s Containment

Though jihadi groups represent a challenge to the peace and security of the Middle East and threaten terrorist violence abroad, one cannot conclude that this is either wholly unique and unprecedented or that the challenge they present is insurmountable. Their absolutist ideology and unwavering hostility to liberal political institutions is also nothing new. In 1947, George Kennan wrote of the Soviet Union:

subjectively these men [Soviet leaders] probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtlessly believed—and found it easy to believe—that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable.3

Kennan drew parallels between the Kremlin under Joseph Stalin and a religious order, operating in a world where the forces of good (the Soviets) would, through the inevitable progress of history, overcome the forces of evil (the global capitalist order):

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right. . . . On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. . . . Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient.4

In confronting an uncompromising ideological opponent, one should expect that challenges to their motivating ideology would be either disregarded or subsumed into the narrative of a decaying, corrupt governing political order. Kennan observed:

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism.5

According to Kennan, Soviet leaders believed themselves to be absolutely powerful at home and infallible in their interpretation and application of their ideology; they could rest assured of their inevitable victory, and could not be criticized from without. The Soviets were a formidable ideological opponent; the political-ideological dimension of the challenge the Soviet Union posed immediately after World War II was greater than the threat they posed to the physical security of people beyond its immediate influence.

Kennan’s prescription for foreign policy under such circumstances is now well known: “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” He cautioned that “such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness.’”6 He suggested that the United States create in the world an image of consistency, harmony, and peaceful prosperity:

It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.7

He cautioned that disunity is a balm to one’s opponents in an ideological battle: “by the same token, exhibition of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect.”8

Kennan’s prescription for patiently squeezing the Soviets was sometimes criticized as being not aggressive enough. It was, after all, a strategy for containing and eventually strangling the Soviet Union, not abruptly destroying it. Applying containment to the present struggle against jihadism may be similarly criticized as not doing enough, but of critical importance are persistence, patience, and consistency along multiple vectors of action (some of which are clandestine), and coordinated efforts with allied states. In a political contest, opponents attempt to create differing visions of a political reality and then try to convince people that the vision they create is preferable. The United States and its allies were arguably better than their Soviet opponents at this kind of competition during the Cold War. In its present conflict with jihadist terror organizations, the United States has been notably less successful.

Since 1947, Kennan’s blueprint for containment has evolved as successive administrations were confronted by the Soviet challenge. For example, Fareed Zakaria argued in 1990 that Ronald Reagan’s administration thought of itself as implementing containment, “but one quite different from any previous version of containment.” He concluded that in spite of its high-risk tendencies, Reagan’s version of containment was successful.9 In a Cold War postmortem, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry argued that over 50 years, with small changes occasionally, “the basic thrust of Western policy toward the [Soviet Union] remained remarkably consistent.”10 They concluded that though containment must have played an important role in the ultimate demise of the Soviet system, it cannot be the sole cause. Writing in 1989, Paul Kreisberg laid out how changes in Soviet economic and military behavior in the late 1980s meant that containment was on its “last gasp” and innovation in U.S. foreign policy was overdue.11 The sudden and unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be attributed to a single cause. However, as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy for six successive administrations, containment served to provide a stabilizing force that contributed to the implosion of the Soviet system.

Kennan later regretted the extent to which his prescription for containing the Soviet threat became dominated by military means at the expense of other avenues. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1987, Kennan sought to contextualize his containment prescription and apply it to the political realities of the late 1980s. When the article was first written as a memo for the new Secretary of Defense in December of 1946, Kennan admitted, “there was no way that Russia could appear to me as a military threat.” What he did see was an “ideological-political threat.”12 The populations of Europe and Asia had been traumatized by World War II and the infrastructure of their societies had been devastated; this made them vulnerable to the political vision of Soviet propagandists. Military conquest was not necessary where people willingly accepted communist promises of a near-to-hand utopia, as was almost the case in Greece and Turkey in 1946.

Kennan’s views on what motivated Soviet aggression changed some over the years. In the final decade of the Soviet system, Kennan was suggesting that an essential element in confronting the Soviets was to seek to understand their perspective and the environment in which they operate.13 Writing in the last years of the 1980s, Kennan suggested, “what most needs to be contained, as I see it, is not so much the Soviet Union as the weapons race itself.”14 Furthermore, “the first thing we Americans need to learn to contain is, in some ways, ourselves; our own environmental destructiveness, our tendency to live beyond our means and to borrow ourselves into disaster.”15 Of course, war is sometimes necessary—Kennan was no pacifist. What Thomas Schelling called the “diplomacy of violence” is a legitimate means of achieving a political outcome in some cases.16 Properly accomplished, containment keeps the widest array of policy options open to ultimately defeat jihadism.

Black Is the New Red

No analogy is perfect, but this does not limit the utility of comparison. In this section, Salafi jihadism is compared to the Soviet ideology Kennan confronted in 1946. First, and perhaps most obviously, communism is a distinct political ideology borne of an economic theory, while Salafi jihadism is a religious interpretation of sacred texts. This important distinction does not render comparison useless, however. In both cases, a core belief system drives and constrains behavior. Importantly, both the communists of the past and the jihadists of the present wage a battle they believe will shape the future of the world. Both belief systems assure their adherents of inevitable success. For the communists, their victory would be a result of the forces of history, and for Salafi jihadists, their victory is divine destiny.

In both cases, local political considerations shaped the manner in which their beliefs were adopted and adapted. Vladimir Lenin’s Russia was different from Mao Zedong’s China, which was different from Abimael Guzmán’s Shining Path in Peru; each had distinct features that differed across place and time, each had unique political and social forces that drove different applications of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Similarly, local sociopolitical conditions shape how the dominant Salafi ideology is manifested through the constellation of terrorist organizations that assert its religious superiority. In spite of some differences in application, a core belief system that inalterably divides the world into two oppositional camps remains.

Other important differences should be noted: no jihadist terror organization possesses the massive industrial complex and economy the Soviets did; though the Islamic State has successfully seized modern military equipment, nothing they have compares to the massive Soviet Red Army. Secondly, though eventually the Soviet nuclear force actually posed an existential threat to the United States and its allies, presently no terror group poses such a threat—in spite of claims made by some political leaders. Thirdly, the Soviets had a rigid, centralized structure for interpreting Marxism-Leninism and possessed the power to demand loyalty to that interpretation—not that schisms did not exist, notably the break between Soviet and Maoist systems. Presently, no single jihadist group can legitimately claim to dictate its interpretation of orthodoxy to others, though many rivals have attempted to do so. In fact, the declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic State was denounced by al Qaeda leadership and organizations affiliated with al Qaeda.17

However, similarities between Salafi jihadist organizations and the Soviets deserve some attention and can help policymaking. Just as Marxism-Leninism sought the establishment of global socialism and the ascendance of the proletariat through revolution, Salafi jihadism expects to spread its authority through violence in order to replace a corrupt, decadent order.18 Like the Soviets 70 years ago, jihadist terrorist organizations capitalize on upended political orders, the chaos that accompanies and follows open warfare, and public anxiety: “[Whole nations] had just been seriously destabilized, socially, spiritually and politically, by the experiences of the recent war. Their populations were dazed, shell-shocked, uncertain of themselves, fearful of the future, highly vulnerable.”19 Written by Kennan to describe Europe and Asia after World War II, it could just as easily describe much of the Middle East and North Africa now, as well as Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the southern reaches of the Arabian Peninsula.

As was argued by Robert Hutchings in Foreign Policy 12 years ago, the phenomena of al Qaeda and Soviet communism were born of political circumstance and sustained by a commitment to a particular ideology.20 For Salafi jihadists and the communists in the Kremlin, the correct application of ideology is key to correcting political imbalance and restoring political Islam and Russia, respectively, to their rightful place of leadership in the global order. The ideological dimension of jihadi groups is often discussed, but too often considered separately from the more tangible dimensions of the threat of violence they pose, the mayhem they cause in the territories where they operate, or funding and supply-chain logistical issues. Properly understood, ideology is central to the existence of any of the jihadist terror groups, justifying and explaining both means and end. It has been argued that al Qaeda is more than an organization, but is representative of a myth and an ideology, which is being immortalized as Nazism and Marxism-Leninism was in the 20th century.21

Salafi jihadism claims to represent an ideological purification and correction, and repentance from prior errors; ultimate victory over the present decadent and decaying order is only a matter of time and piety. Salafism is a relatively modern interpretation, being traced to the 19th-century Iranian scholar Jamal al din al Afghani. It is revivalist, seeking to interpret contemporary events through original Islamic principles. Afghani sought to understand how Islam, which had been dominant for so long and produced so much wealth, could have fallen behind and was now subject to Western imperial projects.22 Both the Islamic State and al Qaeda embrace Wahhabi-Salafism, which focuses on the elimination of idolatry (shirk) and affirming the oneness (tawhid) of God. Its adherents view themselves to be the only “true” Muslims and they engage in the practice of takfir, or declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers.23

A schism has developed between al Qaeda and the Islamic State, although they both agree on the central principles of Salafi jihadism; their differences center on long-term strategy and local tactics. Al Qaeda takes a long view of restoring the caliphate; the Islamic State is committed to its tactics of hyper-violence, even against fellow Muslims, and sees benefits to its high-risk, incendiary style. Al Qaeda sought to attack and disrupt what it viewed as the “far enemy,” the West, and to chase it from Muslim lands. The Islamic State chose to attack the “near enemy” in order to quickly establish its caliphate.24

Political, temporal victory is integral to spiritual revival and ascendancy. An Islamic State spokesperson made its political objectives clear:

We inform the Muslims that, with the announcement of the caliphate, it has become obligatory for all Muslims to give bay’a and support to Caliph Ibrahim. Void is the legitimacy of all emirates, groups, administrations, and organizations to which his [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s] authority extends and his army comes.25

Violence is inherent to their ideology, as interpreted by al-Baghdadi who, in May of 2015, declared:

O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet (peace be upon him) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation. . . . He fought both the Arabs and non-Arabs in all their various colors. He himself left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for a day grew tired of war.26

Salafi jihadism, therefore, combines the puritanical strains of the Wahhabi tradition with a commitment to violence in pursuit of political ascendency. Violence is necessary to create utopia; in some cases, as with the leaders of the Islamic State, religious warfare provides the opening notes of the apocalypse.27

Applying Containment

Kennan’s 70-year-old advice can be fruitfully applied to the present ideological conflict. The intervening years have suggested that Kennan’s read of Soviet conduct exaggerated their expansionist strategy, but given the Kremlin’s inscrutability and open hostility at the time he wrote, his urgency may be forgiven. It may not be possible to deter an organization like the jihadi terror groups the same way that the Soviet Union and Stalin—a realist with an instinct for institutional survival—were deterred. However, Kennan’s principal stricture was patient resolve in containing and squeezing the perceived threat from international communism. Swagger, grand gestures, fruitless engagements were contraindicated. Kennan understood that in open warfare the Soviet Union could not be defeated without great cost, and skirmishes would likewise harden their resolve. Instead, persistent containment through positive example, negative consequences for bad behavior, and above all, unified action and harmony, were advised. Political competition is natural in liberal democratic societies, but the current level of discord in the United States and Europe must comfort jihadi ideologues in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

Just as it took 44 years from when Kennan’s “X” article was published before the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and their ilk will likely present challenges for many years. The important question is how well the threat they pose can be managed and reduced in the interim. Its fight against radical terrorist groups has forced U.S. military planners to rethink what “winning” looks like as it confronts the challenges posed by terror groups spread across the globe, and notably active in Syria and Iraq.28

To differing degrees, the Islamic State and al Qaeda play a three-level game: first, a clandestine transnational effort to infiltrate Western states and commit terrorist acts; second, a propaganda program designed to win support in areas where they assert some level of influence; and finally, a military campaign to take and hold territory. During the Cold War, the Soviets (and arguably, the United States) followed a similar multilevel effort to undermine opposition governments with acceptable levels of deniability, win hearts and minds openly where it could, and engage in military action only where necessary, through proxies if available. Containing Salafi jihadism requires a similar strategy: first, intelligence-driven efforts to detect, disrupt, and destroy jihadi terror operations; second, laying bare jihadi groups’ own hypocrisy, contradictions, and immorality both to undermine their ideological authority and to drive a wedge between it and potential supporters; and finally, fighting it in the open only where absolutely necessary, killing jihadi leaders and destroying terrorist financial and material infrastructure.

First, detect and disrupt clandestine plots to carry out terrorist attacks outside “hot” battlefields through an intelligence-driven effort, relying on well-placed human intelligence assets, appropriately tasked technical assets, and disciplined, rigorous analysis. Today’s Intelligence Community was designed and built to contain the Soviet threat. During the Cold War, intelligence activities flourished in a classic head-to-head contest with the Soviet Union. Assets were recruited over cocktails, microfilm was left in dead-drops, spy planes flew overhead, covert operations changed the political map abroad, while back home there was little oversight, and the American people knew almost nothing of what was happening. An instructor with the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II predecessor to today’s Central Intelligence Agency, is famously supposed to have said that their ideal candidate was a “Ph.D. who can win a bar fight,” and the same is true today. In today’s fight, recruits will likely need to have spent considerable time living and working abroad in dangerous places; they might not have a spotless record or have the smoothest path to security clearance adjudication. The difficult, disciplined, and quiet work of intelligence is just as important now as it was in the Cold War, and requires patient investment and cultivation.

Presently, intelligence is a very public topic, and the people (and Congress) want results. Much of intelligence still needs to be done quietly, however, and “serving in silence” remains the ideal. In today’s fight against jihadism, the same principles will apply, though the settings may look different. Clandestine service officers need to be recruited and trained, human assets need months of development, analysts with rigorous methodological skills must be employed. Gone are the days of Embassy parties; today’s intelligence needs to be done in tents, on horseback, with dangerous people. Analysts, formerly confined to cubicles in a headquarters building, need to be deployed to the field. Intelligence collection at home is perhaps just as important as collecting abroad, as recent “homegrown” jihadist attacks have proved. Surveillance in aid of detecting the potential radicalization of individuals will push the legal limits of a liberal democratic society.

Secondly, deploy an effective counter-propaganda operation and lay bare jihadi contradictions, exaggerations, and hypocrisy. The varied sociopolitical geography of Salafi jihadism will require a finely tuned approach. Any message originating in the United States will be immediately discredited. Therefore, overt U.S. Government projects should not be considered. Covert counter-information operations will need to be given priority.29 This effort will lean heavily on intelligence gathered in the field. The people who produce such messages need to know the local language, the local idioms and slang, the jokes, the history, and the taboos. The right message, delivered in the right way, to the right people requires much effort—and mistakes will be made. Attention needs to be turned home, as well as abroad. The most cost-effective means of carrying out a terror attack in the United States is to convince a disaffected young person to use his own resources to wreak havoc at home. Even if defeated militarily, the online presence of jihadist groups may persist; eliminating or neutralizing the radicalizing effects of these groups may prove to be the most challenging.

Part of this effort will be to avoid giving too much credit to jihadist groups that will inspire attacks against civilian targets in the United States and allied countries. Because terrorism at its core relies on an emotional response on the part of the witnesses to violence, the best counterterrorism policies necessarily require two distinguishable, but related tasks: first, actually reducing the risk of an attack, and secondly, making people feel more secure. Underlining and reinforcing radical linkages between an individual who acts in the name of a Salafi jihadist organization does little but unrealistically amplify that organization’s operational effectiveness. An act of violence that both inflicts harm and raises the profile of the group that inspired the violence is a double-win for the terrorist organization. An effective domestic communication plan, therefore, includes elements directed toward preventing people from choosing to commit acts of violence while resisting the urge to over-hype the combat effectiveness of an organization that may inspire violence.

Finally, fight openly only when absolutely necessary, limiting exposure, and relying on proxies wherever possible. Using drones to kill jihadi leadership and technical experts (especially those responsible for media operations) are important tactical victories, but they do not, on their own, constitute a counterterrorism strategy. In containing the Soviets, only twice (on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam) was a corps-size force deployed to combat, and never in direct contact with the Red Army. Much smaller, detached units of advisors or special operations forces units were sparingly deployed. Routine naval and air patrols were far more likely to make contact with their Soviet counterparts, but were never required to engage. Nuclear deterrence, and an approach to open warfare that was inculcated by the destruction wrought by World War II, meant military engagement was restrained, indirect, and respectfully cautious.

In the 15 years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has deployed two force-size armies to two different theaters of operation and has maintained deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan up to the present day. According to a RAND study, as of 2011, to support Operations Iraqi Freedom (and follow-on operations) and Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Army alone supplied over 1.5 million Soldier-years (that is, one Soldier deployed for 1 year, or 2 Soldiers deployed for 6 months, each). The total Soldier-years of all Services exceed 2.3 million. The same RAND report assessed that only 4 percent (or 20,000) of the Active component of the U.S. Army has not deployed and are available to do so.30 As of September 2016, in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, over 6,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Iraq, and according to the Defense Department, it spends on average $12.3 million every day on the combined joint task force.31 This is unsustainable. Smaller is better in the present fight. The complexity of the battlefield in Syria is a prime example of how U.S. forces can be dragged into settling scores among long-feuding local factions. Success against Salafi jihadism requires policymakers to lean on intelligence, deploy conventional forces only when absolutely necessary, and respect the long-term commitment of military action when it is employed.

Conclusion

Important, though admittedly less exciting, debates will need to happen about precisely when and where the United States absolutely must fight, or what is and is not legal or ethical in collecting the intelligence it needs. The real work of counterterrorism is often quiet, behind-the-scenes, and away from the public’s eye. Open warfare in Iraq and Syria may achieve one goal: the disintegration of the Islamic State’s leadership and its ability to wage an insurgency, but it will not contain the transnational threat remnant jihadi groups may pose. Clear-eyed and unafraid, the work of defeating jihadi terror will mean careful analysis of threats, assessments of countermeasure effectiveness, then the application of the appropriate tools to a well-defined threat.

Like Stalin’s Kremlin in 1947, the leaders of Salafist jihadist groups around the globe believe themselves to be locked in a world-altering battle in which they will inevitably be victorious. As Kennan advised, the longer the rest of the world can deny them any semblance of victory and lay bare their own hypocrisy and contradictions, then the end of this particular challenge is achievable through patient, thoughtful opposition and defense. “Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this,” concluded Kennan.32

About the authors:
*Dr. Scott Englund is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Orfalea Center for Global International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 86, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:
1 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

2 George Kennan [as X], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947), 566–582.

3 Ibid., 569.

4 Ibid., 572–573.

5 Ibid., 570.

6 Ibid., 575.

7 Ibid., 575.

8 Ibid., 581–582.

9 Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105 (Autumn 1990), 374.

10 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Who Won the Cold War?” Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992), 131.

11 Paul H. Kreisberg, “Containment’s Last Gasp,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989), 146–163.

12 George Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” Foreign Affairs 65, no. 4 (1987), 885–890.

13 Paul Hollander, “The Two Faces of George Kennan: From Containment to Understanding,” Policy Review (Summer 1985), 28–34.

14 Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” 889.

15 Ibid.

16 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), chapter 1.

17 Thomas F. Lynch III, The Impact of ISIS on Global Salafism and South Asian Jihad (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, August 2015), available at <https://hudson.org/research/11608-the-impact-of-isis-on-global-salafism-and-south-asian-jihad>.

18 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 2015), available at <www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state>.

19 Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” 886.

20 Robert L. Hutchings, “X + 9/11,” Foreign Policy 143 (2004), 70–72.

21 John Turner, “From Cottage Industry to International Organization: The Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergency of the Al Qaeda Ideology,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (September 2010), 541–558.

22 Ibid., 543.

23 Bunzel.

24 Lynch.

25 Ibid., 31.

26 “Islamic State Releases ‘al-Baghdadi Message,’” BBC Online, May 14, 2015, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32744070>.

27 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015).

28 Anna Mulrine, “In Syria, a Test of Obama’s ‘Good Enough’ Military Doctrine,” Christian Science Monitor Online, May 13, 2016, available at <www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2016/0513/In-Syria-a-test-of-Obama-s-good-enough-military-doctrine>.

29 Scott Englund, “Killing Anwar: Targeting Jihadi Propagandists Only Part of the Solution,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2016, available at <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/killing-anwar-targeting-jihadi-propagandists-is-only-part-of-the-solution/>.

30 Dave Baiocchi, Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR145.html>.

31 “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists,” Department of Defense, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve>; Helene Cooper, “U.S. to Send 600 More Troops to Iraq to Help Retake Mosul from ISIS,” New York Times, September 28, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/obama-troops-iraq.html?_r=0>.

32 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 582.

By Gerald M. Steinberg and Joshua Bacon*

In theory, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promote human rights and humanitarian aid are at the opposite pole from terror groups. NGOs gain moral and ethical legitimacy as platforms for promoting the “inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”[1]

However, some prominent NGOs have employed individuals linked to terror organizations, formed alliances with such groups, supported their radical and violent agendas, and channeled humanitarian aid into terror activities. They are also political participants in conflicts, acting on behalf of terror groups or their political wings. These links are inherently incompatible with the emphasis on peace, security, and universal ethics that make up the core of NGO claims to legitimacy and influence.

These NGOs and their supporters must be held morally accountable while funding for these organizations must be critically considered.

NGOs as Political Actors

NGOs with global impact emerged in tandem with the United Nations and were designed to support the norms and institutions of the post-World War II era, including democracy, human rights, and economic development. By 1948, sixty-nine NGOs had formal consultative status at the U.N.; by 2015, the number was over four thousand, many of which emphasized “universal human rights” in their mission statements.[2]

The growth of this “NGO industry” and of power exerted outside democratic and governmental frameworks has been facilitated by large-scale funding, provided both privately and from governments through various humanitarian aid and human rights frameworks. For instance, World Vision, whose Gaza director is accused by Israel of having funneled 60 percent of funds into Hamas coffers, has an annual worldwide budget of $2.8 billion, including major grants from governments.[3]

The European Union’s main democracy and human rights promotion program, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), grants some €160 million annually to 900 NGOs involved in 1,200 projects in over 100 countries.[4] Other NGO funding frameworks include Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the EU delegations and missions located throughout the world.

While NGOs related to human rights and humanitarian aid have different emphases and positions, they exert considerable influence in the media, on governmental policy, and in diplomatic and academic frameworks. This is a direct consequence of the widespread perception that NGOs embody core universal, ethical values and claim to be politically neutral and nonpartisan. In its mission statement, for example, Amnesty International declares that it is “independent of any political ideology, economic interest, or religion.”[5]

NGO officials—from both human rights and humanitarian aid groups—are often given open access and freedom of movement in areas controlled by terror organizations (in return for “taxes” levied by local warlords). These officials are allowed to cross borders in war zones as VIPs, often in the company of their diplomatic sponsors.[6] In some cases, terrorist organizations are able to infiltrate their members into the NGO structure, as allegedly happened in Gaza. In one recent case, the U.N. demanded the release of an employee arrested for allegedly diverting aid to Hamas in Gaza, claiming he enjoyed “diplomatic immunity.”[7]

Post-colonial Ideology and Human Rights Activism

The dominance of post-colonialist ideology among NGO activists is a major factor explaining the moral inversion in which terrorism and violent resistance are considered legitimate while anti-terror self-defense is a war crime.[8] In broad terms, this ideology is based on the division of the world into “victims” and “aggressors” where the empowerment of the former and the weakening of the latter is the path to peace and justice. Western capitalist society is seen as the aggressor while Third World societies (the Global South), including many dictatorships and terrorist movements—such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas—are automatically embraced as perennial victims. Post-colonial agendas are advanced through political advocacy in the name of social justice as well as by the use of violence.

The centrality of post-colonial ideology in the NGO sphere is reflected in their reports and campaigns, which often demonstrate strong support for the pre-defined victims.[9] As such, post-colonial ideologues claim justification for the use of violence in the form of terror attacks, resistance, and armed struggle, including against random civilian targets. In addition, the implementation of counterterrorism by states and military forces to defend civilian populations is systematically opposed and condemned in different soft-power platforms, such as the U.N. Human Rights Council, parliamentary bodies in Western democracies, and the media.

Ideological bias is also reflected in how NGO activities are not dictated by humanitarian needs or specific situations but rather reflect narrow political agendas. These organizations frequently attack Israel while Hezbollah and Palestinian violations of human rights—including terrorism and internal violence—get very little attention from the NGO community or are justified by activists and officials.[10]

Robert Bernstein, the founder of Human Rights Watch (HRW), raised these issues in criticizing his own organization, both in The New York Times in 2009 and in a speech at the University of Nebraska in 2010. Bernstein condemned the organization for focusing mainly on alleged violations of human rights by democratic armies (U.S., NATO, and Israel). He noted that coverage of incidents involving democracies always insinuates that “civilian casualties could have been avoided” while in truth “except with democratic armies, most deaths are civilian.”[11] With regard to terrorist attacks on Israel, Bernstein points out that

[l]eaders of Human Rights Watch know that Hamas and Hezbollah chose to wage war from densely populated areas, deliberately transforming neighborhoods into battlefields. They know that more and better arms are flowing into both Gaza and Lebanon [which] are poised to strike again … Yet Israel, the repeated victim of aggression, faces the brunt of Human Rights Watch’s criticism.[12]

Bernstein also denounced HRW’s adoption of the agendas of “totalitarian or authoritarian” rulers, whose opponents are “imprisoned, tortured, exiled—anything to silence them”—a veiled reference to fundraising in Saudi Arabia and the embrace of the Qaddafi regime as “human rights reformers.” Instead of denouncing these regimes, Bernstein stated, “Human Rights Watch’s Middle East division prepares report after report on Israel,”[13] reflecting the organization’s core ideological bias, in contrast to the claim for legitimacy on the basis of universal values.

This contrast is most clearly manifested in condemnations of Israeli counterterror actions. Allegations of violations include “collective punishment,” “indiscriminate attacks,” “disproportionate force,” “violations of international law,” “war crimes,” etc.[14] At the same time, the activities of Hamas and Hezbollah that are almost exclusively directed against civilian populations, including rocket and missile attacks and mass suicide bombings, receive minimal mention, or when they are reported by some NGOs, there are no campaigns that follow. NGO officials have responded to accusations of hypocrisy by pointing to the “aggressor” Israel’s military power (drones, advanced missiles and more) while dismissing the rockets and other less advanced weaponry used by “victim” terrorist groups.[15]

However, many NGO campaigns are largely political in nature: the BDS movement (boycotts, divestments, and sanctions); universal jurisdiction lawsuits against Israeli officials or against corporations or state entities conducting business with Israel; and lobbying and campaigning at international institutions such as the U.N., the European Parliament, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International Criminal Court (ICC).^[16] The extensive use of legal terms such as “war crimes,” “disproportionate response,” “international humanitarian law,” and other labels reflect aspirational rather than actual norms, but such terms reinforce the appearance of credibility and expertise for NGO claims.

The impact of such NGO campaigns was illustrated in the cases of Jenin in 2002; the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Israel’s security barrier in 2004; the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, and the operations in Gaza—Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), Pillar of Defense in 2012, and Protective Edge in 2014. In each instance, attacks targeting civilians in major population centers in Israel triggered Israeli countermeasures, followed immediately by NGO condemnations alleging Israeli war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the intentional targeting of civilians—based on supposed eyewitness testimony. Media reports and political figures then repeated these unsubstantiated claims without any verification, and the U.N.—particularly the U.N. Refugee Agency—called for international investigations and war crimes trials.

The NGO “halo effect” explains how the media and other actors accept the most unlikely allegations without question. Groups perceived to promote moral principles are protected from investigation, and their claims are taken at face value. One academic studying this phenomenon noted, “There is a widespread attitude that NGOs consist of altruistic people campaigning in the general public interest.”[17]

In 2014, former Associated Press reporter Matti Friedman documented the close ties between reporters and NGO workers in general, and in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. He described this as an “informal alliance,” which “consists of activists and international staffers from the UN and the NGOs; the Western diplomatic corps, particularly in East Jerusalem; and foreign reporters” in which “[m]any foreign journalists have come to see themselves as part of this world of international organizations, and specifically as the media arm of this world.”[18] Hence, NGO claims are generally accepted as credible by the media, the general public, and decision-makers, even in cases when their arguments, allegations, and claims have no factual basis, are unverifiable, or lack legal merit.

Direct Terror Links

The legitimacy and influence of NGOs claiming to promote agendas based on human rights rest on moral claims and appeals to universal ethical principles. Therefore, any links to or cooperation with individuals and groups whose actions are inconsistent with or antithetical to these principles should raise questions regarding credibility. These questions in turn should also be considered by the donors—both state and private—that are essential to these organizations.

In practice, NGO officials often have close ties with terror organizations or their supporters that are largely ignored by funders and allies. Amnesty International, for example, has connections to Hamas and CAGE, a prisoner’s advocacy organization,[19] as well as other groups. In 2007, Amnesty partnered with CAGE and their spokesman Moazzam Begg. CAGE has campaigned for the release of convicted terrorists, such as Anwar al-Awlaki who was involved in the 9/11 terror attacks.[20] Begg is also an alleged Taliban supporter who espouses “jihad in self-defense.”[21] Amnesty has also extended support to Ameer Makhoul, the head of Israel-Arab NGO Ittijah, who was sentenced to nine years in prison for spying for Hezbollah, stating, “Ameer Makhoul’s jailing is a very disturbing development … [He] is well known for his human rights activism on behalf of Palestinians in Israel and those living under Israeli occupation. We fear that this may be the underlying reason for his imprisonment.”[22] In August 2015, it was revealed that Yasmin Hussein, Amnesty International’s former director of faith and human rights and of international advocacy, had links to the Muslim Brotherhood and possibly to Hamas.[23] Before working at Amnesty, Hussein was employed at Islamic Relief Worldwide,[24] an organization banned by Israel for its financial connections to Hamas. Hussein’s husband, Wael Mussabeh, holds a position in the Human Relief Foundation (HRF), which is a member of the Union of Good, an organization also banned for its funding of Hamas.[25] Additionally, HRF listed Qatar Charity as one of its “institutional supporters”; the charity was also named by Osama bin Laden as an al-Qaeda financier.[26]

Similarly, Shawan Jabarin, director of the Palestinian NGO Al-Haq (and a high official of FIDH, the Paris-based parallel to Amnesty), has been repeatedly denied exit visas by both Israel and Jordan due to his alleged ties to the terrorist organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In a decision upholding a travel ban, the Israeli High Court of Justice in June 2007 referred to Jabarin as

a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, some of his time spent in directing a human rights organization, and some as an activist in an organization which has no qualms regarding murder and attempted murder, which have no relation whatsoever to rights, quite the opposite, which rejects the most basic right of all, without which there are no other rights, that is, the right to life.[27]

Nevertheless, the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland, among others, fund Jabarin’s organization.

Addameer (a Palestinian NGO campaigning for Palestinians in Israeli custody, mainly related to terror allegations) also appears to have close connections to the PFLP. Addameer’s chairperson and co-founder, Abdullatif Ghaith, was banned by Israel from travelling internationally because of his alleged membership in the PFLP.[28] Furthermore, Khalida Jarrar, Addameer’s vice-chairperson, is reportedly a senior PFLP official,[29] and served fifteen months in an Israeli prison after pleading guilty to being a member of the PFLP and inciting to violence.[30] Ayman Nasser, an Addameer research staff-member, was arrested on October 15, 2012, for alleged links to the PFLP.[31] Other Addameer officials are also closely affiliated with senior figures in the PFLP.

Aid to Terror Organizations

There are also cases in which NGOs and their staff have been directly implicated in support for Hamas and other groups, such as in the case of Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), designated an “unlawful association” by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in 2014 due to “ties to the Global Muslim Brotherhood network that provides material support to Hamas.”[32] The United Arab Emirates also banned IRW in 2014 as part of its list of organizations “deemed terrorist.”[33]

IRW has a history of support for Hamas: On May 10, 2006, Iyaz Ali, a Pakistani-born British national, admitted working for the NGO to transfer funds and assistance to Hamas institutions and organizations that had been banned in Israel.[34] He also admitted working in Jordan where he cooperated with Hamas operatives. In 2006, the Israeli security forces arrested IRW’s Gaza project coordinator for links to the terror group.

Humanitarian aid NGOs constitute a major and largely unregulated industry often working in regions controlled by terror groups. An increasing number of journalists and academics have reported on this relationship, including Linda Polman and David Rieff.[35] Such organizations present themselves as carefully accounting for every dollar, pound, euro, or krone that is donated.

In fact, neither the organizations nor their financial auditors can trace funds that are spent in war zones and areas controlled by terror organizations. In August 2016, the head of World Vision’s operations in Gaza, Muhammad Halaby, was arrested by Israel and charged with siphoning off 60 percent of the total funding (up to $50 million) to Hamas over a period of ten years. The indictment stated that he had been trained and planted by Hamas for this task “creating fictitious humanitarian projects and doctoring inflated receipts in order to get the funds to Hamas”[36]

World Vision is not unique in this practice. In June 2014, Israel’s defense minister banned Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) activities in Israel and the West Bank, alleging that it had funneled money to Hamas. News reports indicated that the decision was made after the Israel General Security Service (GSS, or Shabak), the coordinator for government activities in the territories (COGAT), and legal authorities provided evidence against IRW. The GSS stated that the decision to designate IRW was

based on information that has been accumulated over years, that the fund is a central player in financing of Hamas … [and] on accumulated knowledge and experience in fighting terror and financing of terror organizations.[37]

Following these accusations, IRW submitted an incident report to the U.K. Charities Commission in June 2014 and began an internal audit.[38] The commission issued no special advisory regarding donations to IRW; rather, its spokeswoman said that “it was satisfied that the charity was responding appropriately to the incident.”[39] But, in January 2016, the U.K.-based bank HSBC announced that it was ending all links to IRW “amid concerns that cash for aid could end up with terrorist groups abroad.”[40] Yet IRW still receives millions each year from European governments such as Britain and Switzerland, the EU, Oxfam,[41] the U.N. Development Programme, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development,[42] and the U.N.[43]

The Palestinian Relief and Development Fund (Interpal), headquartered in Britain, has been a principal organization for hiding the flow of money to Hamas. It was designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organization by the United States in 2003, citing its links to Hamas.[44] The U.S. Treasury refers to it as “the funding coordinator of Hamas.” A 2002 Israeli investigation found that every one of Interpal’s local partner charities within the Palestinian territories was “affiliated with Hamas or works on its behalf, not only with regard to humanitarian issues but as part of its terrorism-supporting apparatus.”[45] Interpal is also a member of the Union of Good, an internationally recognized network of charities that fund Hamas. The secretary general of the Union of Good also serves as the vice-chairman of Interpal.[46] Interpal is well-established in Britain and enjoyed the support of politicians, specifically from the Labor party and its leader Jeremy Corbyn, who toured Gaza as a guest of the NGO in 2013 and spoke at the group’s events.[47]

The organization was cleared by the U.K. Commission after a number of investigations, claiming that the commission “was satisfied that the Charity had put in place a number of procedures to take account of and address the failings identified by the inquiry which required rectification.”[48] This clearance allows the British government to provide funds to the organization.

The British decision is subject to ongoing criticism and debate, and in April 2016, an Interpal-funded event in Gaza featured Palestinian children simulating terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and praising stabbing attacks. Members of the British parliament demanded an additional investigation; in response, the Charity Commission stated only that it is “aware about concerns about the contents of this video” and that commissioners “are assessing the material as a matter of priority before deciding what regulatory action may be required.”[49]

Another U.K.-based humanitarian NGO with apparent ties to terrorist organizations is Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), funded by the EU, as well as the British, Irish, and other governments. MAP has transferred funds in the past to the al-Ihsan Charitable Society, which was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2005 as a “charitable front for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”[50] MAP has also partnered with the Islah Charitable Society (ICS). ICS founder Jamal Muhammad Tawil, allegedly a Hamas member, was arrested in 2002 for his role in planning bomb attacks against Israeli civilians, and the group is designated as a terrorist organization by Israel.[51] According to two former Treasury Department terrorism experts, ICS has been used as a conduit for funneling funds to Hamas for various purposes, including financial aid to the families of suicide bombers.[52]

The Israeli NGO Shurat HaDin has accused a second MAP partner, Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), of being closely affiliated with the PFLP. According to Shurat HaDin documentation, UAWC

was established by the PFLP; is controlled by senior PFLP operatives; makes its assets available to the PFLP; and acts in coordination with and to advance the interests of the PFLP [including active involvement in PFLP political activity].[53]

Similarly, the Turkish IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi), which also poses as a humanitarian aid organization, was the central backer of the May 2010 flotilla to Gaza where participants attacked Israeli naval commandoes. As a result, several Israeli soldiers were wounded, and one Turkish-American and eight Turkish activists were killed. The IHH has been designated by Israel as an “unlawful association” in 2008 due to its membership in the Union of the Good. According to the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), during the 2002 Jenin counterterror operation, the Union of the Good transferred money via Hamas charities to families of suicide bombers.[54] In 2012, it was officially designated a terrorist organization by the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

According to the Danish Institute for International Studies, the Turkish authorities began investigating IHH in 1997 after receiving information that “leaders of IHH were purchasing automatic weapons from other regional Islamic militant groups.” A raid on the organization’s offices turned up weapons, explosives, and instructions for making IEDs.[55] Danish researchers also cited the investigation into IHH by French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere that found that IHH maintained contact with al-Qaeda in Milan and Algerian terrorists in Europe, recruited militants for fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, and played a “central role” in the al-Qaeda bomb plot targeting Los Angeles International airport.[56]

As these multiple and diverse examples demonstrate, the links between NGOs and terror groups are widespread and significant. In all likelihood, there are many more yet to be uncovered.

Observations and Conclusions

The relationships of NGOs, operating in different parts of the world with different mandates and agendas, to terrorism and terrorists are not readily analyzed through a single framework. But some patterns emerge.

For clearly partisan and political NGOs, such as Al-Haq and Addameer, the connections to terrorism are readily visible. The fact that such NGOs are headed by individuals with terror backgrounds, who are potentially continuing to be active in such activities, does not appear to be a negative factor in receiving grants.

For the universal and ostensibly nonpartisan organizations such as Oxfam, World Vision, Amnesty International, and others, the willingness to tolerate or cooperate with terrorists is either casually dismissed (“one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”) or justified as a necessary evil—part of the cost of doing business. In addressing the Israeli charges against World Vision and other NGOs related to assisting Hamas, Michael Sfard, a prominent Israeli NGO activist, declared: “Even the best-organised operations have no choice but to operate in a grey zone in Gaza.”[57]

In other words, the objective of assisting poor people who live in a region controlled by terrorists, as in Gaza or Central Africa, is used to justify funds and resources being siphoned off as well as NGO officials who participate in terrorism.

The justification offered by Sfard and other NGO activists does not recognize the victims (in this case, Israeli) of terrorism and brutality or present any moral balance between the suffering of the two population groups—those living in Gaza and those who are targeted. By eliminating the victims of terrorism, it is easier to erase the moral issue and accept the false no-choice argument.

But NGOs that operate in a terror-controlled region such as Gaza, do have a choice. They can impose comprehensive oversight to prevent diversion and theft of resources, or they can choose not to work in the area at all, understanding that the benefits do not offset the moral costs.

As David Rieff has noted, NGOs operating in areas of conflict often choose not to examine moral choices, instead claiming to hold themselves aloof “from the political consequences” of their actions—a policy that he condemns as “indefensible.”[58] During the Holocaust, the International Committee of the Red Cross even worked with the Nazi regime, following a policy of cooperation and “public discretion even when faced with the worst atrocities.”[59] While a decision not to work in circumstances where aid is likely to be channeled to terrorists is difficult and harms
the general population, the moral costs must be carefully weighed and not simply ignored.

Similarly, governments that fund organizations that are headed by or cooperate with terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the PFLP must also be held morally accountable. The funding provided by the EU and its member states (as well as Switzerland and Norway) for Al-Haq and Addameer, and to NGOs allied with warlords and tyrants in other parts of the world,[60] is a serious issue, yet to be addressed.

In medicine, the physician’s Hippocratic Oath includes the directive to “do no harm.” For NGOs claiming to promote moral agendas, as well as for their funders, this principle is no less important. When the links with terrorist organizations are ignored or justified, these moral claims become meaningless.

*Gerald M. Steinberg is professor of political studies, the founder of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University, and president of NGO Monitor. Joshua Bacon is the director of the Israel Desk at NGO Monitor. His articles and op-eds have appeared in media including Ynet, NRG, and The Jewish Chronicle.

Source: This article was published at the Middle East Quarterly

[1] “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations General Assembly, Paris, Dec. 10, 1948.

[2] “List of nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2014,” U.N. Economic and Social Council, New York, Dec. 3, 2014.

[3] “World Vision International 2015 Annual Review,” World Vision International, London, Oct. 30, 2016, p. 32.

[4] Compendium 2007-2010 (Brussels: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, accessed Jan. 17, 2016).

[5] “Who we are,” Amnesty International, New York, accessed Apr. 10, 2017.

[6] Linda Polman, War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times (London: Penguin Books, 2011), pp. 62-3, 89.

[7] Jewish News Service, Aug. 25, 2016.

[8] Gerald Steinberg, “Postcolonial Ideology and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Brigitte Bailer,
ed. Israel: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Barumuller: Vienna, 2009), p. 7.

[9] Ibid. p. 11.

[10] “Examining Human Rights Watch in 2008: Double Standards and Post-Colonial Ideology,” NGO Monitor, Jerusalem, Jan. 13, 2009.

[11] Robert L. Bernstein, “Human Rights in the Middle East,” The Shirley and Leonard Goldstein Lecture on Human Rights, University of Nebraska, Omaha, Nov. 10, 2010.

[12] Robert L. Bernstein, “Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast,” The New York Times, Oct. 19, 2009.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Gerald M. Steinberg, “The NGO Front in the Gaza War: The Durban Strategy Continues,” NGO Monitor Monograph Series, Jerusalem, Feb. 12, 2009.

[15] Ken Roth, “Israel precision fire killing 4.9 times as many Gaza civilians as fighters,” Twitter, July 24, 2014.

[16] Pnina Sharvit Baruch, “Operation Protective Edge: The Legal Angle,” in Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, eds., The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), pp. 65-72.

[17] Peter Willetts, “Introduction,” in Peter Willets, ed., The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organisations in the UN System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings University Press, 1996), p. 11.

[18] Matti Friedman, “What the Media Gets Wrong about Israel,” The Atlantic, Nov. 30, 2014.

[19] The Economist (London), Mar. 5, 2015.

[20] “Cageprisoners and Anwar al-Awlaki—a factual background,” Cageprisoners, London, Nov. 5, 2010.

[21] Dan Izenberg, “I don’t support defensive jihad,” The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 9, 2010.

[22] “Israel: Jailing of Palestinian activist Ameer Makhoul,” Amnesty International, New York, Jan. 30, 2011

[23] The Times (London), Aug. 17, 2015.

[24] Kyle Shideler, “Amnesty Senior Leader under Fire for Muslim Brotherhood Ties,” Center for Security Policy, Washington, D.C., Aug. 17, 2015.

[25] “Defense Minister signs order banning Hamas-affiliated charitable organizations,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, July 7, 2008.

[26] “Who We Are,” Human Relief Foundation, West Yorkshire, U.K., accessed Apr. 10, 2017.

[27] “Shawan Jabarin,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Gelilot, Isr., Feb. 17, 2013.

[28] “Face value: The BBC and Palestinian NGOs,” BBC Watch, London, Dec. 14, 2012.

[29] “Jarrar: On the 46th Anniversary of the Naksah, the way forward is unity and resistance,” Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, West Bank, June 5, 2013.

[30] Haaretz (Tel Aviv), Dec. 7, 2015.

[31] “Ayman Ameen Ahmad Nasser,” Addameer, Ramallah, accessed Apr. 10, 2017.

[32] Kyle Shideler, “Funding Terrorists,” The Washington Times, Nov. 29, 2015.

[33] “List of designated terrorist organisations by the UAE,” The National (Abu Dhabi), Nov. 16, 2014.

[34] “British national arrested for assisting Hamas,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, May 29, 2006.

[35] David Reiff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

[36] Associated Press, Aug. 4, 2016.

[37] BBC News (London), Dec. 12, 2014.

[38] The Telegraph (London), Sept. 3, 2014.

[39] Third Sector (Twickenham, U.K.), Sept. 1, 2014.

[40] The Economic Times (Mumbai), Jan. 3, 2016.

[41] “Oxfam International,” NGO Monitor, Aug. 24, 2014.

[42] “Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD),” NGO Monitor, May 13, 2015.

[43] “United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),” NGO Monitor, May 4, 2016.

[44] “Protecting Charitable Organizations: Interpal/The Palestinian Relief and Development Fund,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C., Apr. 5, 2016.

[45] Samuel Westrop, “Supporting Our Own Demise: Part 1,” Gatestone Institute, New York, Jan. 7, 2013.

[46] “The Union of Good—Analysis and Mapping of Terror Funds Network,” Israeli Security Agency, Jerusalem, accessed Apr. 11, 2017.

[47] The Daily Mail (London), Apr. 28, 2016.

[48] “Inquiry Report: Palestinians Relief and Development Fund (Interpal),” Charity Commission, National Archives, London, June 1, 2012.

[49] The Daily Mail, Apr. 28, 2016.

[50] Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector, Kindle ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 140.

[51] “Operation for the confiscation of terror funds—Background,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 26, 2004.

[52] For a broader analysis of the connections between Islah Charitable Society, Jamal Tawil, and Hamas, see Mathew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006) and Jimmy Gurule, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Funding of Global Terrorism (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).

[53] “Breach of anti-terror law by World Vision Australia,” Shurat Hadin (Israel Law Center), Tel Aviv, Mar. 29, 2012.

[54]” IHH, which plays a central role in organizing the flotilla to the Gaza Strip, is a Turkish humanitarian relief fund with a radical Islamic anti-Western orientation,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Gelilot, Isr., May 27, 2010.

[55] Evan F. Kohlmann, “The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and Financing,” Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006, pp. 10-11.

[56] Ibid.

[57] “Alms for the Enemy,” The Economist, Aug. 20, 2016.

[58] Reiff, A Bed for the Night, p. 26.

[59] Ibid., p. 27.

[60] Ibid., p. 23.

The story of Omar Khadr has always been one of the ugliest chapters of the ugly story of the US War on Terror initiated with the Congressional passage of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan.

Yesterday, Khadr finally won a measure of justice when the Canadian government apologized to him for its failure to defend him against his US captors and to seek his release from confinement at the US prison compound at Guantanamo Bay, and awarded him damages of $8.1 million as compensation for his years of suffering.

His vindication as a victim, and not a villain, was a long time coming.

It was in 2002, during the early days of America’s longest — and still ongoing — war against Afghanistan that Omar Khadr, a 15-year-old native of Canada, was wounded and then captured, still alive, and packed off to Guantanamo Bay, one of a number of child soldiers whom the US, under the Bush/Cheney administration’s rule-free War on Terror, held in violation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, a treaty that was signed by the US and that is thus part of US law. It declares that all children under the age of 18 captured while fighting in wars are to be offered “special protection” and treated as victims, not as combatants.

Khadr’s story was never properly told in the US media, which simply lumped him in with all the other alleged “terrorists” held at Guantanamo. His 2010 “trial” — one of the few military tribunals actually conducted at Guantanamo — was a charade of justice which led to his conviction for murder and a sentence of 40 years, later commuted to 8 years, to be served in Canada, not at Guantanamo.

Khadr’s crime, according to his US captives? Murder of one US soldier, and the blinding of another, caused by a hand grenade that the young Khadr lobbed at them.

The truth? Khadr, who didn’t deny throwing the grenade but said he did it out of fear, not a desire to kill, was doing what any courageous wounded soldier in his situation would have done: defending himself, and taking out the enemy at the risk of his own life.

Khadr, whose father, Ahmed Said Khadr had brought his young son along with him at the age of 14 from Canada to help the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, had been killed in battle, leaving his young son alone with al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. At one point, the boy was in a housing compound identified by US troops as under Taliban control. They called in an air strike, and then entered the destroyed site to do a damage assessment. As they picked through the rubble — by one account executing some of the wounded fighters they found — Khadr, himself gravely wounded, was said to have tossed a grenade at them, killing US Sgt. Christopher Speer and blinding Layne Morris, another soldier accompanying Speer.

Had an American soldier done the same thing under the same circumstances and survived, he would surely have been awarded a major medal of some kind for heroism. Khadr, however, was charged with murder.

During Khadr’s ordeal at Guantanamo, where he was initially held in the prison camp’s facility for children, known as Camp Iguana, saw him grow through his teen years into adulthood, until he was finally, in 2012, transferred to a prison in Canada, and later, on orders of a Canadian court, released to home confinement in 2015.

Part of Khadr’s problem was that the ruling Conservative Party government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper showed no interest in helping its young citizen, despite the US government’s clearly being in violation of the Geneva Convention in holding him as a war criminal. Indeed Harper in 2010 called Khadr a “terrorist,” even as the country’s Federal Court at the time declared that his interrogation by Canadian intelligence officials at Guantanamo “offends the most basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.”

The current Canadian government headed by Liberal Party Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, said of the settlement of his case, “On behalf of the government of Canada, we wish to apologize to Mr. Khadr for any role Canadian officials played in relation to his ordeal abroad and any resulting harm. We hope that this expression, and the negotiated settlement, will assist him in his efforts to begin a new and hopeful chapter in his life.”

While the current Conservative Party leader Andrew Scheer termed the settlement “disgusting,” the current Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould, said Khadr’s story carried two messages: “Our rights are not subject to the whims of the government of the day, and there are serious costs when the government violates the rights of its citizens.”

Khadr himself says he wants to get on with his life, and hopes that the government apology will help him to do that. He has apologized for Speer’s death, saying he is “sorry” for any pain it caused his family.

Meanwhile, while Khadr has been vindicated of the charge of murder he fought for 15 years, and no longer faces any risk of incarceration, he still has a default judgement for $134 million in damages that was ordered by a federal judge in Utah in a case brought by Morris and by Speer’s family.

An attorney for Morris and the Speers, David Winer, was reportedly in Toronto on the day the Canadian government’s settlement agreement and apology was announced, seeking an injunction to freeze Khader’s cash settlement — though many legal experts say it is unlikely a Canadian court at this point would agree to do that.

And while the Canadian government has now apologized for its role in this whole sorry affair, there is no sign that the US government, which is the one that illegally captured, incarcerated, tortured and tried as an adult this child soldier, will also do so.

Two officers sought me from within a crowd at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. They seemed to know who I was. They asked me to follow them, and I obliged. Being of Arab background, often renders one’s citizenship almost irrelevant.

In a back room, where other foreigners, mainly Muslims, were holed for ‘added security’, I was asked numerous questions about my politics, ideas, writing, children, friends and my late Palestinian parents.

Meanwhile, an officer took my bag and all of my papers, including receipts, business cards, and more. I did not protest. I am so used to this treatment and endless questioning that I simply go through the motions and answer the questions the best way I know how.

My first questioning commenced soon after September 11, 2001, when all Muslims and Arabs became, and remain, suspect. “Why do you hate our president,” I was asked then, in reference to Bush.

On a different occasion, I was held in a room for hours at JFK International Airport because I had a receipt that revealed my immortal sin of eating at a London restaurant that served Halal meat.

I was also interrogated at an American border facility in Canada and was asked to fill several documents about my trip to Turkey, where I gave a talk at a conference and conducted several media interviews.

A question I am often asked is: “what is the purpose of your visit to this country?”

The fact that I am an American citizen, who acquired high education, bought a home, raised a good family, paid my taxes, obeyed the law and contributed to society in myriad ways are not an adequate answer.

I remain an Arab, a Muslim and a dissident, all unforgivable sins in the new, rapidly changing America.

Truthfully, I never had any illusions regarding the supposed moral superiority of my adopted country. I grew up in a Palestinian refugee camp in Gaza, and have witnessed, firsthand, the untold harm inflicted upon my people as a result of American military and political support of Israel.

Within the larger Arab context, US foreign policy was felt on larger scale. The invasion and destruction of Iraq in 2003 was but the culmination of decades of corrupt, violent American policies in the Arab world.

But when I arrived in the US in 1994, I also found another country, far kinder and more accepting than the one represented – or misrepresented – in US foreign policy. While constantly embracing my Palestinian Arab roots, I have lived and interacted with a fairly wide margin of like-minded people in my new home.

While I was greatly influenced by my Arab heritage, my current political thoughts and the very dialectics through which I understand and communicate with the world – and my understanding of it – are vastly shaped by American scholars, intellectual dissidents and political rebels. It is no exaggeration to say that I became part of the same cultural Zeitgeist that many American intellectuals subscribe to.

Certainly, anti-Arab and Muslim sentiments in the US have been around for generations, but it has risen sharply in the last two decades.  Arabs and Muslims have become an easy scapegoat for all of America’s failed wars and counter-violence.

Terrorist threats have been exaggerated beyond belief to manipulate a frightened, but also a growing impoverished population. The threat level was assigned colors, and each time the color vacillated towards the red, the nation drops all of its grievances, fights for equality, jobs and health care and unites in hating Muslims, people they never met.

It mattered little that, since September 11, the odds of being killed by terrorism are 1 in 110,000,000, an extremely negligible number compared to the millions who die as a result of diabetes, for example, or shark attacks, for that matter.

‘Terrorism’ has morphed from being a violent phenomenon requiring national debate and sensible policies to combat it, into a bogeyman that forces everyone into conformity, and divides people between being docile and obedient on the one hand, and ‘radical’ and suspect, on the other.

But blaming Muslims for the decline of the American empire is as ineffective as it is dishonest.

The Economic Intelligence Unit had recently downgraded the US from a “full democracy’ to a “flawed democracy”. Neither Muslims nor Islam played any role in that.

The size of the Chinese economy is soon to surpass that of the US, and the powerful East Asian country is already roaring, expanding its influence in the Pacific and beyond. Muslims are hardly the culprits there, either.

Nor are Arabs responsible for the death of the ‘American dream’, if one truly existed in the first place; nor the election of Donald Trump; nor the utter corruption and mafia-like practices of America’s ruling elites and political parties.

It was not the Arabs and Muslims who duped the US into invading Iraq, where millions of Arabs and Muslims lost their lives as a result of the unchecked military adventurism.

In fact, Arabs and Muslims are by far the greatest victims of terrorism, whether state-sponsored terror or that of desperate, vile groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Americans, Muslims are not your enemy. They never have been. Conformity is.

“In this age, the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service,” wrote John Stuart Mill in ‘On Liberty.’ The English philosopher, had a tremendous impact on American liberalism.

I read his famous book soon after I arrived in the US. It took me a while to realize that what we learn in books often sharply contradicts reality.

Instead, we now live in the ‘age of impunity’, according to Tom Engelhardt. In a 2014 article, published in the Huffington Post, he wrote: “For America’s national security state, this is the age of impunity.  Nothing it does – torture, kidnapping, assassination, illegal surveillance, you name it — will ever be brought to court.”

Those who are “held accountable” are whistleblowers and political dissidents who dare question the government and educate their fellow men and women on the undemocratic nature of such oppressive practices.

Staying silent is not an option. It is a form of defeatism that should be outed as equally destructive as the muzzling of democracy.

“One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws,” wrote Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Barring citizens of Muslim countries from travelling to the US is a great act of immorality and injustice. Sadly, many Americans report that such discriminatory laws already make them feel safe, which itself is an indication of how the government and media manipulate consent in this country to produce the desirable results.

A big fan of hating Edward Bernays’ work, yet appreciating his honesty, I realize the question is not that of Trump alone. Bernays, whose writing on propaganda influenced successive governments and inspired various military coups, was versed on manipulating popular consent of Americans nearly a century ago. He perceived the masses as unruly and a burden on democracy, which he believed could only be conducted by the intelligent a few.

The outcome of his ideas, which influenced generation of conformist intellectuals, is in full display today.

America is changing fast, and is certainly not heading in the right direction. Shelving all pressing problems and putting the focus on chasing after, demonizing and humiliating brown skinned men and women is certainly not the way out of the economic, political and foreign policy quagmires which American ruling elites have invited upon their country.

“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they don’t want to hear,” wrote George Orwell.

No matter the cost, we must adhere to this Orwellian wisdom, even if the number of people who refuse to hear has grown exponentially, and the margins for dissent have shrunk like never before.

Results of the 2014 general election and the subsequent Assembly elections clearly established that Dalit politics is undergoing a change.

By Satish Misra

The Presidential election on 17 July is like a watershed moment of Indian political and social consciousness. It is a contest between two Dalit candidates, the BJP-led NDA candidate Ramnath Kovind, who was the Governor of Bihar till recently, and the UPA’s nominee Meira Kumar, the daughter of Dalit legend Babu Jagjivan Ram.

In ordinary times, this would have carried not much political significance. But Dalit politics in the country has come under sharper focus since the assumption of throne by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi in 2014 and coming to power of the BJP in 22 states and some violent incidents across the country.

The issue has come under lot of debate in the national as well as international media. The fact that not only has the ruling coalition went for a Dalit candidate to extend its political support base among the Dalit population that according to 2011 census stood at 201.4 million, even the opposition opted for a candidate of the same denomination speaks volumes on the current state of  politics in the country.

In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP swept to power winning 71 out of total 80 Lok Sabha seats from the biggest state of Uttar Pradesh. All the 17 reserved Scheduled Caste seats went to the BJP. It clearly meant that a sizable portion of Dalit votes went to the BJP account and indicated that there was a division among SC voters.

Analysts were of the view that non-Jatav votes went to the BJP.

The results of the 2014 general election and the subsequent Assembly elections clearly established that Dalit politics is undergoing a change. Whether the symbolism of making a Dalit reach the highest constitutional post of the country will help the BJP to consolidate its political base among the SC community and spread it further needs to be examined carefully, particularly in the background of growing social tensions between Dalits and the upper castes, particularly the Rajputs or Thakurs. Rising incidents of violence and maltreatment of Dalits by several BJP ruled states and the Centre itself are a manifestation of the trend.

Politics of “Hinduatva”, revolving around issues of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya, cow vigilantism around the issue of beef ban and other similar issues, is sharpening existing tensions among higher castes and Dalits.

Latest of the series of incidents has been the outlawing of a convention in Lucknow on July 3 to discuss the state of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh by the BJP ruled government. Thirty-one activists were arrested while about 50 Dalits, coming from Gujarat, were sent back by the State Police. The State Administration did not permit them to proceed to Lucknow to mark a symbolic protest.

Earlier in May this year, cutting of the internet services to control social media in caste violence hit district of Saharanpur in western Uttar Pradesh was a very ominous sign of the state of affairs in country’s biggest state. Violent clashes had erupted in Saharanpur on 5 May when Dalits objected to the taking out of a strident procession by Thakurs to commemorate the birth anniversary of the medieval Rajput ruler Maharana Pratap. The Dalits stalled the procession as it entered their area and the confrontation escalated from stone pelting from both the sides. Thakurs did not take the Dalit’s opposition kindly and went into rampage leading to the burning down of about 40 Dalit houses and shops. A mob of Thakurs also indulged in desecration of Dalit iconography and shrines. A Thakur youth died, while many more were injured from both the communities. Dalits abandoned the village apprehending further violence

The atmosphere of confrontation had started building up since a BJP government was installed in the state on 19 March and Yogi Adityanath — a Thakur by birth — became the UP’s 21^st chief minister.

The first skirmish had taken place in Shabbirpur village on 20 April 20 — within 45 days of the new BJP government in Lucknow — when the Jatav-Dalits of the village were about to erect a statue of B.R. Ambedkar to celebrate the Ambedkar Jayanti and Thakurs objected to it, citing lack of administrative permission for the celebrations.

About a month-long tension between the two communities in the communally sensitive district of Saharanpur cannot be merely a law and order problem. It seems to be an abject failure of the state administration to understand the real causes of the problem and treating the issue in a routine fashion.

Violence in Saharanpur was the latest manifestation of the politics that has been pursued by political parties for the last few years in western UP through ‘love jihad’, cow protection and Muslim appeasement.

In 2013, there were communal riots after clashes broke out between Jats and Muslims. Recently held assembly elections in the state further sharpened the fault lines.

The breaking up of Jat-Muslim understanding paid rich electoral dividends in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls when the BJP won all seats in the region and the same was followed in the state elections.

After the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations in early 1990s of the last century, backward and Dalit castes felt empowered and higher caste, particularly the Thakurs, no more had a clout like before when they used to call shots in the state resulting in their perceived humiliation.

But Dalits of the region, notably Jatavs who have been ardent supporters of the BSP and its leader Mayawati, have become much more politically conscious and are therefore not ready to accept upper caste assertion.

The role of the Bheem Army Bharat Ekta Mission, founded by a young lawyer Chandrashekhar Azad, came to the forefront during the Saharanpur clashes as it protested against the caste-based violence and the state administration’s apathy towards them.

The fact that it has come to prominence by organising a massive rally at Jantar Mantar in the union capital on 21 May to protest against the Saharanpur violence cannot either be ignored or brushed under the carpet.

Organisations like the Bheem Army are drawing their strengths from the treatment and injustice meted out to Dalit research scholar like Rohith Vemula of the University of Hyderabad who committed suicide in January 2016.

Dalits have been the integral part of the traditional agrarian economy where milching animals have played a leading role.  Strict enforcement of cow slaughter, the livelihood of Dalits, is directly affected. There have been violent incidents in UP, MP, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other states where Dalits have come under attack of groups of cow vigilantes.

The statement of Bheem Army founder that “for elections, we are Hindus and after that we are Dalits” is a clear reminder to the RSS-BJP brand of politics for making timely corrections failing which it may take an ugly turn. The subsequent arrest of Chandrashekhar Azad by the State Police and the treatment meted out to him is sharpening the existing fault lines in the caste hierarchical system in society.

Dalit consciousness has been rising steadily. A feeling is growing within the community that crimes against them are not seriously pursued and not thoroughly investigated by a caste-biased administration. A growing perception is that guilty are either not adequately punished or manage to go unpunished.

While political parties are playing their short-term game of dividing society on caste, sub-castes and religious lines, emerging Dalit consciousness resulting in assertiveness is sure to influence politics in a decisive manner in the times to come.

It is time that discerning political thinkers and leaders found ways to address the rising phenomenon and take steps to address the issue in a reconciliatory manner instead of embarking on a confrontationist path.

Dalit politics, indeed, seems to be standing at a crucial crossroad.

Recent archaeological analyses of ochre finds in Ethiopia builds on a previous EU-funded project which discovered the emergence of symbols usage by homo sapiens, earlier than previously thought

The EU-funded TRACSYMBOLS project, which closed in 2015, investigated archaeological sites in South Africa for early use of symbols by homo sapiens, examining painting kits, spear points, beads and ostrich egg shell engravings. They also studied the usage of the reddish iron-rich rock, ochre. And it was to ochre that members of the project team have more recently returned.

Recently writing in the open-access journal ‘PLOS ONE’ members of the TRACSYMBOLS project team explain that ochre is commonly found at Middle Stone Age (MSA) sites. The state in which it is often found, with pieces modified through grinding and scraping to produce red powder along with ochre-stained objects such as lithic and bone tools, lead researchers to treat its presence as an indicator of modern symbolically mediated human behaviour.

In this latest research the team analysed the largest known East African MSA ochre collection at Porc-Epic Cave, Ethiopia. It comprised a haul of 40 kg of ochre, which spanned a period of at least 4 500 years and dates back to around 40 000 years ago.

To understand how the ochre had been processed and so learn something of its use, the team analysed 3,792 pieces using visual characterisation, microscopy, surface texture analysis, morphological and morphometric analysis, while also replicating grinding techniques.

A key finding was that the cave dwellers seem to have acquired, treated, and used the same types of ochre over this 4,500-year period. The researchers conclude that, given the quantities discovered, usage indicates the ‘expression of a cohesive cultural adaptation, largely shared by all community members and consistently transmitted through time.’ Some ochre pieces evidenced the usage of grindstones over time, most likely to produce powder which fits knowledge about powder’s use in physical adornment, such as body painting, though a more utilitarian purpose has not been ruled out.

Rewriting our evolutionary history?

The original TRACSYMBOLS project was set up to explore the emergence of key cultural innovations in Africa and Europe between 160 000 and 25 000 years ago. In Africa its archaeological excavations were concentrated in the southern region of Western Cape Province, South Africa. The team complemented the archaeological approach with palaeoclimatic indicators which reflected the evolution of temperature, vegetation and fire regimes. When this information was used by computational modelling the combination afforded a richer understanding of the link between past human adaptive systems and the environments in which they evolved.

The findings led the team to conclude that homo sapiens were already using symbols 75,000 years ago, and possibly as far back as 100 000 years. The timing is significant as it suggests that by the time homo sapiens were leaving Africa, generally thought to be around 80 000 – 60,000 years ago, they were already ‘modern’. It had previously been thought that the culturally and technologically significant advancements of homo sapiens originated in Europe 40,000 years ago. Furthermore, this modernity is likely to have contributed to their subsequent dominance across Europe.

Cordis Source: Based on project information and media reports

Sen. Ted Cruz delivered a speech on the Senate floor calling for Dr. Liu Xiaobo’s release, and for the passage of legislation to rename the street in front of the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C. as ‘Liu Xiaobo Plaza.’

Mr. President, I stand here today on behalf of a hero of freedom and democracy in the People’s Republic of China. Liu Xiaobo and his wife Liu Xia are the faces of liberty in China today, having sacrificed comfort and normalcy to chart a path toward political liberalization. For that, they have been detained, imprisoned, and abused.

In 2008, Liu Xiaobo coauthored ‘Charter 08,’ a manifesto that shined a light on the Communist Party of China and its totalitarian abuse of power. Though many brave souls signed their names, and their fates, to this document, Dr. Liu’s name was at the top.

For this reason, he received a Nobel Peace Prize, and he also received charges of ‘inciting subversion of state power,’ and an 11-year prison sentence.

“It is impossible to neglect this stark irony: a man, dedicated to non-violence, imprisoned for promoting peace.

Motivating Dr. Liu’s tremendous courage and self-sacrifice was a determination to remember what the PRC desperately wants the world to forget: Tiananmen Square.

A poet, author, and political scientist, Dr. Liu was in 1989 a visiting scholar at Columbia University. But when the pro-democracy protests broke out in Beijing in June of that year, he raced back to China to support them. He staged a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square in the midst of the historic student protests and insisted that they would remain non-violent, even in the face of the tanks, which the Chinese military deployed to smash them.

In 1996, the party subjected him to three years of ‘reeducation through labor’ for continuing to question China’s one-party system.

In 2008, on the eve of the 100 year anniversary of China’s first constitution and the 30 year anniversary of Beijing’s ‘Democracy Wall’ movement, Liu dedicated his work on ‘Charter 08′ to the martyrs at Tiananmen Square.

Today, eight years into his unjust imprisonment, Dr. Liu needs our help more than ever.

Last month, it was revealed that Liu had contracted an aggressive, late-stage form of liver cancer. Although the PRC authorities ‘released’ him ‘on medical parole,’ both Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia linger without freedom.

And even worse, Liu Xiaobo is dying. His condition is critical, and we are running out of time to act on his behalf.

Although Chinese authorities compelled the Liu’s to sign an affidavit allegedly attesting to their satisfaction with the medical care they have received in China and their wish to remain there, Liu Xia has communicated to their attorney their desire to spend Liu Xiaobo’s final days in America.

PRC doctors insist that Dr. Liu was too ill to travel, but medical experts from the U.S. and Germany, one of them being Dr. Joseph Herman of the MD Anderson Cancer Treatment Center of the University of Texas, visited Liu and attested to the contrary.

Issuing a joint statement, they agreed that Dr. Liu ‘can be safely transported with appropriate medical evacuation care and support.’ They then issued this stark warning: ‘However, the medical evacuation would have to take place as quickly as possible.

The urgency of this situation goes beyond Liu Xiaobo. Liu Xia’s livelihood is inextricably linked to the ability of the two of them to leave China.

Due to his imprisonment, Liu Xiaobo has been unable to receive his $1.5 million prize money from the Norwegian Nobel Committee. The holdup of transferring the funds is merely routine: a signed form from Dr. Liu and an open bank account with his name on it. But China has prevented these technical steps from progressing.

If Liu Xiaobo dies without receiving this account, Liu Xia will be left destitute with no money. I shudder to think what such a life would hold for the wife of China’s boldest political prisoner.

Only one man stands between a dying man’s wish and his wife’s livelihood, and freedom: Xi Jinping.

Although no one action can undo the turmoil the Liu’s have suffered over the past 28 years, it is not too late to do the right thing and to allow this man and his wife to spend their last days together according to their wishes.

It would not be the first time Xi made a similar decision. Earlier this year, he agreed after consultations with the Trump administration to release an imprisoned Houstonian, Sandy Phan-Gillis, who was incarcerated on false charges. Although nothing could bring back the two years of separation from her family, they are now reunited, something I spent considerable time urging.

And lest Xi forget, even Kim Jong-un, the dictator in North Korea, allowed Otto Warmbier, a young American college student from Ohio in the prime of his life before torture and abuse left him in a coma, to return home for his final hours. Surely Xi can show the same degree of humanity shown by Kim Jong-un.

In 2015, I came to this floor and asked on three separate occasions for unanimous consent to pass my bill to rename the street in front of the Chinese embassy after Liu Xiaobo. Over and over again, sadly, Democratic senators stood up and objected, stymied this effort. Each time that I advocated on behalf of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia, my colleagues expressed procedural concerns: ‘This is counterproductive! Doing this will only antagonize China.’ Well some of us are less concerned about antagonizing Chinese communist dictators. My fellow senators assured me that they have negotiated the release of many political prisoners behind the scenes – well that is wonderful, and I encourage them to do so now in the few days and weeks Liu Xiaobo has ahead of him.

Even so, even despite repeated Democratic objections, repeated Democratic obstructionism, ultimately the United States Senate passed my bill by voice vote in the 114th Congress, and the reason at the time was evident: China’s stubbornness wrongly imprisoning a Nobel Peace laureate required public action to force the issue.

The end goal has never been to merely rename a street, but rather to use that action to shine light on the Liu’s and to pressure the PRC to do the right thing. No member can explain the success of this tactic better than my good friend Senator Grassley, the senior senator from Iowa, who led a very similar effort in 1984 to rename the street in front of the Soviet embassy after Andrei Sakharov, the famed Soviet dissident. Senator Grassley led that effort under Ronald Reagan, and when the street was renamed, it meant any time a Soviet had to write to their embassy, they had to write Sakharov’s name. It meant any time you had to pick up the phone and call the embassy and say ‘where exactly do find the embassy,’ they had to give the address and highlight the dissident. For the P.R.C., they do not want to highlight Liu Xiaobo because he is a powerful voice for freedom and against tyranny.

Just as it worked against the Soviet Union and Reagan demonstrated public shaming, shining light, telling the truth can being down the machinery of oppression, so too, can public shining light, secure Dr. Liu’s freedom.

As we stand here today, we don’t know if Xi is going to allow Dr. Liu to come to freedom, to live out his last days in peace, and to receive the Nobel Peace prize that he was so justly rewarded. If XI does the right thing, we can all commend that action, but if not, I am announcing my intention to continue to press this bill.

To seek its passage again in this Congress, just as the Senate passed it in the prior Congress, I intend to press forward and seek passage of this bill, and if Dr. Liu is not released, if he dies in China still under their oppression, I intend to continue to fight until the day when the street is named in front of the embassy and the Chinese communist can bow their heads in shame at their injustice. If they don’t want to be publicly shamed, there is an easy path. Don’t commit shameful acts. Truth has power. Sunshine and light has power. And so I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Republican and Democrat, if there is an issue that should unite us all, it is that a Nobel Peace laureate speaking out for peace and democracy should not be wrongly imprisoned in communist China.

That should bring us together, and the full force of the United States. I commend President Trump for leading on this issue and I am hopeful that China will see its way to do the right thing.

If OBOR is to be seen as China’s 21st century Marshall Plan, the expanding economic influence would require deeper military commitments.

By Gayathri Iyer

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative — the mammoth sea and road infrastructure linking Asia, Europe and Africa is being rapidly pursued as an inclusive International Capacity Cooperation initiative. It is pitched as an economic agenda where some of the manufacturing capacity of China is shifted to partner countries, resulting in a ‘win-win’ for all. Its immediate manifestation in South Asia is in the form of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a project Beijing claims could trigger South Asia’s rapid modernisation. The façade of business connectivity, however, shrouds a hegemonic ambition to dominate Eurasia and shape a new world order. China’s gambit is fraught with risk, as it involves contradictions that cannot be easily reconciled. The purported innocuousness of China’s endeavour does not confirm to the nature of great power politics and the contradictions do not bode well for it’s future.

The first of these fault lines expresses itself through the nature of great power politics. Given that, great powers have both varied interests and enormous resources, it is not clear why Beijing will confine its ambition to infrastructure and connectivity. Indeed, to ensure hegemony in Asia, China will need to exert both economic and military power. Regardless of the fact that military prowess has ceded space to economics in post World War-II, hard power projection remains as relevant as earlier.

The United States’ Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe was a typical example of an economics-heavy approach underpinned by military strength. Two factors underlie the primacy of hard power.

• First, states found themselves entering an investment trap, where securing economic investments necessitated the introduction of military force.
• The second factor was the propensity of great powers to exert economic influence and extract military commitments from partner states.

The same was the case with the erstwhile Soviet Union, where its clientele — whether in Africa or Latin America — involved heavy military involvement. If OBOR is to be seen as China’s 21^st century Marshall Plan, the expanding economic influence would require deeper military commitments from China. In fact, a recent Pentagon report signals these possibilities when it highlights the possibility of Chinese military bases in Pakistan. OBOR’s “win-win” formulation runs contrary to historical evidence of the behavior of great powers.

China’s own record in the last couple of decades is proof that it cannot escape this tragedy of great power politics. In fact, its rising economic stakes in the past couple of decades have been concomitant with a shift in its military priorities. The shifting of its industrial manufacturing corridors from Hong Kong to Mainland China was rapidly followed by a near-simultaneous increase in its military bases in the South China Sea and the Arabian Sea to guard its own mercantile fleets.

Post the 2008 recession, when the rest of the world was reducing its international investments, China’s counter-cyclical strategic investment across several countries surged as it quietly started embedding its military capabilities in its infrastructure assets across countries. Though China claims its drivers for the investment in infrastructure assets hinge around economic and energy security, an eventual set up of military outposts in various infrastructural investments is inevitable. This is already underway with naval berthing and docking facilities in Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Gwadar.

A purely economic enterprise like OBOR, therefore, cannot escape its own militarisation; which raises the question if China can sustain OBOR militarily. The US decline as the global hegemon, for one thing, is not as pronounced as Beijing would have liked. Despite growing fiscal problems and domestic upheavals, America still has the naval power that China does not.

China’s lack of maritime dominance in the wider-Eurasian seas bears further emphasis. Historically, economic hegemony has been an inevitable result of naval hegemony: it has always been the most powerful maritime powers, which have ruled the space of global trade. The decline of the Dutch as an economic superpower prior to the industrial era is attributed to the security challenges its merchant vessel faced vis-à-vis Britain’s success in exploiting the sea-lanes with its superior navy. Later, the British acceded that position to the Americans. However, China’s current weak naval power alone may not be able to match the American advantage as the US air wings on the carrier are vastly more capable than China’s.

But such maritime powers also establish their hegemony through what Gramsci called the ‘co-option’ of others: by building strong maritime coalitions. Here again, China lags far behind. China is geographically at a disadvantage compared to the US due to its comparatively limited access to water – it is essentially a continental power. Most of China is surrounded by land and, taking Eurasia as a continental alternative, the geographical limitations of the region come in the way of a strong naval coalition. The southern parts of Eurasia — the countries of South East Asia and the Middle East — have disparate geography limited by mountains, deserts and not very navigable waterways.

India-Pakistan coalition is not visible in the near future nor is the Ganges basin navigable. This then leaves only the countries in the North European Plain, the Eurasian steppe and the Yellow River basin as candidates for meaningful coalition. However, though the Northern European Plain and the Eurasian Steppe are adjacent, they have no warm water navigable waterways connecting them among themselves or the Yellow River Basin to make a strong naval coalition possible at this juncture.

The alternative that China seems to be employing is to emulate the Soviet model during the cold war era. Since Peter the Great, Moscow’s quest for warm water ports has been a constant in its security policy. Vladivostok, on the Russian east coast, was constructed with a vision to establish a major naval presence in the Pacific Ocean and to also help Russia solidify its presence and ties with China, North Korea, Japan and other countries in the Far East.

The port has had a large military base and has been valued for being a diplomatic and economic outpost since the time Trans-Siberian Railway connected it to the west, opening Russia’s eastern coast to the valuable markets located in Europe, just like what OBOR aims to do for China now. However, the continental nature of Russian power did not allow her to be a naval power of global consequence at any period in its history. The same tyranny of geography works to China’s disadvantage.

Notwithstanding the continental nature of Chinese power and the restraints which follow, established great powers constantly endeavor to prevent the rise of any global competitors. The same is the case with rise of China as a great power with the OBOR initiative. In fact, China’s grand plans have already initiated a counter-coalition against it. One can see this in the renewed interest in US-Japan-Australia-India quad formation. The US, increasingly apprehensive of the swift movement of the OBOR and Chinese influence, is striking alliances with India, Japan and Australia to join hands in military cooperation in South China Sea in an attempt to balance the increasing Chinese military muscle in international waters. The US has also freshly revived its major infrastructure projects in Asia — New Silk Road (NSR) linking South and Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor linking South Asia and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, India and Japan have joined hands to embark upon multiple infrastructure projects across Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.

China may be bidding to create a new world order as all great powers aspire to do, but in the process, it also cannot escape the unintended consequences of great power politics: its rising economic profile would require a larger military footprint. Militarisation of OBOR, even though unintended, would lead to multiple troubles, exacerbated by China’s relatively modest naval strength, its geographical limitations and necessities of global balance of power. China may attempt to escape these pitfalls but its success is highly doubtful because the process of great power politics creates its own realities and outcomes, which, many a time, are unintended.

The summit of US and French Presidents provides final confirmation that the West’s regime change war in Syria has failed and is being abandoned.

The hints and signals that have been flickering on and off from Washington and Paris since the change of governments in the US and France that the regime change attempt in Syria is being officially abandoned has now received formal confirmation.

This has come in a joint news conference by Presidents Trump and Macron following President Trump’s talks with President Macron in France.

The statement of abandonment of the regime change policy in Syria was set out in the clearest language by President Macron:

Indeed, we now have a new approach in Syria, because we want results and we want to work closely together with all our partners including the United States. We have one main goal which is to eradicate terrorism, no matter who they are, we want to build an inclusive and sustainable political solution. I do not require Assad’s departure, that’s no longer a prerequisite for France. For seven years, we did not have an embassy in Damascus – and still we have no solution.

A more straightforward admission of failure in Syria than the highlighted words would be difficult to come up with.

Inevitably some health warnings are in order. The US and France have not suddenly become converts to the cause of President Assad. As Macron’s words show, their acceptance that he will stay as President of Syria is simply a recognition of reality: that with Russia protecting him and his armies on the offensive on all fronts there is no longer the wherewithal to remove him.

It has taken six bitter years of conflict and five terrible years of war to arrive at this point. Though Trump and Macron are not to blame for this – the regime change war in Syria was not their work but the work of their predecessors – that it has taken so long and has required so much devastation and loss of life is a terrible indictment of Western policy.

The White House said Thursday it welcomes the agreement reached by the Palestinian Authority and Israeli government about the Palestinian allocation of water from the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project to the Palestinian Authority in the amount of 32 million cubic meters (MCM) (22 MCM for the West Bank and 10 MCM for the Gaza Strip).

This agreement falls under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 2013 by Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. The MOU establishes the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, which involves construction of a desalination plant in Aqaba that will provide fresh water to Jordan and Israel and convey brine to the Dead Sea to reduce its rate of decline.‎ The Project also involves Israel supplying additional water to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

According to the White House, Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt successfully supported the Israeli and Palestinian efforts to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement on this vital issue.

“President Trump has made it clear that working towards achieving a lasting peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians is a top priority for him, and he strongly believes that peace is possible,” the White House said in a  statement. “The Administration has urged the parties to undertake efforts to promote an environment that is conducive to advancing peace, and this new agreement, the second major Israeli-Palestinian agreement signed this week, is another indication that the parties are capable of working together to achieve mutually beneficial results.”

(Élysée Palace, Paris, France) — PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. First and foremost, I want to thank President Trump for his visit to Paris this afternoon and tomorrow, tomorrow morning, as well as to thank his delegation. I was very pleased to be able to welcome President Trump and his spouse today. He accepted the invitation I extended a couple of weeks ago in order to invite him to join the ceremonies of the 14th of July, tomorrow.

I think it is both a symbol and very important that the President of the United States could be with us tomorrow on the occasion of our National Day, and attend a military parade, which will — to which the American troops will take part. We will be also commemorating the 100th anniversary of the American troops joining World War I with the allies in France.

I think it is important because, beyond daily news, we live in countries with roots which are deeper and go further and beyond who we are. So the presence of President Trump was, in my eyes, not only natural, and I think it is also an excellent thing for the history of both our countries.

Earlier today, we started by sharing part of our joint history at the Invalides Museum, the Army Museum. Then we had a working session. And I shall say that I’m extremely pleased about it. We’ve been able to talk about a number of topics of joint interest, and we underlined a number of shared convictions and, most importantly, a joint roadmap in order to work together in the coming month.

We agreed to implement free and fair trade, and in the field — and this is the G20, in Hamburg, also expressed in terms of sensitivity. We want to work together in order to implement some efficient measures to tackle dumping anywhere it is taking place in all the fields, by sharing the information that we have and making sure that both the European Union and the United States can take the necessary measures in order to protect within the context of free trade, but of fair, free trade that we can protect all over sectors of activities where we are active.

We then had a long discussion which enabled us to cover all of the topics of international policies and the challenges — the security challenges for the people as well. When it comes to fighting terrorism, from day one I can say that we’ve seen eye to eye, and we are strongly determined to take any necessary measures in order to root out terrorism and to eradicate it no matter where, in particular the narrative on the Internet. We agreed to strengthen our action and our cooperation in fighting against propaganda.

We want to get all the major operators to limit the propaganda, and also tackle cyber criminality. These topics, I believe, are fundamental. And I do hope that we can strengthen the cooperation between both our countries. And it is with a lot of satisfaction that I heard from President Trump the very same approach. And our services will then, therefore, be working together in the coming weeks and months to have a solid action map for that.

Regarding the situation in Iraq and in Syria, here again we agreed to continue to work together, in particular in order to be able to launch together some diplomatic initiatives in order to put in place a roadmap for what will come after the war.

We talked about our role, our post-conflict role, but initially we want to put in place a contact group in order to be more efficient, in order to be able to support what is being done by the United Nations, in order to support a political roadmap, in particular for Syria after the war. It is important to put in place some inclusive political solutions for that period of time. We know where destabilization comes from. The roadmap will take care of that. We’ll cover it. And we’ll also ask our diplomats and our staff to work along those lines so that, in the coming weeks, some concrete initiatives can be taken. And they’re supported by the P5.

We also share the same intentions regarding Libya. And like I told President Trump, I very much want to take a number of diplomatic initiatives, strong ones, given the situation that we know, and which requires more stability and better control over the region.

On Libya or the Sahel, I think I can say that we have the same vision, a very coherent understanding of the situation in the region, and the same willingness to act very clearly against any form of terrorism and destabilization.

Next, climate. Well, here we know what our disagreements are. We have expressed them on a number of occasions. But I think it is important that we can continue to talk about it. I very much respect the decision taken by President Trump. He will work upon implementing his campaign promises. And as far as I’m concerned, I remain attached to the Paris Accord, and we’ll make sure that, step by step, we can do everything which is in the accord.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is in summary what we’ve been talking about. We will continue with a friendly tone and informal one this evening. Regarding trade and security for both our countries, the fight against terrorism, stability in the Near and Middle East, in Libya or in the Sahel, I can say that we have a shared determination. The United States is extremely involved in the Iraq War, and I would like to thank President Trump for everything that’s been done by the American troops against this background. But I would like him to know that I am fully determined to act together with him in this respect — fully determined.

I very much want both our countries in these matters to increase their cooperation in the coming month, because the threat we are facing is a global one. The enemies — our enemies are trying to destabilize us by any way. And I believe that this is very much at the heart of the historic alliance between our two countries, and which fully justifies the presence of President Trump today and tomorrow in Paris.

Thank you. Thank you, dear Donald. Thank you.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well thank you very much, President Macron. And Melania and I are thrilled to join you and Mrs. Macron. This is a wonderful national celebration, and we look very much forward to it. It will be spectacular. Tomorrow — Bastille Day.

We’re honored to be here in your beautiful country — and it certainly is a beautiful country — with its proud history and its magnificent people. And thank you for the tour of some of the most incredible buildings anywhere in the world. That was very, very — a very beautiful thing to see. Thank you.

When the French people rose up and stormed the Bastille, it changed the course of human history. Our two nations are forever joined together by the spirit of revolution and the fight for freedom. France is America’s first and oldest ally. A lot of people don’t know that. Ever since General Lafayette joined the American fight for independence, our fates and fortunes have been tied unequivocally together. It was a longtime ago but we are together, and I think together, perhaps, more so than ever. The relationship is very good.

This visit also commemorates another milestone. One century ago, the United States entered World War I. And when the President called me, he had mentioned that fact — 100 years ago, that was — I said, Mr. President, I will be there. That’s a big, important date — 100 years.

We remember the tens of thousands of Americans who gave their lives in that valiant and very difficult struggle. We also pay tribute to the heroic deeds of the French Troops whose courage at the Battle of Marne, and countless other battles, will never be forgotten by us. More than one million French soldiers laid down their lives in defense of liberty. Their sacrifice is an eternal tribute to France and to freedom. French and American patriots have fought together, bled together, and died together in the fight for our countries and our civilizations.

Today, we face new threats from rogue regimes like North Korea, Iran, and Syria, and the governments that finance and support them. We also face grave threats from terrorist organizations that wage war on innocent lives. Tomorrow will mark one year since a joyous Bastille Day celebration in Nice turned into a massacre. We all remember that, how horrible that was. We mourn the 86 lives that were stolen, and we pray for their loved ones. We also renew our resolve to stand united against these enemies of humanity and to strip them of their territory, their funding, their networks, and ideological support.

Today, President Macron and myself discussed how we can strengthen our vital security partnerships. We just had a meeting with our generals and our representatives, and it went very well. France has excellent counterterrorism capabilities. The French troops are serving bravely in places like Mali to defeat these forces of murder and destruction. The United States and our allies strengthen our commitments to defeat terrorism.

We’re also making tremendous progress. Earlier this week, with the strong support of the United States and the Global Coalition, Iraqi forces liberated the city of Mosul from ISIS control. Now we must work with the government of Iraq and our partners and allies in the region to consolidate the gains and ensure that the victory stays a victory, unlike the last time.

Last week, the G20 leaders also reaffirmed the right to sovereign nations to control their borders. We must be strong from within to defend ourselves from threats from the outside. The nations of the West also face domestic challenges of our own creation, including vast government bureaucracy that saps the strength from our economies and from our societies.

For this reason, I applaud President Macron on his courageous call for that “less bureaucracy” — it’s a good chant — “less bureaucracy,” — we can use it, too — and a Europe that protects its citizens. We did not become great through regulation. And in the United States, Mr. President, we also have cut regulations at a level we’ve never seen before. So we’re very proud of that — over the last six months — but by allowing our people to follow their dreams. That’s what it’s all about. To achieve these dreams, however, we must also confront unfair trade practices that hurt our workers, and pursue trade deals that are reciprocal and fair.

Both President Macron and I understand our responsibility to prioritize the interests of our countries and, at the same time, to be respectful of the world in which we live. We live in a very complex world. We have to respect it. The United States remains committed to being a leader in environmental protection, while we advance energy security and economic growth.

The friendship between our two nations — and ourselves, I might add — is unbreakable. Our occasional disagreements are nothing compared to the immortal bonds of culture, destiny, and liberty that unite us. So strongly unite us, also. As long as we have pride in who we are, where we’ve come from, how we got here, and what we’ve achieved as free and democratic nations, then there is nothing we cannot accomplish together.

France helped us secure our independence. A lot of people forget. In the American Revolution, thousands of French soldiers fought alongside American troops so that, as Lafayette said, liberty would have a country. Ever since then, courageous heroes from both nations have fought for the same noble values and the same righteous cause.

Tomorrow, the French Tricolor will once again wave proudly alongside the American Stars and Stripes. Our brave soldiers will march side-by-side, and we will all be inspired to protect and cherish the birthright of freedom that our ancestors won for us with their sweat and with their blood.

President Macron, thank you for inviting Melania and myself to this historic celebration. And to you and your spectacular country: May God bless France and may God bless America.

Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) Very well. I think we will be taking four questions.

Neither President Trump nor myself have a microphone. (Laughter.)

PRESIDENT TRUMP: He’s getting first question, President?

Q (As interpreted.) A question for President Macron regarding what you said on the occasion of the press conference together with Chancellor Merkel. Do you still hope that President Trump — or did you still hope that President Trump could turn his mind regarding the Paris Accord?

And now, President Trump, is it possible for you to come back to the Paris Accord and change your mind?

Next, regarding your relation, how would you describe it today? What about the dinner tonight? Is it going to be a dinner between friends?

PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) Well, regarding climate — well, we have a number of disagreements, which are in particular due to the commitments taken by President Trump vis-à-vis his — during the presidential campaign. So did I. I’m aware of the high importance that that is, but we therefore talked about our disagreement. And we actually discussed the matter even before President Trump reached the decision.

Next, should that have an impact on the discussions we are having on all other topics? No, absolutely not. This is the reason why we share the same views and some major common goals on many other topics or all other topics, which we’ve been discussing today, and we shall move forward together.

Next — well, of course, President Trump will tell you about it, but he’s made a number of commitments, and we’re going to be working together, and my willingness to continue to work with the United States and the President on these very major topics. I understand that it’s important to save jobs. That being said, we shall leave the United States of America work on what is its roadmap, and continue to talk about it.

So today there is nothing new, unprecedented, otherwise we would have told you about it. But I believe there is a joint willingness to continue to talk about this and try and find the best possible agreement. As far as I’m concerned, I remain extremely attached to the framework of the Paris Accord, which has been a major international breakthrough, and it is within that framework that I’m working on priorities, including for the European Union.

Lastly, as you know, I never very much want to comment who we are and what we are doing, personally. But I can tell you that this evening, at the Eiffel Tower, it will be a dinner between friends, because we are the representatives of two countries which have been allies forever and because we’ve been able to build a strong relation which is dear to me, because it matters a great deal for both countries. It will, therefore, give me great pleasure to have dinner together with you tonight.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: I think that I can reiterate. We have a very good relationship, a good friendship. And we look forward to dinner tonight at the Eiffel Tower. That will be something special. And, yeah, I mean, something could happen with respect to the Paris Accord. We’ll see what happens. But we will talk about that over the coming period of time. And if it happens, that will be wonderful. And if it doesn’t, that will be okay, too. But we’ll see what happens.

But we did discuss many things today, including the ceasefire in Syria. We discussed the Ukraine. We discussed a lot of different topics. We briefly hit on the Paris Accord. And we’ll see what happens.

Yes, ma’am. Go ahead.

Q Thank you. Merci, Mr. President. Mr. President, your FBI nominee said if someone in a campaign got an email about Russia, like the one that your son Don Jr. received, that they should alert the FBI rather than accept that meeting. Is he wrong? Also, were you misled by your team in not knowing about this meeting?

And, Mr. President, thank you very much. You have heard President Trump say that it may have been Russia, it may have been others who interfered with the U.S. election. Is President Trump taking a hard-enough line on Russia, as you see it? Merci.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, I’ll start off by saying, first of all, I believe that we will have a great FBI director. I think he’s doing really well, and we’re very proud of that choice. I think I’ve done a great service to the country by choosing him. He will make us all proud, and I think someday we’ll see that — and hopefully someday soon. So, we’re very proud of him.

As far as my son is concerned, my son is a wonderful young man. He took a meeting with a Russian lawyer, not a government lawyer, but a Russian lawyer. It was a short meeting. It was a meeting that went very, very quickly, very fast. Two of the people in the room, they — I guess one of them left almost immediately and the other one was not really focused on the meeting.

I do think this: I think from a practical standpoint, most people would have taken that meeting. It’s called opposition research, or even research into your opponent. I’ve had many people — I have only been in politics for two years, but I’ve had many people call up — “Oh, gee, we have information on this factor or this person, or, frankly, Hillary.” That’s very standard in politics. Politics is not the nicest business in the world, but it’s very standard where they have information and you take the information.

In the case of Don, he listened. I guess they talked about — as I see it, they talked about adoption and some things. Adoption wasn’t even a part of the campaign. But nothing happened from the meeting. Zero happened from the meeting. And, honestly, I think the press made a very big deal over something that, really, a lot of people would do.

Now, the lawyer that went to the meeting, I see that she was in the halls of Congress, also. Somebody said that her visa or her passport to come into the country was approved by Attorney General Lynch. Now, maybe that’s wrong. I just heard that a little while ago. But a little surprised to hear that. So she was here because of Lynch.

So, again, I have a son who’s a great young man. He’s a fine person. He took a meeting with a lawyer from Russia. It lasted for a very short period, and nothing came of the meeting. And I think it’s a meeting that most people in politics probably would have taken.

Mr. President.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (In English.) Yes, to answer your question, I will not interfere in U.S. domestic policy. And I think it’s always good between partners and allies not to interfere in others’ domestic life.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: What a good answer that was. (Laughter.)

PRESIDENT MACRON: (In English.) And I do believe that both of us have a direct relationship with Russia. President Trump had more than two hours meeting with President Putin during this past G20. So that’s — I had two very long meetings with President Putin, the very first one in Versailles and the second one during the G20. And this relationship is very important. We have a lot of disagreements. We have a lot of discrepancies, obviously, with Russia. But in the current environment, especially in the Middle East, it’s a necessity to work together, to work together, to exchange information, to share disagreements, and to try to build solutions.

So that’s my relationship with Russia. And we don’t have, obviously, the same relationship as the one with the U.S. But that’s a longstanding relationship with Russia as well, and I think it’s important that both of us have direct discussion and contact with President Putin.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: One of the great things that came out of that meeting, by the way — even though it’s not part of the question — was the fact that we got a ceasefire that now has lasted for, I guess, Mr. President, almost five days. And while five days doesn’t sound like a long period of time, in terms of a ceasefire in Syria, that’s a very long period of time. And that was a result of having communication with a country. So, during that five-day period, a lot of lives have been saved. A lot of people were not killed. No shots have been fired in a very, very dangerous part of the world, and this is one of the most dangerous parts of Syria itself.

So by having some communication and dialogue, we were able to have this ceasefire, and it’s going to go on for a while. And, frankly, we’re working on a second ceasefire in a very rough part of Syria. And if we get that and a few more, all of a sudden you’re going to have no bullets being fired in Syria. And that would be a wonderful thing.

Mr. President, you have a question.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) Third question from BFN TV.

Q (As interpreted.) A question to President Macron. You went to Lausanne in order to support Paris’s bid for the Olympic Games, and on this occasion you somehow criticized President Trump’s policy without naming him. You said that France made a very clear choice to leave its border open and not to build walls to protect its people. Do you condemn the Muslim ban and the building of the wall between the United States and Mexico?

Regarding Syria, as it was just mentioned by President Trump, is France ready to talk directly with Bashar al-Assad in the negotiation that you mentioned?

(In English.) You’ve mentioned a friend, Jim, who told you that Paris is no longer Paris. You were implying at the time that Paris was not safe anymore. You’ve also said that France and Germany are infected by terrorism and “it’s their fault because they let people enter their territory.” Those are very strong words. Would you repeat them today? And do you still believe that France is not able to fight terrorism on its own territory? Thank you.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: You better let me answer that one first. That’s a beauty. (Laughter.) He’s the one that asked the question. That wasn’t even one of my picks.

You know what, it’s going to be just fine because you have a great President. You have somebody that’s going to run this country right. And I would be willing to bet — because I think this is one of the great cities, one of the most beautiful cities in the world — and you have a great leader now, you have a great President, you have a tough President. He’s not going to be easy on people that are breaking the laws and people that show this tremendous violence.

So I really have a feeling that you’re going to have a very, very peaceful and beautiful Paris, and I’m coming back. You better do a good job, please. (Laughter.) Otherwise you’re going to make me look very bad.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (In English.) And you’re always welcome.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) Regarding the first question, like I said, I believe that the discussions that we’ve had today is the proper answer to terrorism. The right answer is strengthen cooperation between our services and a never-ending fight against terrorists no matter where they are. This is what I was referring to, this is what we’re working on actively together.

So, in this respect, there is no difference and no gap between the French and the American positions. When I have something to say, I say it clearly, and I do say who I’m aiming at. And when I refer to those who have been my opponents in the French political battle, I also mention the names. So let us not mix up everything.

And regarding the fight against terrorism, I think the right approach is to have strengthened cooperation in the field of intelligence, is also to be working together on all the theaters of operation where we are. And I think that the decisions we’ve reached today will enable us to do more.

Next, your question regarding Bashar al-Assad, which is an important one. Let me put it simply: Indeed, we now have a new approach of Syria because we want some results and we want to be closely working together with our partners, including the United States of America. We have one main goal, which is to eradicate terrorism. No matter who they are, we want to build an inclusive and sustainable political solution. Against that background, I do not require Assad’s departure. This is no longer a prerequisite for France to work on that, because I can only tell you that, for seven years, we did not have an embassy in Damascus, and still we have no solution.

Next, we also have a common red line, together with President Trump. He intervened before I was elected, and I said it to President Putin after my election: No use whatsoever of chemical weapons. Any use will lead to reaction — an attack against a reaction regarding the storage places.

Next, we also want humanitarian corridors. Also, we want to build a sustainable political stability for Syria. This is our roadmap. In order to stick to it, we need diplomatic initiative beyond our military actions. This is what we’ve been agreeing upon, because we want to take an initiative with the members of the Security Council and a number of countries involved in the process. Of course, there will be representatives of Assad that will enable us to put in place the roadmap for after the war, but there will also be representatives of the opposition and people with different backgrounds, and we will talk to all of them against that background.

One last question for an American journalist.

Q Thank you. (Inaudible) TV of China. (As interpreted.) For both Presidents: Mr. Macron, you had your first meeting with the Chinese President during the G20 Summit. What will France do? How will France cooperate with all of these areas with China? And what do you think personally of Mr. Xi Jinping?

(In English.) Mr. President, you have just met the Chinese President during the G20 Summit. How do you want to continue to work with China? And what do you personally think about Mr. Xi Jinping? Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, he’s a friend of mine. I have great respect for him. We’ve gotten to know each other very well. A great leader. He’s a very talented man. I think he’s a very good man. He loves China, I can tell you. He loves China. He wants to do what’s right for China.

We’ve asked him for some assistance with respect to North Korea. Probably, he could do a little bit more, but we’ll find out. We’re now working on some trade deals. He’s been very nice. He’s let, as you know, beef go back in, certain financing go back in, credit card financing, and various other things go back in at my request, which is a great thing for our farmers. A lot of good things are happening, but we’re going to be working on some very major trade components.

But President Xi is a terrific guy. I like being with him a lot, and he’s a very special person.

Okay, thank you.

PRESIDENT MACRON: (As interpreted.) I first talked to President Xi over the telephone, and then I got to meet him in the margin of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. Early next year I will be traveling to China. We’ve agreed to it. So I cannot say that he’s a friend of mine or that I know him very well because I very much want to say things as they are. But we had some initial contacts which were extremely fruitful and positive.

I have a lot of respect for President Xi, and I would like to say that over the past few months he did express his willingness to have a vision for multilateralism and wanted to commit himself on a number of topics. I think that many of us remember his words in Davos, and he there very strongly expressed his vision of the role of China. We have a number of joint commitments, including on climate. He’s very committed to that, and he told me that he wanted to do more in the field, and I can only be happy about it. He wants strong cooperation.

And like President Trump said, the trade issues and regarding the number of activities — there are issues, there are differences, but a joint willingness to sort them out. And as permanent members of the Security Council, we want to work together on all of the topics we’ve been discussing today.

And China, in this respect, is a key partner in order to build peace all around the world, and I share what President Trump just said, that China is to play a very specific role regarding the rising tension, the growing tension with North Korea. It’s important that China can play fully its role in the region.

In summary, I think he is today one of the great leaders of our world, implementing a major and ambitious reform of China society and the economy in China. And therefore my willingness, in this respect as well, is to have strategic dialogue, the purpose of which is to continue to talk about the industry of — civil nuclear industry, economic matters, and talk about any difficulties we may have together.

Very well. Allow me to thank you, ladies and gentlemen, and once again thank President Trump for his visit. And I will be seeing him in a few moments in a friendly atmosphere.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you very much. Great honor. Thank you.

By Sandip Kumar Mishra*

After over a year of deliberations, a team of Japanese officials and few business leaders finally visited the Russian-controlled Southern Kurils Islands on 27 June 2017. Japan calls them Northern Territories, but they have been under the control of Russia since World War II. The purpose of the visit was to explore the possibilities and modalities of joint economic activities on the islands by both Russia and Japan. Even though the five-day visit is claimed to be “a big step towards resolving the territorial issue” between Japan and Russia, a remarkably cold response from the latter makes it difficult to anticipate any substantial breakthrough on the issue in the near future. Moreover, the change in the regional power equations has also made it less likely that Russia would be still eager to cooperate with Japan as it promised earlier.

This has been one of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitious projects, part of his policy of rapprochement towards Russia. In May 2016, Abe announced this policy, called the New Approach to Russia, and said that Japan would like to resolve territorial disputes with it by utilising two mechanisms: economic cooperation and frequent high-level diplomatic exchanges. This policy is based on the premise that economic benefits to Russia would be able to buy territorial concessions for Japan.

However, it seems that political and other security variables were not taken into consideration in the formulations of this optimistic policy.

The potential economic benefits to Russia through cooperation with Japan cannot be denied. It was this reason that compelled Russian President Vladimir Putin to respond positively to Japan’s proposal last year. In December 2016, Putin visited Tokyo and agreed to undertake joint economic projects for the Kurils Islands after joint surveys and studies. He also agreed that these joint projects should be operated under a ‘special legal framework’. However, it was naïve on Japan’s part to believe that Russia would pursue its economic benefits devoid of security and strategic interests.

From the very beginning, both parties have different perspectives about the deal. Russia considered this purely as an economic deal, which would not dilute its claim over the islands. But Japan publicised Putin’s agreement about the ‘special legal framework’ as Russia’s indirect admission that these islands did not come under its legal framework. It was, thus, perceived as a sign of Russia’s compromise on the issue of its sovereignty. This deal has not progressed well because of these fundamental differences in their respective perspectives. An initial survey was originally planned to be conducted in May 2017, but it was postponed by Russia.

Japan sent a special envoy to Russia and finally the survey dates were scheduled for late June 2017.

Furthermore, in the past few months, there have been other adverse developments, connected to the different perspectives of the two countries. In recent times, a Russian research vessel was found to be operating in Japan’s exclusive economic zone and a Japanese lecturer was caught by Russian customs authority carrying Japanese language teaching material to the disputed islands. All these developments show that political and security considerations, which are the backbone of the bilateral differences to the proposed deal, are going to make it difficult for Japan’s ‘New Approach’ to Russia to succeed.

Constant changes in the US-China contestations in the region have also made Russia more reluctant to concede any potential advantage to Japan. US President Donald Trump’s administration appears to be unhappy with North Korea’s persistent belligerent behaviour, and is ready to enhance security cooperation with Japan, which is unacceptable to Russia.

On 1 June 2017, Putin underlined the importance of the islands, claiming that their transfer or even common use with Japan might lead to these islands being used for missile defence systems. Although, he did not name the US, his indication was quite clear. On 15 June 2017, the Russian embassy in Tokyo issued an appeal to Japan not to join the US missile defence system. Russia appears to be worried about Japan moving closer to the US in the context of the US-China contestations, which would not be conducive to Russia’s national interests.

Overall, it seems that Shinzo Abe’s ‘New Approach’ to Russia is unlikely to help in resolving territorial disputes with Russia on the Kuril Islands. Even though the initial survey has begun, given the different priorities of the two countries and broader geopolitical factors, the prospects of the ‘New Approach’ do not look positive.

* Sandip Kumar Mishra
Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Visiting Fellow & Columnist, IPCS

In a new book on Islamic radical movements in the Caucasus, a group of Russian scholars argue that efforts to explain Islamist movements by considering the theological positions of this or that trend within Islam are deeply mistaken because many radicals don’t know theology and come their radicalism independent of this or that doctrine.

One of the authors of the book, Enver Khizriyev, a specialist on the Caucasus at the Moscow Institute of African Studies, says that efforts to explain Islamist radicalism by searching for theological citations are not only wrong but have the effect of leading to incorrect conclusions about what is going on (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/305846/).

Adopting a civilizational approach, one that considers specific social situations, the influence of both internal and external factors, local history and changes in the world at large, provides a far better way to understanding why some Muslims become radicalized while others do not.

The new book, Radical Islamist Movements on the Political Map of the Present-Day World, Issue 2. North and South Caucasus (in Russian, Moscow: Academy, 2017, 610 pages, 300 copies), will soon go on sale in Moscow, one of its authors, Anatoly Savateyev of the Institute for African Studies says.

Savateyev tells Kavkaz-Uzel that “Islam has given a new meaning of life to former residents of the USSR.” After the Soviet collapse “a vacuum of ideas arose,” one that hit the peoples of the Caucasus especially hard especially because they were deeply attached to ideas of social justice common to Islam and Sovietism, values that capitalism rejected.

That rejection helped power Islamist radicalization as did events in Iran and Afghanistan, and Russian scholars have been trying to understand its causes and trajectories ever since. This latest work, the second in what is projected to be a multi-volume series, systematizes and generalizes on their research.

Khizriyev says that the volume is unified by a rejection of the theological approach often encountered in the past, “In many texts on this theme,” he says, “one can uncover the position that this or that Islamic theological doctrine directly motivates its supporters to acts of political radicalism.”

That is seldom the case and has the effect of making Islamism a product of Islam rather than being a product of Islam’s interaction with a variety of social and political factors, the scholar says. Indeed, he says, “offering particular citations from the Koran to show the origin of Islamist movements is a profanation of scientific research.”

Naima Neflyasheva, a senior scholar at the Center for Civilizational and Regional Research at the Institute of Africa and a blogger for Kavkaz-Uzel, agrees. The radicalization of young people reflects “a number of factors, ‘from social lifts that don’t work to clans,, from poor education including Islamic to the crisis of traditional ethnic ideologies.”

Other factors at work, she continues, include “the aggressive presence of radical groups on the Internet and their impact on young people to the dominance of an approach based on force … and questions about relations with the so-called ‘new Muslims’ and Caucasuso-phobia, which is present in latent form in the media.”

By Elise Harris

After nearly a year since his kidnapping, Yemen officials say that Fr. Tom Uzhunnalil is in fact alive and efforts are being made for his release.

“The Yemeni deputy prime minister conveyed that as per available information, Father Tom was alive and the Yemen government has been making all efforts to secure his release,” Gopal Baglay, official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs in India said July 11.

The statement was made after Yemen’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulmalik Abduljalil Al-Mekhlafi, told Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj that the Salesian priest was in fact alive, and that continued efforts were being made to obtain his release.

According to India’s Deccan Herald news service, Al-Mekhlafi met Swaraj during his current tour to New Delhi. Swaraj had inquired about Fr. Tom, voicing concern for his safety.

Baglay said Al-Mekhlafi “assured all cooperation” in working for the priest’s freedom.

The confirmation comes more than a year after Fr. Tom’s abduction. He was kidnapped in Yemen in March of last year during an attack on a Missionaries of Charity house that left four sisters dead.

He garnered international attention when rumors spread that he was to be crucified on Good Friday, which were later discredited. Since then, numerous photos and videos have been released picturing Fr. Tom, thin and with an overgrown beard, pleading for help and for his release.

The videos were never officially authenticated, however Al-Mekhlafi’s assurance that the Kerala priest is alive confirms the likelihood the man shown was in fact Uzhunnalil.

In the most recent video, published in May, Fr. Tom spoke slowly in English, saying the Indian government has been contacted several times concerning his release. The bishop of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates has also been contacted, he said, claiming that he’s seen their responses, and they were “very, very poor.”

The priest indicated that he is in poor health, saying: “my health condition is deteriorating quickly, and I require hospitalization as early as possible,” he said.

He then made an appeal for his release, asking “my little family people” to do what they can “to help me be released. Please, please do what you can to help me be released. May God bless you for that.”

Since his kidnapping, Salesians in the Bangalore province of India have made continued efforts for his safety and release, including holding a prayer vigil Jan. 4 and a worldwide novena Jan. 15-23.

Although some attribute the kidnapping to ISIS, no one has claimed responsibility, which has made it difficult for the Indian government to broker the priest’s release. In addition, the situation has been exacerbated by the political instability in Yemen.

Yemen has been embroiled in civil war since March 2015, when Shia rebels attempted to oust Yemen’s Sunni-led government. Saudi Arabia has led a pro-government coalition. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have set up strongholds in the country amid the power vacuum. More than 6,000 people have been killed in the conflict, according to the United Nations.

For Qatar to stop supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, the US must declare it a terrorist organization, said former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton.

“The Saudis have picked on Qatar in particular because of its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, but I think also they’re worried about Qatar’s tilt toward Iran,” he told Breitbart News on Wednesday.
Saudi Arabia wants a “united Sunni Arab community” in the Middle East, Bolton said, adding: “Qatar’s response is, ‘Well, what are you picking on us for? Because of the Muslim Brotherhood? The United States hasn’t declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and neither have we, so why are we any different from you?’”

He said the US should “do what it should’ve done anyway. Let’s declare the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Having done that, we turn back to Qatar and say, ‘Now you follow suit’.”

Bolton urged the US to make full use of the outcomes of the Riyadh Summit upon President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May, which concluded with the inauguration of a pan-Arab, pan-Muslim center against terrorism.

“Give all these governments the cover they need to cut off the sources of terrorist financing,” Bolton said, including the Qatari royal family.

Although Saudi Arabia declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group in 2014, he believes it is a “complicated organization; not every part of it is devoted to the support of terrorism. Some of them do humanitarian work and so on. A declaration that the entire Brotherhood is a foreign terrorist organization would actually buttress the cause of the jihadis.”

Excluding some affiliates and components of the Brotherhood from the designation would be a better option, he said, adding: “Just declare part of it a terrorist organization. We’ll deal with the rest of it later.”

Iran and the IRGC

Meanwhile, Bolton said the US should also add Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the list of terrorist groups, because “that’s fundamentally what it is.”

Tehran’s objective is “to link up from Iran, through the Baghdad government in Iraq, to the Assad regime’s regular forces in Syria and the Hezbollah terrorists who are there in Lebanon,” Bolton warned.

He said Tehran is trying to create “an arc of control that lays the foundation for the next struggle in the Middle East, against the Sunni coalition led by the Saudis.”

He added that the Obama administration was “entirely comfortable” with that, as the situation was consistent with its view that Iran is a “normal kind of nation; we’ll just talk them out of their nuclear weapons and then everything will be fine.” Bolton said Tehran has a different take on this issue.

To prevent it from creating that arc of control, Bolton proposed the creation of a new state that is secular yet demographically Sunni, partially paid for by Saudi Arabia.

“This is part of the bigger picture of how we deal with Iran, which is continuing to pursue nuclear weapons along with its friends in North Korea, and continuing to support terrorism around the world,” he said.

“That struggle with Iran is something that was just absent from the radar screen in the Obama administration, but it’s going to come to the fore again once ISIS (Daesh) is defeated.”

On Sunday, Iraq declared victory against Daesh in Mosul after a grueling months-long campaign, dealing the biggest defeat yet to the terrorist group.

Bolton said having an active strategy is a must. “It’s not enough to kind of wake up every day and say, ‘Well, gee, what problem do we have now?’ You have to have a strategy.”

He said combating terrorism and tackling the threat of “the world’s principal state sponsor of terrorism, which is Iran,” is a critical strategy that should be developed urgently. This requires advancing US objectives and Arab unity, he added.

France has shifted its priorities from ousting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to defeating terrorism and seeking political stability at home, French President Emmanuel Macron said at a joint press conference with US President Donald Trump.

“On the Iraq-Syria situation, we have agreed to continue working together, in particular on the building of a roadmap for the post-war period,” Macron said during a joint news conference in the aftermath of talks with Donald Trump in Paris. “We have asked our diplomats to work in that direction, so in the next few weeks a concrete initiative can be taken and managed by the P5 [the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council(UNSC)].”

The so-called “contact group” on Syria, according to Macron, should include UN Security Council members, as well as representatives of the Syrian government and rebel groups.

President Assad’s departure is no longer as relevant for Paris, as fighting terrorism at home has now become the top priority, Macron stated.

“Indeed, we now have a new approach in Syria, because we want results and we want to work closely together with all our partners including the United States. We have one main goal which is to eradicate terrorism, no matter who they are, we want to build an inclusive and sustainable political solution,” Macron said. “I do not require Assad’s departure, that’s no longer a prerequisite for France. For seven years, we did not have an embassy in Damascus – and still we have no solution.”

Donald Trump confirmed that the US and Russia are working on a second ceasefire agreement in Syria as a follow up to the one he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed upon during their first meeting on the sidelines of G20.

“One of the great things that came out if this meeting, by the way, was the fact that we got the ceasefire that now has lasted for almost five days. Five days doesn’t sound like a long period of time. In terms of a ceasefire in Syria it’s a very long period of time,” Trump said.

“That was a result of having communication with a country. During that five day period a lot of lives have been saved, a lot of people were not killed, no shots have been fired in a very, very dangerous part of the world and this is one of the most dangerous parts of Syria itself,” he added.

“By having some communication and dialogue we were able to have a ceasefire and it’s going to go on for a while. And frankly we’re working on the second ceasefire in a very rough part of Syria.”

The French President stressed the importance of maintaining good relations with Russia, especially with regard to solving the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.

“We have a lot of disagreements, we have a lot discrepancies obviously with Russia. But in the current environment, especially in the Middle East, it’s a necessity to work together to exchange information, to share disagreements, and to try to build solutions,” Macron stated.

Trump has arrived in Paris for his first official visit to France on Thursday. Apart from discussing international and bilateral relations with his French counterpart, the US president is to attend a Bastille Day parade in the French capital on Friday.

The summit in Kyiv welcomed the completion of the ratification of the association agreement and the recent entry into force of visa liberalization for Ukrainian citizens, both of which are fundamental steps towards reinforcing the EU-Ukraine partnership.

“This Summit is a good moment to celebrate the strong and deepening friendship between the European Union and Ukraine,” said Donald Tusk, European Council President

Leaders discussed the importance of pursuing an ambitious reform process, especially in the fight against corruption, as well as ways to maximize the benefits/potential of the EU-Ukraine association agreement. Leaders also discussed the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, including the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

The European Union was represented by Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, and Jean Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. Ukraine was represented by President Petro Poroshenko.

Additionally, the leaders welcomed the ratification by all EU countries of the association agreement, including the deep and comprehensive free trade area. The agreement will enter into force on September 1, 2017.

Most of the association agreement is already operational. Many political and sectoral parts of the agreement have been provisionally applied since 1 September 2014, while its trade part, the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA), has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. Trade between the EU and Ukraine continued to grow over this period of time and the EU has reinforced its position as Ukraine’s primary partner. Trade between the two grew by almost 30% in the first quarter of 2017 compared to the first quarter of 2016.

The European Commission on Thursday put forward new rules to clamp down on the illegal import and trafficking of cultural goods from outside the EU, often linked to terrorist financing and other criminal activity.

Thursday’s proposal marks one of the final steps set out in the Commission’s action plan to strengthen the fight against terrorism financing. It will stop this traffic in its tracks by banning the import into the EU of cultural goods exported illegally from their home countries. It comes just days after the Hamburg G20 called on countries to tackle terrorist finance, including the looting and smuggling of antiquities.

According to Commission First Vice President Frans Timmermans, “Money is oxygen to terrorist organizations such as Daesh. We are taking action to cut off each of their sources of financing. This includes the trade of cultural goods, as terrorists derive funding from the looting of archaeological sites and the illegal sale of cultural objects. By preventing them from entering the EU, we can help dry up this source of income.”

At the moment, the EU applies prohibitions on goods from Iraq and Syria but there is no general EU framework for the import of cultural goods. Current rules can be exploited by unscrupulous exporters and importers who can use the profits to fund illegal activities such as terrorism. Diverging and ineffective existing national legislation in this area means that EU action is necessary to ensure consistent treatment of imports of cultural goods all along the EU’s external borders. This will help prevent illicit cultural goods being brought into the EU, directly weakening the cultural, historical and archaeological life of the country of origin.

Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, said, “The illegal trafficking of cultural goods is an issue of grave concern. Such activity can wreak serious damage on the cultural heritage of those countries that can least afford to protect their interests. Today’s proposal equips customs authorities with the right tools to ensure the EU market is closed for such goods.”

Plans for the new measures were first set out as part of the Commission’s European Agenda on Security and its 2016 action plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism. In February 2016, EU Member States recalled the importance of urgently enhancing the fight against the illicit trade in cultural goods and asked the Commission to propose legislative measures on this matter as soon as possible.

Tibor Navracsics, Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, said, “The looting and illicit trafficking of cultural goods deprives citizens of affected countries of a part of their cultural identity and destroys the cultural heritage of humankind. Today we are demonstrating the Commission’s commitment to protecting this global heritage, which we will showcase during the 2018 European Year of Cultural Heritage.”

Awareness campaigns targeting buyers of cultural goods, such as professional art market importers but also buyers of cultural goods in Europe are envisaged. In parallel, training sessions for customs officers and other law enforcement services will be organised by Member States in order to improve their ability to recognise suspicious shipments and to co-operate more efficiently in preventing illicit trade.

EU Member States will be obliged to ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties are in place for those who do not follow the rules, in particular for anyone who makes false statements or submits false information.

By François Gouyette*

Paris and Riyadh are bound by historic relations. France opened its first consulate in Jeddah in 1839, and since the meeting between Gen. Charles de Gaulle and King Faisal in 1967, bilateral relations have distinguished themselves by political and personal high-level contacts. This year, we will celebrate the 50th anniversary of this memorable meeting.

Paris and Riyadh have sealed a long-term special relationship. The five-year term of former President François Hollande strengthened the French-Saudi global strategic partnership, which his successor Emmanuel Macron intends to improve in order to identify new synergies with the Kingdom’s bold Vision 2030 plan for economic and social reforms.

In the coming months, our two countries will develop cooperation in numerous fields: Defense, peace and security, energy, health, agriculture, education, culture, the environment and tourism. Our two friendly countries have always enjoyed a strong, close and confident relationship. They share a broad convergence of views on major regional and international issues, as well as the main challenges of the 21st century.

In that context, visits of French and Saudi senior political figures have considerably increased in recent years. At the same time, members of the French Parliament and Majlis Al-Shoura have developed their relations through the French-Saudi friendship group. The scope, dimension and level of our bilateral relations reflect the close links between our countries for the benefit of the French and Saudi peoples.

Political relations between Paris and Riyadh have reached new heights. France and Saudi Arabia have a common ambition: To ensure their economic partnership is in line with their special political relation. In May 2015, the French president and Saudi king adopted an ambitious action plan to boost our relationship through a win-win approach. Since then, France and Saudi Arabia have already held two joint committees.

The third joint committee will focus on our mutual determination to strengthen the French-Saudi strategic partnership and deepen our special relationship via increased trade and identification of new cooperation prospects within the framework of the National Transformation Program (NTP) 2020, adopted by the Kingdom to implement Vision 2030.

French expertise must take part in this new era in the Kingdom. The French government and private investors are eager to stand with the Saudi people. The Kingdom is a major economic and commercial partner for France in the Gulf and in all the Middle East.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with a volume of trade worth $8 billion in 2016, France is one of the Kingdom’s top 10 commercial partners in the world. Our trade relations cover fields as diverse as defense, energy, transport and tourism. In 2016, Saudi exports to France amounted to €3.8 billion ($4.3 billion), while Saudi imports from France reached €4.1 billion ($4.7 billion).

France is a major importer of crude oil. With an average of 1.2 million barrels per day in 2016, we are the fourth-largest European importer of crude oil. But those imports have slowly decreased since 1998 due to our commitment to energy efficiency, renewable energy and public transport.

At the same time, the market share of Saudi oil in our imports has regularly increased for the last 10 years. In 2016, it represented 15 percent of our external supply of oil. This shows the stability of our trade relations and the quality of Saudi oil products.

These strong links will keep strengthening in the coming months and years, since French companies have established strong partnerships with Saudi players, who do not want to be only suppliers but also agents of economic modernization.

With more than $15 billion of French foreign direct investments (FDI) in Saudi Arabia, France is the third-biggest foreign investor in the Kingdom. French companies employ more than 27,000 people in Saudi Arabia, with a 36 percent average Saudization rate.

France is one of the most attractive countries for incoming FDI. Saudi investments in France cover fields as diverse as the hotel industry, the agro-food industry and real estate. According to INSEE, the French national statistics institute, 24 Saudi companies operate in France. They employ some 3,200 people and have a consolidated turnover of around €350 million ($399 million).

Including portfolio and residential real estate investments, Saudi investments in France amount to around €1 billion ($1.1 billion). The French-Saudi Business Council is a key player in helping reinforce the volume of bilateral trade.

Last but not least, the number of Saudi tourists in France is another indicator of the bilateral friendship. In 2016, the French consulates in the Kingdom issued almost 130,000 visas, mostly within 48 hours and multiple entry.

Many of the most famous French tourist attractions are in the countryside, such as the viaduct of Millau, the Provence and Côte d’Azur region, and some of the royal castles scattered along the Loire Valley. France is also the second destination worldwide for skiing.

Long live the French-Saudi friendship!

• François Gouyette is ambassador of France to Saudi Arabia.