Fortum has made a final investment decision on the Sørfjord windfarm in Northern Norway. Sørfjord is part of the wind portfolio that Fortum acquired from Nordkraft earlier this year.
The Sørfjord wind park will have 23 wind turbines with a total capacity of 96.6 megawatts. The wind turbines for Sørfjord will be delivered by Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy. Each wind turbine will have a nominal effect of 4.2 megawatts and a rotor diameter of 130 meters.
Initial civil works on the Sørfjord site have been ongoing since spring 2017. The foundations and the electrical works will be executed during 2018 and 2019 and the wind farm is expected to be commissioned in late 2019.
“This investment decision is a further step in the implementation of our wind growth strategy. Our aim is to build a sizeable wind portfolio in the Nordic area. We believe that wind will be one of the most competitive options in the Nordic power production. Sørfjord has attractive and unique wind conditions that will be efficiently harnessed through direct drive and large rotor machines,” said Philippe Stohr, Vice President of Wind Power at Fortum.
Fortum finalised the acquisition of three wind power projects from Nordkraft at the beginning of January 2017. The transaction consisted of Nygårdsfjellet wind farm, which is in operation, as well as the fully-permitted Ånstadblåheia and Sørfjord projects that are now being constructed. When built, the total installed capacity of the three wind farms will be approximately 180 MW. Fortum is cooperating with Nordkraft for the construction and operation of the portfolio.
The very last agricultural quota system in place, managing sugar production in the European Union, will be scrapped on September 30, 2017, after nearly 50 years.
The decision to end the sugar quotas now was agreed between the European Parliament and Member States in the 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural policy (CAP) after a major reform and restructuring process initiated in 2006.
Between 2006 and 2010, the sugar sector had been thoroughly restructured with the support of €5.4 billion. As a result, the sector has been able to carefully prepare for this moment and productivity has improved substantially over the last years. The end of the quota system gives producers the possibility to adjust their production to real commercial opportunities, notably in exploring new export markets. It also significantly simplifies the current policy management and administrative burden for operators, growers and traders.
Phil Hogan, Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, said, “The end of the quota system represents an important turning point for our European sugar sector and marks another important step in the market orientation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Producers will now have the opportunity to expand their trade on global markets, and with the right policy supports from the European Commission – such as the Sugar Market Observatory which provides timely and relevant market information – they should have every chance of success. I am confident that, since the end date for sugar quotas was decided, the industry has positioned itself well to benefit from the opportunities which the end of sugar quotas presents.”
EU’s continuing support for the sugar sector
Various measures from the Common Agricultural Policy can be used to continue supporting the EU sugar sector to face unexpected disturbances on the market. This includes a substantial EU import tariff (outside preferential trade agreements) and the possibility to give support for private storage and crisis measures that would allow the Commission to take action in case of severe market crisis involving a sharp increase or decrease of market prices. Income support for farmers in the form of direct payments is also available, including the possibility for EU member states to provide so-called voluntary coupled support for sectors in difficulty, including sugar beet production.
The possibility to collectively negotiate value sharing terms in the contracts between EU beet producers and sugar processors is maintained after the end of the quotas.
The European Commission has also improved transparency on the sugar market in anticipation of the end of the quota system. A new Sugar Market Observatory provides short-term analysis and statistics about the sugar market, as well as analysis and outlook to help farmers and processors manage their businesses more effectively.
The sugar quota system was introduced with the first CAP rules on sugar in 1968, along with a support price for producers set at a level significantly above the world market price. The decision to end the quota system for sugar was taken by Member States in 2006.
The end of the quota system follows the significant reform of the sector from 2006-2010. The average EU sugar price has recovered since the end of 2016 to around €500/t and has been stable in the last few months.
The EU is the world’s leading producer of beet sugar (roughly 50% of the total). However, beet sugar represents only 20% of the world’s sugar production; the other 80% is produced from sugar cane. Most of the EU’s sugar beet is grown in the northern half of Europe, where the climate is more suited to growing beet. The EU also has an important refining industry that processes imported raw cane sugar.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has offered to provide evidence that the Russian collusion narrative is false in exchange for a pardon from President Trump.
The president, apparently, has not yet gotten the message. President Trump told reporters that he has “never heard” of Assange’s offer to make a deal.
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) told The Daily Caller that Trump is being blocked from knowing about the potential deal with Assange. “I think the president’s answer indicates that there is a wall around him that is being created by people who do not want to expose this fraud that there was collusion between our intelligence community and the leaders of the Democratic Party,” Rohrabacher said.
“The congressman spoke to chief of staff John Kelly two weeks ago about the potential deal with Assange,” The Daily Caller reported. “The Wall Street Journal reported that Kelly told Rohrabacher to bring the information to the intelligence community.”
“This would have to be a cooperative effort between his own staff and the leadership in the intelligence communities to try to prevent the president from making the decision as to whether or not he wants to take the steps necessary to expose this horrendous lie that was shoved down the American people’s throats so incredibly earlier this year,” Rohrabacher said.
Rohrabacher called the collusion narrative “a massive propaganda campaign” and “historic con job” meant to conceal the ideological conspiracy between the intelligence community and the Democrat party.
The chairman of Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority (GEA) said in April that he sees cinemas returning ot the Kingdom.
On Thursday, September 28, 2017, the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news channel tweeted (at 9.19pm): “Cinemas are coming to Saudi Arabia. Ready?”
The reported reopening of movie screens in Saudi Arabia is seen as part of reforms sweeping across the Kingdom since King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz came to power — and comes hot on the heels of a landmark Royal decree allowing women to drive.
In the April interview with Reuters, GEA chairman Ahmed Al Khatib, said conservatives who criticized the reforms were gradually learning that most Saudis, a majority of whom are under 30, wanted these changes.
The kingdom had some cinemas in the 1970s but the clerical establishment persuaded the authorities to close them, reflecting rising Islamist influence throughout the Arab region at the time.
The government has promised a shake-up of the cultural scene with a set of “Vision 2030” reforms announced by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz last year, aimed at creating jobs and opening up Saudis’ cloistered lifestyles.
The changes are also intended to capture up to a quarter of the $20 billion currently spent overseas by Saudis, who are accustomed to travelling abroad to see shows and visit amusement parks in nearby tourist hub Dubai or further afield.
Al Khatib says his goal was to create entertainment that “will be like 99 per cent of what is going on in London and New York,” although he noted that after decades of cultural conservatism such change could not be rapid.
“I believe we are winning the argument,” he said.
A few Saudis were liberal, a few conservative, but “the majority are moderate.”
“They travel, they go to cinemas, they go to concerts. I am counting on the middle segment, which is about 80 per cent of the population,” he said.
Conservatives, he added, could simply opt to stay at home if they did not care for the events.
On Wednesday the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey, congratulated Russia on completing the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile which originally totalled 39 967 agent tonnes (i.e. excluding munition weight). This represents a major milestone towards realizing a world without chemical weapons as envisaged by the negotiators of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The experience gained from a 1989 Memorandum of Understanding and a 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States partly informs the procedures by which possessor states declare their chemical weapons to the OPCW and how the OPCW verifies their destruction. Over the years Russia and the USA have consulted each other on the development of common understandings on the selection and optimization of chemical weapons destruction technologies, including within the framework of the 1992 Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Other states (such as Germany) and civil society (such as Green Cross Russia and Global Green USA) have played important roles in such efforts, including by supporting risk assessment and public outreach at Russia’s seven chemical weapons storage facilities.
As a rule, the completion of destruction operations is marked by a closing ceremony with the OPCW Director-General (or other designated representative) in attendance. However, such a ceremony was deemed infeasible in this case (for unclear reasons) and Ambassador Üzümcü issued his statement at the OPCW headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands.
The USA, the other major possessor of a chemical weapons stockpile (which originally totalled approximately 30 000 agent tonnes), has completed the destruction of approximately 90 percent of its stockpile and is scheduled to finish its operations by 2023. Old chemical weapons (in the low hundreds of tonnes) will continue to be recovered and destroyed under OPCW verification for some years. Most recoveries originate from former World War I battlefields in Europe or sites in China where chemical weapons were abandoned by Japan at the end of World War II.
The CWC regime is entering a ‘post-chemical weapons destruction’ phase. At least two visions may be realized: the first in which the OPCW is focused on chemical weapons threats with most resources allocated accordingly, the second in which the OPCW serves as a model of international outreach and capacity building for the peaceful uses of chemistry. This transition will occur under the guidance of a new Director-General, starting next year.
The CWC regime remains a platform for the member states to cooperate on technical matters. It is imperative for the OPCW to retain its capacity to help to ensure that the threat of chemical warfare does not re-emerge over the indefinite future.
About the author:
* Dr John Hart is Head of the Chemical and Biological Security Project.
The public outcry attending President Trump’s attempted travel ban from seven radical Muslim states, designed to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the country, has diverted attention from the longstanding danger of homegrown jihadists. As early as 2007, the New York Police Department (NYPD) released a 92-page report documenting the extent of al-Qaeda-linked homegrown jihad in Europe and the United States.[1]
The Obama administration, however, went out of its way to ignore, deny, and whitewash any homegrown terror that smacked of Islamist violence. But a decade later, al-Qaeda has been all but eclipsed by the Islamic State (ISIS), which has skillfully used social media to become the foremost purveyor of jihadist indoctrination in the West, creating a “virtual caliphate,” extremely dangerous and easily accessible to vulnerable men and women from a variety of backgrounds in a manner al-Qaeda was never able to achieve. Even were all territory now under ISIS control to be retaken, this virtual caliphate could continue to pose a major threat.
Cyber Radicalization
Screenshot of ISIS Twitter account. Twitter is by far the platform of choice for ISIS supporters, who have found ways to outmaneuver Twitter’s continued closing of jihadist accounts.
While the NYPD’s report noted the Internet “as a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization” for al-Qaeda,[2] this was largely limited to the terrorist group’s use of chatrooms, which represent only a small portion of the Internet’s potential. Indeed, according to a 2011 Rand Institute study, while al-Qaeda “does 99 percent of its work on the Internet,” its scope is limited to merely a few cyber platforms, demonstrating its simplistic utilization of the Internet.[3]
By contrast, ISIS has taken a more advanced approach, targeting and utilizing a number of novel platforms to preach its jihadist ideology, thus blending tradition and technology in a sophisticated manner. Running a $2 billion campaign[4] thanks to its oil monopoly in Syria,[5] the group expertly commands usage of the cyber community in a multitude of forms: Twitter is by far the platform of choice among forums such as Facebook, Google, Tumblr, Kik, WhatsApp, and more.[6] Coupled with its use of more under-the-radar messaging apps such as Telegram (which is encrypted) and Surespot, ISIS is able to maintain a constant and steady presence on the Internet.
Constant accessibility. Not only is ISIS using nontraditional and innovative cyber platforms, but it is also ensuring continuous access to their content. Its supporters have found ways to outmaneuver Twitter’s continued closing of jihadist accounts, notably via Bait al-Ansar (literally, the House of Supporters), which allows users to recreate new accounts quickly without having to enter new information.[7] In fact, as shown by a 2015 George Washington University study, many jihadists view account suspensions as “badges of honor.”[8] Twitter campaigns—such as “Hashtag Jihad”—are also utilized to encourage Americans to join the fight in Syria, according to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Cyber and Jihad Lab.[9] At times in 2015, the U.S. government was battling about 90,000 tweets a day, according to a State Department spokeswoman; and while a militant may be killed, a tweet cannot.[10]
Highly popular sites are not the only form of jihadist communication. The more covert Russian messaging app, Telegram, which provides almost complete anonymity to its users and relies on client-server/server-client encryption, dedicates whole channels to ISIS and its ideology. “The Nasheed Gallery,” a channel on the app, allows supporters (and potential supporters) to listen to jihadi nasheeds, also known as Islamic songs.[11] The songs are a “main factor in reinforcing the group’s narrative and attracting new recruits,” according to MEMRI.[12] This channel and channels similar to it can be accessed anytime, granting potential supporters unlimited access to jihadist ideology.
The radicalization echo chamber. The success of ISIS’s Twitter campaign can be attributed to its use of the platform as a “radicalization echo chamber,” namely the sharing and spreading of jihadist propaganda for continued consumption by other supporters and, even more importantly, potential supporters. The chamber is comprised of three user groups: nodes, amplifiers, and shout-outs that can best be understood as a tier-like system.[13] The nodes (first tier) are by far the loudest and most authoritative voices in the social media jihad realm, tweeting out videos, phrases, articles, etc. The amplifiers then engage the content further by retweeting material from the nodes; and while not necessarily presenting new material and propaganda, they actively utilize the node twitter accounts. Finally, shout-outs allow users to become familiar with ISIS accounts by giving them a “shout out,” or naming them in tweets, thus promoting the original node accounts, making the shout-out users “vital to the survival of the ISIS online scene.”[14] The average ISIS Twitter account has one thousand followers,[15] and the echo chamber process is an integral part of ensuring the continued success of the accounts.The Russian messaging app, Telegram, which provides almost complete anonymity to its users and relies on encryption, dedicates whole channels to ISIS and its ideology.
Resulting recruit success. By constantly capitalizing on modern technology, ISIS supporters are able to continually engage the online community as “keyboard warriors.” However, the online jihad is not merely talk. Between March 2014 and November 2015, 82 people within the United States were arrested on charges related to promoting terrorism or attempting to initiate an attack. Of the 82 individuals, 39 (47.5 percent) had a strong social media presence prior to their interdiction.[16]
In addition, the number of arrests made among ISIS and al-Qaeda supporters in the United States highlights the recruiting success of ISIS. A 2011 Rand Institute report identified 176 people who had been interdicted or arrested following 9/11,[17] an average of 1.5 al-Qaeda recruits per month on American soil. On the other hand, ISIS averages 4.1 recruits per month, a 300 percent increase in recruitment rates over al-Qaeda.[18]
Demographic Variances and Similarities
Analyzing the recruitment rate is an integral part of measuring ISIS’s reach, but the demographics of its supporters are an equally important way to understand its success in U.S.-based radicalization. Although there are some similarities among individuals radicalized by al-Qaeda and ISIS, the latter group has managed to broaden the demographic base in a number of ways, a reflection of its successful social media outreach campaign. The NYPD report found most al-Qaeda supporters to be second or third generation males under the age of 35 from “Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian cultures,” highlighting that “middle class families and students appear[ed] to provide the most fertile ground for the seeds of radicalization.”[19] By contrast, most ISIS supporters are males under the age of 26, from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds and social classes. Understanding the ISIS audience highlights how the organization is poised to continue to target successfully a young and extremely vulnerable demographic.
Most ISIS supporters are males under the age of 26, from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds and social classes. This appeal to youth and diversity among foreign fighters can, in part, be attributed to ISIS’s use of social media. Graphic: GW Program on Extremism.
Age.At a quick glance, the comparative demographic overview of radicalized Western supporters from al-Qaeda and ISIS seems nearly identical, with “young and male” being the most obvious description. However, to place the supporters of both groups in the same category is to ignore the youthful trend of the Islamic State and its path across a variety of social and economic cleavages, all of which highlight the expansive success of its radicalization tactics. Most obviously and perhaps most importantly, the drop of supporters’ median age from 35 to 26 signals the success ISIS has in reaching a younger audience, once again a facet of its effective social media campaign. According to the Pew Research Center, 86 percent of people between the ages of 19-29 utilize social media.[20] The decrease in average supporter age by nine years is a testament to the success of ISIS in skillfully using social media.
While many of the case studies used by the 2007 NYPD report focused on men in their thirties taking part in jihad, it is the stories of young teens fleeing their Western nations to join ISIS and their potential for exporting jihadist terrorism to the West on their return home that has dominated headlines over the past few years. This is not to say that the NYPD report inaccurately assessed the profile of al-Qaeda supporters, but rather to highlight how ISIS has expanded beyond that initial demographic to capture a larger berth of supporters. In a 2015 briefing on the foreign terrorist threat of ISIS, U.S. assistant attorney general John Carlin noted,
this is a social media-driven threat, in over 50 percent of the cases the defendants are 25 years or younger, and in over a third of the cases, they are 21 years or younger. And for us in confronting the terrorist threat, that is different than the demographic we saw who went to support core al-Qaida in the Afghanistan region.[21]
Ethnicity. Age is not the only shifting demographic. Indeed, the case studies of the NYPD report are marked by the distinguishing demographic feature of 30-something Middle Eastern men. In Madrid’s 2004 attack, London’s 2005 bombing, the attempted New York City Herald Square bombing, etc., all the perpetrators came from relatively middle class families from either the Middle East or Pakistan. The report even highlights the universities the men attended, types of families they grew up in, and even one fighter’s estimated estate worth in one case.[22] By contrast, ISIS followers are “not confined to any ethnic group,”[23] nor is their economic background the same. Supporters of ISIS represent a broad international spectrum, with some 40 percent being converts to Islam.[24] Though the list of examples is long and diverse, ultimately all of them represent a fundamental shift in demographics from specific ethnic groups to the expansion of the jihadist Western radicalization movement. This variation of ISIS supporters attests to its success. Once again, its utilization of social media has granted it access to a number of ethnic groups and nationalities and has contributed to diversity among foreign fighters.
The Indoctrination Process
While it is apparent that ISIS achieved (and continues to achieve) greater success than al-Qaeda in radicalizing Western citizens, a comparison of the methods used by the two terror groups finds the process to be strikingly similar. The NYPD report, heavily criticized for its discussion of the pattern of indoctrination when published in 2007, holds up as a credible source for understanding the process of radicalization when analyzed next to a study of ISIS radicalization. The 2007 report broke new ground in publishing its analysis of both the indoctrination pattern and the spectrum of radicalization. It highlights that, though the demographics and platforms utilized by ISIS are more successful in garnering support, the specific process an individual must complete (and the environment that triggers it) is largely the same.
Four stages to radicalization. The NYPD report found the radicalization process to be a clearly defined structure, with the following four distinct phases:
Pre-radicalization: life before adoption of Salafi jihadist ideology.
Self-identification: exploration into Salafi Islam.
Indoctrination: intensification of beliefs, complete adoption of ideology.
Jihadization: acceptance of the duty to wage jihad; planning and execution of attack.[25]
While each phase is important in its own right, the greatest overlap for al-Qaeda and ISIS supporters occurs in the first stage: pre-radicalization. It is in this vulnerable stage that the exploration into jihad first begins; and despite the divergent radicalization tactics of the two terror groups, the pre-radicalized lives of their followers prove to be nearly identical, underscoring the unchanging nature of those most susceptible to jihadist indoctrination, namely individuals looking for the “meaning of life” and seeking identity. By and large, they lead ordinary lives but feel estranged from society and are motivated by an activist spirit.[26]
This loneliness, averageness, and desire for community are some of the key catalysts for seeking jihadist propaganda, and this narrative has hardly shifted with the rise of ISIS. German researcher Daniel Koehler, who evaluated three Somali-American teens who attempted to travel to Syria, found a number of pre-radicalization signs similar to those outlined in 2007, which he termed the “radicalization recipe.” A number of factors set off the process, including, “experiences of racism, bullying, lack of education. … anything that frustrates you and alienates you from your hosting society.”[27] These vulnerabilities provide a fertile breeding ground for al-Qaeda and ISIS recruits alike.
In later stages, such as self-identification, the ISIS recruits are driven by a certain interpretation of Islam they find compelling, which is intensified when coupled with their “warrior spirit.”[28] The path to radicalization among al-Qaeda supporters is set with the same markers according to the NYPD report, which notes the presence of “activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence.”[29]
A spectrum of threat. While the radicalization process, especially in its earlier stages, is enticing to young people and dangerous if completed, not every potential recruiter emerges as a jihad-driven terrorist. The process acts as a funnel: At every stage, the pool of recruiters grows smaller.[30] Similarly, not every ISIS supporter commits to jihad. Some never manifest beyond their keyboard warrior persona while others withdraw when the moment of truth arrives (e.g., traveling to Syria or carrying out a terror attack in their Western home country).[31] Ultimately, both spectrums for al-Qaeda and ISIS recruits tell a similar story: These supporters are the minority, not the majority, of Muslims, and embarking upon the process does not wholly commit someone to jihad.
Accessibility helps ISIS. A final note about indoctrination worth mentioning is the role of travel. In many cases, travel to Middle Eastern countries can be a powerful mechanism in strengthening jihadist ideology within a person and providing training in how to commit to jihad.[32] While al-Qaeda encouraged travel, and all the case studies examined by the NYPD report include individuals who traveled or attempted to travel, there are significant differences in the accessibility of these states. Afghanistan, for example, can be difficult to access[33] while Syria and Iraq were, until recently, easier to reach with the largest entry point being through Turkey although the abortive July 2016 coup d’état there seems to have had a moderating impact.[34] At least 51 percent of ISIS recruits since February 2014 traveled to or attempted to travel to Syria,[35] providing greater access to its ideology and training.
Conclusion
While the process of jihadist radicalization in the West is not unique to the twenty-first century, a comparison of the tactics used by al-Qaeda and ISIS highlights how it has rapidly evolved over a short period of time due to the introduction of new propaganda tools, most notably modern social media with its massive appeal to Western youth. Through an easily accessible social media campaign, using such platforms as Twitter, ISIS has succeeded in commanding the attention of millions. Its constant presence on the Internet has translated to greater recruitment rates than al-Qaeda, a younger demographic, and a more diverse ethnic base. At the same time, the triggers for radicalization and the steps leading to full jihadist indoctrination have remained virtually constant although occurring at a speedier pace with more diverse levels. There is no single successful methodology for identifying potential perpetrators, but continuing to monitor social media while creating a cyber counter-narrative campaign may be a powerful way to dissuade the young, vulnerable minds on which ISIS so successfully preys.
About the author:
*Mina Hamblet served as a research intern at The Jewish Policy Center and is currently at the University of Virginia.
[3] Brian Michael Jenkins, “Virtual Dogs and Stray Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadi Terrorism in the United States since 9/11,” The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., 2011.
[15] Jonathon Morgan and J.M. Berger, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter,” Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., Mar. 5, 2015, p. 3.
[27] Daniel Koehler, interview, “Radicalization Recipe: Why Young People Are Drawn to ISIS,” Weekend Sunday Edition, National Public Radio, June 5, 2016.
Strains between North Korea and United States already tense, this previous week saw them pushed significantly higher, and considerably more to an unnerving spot. The particular developments in this regard were the assertions from North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho in a UN speech that it is inevitable for North Korea to launch a missile at the US mainland. However, it actually came days after Trump used the same venue to pronounce that US might ‘totally destroy’ North Korea if it keeps on debilitating US or its allies.
The US is the regular concentration of North Korea’s propaganda and is constantly seen and anticipated as the country’s fundamental foe. It’s less demanding to lead a totalitarian regime when there is nationalistic cause around which the mass population can be united, and as such Kim Jong Un needs an enemy in the face of US.
Scaling up bellicose rhetoric towards the West, and particularly US, could result in further escalations. North Korea however, doesn’t realize the disparity of power between itself and the US. Trump sent US bombers prior to Ri’s UN speech to fly in international waters along the North Korean coast in a provocative show of power. In response, North Korea is threatening the Americans by claiming the very right to shoot down US strategic bombers even when they are not inside the airspace fringe of their country. There is a continuous war of words; Trump belittled Kim Jong Un as ‘Rocket Man’, followed by Kim’s disparaging term for Trump as a ‘dotard’, but thank goodness both parties are campaigning affronts at each other, rather than actual bombs.
The root of the current nuclear standoff, in the opinion of experts, lies in the ‘stability-instability paradox’, that nuclear weapons do deter war as the world witnessed during cold war. However, the sense of security granted by the possession of these weapons also encourage certain low-level provocations and this paradox — where nuclear weapons on the one hand deter a full scale war, but at the other also encourage a low level behavior — is the reason why Kim thinks he can get away with threatening and firing on US strategic bombers.
Nevertheless, Kim knows that as long as China will join with the US in taking him out, he can keep upping the ante. The absence of concern on the part of China and Russia regarding North Korea’s debilitated dispatch stands in contrast with Japan at the other end of the spectrum. Russia has come out in opposition to US unilateral action, insisting that dialogue is the only way out. Putin is additionally indisposed to help the US request for an oil ban contending that Russian oil exports to North Korea are negligible. Beijing conversely, is more open to pursuing sanctions and is signaling a shift in the attitude.
Whereas, Japan is becoming less tolerant with its premier’s pronouncements that North Korea’s provocative acts are threatening world peace, Japan is planning remilitarization in response to the threat from North Korean aggression. The Japanese defense ministry intends to acquire the land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system in response to the type of threat it faces.
Kim Jong Un’s stubbornness is not likely to stop brinkmanship efforts, although in the meantime inciting the US beyond a specific point is very liable to welcome pre-emptive action. Whatever the nature of the pre-emptive action, the destruction that would ensue the world would be ‘unimaginable’, in the words of Trump.
There is an ineluctable need for the major parties to play their part in saving the planet. Neither very hard nor very soft approaches are going to get Pyongyang back to seriously negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea. The international community needs to be more prudent and pragmatic.
However, among the possible solutions to the ongoing nuclear standoff is accepting the “nuclear North Korea,” just as the world did with China or accept the risk of using non-diplomatic military tools. Though negotiations are one way to date they have failed at every turn, likewise war is another option, but costly and risky. Beijing in this regard argues that the US must cease joint military exercises with South Korea in exchange for North Korea agreeing not to carry out further missile tests.
Correspondingly, overlooking Kim’s barbarity against his own citizens has been standard practice in the civilized world long before the North Korean nuclear weapons and ICBMs became a believable threat. This scant mention of barbarity is ironic. North Koreans are suffering at the hands of the country’s dynastic leadership that is among the most repressive in the world and this alone is enough of a reason to isolate or force change in the country.
This is the loftiness of incongruity — that the whole international community persisted in being quiet with respect to the gross human rights violation in North Korea, but when it comes to their own strategic interests in the same region, in consort to real politik considerations, they highlight it in a drum beat.
*Ubaid Ahmed is currently working as Research Affiliate in Strategic Vision Institute and can be reached at ubaid@thesvi.org
A recent expose by a media organization should put Indian Muslims to shame. Arab men coming to Hyderabad to hunt for young Indian Muslim brides, some even legally minor. It is to the credit of the local civil society that it brought this to the notice of the local police and some of these Arab men are today facing tough police questions. Of course, all this is not new. This has been going on for decades now. The only difference is that today there is increasing media spotlight on the issue and some of these heinous acts come to light and therefore become topic of discussion. What is also important to realise is that there is a network of men and women working behind the scene who work to facilitate such arranged marriages. Without the support of such men and women, this ‘trade’ will not succeed. What is astonishing is that most of the time, these men are close relatives of the young girl in question. Since there is so much silence on the issue in the Muslim community, this is really a social problem. Apart from police surveillance, what is required is a debate in the Muslim community over the whole issue of marriage itself.
But what drives such old men to come to India and hunt for brides. In modern parlance, the desire to engage in sexual acts with young girls is called paedophilia. This is a modern day crime in which not just the Arab Sheikhs, but whole lot of other communities are also involved. The whites engage in this forbidden through various charitable networks which they supposedly work for or indulge in it through sex tourism in places like Thailand and other places. Therefore this kind of a desire seems to be a global problem. But there are fundamental differences when we talk about such acts in the western world and in the Arab Muslim world. And that difference has to do with the very different responses of these two parts of the worlds to the problem. While the western world has outlawed this kind of consummation of desire, the Arab world still thinks that it is normal. Not just the legal framework, but even the two societies understand the problem and react to it differently. While the western society has delegitimized it long time ago, the Muslim world still has social sanction to this practice, often through religion. And that’s a very big difference between the two contexts.
The pious utterances on television by various Muslim personalities saying that this practice is un-Islamic and that men indulging in such practices are doing it for fulfilling their baser instincts is hardly convincing. After all, marriages around the world are understood as the legitimate means of sexual gratification. So what is wrong if these Muslim men are indulging in such marriages? The problem therefore is not of lust which is a very normal human emotion The problem is informed choice.
The first and foremost problem with such a marriage is that in a majority of cases it is driven by acute poverty. When a family, too poor to feed itself and where a girl child is understood as a burden the very idea of marriage appears appealing to the family. At least it is one mouth less to feed since the girl becomes someone else’s burden and responsibility. Scores of marriages take place because of considerations of poverty and it happens amongst all communities. Because of poverty, neither the family nor the persons involved have any real choice in such marriages.
But there is an added dimension when it comes to Muslim society. And that is that such marriages are considered legitimate and sanctioned by religion itself. After all, there are scores of examples within Muslim history where much older men happen to get married to younger girls. In a moving Afghan film, Osama, directed by Siddig Barmak, an elderly village cleric takes pity on a young orphan and marries her. The movie, made with extraordinary sensitivity, makes clear that in the mind of the cleric, the prime question was not lust but to care for orphans which he understood as a religious duty. As part of his religious duty, he also has to consummate the marriage with this little girl which he does eventually. How does then one separate matters of piety with matters of lust? While we can condemn this village cleric as a man driven by his lust, the problem is not that simple. It can be very well argued that he was performing his religious duty as a Muslim. Not just this person, but the same religious call has been answered by many others pious Muslims throughout its history.
But we hardly condemn those great personalities in Islam who have done similar marriages. Why this double standard? The important point is that such marriages are sanctioned within Islam and it is time perhaps to raise voices against it. After all, the age of marriage for girls within Islam is just after puberty: a time when the mental faculties are not yet fully developed and neither is she emotionally ready for such a union. It is heartening to note that some countries have reformed their marriage laws and age of consent of Muslim girls has steadily risen but the problem remains that within theology, this is still permissible. There has been hue and cry from Muslim quarters within this country about raising the age of consent for girls.
A large part of this discontent is driven by Islamic legitimacy to marry young girls. We must understand that young girls have no real informed choice to make in such unions and till the time Islam accepts that such a choice is important, there cannot a resolution to this issue Till such time, elderly men will keep marrying young girls, keep thanking Allah, without any even a hint of remorse. Such unions should necessarily be understood as a form of sexual slavery. It is time for Muslims to take a call to make such unions theologically criminal.
The Catholic baiting that Notre Dame law professor Amy Coney Barrett has been subjected to is becoming a liberal sport; she is being considered for a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. After first being questioned about her religious convictions—coming close to invoking a religious test—by Senator Dick Durbin and Senator Dianne Feinstein (I wrote to both of them registering my outrage), Barrett’s religious affiliations are now under attack.
The New York Times has an interesting story on Barrett’s membership in a Catholic group called People of Praise. The paper calls it “a small, tightly knit Christian group,” one whose members enter into a covenant with each other.
What seems to bother the Times, as well as others opposed to President Trump, are two issues: the extent to which membership in this group might compromise Barrett’s independence, and whether her association with a group that accepts a traditional role for married women is acceptable for a federal judge.
“These groups can become so absorbing that it’s difficult for a person to retain individual judgment,” says Sarah Barringer Gordon, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania.
“These groups?” If Gordon has proof that People of Praise is a cult—that is the clear implication of her remark—she should share it. But she has none. Which leaves us to conclude that she is engaged in the same Catholic-baiting tactics used by Durbin and Feinstein.
People of Praise was founded in 1971 in South Bend, Indiana. Today it has branches throughout North America and the Caribbean. It sees itself as “part of a global movement that has brought powerful new experiences of the Holy Spirit to more than 500 million people since the beginning of the 20th century.” It aligns itself with “the Pentecostal movement or the charismatic renewal.”
Among other things, it operates interracial schools and camps, and provides for many family outings; members often travel together. Is it a Catholic fringe group? No, for if it were, Pope Francis would not have welcomed it in June: he celebrated with them, and others, the 50th anniversary of the Catholic charismatic renewal; the event drew over 30,000 people from 128 countries.
Praise for People publishes a magazine, V&B (Vine and Branches), that offers concrete proof that it is anything but a cult. The cover story of the Winter 2014 edition was called, “Looking at Marriage.” It featured the experiences of five community couples. They were illustrative of the theme, “Marriage & Community: Two Covenants, One Life Together.”
The first couple, Clem and Julie, do not sound like biblical robots who live an ascetic existence. The interview begins with Julie putting Clem in his place for going out for beers after work on Friday nights, leaving her to tend to their babies. “I’d like to go out for beer on Friday nights, and here I am with these two kids all day, and you go out for a beer?” This isn’t exactly the voice of submission.
Then there is Tom, married to Nancy, who says, “I’m aware of people who left the community because they felt the People of Praise was too much encroaching on their family time….” Cults don’t allow their members to bolt, and if some do manage to leave, there is no lament—just condemnation.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this latest attempt to smear Barrett is the hypocrisy: while there are some people of faith who are guilty of Groupthink, it is not a phenomenon unique to them. “Open-minded” liberals, it could easily be argued, are the most likely to lack independence of thought. Enter Hillary and Michelle.
Why do liberals resent it when women do not engage in Groupthink? Hillary Clinton is fuming over women who did not vote for her: women have an obligation to vote for the woman candidate, she says, regardless of their convictions. She explicitly excoriated women who exercised their independence of mind by not voting for her.
Michelle Obama also resents women who think for themselves. She slammed women who voted for Trump, saying that they “voted against their own voices.” Tell that to the majority of white women who voted against Hillary, Michelle: it’s important to inform them that you know what their interests are better than they do.
The next time a secular liberal is nominated to the federal bench, conservatives should return the favor by subjecting them to the same acid test of independence. Groupthink is such a staple of liberal thought these days that no nominee would ever pass muster.
Tom Price stepped down Friday as US Secretary of Health Services amid reports that he had used chartered private planes for government travel.
In a short press release, the White House announced that, “Secretary of Health and Human Services Thomas Price offered his resignation earlier today and the President accepted.”
The White House added that President Trump, “intends to designate Don J. Wright of Virginia to serve as Acting Secretary, effective at 11:59 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Mr. Wright currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health and Director of the Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion.”
Price was facing criticism from Democrats after media reported that he had not only flown on military planes, but also a few dozen private chartered flights to Europe and Africa, at the expense of taxpayers.
US Vice President Mike Pence on Friday encouraged Kosovo to ratify a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro to resolve the longstanding dispute.
Pence made the comments in a meeting with the Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaci at the White House.
The European Union is pressuring Kosovo to resolve the border conflict with Montenegro as part of the country’s citizens being allowed to travel visa-free in the Schengen zone.
According to the White House, besides speaking on the border dispute, Pence reaffirmed the US’ support for a sovereign, democratic, and prosperous Kosovo.
Additionally, Pence expressed appreciation for Thaci’s leadership, along with Serbian President Vucic, to advance the EU-facilitated dialogue to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the White House said.
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, however Serbia still doesn’t recognize its independence.
Pence and Thaci agreed on the importance of advancing reforms to strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, and boost economic growth, and the Vice President expressed support for the transformation of the Kosovo Security Forces via constitutional means, the White House said.
Iraqi villagers have accused units within the Iraqi government’s armed forces of abuses in the ongoing battle to take the city of Hawija, Human Rights Watch said. Units of the Popular Mobilization Forces (known as the PMF or Hashd al-Sha’abi) affiliated with the Badr Organization detained and beat male villagers in a nearby village and took away four men without telling the men’s families where they were being taken or why, villagers told Human Rights Watch.
Because of the PMF history of gross abuses, including war crimes, in previous operations, before the battle for the northern city of Mosul began in October 2016, United Nations senior officials and diplomats said that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had made a commitment to the international community to keep PMF units out of Mosul, and away from the screening process. However, he has permitted the PMF to play a more prominent role not only in the fighting but also in screening and detaining people during military operations. The Iraqi government should uphold its commitment not to allow PMF or any other units with an abusive track record, including forces affiliated with the Badr Organization, to participate in screening or detaining anyone, Human Rights Watch said.
“Iraqi military forces are taking the law into their own hands, playing judge, jury, and executioner with captive ISIS suspects,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “If Iraq wants to distinguish itself as a government run by the rule of law, it needs to rein in these abusive units.”
On September 21, various Iraqi forces began an operation to retake Hawija, 130 kilometers southeast of Mosul, and neighboring villages. Human Rights Watch visited a camp for displaced people south of Mosul on September 23, and separately interviewed five residents – three men and two women – from Sayhat Othman, a village 85 kilometers south of Mosul and 42 kilometers northwest of Hawija. The residents said that a mix of uniformed Badr Organization PMF forces and Federal Police officers, under the Interior Ministry, arrived in their village in about 20 military vehicles on September 21 at about 9 a.m.
The villagers emerged from their houses waving white flags, and an officer called on those affiliated with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) to come forward, villagers said. They said that four men surrendered, and the fighters took them out of the village. The father of one of the four told Human Rights Watch he then heard gunshots, while the other four people interviewed said they heard rumors that the men were shot and killed. The families have had no information about the men.
The Iraqi forces then separated the women from the remaining 25 men, they said. The women were confined in one of the houses. The Iraqi forces handcuffed and blindfolded the men, including the interviewees, put them in the military vehicles, and drove them a short distance to a building where they held them in a room for a day. The men interviewed said the fighters used their gun butts to beat the men when they arrived, and during their time there, they brought them food once and a small amount of water but did not let them use a bathroom.
They said the officers questioned the men as a group, asking who was affiliated with ISIS. The men interviewed remained handcuffed and blindfolded throughout so did not see where they were being held, they said. They showed researchers blisters and wounds around their wrists caused by the handcuffs, but were afraid to show the marks they said were on their backs because of nearby security forces in the camp. On the evening of September 22, the fighters put all the men on Transport Ministry buses used to transport displaced people and took them to the camp.
The women interviewed said the fighters took them and their children from the house they were being confined in to the local schoolhouse. The fighters held and questioned the women there for two hours about the identity of ISIS-affiliated villagers, and then loaded them on buses and took them to the same camp.
At about 9:30 a.m. on September 23, Iraqi Security Forces came to the camp and took 15 of the men from their village away again, without telling them or their families where they were taking them, the villagers said. The men had not returned by the time researchers left the camp. The families of the four men who had surrendered said they were afraid to ask or to notify any staff at the camp about their fate, fearing that the PMF would come back and “kill us,” one said. They said that one of the men who surrendered is an amputee in a wheelchair, with weak eyesight, who worked in the local mosque under ISIS and cooperated with the group while they were in control of the area.
The PMF have no legal authority to detain anyone in Iraq and the units deny screening or detaining anyone. Representatives have told Human Rights Watch that they hand over captured ISIS suspects to state security forces whose job it is to screen possible suspects. However, Human Rights Watch has documented that PMF groups, including units affiliated with the Badr Organization, have screened, detained, and tortured people during the military operations.
Al-Abadi should rein in units carrying out such activities. Coalition partners supporting Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIS should report any PMF screenings or detention that their forces witness and urge Baghdad to end the practice.
Iraqi authorities should investigate all suspected crimes, including torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other abuses committed by members of any side in the conflict, in a speedy, transparent, and effective manner, up to the highest levels of responsibility. When evidence of criminal responsibility emerges, prosecutions should follow. Those conducting such criminal investigations and making decisions about prosecutions should be independent of those being investigated, outside any military chain of command, and free from political interference in their decisions. The authorities should ensure the safety of all witnesses.
“Right now, the Iraqi government’s attitude seems to be ‘all hands on deck’ for these last battles against ISIS,” Whitson said. “While Iraqi forces do need all the help they can get, the government should not allow abusive forces to use this opportunity for even more abuse.”
The recent arrests of female IS supporters in Singapore indicate that the roles of women are evolving to include previously male-dominated domains. In view of the dynamic changes in contemporary women’s roles, how can their unique strengths be harnessed and supported for counter-ideological purposes?
By Mohamed Bin Ali and Sabariah Binte Mohamed Hussin*
Recruitment and radicalisation via the social media today has shifted the roles of women in terrorism. No longer seen solely as supporters and sympathisers of terrorist networks charged with bringing up the next generation of fighters, these women break through the domain traditionally held by men in terrorism.
They now play active roles in recruitment, financing and fundraising for terrorist operations. These additional roles play a crucial part to sustain the longevity of the terrorist movements as they provide an added value to terrorist narratives and are a powerful tool for recruitment.
Women as Cornerstone to Protect Families
Given their nurturing and intuitive qualities, the unique strengths and capabilities of women used to preserve the family institution should be fully utilised to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts, specifically in preventing the family members from straying down the path of radicalisation.
Their nurturing sides can be deployed to protect their children from radical influences. Wives also play influential roles in helping to deradicalise their husbands who may have subscribed to terrorist ideologies. Their intuitive and familial nature can be employed to detect any changes in the behavioural or thinking patterns of their family members.
As wives and mothers, women have the most intimate knowledge of their kin and would be able to detect any attitudinal or behavioural changes competently. The womenfolk in the family must be equipped with tools and knowledge to enable them to effectively assess even seemingly innocuous acts such as their husbands or children dabbling with extremist narratives or alienating themselves from the community.
Women and men have important complementary roles to play in the household and society. Collectively, parents play a major role in equipping their children to reject extremist narratives and violence. Specifically, the unique strengths of women need to be fully harnessed to provide a solid cornerstone of the family structure.
What Are Their Roles in CVE?
First, women can help to nurture an environment that censures extremist ideologies or support for terrorist activities. They can encourage their children, among others, to embrace positive values of tolerance and inclusiveness and forging peaceful relations with others. This can help to reduce their children’s vulnerability and strengthen their psychological resilience against falling for extremist narratives.
Mothers who observe that their children are attracted to terrorist narratives can intervene to build their children’s resilience by: (1) encouraging them to evaluate the information they receive and develop their critical thinking skills; (2) teaching them that violence should not be permitted under any circumstances; (3) providing them with strong counter narratives to challenge and undermine extremist narratives; and (4) explaining why violent extremism must be rejected.
Second, women must have the moral courage and responsibility to advise their spouses if and when the situation arise. From the Islamic perspective, each and everyone has a responsibility to enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil including wives who observe their husbands perform or plan to perform acts of violence in the name of religion.
Naturally, some wives perceive their acts of providing (constructive) ‘criticism’ as being disobedient to their husbands. Such wives have to be educated to appreciate the difference between being unreservedly disobedient and their religious obligation to advise if their spouse’s behaviours go against the religion and possibly border on violent extremism.
Educating Their Families
Third, women must be empowered to educate their families to recognise how extremists have disguised their violent ideologies under the cloak of religion and engage them in discussion about this issue. These women should also be equipped with information pertaining to how to seek help should they encounter difficulties or require further support.
In Singapore, family members can seek help from religious teachers recognised under the Asatizah (religious teachers) Recognition Scheme, as well as Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) counsellors for advice on issues of radicalization and extremism. They can also contact RRG Helpline at 1800-7747747. Alternatively, members of the public can download the RRG mobile application that allows users to converse one-on-one with an RRG counsellor.
Finally, youths, including young women have a very important role to play in CVE since they are usually the targets of groups like IS. This can be done by encouraging them to lead initiatives that focus on conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities among their peers. Young women should also be encouraged to participate in national consultations on security and peace issues so that more comprehensive policies and programmes that address the differentiated needs across the genders and age groups can be successfully formulated.
Spotting Early Signs of Radicalisation
Nipping the radicalisation process in the bud is crucial as this means that the radicalisation is not yet deeply rooted in the person’s belief system. Particularly, mothers and wives are known for their ability to spot the tell-tale signs due to their ‘sensitivity’ and ‘close contact’ with their children and spouse.
It would be prudent therefore, to be familiar with the warning signs of radicalisation which broadly include: (1) justifying the use of violence to defend a cause; (2) expressing intent to participate in acts of violence locally or overseas, or incite others to participate in acts of violence; (3) idolising terrorist personalities; (4) expressing support for militant groups on social media; and (5) frequenting radical websites or try to establish contact with radical ideologues.
There is real value in reporting early to the authorities if a loved one exhibits some of these potential signs of radicalisation. Multiple research has shown that it is immediate families who play the major role in preventing their family members from further radicalization. Hence, reporting should be perceived as acting in the interests of their loved ones.
The family has always been important in the stability of the society. Ensuring the resilience of family members is a giant step towards countering extremism and reducing its influence in the community. By helping family members who display out-of-the-norm behaviour, it will go a long way to help reduce the threat of violent extremism.
Indeed, the ability of women and the family institution to be an agent of positive change is critical in countering violent extremism. Hence, governmental and community initiatives to provide dedicated support for all women should be sustained and strengthened so that women can successfully strive to build a nurturing environment to develop future generations that are inured to radical influences.
*Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor with the Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies Programme and Sabariah Mohamed Hussin is Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
A recent ISIS video featuring a Singaporean terrorist fighter for the first time attests to the unceasing terrorist threat confronting Southeast Asia including Singapore. It is also a strong reminder of ISIS’ intent to target the wider East Asia.
By Remy Mahzam and Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman*
The shrewd use of the media is integral to ISIS’ recruitment success. ISIS strategy includes crafting narratives that spotlight stories of ordinary fighters who are being featured as heroic figures in their military escapades. The promotion of Southeast Asian figures as ideologues in propaganda videos is aimed to motivate and militarise aspiring terrorists in Southeast Asia.
In an unprecedented gambit, a Singaporean terrorist fighter known as “Abu Uqayl” has been featured in the video titled “Inside the Khilafah 4” which was released on 24 September 2017 by ISIS’ official media outlet Al-Hayat. The Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has confirmed his involvement in ISIS and believed that he was radicalised while working abroad. “Abu Uqayl” has joined the ranks of earlier terrorist figures (such as “Jihadi John” and “Abu Jandal Al-Indonesi”) who served as extremist ideologues and in overseas conflicts.
Its release may have been aimed at arousing mistrust between the races and religious groups.
Spotlight on East Asian Jihadists
In June 2016, a 20-minute video “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus” (The Solid Structure) introduced three East Asian fighters, Abu Walid al-Indonesi, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Filipini and Abu Awn al-Malisi urging their respective comrades from Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia to unite under the leadership of Isnilon Hapilon and join the jihad in Philippines.
“Inside the Khilafah” is a new video series that continues ISIS’ earlier high-quality media production to promote terrorism; this is achieved by portraying terrorists as heroic figures and perverting religious texts to justify violence. This series, circulated on social media since July 2017, also featured foreign terrorist fighters from the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Australian “Abu Adam” and Filipino “Abu Yamaan”) who called for jihad in and hijrah to East Asia especially the Philippines.
Although previous ISIS propaganda materials, including those featuring Katibah Nusantara, had already placed Southeast Asia in the ISIS radar and sought to appeal to a Malay-speaking audience, the latest video with “Abu Uqayl” may signal a possible strategic shift.
Strategic Shift?
Firstly, the featuring of an English-speaking Malay person appears to be a stepped-up attempt to reach out to a younger and better-educated audience in a predominantly Malay/Muslim region. Secondly, the video eschews graphic violence (e.g. beheadings) and portrayal of child soldiers dressed in military uniform and brandishing weapons.
Instead, the video highlights the ‘meaningful’ role of ‘Abu Uqayl” as a skilled combatant rather than simply as an ISIS spokesperson, or undertaking menial tasks as lamented by some former ISIS fighters. Thirdly, the mention of Britain’s Prince Harry’s visit by a Singaporean terrorist fighter implicitly suggests that ISIS is aware of key developments – including counterterrorism measures – and the presence of high-value targets in Singapore.
Of immediate concern, this video may possibly embolden more radicalised individuals and groups in Southeast Asia to carry out domestic attacks that ISIS would later claim to authorise.
The global terrorism landscape continues to be dynamic as ISIS is able to persevere in its online radicalisation efforts despite facing heavy military losses in the Middle East.
ISIS is increasingly focusing its attention on East Asia by exploiting local and regional problems especially the current plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the security situation in Mindanao, Philippines. To this end, ISIS is driving a wedge between Muslims and Non-Muslims in the region. The featuring of “Abu Uqayl” also suggests that ISIS continues to attract radicalised individuals who may replace earlier terrorist figures who were killed in military strikes by coalition forces in the Middle East.
Moving Closer to Home
Singapore would thus have to continue improving and adapting its CT measures to new developments and challenges. At the community level for example, Singaporeans would need to be more aware and prepared for terror attacks, and continue to be guarded against implicit attempts to spread communal distrust and rock social cohesion. The Straits Times article dated 24 September 2017 which reported a poll’s finding that about 4 in 5 Singaporeans are unprepared for a terror attack is noteworthy.
Singaporeans would thus need to familiarise themselves with emergency preparedness skills and tools (e.g. SGSecure App) as advocated by SGSecure so that they are able to protect themselves and assist the security agencies during a crisis. At the institution level, community leaders and religious figures (Asatizah) who play a crucial role in countering extremist propaganda would need to continue enhancing existing initiatives (e.g. Religious Rehabilitation Group, or RRG app) to challenge the persistence and appeal of ISIS especially on social media.
New initiatives may be needed to protect Singaporeans from being radicalised abroad. In sum, the unveiling of “Abu Uqayl” reiterates that counter-terrorism would be a long struggle for Singapore and that the threat is moving closer to home.
*Remy Mahzam is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman is a Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
The Human-Induced Earthquake Database (HiQuake), the world’s most complete database of earthquake sequences proposed to have been triggered by human activity, now includes approximately 730 entries, according to a report published October 4 in the “Data Mine” column of the journal Seismological Research Letters.
Mining projects (37%) and water impounded behind dams (23%) are the most commonly reported causes of induced earthquakes, but unconventional oil and gas extraction projects using hydraulic fracturing, are now a frequent addition to the database, said Miles Wilson, a geophysicist at Durham University working on the HiQuake research effort.
“Any successful hydraulic fracturing operation induces microseismicity because the rock is fractured. The number of hydraulically fractured boreholes has increased in recent years, so there is obviously going to be a trend between the number of successfully hydraulically fractured boreholes and the amount of associated microseismicity,” Wilson said. “The more important trend is that between hydraulically fractured boreholes and unusually large earthquakes, most likely related to the reactivation of pre-existing geological faults.”
Other human activities related to unconventional extraction contribute to induced earthquakes as well, Wilson noted. “The most obvious induced seismicity trend in HiQuake is the recent increase in the number of waste-fluid disposal projects reported to have induced earthquakes. This increase is consistent with increased waste-fluid disposal activities in the USA.”
HiQuake, which is freely available at http://www.inducedearthquakes.org, was first developed in 2016 by a group of researchers from Durham and Newcastle Universities, who were funded by the Dutch oil and gas company Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij to review the full global extent of induced earthquakes.
To build the database, Wilson and his colleagues analyzed peer-reviewed literature, academic presentations, media articles, and industry and government reports for projects where scientific evidence suggests that the human activity was the cause of an earthquake sequence. Each entry in the database corresponds to a project, or phase of a project. The projects extend back almost 150 years, with most maximum observed magnitude earthquakes falling between magnitude 3 and 4.
The largest proposed induced earthquake in the database was the 2008 magnitude 7.9 Wenchuan earthquake that occurred in China in response to the impoundment of the Zipingpu Reservoir only a few kilometers away from the mainshock epicenter. The HiQuake researchers were initially surprised to find that such large magnitude earthquakes were proposed as induced, Wilson said, “but most of the stress released in these cases is of natural tectonic origin. The anthropogenic activity is just the final straw that releases this built-up stress.”
At first, Wilson and colleagues were also surprised by the variety of proposed causes for these quakes, including nuclear explosions and the building of heavy skyscrapers. “With hindsight we probably shouldn’t be surprised by any anthropogenic cause. All anthropogenic projects influence forces acting in the Earth’s crust, for example by adding or removing mass, so we shouldn’t be surprised that the Earth responds to these changes and that in some cases earthquakes are the response.”
Human activities that act on the crust are likely to multiply in the future, Wilson noted, as projects to tap into geothermal sources of energy and to store carbon dioxide emissions become more widespread.
“Additionally, mines may become larger, deeper, and more extensive, surface water reservoir impoundments more common, and buildings on larger scales could be built to meet a growing world population and resource demand,” he said. “Perhaps one day a balance will need to be struck between earthquake hazard and resource demand.”
The first quantum-safe video conference was held between President Chunli Bai of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing and President Anton Zeilinger of the Austria Academy of Sciences in Vienna, as the first real-world demonstration of intercontinental quantum communication on September 29th.
Private and secure communications are fundamental human needs. In particular, with the exponential growth of Internet use and e-commerce, it is of paramount importance to establish a secure network with global protection of data. Traditional public key cryptography usually relies on the perceived computational intractability of certain mathematical functions. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) uses individual light quanta (single photon) in quantum superposition states to guarantee unconditional security between distant parties. Previously, the quantum communication distance had been limited to a few hundred kilometers, due to the channel loss of fibers or terrestrial free space. A promising solution to this problem is exploiting satellite and space-based link, which can conveniently connect two remote points on the Earth with greatly reduced channel loss because most of the photons’ propagation path is in empty space with negligible loss and decoherence.
A cross-disciplinary multi-institutional team of scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, led by Professor Jian-Wei Pan, has spent more than ten years in developing a sophisticated satellite, named Micius, dedicated for quantum science experiments (for the project timeline, see Appendix), which was successfully launched on 16th August 2016, from Jiuquan, China, orbiting at an altitude of ~500 km . The satellite is equipped with three payloads: a decoy-state QKD transmitter, an entangled-photon source, and a quantum teleportation receiver and analyzer. Five ground stations are built in China to cooperate with the Micius satellite, located in Xinglong (near Beijing, 40°23’45.12”N, 117°34’38.85”E, altitude 890m), Nanshan (near Urumqi, 43°28’31.66”N, 87°10’36.07”E, altitude 2028m), Delingha (37°22’44.43”N, 97°43’37.01″E, altitude 3153m), Lijiang (26°41’38.15”N, 100°1’45.55”E, altitude 3233m), and Ngari in Tibet (32°19’30.07”N, 80°1’34.18”E, altitude 5047m).
Within a year after the launch, three key milestones that will be central to a global-scale quantum internet have been achieved: satellite-to-ground decoy-state QKD with kHz rate over a distance of ~1200 km (Liao et al. 2017, Nature 549, 43); satellite-based entanglement distribution to two locations on the Earth separated by ~1200 km and Bell test (Yin et al. 2017, Science 356, 1140), and ground-to-satellite quantum teleportation (Ren et al. 2017, Nature 549, 70). The effective link efficiencies in the satellite-based QKD were measured to be ~20 orders of magnitudes larger than direct transmission through optical fibers at the same length at 1200 km.
The satellite-based QKD has now been combined with metropolitan quantum networks, in which fibers are used to efficiently and conveniently to connect many users inside a city with a distance scale of ~100 km. For example, the Xinglong station has now been connected to the metropolitan multi-node quantum network in Beijing via optical fibers. Very recently, the largest fiber-based quantum communication backbone has been built in China by Professor Pan’s team, linking Beijing to Shanghai (going through Jinan and Hefei, and 32 trustful relays) with a fiber length of 2000 km. The backbone uses decoy-state protocol QKD and achieves an all-pass secure key rate of 20 kbps. It is on trial for real-world applications by government, banks, securities and insurance companies.
The Micius satellite can be further exploited as a trustful relay to conveniently connect any two points on the earth for high-security key exchange. Early this year, the Chinese team has implemented satellite-to-ground QKD in Xinglong. After that, the secure keys were stored in the satellite for 2 hours until it reached Nanshan station near Urumqi, by a distance of ~2500 km from Beijing. By performing another QKD between the satellite and Nanshan station, and using one-time-pad encoding, secure key between Xinglong and Nanshan were then established. To test the robustness and versatility of the Micius, QKD from the satellite to Graz ground station near Vienna has also been carried out successfully this June, as a collaboration between Professor Pan and Professor Anton Zeilinger’s group. Upon request, future similar experiments are also planned between China and Singapore, Italy, Germany, and Russia.
Dr. Jacob Wood, an assistant professor of theology at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, offers answers on some frequently-asked-questions about the ‘Filial Correction on the Spread of Heresies” a letter sent to Pope Francis by a group of bishops, priests, and scholars, who released the letter this past weekend.
What is fraternal correction?
Fraternal correction is an act of charity (CCC 1829), in which we call a brother or sister in Christ, who has fallen into serious sin, back to the way of the Gospel. Fraternal correction is explained by Jesus in the Gospel (Mt 18:15-17).
Why is this called a “filial” and not a “fraternal” correction?
Christ established a hierarchy in his Church (CCC 877), and the signatories on the letter are not on equal footing with the pope in that hierarchy. Out of respect for the pope’s authority, they appeal to the pope as his spiritual sons and daughters, not as spiritual brothers and sisters.
Why is this correction being issued?
Some of the signatories issued a filial appeal to Pope Francis last year, asking him to clarify the Church’s teaching with regard to marriage, sin, and grace. When they did not receive a response, they prepared this correction. The correction was originally sent to Pope Francis privately in July.
Why is this correction being made public now?
When the signatories received no response from Pope Francis to their appeal or their correction, they were concerned about the possibility of scandal, and so they made it public.
Was it right to make the correction public?
Not necessarily, no.
In Donum Veritatis, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stipulates that theologians who wish to critique the timeliness, form, or substance of non-infallible magisterial documents should address their concerns to the “responsible authority” rather than the “mass media” (DV 30). The responsible authority for the Church’s teaching on faith and morals is the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The responsible authority for the interpretation of canon law is the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts.
Moreover, the principal concern of a filial or fraternal correction should be the amendment of the one who is thought to have sinned. But the publication of the document (as opposed to its private submission) was not undertaken primarily with a view towards correcting a supposed sin of Pope Francis. Rather, the cited reason for the publication of the correction is the avoidance of scandal to others, not the correction of Pope Francis himself.
Furthermore, although the correction seeks to avoid scandal, the correction itself has served as a cause of scandal. It insinuates that the pope is a heretic, it thereby weakens people’s trust in the pastors of the Church, and it provides the mass media with the opportunity to paint a false picture of the Church, in which those who believe the Church’s teaching about marriage, sin, and grace are seen as somehow opposed to the pope.
What authority does the correction have?
The correction is a private act on the part of the individual signatories, which they have undertaken in their capacity as baptized members of the Church (Can. 212, §3). The correction therefore has no magisterial authority in the Church.
Are Catholics required to follow the correction?
No. Since the correction lacks magisterial authority, Catholics are not required to agree with it or to follow it.
What is heresy?
“Heresy is the obstinate post-baptismal denial of some truth which must be believed with divine and catholic faith, or it is likewise an obstinate doubt concerning the same…” (CCC 2089).
Does this mean that the pope is a heretic?
No. Despite the document’s title, the signatories acknowledge in the document that they lack the authority to judge whether the pope has committed the sin of heresy or the canonical crime of heresy. The difference between the sin and the crime of heresy, and an answer to the question about whether the pope can be a heretic, are discussed here.
If the signatories cannot convict the pope of heresy, what sin do the signatories claim that the pope has committed?
The signatories claim that the pope has failed to stop the spread of heresy, rather than that he has committed the sin of heresy himself.
What heresy do the signatories claim that the pope has failed to stop?
The signatories claim that the pope has failed to stop the spread of seven heresies. Most of these concern the Church’s teaching on mortal sin. The Church’s teaching is that we cannot with full knowledge and deliberate consent choose to perform grave evil without cutting ourselves off from God’s grace (CCC 1857), and that we cannot live in a state in life which is contrary to God’s law without cutting ourselves off from the Sacrament of the Eucharist (CCC 1650).
Are those heresies contained in Amoris Laetitia?
None of the passages of Amoris Laetitia cited by the correction explicitly denies that a person who knowingly and willingly commits grave evil cuts himself or herself off from God’s grace.
Amoris Laetitia does explore the possibility that a person who commits grave evil may in some cases not have full knowledge or deliberate consent when doing so, but precisely insofar as they lack full knowledge and/or deliberate consent, such a person is not necessarily committing mortal sin.
Amoris Laetitia also explores the process of healing the gravely sinful elements of a state in life which is contrary to God’s law, without necessarily abandoning that state in life altogether. Amoris Laetitia only speculates as to what may be possible in this context, and its teaching is not clear. The Church teaches that in ambiguous cases such as this one, “everyone should be careful to interpret insofar as possible his neighbor’s thoughts, words, and deeds in a favorable way.” (CCC 2478) That means interpreting ambiguous statements in continuity with the faith and practice of the Church, not in terms of a rupture with that faith and practice.
How can we gain clarity about the teaching of the Church on divorce and remarriage?
With magisterial authority, St. John Paul II declared that the Catechism of the Catholic Church is a “sure norm for teaching the faith” (Fidei Depositum 3). We may therefore look to the teaching of the Catechism on the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony (1601-1666), sin (1846-1879), and grace (1950-2029). Four Cardinals of the Catholic Church have also submitted five “dubia” to Pope Francis. A “dubium” is a question about faith and/or morals to which the faithful would like a magisterial answer, and “dubia” is the plural of “dubium.” Should Pope Francis answer the dubia, it would give us further guidance as to his intended teaching.
What should Catholics do now?
Catholics should pray for the pope, for the signatories of the correction, and for the Church. Jesus Christ himself promised to send his Holy Spirit so as to lead the Church into all truth (Jn 16:13), and to defend the Church from error (Mt 16:18). Jesus is always faithful to his promises.
*Dr. Jacob Wood is assistant professor of theology at the Franciscan University of Steubenville. His opinions are his own.
Moscow has confirmed that it received an advance from Turkey for the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems. The much-discussed deal may signal closer ties between both countries, as well as a growing rift between Turkey and its NATO allies.
“Yes, we have received it [the down payment]. We can’t name the dates of supply yet. They want it earlier [than 2019], but the issue is still under discussion,” Russian presidential aide for military-technical cooperation Vladimir Kozhin said as cited by RIA Novosti, adding that the deal has come into force.
Earlier in September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also confirmed that Ankara had paid a deposit for the purchase of S-400 anti-aircraft systems from Russia.
“The process will continue by the transfer of a credit from Russia to us. Both [Russian President] Mr. Vladimir Putin and myself, we are determined on this issue,” he told journalists after returning from Kazakhstan on September 10.
On Monday, Turkish Defense Undersecretary Ismail Demir said that S-400 delivery to Turkey will start within two years, Anadolu news agency reported.
In July, Turkish media reported that Russia would supply two batteries and help Ankara build two more such systems, capable of engaging with up to 80 targets within a range of 400km.
On September 21, the state-run Turkish news agency Anadolu published an infographic detailing the components of an S-400 battalion and the system’s capabilities.
Those include the bombers B-52 Stratofortress and B-1 Lancer, as well as the E-3 Sentry, better known as AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). Apart from that, the list includes half-a-dozen US-made fighter jets and support aircraft, including the F-22 Raptor and the E-2 Hawkeye flying radar, and the Tomahawk cruise missile.
Meanwhile, NATO and Turkish allies individually, including Washington, have criticized Ankara for choosing Russian-made air defense system instead of one produced by NATO members, such as the US-made Patriot PAC-3.
In July, US Defense Secretary James Mattis said that S-400 anti-aircraft systems are “not going to be interoperable with NATO systems.”
“The problem is, how do you interoperate in the NATO system with Russians? They’ll never interoperate,” Mattis said.
Erdogan lashed out at the critics, saying Turkey doesn’t want to wait for the protection of its NATO allies.
“What do you expect? Should we wait for you? We take care of ourselves in every security point. We are taking precautions and we will continue to do so,” he said.
(RFE/RL) — U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and other officials on September 30 on issues including trade, the North Korean nuclear threat, and an upcoming visit to China by U.S. President Donald Trump.
Tillerson called for calm in regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula but said North Korea must stop its missile tests.
“Obviously it would help if North Korea would stop firing off missiles,” Tillerson told journalists in Beijing. “That would calm things down a lot.”
Tillerson also told journalists that the United States has “lines of communication to Pyongyang.”
“We’re not in a dark situation, a blackout,” Tillerson said. “We have a couple, three channels open to Pyongyang.”
The Reuters news agency quoted Tillerson as saying “we can talk to them; we do talk to them.”
Following Tillerson’s remarks in Beijing, State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert told journalists in Washington that “North Korean officials have shown no indication that they are interested or ready for talks regarding denuclearization.”
In Beijing, Tillerson also said the United States would not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, but added Washington has no intention of overthrowing the regime of autocratic ruler Kim Jong Un.
Washington wants China to take tougher actions against North Korea in response to its nuclear-weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.
On September 28, China announced that all North Korean companies in China will be required to shut down by early January.
But the notice said companies approved by the United Nations Security Council sanctions committee, including nonprofit and noncommercial infrastructure projects, would be exempted.
That order is linked to the latest sanctions, passed on September 11 by the United Nations Security Council, in response to North Korea’s missile and nuclear-weapons tests.
Earlier, Tillerson said his visit gave him an opportunity to assess progress made between the two countries since Xi and Trump met in April in Florida for talks that established a 100-day plan for further trade discussions running through mid-July.
He told top Chinese foreign policy adviser Yang Jiechi that Trump and Xi had developed a “very regular and close working relationship.”
Tillerson also met with Foreign MInister Wang Yi who told the secretary of state that relations between the two countries “overall have a positive momentum and have arrived at an important opportunity to progress further.”
Other topics of Tillerson’s talks in Beijing include the huge U.S. trade deficit with China and Beijing’s military build-up around disputed islands in the South China Sea.
Trump’s first official visit to China is expected to take place in November.
PRESIDENT XI: (Via interpreter) Secretary Tillerson, it is indeed a great pleasure for me to meet with you here. I understand that you have traveled a long way to arrive in Beijing and, immediately after getting out of your plane, you have entered into busy working sessions with your Chinese counterparts. And I’ve been briefed that you have just had very good discussions. Since taking office as the Secretary of State, you’ve been placing tremendous importance on China-U.S. relationship and you have played a positive role in advancing the growth of China-U.S. relations. And we would like to express our appreciation for what you have done.
Right now for China-U.S. relationship, the most important agenda is the visit to China by President Trump in November. Well, on top of the two meetings between President Trump and I at Mar-a-Lago and also in Hamburg, Germany, we’ve also exchanged letters and telephone conversations on multiple occasions. I’ve enjoyed each and every one of those engagement, and we have made concerted efforts to push for the growth of China-U.S. relationship. And the two of us have also maintained a very good working relationship and personal friendship. I believe that President Trump’s upcoming visit to China means (inaudible) opportunity for the furtherance of China-U.S. relationship, and I hope the teams on both sides will make full preparation for this important event. And I believe his visit will be special, wonderful, and successful.
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President, for giving us this time for my delegation to call on you. President Trump is looking forward with great anticipation to the summit here in Beijing, as is the first lady, Melania Trump. And our teams have had very good discussions today to move forward on the preparations for this very important visit; had very good discussions with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, State Councilor Yang, and I think the details of the visit are coming together quite nicely. And we appreciate all the preparation and the efforts being taken by the Chinese side. As you have noted, this is a relationship that continues to grow and mature on the strength of the relationship between yourself and President Trump, and we look forward to advancing that relationship with this upcoming summit. Thank you.
