Donald Trump has blamed Iran after Saudi Arabia was forced to blast a ballistic missile out of the sky near Riyadh.

The U.S. President called Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in the aftermath of the incident to discuss counter-terrorism efforts and “the continuing threat of Iranian-backed Houthi militias in Yemen.”

“A shot was just taken by Iran, in my opinion, at Saudi Arabia. And our system knocked it down,” said Trump, referring to the Patriot missile batteries Saudi Arabia has purchased from the U.S.

“That’s how good we are. Nobody makes what we make and now we’re selling it all over the world.”

Saudi Arabia said its forces intercepted a ballistic missile fired by Iran-backed rebels in Yemen toward one of the kingdom’s major international airports on the outskirts of Riyadh.

The missile was destroyed near Riyadh’s King Khaled international airport and was said to be of ‘limited size’.

No injuries or damage were reported.

When The White House made contact with Riyadh, President Trump also thanked the monarch for Saudi Arabia’s military purchases, including a $15 billion investment in the American-made THAAD anti-ballistic missile defense system.

Only hours before the missile was shout out of the sky, Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri resigned from his post in a televised address from Riyadh, offering a vicious tirade against Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah group for what he said was their meddling in Arab affairs.

“Iran’s arms in the region will be cut off,” Hariri said.

Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for firing missile, which was targeting the airport, the Houthis’ Al-Masirah television said.

Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s southern neighbor, has been ripped apart by a war between the Saudi-backed government of president Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi and Houthi rebels backed by Iran.

Rebels continue to hold much of Yemen and the United Nations has warned the country is on the brink of famine.

The intergovernmental organization has failed to agree on a peace deal to end the fighting, which has left more than 8,600 people dead since the coalition entered the conflict.

More than 2,100 people in Yemen have been killed since a cholera outbreak in April as hospitals struggled to secure basic supplies amid a coalition air and sea blockade.

Original source

By Ali Esmaeili Ardakani*

The existing institutional order of the world was the product of the modern international system and thrived during the 20th century. Due to the high number of global issues, this order has undergone many alterations. All institutions and regimes related to this order have turned into a part of the global governance mechanism and have undertaken various roles and numerous special tasks in international politics, security, environment, health, education and economy. Therefore, any form of damage to the aforesaid regimes and institutions will lead to damage and disruption in the process of socialization of countries and various non-state actors within the international community.

At the present time, the institutional order is at the risk of collapse. The United States has defined its interests in a way that they are in contravention of the logic of institutionalism theory. US President Donald Trump and the present sovereign organs in this country have pointed to the costs of institutional membership and institutional activity, and while condemning it, have resorted to the “America First” as their main slogan in order to pave the way for quitting those international institutions and regimes, which appear to be cumbersome and costly for the United States.

The beginning of the gradual death of a dream

As put by Lisa Martin[1], under conditions of the Cold War, the United States considered “self-commitment” as its main strategy toward multilateral organizations and institutions. However, as time went by, and more accurately, following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States has changed this strategy. The United States invasion of Iraq without attention to the need for institutional and coalition-based support was the beginning of this strategy. Of course, under President Barack Obama, the United States tried to regain trust of its allies and emerge as a pioneer with regard to international regimes and agreements in order to somehow reduce the distrust that had been developed toward the United States under former US president, George W. Bush.

In the meantime, US withdrawal from many international treaties and regimes under Trump, including withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement; leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) agreement; requesting renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); criticizing the text and contents of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on grounds that it harms American workers; criticizing and casting doubt on the multilateral international nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and most recently, leaving the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have cast basic doubts on the possibility of maintaining the existing global institutional order. To the above list one can add Washington’s harsh criticism of the cost of NATO membership for the United States as well as supporting Britain’s divorce from the European Union, or Brexit, each of which can be the beginning of the end of the existing institutional order. Without a doubt, such steps will somehow lead to reduced legitimacy of the institutional order, which is made up of institutions and regimes part of whose agendas was previously dictated by the United States due to the global standing of this country.

Consequences of America’s anti-institutional approach under Trump

The question, however, is what goal does the US want to achieve by rejecting the current institutional order? Or how long can the US under Trump remain indifferent to legitimacy of international institutions and regimes? On the other hand, what consequences can the United States lack of commitment to the institutional order have for this country? It seems that this country has initiated this strategy in order to take advantage of the economic benefits of leaving international treaties and also to reduce the costs arising from membership in security treaties. However, the United States will in the long run jeopardize itself and the whole international system due to the rising international distrust at a time that international trust is a requisite for the resolution of various economic, political and security crises in the world. In response to the second question, one can say that Trump’s anti-institutional approach can only continue until an urgent international crisis emerges.[2]

Due to absence of clear-cut historical experience about falling legitimacy and efficiency of big powers as a result of not respecting the rules and nature of international institutions and regimes, the critics of the institutional order believe that the US will not lose its legitimacy as a result of disregard for rules and nature of such institutions. However, these critics ignore the point that the most important differentiation between our time and previous junctures of history is not only the growing role of the emerging and non-Western powers, but also increased global awareness as a result of thriving communication technologies. On the other hand, such measures have increased the distrust in international agreements and performance of various institutions and regimes, and have jeopardized management of both urgent and long-term crises. An example to the point is North Korea, which has cited this distrust and mentioned the past experience of disarmament talks by the U.S. with Libya and Iraq to avoid signing any kind of international agreements with this country.

Trump’s anti-institutional approach and future of the JCPOA

In the case of Iran, in particular, the United States has been always facing difficulties for forging global consensus to impose sanctions on Iran following the war on Iraq. This is because the Islamic Republic of Iran has been always emphasizing the stabilizing and effective role of international regimes and institutions in order to boost its international interactions, on the one hand. On the other hand, the general trust in the US actions has been constantly on the fall. At that juncture, however, countries like China and Russia were convinced, though with a lot of difficulty, to cooperate with the United States for imposing sanctions on Iran. However, under the present conditions and in view of Trump’s hostile policies toward Iran, there are serious doubts about cooperation of China, Russia and European countries with the United States, at least in their official and institutional positions. Let’s not forget that it was that cooperation, which previously led to the conclusion of the JCPOA with Iran. Despite all these facts, the realities of the international system call on Iran to not only continue extensive interaction with the world, but also exercise more caution in this regard. Iran must also monitor all actions taken by countries that are a party to the JCPOA following Trump’s remarks on the nuclear deal on October 13, 2017, and adopt suitable measures proportionate to those actions at regional and international levels.

Conclusion

Apart from Trump’s performance during the past few months and regardless of all debates on Iran and the JCPOA, any kind of effort by the United States to revise or withdraw from the current institutional order will be dangerous. This is true because such effort will deal a blow to multilateralism and lead to reduced cooperation among those institutions and regimes that are very important to preservation of order and management of international crises. Therefore, since rebuilding international trust in performance of international institutions and regimes is costly and needs a lot of time, such effective countries as Russia and China, as well as progressive European countries must criticize the current trend and try to inform the United States of the consequences of its anti-institutional strategy by pursuing a single policy. This is necessary because if the United States does not stop this trend and does not begin rebuilding international trust, its consequences will affect the international order and, in other words, will increase entropy[3] in the international system.

* Ali Esmaeili Ardakani
Doctoral Student of International Relations at Allameh Tabatabaei University

**These views represent those of the author and are not necessarily Iran Review’s viewpoints.

[1] Lisa L. Martin .Multilateral Organizations after the U.S.-Iraq War of 2003

[2] Of course, we have already reached the conclusion about North Korea that this crisis has also necessitated gaining this country’s trust in order to pursue a deterrent strategy based on bargaining; see: http://www.tisri.org/default-2544.aspx

[3] Entropy is often interpreted as the degree of disorder or randomness in a system.

By George W. Croner*

(FPRI) — Since first passed by Congress in 2008, the intelligence collection program conducted under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)^[1] has expanded to become arguably the most significant collection tool available to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Just last week, in a letter delivered to the congressional leadership of both parties and to the heads of the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees in both chambers, seven former intelligence officials including three former Directors of National Intelligence (DNI), a former Attorney General, and Michael Hayden, the only man to have been appointed director of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), implored Congress to reauthorize Section 702 advising that “[w]e have personally reported to our Presidents – Republicans and Democratic – and to the Congress details of plots disrupted based on information from Section 702.”^[2] Described as the “crown jewel” of the Intelligence Community’s surveillance authorities, the reauthorization of Section 702 without material change has been designated by the current Attorney General and DNI as the Intelligence Community’s “top legislative priority.”^[3]

Originally approved by Congress as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and then reauthorized in 2012, legislative authority for the Section 702 collection program (“Section 702 Program”) expires on December 31, 2017. Despite its virtually unmatched pedigree as a foreign intelligence tool and the unqualified support of those who best know that pedigree, the renewal of Section 702 is hardly assured; providing a dispiriting example of what happens in Congress when right-wing libertarians and left-wing civil liberties activists manage to find a common target for their ire. The result: a legislative squeeze play by these unlikely allies focused on neutering the Section 702 Program secure in the knowledge that those charged with protecting the national security will acquiesce to their “reforms” rather than risk the Program’s complete lapse. Unless the majority of legislators distance themselves from these two fringes, the outcome may well be a dangerous and flawed security policy masquerading as reform. Fortunately, there is still time for prudence to produce the outcome that best preserves the balance between the nation’s security interests and individual liberty, but, recent events confirm that the path to such an outcome will require careful navigation.

Earlier this month, the “USA Liberty Act of 2017” (USA Liberty Act)^[4] was introduced in the House Judiciary Committee. This bill extends (through September 30, 2023) the collection authority found in Section 702, albeit with a series of new restrictions and reporting requirements that are flawed for the reasons explained in my commentary on that bill published earlier in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s (FPRI’s) E-Notes.^[5] As I noted at that time, there was no indication that the USA Liberty Act enjoyed any particular legislative support from either the House Intelligence Committee or the Senate committees principally responsible for intelligence oversight.

As if on cue, the skirmishing over the renewal of Section 702 emerged into full public view last week with the introduction of two more bills addressing the extension of this FISA collection program. Both new bills were introduced by members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, but their stark differences suggest that the controversial debate over extending Section 702 is likely to continue well into the autumn, perhaps pushing up against the December 31, 2017 sunset date that looms over this critical intelligence collection program.^[6]

The two Senate bills were both reported as being introduced on October 23. Senator Richard Burr, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, introduced the proposed “FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017” (FISA Reauthorization Act), a title that sounds almost quotidian compared to the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Reforming and Improving the Government’s High-Tech Surveillance Act of 2017” (USA Rights Act)^[7] that was introduced the same day by Burr’s Intelligence Committee colleague, Senator Ron Wyden. Viewed on a continuum, Burr’s bill would leave the operation of the Section 702 Program largely unchanged, while Wyden’s legislation would drastically limit and alter the manner in which the Section 702 Program is currently conducted.^[8]

The FISA Reauthorization Act renews the Section 702 Program’s collection authority for eight years (through December 31, 2025). Like every piece of Section 702-related legislation introduced thus far, Burr’s bill would codify the ban on “about” acquisitions,^[9] a collection that the NSA, the agency principally responsible for operation of the Section 702 Program, ceased in March of this year. Other than barring “about” collection (and then creating a byzantine protocol to be followed should the executive branch seek to renew this form of collection), the FISA Reauthorization Act proposes the following changes to the statute in its current form:

• imposes several new requirements that expand upon existing disclosure provisions found in current Section 702 legislation,
• refines the list of criminal proceedings in which Section 702-derived information can be used,^[10] and
• requires that the Attorney General and the DNI adopt procedures for use in querying^[11] the unminimized data collected pursuant to authorized Section 702 acquisitions while also mandating that those procedures include a technical process to record all queries that use a known U.S. person identifier.

A separate provision in the bill also would require that the FBI now report to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) all queries of Section 702 data that return information concerning a known U.S. person.^[12] The FISC is charged with reviewing these FBI queries for “consistency with the Fourth Amendment.” Any information retrieved in response to a query found by the FISC not to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in any court proceeding. The FISC is charged with reporting to Congress at least annually on its reviews of FBI queries specifying the number of FBI submissions reviewed by the FISC and the number of those submissions that the court determined were not consistent with the Fourth Amendment.^[13]

In terms of collection authority, the FISA Reauthorization Act essentially permits the Section 702 Program to continue in its current form in all material respects.^[14] Except for the new requirements relating to FBI querying of the Section 702 database, this bill is, in terms of operational effect, the “clean” reauthorization sought for Section 702 by the Attorney General and the DNI, and it was reported out of the Senate Intelligence Committee on a 12-3 vote on October 24.

But a favorable endorsement from the Senate Intelligence Committee hardly assures that the FISA Reauthorization Act will become law because the USA Rights Act is supported by a strange cast of bedfellows. The curious consortium joining as co-sponsors of the bill includes Sens. Heller (NV), Paul (KY), and Lee (UT), all of whom received scores above 0.70 (where 1.0 represents the most conservative score) from GovTrack, an independent, nonpartisan congressional tracking service, in its 2015 “Ideology Score.” Concomitantly, the consortium also counts Sens. Baldwin (WI), Sanders (VT), and Warren (MA) as co-sponsors, whose GovTrack “Ideology Scores” were 0.07, 0.04, and 0.00, respectively. Despite the myriad problems facing the nation, these Senate confederates can apparently unite in communion only where the effort is to neutralize America’s most important intelligence collection program. If the USA Rights Act represents their version of what Section 702 should look like, the Program’s utility and effectiveness could be seriously compromised in the coming legislative battle. This proposed legislation is a paradigm of responding to imagined risks rather than genuine abuses, and then producing a flawed statute to “correct” those misperceived risks. Enacted in its current form, the USA Rights Act would neuter important intelligence advantages now provided by Section 702 while also injecting ill-advised and unnecessary changes into the entire structure of FISA. How does the USA Rights Act manage to create such a mess? Let us count the ways.

A Dangerously Poor “Fix” for the “Back Door” Search

As with the USA Liberty Act introduced earlier this month in the House Judiciary Committee, the USA Rights Act professes to end “back door’’ searches.^[15] As I noted in commenting on the USA Liberty Act,^[16] “back door” searches are a particular bête noire of Section 702 critics, and Senator Wyden has been an outspoken critic since Section 702 was first passed by Congress in 2008. But, while the House bill (the USA Liberty Act) addresses the “back door” issue by at least focusing on the arguably relevant question; i.e., whether Section 702-acquired data can be queried to find evidence of a crime,^[17] the USA Rights Act completely oversteps with a prophylactic ban on all queries of Section 702 data where the query is intended to find communications “of or about a particular United States person or a person inside the United States” whether or not the underlying query is directed to producing foreign intelligence or not. If enacted, this seismic change would substantially undermine the utility of the Section 702 Program, particularly in the area of counterterrorism.

Critics like Senator Wyden persistently describe the “back door” search as a Fourth Amendment concern, but no court that has considered the issue agrees with this characterization. Remember, the communications that are being queried here already have been legally collected.^[18] Yes, that collection is “incidental” to the targeting of a foreigner, but such incidental collection is lawful precisely because the target is a foreigner, located abroad, with no Fourth Amendment rights. Courts considering the question have concluded that once these communications have been lawfully collected, a subsequent querying of the database containing those communications is not a separate “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, elevating the “back door” search question to one of constitutional dimension is an exaggeration.

One should also be precise about exactly what type of U.S. person communications are acquired in a Section 702 surveillance. We are talking about the incidental acquisition of those communications of U.S. persons to or from foreigners located abroad who use communication selectors^[19] that, because of the reasonable likelihood that those communication selectors are used to transmit foreign intelligence information satisfying one or more criteria contained within a Section 702 certification approved by the FISC, have been properly targeted for collection pursuant to targeting procedures that also have been reviewed and approved by the FISC. Subsequent retention, use, and dissemination of any information derived from these incidentally collected communications are governed by minimization procedures also reviewed and approved by the FISC. Thus, far from being the surveillance dragnet depicted by critics, the universe of U.S. person communications acquired and retained in the Section 702 database consists only of those to or from that subset of U.S. persons who communicate with a corresponding subset of foreigners located abroad whose activities have satisfied the targeting requirements of the Section 702 Program.

Here is the practical effect of what the USA Rights Act would do: a foreigner located abroad and properly targeted pursuant to a FISC-approved Section 702 certification communicates via email with “a person inside the United States” (not necessarily even a “United States person,” as defined in FISA). The email between these communicants is lawfully acquired by the NSA under Section 702 authority, and it discusses terrorist activities while mentioning a number of other individuals who also are in the United States, without specifically indicating the role, if any, played by these other persons. The USA Rights Act would prohibit an analyst from querying the Section 702 database using the names of any of these “person[s] inside the United States” in an effort to develop further foreign intelligence information on this possible terrorist ring.

Moving one step further: assume that the names mentioned in this email include those of certain U.S. persons without specifying the role of these U.S. persons in connection with the potential terrorist activities discussed in the email. Current NSA Minimization Procedures used with the Section 702 Program permit an analyst to query the database using a U.S. person identifier after a written statement of facts establishes that the use of such identifier as a selection term is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.^[20] In this circumstance, a properly constructed query using a U.S. person identifier based on a name identified in this email might produce other communications elaborating on terrorist plans, or on the size or composition of the group involved in this terrorist activity, or of the times they communicate, or even of the identity of other participants.

Such analytical queries are the essence of counterterrorism work: the difficult process of assembling the pieces of the intelligence mosaic to effectively combat a furtive foe making every effort to preserve anonymity. In both the situations described above, however, the USA Rights Act would ban any query that is intended to find either the communications of those U.S. persons identified in the email or, more remarkably, even a query that is constructed “to find communications of or about . . . a person inside the United States”—whether legally or not.^[21]

The example offered above speaks for itself. The “solution” the USA Rights Act offers to the “back door” search issue is dangerous overkill: it prohibits Section 702 database queries employing U.S. person identifiers even where used solely to retrieve important foreign intelligence. By contrast, the FISA Reauthorization Act prudently addresses this “back door” search issue by focusing on FBI queries of Section 702 data undertaken for law enforcement purposes.^[22] Those queries that return information concerning a known U.S. person must be submitted to the FISC for review, and, if the FISC finds a query is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the information retrieved by that query cannot be used in any court proceeding. This “suppression” remedy affords precisely the same relief available in more “traditional” litigation settings. Nothing in the operational history of the Section 702 Program provides any basis for circumscribing the utility of the Program in the clumsy fashion proposed in the USA Rights Act. Its solution for the “back door” search is an inept remedy adrift in search of a non-existent problem, and its adoption would unnecessarily endanger national security.

Meddling … Simply for the Sake of Meddling

Multiple sections of the USA Rights Act are notable either for their needless redundancy or their misguided impact. Section 3 of the bill proposes to prohibit “reverse targeting.” This is the practice where the communications of a person outside the United States are targeted when the purpose of the surveillance is actually directed to acquiring the communications of a person who is in the United States. This is improper—and it is already specifically prohibited by Section 702.^[23] In an uncanny display of fine parsing, the USA Rights Act assures that such reverse targeting will be prohibited not only where the purpose of the surveillance is to reverse target, but also where a significant purpose of the surveillance is to reverse target. How such a distinction is to be drawn in the real world of foreign intelligence surveillance is explained nowhere in the USA Rights Act but, presumably, we should all feel safer with this distinction as the law of the land.

Section 4 of the proposed bill also codifies the ban on “about” collection that is similarly found in the FISA Reauthorization Act. As noted earlier, the NSA terminated “about” collection earlier this year.

In Section 5 of the USA Rights Bill, there is a ban on the collection of communications that are entirely domestic. Current NSA Minimization Procedures require that domestic communications (i.e., communications without any communicant located outside of the United States) “be promptly destroyed upon recognition” unless the Director of NSA specifically determines, in writing, on a communication-by-communication basis that retention of that communication meets one of four specific criteria (e.g., “significant foreign intelligence information;” “evidence of crime;” “information necessary to understand or assess a communications security vulnerability;” or “imminent threat of serious harm to life or property”). Consequently, the ban on collection of domestic communications found in the USA Rights Act is, once again, largely redundant with the way in which the Section 702 Program is currently conducted.

Still another redundancy is found in the USA Rights Act’s requirement that directives to electronic communication service providers now be approved by the FISC before any assistance can be demanded of the provider. As written, FISA contemplates that the Attorney General and the DNI can direct a provider to furnish all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to effectuate a Section 702 acquisition, while already affording the provider the right to challenge any such directive in the FISC.^[24] By law, the provider is protected against any liability relating to the assistance provided.

The USA Rights Act would change this logical process. Instead, the Attorney General and DNI would now be prohibited from requesting assistance from any electronic communication service provider without first demonstrating to the FISC that the assistance sought is “necessary,” “narrowly tailored,” and “would not pose an undue burden on the electronic communication service provider.”^[25] Of course, no legislative guidance is provided as to what might pose “an undue burden.” More to the point, the USA Rights Act takes another facet of the Section 702 process, inverts that process as currently used, and thereby invites fractious collateral litigation that will serve only to delay the implementation of important foreign intelligence collection efforts. In a business where timeliness and efficiency often represent the difference between success and failure, and where failure can have catastrophic consequences, the deliberate creation of needless impediments to efficiency is dangerously short-sighted.

Section 7 of the USA Rights Act “reforms” the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) by broadening its authority to review foreign intelligence activities including receiving and acting upon whistleblower complaints from employees or contractors of the intelligence community. Of course, as with so many other aspects of the USA Rights Act, this is redundancy piled on redundancy. There are copious federal laws applicable to the agencies of the Intelligence Community that already provide whistleblower protections.^[26] Moreover, the PCLOB is a particularly unfit vehicle for the task of acting upon whistleblower complaints given that it is an organizational shell with only one serving member and four vacancies. Consequently, assigning any task of consequence to a group that needs to have two members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate before it even gains its statutory quorum suggests a congressional obtuseness that belies a genuine interest in accomplishing the assigned task.

These same realities show a complete absence of logic in the mandate that the Attorney General “fully inform the PCLOB about any activities carried out by the Government under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.” Are the sponsors of the USA Rights Act serious? Bear in mind that the statutory qualifications for appointment to the PCLOB require no particular expertise in FISA, electronic surveillance more generally, or counterterrorism; but, they do require an “expertise in civil liberties and privacy.”^[27] There is simply no wisdom to be found in requiring that some of the nation’s most sensitive foreign intelligence secrets be “fully” shared with a “board” that has one body, four empty chairs, and no organizational expertise in FISA or the activities conducted under its authority.

Order in the (FISA) Court?

The USA Freedom Act introduced amici curiae counsel into the FISA approval process in 2015. Subsequently, the FISC has appointed six individuals to serve in this capacity, and FISA currently provides the FISC with the discretion to determine when these individuals are appointed to “assist [the] court in the consideration of any order or review that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate.”^[28]

The USA Rights Act now proposes to circumscribe the judicial discretion to appoint amici counsel and mandate their appointment whenever the FISC is considering a Section 702 certification. No explanation is offered, and it is difficult to discern one, that justifies this mandated intrusion into the conduct of FISA judicial proceedings.

Judicial oversight has been an integral part of the statutory construct of FISA from its inception in 1978. Throughout that time, both the FISC and, later, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) have been populated by federal judges chosen by the Chief Justice of the United States. It would be hard to find an argument with any substance that has been advanced in opposition to this procedure during the four decades FISA has been in existence—until the USA Rights Act.

Section 9 of the bill seeks a complete reformation of the manner in which the FISC and FISCR are constituted. Currently, FISA provides that the FISC be comprised of 11 district court judges designated by the Chief Justice. Similarly, the FISCR is composed of three judges chosen by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice, of course, is nominated by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and is the highest ranking judicial official in the country.

The USA Rights Act would jettison this coherent process, expand the FISC to 13 judges, and pass the initiative for choosing those judges from the Chief Justice to the thirteen chief judges of the federal courts of appeal.^[29] Now, no disrespect intended, but the position of chief judge in a federal judicial circuit is neither permanent nor merit-based; these simply are the most senior of the judges in their particular circuit who happen to be under 65 and have not yet served as chief judge at the time the position falls open. Not exactly the sort of substantive selection criteria that assures any particular proficiency regarding FISA; and most Americans would be hard-pressed to identify any one of the currently serving chief judges across the 13 judicial circuits in the country. It is onto these anonymous jurists that the USA Rights Act would now confer the task of designating those who become FISC judges.

Compounding this perplexing convolution of the designation process used for FISC judges is another favorite legislative encroachment—the ordering of a study and, of course, yet another report. The subject this time—whether those appointed as judges of the FISC and the FISCR—are “diverse and representative.” Yet, the proposed bill is silent on whether the diversity sought is racial, gender, age, political affiliation, or some combination of these and other characteristics. What is clear is that the available literature reveals no source of any substance ever hinting that there is a diversity problem with either the FISC or the FISCR. And so, another “fix” is provided to another illusory problem.

Creating a Senseless Legal Standard that Endangers Us All

Unnecessary tinkering with the mechanism for designating FISA judges is annoyingly meddlesome, but it will not necessarily leave us all more exposed to the dangers of terrorism. This is not true of the short-sighted proposal found in Section 11 of the USA Rights Act. Perhaps no provision in this legislation is more inexplicable than its promotion of a legal claim available to anyone who “(A) has a reasonable basis to believe that the person’s communications will be acquired under [Section 702], and (B) has taken objectively reasonable steps to avoid surveillance under [Section 702].”^[30]

It is hard to exaggerate just how foolishly mistaken this concept is. Recall that the universe of U.S. persons whose communications have any chance of being incidentally collected during a Section 702 surveillance consists only of that subset of U.S. persons communicating with a foreigner located abroad who is a Section 702 target by virtue of satisfying the collection criteria for foreign intelligence information contained in a FISC-approved Section 702 certification. Under the USA Rights Act, all those foreign targets would now be effectively immunized from collection because NSA would face potential litigation with any U.S. person who regularly communicates with these foreign targets—and do so with the claimant already having been gifted an “injury in fact” presumption conferred by the USA Rights Act. Yes, I realize that, technically, the USA Rights Act furnishes this presumption only to those whose “profession . . .  requires the person regularly to communicate foreign intelligence information” to these foreigners abroad; but, since the NSA is targeting the foreigner and not the U.S. person it cannot know until after it has acquired a communication whether another communicant thereto meets the criteria for “injury” by virtue of the communication having been intercepted. Consequently, the NSA will have little choice but to forego collecting important foreign intelligence information on virtually every foreign target because it will never know, in advance, who is communicating with that target and whether that collection will expose it to liability to an aggrieved person under the USA Rights Act’s new “injury in fact” standard. The loss of valuable foreign intelligence will be immediate and palpable.

There is actually an “object lesson” demonstrating the critical problem created by the USA Rights Act’s proposed legal standard for “injury” arising from Section 702 surveillance. In Wikimedia v. National Security Agency,^[31] the challenge is that Section 702 collection “chills” the exercise of Wikimedia’s First Amendment rights because their foreign “sources” will hesitate to communicate if they believe that the NSA is collecting their communications. Setting aside the subjective concerns of these “sources,” objectively, such collection is possible only if, as noted above, the “sources” are also Section 702 “targets” properly identified through the application of the NSA’s targeting procedures pursuant to an appropriate FISC-approved certification. To be targets, such “sources” are necessarily foreigners located abroad who will use the tasked communication selectors to transmit or receive foreign intelligence information necessary to the national security of the U.S. or the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs.

No logical reading of the First or Fourth Amendments would immunize legitimate foreign intelligence targets from Section 702 surveillance simply because Wikimedia views them as “sources.” Such a misguidedly perverse outcome essentially subordinates the conduct of U.S. foreign intelligence operations to the news gathering decisions made by Wikimedia and other media entities. Yet, this is precisely what the USA Rights Act would accomplish—the Wikimedia position fits squarely into the niche created by the bill which allows those like Wikimedia, who regularly communicate foreign intelligence information to foreigners located outside the U.S., to claim what would now be accepted as a legally cognizable injury when the same foreign intelligence information is collected in a lawful Section 702 surveillance.

Simply re-reading that last paragraph ought to convince any reader of the absurdity of this proposed feature of the USA Rights Act. It is no exaggeration to say that if this part of this bill becomes law it will go a long way towards effectively dismantling the most important intelligence collection tool available to the U.S. government.

Still More Meddling

What has been described so far is damage enough wrought by a single piece of misguided legislation, but there is more in the USA Rights Act:

• reporting requirements demanding ever more statistics on the operation of the Section 702 Program,
• retroactive application of the requirement that decisions of the FISC be declassified and released to the fullest extent practicable,
• a requirement that the DNI now annually publish a description of “the subject matter of certifications provided under Section 702.” This effectively compels the DNI to wrestle with how to reveal for public consumption sensitive targeting details without compromising ongoing collection operations, and
• limiting the extension of Section 702 to four years (as opposed to the 8-year extension provided by the FISA Reauthorization Act).

Wrapping Up

The antipathy which its critics hold for Section 702 assured that its reauthorization would be fiercely debated, but the competing bills now pending further action in Congress clearly show that the future of this critical intelligence collection program is uncertain. The FISA Reauthorization Act would largely provide the “clean” renewal of Section 702 sought by the Intelligence Community. The USA Liberty Act would impose unnecessary restrictions on the future functioning of Section 702,^[32] but this legislation now looks tame compared to the USA Rights Act which, if enacted, would substantively eviscerate the Section 702 Program as currently conducted.

These are the stakes in the debate that, one way or the other, must reach a final decision on renewal by December 31, 2017. The clock is indeed ticking, and it’s getting closer to midnight every day.

About the author:
*George W. Croner previously served as principal litigation counsel in the Office of General Counsel at the National Security Agency. He is also a retired director and shareholder of the law firm of Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., where he remains Of Counsel, and is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
^[1] Section 702 of FISA allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly authorize the targeting, without an individualized warrant, of non-U.S. persons located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.

^[2] “Ex-U.S. spy chiefs urge Congress to renew internet surveillance law,” Reuters, Oct. 23, 2017.

^[3] “Jeff Sessions urges Congress to reauthorize FISA ‘promptly,’” Washington Examiner, Sept. 12, 2017.

^[4] USA Liberty Act, H.R. 3989, 115^th Congress (2017).

^[5] “What’s to be Found in the ‘USA Liberty Act,’” FPRI E-Notes, Oct. 20, 2017.

^[6] A full discussion and analysis of FISA Section 702 and the surveillance program operated under its authority appears in “The Clock is Ticking: Why Congress Needs to Renew America’s Most Important Intelligence Collection Program” published in FPRI E-Notes, Sept. 29, 2017.

^[7] USA Rights Act, S. 1997, 115^th Congress (2017). A companion bill to the USA Rights Act was introduced in the House by Reps. Zoe Lofgren and Ted Poe.

^[8] The USA Liberty Act introduced in the House resides somewhere between the two Senate bills in terms of its impact on current Section 702 operations; albeit with several material and problematic changes that are discussed in my October 20, 2017 E-Notes commentary. By way of comparison, an open letter from the ACLU describes the provisions of the USA Rights Act as “significantly more robust than those contained in the House’s USA Liberty Act.” See, https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-urging-support-usa-rights-act (Oct.24, 2017).

^[9] In Section 702 parlance, an “about” communication is one that includes the tasked email address in the text or body of an email even though the email is between two persons who are not themselves targets. In the case of “about” communications, acquisition may include communications that are neither to nor from a target but, instead, where a particular selector tasked for collection happens to be included in the body of the communication.

^[10] The USA Rights Act similarly limits those criminal proceedings in which Section 702-derived information may be used in evidence.

^[11] “Query” is now defined in the FISA Reauthorization Act as “any instance in which data the Government has already acquired is searched using a specific term or terms for the purpose of discovering or retrieving unminimized content or metadata.” FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, S. 2010, 115th Congress (2017).

^[12] The required report from the FBI to the FISC must include: the query used, the information retrieved in response to the query, and a justification for executing the query. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, S. 2010, 115th Cong. (2017).

^[13] FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, S. 2010, 115^th Congress (2017).

^[14] As noted earlier, a description of the current operation of the Section 702 Program can be found in “The Clock is Ticking: Why Congress Needs to Renew America’s Most Important Intelligence Collection Program,” FPRI E-Notes, Sept. 29, 2017. But for the new reporting mandate regarding FBI queries, the FISA Reauthorization Act would leave the Program’s operations substantively unchanged.

^[15] The “full summary” accompanying the USA Rights Act claims that the bill will “End Back Door Searches.”

^[16] “What’s to be Found in the ‘USA Liberty Act,’” FPRI E-Notes, Oct. 20, 2017.

^[17] In those circumstances where the Section 702 database is queried by analysts seeking evidence of a crime (as opposed to foreign intelligence information), the USA Liberty Act would require that an order, based upon probable cause, first be obtained from the FISC.

^[18] This is confirmed by looking to the definition of “query” supplied in the FISA Reauthorization Act, to wit: “any instance in which data the Government has already acquired is searched using a specific term or terms for the purpose of discovering or retrieving unminimized content or metadata.” FISA Reauthorization Act of 2017, S. 2010, 115^th Congress (2017).

^[19] “Communication selectors” are specific communications facilities used by a target such as telephone exchanges or email addresses.

^[20] Those same NSA Minimization Procedures require multiple pre- and post-query levels of review with respect to the use of any U.S. person identifier as a selection term.

^[21] In using the term “person inside the United States,” the USA Rights Act draws no distinction as to whether such person is in the United States legally or not.

^[22] As noted in “What’s to be Found in the ‘USA Liberty Act’” (FPRI E-Notes, Oct. 20, 2017), when the “back door” search issue is properly framed as a search of Section 702 data for evidence of a crime, such a construction is not one that significantly impacts the operation of the Section 702 Program as conducted by the NSA. The NSA’s principal mission is to conduct signals intelligence activities to produce foreign intelligence for consumption by other members of the Intelligence Community. The NSA’s FISC-approved minimization procedures relating to Section 702 collection require that queries of unminimized Section 702 communications using U.S. person identifiers be “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information, as defined in FISA.” Those minimization procedures do not authorize queries using U.S. person identifiers for the purpose of producing “evidence of a crime.” Consequently, properly framed as a law enforcement issue, the “back door” search primarily impacts the FBI, and the FISA Reauthorization Act prudently treats it accordingly.

Conversely, the overly broad “back door” search “remedy” advanced in the USA Rights Act categorically bans all queries of Section 702 data designed to retrieve communications “of or about a particular U.S. person or a person located inside the United States” whether or not the underlying query is directed to producing foreign intelligence information, as opposed to evidence of a crime. As should be apparent from the example provided, the excessive breadth of this “remedy” would adversely impact the NSA’s efforts to produce foreign intelligence information.

^[23] 50 U.S.C. §1881a(b)(2).

^[24] 50 U.S.C. §1881a(h).

^[25] USA Rights Act, S. 1997, 115^th Congress, Sec. 14 (2017).

^[26] See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012.

^[27] 42 U.S.C. §2000ee(h)(2).

^[28] Pub. L. No. 114-23 (2015); 50 U.S.C. §1881a(i).

^[29] For the FISCR, the appointment process would now require that any judge designated by the Chief Justice receive the approval of five justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.

^[30] USA Rights Act, S. 1997, 115th Cong., Sec. 11 (2017).

^[31] 857 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2017).

^[32] See, “What’s to be Found in the ‘USA Liberty Act,’” FPRI E-Notes, Oct. 20, 2017.

Tax revenue has historically been one of the arguments in favour of legalising marijuana. This column uses a change in Washington’s marijuana tax regime to explore how taxation affects industry and consumer behaviour. Gross receipts taxes encourage vertical as a form of tax avoidance and thus reduce expected revenue. The choice of what to tax (revenue versus weight) also has important implications for how the market evolves.

By Benjamin Hansen, Keaton Miller and Caroline Weber*

In 2015, the majority of American adults indicated support for legalising marijuana in some form for the first time (Motel 2015). Eight states (containing 21% of the US population) have, or soon will have, operating markets for recreational marijuana. Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, Spain, South Africa, and Uruguay have also legalised recreational marijuana in some form.

The revenue from taxation has been one of the primary arguments for legalising marijuana (Miron and Zwiebel 1995). However, as the literature has focused on black market marijuana, little is known about behaviours in legal marijuana markets, and therefore what the optimal policies for revenue generation or social welfare may be. Indeed, legislators across states have implemented varied policies – Colorado requires retail firms to grow 80% of the product they sell, while Washington forbids retailers from growing at all. Washington’s current tax rate is 37%; Maine has a tax rate of 10%.

The case of Washington state

In a recent paper, we offer new evidence concerning key policy-relevant behaviours by examining the market in Washington where recreational marijuana became available at retail stores beginning on 8 July  2014 (Hansen et al. 2017). We use comprehensive ‘seed-to-sale’ data collected by the state that track all marijuana produced in the state through the cultivation, production, and sales processes. We observe the prices, quality, and variety of marijuana products available in Washington’s marketplace. In contrast, previous studies of the marijuana industry have examined the illegal market through surveys, prices collected from drug seizures, and crowd-sourced data (e.g. Jacobi & Sovinsky 2016).

We take advantage of a reform of Washington’s tax policy. Prior to 1 July 2015, a 25% gross receipts tax was assessed at each transfer of marijuana within the supply chain and at retail. After 1 July 2015, the only tax collected was a 37% excise tax at retail. Crucially, this change was unexpected by market participants – the reform was passed during a special session of the Washington Legislature on 27 June 2015, and signed by the governor on 30 June. We estimate the effect of this exogenous change on decisions made throughout the marketplace.

The influence of tax regimes on vertical integration

Marijuana in Washington is produced through a legally defined three-step process. Cultivators raise cannabis plants, processors transform those plants into ‘usable marijuana’, and finally retailers sell small, sealed packages of marijuana to consumers. Under the original tax regime, vertically integrated firms that grow and process their own marijuana could have a competitive advantage by avoiding the 25% gross receipts tax that would normally be assessed on cultivator-processor transactions.

We find that the original tax regime encouraged vertical integration within the supply chain where legal. We capture this behaviour by examining the provenance of retail marijuana products. Before the reform, 94% of wholesale marijuana transactions were between vertically integrated producers and retailers, as seen in the left panel of Figure 1. Afterwards, roughly 90% of transactions originated from vertically integrated producers. At the same time, the weight of marijuana produced by non-vertically integrated firms increased 42%, as seen in the right panel of Figure 1. These results suggest that the original gross receipts tax created inefficiencies in the supply chain that persisted after the removal of the taxes. To test this hypothesis, we restrict the analysis to transactions from producers in their first week of business – that is, to capture firms’ decisions about vertical integration before paying the fixed costs of entry. We find that the drop in the percentage of vertically integrated transactions quadruples to 16%, and the increase in the weight of dis-integrated marijuana more than doubles to 105%.

Although economists have argued for many years that gross receipts taxes lead to vertical integration, we are the first to provide evidence of such behaviour. This is more relevant than ever for policy today, as several states have considered or have implemented such taxes (Kaeding 2017).

Figure 1 Vertical integration

Though seven (of eight) states with legal marijuana have a sales or excise tax, several states have also imposed cultivation taxes. Our findings suggest that cultivation taxes can directly affect incentives to vertically integrate. Additionally, Alaska’s and California’s cultivation taxes are based on weight alone, and Colorado’s wholesale tax is based on the average price per gram of marijuana sold in the state. As the amount taxed in those states does not change in response to the price of the wholesale marijuana sold, these taxes are relatively higher for cheaper marijuana, which tends to be of lower quality and potency. The tax regimes in Alaska, California, and Colorado may thus incentivise suppliers to produce higher priced and higher potency marijuana.

The price sensitivity of consumers

While the price elasticity of demand and tax incidence are of first-order concern for policymakers tasked with setting taxes, the analysis is complicated by the degree of product differentiation – the typical retailer has many products available at any time. After accounting for substitution between products by consumers, we find that the tax-inclusive price faced by consumers for identical products increased by 2.3%. We find that the quantity purchased decreased by 0.95%, though estimates are noisy, implying a short-term price elasticity of -0.43. However, over time, the magnitude of the quantity response significantly increases, and our estimates suggest that the price elasticity of demand is about negative one within two weeks of the reform. We conclude that Washington, the state with the highest marijuana taxes in the country, is near the peak of the Laffer curve – further increases in tax rates may not increase revenue.

We summarise the components of the average tax-inclusive retail price of a gram of marijuana in Figure 2. The left and right bars, respectively, present the components of the retail price before and after the tax change. We consider how much goes to processor and retail taxes as well as how much the firms keep. Before the tax change, all prices and taxes (in dollars) are based on the average prices across all firms the month prior to the tax change. The post-reform numbers are calculated by applying our estimated price responses to the pre-reform averages. This holds the composition of the market constant and eliminates any secular trends in prices as well as changes in the consumption patterns of consumers.

Figure 2 The average price of one gram of marijuana and tax incidence across markets

Considering the changes in tax rates as well as the adjustment in retailers’ marginal costs (due to the change in processor prices in response to their own tax changes), we find that consumers bear about 44% of the retail tax burden. This result stands in contrast to the literatures on cigarette and gasoline tax incidence, which generally find that consumers bear a substantial majority of the tax burden (Harding et al. 2012, Kopczuk et al. 2016) and that the rate of tax pass-through to consumers can even exceed one (Barnett et al. 1996, Kenkel 2005). One plausible explanation for the difference is that our estimated medium-run elasticity of demand for marijuana is higher than the consensus estimates for cigarettes or gasoline. Alternatively, tight ownership and size restrictions in Washington’s marijuana market may lead to differential market power effects or frictions relative to these other markets. This difference could also be explained by the decline in the amount of federal income taxes some retail firms expected to pay upon the switch from a gross receipts tax to an excise tax.

A broader perspective on optimality

A simple analysis of excise tax revenue maximisation suggests that Washington, which has the highest tax rate out of all of the states which have legalised marijuana, is likely near the peak of the Laffer curve, and further tax increases may decrease marginal revenue received by the state. We have also highlighted that the type of tax imposed matters; a gross receipts tax on the cultivator will encourage vertical integration as a form of tax avoidance and thus lower expected revenue. Moreover, both the choice of the type of tax as well as what we tax (e.g. revenue or weight) have important implications for the way the industry evolves in terms of market structure and the types of products offered. This is particularly relevant due to the fledgling nature of the rapidly growing marijuana industry.

Although tax revenue has historically been one of the many arguments in favour of legalising marijuana, evaluating the impact of marijuana policy (and constructing optimal policy) in a broader social sense requires additional considerations. For one, the public health externalities of marijuana consumption are not well established; nor is the relation between legal marijuana consumption and the consumption of other ‘sin’ goods, such as alcohol or tobacco. If it is indeed true, as many advocates claim, that marijuana consumption is ‘better’ in a public health sense than alcohol or tobacco consumption, the optimal taxation of marijuana should be designed to take into account responses in these other markets as well. Likewise, excessive taxation might prop up the very black markets that legal marijuana is intended to supplant. As additional jurisdictions consider legalising marijuana and debate over optimal policy design, these trade-offs should be explored and taken into account.

*About the authors:
Benjamin Hansen, W.E. Miner Professor of Economics, University of Oregon

Keaton Miller, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Oregon

Caroline Weber, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Oregon

References:
Barnett, P G, T E Keeler and T W Hu (1995), “Oligopoly structure and the incidence of cigarette excise taxes”, Journal of Public Economics 57(3): 457-470.

Hansen, B, K Miller and C Weber (2017), “The taxation of recreational marijuana: Evidence from Washington state”, NBER, Working paper 23632.

Harding, M, E Leibtag and M F Lovenheim (2012), “The heterogeneous geographic and socioeconomic incidence of cigarette taxes: Evidence from Nielsen Homescan Data”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(4): 169-198.

Jacobi, L and M Sovinsky (2016), “Marijuana on Main Street? Estimating demand in markets with limited access”, American Economic Review 106(8): 2009-45.

Kaeding, N (2017), “The return of gross receipts taxes”, Tax Foundation, 28 March 2017.

Kenkel, D S (2005), “Are alcohol tax hikes fully passed through to prices? Evidence from Alaska”, American Economic Review 95(2): 273-277.

Kopczuk, W, J Marion, E Muehlegger and J Slemrod (2016), “Does tax-collection invariance hold? Evasion and the pass-through of State diesel taxes”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8(2): 1-36.

Miron, J A and J Zwiebel (1995), “The economic case against drug prohibition”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4): 175-192.

Motel, S (2015), “Six Facts about Marjuana”.

By Herbert Vytiska

(EurActiv) — Since 1 November, a stricter law on foreigners has been in force in Austria, which wants to crack down rigorously on people residing illegally in the country, including refugees.

Before the elections, the outgoing SPÖ-ÖVP government and the old parliament adopted an amendment to Austrian law that has now come into force.

It contains a series of tighter provisions, especially aimed at people whose asylum applications have been rejected and who went missing afterwards.

Under the amended law, if refugees whose application has been rejected do not leave the country or try to re-enter it, high penalties can be imposed, ranging from €5,000 to €15,000 or six weeks detention. Those who knowingly make false statements to obtain a residence permit can be punished with up to €5,000 as well.

Zero tolerance policy

Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka stressed the importance of respecting the law: “In many cases, we have a situation where illegally appointed asylum seekers ignore the instructions of the authorities despite not having a residence permit, and make no attempt to leave Austria. Illegal stay is no trivial offence.”

Sobotka also claimed that illegal activities provide a way-out for those denied the chance of long-term stay in Austria. This can be only counteracted with a “zero-tolerance-limit,” he added.

Asylum-seekers unwilling to leave the country face the prospect of having basic welfare withheld, as well as being detained until they leave the country.

Permission for charitable work

But for refugees, asylum seekers and foreign students, there is also positive news. In the future, refugees will be able to officially take part in non-profit charitable activities in non-governmental organisations. Although this regulation is already contained in the law, it comes into force at the earliest in April 2018.

Foreign university graduates will also be pleased. With the new law in place, they will be granted one year – instead of the current six months – to find a qualified job in Austria after finishing their studies, without losing their residence permit.

Furthermore, founders of start-ups will also have access to the “Red-White-Red Card”, which will be extended from one year to two years.

The card entitles third-country nationals to fixed-term settlement (as a self-employed or an employed person, not limited to a specific employer). Thereafter, a “Red-White-Red Card Plus” will be issued for unrestricted access to the labour market.

Qatar condemned and denounced on Sunday the targeting of the Saudi capital, Riyadh by a ballistic missile.

In a statement today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated Qatar’s rejection of any direct or indiscriminate attacks against civilians as a violation of international humanitarian law.

It called on all parties to avoid escalation and engage in a comprehensive dialogue to end the war and restore stability to Yemen.

The statement also reiterated Qatar’s firm and supportive stance of the Gulf initiative, the outcomes of the national dialogue, and UN resolutions aimed at restoring stability in Yemen.

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena has given instructions to appoint a Committee to take steps for the progress of the cinema and the teledrama industry, comprising of representatives from all the sectors of the cinema and the teledrama industries.

Sirisena has given these instructions during a meeting with the representatives of the Expert Committee on Artistic Affairs, held at the President’s Official Residence, on 1st November.

This is the third phase of the series of discussions to obtain the views of the intellectuals regarding artistic affairs including literature, stage drama, television drama, cinema, radio channels and dance.

It was discussed in detail regarding the issues faced by the relevant sectors as well as regarding the solutions that should be taken to solve those issues.

President Sirisena instructed the Chairman of the National Film Corporation to appoint the Committee to look into future steps that should be taken to develop the industry and Deputy Minister Lasantha Alagiyawanna was given the responsibility of appointing a Committee regarding the progress of the teledrama industry.

The attention was also drawn to appoint a Committee to establish Media Force with the consent of all the parties.

It was decided to meet this Committee twice a week and to prepare the reports of all these Committees speedily.

By Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain*

The third quarter of 2017 in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been characterised by the marked success of Operation All Out; a reduction in the quantum of violent incidents; and an overall stabilisation of the situation, which has permitted the government to continue looking at avenues of development with a lot more seriousness. The summer of 2016 and its aftermath had not permitted governance to take effective shape with all focus being on the state of law and order.

Overview

Operation All Out continues to be a large scale undertaking by the security forces in Kashmir to regain full dominance over the counter terror grid after a series of setbacks that have given a perception that their hold had slackened. The Operation has achieved spectacular results considering the comparatively lower strength of terrorists present in the Valley today; that actually makes the job much more difficult, especially when the local content of terrorists is also high. The near dismal situation in the first quarter of 2017 when ratios of own casualties to the number of terrorists killed had slid almost to a par of 1:1, and when the Army and other security forces were being ambushed, has been restored. This is a result of some timely and sensible measures that were adopted.

First, additional troops have been made available. The Shupiyan-Kulgam belt, which needed a higher presence of troops, was accordingly populated. Second, the counter infiltration grid was further tightened; the absence of any major battles with terror groups in the traditional reception areas of the Kupwara forests appears to confirm that infiltration success could only have been marginal. Third, intelligence has been of a higher order especially after the run of atrocities against policemen. Fourth, the concept of focusing on terrorist leaders as against a general campaign against run of the mill terrorists of all hues has prevented the consolidation of any of the leaders in the post Burhan Wani period. Fifth, the security forces have undoubtedly achieved a high degree of cooperation and coordination in the face of the tactics of flash mobs intervening at encounter sites. The level of joint-ness and understanding of each other’s strengths and shortcomings has been very effective. Lastly, the Army in particular has correctly gone back to some of its older tactics. The cordon and search Operation (CASO) has been demonstrated, albeit results may not have been immediately forthcoming. Such operations assist in keeping an area under domination disallowing freedom of movement to terrorists at any time of the day and night.

There cannot be any doubt that one of the major contributing factors towards effectiveness and prevention of street turbulence has been the strict control over finances. It is only now that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has been finally tasked to unearth the clandestine networks that finance street turbulence, terror acts and ensure maintenance of the separatist leaders.

Domination of the military space by the Indian Army and other security forces has been a recurring phenomenon throughout the 28 years of proxy conflict in J&K. This begs the questions: is it possible to sustain this? Or, are the sponsors and terror groups capable of innovating to either upend the situation in their favour or do something to put the pressure back on the establishment?

The other strains such as al Qaeda, which have through the summer attempted to establish a footprint, are not yet relevant. Its impact or that of the non-existent Islamic State (IS) in the Valley can only be felt if it brings a more violent form of conflict such as suicide bombing into the Valley. However, that does not seem likely; and the degree of radicalisation has not reached such levels.

However, the existence of mosque power is yet worrisome. This field is far more difficult to neutralise than the terrorists because there is a diffused existence of radical ideology mixed awkwardly with a sense of sub-nationalism. There are steps afoot to counter this but perhaps more will need to be done. Measures on a war footing in the manner the NIA is undertaking against financial networks would be the need.

Looking Ahead

Winter is approaching and with it, there could be a change in nature of conflict and its focus. In the run up to December 2017, the proxy masters will attempt two things: first, they will attempt to target the intelligence grid, which has to be protected at all costs. Second, they will aim to get the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) to infiltrate more Fidayeen squads to maintain pressure through actions against camps and posts.

2018 is election year in Pakistan. Although Kashmir does not form any part of the political agenda during elections, Hafiz Saeed is aiming to acquire a political role with the Milli Muslim League. Kashmir provides him the fodder for his politics. If he can convince the Pakistan Army about his relevance in ensuring that India does not acquire irreversible military domination in Kashmir, the beginnings of Saeed’s plans could be witnessed through winter. What these plans are is something the intelligence agencies must be tasked to reveal.

Some aspects must be focused on during the upcoming winter: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made very relevant remarks during his Independence Day speech. India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s long visit must be followed up by continuous engagement with relevant local players who could well be fence sitters but no separatists. Third, if the security forces led by the Army can prevent resurgence of violence, then there needs to be a much larger emphasis on governance to give the Valley a better winter. Fourth, the absence of violence must be exploited to set forth a greater agenda for interaction between the three regions of J&K, based on social, educational, economic and other needs. Jammu is often ignored at our peril.

The current time period is a consolidation phase following a temporary reverse. It is important to ensure that the current stability does not get diluted through any trigger. The government must not come under any pressure to reduce the Army’s presence, especially from South Kashmir and there is yet no need to talk to anyone except the people with whom an informal dialogue is always possible. That is what the agenda for winter ought to be.

* Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain
Member, Governing Council, IPCS, & former GOC, 15 Corps, Srinagar

By Ulrich Speck*

After years of crises, of doom and gloom, the mood in European capitals is now becoming more upbeat. Brexit is not turning out to be the nail in the EU’s coffin that some observers had predicted. Instead of running headlong towards the exit, a large majority of Europeans see the UK’s struggle with Brexit as a cautionary tale, a series of political missteps not to be imitated. And with Emmanuel Macron’s triumph over the Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen, France has an energetic leader eager to cut a new deal with Germany in order to revive the ‘tandem’: the German-French team that was crucial in the past for leading the EU towards closer integration.

In a number of recent speeches, Macron has set out, with broad brush strokes, a long list of projects for the EU. He has even spoken of a ‘sovereign’ Europe, using the federalist language that has been out of fashion over the past few years. Indeed, his overall vision sounds highly federalist, being based on the analogy of the state.

At the Sorbonne (with an English summary titled “Initiative for Europe. A sovereign, united, democratic Europe”), Macron spoke of six areas in which EU member states should work together more closely: security (including defence, where he called for a new EU intervention force), border control and migratory regulation (including a European Asylum Office), foreign policy (with a clear priority for Africa), sustainable development, digital transformation, and Europe as an economic and monetary power. In addition, he made some proposals on tax harmonisation, trade, EU enlargement (mentioning the Western Balkans) and education (exchanges and the creation of ‘European universities’). Finally, he expressed an interest in strengthening the European Parliament through transnational voting lists and made some proposals for organising the reform process he is eager to start (democratic conventions, a Europe of different speeds with a Franco-German ‘engine’ and the establishment of a ‘Group for overhauling Europe’).

Macron’s speech was thematically wide-ranging. In practice, the discussion over the next few months and perhaps years is likely to focus on the three topics of Euro governance, migration and defence, the issues at the centre of the recent crises, precisely involving the Euro, migrants and security and defence (with conflicts spilling over from the Middle East, an aggressive Russia and uncertainty caused by Trump’s stance on NATO). On all three there are already some EU-wide policies in place. But, at the same time, member states, especially big ones, have been very reluctant to give up control and hand over authority from the nation-state to the EU.

The way Macron wants to move these dossiers forward is through a French-German deal. He apparently wants to win over Germany to at least some of his ideas, creating momentum by moving the two biggest and most powerful countries (especially after the Brexit vote) behind a joint agenda. The key question is whether Germany is ready to tango.

Macron has chosen a moment for his opening salvo that is unfavourable for the German Chancellor. Merkel is in the midst of complex coalition negotiations –which might only come to fruition at the end of the year– and is therefore unable to say anything of substance in response to Macron. For Berlin, starting the debate early next year would have made much more sense, with a German coalition in place that has made up its mind about the EU and ready to enter into talks with Paris, Brussels and other capitals about reform projects.

With regard to the substance of the Macron proposals, there is certainly some room for a deal. The point, however, is: will the deal be merely symbolic rather than truly make a difference in substance? Macron and Merkel are both keen to demonstrate to their domestic audiences and to Europe that ‘the tandem’ is still driving European integration forwards. But, on the other hand, both countries have well-developed views on the issues that are pulling them apart.

On Eurozone governance, France continues to seek greater risk-sharing and more flexibility. This is exactly what Germany has rejected in the past –even with the SPD in a coalition government with Merkel’s CDU/CSU– and is likely to reject in the future, favouring instead more pressure on member states to reform. A significant Eurozone budget (Macron spoke of ‘several percentage points of GDP’) seems to be a no-go for Berlin, especially because the FDP –one of Merkel’s partners in a ‘Jamaica’ coalition– is strongly opposed to it. The creation of the office of a Eurozone Finance Minister may be possible, but given the contrary views of France and Germany it would only have a rather modest portfolio that would not really justify the title. The bottom line is that the difference of views between Germany and France, which also reflects broader differences between the South and the North and North/East of the EU, is here to stay and will very much limit the potential for reforming Eurozone governance.

On defence, Germany and France appear to be more on the same page. Nevertheless, Macron’s call for ‘a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action’ is likely to fall on deaf ears in Berlin. Even more so as the focus for the deployment of such an intervention force would be, as Macron leaves no doubt, Africa, where France is substantially engaged and is looking for support. For Germany, defence remains geographically focused on the East rather than the South, and on territorial defence in the context of NATO rather than military intervention (for a good overview of the differences see Jutyna Gotkowska, “Franco-German tandem in EU’s security policy – industrial interests and military differences”). The disparity in focus, the result of significant divergences in the strategic cultures of the two countries, will make it difficult to find common ground beyond the level of limited, more symbolic, institutional innovations and declarations.

The issue on which Germany and France are most in tune is migration. The overhaul of the institutional set-up for migration will be a top priority for Merkel in her fourth term. With his call for ‘a common area for border management, asylum and migration’, Macron will therefore find a partner in Berlin. In this dossier there should be much common ground. But both Germany and France are of course aware of the deep East-West divide on migration and asylum in the EU. Most Central European governments have little taste for compromise on the issue after it became a major topic in the public discourse, with a majority of voters and parties strongly opposing the entry of larger numbers of refugees or migrants.

A ‘great leap forward’ in European integration is very unlikely to occur in the German-French discussions on the EU, which will probably start in early 2018. Both sides have well-established views on the main issues, reflecting their respective political cultures, and these have not converged in the past few years. Paris and Berlin will certainly come up with some joint proposals if only in order to keep up the growing optimism that has spread throughout Europe in the past months. Truly deeper integration, however, would require a much greater degree of convergence in views not only between Germany and France but also between the other EU members. Another round of overhauling institutions is not going to be effective if there is no substantial political will in the member states to breathe life into these institutions.

About the author:
*Ulrich Speck,Senior Research Fellow, Elcano Royal Institute, Brussels Office | @ulrichspeck

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

In a shocking development, Saudi press Al Mayadeen reported late on Saturday that prominent billionaire, member of the royal Saudi family, and one of the biggest shareholders of Citi, News Corp. and Twitter – not to mention frequent CNBC guest – Al-Waleed bin Talal, along with ten senior princes, and some 38 ministers, has been arrested for corruption and money laundering charges on orders from the new anti-corruption committee headed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while Royal princes’ private planes have been grounded.

Among those fired and/or arrested are the head of National Royal Guards, Miteb Bin Abdullah, the Minister of Economy and Planning, Adel Fakeih, and Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan, the Commander of the Saudi Naval Forces.

As the local press further adds, the supreme committee chaired by Crown Prince and billionaire stops “on charges of money laundering.”

Al-Waleed bin Talal is perhaps best known not only for his periodic CNBC appearances, but for his recurring on and off spats with president Trump.

According to al Arabiya, among those sacked and/or arrested are Moteib Bin Abdullah, Minister of the National Guard, and Prince Khalid bin Ayyaf has been appointed as his replacement. A second Royal Order was issued to relieve Minister of Economy and Planning, Adel al-Faqieh, from his duties, and the appointment of Mohammed Al Tuwaijri as Minister of Economy and Planning.

According to a Royal Decree issued by King Salman on Saturday the anti-corruption committee is chaired by the Crown Prince with the membership of: Chairman of the Monitoring and Investigation Commission, Chairman of the National Anti-Corruption Authority, Chief of the General Audit Bureau, Attorney General and Head of State Security.

As Saudi analysts were quick to point out, the purge by the Saudi King means that King Abdallah’s last remnants (Riyad firmer gov. and head of Nat. Guard); media moguls; SAGIA & financial policy officials have been purged.

As Bloomberg notes, changing the head of the National Guard, an institution that’s been controlled by the clan of the late King Abdullah, “is not like changing the minister of oil,” said Kamran Bokhari, a senior analyst with Geopolitical Futures and a senior fellow with the Center for Global Policy. “I wouldn’t be surprised if this leads to greater fissures within the royal family.”

Arabiya adds that King Salman also issued sacking and replacement orders for Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan, the Commander of the Naval Forces, is to be terminated and be retired; his replacement is Vice Admiral Fahd bin Abdullah Al-Ghifaili, to be promoted to the rank of admiral and be appointed as Commander of the Naval Forces.

Additionally, Minister of Economy and Planning Adel al-Faqieh was replaced by Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, SPA said, quoting a royal decree. Commander of the Saudi Navy, Abdullah al-Sultan, was replaced with Fahad al-Ghafli. The king also replaced Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih withMohammad Al Tuwaijri, his deputy.

Al Tuwaijri, formerly vice minister for economy and planning, had already played a key role in shaping Saudi economic and fiscal policy over the past year. Before joining the government in May 2016 he was Middle East chief executive for HSBC. He’s served as a frequent spokesman for the government’s economic reform plan on TV and with Western journalists.

King Salman also issued an decree forming an anti-corruption committee headed by the crown prince. Its powers include the ability to trace funds and assets, and prevent their transfer or liquidation on behalf of individuals or entities, along with the right to take any precautionary actions until cases are referred to relevant investigatory or judiciary authorities, according to a government statement.

The committee’s formation was deemed necessary “due to the propensity of some people for abuse, putting their personal interest above public interest, and stealing public funds,” the Royal Order said.

Some more cynical observers noted how MBS is quickly learning from XIi Jinping “how to get rid of enemies under justification of “corruption commission” & place “friendlies” in high places.”

Putting the arrests in context, the heads of the main three Saudi owned TV networks were arrested, Alwalid Bin Talal (Rotana), Walid Al Brahim (MBC), Saleh Kamel (ART)

The 2016 American presidential election and its result have been odd by any standard. No one expected Donald Trump, a man who never ran a single public office in his life, to be chosen by the GOP as its candidate and then win the election defeating Hillary Clinton. The latter, even on the very day of voting, was touted as the presumptive winner until almost midnight when it was clear that she could not win the states like Florida and Pennsylvania where it was necessary. But more importantly, even the Democratic Party was not fair in its path to nominating Mrs. Clinton. The party insiders have long been accused of showing favoritism to her and that Bernie Sanders was cheated out of the system. Even the questions during the 1-to-1 debate were leaked out to Clinton! Primary election was rigged, true to Trump’s accusations.

Democracy is becoming a joke these days strengthening despots everywhere who had come into power – not by coup though but through democratic election and using all means imaginable now to stay in power! I wish the USA had shown the path to true democracy. Alas, it has miserably failed in that vital task. Tired of the bickering 2-party politics, they ended up choosing an immoral person with all the inklings of a would-be-fascist.

Shame on the Democratic National Committee (DNC) that let Bernie Sanders to be sidelined in favor of Hillary Clinton in the primary elections! That lingering wound was ripped open again when Donna Brazile, the former DNC interim chairman, alleged in Politico (as she tries to sell a new book) that Clinton had executed a “secret takeover” of the DNC while the 2016 primary race was in its infancy. Brazile’s allegation is reminiscent of a talking point in Bernie Sanders circles in 2015 and 2016, putting to rest the assertions about collusion between the DNC and the Hillary campaign.

Donna Brazile, in her excerpt, described the DNC’s deal with the Clinton campaign as a “cancer.”

“I had tried to search out any other evidence of internal corruption that would show that the DNC was rigging the system to throw the primary to Hillary, but I could not find any,” she wrote, saying she had undertaken the review in response to concerns from Clinton’s insurgent primary opponent, Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont. “Then I found this agreement.”

The victory fund agreement was reached by the DNC under the leadership of Brazile’s predecessor as chair, Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, dozens of state parties and Clinton’s campaign to divide money among the state parties and the campaign. According to Brazile, the agreement was signed in August 2015, four months after Clinton announced her candidacy and a year before she won the nomination.

“The funding arrangement … was not illegal, but it sure looked unethical,” Brazile said in her excerpt.

The Democratic National Committee struck a deal with Hillary Clinton in 2015 that gave her campaign input on some party hiring and spending decisions, but required they be related only to preparations for the general election, according to a memo obtained by NBC News. It also left the door open for other candidates to make similar arrangements.
The document provides more context to the explosive claims made by Donna Brazile in a forthcoming book, an excerpt of which was published this week.

The August 26, 2015, memorandum of understanding from Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook to DNC CEO Amy Dacey details the relationship between Clinton’s campaign and the DNC long before she won her party’s nomination.

In exchange for Hillary for America’s (HFA) helping the cash-strapped DNC raise money, the party committee agreed “that HFA personnel will be consulted and have joint authority over strategic decisions over the staffing, budget, expenditures, and general election related communications, data, technology, analytics, and research.”
President Trump seized on the account by Donna Brazile.

“The real story on Collusion is in Donna B’s new book. Crooked Hillary bought the DNC & then stole the Democratic Primary from Crazy Bernie!,” the president tweeted Friday morning.

“Pocahontas just stated that the Democrats, lead [read ‘led’] by the legendary Crooked Hillary Clinton, rigged the Primaries! Lets [read – let’s] go FBI & Justice Dept.,” he added, using a racially-charged epithet for Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass.

Trump’s cries of collusion between Clinton and the DNC came just days after two former top aides to the POTUS were charged in special counsel Robert Mueller’s probe investigating his campaign’s ties to Russia. Another former campaign adviser pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI.

“Bernie Sanders supporters have every right to be apoplectic of the complete theft of the Dem primary by Crooked Hillary!,” the president, who signed a joint fundraising agreement with the Republican National Committee two months before he was officially selected as the nominee, tweeted. “I always felt I would be running and winning against Bernie Sanders, not Crooked H, without cheating, I was right.”

Both Senators Sanders and Warren responded to President Trump on Twitter Friday, arguing his tweets were an attempt to change the subject and saying they wouldn’t let him distract them from keeping the focus on his own policies.

Rep. Keith Ellison of Minn., now the DNC’s deputy chair, said in a statement that Brazile’s account cannot be dismissed and many in the party “still feel hurt and betrayed” by the 2016 Democratic presidential primary. “We must heed the call for our party to enact real reforms that ensure a fair, open and impartial nominating process in elections to come,” he said.

Tom Perez, the current DNC chair, also said he wants a “culture change” in the committee, noting in a letter to DNC members this week after Brazile’s story was published that “even a perception of impropriety — whether real or not— is detrimental to the DNC as an institution.”

There is no doubt that perception is important in politics and that the DNC must do its best to avoid such problems from brewing in the future. I, for one, do believe that if Bernie had run on the Democratic ticket, he would have beaten Trump squarely. But we shall never know that because of the ‘cancer’ within the DNC that Brazile now complains about in her upcoming book!

While the revelation is too late for us to avoid seeing Trump inside the White House, perhaps a major lesson learned from this experience is that like anything in our time even democracy is on sale, and can be manipulated easily by determined folks – both inside and outside the USA (including those in Russia)! That is the worrisome news for all those who believe – perhaps wrongly – that the USA remains the last best hope for genuine democracy in our planet.

Late September, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Embassies accredited to the Russian Federation celebrated the 37th Anniversary of SADC at the Korston hotel in southern Moscow.

SADC is an inter-governmental organisation of the Southern African region comprising the following sixteen countries: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

During the 37th Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government held on 19 – 20th August 2017 in Pretoria, South Africa, the Republic of South Africa was elected Chair of the SADC for the year 2017/2018.

The Organisation’s primary goal is “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security.”

High on the priority list of SADC is the implementation of the SADC Industrial Strategy and Roadmap 2015-2063, which recognises the necessity for the structural transformation of the SADC region through industrialisation, modernisation, upgrading, skills development, science and technology, financial strengthening and deeper regional integration.

During the 37th Summit held in Pretoria in August 2017, the SADC Heads of State and Government also noted progress in the implementation of the Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap in specifically profiling of value chains in the three priority sectors of agro-processing, mining and pharmaceuticals and further urged member states to keep the momentum in developing and actualising the identified value chains.

In the Russian Federation, ten SADC member countries are prominently represented, namely: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The primary goal of the SADC Embassies in the Russian Federation is to strengthen the historical relations between the Russian Federation and the SADC member countries, bilaterally and as a collective. To this end, the SADC member countries in the Russian Federation have structured bilateral mechanisms designed to depeen bilateral relations with Russia.

SADC member countries are also engaged in efforts to forge bilateral relations between the 85 regions of the Russian Federation and their country’s regions. This is because of the recognition that linkages at the regional levels play a pivotal role in the strengthening of bilateral relations, particularly in the trade and people-to-people spheres.

There are other equally significant aspects of cooperation with the Russian Federation. These include: military cooperation, with several SADC Embassies having Military Attaches; education cooperation, as many students receive tertiary training in the institutions of higher learning of the Russian Federation; people-to-people relations, which involve promotion of different cultures in the Russian Federation, tourism promotion – encouraging Russians to go on holiday to SADC countries and enjoy the variety offered by these countries.

Strengthening trade, investment and economic relations to the mutual benefit of both SADC countries and the Russian Federation remains high on the agenda of all SADC Embassies in the Russian Federation. To this end, on various occasions, Trade and Economic Ministers, and high-powered delegations have visited the Russian Federation; SADC Embassies participate regularly in Russian international investment forums and exhibitions such as SPIEF in St. Petersburg, Forum in Sochi, Far East Economic Forum in Vladivostok, INNOPROM Industrial Exhibition in Ekaterinburg, Moscow World Food Exhibition, Russia Agriculture Golden Autumn Exhibition, to cite here but a few.

In this context, SADC wishes to inform that the region hosts a variety of international exhibitions. SADC, thus, invites Russian business people to explore vast opportunities available in the member countries.

The SADC countries enjoy a strong convergence of principles and positions on multilateral issues with the Russian Federation, especially in championing peaceful resolution of conflicts and the primary role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the maintenance of global peace and security, human rights, multilateralism, the rule of law in international relations, the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, the democratisation of the global governance system through the United Nations (UN), G20 and the BRICS Forum.

SADC, is one of the five Regional Economic Communities of the African continent, and its member countries in the Russian Federation participate in the activities of the African Group of Ambassadors in the Russian Federation. SADC Embassies are proud that the Dean of the African Group of Ambassadors in the Russian Federation is H.E. Ambassador Eloi Maxime Dovo from the Republic of Madagascar – a member country of SADC.

The SADC Embassies, bilaterally and collectively look forward to further strengthening bilateral relations in all spheres to the optimal level with the Russian Federation.

Few paid attention to a rare protest in Saudi Arabia in late January 2011 as a wave of popular uprisings swept the Middle East and North Africa, toppling the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Yet, the protests and criticism of the government’s handling of floods in the Red Sea port of Jeddah in 2009 and 2011 play an important role in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s extension to members of the ruling family and the military of his crackdown on any form of opposition to his mercurial rise, economic and social reform plans, and conduct of the Yemen war.

In announcing the creation of an anti-corruption committee headed by Prince Mohammed as well as the dismissals and/or detention of eleven princes, senior government officials. an unidentified number of prominent businessmen largely linked to different factions within the ruling family, and top military officers, the government said the new body would be looking into the handling of the floods.

Torrential rain in Jeddah that caused death and destruction as well as prolonged power outages in the city prompted dozens to protest Jeddah’s poor infrastructure. The 2009 floods killed 120 people and triggered a rare public debate about the management of public funds and infrastructure defects. The 2011 torrents prompted dozens to protest the port city’s poor infrastructure that Saudis said was the reason why floods had such a devastating effect.

The 2011 protest erupted in response to a mass Blackberry message campaign, calling on residents to gather on the city’s main shopping street. Up to 50 protestors were believed to have been arrested.

The government, in a bid to address widespread frustration in Jeddah, this year contracted China’s state-owned Chinese Communication Construction Group (CCCG) to build a 37-kilometre-long channel to catch rain and flood water. “It might be an ordinary channel in another area, but it isn’t the same in Saudi Arabia and it has special importance and came after painful lessons,” said Ma Chifeng, the director of CCCG’s Jeddah City Project for Flood Drainage.

The crackdown is of course about much more than the Jeddah floods, even if making them one of the anti-corruption committee’s first focal points is significant. Among those dismissed and/or detained were National Guard head Prince Meteb bin Abdullah; economy minister and former Jeddah mayor Adel bin Mohammad Fakeih; and navy commander Abdullah al-Sultan, as well as reportedly businessmen such as multi-billionaire Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz, a major shareholder in some of the world’s best-known blue chips and media mogul, who is widely seen as a liberal; Waleed bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, a brother-in-law of King Fahd and together with Abdulaziz bin Fahd, the late king’s son, owner of the Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC) that operates the Al Arabiya television network; and Saleh Kamel, head of one of the Middle East’s largest conglomerates, who in the past had close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Prince Meteb, a son of the late King Abdullah, was the last senior member of the ruling family unconnected to King Salman’s tack of the family, who was in a position of power. The tribally-rooted guard, a military unit founded alongside the military to protect the ruling family rather than the country, was long seen as a stronghold of King Abdullah and his closest associates.

The crackdown on national guard and military commanders coincided with Houthi rebels signalling with a missile firing that the Saudi capital of Riyadh was within their range. The firing suggested that Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the 2.5-year long Yemen war, based on an air campaign rather than the commitment of Saudi ground troops, has so far failed to achieve its declared goal of ensuring the kingdom’s security.

The crackdown also follows the disappearance and alleged kidnapping of three of four known dissident members of the Saudi ruling family who had gone into exile in Europe. Among the four was Prince Turki bin Bandar, a former senior police officer responsible for policing the ruling family, and Prince Sultan bin Turki, the husband of a late daughter of King Abdullah.

It also follows a wave of earlier arrests of scores of Islamic scholars, judges and intellectuals, whose views run the gamut from ultra-conservative to liberal. Among those arrested were scholars Salman al-Odah, Aaidh al-Qarni and Ali al-Omari, poet Ziyad bin Naheet and economist Essam al-Zamil, some of whom have more than 17 million followers on Twitter.

The detentions were designed to silence alleged support in the kingdom for an end to the almost four-month old Gulf crisis that has pitted Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar, mounting criticism of the conduct of the Yemen war, and Prince Mohammed’s reforms.

Beyond grandiose plans, Prince Mohammed has yet to deliver on the economic aspects of his reform plans articulated in his Vision 2030. Prince Mohammed has so far delivered on limited, headline-grabbing social changes such as lifting the ban on women’s driving and access to sports stadia needed for his economic reforms as well the encouragement of greater entertainment opportunities that contribute to economic growth and address grievances among youth who account for a majority of the kingdom’s population. He has yet to deliver on jobs in a country that has high un- and under-employment and whose population has been weaned on cradle-to-grave welfare.

The most recent crackdown breaks with the tradition of consensus within the ruling family whose secretive inner workings are equivalent to those of the Kremlin at the time of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the dismissals and detentions suggest that Prince Mohammed rather than forging alliances is extending his iron grip to the ruling family, the military, and the national guard to counter what appears to be more widespread opposition within the family as well as the military to his reforms and the Yemen war.

It raises questions about the reform process that increasingly is based on a unilateral rather than a consensual rewriting of the kingdom’s social contract. “It is hard to envisage MBS succeeding in his ambitious plans by royal decree. He needs to garner more consent. To obtain it, he must learn to tolerate debate and disagreement,” quipped The Economist, recently referring to Prince Mohammed by his initials.

By Gulgiz Muradova

Oil traders have faced a new risk factor amid the developments in Saudi Arabia, the world’s second-largest crude producer and the biggest crude exporter.

The oil market, for a balance on which Saudi Arabia made huge efforts, is likely to be affected by the arrest of dozens of former state officials and at least 11 Saudi princes in an anti-corruption drive in Saudi Arabia, experts say.

On Sunday, 11 Saudi princes, four incumbent ministers of the Saudi government and dozens of former government ministers had reportedly been arrested in an anti-corruption operation.

The arrests took place after Saudi ruler King Salman decreed the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee led by his son and heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

As the unexpected crackdown spread panic through the Saudi establishment, Gal Luft, the co-director of the Washington-based Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, expects the game of thrones to be fierce.

“This is only first act of what could be a period of turmoil in the Kingdom’s leadership and the implications for the oil market will soon be felt,” Luft told Trend.

Luft believes that traders will be taken aback by the new uncertainty as it demonstrates that no businessman in the Kingdom is untouchable.

“This may have impact on investment decisions and can lead to protracted period of price volatility,” he noted.

In late October, the price of the industry standard Brent crude moved above $60 per barrel for the first time in more than two years.

On Nov.3, the price increased to $62.07, recouping a loss earlier in the week to finish 2.7% higher than the previous week. On Saturday, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan voiced readiness to do more work to reduce global oil inventories after a three-year market downturn.

Saudi Arabian oil minister Khalid Al-Falih said on Saturday that more work was needed to reduce global oil inventories.

OPEC, Russia and other oil producers are due to meet at the end of November in Vienna to decide whether to extend the current supply-cut pact.

(RFE/RL) — A massive leak of financial documents — dubbed the Paradise Papers — indicates U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has an investment in a shipping firm that has links to a company controlled by associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The documents released on November 5 by the U.S.-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), also revealed that Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II has some $13 million in investments in offshore portfolios.

ICIJ was behind the release of the so-called Panama Papers in 2016, in which documents from a Panama-based law firm revealed detailed information on offshore accounts of many world leaders and wealthy individuals.

The Paradise Papers material came from two offshore service providers and the company registries of 19 tax havens. It was obtained by the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung and shared by the ICIJ with partners including The Guardian, the BBC, The New York Times, and dozens of other news agencies that analyzed the information.

The documents were shared with multiple news outlets because of the high volume of information involved in what was called Project Paradise.

Ross and Queen Elizabeth were the biggest names involved in examinations of the first batch of the 13.4 million files.

There was no indication either person’s activities were illegal, although Ross’ connections to a Russian interests could be embarrassing to the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and raise questions about conflicts of interest.

Potential links between Trump associates and Russia have come under scrutiny amid allegations that Moscow interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

The documents indicate Ross, a billionaire investor, maintained ties after taking office with a shipping company that has links to associates of Putin.

Ross, 79, once had a large stake in Navigator Holdings, a shipping company that transports gas for Russian energy firm Sibur.

Sibur is partially owned by Gennady Timchenko, a friend of Putin’s who is under U.S. sanctions over Russian aggression in Ukraine, and by Putin’s son-in-law, Kirill Shamalov, the New York Times reported.

Ross’ private equity firm has been the biggest shareholder in Navigator.

His personal share of the firm’s stake was reduced when he took office in February, although his U.S. government filings show his holdings are still valued at $2 million to $10 million.

The New York Times reported that Ross’ stake in Navigator has been held by a complex web of companies in the Cayman Islands.

James Rockas, a Commerce Department spokesman, said Ross “was not involved with Navigator’s decision to engage in business with Sibur, a publicly traded company, which was not under sanction at the time and is not currently.”

“Moreover, Secretary Ross has never met the Sibur shareholders referenced in this story and, until now, did not know of their relationship,” he added.

The BBC reports the documents also show that Kremlin-connected tycoon Alisher Usmanov may have a secret stake in a company responsible for making anti-money-laundering due diligence on companies it administers.

The BBC said Usmanov is a client of Bridgewaters and that If he also owns a stake, it would constitute a conflict of interest.

Usmanov and Bridgewaters “strongly deny” the Russian owns or controls the company, the BBC reported.

Meanwhile, the papers indicate that millions of dollars of Queen Elizabeth’s private funds were invested into funds in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda by the Duchy of Lancaster, which provides the Queen with an income and handles investments for her $650 million private estate.

Analysts said that while there did not appear to be anything illegal with the investment activity and no indication that she avoided taxers, the Queen could face criticism for investing offshore instead of within Britain.

Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, one of the richest people in the world, has been allegedly arrested amid Saudi Arabia’s sudden anti-corruption crackdown. The multi-billionaire has stakes in major US enterprises and has been dubbed the “Arabian Warren Buffett.”

Bin Talal was among the 11 Saudi princes arrested by a new anti-corruption committee just hours after it was created by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, various media outlets reported, citing unnamed sources within the Saudi government.

A grandson of the first Saudi king, Alwaleed bin Talal was listed as the 45th richest man in the world by Forbes in 2017. Bloomberg Billionaires Index put him in 50th place in a similar ranking. The Saudi prince’s fortune amounts to between $18 billion and $19 billion, according to various estimates.

The Saudi multi-billionaire is the founder, CEO and almost sole owner of the Kingdom Holding investment company, which has a market capitalization of over $12 billion. His investment activities have led to him being dubbed the “Arabian Warren Buffett,” as the prince has stakes in several major western corporations and in particularly made successful early bets on Apple and Netscape Communications.

Now, Alwaleed bin Talal holds major stakes in such US companies as Citigroup, Apple and Twitter. His company has also been a “significant investor” in Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation since 1997.

The prince’s investments include several luxury hotel chains and he particularly invested in the Four Seasons Hotel George V in Paris, the Savoy in London and the Plaza in New York. Apart from that, he is known for doing business with such prominent western businessmen as Bill Gates, Rupert Murdoch and Michael Bloomberg.

He also received a western education, being awarded a bachelor’s degree in business administration from Menlo College in California. The prince was also frequently seen with top western politicians and Wall Street executives, including Lloyd C. Blankfein, the chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, and even British royals.

He also had an extraordinary western media profile for a Saudi national and virtually became an unofficial public face of the Saudi kingdom finance in the West as he often gave interviews to various media. Most recently, he spoke to CNBC’s Squawk Box and expressed serious doubts about the future of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency.

Notably, the prince has somewhat controversial relations with US President Donald Trump. During Trump’s election campaign, the Saudi multi-billionaire called him “a disgrace not only to the GOP but to all America” and called on him to withdraw from the presidential race, predicting that Trump “will never win.” Still, later, he congratulated Trump on his election victory.

In October 2017, he praised Trump’s governing style and straight talking in an interview with CNBC. “President Trump has his own way of governing,” he said at that time.

Alwaleed bin Talal, however, has long been a kind of outsider within the ruling elite of the ultraconservative Muslim kingdom – due to his liberal views and open advocacy of women’s rights. He particularly hired a first Saudi female pilot for his jet at a time, when there was no prospect of women being allowed even to drive. At the same time, he has never openly opposed the ruling elite.

He also reportedly had no major differences with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is now heading the committee that launched the crackdown on corruption. In October, bin Talal publicly declared his support for Mohammed bin Salman by telling CNBC that he fully backs the crown prince’s reforms and had repeatedly expressed similar proposals concerning diversification of the Saudi economy for years.

With no official statement issued, the reasons behind Alwaleed bin Talal’s arrest remain a mystery. However, it already prompted a reaction from the stock markets. Shares in his Kingdom Holding Co. fell by 7.5 percent in trading Sunday, despite the fact that the company announced profits amounting to 247.5 million riyals ($66 million) in the third quarter.

“This is going to cause some immediate apprehension in terms of investors looking at Saudi Arabia,” Graham Griffiths, a senior analyst at Control Risks focusing on Saudi Arabia, told AP, referring to the crackdown. He also called Alwaleed bin Talal “someone who has been represented as a face of the kingdom, someone that a lot of people have done business with and are comfortable doing business with.”

With more such projects in the pipeline at least in Asia, China has opened its first ever over sees military base on October 31 in African country of Djibouti.

Speaking to China’s Djibouti-based forces during a visit to a joint battle command center in Beijing, Chinese President Xi “got a good understanding” of the base’s operations and the lives of the soldiers there, China’s Defense Ministry said late Friday.

Xinhua said in its short report that the ships had departed from Zhanjiang in southern China “to set up a support base in Djibouti.” Navy commander Shen Jinlong “read an order on constructing the base in Djibouti.” It did not say when the base might formally begin operations.

Ships carrying Chinese military personnel for Beijing’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, have left China to begin setting up the facility, the state news agency Xinhua reported. Troops serving at China’s first overseas military base, in the Horn of Africa country of Djibouti, should help promote peace and stability, President Xi Jinping told them in a video chat, encouraging them to promote a good image.

China began construction of the base in Djibouti last year. It will be used to resupply navy ships taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia, in particular. Xi “encouraged them to establish a good image for China’s military and promote international and regional peace and stability”, the ministry said.

This will be China’s first overseas naval base, although Beijing officially terms it a logistics facility. China began construction of a logistics base in strategically located Djibouti last year that will resupply naval vessels taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia, in particular.
$180 billion spent

After months of anticipation since announcing plans for its first foreign base, China opened what it calls a logistical facility on August 1. The base will be used mainly to resupply ships moving through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, and support humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in East Africa, China has said. Satellite photos, however, have led to speculation about a large underground area where unseen equipment may be stored, and the facility could shift the balance of power in the region.

Xinhua said the establishment of the base was a decision made by both countries after “friendly negotiations, and accords with the common interest of the people from both sides.”

The base will ensure China’s performance of missions, such as escorting, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia. The base will also be conducive to overseas tasks including military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas Chinese, and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international strategic seaways.

China spent $180 billion on its People’s Liberation Army last year, according to the Pentagon report, though the report concedes “it is difficult to estimate actual military expenses, largely due to China’s poor accounting transparency.”

China’s official defense budget puts its expenditures at about $140 billion, but that budget fails to include major defense expenditures related to research and procurement of foreign equipment. The official Chinese defense budget has nearly doubled since 2007, from roughly $75 billion to $140 billion in 2016.

The base is part of China’s plan to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, a $1 trillion plan to link China with 68 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe through trade deals and infrastructure projects. The initiative was first announced in 2013 and includes a Chinese presence around the east coast of Africa.

Economic power

Chinese President Xi Jinping is overseeing an ambitious military modernization program, including developing capabilities for China’s forces to operate far from home. During his visit to the command center, Xi also instructed the armed forces to improve their combat capability and readiness for war, the ministry said. Xi said progress in joint operation command systems, especially in efficiency at the regional level, was needed and troops must conduct training under combat conditions.

Djibouti, which is about the size of Wales, is at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal. The tiny, barren nation sandwiched between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia also hosts USA, Japanese and French bases.

Products that China wants to ship are based in the region, so it makes sense to expand the infrastructure to transport them. But the Djibouti facility is also a sign of China diversifying its engagement and avoiding restrictions on its presence. This might be the start of some more military, security-related bases

Currently, China mainly imports minerals and oil from Africa, but its long-term plan is to build factories on the continent and move some of its manufacturing there to take advantage of the cheaper labor and geographic position.

Pakistan singled out

There has been persistent speculation in diplomatic circles that China would build other such bases, in Pakistan for example, but the government has dismissed this. Myanmar and Sri Lanka are other nations China would be considering for similar military bases.

The report singles out Pakistan as one of those allies potentially willing to host Chinese troops and says China already has begun construction on a military base in the small east African country Djibouti, which lies along the Gulf of Aden. The Pentagon believes construction will be completed within the next year. “This initiative, along with regular naval vessel visits to foreign ports, both reflects and amplifies China’s growing influence, extending the reach of its armed forces,” the report reads.

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying blasted the report, saying it disregarded facts and made “irresponsible remarks.” Speaking with reporters, Hua refused to comment on the potential future overseas bases, but said China is a force for safeguarding peace in Asia and “friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan does not target any third party.” “We hope the USA side will put aside the Cold War mentality, view China’s military development in an objective and rational manner, and take concrete actions to maintain steady growth of the military relationship between the two countries,” she said.

Djibouti is located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal. The tiny, barren nation sandwiched amid Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia also hosts USA, Japanese and French bases.

China’s new military and logistical base in Djibouti has put other foreign powers on edge, but observers believe China’s strategy in the region is more about economic growth than military might.

Djibouti’s position on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean has fueled worry in India that it would become another of China’s “string of pearls” military alliances and assets ringing India, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

Regional concern

China’s ambitions have fueled concern in India, which has watched its neighbor’s presence grow in the Indian Ocean. In a strategy known as the “string of pearls,” China already has military and commercial links with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. India has always viewed the Indian Ocean region as its domain, and as China increasingly has more economic interest and a large military presence in the region, India seeking to play a larger global role is going to have deeper and deeper concerns about its presence.

The base in Djibouti is like a game changer in terms of the security environment, and India is worried about it. The speed with which China is executing its strategy in the region caught India off guard and may prompt countermeasures.

For China, the Djibouti base represents a shift to a more dual role in its global expansion — one that focuses on economics as well as military and logistics support. “We’re going to see more of these types of facilities in other places,” said the Asia Society Policy Institute. “Some of these aren’t going to look like bases. They’re going to look like dual use, civilian sort of access facilities, where also you can get access for military vessels as well.”

China’s expansion has also garnered the attention of the U.S., which has its own base, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti. France and Japan also have military bases in Djibouti. The United States will be concerned about the possibility of espionage, including electronic espionage, but will likely also be very closely observing the Chinese.

US remarks

China likely will try to expand its military presence across the world with military bases in Pakistan, Djibouti and elsewhere, as it sees its role in global affairs growing, according to a report released by the Pentagon.

The annual Pentagon report on Chinese military developments says China already is expanding its presence in foreign ports as a way to “pre-position the necessary logistics support” to sustain far away from the Chinese homeland. “China’s expanding international economic interests are increasing demands for the Chinese Navy to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication,” the report reads.

The Pentagon believes China most likely will try to set up additional military bases in countries where it has “longstanding friendly relationships and similar strategic interests.”

The report singles out Pakistan as one of those allies potentially willing to host Chinese troops and says China already has begun construction on a military base in the small east African country Djibouti, which lies along the Gulf of Aden. The Pentagon believes construction will be completed within the next year. “This initiative, along with regular naval vessel visits to foreign ports, both reflects and amplifies China’s growing influence, extending the reach of its armed forces,” the report reads.

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying blasted the report Wednesday, saying it disregarded facts and made “irresponsible remarks.” Speaking with reporters, Hua refused to comment on the potential future overseas bases, but said China is a force for safeguarding peace in Asia and “friendly cooperation [between China and Pakistan] does not target any third party.” “We hope the U.S. side will put aside the Cold War mentality, view China’s military development in an objective and rational manner, and take concrete actions to maintain steady growth of the military relationship between the two countries,” she said.

Playing the game of Asia pivot to contain China as well as Russia, America is increasingly concerned about the Chinese expansionism in Asia. It can easily understand the rules of expansionism as it guides Israel in its expansionist agenda in West Asia, especially in Palestine.

Most Canadians love hockey. I do. Like most of my classmates, I learned skate with my father at the age of three on a frozen ice rink near our home. It was tough love. After much complaining, I learned how to skate little by little. Within what seemed to be a fraction of a second, I found myself with a hockey stick in my hands and I was skating furiously after a small black disc. Canadians call it a ‘hockey puck’. The object was to put the puck in the net and the history of hockey in Canada is full of the glorious exploits of Rocket Richard, Jean Beliveau, Dave Keon, Bob Baun, Darly Sittler, Guy Lafleur, Jacques Plante and countless others. And then there was the Paul Henderson goal in Moscow in 1972 confirming Canada’s best were indeed the best notwithstanding the Kharlamovs and Tretiaks of Russia.

Now, Canada is in the midst of another game similar to hockey but so much more important to our economy and prosperity. Our immediate future and that of our children are in the balance. You wouldn’t know it though listening to the Trudeau Liberal team negotiating that very future with our two NAFTA partners. You surely would not know which period we are in and how desperate the outcome really is.

The First Period

We should have known this would happen. The first Trudeau-Trump meeting in early 2017 put the Canadians to sleep. ‘Just a little tweaking’, so said the artful Dodger in Washington. As if no one had been following American politics, the Republican nomination and Trump’s own statements during the Presidential election campaign about how miserable NAFTA was for America.

Welcome to Sleepy Hollow. Either our Embassy in Washington was asleep at the switch and only too happy to go along with the easy breezy Trudeau strategy of free lunches and cocktail tippling for American ‘deciders’ or Ottawa’s Liberals were simply not listening. Even now, the Canadian commercial literati advise that Canada has only to keep its head down while the USA demand more from Mexico where the trade deficit is much greater than the Canadian one. Hockey teams do not win playing defense and skating away from the puck.

The Second Period

We know better now. Trump has named his trade representatives and they are tough cookies. He has threatened to rip up NAFTA. Bombardier, one of our national jewels, has been ripped from our national fabric similar to what happened in the 1960s with the Arrow, huge tariffs have been imposed on our softwood lumber. No end is in sight.

The Bombardier meltdown is unforgiveable. Boeing was inspired by Trump’s bully tactics and Canadian government resolve was insufficient to prevent one the greatest industrial innovations of our time, the C-Series, from falling into the hands of Europeans and Americans. To make matters worse, Boeing has rubbed salt into the wounds by taking out ads in Canada telling us how lucky we are to have them thinking about our ‘higher interests’.

Many reflective Canadians say that America is polarized. All we have to do is convince those who are Democrats and or hostile to Trump and his right-wing blithering about how much Canada is essential to US prosperity and the NAFTA negotiations will be secured. False. For our purposes, there is only one America. Our ‘friends’ in the north east and north west will shed no tears for the Canadian auto workers, farmers and forest workers.

We are in the third period now of NAFTA negotiations and we need to start playing offence. One of the few Canadian visionaries, Benj Gallander, king of the contrarian investors, has correctly analyzed the situation.

We are going to lose the game if we do not win the third period and big time.
Some Canadians believe that to challenge the US and its unfair trade practices will only bring forth worse measures. Such were the whispers when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien refused to follow the 2003 US led coalition to invade Iraq. His response must be our rallying call – Business is business is the American credo and they will continue to do business with Canada.

Canadians have to a) stop being afraid of President Donald Trump, b) learn to be more sanguine about the real motivations of our southern neighbors and c) look to our history to find the courage to stand up for our workers and guess what? For the middle class too because there may not be one if we continue Trudeau’s apple-polishing ‘charm’ strategy. Americans will shed no tears for us when the milk is spilled in Canada. There is already plenty of that on the floor.

The Third Period or How to Play Offense?

OK, I’ve convinced you to throw fear aside and play offence. How do we do that? Here are a few suggestions:

• Integrate the softwood lumber file into the NAFTA negotiations
• US negotiators are tough but both have Achilles heels (a clue is their dealings with foreign governments) yet both were approved unanimously by the US Senate
• Play hard ball with Boeing and use their unfair trade practices as a Trojan horse in the negotiations (relate any and all of our claims to their malfeasance)
• Wilber Ross is Trump’s man – use this in a strategic manner
• mobilize Canadian public opinion to support pro-active claims to entry into the US market like abandoning the America First programme as a pre-requisite sine qua non for further NAFTA negotiations
• Ask for a pause in negotiations to a) consult with provinces to draw up a list of new measures and claims for US market entry including the Bombardier Alabama plant roll back, b) appoint a new set of negotiators and, if necessary, relieve the Canadian Foreign Minister of her post and c) develop a new offensive negotiating strategy.
• Stop entertaining idle thoughts about the objectives of President Donald Trump and his motley collection of supporters. They mean business. They are not to be feared but challenged. We need to stand up to them and assert our rights firmly.
• Inject a new condition into negotiations that a deal can only be ratified by the whole of the Canadian people in a national referendum
• Listen to Stompin Tom Connor’s Hockey Song and re-learn what it is to be a Canadian

Take heart. Anything can happen in the third period of a hotly contested hockey game. Let’s get serious about this and take the body. And win.

The consequences of losing are too crushing to bear. We will lose more of our economy and productive capacity. We will eventually lose heart. We may even lose our country.

(This article can be advantageously read in conjunction with Stompin Tom Connor’s musical video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxJvrD80nJ)

*Bruce Mabley is a former Canadian diplomat having served in the Middle East, and is the director of the Mackenzie-Papineau think tank in Montreal.

The means by which a modern empire such as the United States seeks to achieve its goals are often immersed in hypocrisy. Wars by deceit are, in fact, second nature to US government, with its history replete with numerous examples, including the sinking of U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898 that was instantly pinned on the Spanish “enemy” without any proof, or the infamous Gulf of Tonkin incident or, more recently, the “pretextual” invasion of Iraq, under the twin justification of an Iraqi WMD and also links to Al-Qaeda, both lame excuses for war.

Clearly, contrary to what Hegel and Marx wrote, major historical events tend to appear more than twice, although Marx is fairly on the mark that first they appear as a tragedy and subsequently as a (tragic) comedy. This is certainly the case with the new anti-Iran allegations that accompany the US’s release of tens of thousands of new documents from the “Bin Laden file,” although the CIA website supposedly releasing them continues to be plagued with “technical problems” and the said files are, in fact, as of this moment yet to be publicly released several days after their announcement.

But, thanks to the freedom of information act, a couple of right wing US outfits have supposedly managed to get hold of the crucial files — that depict a cozy Iran-Al Qaeda relationship. Chief among them is a typed Arabic text attributed to Al-Qaeda that has been used by the US media to hurl new accusations of terrorism against Iran at a crucial time when following Trump’s decertification of the Iran nuclear file the US Congress is working overtime to slap Iran with more punishing sanctions. The Al-Qaeda text goes into some details about occasional tensions with Iran as well as their supposed synergy vis-a-vis US power in the region, i.e., as a common enemy.

There is, of course, no way to ascertain the authenticity of this document and prove or disprove that it may have been fabricated in order to demonize Iran as part of a sophisticated public relations ploy. The timing of its release and the absence of corroboration by the US government, whose website is somehow malfunctioning, allows the matter to proceed as a fact for public and policy consumptions while keeping the government off the hook. But, given the facts that it takes several months to acquire anything of significance through the freedom of information act and the US has only very recently decided to release the above-mentioned documents, the question is what is behind the coordinated move with the two hawkish outfits that have released that text?

Inevitably, all this raises another important question: are we witnessing a historical deja vu, that is, the repetition of the Iraq invasion that, lest we forget, was rationalized by a forged UK document, adopted at face value by the US government at the time, falsely claiming that Saddam Hussain was in bed with the Al-Qaeda terrorists. Some US scholars, Laurie Mylroie, the author of Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War, were given free reign in the US media to spread the big lie under the veneer of scholastic research, and subsequently rewarded with well-paid academic positions, never to recant subsequently for their dutiful functions as accessories to a great historical war crime.

But, the uncritical embrace of the new “Bin Laden files” by a large portion of the mainstream US media clearly indicates that they have learned precious little from the past history and are quite apt to repeat the past mistake, that is, to allow themselves be manipulated by a new barrage of Iranophobic propaganda. Never mind the historical anomalies that might contradict them, such as the fact that Iran fully cooperated with the fall of Al-Qaeda-linked Taliban in 2001 and that is a matter of undisputed historical record, or the barely mentioned fact that Iran imprisoned a number of Al-Qaeda agents who fled to Iran, showing that Iran and Al-Qaeda were at cross-purposes and not in harmony.

Besides, as of this date the Saudi sponsors of Al-Qaeda continue to evade the US radar, for all the known reasons pertaining to US-Saudi strategic partnership. Indeed, what explains the fact that Saudi Arabia is not on the list of Muslim countries banned by Donald Trump, despite the fact that nearly all the 9/11 perpetrators were of Saudi origins? The right-wing Foundation for the Defense of Demoracies, presently fanning the flames of Iranophobia by its timely recourse to the “Bin Laden files” has, as expected, never been bothered by such known hypocrisies and ‘anomalies’ in US’s foreign policy.

In conclusion, while our final verdict on this matter must await the fixing of CIA’s website so that the much-talked about declassified files finally come to public limelight, nonetheless given the stated reasons cited above, there are plenty of reasons to be suspicious of yet another foul play that could, conceivably, be part of a more sinister jingoistic war plan, thus confirming our cynicism of a historical deja vu.

With the victory of another anti-Establishment party, the European political landscape is set to shift once more. Czech Prime Minister (PM)-elect Andrej Babiš, billionaire business man-turned politician, is set to shake up his country’s political system as he is inching closer to forming a rare minority government. Emerging victorious in the Czech parliamentary elections this October, Babiš is bad news for European transparency. However, despite having pledged to weed out corruption in mainstream Czech politics, Babiš himself faces corruption and fraud charges, making him symptomatic of a new trend in Europe where using media channels to deflect, profit and achieve power is becoming the new normal.

The Czech Republic’s second richest man won the parliamentary elections with almost 30% of the popular vote. Owning a sprawling conglomerate of chemical and food companies, Agrofert, the 63-year-old holds a fortune of an estimated $4 billion, making him simultaneously the largest private employer in the Czech Republic. All the while the campaign of Babiš’ party ANO (centrist movement Yes) centered on an anti-establishment and Eurosceptic platform, attacking traditional parties for corruption, elitism, and incompetent management of public finances.

These are bold accusations from a man who has been heavily attacked for his own suspected wrongdoings. The PM-elect allegedly made his fortune thanks to the same system he now attacks – and his road to riches has left a long paper trail. In 2016, the European Union’s anti-fraud office (OLAF) opened an investigation into the circumstances under which Agrofert benefitted from EU subsidies to the tune of some €2 million. He stands accused of hiding ownership of a resort built by his company in 2008, when Agrofert was not eligible for subsidies. Worse, while holding the Finance Minister position, then-Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka and his government resigned in protest over Babis’ involvement in tax evasion schemes during his time as Agrofert CEO. A parliamentary request to explain his opaque financial dealings of that time has gone unheeded.

The fact that Babis will take up public office while under EU investigation is concerning enough. However, his ascent is also problematic for another reason. As Czech Finance Minister he already proved his ability to disrupt EU anti-corruption efforts. Last year in Brussels, he made a name for himself for effectively scuttling the EU’s plans to clamp down on tax fraud, at a time when consensus on the matter was finally about to be reached. Arguing that individual VAT fraud was a bigger problem than corporate tax dodging, Babis has delayed the passing of the EU’s tax avoidance directive by threatening to veto Commission proposals. The directive was eventually adopted, albeit significantly watered down, giving member states considerable leeway in the design and application of anti-avoidance rules.

Considering his unclear tax record as Agrofert chief executive, this move was perhaps not surprising, and Babis seemingly got what he wanted. Now it stands to reason that as PM his power to stall European attempts at reining in corruption will only grow. To a large extent, this power will be underpinned by his vast influence over the Czech Republic’s media landscape. Over the years, Babis has purchased various media outlets, and now controls two of the country’s most important agenda-setting newspapers, a popular TV channel and a radio network. Not only has he utilized these extensively to dispel the allegations levied against him, he furthermore employed his connections to roast his opponents, disseminate praise for his efforts, and cut off journalists looking too deeply into his affairs.

Without a doubt, this has helped him in the polls. A prime example of the spin he succeeded to place in the media regarding his person was a conflict of interest bill passed in the national parliament in September 2016. The law – aimed at Babiš himself – bans ministers from owning stakes in media firms. In blatant disregard of the law’s stipulations, Babiš leveraged all media channels available to him to portray the law’s enactment as a witch-hunt against him. As such, ANO’s credentials were thereby strengthened, and Babiš portrayed himself as a victim yearning for transparency among a deeply corrupted political elite.

Unfortunately, Babiš’ tactics are merely the most recent example of how the media is used for personal whitewashing, where the premise of politically-motivated prosecution is the defense of choice. For example, Romanian millionaire Alexander Adamescu escaped justice in his home country by seeking refuge in London after Romania’s anti-corruption agency issued a European Arrest Warrant on his name. Using top-tier British media to portray himself as a victim of political persecution, he has been trying to absolve himself of any involvement in the large-scale fraud uncovered at the insurance company he chaired in order to prevent extradition to Romania.

While Adamescu plays the victim, Hungary’s PM Victor Orbán’s tactics adhere more closely to those of Babis. Aiming to dictate the views society should be exposed to, omnipresent Orban-ally Lőrinc Mészáros has acquired one of the biggest media outfits in the country, Mediaworks, which owns several regional daily newspapers. He also bought stakes in TV broadcasters in what amounted to a broader move of Orban-affiliated tycoons to gain an ever-greater share of the media landscape. A report published in August estimates that the editorial agendas of “at least one hundred Hungarian news outlets” is now firmly under the control of Orban and his cronies.

Although Babiš promises a more transparent future, combining business, politics and power legitimizes what has now become a large-scale threat to democracy. Romanian, Hungarian, and Czech cases of corruption among politicians and business people are seemingly becoming the norm. Lack of probity combined with anti-EU sentiments severely means that the democratic slip will continue and jeopardize constitutional safeguards, media pluralism, and civil society. As the previous examples illustrate, the fight against corruption is far from over.

*Nicholas Kaufmann is a public affairs consultant based in Brussels.