By Dr Tytti Erästö*

European leaders have clearly set themselves apart from the United States and the administration of President Donald J. Trump in relation to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal. They view the deal—also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as a success for non-proliferation and international security. In contrast, the current US Government has criticised the deal for failing to address non-nuclear issues, notably Iran’s continuing ballistic missile development, which the USA has long viewed as both a regional and a global threat.

Iran’s missile programme was also one of the main justifications for President Trump’s recent refusal to certify that continuing the suspension of sanctions—a key US commitment under the agreement—is proportionate to Iran’s respective commitments under the JCPOA. As a result, continued US adherence to the deal now depends on the US Congress.

However, while defending the JCPOA, the major European powers have joined the Trump administration in squarely condemning Iran’s missile tests and satellite launches. This commonality of views was highlighted in a joint statement on 13 October 2017 by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which said that ‘as we work to preserve the JCPOA, we share concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile programme and regional activities [and] . . . stand ready to take further appropriate measures to address these issues’.[1]

The Trump administration expects European countries to take a harder line on this issue. As part of an attempt to address the JCPOA’s ‘many serious flaws’, the US President has urged ‘allies to join us in . . . through sanctions outside the Iran Deal that target the regime’s ballistic missile program’.[2]

Given the transatlantic disagreement over the JCPOA, European countries might feel increasing pressure to focus on Iran’s ballistic missile activities in order to find common ground with the USA. But is the Western perspective on Iran’s missile programme based on an objective threat assessment, and is a punitive approach helpful in addressing it?

Transatlantic disagreement over the JCPOA, solidarity against the missile threat

The JCPOA is a multilateral agreement negotiated between Iran, the five permanent United Nations Security Council members and Germany, with the specific aim of putting an end to concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme might be used for military purposes. Although ballistic missiles were left out of the agreement, they were mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in July 2015.

More specifically, the missile-related provision in the resolution calls on Iran ‘not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’ until 2023. This ambiguous formulation has been a source of increasing controversy. The Iranian position is that its missile testing has nothing to do with the JCPOA, because its missiles are conventional and not designed to carry nuclear weapons. This diverges from the Western expectation that Iran should have suspended missile testing for eight years.

On these grounds, the Trump administration argues that Iran’s continuing missile tests violate the spirit of the JCPOA—as well as Resolution 2231. The USA’s Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, has repeatedly called for the Security Council members to punish Iran for its ‘blatant violations’ of Resolution 2231, including ‘provocative and destabilising missile launches’.[3]

European countries, in contrast, have stressed that the JCPOA is essentially a nuclear deal, and that everything else is outside its scope.[4] At the same time, however, they too have condemned Iran’s missile activities as inconsistent with Resolution 2231, even though they do not subscribe to the USA’s accusation of violation.

France, for example, has threatened to push for European sanctions in response to Iran’s missile tests, and has said that it would consider ‘the means to obtain from Iran the cessation of its destabilizing ballistic missile activities’.[5] France, Germany and the UK have also joined the USA in calling for UN Security Council action in response Iran’s missile tests and satellite launches, arguing that the tested missiles are ‘inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons’,[6] and pointing to similarities between satellite launcher and long-range missile technologies.[7]

The link between nuclear weapons and missiles

Although there is no binding international treaty controlling ballistic missiles, they are often associated with nuclear proliferation. This is because ballistic missiles, particularly long-range ones, have historically been the most important delivery system for nuclear warheads.

At the same time, several countries rely on conventionally armed missiles as part of their national security strategies. Of the 31 countries that currently possess ballistic missile capabilities, only 9 are nuclear-armed.[8] The arsenals of most of the remaining 22 states are not generally viewed as problematic due to their short range and small numbers. However, there are also political factors behind the lack of attention to their capabilities, which is why it is rare to hear that Israel and Saudi Arabia actually possess the longest-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East—not Iran.

Nevertheless, Iran’s missiles stand out from the rest for several reasons. Apart from having the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region, Iran actively develops its missiles through testing. It also has an adversarial relationship with the USA, which has long suspected Iran of having nuclear weapon ambitions. Although it was hoped that the JCPOA would put an end to such concerns, critics argue that Iran might still develop nuclear weapons after the deal expires—in which case it could mate its missiles with nuclear warheads.

Finally, Iran’s past purchases of North Korean missiles and related technology continue to fuel speculation about ongoing missile cooperation between the two countries. Iran has also reportedly provided assistance to the Syrian Government in missile technology.[9]

Iran’s missile programme as a regional deterrent

Iran views its missiles as a counter to the military capabilities of its regional rivals—particularly their state-of the-art, Western-supplied military aircraft.[10] Despite US and international sanctions, which have considerably restricted Iran’s ability to develop its conventional armed forces, the country has become increasingly self-sufficient in developing ballistic missiles.

The role of ballistic missiles in Iran’s national security was highlighted in the 1980s, when its cities were left defenceless against Scud missile and air attacks from Iraq under President Saddam Hussein. Iran’s acquisition and use of its own short-range missiles is regarded as a crucial turning point in the Iran–Iraq War. Since then, Iran’s ballistic missiles have gained further importance as a conventional deterrent—particularly during the escalation of the nuclear crisis in 2006–13, when Israel and the USA threatened military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran’s missile arsenal consists of short- and medium-range missiles. Its longest-reaching operational missiles have a range of 1600 kilometres, which means that they could hit Israel or US military bases in the Middle East. Although Iran continues to develop its missile capabilities, its focus for the past decade has been on enhancing the accuracy, rather than range, of its missiles. As noted by Michael Elleman, a leading missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there is ‘no evidence to suggest that Iran is actively developing an intermediate- or intercontinental-range ballistic missile [ICBM]’.

In other words, Iran’s pattern of missile testing—which has sought to address the long-standing problem of poor accuracy—is consistent with the programme’s stated purpose as a regional deterrent. It also reinforces the argument that Iran’s missiles are designed to be conventional, not nuclear: nuclear-armed missiles do not need to be accurate, due to their disproportionate destructive power. For conventional purposes, however, inaccuracy severely limits the missiles’ military utility.

Iran’s missile development has also been influenced by the perceived need to respond to the growing number of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Israel. For example, Iran’s Emad missile is equipped with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle,[12] and the Khorramshahr missile is reportedly able to carry multiple warheads.[13] Such features can increase the chances of overcoming missile defences.

The link between space rockets and long-range missiles

Iran successfully used the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) to send its first satellite into space in 2009, and has since then delivered at least three more satellites into the Earth’s orbit. In addition, Iran has launched animals into space and has plans to send humans there as well.[14] It is currently developing a larger Simorgh SLV to reach higher orbits.[15]

Given the technological similarities between missile and SLV technologies, Iran’s satellite programme has raised suspicions about its potential aims to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Indeed, there are many historical examples of states having converted ICBMs into SLVs, or developing the two technologies in parallel. However, the reverse scenario—that is, SLVs being turned into long-range missiles—has never happened, because ICBM development is more demanding in many ways. Missiles carry warheads that must not just reach space, but must also withstand re-entry into the atmosphere. Further, they need to work reliably under various conditions, with little advance warning.[16]

Although having a satellite programme can contribute to ICBM development, it is not a shortcut to long-range missiles. Even if Iran converted the Simorgh SLV into a long-range missile, it would still need to undergo the normal, time-consuming routine of missile testing, which would not go unnoticed.

Iran’s missiles and NATO’s missile defence policy

Some of the current Western solidarity against the Iranian missile threat can be traced to the missile defence policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—also known as the European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Introduced by the USA under the Obama administration, EPAA was preceded by the Bush administration’s plans to put large interceptors in Europe to defend the US mainland from hypothetical nuclear-armed ICBMs coming from Iran.

Instead, the aim of EPAA was to protect south-eastern parts of Europe from Iran’s existing arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles. The key idea was to adapt to changing circumstances: while systems against ICBMs were envisioned in the later stages of EPAA, President Obama said that there would be no need for the system if the threat from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs were eliminated.[17]

The NATO Secretary General at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also referred to the Iranian threat when arguing for EPAA to be adopted as official NATO policy. However, since that decision was made at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the alliance has avoided direct references to Iran. At the same time, NATO has never openly challenged the US argument that EPAA is essentially about Iran—except for stressing that the system ‘is not about any one country, but about the threat posed by proliferation more generally’.[18]

Arguably, European countries valued EPAA primarily because it was seen to strengthen the transatlantic link and provide additional reassurance against Russia. Unlike many other forms of military cooperation, land-based missile defences have meant permanent US presence on European soil. This trade-off seemed unproblematic during the height of the Iran nuclear crisis, but the picture has changed considerably since then. Despite the landmark nuclear deal, in May 2016 NATO began to construct a new missile defence site in Poland against intermediate missiles—which Iran does not possess.

Nevertheless, US officials justify the new Polish site in terms of the Iranian threat, pointing to the possibility that Iran might still develop longer-range missiles. Meanwhile, NATO continues to talk about the generic threat of missile proliferation and points to over 30 countries with ballistic missile capabilities, without unpacking what this threat means in concrete terms.[19]

European disinclination to subject NATO’s missile defence policy to critical scrutiny can be understood in terms of inertia, the desire to ensure US presence on the continent, as well as the heightened need to maintain transatlantic unity after the events in Ukraine. This creates a bias that makes European countries less prone to question US assessments of the Iranian missile threat, also outside the context of EPAA.

Putting Iran’s missile programme in context

The prevailing Western tendency to target Iranian missiles while ignoring the overall military balance in the Middle East reflects the historical experience of the USA and its regional loyalties. Despite mounting pressure to join this approach and the related punitive measures, European countries should put the issue of Iran’s missiles in its proper context.

Iran’s ballistic missile programme does not constitute a global threat. Rather, it is part of broader regional security dynamics, and cannot be addressed in isolation. As missiles play a key role in Iran’s national security strategy, it is unrealistic to expect that the country will forgo efforts to improve their operationality and survivability through testing.

In September 2017, President Hassan Rouhani responded to US condemnation of Iran’s missile development by stating: ‘No matter if you like it or not, we will boost our defence and military capabilities to the extent deemed necessary for defence. We will not seek permission from anyone to defend our country and our land.’[20]

A punitive approach to Iran’s missile programme is not only likely to be ineffective, it could also undermine simultaneous European attempts to maintain the JCPOA, lending legitimacy to potential measures by the US Congress to link US adherence to the JCPOA with the missile issue. Even if the US measures do not directly impact the JCPOA, new sanctions against Iran’s missile programme might further impede international trade with Iran, thus increasing the already pervasive Iranian perception that sanctions relief is not being implemented.

Therefore, it is important that European countries do not let the missile issue distract them from seeking to maintain the JCPOA as their first priority. The former US Department of State coordinator for the deal’s implementation, Jarrett Blanc, recently argued that ‘Iran and its missiles are less dangerous because of the JCPOA. That accomplishment cannot be sacrificed for an unrealistic effort to pressure Iran on ballistic missiles’.[21]

However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no way to constrain Iran’s missile programme. Given repeated statements by Iranian officials that the country has no need of missiles beyond the range of 2000 km,[22] Iran could in principle agree to limit its missiles to that level.[23] As for any further limits to Iran’s ballistic missile programme, they are unfeasible without parallel discussions with other states in the region about their respective military capabilities.

Unfortunately, it is not an optimal time to discuss either Iran’s missiles or the broader issues of regional security. As the JCPOA has shown, arms control negotiations require at least some mutual respect and trust, both of which are clearly absent from the current US–Iranian relationship and in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This also casts a shadow on any attempts by others to start a missile dialogue with Iran, which would probably be rejected as part of the controversial US plans to ‘renegotiate’ the nuclear deal. Further, any new Iranian compromises with the West should not be expected at a time when previous promises under the JCPOA are in such serious doubt.

Yet this should not discourage long-term thinking. European countries could use their political channels with Iran and other regional actors to get a more thorough understanding of their respective security concerns. Such knowledge could then be used to inform future discussions on Iran’s missiles, as well as a more comprehensive arms control dialogue in the region—a goal that has long evaded international efforts, but is still worth pursuing.

About the author:
*Dr Tytti Erästö is Researcher on nuclear weapon issues at SIPRI.

Source:
This article was published by SIPRI.

Notes:
[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-an…

[2] https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-presiden…

[3] https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7933

[4] http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2017/09/21/intv-amanpour-federica-m…

[5] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-missiles/iran-tests-ne…

[6] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles/exclusive-iran-missile…

[7] http://www.dw.com/en/iran-rocket-launch-condemned-by-germany-france-uk-…

[8] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles

[9] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf

[10] https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/state-major-arms-transfers-8…

[11] https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f64d023a-d6fc-4dc4-8…

[12] http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/toda…

[13] https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/khorramshahr.htm

[14] https://www.space.com/19490-iran-launches-monkey-into-space-report.html

[15] http://spaceflight101.com/iran-announces-first-successful-simorgh-test-…

[16] https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f64d023a-d6fc-4dc4-8…

[17] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president…

[18] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm

[19] http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/Between-the-S…

[20] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/iran-tests-ballistic-missile-stat…

[21] http://thehill.com/opinion/international/352488-irans-ballistic-missile…

[22] https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f64d023a-d6fc-4dc4-8…

[23] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dealing-irans-ballistic-missile-pro…

By Anita Powell

Zimbabwe’s longtime president is “confined to his home,” South Africa’s president said Wednesday, leaving Robert Mugabe’s fate uncertain after what increasingly appears to be a military-backed effort to oust him after 37 years in power.

Social media accounts report the mood is tense in Harare, the capital, as some businesses closed early.

Tanks rolled through Harare on Tuesday, a day after the head of Zimbabwe’s armed forces, General Constantino Chiwenga, warned he would “step in” unless Mugabe stopped trying to purge the ruling ZANU-PF party of supporters of former vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Dozens have been arrested since Mugabe fired the vice president on November 5.

Zimbabwe’s ruling party accused Chiwenga of “treasonable conduct” after that statement.

​The events of the last few weeks, says analyst Piers Pigou of the International Crisis Group, tipped the balance on an escalating crisis.

“Something obviously had to give, particularly over the last week, in the last few days, when the situation has become a lot more tense,” he told VOA. “[Chiwenga] said he will intervene, and I think that a number of people thought that this was a bluff, that he wouldn’t intervene, that Mugabe still retained some measure of control of the situation.”

That notion disappeared when soldiers took over state television early Wednesday.

“We wish to make this abundantly clear this is not a military takeover of government,” army spokesman Major General SB Moyo said in an early morning statement. “What the Zimbabwe defense forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country, which if not addressed may result in violent conflict.”

The chairperson of the nation’s influential war veterans’ group described the action as “a bloodless correction” — a term analysts disputed.

“I think it has all the makings of a coup d’etat, in terms of a military takeover, it’s an unconstitutional action,” Pigou said. “It’s been couched in all sort of different terms by the security sector itself … but yes, it has the markings of a coup d’etat, though as we know, coups have many different calibrations.”

Update from Zuma

President Jacob Zuma, who chairs the Southern African Development Community, said in a statement that he spoke to President Robert Mugabe, who indicated he was confined to his home. South Africa is also in contact with the Zimbabwean Defense Force.

When Mugabe fired Mnangagwa he indicated he was planning to replace the ousted vice president with the first lady, which would put her in position to become president when her 93-year-old husband retires or dies.

Zimbabwe’s ruling party said on social media Wednesday that Mnangagwa will return. His whereabouts are currently unknown, though he is rumored to be in South Africa.

“Neither Zimbabwe nor ZANU are owned by Mugabe and his wife,” said the Twitter message from the @zanu_pf handle. “Today begins a fresh new era and comrade Mnangagwa will help us achieve a better Zimbabwe.” The Twitter account has previously been used to air the party’s beliefs, though it was not possible to independently verify the claims.

Late Tuesday, a VOA reporter was physically assaulted by soldiers in the capital while attempting to cover events at the state broadcaster. Soldiers beat the reporter and a local-media colleague with batons, kicked them and took the reporter’s money, phone and press card.

Witnesses reported at least three explosions and heavy gunfire in the capital in the early morning.

A State Department official said the United States “encourages all Zimbabweans to approach disputes calmly and peacefully while following democratic, transparent, and constitutional processes for resolving differences.”

Zuma, in his statements, also “called for calm and restraint and has expressed hope that developments in Zimbabwe would not lead to unconstitutional changes of government.” British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson called for “calm and restraint”, but offered harsh words for Mugabe.

“Mugabe’s consuming ambitions was always to deny them that choice,” he said before the House of Commons. “And this House will remember the brutal litany of his 37 years in office. The elections he rigged and stole; the murder and torture of his opponents; the illegal seizure of land leading to the worst hyper-inflation in recorded history.”

Mnangagwa, 75, was seen for years as a likely successor to the president, and maintains strong backing in the army. Grace Mugabe, 52, has support in the party’s youth wing and is believed to have engineered the firing of another vice president, Joice Mujuru, in 2014.

Sebastian Mhofu in Harare contributed to this report.

South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, in his capacity as chair of Southern African Development Community (SADC), is sending special envoys to Zimbabwe and Angola in light of the unfolding situation in that country.

“The President is sending the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula and the Minister of State Security, Bongani Bongo, to Zimbabwe to meet with President Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF),” the Presidency said on Wednesday.

According to the Presidency, President Zuma had spoken to President Robert Mugabe on Wednesday, who indicated that he was confined to his home but said that he was “fine”. South Africa is also in contact with the ZDF.

The special envoys will also be sent to the Republic of Angola to see President Joao Lourenco, chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to brief him on the situation.

President Zuma has reiterated his call for calm and restraint and for the ZDF to ensure that peace and stability are not undermined in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean military has allegedly taken control of state institutions, saying that it is targeting criminals in government who are bent on destabilising that country.

President Zuma has expressed hope that developments in Zimbabwe would not lead to unconstitutional changes of government, as that would be contrary to both SADC and African Union positions.

He has urged the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Defence Force to resolve the political impasse amicably and has urged the Zimbabwean Defence Force to ensure that the maintenance of peace and security in the country is not compromised.

On Wednesday, the Chief of Staff in the Zimbabwe National Army, Sibusiso Moyo, appeared on State television, saying that the position taken by the military since the statement made by Zimbabwe Defence Force’s commander, Constantino Chiwenga, Monday had reached “another level”.

General Chiwenga on Tuesday accused the ruling party ZANU-PF of being infiltrated by counter-revolutionaries who wanted to destroy it.

He issued a warning that the army would intervene if President Mugabe continued his tactics in an effort to help his wife, Grace Mugabe, succeed him as ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean President in party and national elections due next year.

Mugabe “safe”

Moyo assured all Zimbabweans and the international community that this is not a military takeover and that President Mugabe and his family are safe and their security is guaranteed.

“We are only targeting criminals around him (President Robert Mugabe) who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice,” he said.

Last week, President Mugabe fired his Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on allegations of disloyalty and deceit. The two had been political allies for more than 40 years.

Zimbabweans have been urged to minimize movement with exception of those who offer essential services and businesses.

The Presidency said SADC will continue to closely monitor the situation and remains ready to assist where necessary to resolve the political impasse in keeping with established SADC protocols and processes.

By Ann Toews*

Violence remains a possibility in a country heaving with hope

(FPRI) — Zimbabwe and the rest of the world awoke this morning to an apparent military coup that has so far remained bloodless. After President Robert Mugabe dismissed his vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, last week on charges of plotting a takeover, members of the military loyal to Mnangagwa decided the time was ripe to tear open a longstanding rift in the ruling party and publicly challenge the nonagenarian dictator. Change was clearly on the horizon yesterday as tanks neared the capital city: the Twittersphere burst with buoyant visions of how #MyNewZimbabwe would look in a post-Mugabe world.

Much of the international community had hoped that Mnangagwa, who is seen as a stabilizing force despite his dismal record on human rights, would succeed the aging dictator. Indeed, the South African Development Community (SADC), the United States, and the United Kingdom, among others, have remained notably aloof as forces loyal to Mnangagwa have seized power, calling chiefly for nonviolence and a democratic process.

While the situation appears peaceable at the moment, the international community should remain attuned to threats of possible political violence in the coming days and beyond.

The most urgent threat of violence stems from a possible outbreak of fighting between party factions loyal to Mnangagwa and Mugabe’s wife Grace, respectively. Grace Mugabe, whose path to power seemed all but certain less than a week ago, has reportedly fled the country, leaving open the option that she may soon draw on her Youth League supporters to stage a comeback. Her backers, eager for power after years of service, have become quiescent in recent hours, as they apparently decide whether to seek an alliance with Mnangagwa’s “old guard” or rally their own faction to challenge their party rivals. Just before the coup, key Grace supporter Kudzai Chipanga affirmed that “Defending the revolution and our leader and president is an ideal we live for and if need be it is a principle we are prepared to die for,” suggesting the lengths to which they are prepared to go. But Chipanga appears to have been arrested, calling into question whether a subordinate will act in his place. Grace, for her part, currently faces a decision between living in exile from her homeland or pursuing the power and prestige of her husband’s position. It is not at all clear that she will choose the former.

If Grace perceives a political opening, evidence suggests that she and her supporters would not hesitate to employ violence. Some observers believe Grace, who is 41 years Mugabe’s junior, helped enable her husband’s horrific attacks on white landowners and state-led political violence surrounding elections that began in earnest a few years after they married in 1996. In recent years, she has become increasingly willing to leverage state power for personal gain. When she met resistance in seeking to procure more land near her farm, she had police burn houses and forcibly evict and arrest residents. “I might have a small fist,” she said, “but when it comes to fighting I will put stones inside to enlarge it, or even put on gloves to make it bigger. Do not doubt my capabilities.” Grace’s assaults on strangers abroad were once the stuff of juicy tabloids, until they became indicators of how the next president might behave. Her use of crude rhetoric against perceived critics—once saying of a former VP that “dogs and fleas would not disturb her carcass,” for example—isn’t a causal predictor of mass violence, but also isn’t exactly reassuring. Fiery braggadocio is not unknown in Zimbabwean politics, but Grace’s invectives reach a new and graphic level.

A second threat of violence stems from choices made by the interim leader that emerges. If he (or she) does not quickly establish a unity government or schedule elections, Zimbabweans themselves would likely stage protests—events that Mugabe (and Mnangagwa under him) have previously met with force. As I wrote last month, citizens have already become so exasperated that many freely denounce Mugabe in ways that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. The only hope that remains for those suffering through prolonged economic catastrophe is life in a post-Mugabe world, as the Economist recently reported. Zimbabweans won’t easily abandon that hope. Watching another negligent dictator take the reins is an intolerable prospect for many. But Mugabe’s decades-long history of state-led violence against civilians suggests that his successor would similarly seek to maintain power by aggressively suppressing dissent.

Almost overnight, many Zimbabweans, desperate for change, have found themselves in perhaps the most hopeful position in memory. Violent scenarios are certainly not inevitable at the moment, but neither are they unfathomable. The coup has shocked many veteran Zimbabwe watchers, suggesting that more unexpected turns—or even a violent crackdown to maintain the status quo—may lie in store. Life-or-death factional wrangling for party support or brutal suppression of political opposition are not unthinkable in the current high-stakes environment. Zimbabwe watchers have been ruminating for decades about the contours of the country after its longstanding dictator abandons his office, and it appears the dramatic moment has finally arrived. May the world not cheer or turn its back too soon.

About the author:
*Ann Toews, Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC Fellow – Program on National Security. Starting in September 2017, Ann Toews, a U.S. Army veteran, is the inaugural Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC Fellow. Ann formerly served as a military intelligence officer with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe and Afghanistan and later contributed to reactivating the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade in support of U.S. Army Africa. She has interned for the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and World Vision.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

The Anti-Terror Quartet — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain — has added two new entities and 11 individuals to the terror lists for their role in disseminating and supporting terrorism.

In a statement released through the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), the quartet identified the two terror entities as the International Islamic Council “Massaa'” and the World Union of Muslim Scholars.

The statement identified the individuals as Khaled Nazem Diab, Salem Jaber Omar Ali Sultan Fathallah Jaber, Moyasar Ali Musa Abdullah Jubouri, Mohammed Ali Saeed Atm, Hassan Ali Mohammed Juma Sultan, Mohammed Suleiman Haidar Mohammed Al-Haydar, Mohammed Jamal Ahmed Hishmat Abdul Hamid, Alsayed Mahmoud Ezzat Ibrahim Eissa, Yahya Alsayed Ibrahim Mohamed Moussa, Qadri Mohamed Fahmy Mahmoud Al-Sheikh and Alaa Ali Ali Mohammed Al-Samahi.

Of the entities that were added to the list the statement said: “The two listed entities are terrorist organizations working to promote terrorism through the exploitation of Islamic discourse and its use as a cover to facilitate various terrorist activities.”

The quartet also identified Qatar’s role in aiding terrorist, “The Individuals also have carried out various terrorist operations in which they have received direct Qatari support at various levels, including providing them with passports and assigning them to Qatari institutions with a charitable appearance to facilitate their movement,” the statement said.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain severed ties with Doha on June 4, accusing it of supporting terrorism.

The quartet, through monitoring “emphasize continued Qatari authorities’ support for and sponsor and finance of terrorism, promotion of extremism and dissemination of hate speech, and that these authorities have not taken effective action to stop terrorist activity,” the statement said.

“The four countries reaffirm their commitment to strengthening all efforts to combat terrorism and to establish security and stability in the region, and stresses that they will not hesitate to pursue individuals and terrorist groups and will support all means in this regard at the regional and international levels,” the statement continued.

“They will continue to combat terrorist activities and to target the financing of terrorism regardless of its source, and will continue to work with partners around the world to effectively reduce the activities of terrorist and extremist organizations that should not be tolerated by any state.

The four countries also thank all the countries that support them in their actions in the fight against terrorism, extremism and violence, and rely on them to continue their efforts and cooperation to eradicate this phenomenon, which has long been evil throughout the world,” said the statement.

By Bradley Jardine

A counter terrorism operation launched by Georgia’s State Security Service (SSG) turned into a deadly firefight on the capital’s outskirts.

In the early hours of November 22, a counter-terrorism unit of the SSG launched an offensive against what authorities called terrorist suspects in an apartment building in the Isani district, on Tbilisi’s eastern edge. After negotiations broke down, the suspects began a fierce gunfight, according to the authorities, throwing grenades out the windows and injuring an SSG operative. The 41-year-old operative was later pronounced dead at 17:09 local time.

The security services said that according to their preliminary information, the suspects are not citizens of Georgia and are “members of a terrorist organization.” Speculation, naturally, turned immediately to the possibility of transnational groups like the Islamic State (IS). Authorities said they were working to identify the suspects, conducting investigations within Georgia and abroad.

However, the head of the village of Duisi, in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, told the Netgazeti news site that a relative of the flat’s owner responsible for taking on the tenants had been arrested in the village. The Pankisi Gorge is populated largely by Kists, Muslim people closely related to Chechens, and a number of men from the region have fought with IS in Syria and Iraq.

At one point, the SSG brought in Umar Idigov, head of the Georgian Chechen association “Caucasus Integration Foundation” to negotiate with the suspects before they attempted to storm the building a second time at 14:00.

A spokesperson for the SSG claimed that the building was evacuated before the operation began at 5:00 am. The nearby Public School #97 was also temporarily closed, along with a kindergarten.

But local media reports showed a number of residents leaving the area later, at around 11:30 am.

“We are locked in the bathroom,” a local resident told the Rustavi 2 television station in a phone call.

“All the windows are broken in the apartment. I’m staying here with my child and parents,” another resident said.

Other residents claim the suspects took hostages.

“The operation is being conducted against two Chechen families who have been living in this building for years – they even have children. We just learned they took our neighbors hostage,” a local resident told the ambebi.ge news portal.

United States Ambassador to Georgia, Ian Kelly, commented on the incident, saying the safety of residents is of utmost importance.

“We are carefully observing the developments and we hope maximum safety measures are taken,” he added.

The claims about hostages remained unconfirmed as of the publication of this post.

One suspect has reportedly been arrested. The operation was declared over by early evening, with three suspects killed.

Pyrethroid pesticides are effective. Sometimes too effective.

Researchers at Michigan State University’s entomology department have unlocked a key to maintain the insecticide’s effectiveness in eliminating pests without killing beneficial bugs, such as bees. The study, featured in the current issue of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, shows that molecular tweaks can make the difference.

Pyrethroids target the voltage-gated sodium channel, a protein found in nerve and muscle cells used for rapid electrical signaling. Pyrethroids basically work by binding to the voltage gate of the sodium channel and prevent it from closing. The nervous system becomes over-stimulated and the insect is killed. These pesticides, however, don’t have the same effect on humans, or other mammals for that matter.

Ke Dong, MSU insect toxicologist and neurobiologist and co-author of the paper, honed in on a single protein that could afford bumble bees the same resistance as humans – tau-fluvalinate, a pyrethroid insecticide. Dong worked with Shaoying Wu, lead author from Henan Agricultural University (China), who conducted the research in Dong’s lab as a visiting scholar.

“For the first time we are showing that unique structural features in bee sodium channels interfere with the binding of tau-fluvalinate to bumble bee sodium channels,” said Dong. “This opens the possibility of designing new chemicals that target sodium channels of pests but spare bees.”

Sodium channels are large transmembrane proteins of more than 2,000 amino acid residues. Dong’s lab spent many years unraveling this groundbreaking advance. The scientists initially started with sodium channels from other bugs, such as mosquitoes, fruit flies, cockroaches, mites and ticks, to find where pyrethroids bind on insect sodium channels to effectively kill them. They got some help from nature.

“By examining wild mosquitoes that have become resistant to pyrethroids, we were able to help narrow down the potential sites on which to focus,” Dong said.

Specifically, in a previous study, Dong and the team identified mutations that made the channels more resistant to pyrethroids. Working with Boris Zhorov, a computer modeling expert from McMaster University in Canada, they identified two distinct pyrethroid binding sites on insect sodium channels. They also uncovered the molecular differences between mammals’ and insects’ differing reactions to pyrethroids.

For the current study, the team focused on a longstanding enigma that bumble bees and honey bees are highly sensitive to most pyrethroids, but they were resistant to tau-fluvalinate. Currently, tau-fluvalinate is widely used to control agricultural pests and also varroa mites, which are one of the biggest threats to bees worldwide.

Eventually, the team discovered that the channel is resistant to tau-fluvalinate but sensitive to other pyrethroids. Further mutational analysis and computer modeling revealed that specific amino acid residues in bumble bee sodium channels are responsible for the selective toxicity.

Future research will examine sodium channels from various pest and beneficial insects to explore the features of pyrethroid binding sites, which could lay the groundwork for designing new and selective pesticides. It also will shed light on how pests develop resistance to insecticides over time and how beneficial insects respond to them in the field.

Nature itself can be the best defense against climate change for many species — at least in the short term­ — according to a study published in the journal Ecology Letters from the University of California, Davis.

The study found that natural habitats play a vital role in helping other plants and animals resist heat stresses ramping up with climate change — at least until the species they depend on to form those habitats become imperiled. This suggests a need to re-evaluate climate change predictions for many species, including predictions that species in the south will move north with global warming.

The work focused on the rocky shoreline stretching from California’s Channel Islands to Washington’s Olympic National Park, where low tides expose marine species to intense heat. It also has implications for habitats like grasslands and rainforests, which support millions of smaller species.

ECOLOGICAL AIR CONDITIONING

Similar to how trees support birds and chipmunks, species like mussels and seaweed form habitat for other coastal species. They can lower temperatures so much for those other species that there is ultimately no difference in heat stress for sea creatures living in southern California versus northern Washington. If those habitats become suddenly imperiled, however, the species relying on them have little time to adapt.

“We might take for granted some of the resilience of our ecosystems because we don’t realize how much they depend on these habitats,” said lead author Laura Jurgens, who was a Ph.D. candidate at the UC Davis Bodega Marine Laboratory at the time of the study and is currently a postdoctoral researcher with Temple University and Smithsonian Institution. “For creatures that live in mussel beds and seaweed beds, it’s like having a house with air conditioning at low tide. You can tolerate a lot of what goes on outside if you have air conditioning. But if you’re looking at a future with more intense heat waves, and you don’t have air conditioning anymore, you wonder, ‘Where can I go?’ For these species, they could make a big move north, but it won’t help — they still need these habitats to keep the heat in a tolerable range.”

The study indicates that plants and animals whose habitats serve as “ecological air conditioning” are not likely to move until the other species protecting them are threatened. This could make those species more vulnerable to sudden events like warm blobs of ocean water, disease, extreme storms or intense heat waves. These species may appear “deceptively resilient” to climate change until one event takes away their habitats.

HABITAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN LATITUDE FOR SOME

The study adds to the understanding of how different species respond to climate change. Scientists have observed some plants and animals under climate change are leaving lower latitudes for cooler ones. But this study shows that, for some species, habitat is more important than latitude in protecting them from the effects of climate change.

“If you’re an octopus living in a mussel bed, the most important thing to keep your body temperature survivable is that mussel bed around you, not whether you live in Southern California, where it’s warmer, or Washington,” Jurgens said.

The study also reinforces the benefits of habitat conservation. It indicates that destroying habitat can reduce climate resilience, while restoring and conserving habitat can help maintain biodiversity as the climate warms.

“People are really big compared to most organisms on the planet,” Jurgens said. “We’re enormous, and it’s hard for us to understand what it’s like to be in these habitats unless you imagine yourself in a place like a forest you walk into on a hot day. If that temperature is what you need to survive, that forest better be there.”

The majority of LGBTQ people say they or an LGBTQ friend or family member have experienced violence, threats, or sexual harassment because they are LGBTQ; 34% report harassment in bathrooms. These are the results of a survey conducted for National Public Radio, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.

A majority of all LGBTQ Americans polled say that they or a friend or family member who is also LGBTQ have experienced multiple forms of discrimination. Among all LGBTQ people, 57% say that they or an LGBTQ friend or family member have been threatened or non-sexually harassed because of their LGBTQ identity. A majority of LGBTQ people also says they or an LGBTQ friend or family member have been sexually harassed (51%) or experienced violence (51%) because they are LGBTQ.

Additionally, 34% of all LGBTQ people say that they or an LGBTQ friend or family member have been verbally harassed in the bathroom when entering or while using a bathroom, or been told or asked if they were using the wrong bathroom (Chart 1). For this question, there are too few transgender respondents to analyze separately.

Nearly one in five LGBTQ people avoid medical care out of concern for discrimination; nearly a third of transgender people have no regular doctor

Overall, 16% of LGBTQ people report being personally discriminated against because they are LGBTQ when going to a doctor or health clinic, and 18% say they have avoided going to a doctor or seeking health care out of concern that they would be discriminated against or treated poorly because of their LGBTQ identity.

Regarding health care, 31% of all transgender people say have no regular doctor or health care professional who provides most of their health care when sick or having a health concern, and 22% say they are currently uninsured.

Logan Casey, research associate in public opinion at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and deputy director of the survey says, “This report confirms the extraordinarily high levels of violence and harassment in LGBTQ people’s lives. It also shows the serious barriers to health care for LGBTQ and especially transgender people in America.”

Majority of LGBTQ people have personally experienced slurs and offensive comments about their sexual orientation or gender identity

Chart 2 shows that a majority of LGBTQ people have personally experienced various forms of individual discrimination: 57% of all LGBTQ people say they have experienced slurs and 53% have experienced insensitive or offensive comments or negative assumptions about their sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity.

At least one in five LGBTQ Americans have experienced discrimination in housing, the workplace, or at college because of their LGBTQ identity

At least one in five LGBTQ Americans say they have personally experienced institutional discrimination because of their sexuality or gender identity across a wide range of areas of life.

Overall, 22% of LGBTQ people say they have been personally discriminated against because of their LGBTQ identity when trying to rent a room or apartment or buy a house. One in five (20%) LGBTQ people say they have been personally discriminated against because they are LGBTQ when applying to or while attending college.

In the workplace, 22% of LGBTQ people say they have personally experienced anti-LGBTQ discrimination when it comes to being paid equally or considered for promotion, and 20% report this discrimination when applying for jobs.

Additionally, nearly one in six (16%) LGBTQ people say they have been discriminated against because of their LGBTQ identity when interacting with police.

For these questions, there are too few transgender respondents to report their experiences separately. The full report presents available results regarding transgender people’s experiences of discrimination.

LGBTQ people of color twice as likely as white LGBTQ people to report anti-LGBTQ discrimination when applying for jobs and interacting with police, and six times more likely to have avoided calling the police for fear of discrimination

As Chart 3 shows, LGBTQ people of color are more than twice as likely as white LGBTQ people to say they have been personally discriminated against because of their LGBTQ identity when applying for jobs and when interacting with police.

Nearly a third (32%) of LGBTQ people of color say they have personally experienced discrimination because of their LGBTQ identity when applying for jobs, compared to 13% of white LGBTQ individuals. Similarly, 24% of LGBTQ people of color say they have personally experienced discrimination because they are LGBTQ when interacting with the police, compared to 11% of white LGBTQ people (Chart 3).

Additionally, 30% of LGBTQ people of color say they have avoided calling the police or other authority figures, even when in need, out of concern they would be discriminated against because they are LGBTQ. Only 5% of white LGBTQ people report this avoidance.

LGBTQ people divided over whether individual prejudice or discriminatory laws is the bigger problem for discrimination against LGBTQ people today

Overall, 90% of all LGBTQ people believe, generally speaking, that there is discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in America today, and 91% of all LGBTQ people believe there is discrimination against transgender people in America today.

Among those who believe anti-LGBTQ discrimination exists, one-third (33%) say the bigger problem is discrimination based in laws and government policies, while 43% say discrimination based on individual level prejudice. Another 23% say that both forms of discrimination are equally a problem (Chart 4).

Older LGBTQ people (50+) are more likely than younger LGBTQ people (18-49) to identify individual prejudice as the larger problem for anti-LGBTQ discrimination. Younger LGBTQ people are more likely to identify institutional discrimination based in laws and government policies as the larger problem.

Survey Background

The survey was conducted January 26 – April 9, 2017, among a nationally representative, probability-based telephone (cell and landline) sample of 3,453 adults age 18 or older. The survey included nationally representative samples of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, as well as white Americans; men and women, and LGBTQ adults. This report presents the results specifically for a nationally representative probability sample of 489 LGBTQ U.S. adults. Other reports analyze each other group, and the final report will discuss major highlights from the series.

An international group of scientists, with the participation of the University of Granada (UGR), has shed new light on the origin of gold, one of the most intriguing mysteries for Mankind since ancient times and which even today doesn’t have an answer that convinces the scientific community.

Their work, which has been recently published in the renowned Nature Communications journal, has established that the gold came to the Earth’s surface from the deepest regions of our planet. Thus, the Earth’s set of internal movements would have favored the ascent and concentration of the precious metal.

The researchers have found evidence of said process in the Argentinean Patagonia, which in addition represents the first register of gold found under the South American continent, specifically at a depth of 70 kilometers.

The researchers belong to various universities from Chile, Australia and France, and among them there’s also José María González Jiménez, a Ramón y Cajal researcher from the Department of Mineralogy and Petrology at the University of Granada.

The UGR researcher reminds that the interior of the Earth is divided into three large layers: crust, mantle and core. “The minerals we extract and which support our economy are located in the crust. And, although we are experts in taking advantage of them, we still know very little about their true origin. The search for gold has motivated migrations, expeditions and even wars, but its origin is one of the main questions in the field of mineral deposits genesis”.

The mantle is the layer separating the nucleus from the crust in which we all live, and its upper limit is located at about 17 kilometers under the oceans and 70 kilometers under the continents. “This distance is unreachable for Mankind, since we don’t possess the means for reaching the mantle and thus knowing more about it in a direct way yet”, the UGR researcher notes.

Nevertheless, the mantle can reach us thanks to volcanic eruptions, which bring with them small fragments, or ‘xenoliths’, from the mantle under the continents to the surface.

Those rare xenoliths are the ones that have been studied in this research. In them, the researchers have found tiny native gold particles, whose thickness is that of a human hair and whose origin is the deep mantle.

Research at the Deseado Massif

The focus of the research has been the region of the Deseado Massif at the Argentinean Patagonia, one of the largest auriferous provinces in the whole planet and whose gold mines are still being exploited.

Since the concentration of gold at that spot in the crust is very high the researchers have been able to figure out why mineral deposits are limited to some specific regions of the planet. Their hypothesis is that the mantle under that region is unique: it has a tendency to generate gold deposits on the surface due to its history.

“Said history dates back 200 million years, when Africa and South America were part of the same continent -González Jiménez says-. Their separation was caused, among other factors, by the ascent of a ‘mantle plume’ from the deep mantle, which broke the crust (much thiner and fragile) and caused the separation of the two continents. The ascent of said deep mantle plume generated a true chemical factory that enriched the mantle with metals, which would later generate the conditions for the creation of gold deposits. This time the process was caused by the movement of a tectonic plate under another, allowing the circulation of metal-rich fluids through the cracks, which precipitated the metals and concentrated them near the surface”.

The findings of the research team shed new light on the formation of mineral deposits, which are generally attributed to an origin in the crust itself, without taking into account the role of a deeper root from the mantle.

This new scientific evidence could contribute to a more advanced exploration of deposits that takes into account not only surface images or ‘radiographies’ of the crust for their search, but also studies the depths of the mantle, a region where the origin of one of the metals that has allured our species the most could be traced to.

By Michelle Bauman

Sexual misconduct allegations against Republican candidate Roy Moore have brought Alabama’s special election to fill a U.S. Senate seat into the national spotlight.

U.S. Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.) has also been recently accused of kissing and groping women against their will. During the 2016 presidential campaign, more than a dozen women raised allegations of sexual assault or harassment against Republican candidate Donald Trump.

These accusations have raised public debate about whether a candidate’s personal character should matter in elections, and if so, to what extent.

“Obviously, all of us are sinners. But some sins are especially relevant when deciding whether to give one’s vote to a candidate,” said Dr. Kevin Miller, professor of moral theology at Franciscan University of Steubenville.

“The key purpose of politics is justice – as thinkers from Aristotle to Pope Benedict XVI have taught,” Miller told CNA.

“Thus it should especially be taken into account when a candidate has – based on good evidence – acted unjustly, and even more especially when the candidate’s unjust actions have been habitual and/or when the candidate does not give serious indication of repentance against these actions.”

Moore is the Republican nominee in Alabama’s special election to fill a U.S. Senate seat, left vacant when former U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions was appointed U.S. attorney general earlier this year.

A former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Moore was removed from the court twice – once for refusing to obey a federal court order to remove a statue of the Ten Commandments from the Alabama judicial building, and later for instructing that same-sex marriage licenses should not be issued after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in 2015.

In recent weeks, nine women have brought allegations of misconduct against Moore, including an accusation of forced sexual contact with a 14-year-old in 1979.

A number of high-profile Republican leaders – including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ken.) – have withdrawn their support from Moore, while others, including Alabama Governor Kay Ivey, continue to support the candidate. One Alabama pastor told the Boston Globe that he would continue to support Moore even if the allegations against him were true.

Franken, who has publicly criticized other public figures accused of sexual misconduct, has apologized for some accusations leveled against him, while maintaining that other allegations are the result of misunderstanding, or have been mischaracterized. While some public figures have defended him, including former colleagues in the entertainment industry, others have called for investigations, or for his resignation.

When a candidate is facing serious allegations of misconduct, how should Catholics respond?

While Church teaching does not dictate which party or candidate a Catholic should choose, it does offer guidelines for Catholics in the voting booth.

In the 2007 document “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship,” the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops outline an approach to political responsibility based upon developing a “well-formed conscience.”

In addition to considering moral issues of grave importance, the document says that voting decisions “should take into account a candidate’s commitments, character, integrity, and ability to influence a given issue.”

The importance of character and integrity should not be taken lightly, Dr. Miller told CNA.

When there is good evidence that a candidate has habitually or unrepentantly engaged in serious injustice, whether in sexuality or in another area, Miller said, “there is a serious presumption that the candidate ought not be entrusted with decisions about the common good, which consists especially of justice.”

“One doesn’t need ‘proof’ that allegations against a candidate are true before one may reasonably decide that such allegations warrant a decision not to vote for the candidate,” Miller continued.

Even when definitive proof is lacking, there may be substantial evidence supporting an allegation, he said. “It is a voter’s right and responsibility to make an honest and serious attempt to consider whether such evidence exists. As others have pointed out, a candidate doesn’t have a right to one’s vote.”

The election of a candidate who has habitually committed serious injustices is likely to cause scandal and a negative influence on culture, Miller said, adding that negative cultural consequences could outweigh the good the candidate might do in office.

Additionally, a candidate who defends serious injustices in his own life may make poor decisions about justice in society, Miller said.

Miller also cautioned that there can be a tendency to be defensive about the candidate that one supports, and to minimize flaws in personal conduct and in policy decisions.

“This is a way in which voting for a ‘bad’ candidate can be bad, not only for justice and the common good, but for the voter’s own soul,” he said.

“Thus, there is a serious risk that voting for a ‘bad’ candidate can be the equivalent of trying to gain the world at the expense of one’s soul,” he continued, noting that voters must be concerned with personal salvation and the “soul” of political culture.

Miller clarified that deciding not to vote for a candidate in one party does not morally translate to a vote for the candidate of another party.

“There are other alternatives, like voting write-in or third-party – or not voting at all in a particular race,” he said.

Character is not the only factor to be considered in weighing candidates, Miller acknowledged. “There are obviously some policy issues that are extraordinarily serious,” he said, pointing to abortion as an example.

“I think you have to take seriously the gravity of some of the political issues we’re faced with today,” he said. “You also have to take seriously violations of human dignity and justice,” such as some of the allegations being raised against prominent politicians and other leaders.

In the case of a candidate for whom there is evidence of engagement in particularly grave evils and no sign of repentance, Miller said Catholics should at least consider voting third party or abstaining.

In the end, there is no easy formula or flow chart that is guaranteed to give the uniquely correct answer to every question that arises at the ballot box, he said. Catholics should take all factors into account and think about what will serve justice and the common good, not just in the short term, but in the long term.

A part of that discernment, Miller said, is that Catholics consider a candidate’s character and integrity.

“The point is that voters need at least to consider these concerns – in a morally [and] intellectually serious and honest way – rather than simply ignoring [or] dismissing them,” he said.

Hundreds of thousands of Americans are being denied the right to vote because they are poor.

In nine states, Republican legislators have enacted laws that disenfranchise anyone with outstanding legal fees or court fines. For example, in Alabama more than 100,000 people who owe money – roughly 3 percent of the state’s voting-age population – have been struck from voting rolls.

This is unconstitutional. In 1964, the 24th amendment abolished the poll tax, a Jim Crow tactic used to bar poor blacks from voting.

These new laws are a modern reincarnation of that unconstitutional system, disproportionately disenfranchising people of color.

Income and wealth should have no bearing on the right to vote. Many Americans are struggling to make ends meet. But they still have a constitutional right to make their voices heard.

Preventing people from voting because they owe legal fees or court fines muzzle low-income Americans at a time in our nation’s history when the rich have more political power than ever.

These state laws are another form of voter suppression – like gerrymandering, voter ID requirements, and bars on anyone with felony convictions from voting.

We must not let them stand.

Leaders of right-wing Hindu groups are reigniting the controversial issue of Christian missionaries converting Hindus, ahead of Pope Francis’ historic Asian visit that will see him travel to Myanmar instead of India.

They have feigned ignorance about the pontiff being blocked from a planned India visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.

The “Vishwa Hindu Parishad” (VHP, Council of Hindus) and other right-wing groups such as the Bajrang Dal, a hard-line Hindu group opposed to Christian missionary work, have been demanding a moratorium on the church’s conversion activities. They also opposed Pope John Paul II’s visit to New Delhi in November 1999.

Pope Francis “will have to clarify how conversion of people from other religions is justified,” said Bajrang Dal activist Angad Prasad from Assam state in northeastern India.

VHP sources told ucanews.com they would have a few questions for the pope, in an obvious reference to the conversion issue that Hindu groups have been steadfastly opposing.

Church leadership “lost hope” for a 2017 papal visit to India when Indian Cardinal Oswald Gracias of Bombay, who will now be celebrating Mass with Pope Francis in Yangon on Nov 29, indirectly told media that until June this year New Delhi had issued no invitation to the pope — a necessary condition for a head of state visit under international diplomatic protocol.

“We are already in June. Even if they suddenly say, ‘come’ … (it) will take several months for the dioceses to prepare the people,” the president of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences was quoted in the media as saying.

The leader of the Asian bishops then hinted a change of place saying: “We have to find a good spot where we can give the Holy Father his due importance and respect.”

Neither the government nor the Vatican has issued any statement explaining why India was dropped, but it is widely understood that Modi’s pro-Hindu government did not issue the required invitation.

Pope Francis told media a year ago that he was “almost sure” of visiting Bangladesh and India in 2017 but in August the Vatican made the surprise announcement of a Nov. 27-Dec. 2 papal trip to Bangladesh and Myanmar.

“I am not sure whether he (Pope Francis) was ready to come or was keen enough,” said Pravin Togadia, international president of the VHP.

“I also do not know why he is not coming … so I would not like to comment on the matter,” Togadia told ucanews.com.

Modi has had a number of diplomatic engagements in the past fortnight meeting global leaders including the US President Donald Trump and the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Manila.

At home, Modi has also been meeting several visiting dignitaries including French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.

December is also election month in Gujarat, a crucial western Indian state for Modi’s ruling pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party and where Modi was chief minister before launching his successful foray into national politics.

Observers say Modi and the BJP avoided a November papal visit as it could endanger the party’s election prospects.

By Angshuman Choudhury*

Between 11-12 November 2017, senior officials from Myanmar’s union government and the Tatmadaw met with the country’s largest Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO), United Wa State Army (UWSA), and its less powerful ally, National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), in their respective autonomous enclaves in the northeastern state of Shan. Both these EAOs are part of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), a new alliance that includes five other non-ceasefire groups, mostly based in the north.

Preliminary media reports suggest that the meeting did not bear any constructive outcome. However, it highlighted certain deep-rooted divergences between the northern groups and the union government that stand tall in the way of a permanent negotiated settlement.

Indications from the Meeting

The crucial meeting came after months of failed attempts by Naypyidaw to arrange talks with the northern groups who have refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA), the premise of the current dialogue process. Earlier this year, these non-ceasefire EAOs broke away from the original alliance of non-signatories, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), to create the FPNCC – also known as the ‘Pangsangh Alliance’.

Certain issues indicative of the rift between the union government and the northern groups surfaced during the meeting.

First, the FPNCC members want the government to follow its alternative framework for political dialogue enshrined in FPNCC’s charter of principles that was submitted to the government earlier this year, while the government wants them to sign the NCA. This deadlock is not expected to be resolved soon given the government’s staunch insistence government on preserving the union-centric NCA as against the starkly contrasting FPNCC charter, which demands extensive devolution of power to ethnic ‘nations’.

Second, while the government insists on holding talks with the northern EAOs individually, UWSA, who is also the leader of the alliance, wants to engage with Naypyidaw as a single alliance ie FPNCC. The government may not agree on this point easily since opening an official dialogue channel with the FPNCC would mean legitimising the existence of the group, thus giving greater credence to UWSA as a parallel agenda-setter. This would directly impinge on Naypyidaw’s authority and administrative autonomy, particularly the Tatmadaw.

Third, UWSA demands the revocation of the ‘terrorist’ designation slapped on three members of FPNCC – Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – through a motion passed in the Shan State parliament in December 2016. The union government claims to maintain a policy of not negotiating with terrorists, and talking to these groups without revoking the label would be a contradiction for the government. At the same time, revocation could take time since the Shan State parliament is dominated by the pro-military party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) while the state government is led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). This split could hinder or delay consensus on revocation.

Fourth, during the meeting, UWSA put forward certain demands to the government representatives, mostly related to provision of union funds for public infrastructure, sanction for hydropower projects, and issuance of national ID cards for higher education in Wa-controlled regions. This gives the impression that UWSA is merely using FPNCC, or rather the entire peace process, to forward its own agenda and secure the Wa’s future.

What Must The Government Do?

First, the union government should engage in informal talks with the FPNCC through backdoor channels. This would give Naypyidaw a clear idea about the agendas on the table, including the commonalities and differences, while also not putting an official stamp on the alliance. An effective mediator would be China who is already in direct talks with the northern EAOs. Since Beijing enjoys significant political leverage over these groups, Naypyidaw could instrumentalise its own bilateral relationship with China to arrange back-channel discussions.

Second, the union government and the Tatmadaw must engage with the Shan State parliament on a priority basis to revoke the terrorist label currently placed on AA, MNDAA, and TNLA. These three EAOs, along with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), constitute the ‘Northern Alliance,’ which maintains a hostile posture on the ground, thus preserving openings for escalated violence. If the government is serious about restoring peace in the conflict-torn north, then it has no other option but to talk to these groups.

Third, Naypyidaw must consider holding national-level dialogues in Shan and Kachin States and including them as core participants in the upcoming edition of the Union Peace Conference. This would not only strengthen the NCA’s credibility, but also bridge some of the trust deficit between Naypyidaw and influential non-signatory groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). In fact, facilitating FPNCC members to consult their own people and inviting them to the union-level dialogue could dissuade them from following an alternative, more radical path.

It remains palpably clear that the peace process is hardly going anywhere. Without the cooperation and compliance of the northern EAOs, there can be no peace in Myanmar. The union government needs to realise this before a fresh cycle of violence begins and the situation spirals out of control.

*Angshuman Choudhury
Researcher and Coordinator, SEARP, IPCS

By Shivani Singh*

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for being a strong and active force in campaigning for disarmament and pushing for the adoption of the nuclear weapons ban treaty, 2017.

Despite the best efforts of disarmament organisations like ICAN over the past decade, in the specific case of the ban treaty, the purpose of adopting the treaty itself was belittled as none of the states possessing nuclear weapons attended the negotiations, let alone sign or ratify it. This begs the question, why has bringing states possessing nuclear weapons on board for negotiations towards nuclear disarmament proven so difficult?

The so-called indifference of nuclear-armed states to disarmament efforts must be seen in the context of evolving security dynamics, which are accompanied by three challenges: fear of the threat of regime change in ‘rouge states’, security dilemmas that result from a trust deficit among the states possessing nuclear weapons, and ineffective non-proliferation regimes.

Fear of Threat of Regime Change

A theme that dominates West-dominated global nuclear conversations is pushing ‘rouge’ states to disarm. An example is North Korea, whose actions are offered as a justification for the lack of traction with disarmament initiatives. North Korean nuclear weaponisation has made the very notion of complete disarmament irrelevant for discussion.

However, North Korea’s nuclear advances cannot be wished away. Its actions are guided by a lack of trust with the international community, and the fear that if it gives up its nuclear weapons, the country will be open to external attempts at regime change. Gaddafi and Libya’s fate in this regard serve as a cautionary tale, as do the conversations in the US about decertifying the Iran deal despite Iran’s adherence to agreement, as certified by the IAEA.

Given these unsettling precedents, Kim Jong-un, is unlikely to surrender his nuclear arsenal and thus surrender his only leverage.

Prevailing Security Dilemma

Nuclear-armed states, especially in Southern Asia, are part of a complex nuclear weapons geometry and each state in this web measures – or at least claims to – their nuclear arsenal in regard to the other.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is said to be designed to counter India’s nuclear capabilities whereas India measures its nuclear capability against China’s. In turn, China has its eye on US capabilities. The US, in turn, shares a tense dynamic with North Korea. Added to this are US’ extended nuclear deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan.

With the prevailing trust deficit and every state advancing their nuclear and military capability against their adversary, this kind of interconnectedness is hard to break through. Without the participation of these same nuclear-armed states, any disarmament effort is deemed to fail.

Ineffective Non-Proliferation Regimes

Disarmament goes hand-in-hand with non-proliferation and both have to be approached simultaneously. Over the past few decades, nuclear non-proliferation efforts have come under the scanner for their ability and success in curbing proliferation. For instance, China’s involvement in directly (or indirectly) facilitating nuclear proliferation is probably one of the biggest testaments to this failure.

China has been known to play a central role in transferring conventional and non-conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, to countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran and so on. As Samuel P Huntington writes in ‘Clash of Civilisations’, China’s biggest contribution has been to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which has been in the form of “furnishing Pakistan with Uranium for enrichment, advising on bomb design, and supplying Pakistan with M-11, 300 kilometers range ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons.”

The legacy of Chinese nuclear technology was further merchandised by countries like Iran and Pakistan to North Korea with the help of the AQ Khan network. China, a P5 state, has been indirectly involved in supplying nuclear weapons and technology right under the nose of such non-proliferation regimes, without facing any punitive action.

Conclusion

For the successful implementation of any regime, it is crucial that the biggest and the strongest players in the international system support it. Without this kind of backing, any initiative to ensure global security, especially those aimed at nuclear disarmament, starts on the wrong foot.

In order to get the disarmament ball rolling, it is important to first acknowledge these three challenges, and then attempt to address them. A one-size-fits-all approach in disarmament, especially at this particular juncture, is unlikely to yield a positive result.

* Shivani Singh
Research Intern, NSP, IPCS

By Santo D. Banerjee

A senior United Nations official has emphasized the urgency to resolve the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and to return the enclave to full civilian and security control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as agreed in the Cairo accord on October 12, 2017, described as a “landmark development”.

According to media reports, the agreement between the Fatah and Hamas factions allows the Palestinian government to resume its responsibilities in Gaza. A statement released by Egypt, which facilitated the accord, said the Palestinian government should assume its full responsibilities to manage the enclave by December 1, 2017.

“The United Nations, the Middle East Quartet and the international community continue our support for Egyptian efforts to sustainably implement the recent intra-Palestinian agreement and return Gaza under the control of the legitimate Palestinian Authority,” Nickolay Mladenov, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, told the Security Council on November 20, 2017.

“The positive momentum should be maintained and the Palestinian government must be fully empowered to function in Gaza,” he added.

He pointed out that on November 1, in a momentous step, the Palestinian Authority had regained control over Gaza crossings. And for the first time in more than a decade, on November 18, the Rafah crossing opened under PA control. The handover has eased access at the crossings for Palestinians with permits and ended illegal taxation imposed by Hamas at the crossings since June 2007.

“This handover, if translated into the full civilian and security control by the Palestinian Authority of Gaza, could be a step towards the normalization of movement in and out of the Strip,” he added.

Another important step was taken on November 2 when the Palestinian committee tasked with rationalizing and integrating Gaza’s public sector, held its first meeting.

Meanwhile, the transfer of responsibility at Gaza-based public institutions is slowly proceeding. The Ministers of Education, Health, Transport and Environment, among others, as well as technical teams from ministries in Ramallah, have travelled to Gaza to begin restoring Government control.

Some 150 PA-employed teachers have returned to work for the first time since 2007. A ten-day registration period for all PA employees in Gaza began on November 12, to determine staffing numbers, based on an evaluation of qualifications against needs.

Mladenov noted that the process is under way in an organized manner. Some ministries with low numbers of employees have already accomplished the task and the others are expected to finish within the set time-frame.

He warned: “With all the difficulties inherent in the Egyptian-led process and concerns about the timing and modalities of the Palestinian Authority’s assumption of full civilian and security control of Gaza, the process must not be allowed to fail.”

If the peace process fails, he declared, “it will most likely result in another devastating conflict,” adding: “Whether that conflict would be triggered by a meltdown of law and order in Gaza, by the reckless action of extremists or by strategic choice the result will be the same – devastation and suffering for all. This cycle must be avoided at all costs.”

Mladenov said: “Two million Palestinians in Gaza have high hopes that the Government’s return will improve their lives. After living in abject misery under Hamas control and locked in by the closures, their situation is close to exploding.”

He stressed that especially Palestinian leaders, Israel and the international community, have an important responsibility to advance the peace efforts. In this context, he expressed concern about the implications of the latest developments related to the PLO representative office in the U.S. “Only through constructive dialogue can we hope to advance peace and I call on all parties to remain engaged in the peace efforts,” he added.

Turning to the question of settlements, he pointed out that Israeli planning authorities had approved building permits for at least 418 housing units in the East Jerusalem settlements of Gilo and Ramat Shlomo. They had also issued a conditional approval of 178 housing units in the settlement of Nof Zion located in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber.

On November 10, the Israeli Prime Minister pledged to advance $226 million for the construction of infrastructure in the occupied West Bank that improves the connectivity of settlements to Israel potentially facilitating their expansion.

“The UN considers all settlement activities illegal under international law. They constitute a substantial obstacle to peace and should cease,” Mladenov said. “Legislative action that undermines the viability of the two-state solution also continues, as the Knesset considers a legislative amendment that would require a majority of 80 out of 120 members for any transfer of territory currently included in Israel-defined municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to a ‘foreign entity’.”

Against this background, Israeli authorities had demolished or seized 30 Palestinian structures, displacing 53 persons, including 31 children across the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Three Bedouin herding communities in Area C, including Ein al Hilwe, Um al Jmal, and Jabal al Baba, were at risk of having a total of 520 structures demolished after receiving “removal of property” orders in recent weeks. “Of particular concern are donor-funded structures serving as schools threatened with demolition,” the senior UN official added.

South Korea’s trade minister has met with Russian officials in Moscow, an official said Wednesday, November 22, in a move to lay the groundwork for a free trade deal with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) amid growing U.S. trade pressure, Yonhap news agency reports.

Kim Hyun-chong held separate talks with Herman Gref, CEO of Russia’s state-owned banking giant Sberbank and Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development Alexei Gruzdev on Tuesday. They discussed how to lay the foundation for a free trade agreement (FTA) between South Korea and the EAEU, a South Korea trade ministry official said, without giving any further details.

The meetings represent South Korea’s latest efforts to accelerate the ongoing negotiations between South Korea and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for an open trade pact.

South Korean officials said they hope to launch negotiations with the EAEU by the end of this year.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev agreed last week to accelerate the ongoing negotiations between South Korea and the EAEU for an FTA. The two leaders met on the sidelines of a regional forum in Manila.

South Korean officials say a free trade deal with the EAEU is effectively the same as clinching a bilateral trade deal with Russia.

Vietnam became the first country to sign an FTA with the EAEU in 2015.

The EAEU includes Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Timor-Leste’s response to the El Niño emergency in 2015-16 has exposed the challenges ahead as climate-induced disasters become commonplace in the future.

By Foo Yen Ne*

Against the backdrop of a freak storm this month in Malaysia and typhoon in Vietnam, one is reminded of the effects of climate change and the contrasting El Niño which hit Timor-Leste in 2015-2016. The 2015/2016 El Niño cycle was one of the most severe recorded. For the Asia Pacific region, the extreme weather event brought prolonged drought conditions that affected some 4.7 million people. The island state of Timor-Leste was one of the worst hit in the region; some 120,000 people in five districts were exposed to food and water insecurity as aquifers dried up.

As climate-induced disasters become commonplace in future, food and water security have implications on Timor-Leste’s long-term socio-economic development. Affected Timorese communities coped with drought conditions by seeking alternative food and water sources, selling assets, taking debt for food, reducing food portions and altering their diets.

Lingering Drought

These coping mechanisms do not cease when drought conditions retreat. Subsistence farmers’ inability to farm and harvest crops and feed livestock affect livelihoods and incomes for seasons to come. In turn, Timorese communities whose capacity to cope is already stretched are unable to pay for basic needs and send children to school.

The Timor-Leste government and humanitarian actors were well-informed of the risks of El Niño. Farmers and government officials noticed the decline of agricultural yields and delayed rains. Humanitarian agencies conducted joint consultations, satellite mapping, needs assessments and shared information with other stakeholders as the El Niño gradually unfolded.

All combined to soften the impact of the drought that followed. The government developed and disseminated radio messages to prepare farmers on how to mitigate the drought effects and procured rice stock for sale and distribution to ease the pains of inflated food prices. Local and international humanitarian agencies distributed drought resistant vegetable seeds, water filters, installed water tanks and rainwater harvesting equipment, gave unconditional cash assistance and conducted awareness sessions on drought mitigation.

These measures notwithstanding, the human and economic toll of the El Niño continues to manifest long after the drought. An assessment conducted by Red Cross Timor-Leste in September 2017 found that 67% of households in drought-affected municipalities were still experiencing the effects of the last drought.

Farmers continued to suffer from low agriculture harvests two seasons later. Some communities, it was reported, may take up to two years to recover. A lengthy recovery magnifies Timor-Leste’s pre-existing vulnerabilities such as widespread poverty and high incidence of malnutrition.

Based on a recent field visit, three challenges to effective disaster response to the 2015/2016 drought could be identified in Timor-Leste.

Too Little Too Late

First, direct action to alleviate the initial impact of the El Niño on communities were limited until the scope and severity of the drought became apparent and irreversible. One reason may be that the El Niño-induced drought was mistaken to be an extended “hungry gap”, a reference to an unproductive period between when the stocks of the last harvest have depleted and the beginning of the next harvest season. This is attributable to the slow-onset nature of an El Niño.

The impact of the drought was difficult to define, inconsistent across affected areas and were neither immediately seen nor felt to justify an emergency response. Actors tended to wait for more data before mobilising resources towards a committed response.

Presumably, this was reflected in the Timor-Leste government’s decision not to declare a state of emergency during the El Niño. This limited the options for response to the drought. In particular, international agencies affiliated to the United Nations (whose presence in Timor-Leste was sizable) were restricted by their mandates and were not able to access additional funds intended for emergency situations.

There is need for humanitarian actors in Timor-Leste to recognise the creeping character of a slow-onset disaster. Developing an agreed community-level baseline indicators such as food prices, access to water and agricultural yields that trigger emergency response may be a start for preventing a ‘wait and see’ approach that leads to late intervention.

Capacity and Coordination

Second, the need to enhance Timorese capacity for disaster management cannot be overstated. At the moment, physical capacity limitations such as poor road networks, telecommunications and water supply systems adversely affect disaster response and constrain access to aid. Local communities are ill-equipped with knowledge and practices for reducing risks, mitigating and adapting to natural hazards.

Government ministries responsible for disaster management also lack technical experts and adequately trained first responders, leading to disproportionate reliance on non-state actors to shoulder disaster response duties. Strengthening institutional capacity and community resilience to withstand disasters is made difficult by economic insecurity of the Timorese people and its government. But, failing to prioritise it risks perpetuating the cycle of disaster-related vulnerability.

Third, integrated coordination among actors in the crowded humanitarian landscape in Timor-Leste is still absent. Emergency response planning is concentrated in Dili where policy makers and development actors coordinate response through a multi-stakeholder forum, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

The HCT meets periodically to facilitate information sharing and response planning. But, local governments and community-based actors who have access to communities in need are excluded and organise separately. Overlaps in resilience programs, duplication of effort, uneven aid distribution and wastage of scarce resources also occur often.

The drought of 2015/2016 is not likely to be an aberration. The frequency and severity of climate-related disasters will increase. A patchwork of humanitarian aid efforts will offer immediate relief to some. But, if Timor-Leste was to address the underlying vulnerabilities that expose its people to natural disasters, it must have a disaster management structure that tackles the challenges above.

*Foo Yen Ne is a Senior Analyst with the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

ASEAN’s 50th anniversary has been marked by claims that its consensus decision making approach is no longer fit for purpose. ASEAN needs to move beyond the straightjacket of trying to achieve unanimity among ten divergent members. This is a misreading of consensus.

By Alan Collins*

The introspection that greeted ASEAN at its 50th anniversary suggests that not all is well. True, some have been moved to call it a “miracle”, a “world star” and one deserving a Noble Peace Prize. But many others prefer to prefix ASEAN with adjectives such as adrift, confused, divided and weak.

ASEAN’s initial silence during this year’s Rohingya crisis, and the Chairman’s Statement in September that deliberately did not mention the Rohingya community by name and placed equal culpability for the crisis at the door of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, appeared to confirm the criticism that ASEAN has a “culture of inaction” that prioritises procrastination.

Malaysia’s subsequent disassociation from the Chairman’s Statement as it was a misrepresentation of the situation, gave further muster to the view of ASEAN as divided and ineffectual. It certainly suggests that ASEAN is having great difficulty gaining consensus amongst a membership that has since left the familiarity created by its founding members.

Consensus, Not Unanimity

Malaysia’s public disavowing of the “Rohingya statement”, and prior to that ASEAN’s 2012 failure to issue a joint communique at the end of the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Cambodia, are headline-grabbing events that suggest consensus is indeed problematic. While this is so, the difficulty in gaining unanimity is also revealed in the increasing use in ASEAN communiques of the caveat “some ministers”, showing that a common sentiment was not accomplished.

This is seen as a failure to achieve consensus via consultation and negotiation. Is consensus no longer fit for purpose when ASEAN has become 10 and significant differences exist amongst the membership? No.

Consensus is the ASEAN solution precisely because it has not meant unanimity and it does not bestow on members a veto. If it has become interpreted in this manner then this is a political move that ASEAN members need to resist. Consensus has always meant that state elite could engage in a discussion in the knowledge that if there existed a point of disagreement, then the issue would be shelved until a time when the disagreement ceased to exist.

In essence, it ensured that no decision could be taken against outright opposition and so it enabled the elite to be at ease with one another; this no doubt helped develop the familiarity amongst the elite that captures the essence of the ASEAN Way.

Very importantly it ensured a sense of equality among the members; there is no ASEAN Security Council. Consensus was thus about being comfortable, to a greater or lesser degree, with the subjects being discussed and decisions reached. This understanding of consensus was captured in the formula, ASEAN minus X (A-X).

That is, ASEAN can proceed with a decision where some ASEAN members are more comfortable with the decision than others, so long as those others are not opposed. It did not therefore equate consensus with unanimity. It did not require all members to agree to participate and it did not give one member a veto.

Subtlety of ASEAN Diplomacy

This latter point is important to appreciate; how can equality exist if one member can prevent others from acting? If a member was opposed to an ASEAN decision, but it was in a minority of one, then consensus would publicly be said to have been achieved.

Through a process of consultation, the anomalous one would be reassured that its concerns would be respected and in return it would not prevent the others from proceeding. Being opposed did not mean becoming estranged and consensus via consultation ensured ASEAN was united in how it managed the wishes of all members.

In circumstances where those for and against are more even, then it is not unusual for the publication of a statement to accompany a declaration. While the declaration is likely to contain passages that quite often appear contradictory and reveal different positions within the membership, the statement is used to clarify a particular interpretation.

For example, when the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was adopted in 2012 it was accompanied by the Phnom Penh Statement, which sought to counter the expected accusation that the AHRD fell short of international human rights standards. In those circumstances where more than one was opposed and no amount of consultation would resolve concerns then consensus equated to adjournment.

Consensus as ASEAN’s Glue

Consensus is thus the glue that holds ASEAN together. It is what marks out the ASEAN Way as being different from the adversarial posturing, majority voting and legalistic governance structures that can be found in the West. It is what enabled states that, for the most part, freed themselves from a controlling colonial power to create an institution that does not replace that colonial power with a supranational organisation that could also impinge on their independence.

It is a process that encourages independent sovereign states to work cooperatively together in a familiar, non-threatening, environment. It is this familiarity that underpins the sense of friendship that ASEAN promotes and symbolises; the latter most visible in the routine arms-crossed handshake that is performed at public ASEAN meetings.

The solution to ASEAN’s challenges as it continues on its community-building path is not to jettison consensus, but rather to ensure that it is not narrowly framed as unanimity. Equally, the A-X formula should not be consigned to just its economic pillar but instead applied to all ASEAN activity as it was originally intended.

A good start is to boldly put consensus in the name of an ASEAN commitment; something like an “ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers”.

*Alan Collins is Professor of International Relations at Swansea University, United Kingdom and was recently a Visiting Professor with the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

By Malik Ibrahim

When Somaliland went to the polls last week, the self-declared state had more at stake than a transfer of power. The vote, if conducted in a peaceful and orderly way, would have been a chance for the self-declared state to make a compelling bid for international recognition. While the polls themselves occurred without major hiccups, violence erupted afterwards, when the Wadani opposition party to the ruling Kulmiye party claimed serious polling irregularities. In the ensuing chaos, seven people were killed amid outgoing President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo’s pleas for all sides to show restraint.

The recent developments are an unexpected tragedy for a would-be country known for its relative stability since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991. For seasoned observers, it wasn’t surprising that in the electoral run-up, the authorities seemed committed to get things right. Unlike neighboring Kenya, whose electoral process was flawed from the very beginning, the Somaliland government sought to avoid such attacks by using biometric voter registration in a bid to ensure the legitimacy of the vote. What’s more, outgoing President Silanyo banned government staff from using state funds for campaigning, and urged state media to provide equal coverage of all candidates. The nominees also participated in a presidential debate that was live-streamed from the capital, leading international observers to brand the process a success.

However, all these accomplishments are now on the verge of being undone. The accusations of vote-rigging levied against Kulmiye by Wadani party candidate Abdiraham Irro are threatening to throw Somaliland into political disarray. Not only is this undermining the state’s claim to legitimacy and recognition, it also has potentially far-reaching consequences. Without international recognition, Somaliland will face difficulties gaining international assistance to achieve a lasting peace accord with Somalia. Strategically located at the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland is crucial for achieving greater stability and security in the region.

Along with the allegations, Wadani officials suspended cooperation with the National Election Commission (NEC) and presented a book of empty ballot papers supposedly forged by Kulmiye. The announcement was enough to incite hundreds of irate Wadani supporters to take to the streets in clashes with law enforcement.

It is true that the riots have so far been relatively small and highly localized. But they may point to rising tensions simmering beneath the surface that are now coming to the fore. As such, they carry a serious inherent risk of fracturing what is still a clan-based society. Somaliland has owed much of its internal stability to the 1993 Boroma conference, where questions pertaining to representation and power-sharing between clans were resolved through the clans’ effective institutionalization. Clans were “turned” into parties, with the two most important ones – Habar Awal and Habar Yonis – controlling the country’s major political entities: the Kulmiye and Wadani party, respectively.

The new system established an upper house of clan elders, fusing indigenous forms of organization with contemporary modes of governance that ensured a democratic, consensus-based governing system. That way, political leaders succeeded in implementing a constitutional mechanism for settling differences, rather than resorting to violence. While this broadly appeased society, clan competition continues and society remains formally divided along clan lines, most of which are in coalition with either Kulmiye or Wadani.

Still, there is no indication that the riots were orchestrated from the top. In fact, amidst the violence, it did not take long for Wadani officials to reach an agreement with the NEC. Consequently, cooperation with NEC was restored and an investigation into the allegations will be initiated. The swift resolution was hailed by international observers and regarded as proof that all parties continue to support the electoral code of conduct signed in April this year.

While a bitter taste remains, goodwill and a desire to avoid further bloodshed were factors driving the agreement with the NEC. This alone is no mean feat in a region where stalled or non-existent elections are the norm, and where political figures are generally much less concerned about maintaining internal peace than clinging to their power. Thus, Somaliland is in a much better condition than countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where President Joseph Kabila has lingered in office past the end of his second, and ostensibly final, term in December 2016. Blatantly disregarding an agreement with the opposition to hold elections by the end of 2017, the government has now announced that the long-overdue votes will not be held until December 2018. Naturally, not only has this prompted ethnic conflict, but is also raising the question of whether the polls will continue to be pushed back indefinitely.

With the political crisis in the country driving a humanitarian disaster in the eastern and central parts of the DRC, the international community and the opposition have balked at Kabila’s latest announcement. Ida Sawyer, head of Human Rights Watch for Central Africa, noted that although Kabila had slightly curtailed the delay, “a large number of Congolese are, rightly, skeptical.” Moïse Katumbi, the opposition’s most credible candidate against Kabila, also criticized the continual postponements as a “maneuver by a predator regime, which wants to hold onto power indefinitely.” Considering how Kabila has entrenched his grip on power through corruption, violence, and an ever more forceful crackdown on the opposition, the DRC is only going to be slipping deeper into chaos.

It remains to be seen what results Somaliland’s NEC investigations will yield. Whether or not electoral fraud will be proven to have taken place, Somaliland must be able to show that its democratic institutions are strong enough to resist attacks on their credibility. Otherwise, Somaliland could face a similar fate to DRC: ravaged by internal conflict, becoming just another name on Africa’s long list of failed democracies.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com