By Peter G. Klein*

One of the more contentious aspects of the tax reform bill currently going through Congress is a proposal to treat the value of graduate-student tuition waivers as taxable income. In the US most PhD programs charge tuition, like undergraduate programs, but PhD students are typically granted a waiver of tuition along with a modest stipend to cover living expenses. In the early versions of the tax bill, the value of this waiver — which could be $50,000 to $60,000 at a private university — would be classified as taxable income. University officials, graduate student associations, academics, and most journalists have condemned this aspect of the tax plan. As a university professor I have received multiple communications urging me to write my Congressional representatives, speak out publicly, and otherwise fight to defeat this legislation.

As of this writing, it appears the tuition-waiver piece will not be in the final bill, so university officials, the AAUP, the grad student unions, and other graduate-education supporters can rest easy. Maybe all that lobbying paid off.

While I don’t support tax increases as a matter of principle, the arguments I heard for defeating the proposal were not very convincing. Most advocates for increased public funding of science, technology, graduate programs, and higher education more generally simply assert that their favorite projects are vital to the well-being of humanity. I saw multiple social media posts and similar items explaining that a PhD student on, say, a $20,000 annual stipend cannot possibly afford the taxes on the value of a $50,000 tuition waiver. “I would never have completed my degree!” say the professors. “I would have to drop out!” say current PhD students. OK, but how is that an argument against the tax bill?

Note that the US tax rules on gifts are complicated. Inheritances are obviously taxable, as are most tangible gifts. For example, if a person earning $20,000 goes on a TV game show and wins a car or a vacation worth $50,000, the prize value is considered taxable income, just like cash. If the winner complains, “But I can’t afford the taxes,” many people would reply, “then you shouldn’t have gone on the show!” Likewise, one might tell a PhD student, if you can’t pay the taxes on your tuition waiver, and can’t borrow against your future earnings to pay it, then maybe you should consider another career path. Most likely, if tuition waivers become taxable, schools will simply increase the value of scholarships and stipends, taxable or not, to cover the difference, at least for their more promising candidates, so maybe the effects will be small.

My main interest is not these technical details, however, but the general case for promoting graduate education. As noted above, most of the arguments I’ve seen simply take it as self-evident that academic research is valuable and that public policy should promote it. But do graduate programs really produce value? How can we tell?

The more thoughtful responses try to apply some economic theory. Some economists say that government should not tax investment, only consumption, to encourage growth. Expenditures on graduate education (and education more generally) are investments in human capital, so they should not be taxed. Leaving aside my general reservations about the human capital concept, this argument has many problems. First, why should government promote economic growth? As Murray Rothbard pointed out, there is no “optimal” rate of growth beyond that emerging from the voluntarily decisions of individuals to consume or save. Second, in what sense do we classify expenditures on education as investment? Perhaps education is a sort of consumer durable good like a house, refrigerator, or weight-loss program that provides the user with benefits now as well as in the future; if so, then at least part of this spending should be classified as consumption. Moreover, even if we agreed that years and dollars devoted to advanced study in biology, medicine, astrophysics, engineering, and perhaps law or business, result in some long-term societal benefit, what about a PhD in Gender Studies? Or Keynesian macroeconomics? Or Marxist political theory? I say society would be better off with fewer of these.

Another related argument, which was offered by many of my academic friends and colleagues, goes like this: science is a public good, and public goods should be subsidized by the state. I have criticized this kind of argument many times; Bill Butos gave an excellent presentation on this at Mises University and has written widely on the topic. Terence Kealey’s work should also not be missed. We all argue that both theory and evidence argue against the public-goods nature of science. However, even if the public-goods argument were correct, it would hardly jusify subsidies or incentives for graduate degrees per se. Again, think about the kind of work highlighted at New Real Peer Review. If anything, these dissertations and research papers generate negative externalities, not positive ones. I personally think the case for government support for STEM degrees is weak, but at least we can have a reasonable conversation about it. Higher education per se? Not even close.

In the end, I’m glad if the federal government has less tax revenue to spend. But the case for not taxing tuition waivers is the same as the case for not taxing anything else. There’s nothing magical about graduate degrees.

About the author:
*Peter G. Klein is Carl Menger Research Fellow of the Mises Institute and W. W. Caruth Chair and Professor of Entrepreneurship at Baylor University’s Hankamer School of Business.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

The transformational change in the manufacturing practices reveals that the development of sectoral growth and labour intensive industries are not the panacea for Make in India success. Sectoral growth or growth of traditional industries, such as textile, leather, agro based industries, cannot act as springboards for India to become global manufacturing hub, lest it becomes party to GVC (Global Value Chain) value added manufacturing network.

World manufacturing has entered into a new arena , where GVC plays a crucial role for the sake of low cost production. To this end, labour intensive industries in developing countries have worked well in the GVC manufacturing network. Automobile, electronics and the digitization are the heydays for world manufacturing. India is required to fit into this GVC network for the success of Make in India.

Firms in developed countries have established transnational manufacturing network , combining their high tech know how – with lower wage labour in developing countries. Eventually, production has become increasingly fragmented across the borders through growing prevalence of GVC for production of components and parts in low wage countries. Initially, South East and East Asia exemplified this new pattern of production.

So far, India trailed behind in this race. Reasons, there were lack of adequate skilled labor, lackluster export infrastructure, limitation of scale and difficulty in accessing cheap credit. These economic ills shadowed India’s potential as manufacturing exporter and became detrimental for it to enter the GVC network of manufacturing.

Success of GVC manufacturing network depends on how the component makers, dubbed “Supporting Industries”, function efficiently to upgrade technology, which are required for the assemblers. Asian car production by Toyota Motor Company is a case in point. To cut costs and re-enter into competitiveness , the Japanese company, after the Japanese currency yen appreciated, adopted GVC system of manufacturing to produce their Asian car model . It set up a five country base network for auto part production in between four ASEAN countries and India. It set up production facilities for diesel engine, press parts, axle in Thailand, manual transmission ( middle type) in Philippines, engine computer in Malaysia, gasoline engine and door lock in Indonesia and manual transmission ( large type) in India.

Nevertheless, opportunities sprouted with the rise in wages in China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia– the main partners for GVC in East Asia and ASEAN . India pitches for low wage country despite having high growth trajectory in the world. But only the cheap wages are not enough . Technology upgradation, skilled manpower and better export infrastructure are also essentials for India to become party to GVC manufacturing network.

Even though country’s manufacturing landscape has made transformational change from traditional industries to modern industries, such as automobile and electronic industries , resulting the modern industries the trend setter, the upgradation is yet to be made to make country potent for GVC network for manufacturing, like Vietnam and other South East Asian countries. This is despite that fact that India is already engaged in multilateral FTA with ASEAN and bilateral FTAs with Malaysia and Thailand.

To be party to the GVC manufacturing network in ASEAN, how should India’s manufacturing landscape fit in, if Make in India vows for a success. India’s manufacturing sector is required to be divided into two parts. The first part should include development of natural resource base industries , such as agro base and textile, mining and metal. The second part includes component base industries , such as automobile, electronic and digitization.

It is the second part where India can be the party to GVC value added manufacturing. India can be a challenging turf to become manufacturing hub for component and parts through GVC production network. India can provide workshop for manufacturing labour intensive component and parts for developed nations. Factors , which can go in favour of India, are India’s demography dividend and the edge in low cost manufacturing over South East and East Asia countries.

But, there are hurdles also to become partners to GVC . They are lack of skill workforce and lackluster infrastructure for exports. India is yet to ramp up its bottom down skilled workforce and infrastructure for exports.

Only 2 percent of the workforce is skilled in India, compared to 40 percent in China. The reason for abysmally low skilled workforce is the formal education, which does not provide suitable skills to make candidates viable for employment. The ITIs – government run training institutes – are either poorly managed or outdated. In China, skill development is geared up by steering secondary schools students into formal skill training programme.

For infrastructure development for export, development of India – ASEAN connectivity can become a new challenge for India to become party to GVC manufacturing network. Ministry of External Affairs ( MOEF) has initiated several steps to improve the India- ASEAN connectivity under Act East Asia policy. Shipping Corporation of India ( SCI) launched India-Myanmar Container Service in 2014. Joint Working Group was set up for development of Dawei Port in Myanmar. Ministry of Shipping has decided to start the India-Bangladesh- Myanmar-Sri Lanka/ Maldives direct shipping services by SCI. Myanmar is the gateway to ASEAN. Myanmar is the only nation in ASEAN , which has both road and sea borders with India.

Today, Indian economy is globally integrated. It has become one of the important wings for global growth. To this end, polarization of Make in India on sectoral growth and labour intensive industries are not enough for success. Integration of manufacturing through GVC had become the need of the hour for Make in India success.

Automobile, electronic and digitization are the component based industries. Developed nations , particularly Japan , fragmented component manufacturing for these industries in ASEAN countries for the benefit of low cost. India too developed its automobile industry and is on the trajectory for development of electronic industries, such as mobile phone manufacturing and thrust on digitization. In this perspectives, India’s initiative to develop India- ASEAN connectivity and focus on skill development are timely attempts to make India viable for partnership to GVC manufacturing network and eject a new challenge for Make in India success.

Views are personal

By Arie Firdaus

By a five to four vote, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (MK) on Thursday rejected a petition to outlaw extramarital and gay sex, in what is being hailed as a triumph by the LGBT minority in the country with the world’s largest Muslim population.

The MK ruled against the 2016 petition by the Family Love Alliance (AILA) to alter some articles in the criminal code. The alliance of conservative academics and activists said members sought to prevent Indonesia from being swamped by immoral behavior.

AILA urged the court to expand the existing law by forbidding married people from having sex with anyone but their spouses and barring all sex between unmarried people.

The group also asked the court to expand the current law that makes it illegal to have sex with a minor to also forbid gay sex.

“Rejecting the whole petition of the petitioners,” MK Chief Justice Arief Hidayat, who voted with the minority, announced on Thursday.

Judge Saldi Isra, who voted with the majority, said the court does not have the authority to amend the law by expanding its definition. The judiciary’s main function is to rule on the constitutionality of a law.

He said granting AILA’s petition would give the government power to interfere in what should be a domestic matter.

“Building an argument of organizing social order by threatening members of society with punishment, moreover with the criminal law, is to say that social order is only possible by implementing a threat,” Saldi said, calling that argument baseless.

Judge Wahiduddin Adams said in his dissenting opinion that alteration of the law is needed to be in harmony with the country’s values.

“All misconduct done by an individual, especially adultery, is always considered to have a negative impact communally because the individual is not an alienated person who is free from all structural ties of his or her society,” Adams said.

Activists raise concern over intolerance

Rights activists welcomed the ruling, but expressed surprise as they fear rising intolerance in Indonesia. The decision comes just a few months after police conducted raids against gay groups.

In May, police took 141 men into custody after raiding what they described as a gay striptease performance at a fitness club in North Jakarta.

That same month, two men who were found in bed together were publicly caned in Aceh province after being arrested in March. Except in the province of Aceh, where Sharia law is in force, gay sex is not illegal in Indonesia.

Naila Rizki, an activist with the National Commission of Women, said she was pleased by the decision, but regretted the court’s suggestion that petitioners channel their request to the legislature (DPR).

“Especially given the argument rejecting the petition is that the state should not intervene too much into the privacy of its citizens,” Naila said.

Dede Oetomo, an LGBT activist, said AILA’s petition “will trigger the action of intolerance.”

AILA ‘still fighting’

Meanwhile, AILA member Euis Sunarti, a professor at Bogor Agricultural University, said her group was not pleased.

“Of course I am sad, because we had big expectations. But today’s decision was five judges against four,” Euis told reporters after the ruling.

“We respect all the MK judges, especially those four who have dissenting opinions, their words make me cry.”

Euis said she and her group will take their petition to lawmakers as the legislature discusses revising the country’s criminal code.

“We are still fighting,” Euis said.

(Civil.Ge) — The Russian Foreign Ministry hosted on December 5 consultations with the representatives of the Russian-backed Sokhumi authorities regarding two projected agreements that are supposed to regulate “the dual citizenship issues” and “the simplified procedure for the acquisition of the Russian citizenship” by the residents of Abkhazia.

Dmitry Shamba, head of Abkhaz leader Raul Khajimba’s administration, who attended the talks last week, held a press conference regarding the consultations on December 11. Shamba said these were the first actual consultations about the draft agreement on dual citizenship, even though it had been officially discussed since 2009. According to him, representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service (FSB) participated from the Russian side.

Shamba also noted that the purpose of the projected agreement was to “regulate the status of the individuals who presently have dual citizenship,” since according to the Russian law it is impossible to get the Russian citizenship without giving up one’s previous citizenship, unless regulated otherwise by an international agreement. As a result, said Shamba, “since 2008, from the moment of recognition of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation, the process of the Abkhaz citizens receiving the Russian citizenship had been halted until the signing of a relevant agreement.”

Shamba also stressed that the projected agreement would not regulate how the Russian Federation citizens could acquire the “Abkhaz citizenship,” because “the very first article of the draft agreement contains the statement that issues concerning how citizenship is acquired will be regulated by national laws,” adding that the agreement “does not envision any changes in the laws of the republic of Abkhazia.”

Khajimba’s representative also spoke about another projected agreement discussed during the consultations, that would be based on the “alliance and strategic partnership” deal signed between Sokhumi and Moscow on November 24, 2014, in which Russia committed to “undertake additional measures” to ease procedures required for obtaining Russian citizenship for the “citizens of Abkhazia.”

In Shamba’s words, the second agreement was needed because the one about dual citizenship “would remove only one restriction” – the obligation to renounce “the Abkhaz citizenship” when receiving the Russian one. Therefore, said Shamba, it had been agreed “with the Russian colleagues” that besides the dual citizenship deal an “agreement on the simplified procedure for the acquisition of the Russian citizenship by the citizens of the republic of Abkhazia” would also be prepared and signed.

The two agreements, he explained, would be processed as a “package,” so that they could be “signed, presented for ratification, and come into force at the same time,” all within the next six months.

The agreement on dual citizenship was envisioned in the 2008 treaty on “the friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed between Russia’s President Dmitri Medvedev and the Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh on September 17, 2008. According to the document, citizens of one contracting party can obtain the citizenship of another contracting party “on terms and in the manner established by the legislation of the contracting party whose citizenship is obtained.”

The agreement was discussed during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s April visit to Abkhazia, where the matter “was a top agenda item” in Lavrov’s conversations with Raul Khajimba, according to the region’s Moscow-backed authorities.

Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Khalid Al-Falih announced the launch of a new export bank with SR30 billion ($8 billion) in capital to boost the Kingdom’s exports, the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported.

Khalid Al-Falih said SR5 billion was allocated to the new bank as the first capital payment. Stressing the importance of government funding for industrial and mineral projects, he said the capital of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) was increased from SR500 million to SR65 billion this year.

His remarks came at the annual Iktifaa forum organized by Saudi Aramco, in the presence of Eastern Region Gov. Prince Saud bin Naif.

The forum is a platform to examine ways to streamline spending with a view to stimulating industrial and logistical development in the Kingdom and promoting national cadres.

In the next 10 years, Saudi Aramco will spend over SR1 trillion on its capital projects and operational purchases, Al-Falih said.

A riot of colour and light dances through this peculiarly shaped galaxy, NGC 5256. Its smoke-like plumes are flung out in all directions and the bright core illuminates the chaotic regions of gas and dust swirling through the galaxy’s centre. Its odd structure is due to the fact that this is not one galaxy, but two — in the process of a galactic collision.

NGC 5256, also known as Markarian 266, is about 350 million light-years away from Earth, in the constellation of Ursa Major (The Great Bear) [1]. It is composed of two disc galaxies whose nuclei are currently just 13 000 light-years apart. Their constituent gas, dust, and stars are swirling together in a vigorous cosmic blender, igniting newborn stars in bright star formation regions across the galaxy.

Interacting galaxies can be found throughout the Universe, producing a variety of intricate structures. Some are quiet, with one galaxy nonchalantly absorbing another. Others are violent and chaotic, switching on quasars, detonating supernovae, and triggering bursts of star formation.

While these interactions are destructive on a galactic scale, stars very rarely collide with each other in this process because the distances between them are so vast. But as the galaxies entangle themselves, strong tidal effects produce new structures — like the chaotic-looking plumes of NGC 5256 — before settling into a stable arrangement after millions of years.

In addition to the bright and chaotic features, each merging galaxy of NGC 5256 contains an active galactic nucleus, where gas and other debris are fed into a hungry supermassive black hole. Observations from NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory show that both of these nuclei — and the region of hot gas between them — have been heated by shock waves created as gas clouds collide at high velocities.

Galaxy mergers, like the one NGC 5256 is currently experiencing, were more common early in the Universe and are thought to drive galactic evolution. Today most galaxies show signs of past mergers and near-collisions. Our own Milky Way too has a long history of interaction: it contains the debris of many smaller galaxies it has absorbed in the past; it is currently cannibalising the Sagittarius Dwarf Spheroidal Galaxy; and in a kind of cosmic payback, the Milky Way will merge with our neighbour, the Andromeda Galaxy in about two billion years.

Also in this Hubble image is another pair of probably interacting galaxies — they are hiding to the right of NGC 5256 in the far distance, and have not yet been explored by any astronomer. From our perspective here on Earth, NGC 5256 is also just a few degrees away from another famous pair of interacting galaxies, Messier 51, which was observed by Hubble in 2005 (

The oldest ice core ever drilled outside the polar regions may contain ice that formed during the Stone Age–more than 600,000 years ago, long before modern humans appeared.

Researchers from the United States and China are now studying the core–nearly as long as the Empire State Building is tall–to assemble one of the longest-ever records of Earth’s climate history.

What they’ve found so far provides dramatic evidence of a recent and rapid temperature rise at some of the highest, coldest mountain peaks in the world.

At the American Geophysical Union meeting on Thursday, Dec. 14, they report that there has been a persistent increase in both temperature and precipitation in Tibet’s Kunlun Mountains over the last few centuries. The change is most noticeable on the Guliya Ice Cap, where they drilled the latest ice core. In this region, the average temperature has risen 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) in the last 50 years and the average precipitation has risen by 2.1 inches per year over the past 25 years.

Lonnie Thompson, Distinguished University Professor in the School of Earth Sciences at The Ohio State University and co-leader of the international research team, said that the new data lend support to computer models of projected climate changes.

“The ice cores actually demonstrate that warming is happening, and is already having detrimental effects on Earth’s freshwater ice stores,” Thompson said.

Earth’s largest supply of freshwater ice outside of the Arctic and Antarctica resides in Tibet–a place that was off limits to American glaciologists until 20 years ago, when Ohio State’s Byrd Polar and Climate Research Center (BPCRC) began a collaboration with China’s Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research. There, glaciologist Yao Tandong secured funding for a series of joint expeditions from the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

“The water issues created by melting ice on the Third Pole, along with that from the Arctic and Antarctica, have been recognized as important contributors to the rise in global sea level. Continued warming in these regions will result in even more ice melt with the likelihood of catastrophic environmental consequences,” Yao noted.

The name “Third Pole” refers to high mountain glaciers located on the Tibetan Plateau and in the Himalaya, in the Andes in South America, on Kilimanjaro in Africa, and in Papua, Indonesia–all of which have been studied by the Ohio State research team.

Of particular interest to the researchers is a projection from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that future temperatures on the planet will rise faster at high altitudes than they will at sea level. The warming at sea level is expected to reach 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100, and possibly double that, or 6 degrees Celsius, at the highest mountain peaks in the low latitudes.

“The stable isotopic records that we’ve obtained from five ice cores drilled across the Third Pole document climate changes over the last 1,000 years, and contribute to a growing body of evidence that environmental conditions on the Third Pole, along with the rest of the world, have changed significantly in the last century,” Thompson said. “Generally, the higher the elevation, the greater the rate of warming that’s taking place.”

Around the world, hundreds of millions of people depend on high-altitude glaciers for their water supply. The Guliya Ice Cap is one of many Tibetan Plateau ice caches that provide fresh water to Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

“There are over 46,000 mountain glaciers in that part of the world, and they are the water source for major rivers,” Thompson said.

In September and October of 2015, the team ventured to Guliya and drilled through the ice cap until they hit bedrock. They recovered five ice cores, one of which is more than 1,000 feet long.

The cores are composed of compressed layers of snow and ice that settled on the western Kunlun Mountains year after year. In each layer, the ice captured chemicals from the air and precipitation during wet and dry seasons. Today, researchers analyze the chemistry of the different layers to measure historical changes in climate.

Based on dating of radioactive elements measured by scientists at the Swiss research center ETH Zurich, the ice at the base of the core may be at least 600,000 years old.

The oldest ice core drilled in the Northern Hemisphere was found in Greenland in 2004 by the North Greenland Ice Core Project and was dated to roughly 120,000 years, while the oldest continuous ice core record recovered on Earth to date is from Antarctica, and extends back 800,000.

Over the next few months, the American and Chinese research teams will analyze the chemistry of the core in detail. They will look for evidence of temperature changes caused by ocean circulation patterns in both the North Atlantic and tropical Pacific Oceans, which drive precipitation in Tibet as well as the Indian monsoons. For instance, one important driver of global temperatures, El Niño, leaves its chemical mark in the snow that falls on tropical glaciers.

Ultimately, researchers hope the work will reveal the linkages that exist between ice loss in tropical mountain glaciers and climate processes elsewhere on the planet. Thompson, Yao, and German ecologist Volker Mosbrugger are co-chairing a Third Pole Environment Program to focus on basic science and policy-relevant issues.

“The more we study the different components of the environment of the Third Pole, the better we understand climate change and its linkages among Earth’s three polar regions,” Yao said.

Higher blood sugar early in pregnancy raises the baby’s risk of a congenital heart defect, even among mothers who do not have diabetes, according to a study led by researchers at the Stanford University School of Medicine.

The study was online Dec. 15 in The Journal of Pediatrics.

For many years, physicians have known that women with diabetes face an increased risk of giving birth to babies with heart defects. Some studies have also suggested a link between nondiabetic mothers’ blood sugar levels and babies’ heart defect risk. However, the new study is the first to examine this question in the earliest part of pregnancy, when the fetal heart is forming.

“Most women who have a child with congenital heart disease are not diabetic,” said the study’s senior author, James Priest, MD, assistant professor of pediatric cardiology. “We found that in women who don’t already have diabetes or develop diabetes during pregnancy, we can still measure risk for having a child with congenital heart disease by looking at their glucose values during the first trimester of pregnancy.”

The study’s lead author is Emmi Helle, MD, PhD, an affiliate in pediatric cardiology and former postdoctoral scholar.

A research challenge

One challenge associated with conducting the research was the fact that maternal blood glucose is not routinely measured in nondiabetic pregnant women. Instead, women typically receive an oral glucose tolerance test halfway through pregnancy to determine whether they have gestational diabetes, but this test is performed well after the fetal heart has formed.

The research team studied medical records from 19,107 pairs of mothers and their babies born between 2009 and 2015. The records included details of the mothers’ prenatal care, including blood test results and any cardiac diagnoses made for the babies during pregnancy or after birth. Infants with certain genetic diseases, those born from multiple pregnancies and those whose mothers had extremely low or high body-mass-index measures were not included in the study. Of the infants in the study, 811 were diagnosed with congenital heart disease, and the remaining 18,296 were not.

The scientists analyzed blood glucose levels from any blood sample collected from the mothers between four weeks prior to the estimated date of conception and the end of the 14th gestational week, just after the completion of the first trimester of pregnancy. These early blood glucose measurements were available for 2,292, or 13 percent, of women in the study. The researchers also looked at the results of oral glucose tolerance tests performed around 20 weeks of gestation, which were available for 9,511, or just under half, of the women in the study.

When risk is elevated

After excluding women who had diabetes before pregnancy or who developed it during pregnancy, the results showed that the risk of giving birth to a child with a congenital heart defect was elevated by 8 percent for every increase of 10 milligrams per deciliter in blood glucose levels in the early stages of pregnancy.

The next step in the research is to conduct a prospective study that follows a large group of women through pregnancy to see if the results are confirmed, Priest said. If researchers see the same relationship, it may be helpful to measure blood glucose early in pregnancy in all pregnant women to help determine which individuals are at greater risk for having a baby with a heart defect, he said.

“We could use blood glucose information to select women for whom a screening of the fetal heart could be helpful,” Priest said, adding that modern prenatal imaging allows for detailed diagnoses of many congenital heart defects before birth. “Knowing about defects prenatally improves outcomes because mothers can receive specialized care that increases their babies’ chances of being healthier after birth.”

The work is an example of Stanford Medicine’s focus on precision health, the goal of which is to anticipate and prevent disease in the healthy and precisely diagnose and treat disease in the ill.

By Saji Thomas

Hindu activists have beaten eight priests and torched their vehicle outside a central Indian police station.

The assault victims had been attempting to assist 30 seminarians and two priests arrested on Dec. 14 for allegedly trying to convert non-Christians.

Trouble started when the group from St. Ephrem’s Theological College in Satna town of Madhya Pradesh state went to a local village to sing Christmas carols.

Father George Mangalappally said that as they were singing an angry mob started shouting slogans against what they regarded as conversion activities.

“One of them called police and demanded action against us,” Fr. Mangalappally said.

A police officer, on condition of anonymity, stated that after being arrested and charged the carolers were kept in ‘protective custody’ because of fears they would be attacked if released immediately.

Father Anish Emmanuel was among those who went to the police station to aid the carolers.

However, about 100 Hindus attacked them in the police compound, Father Emmanuel said.

“We were beaten up in front of the police, but they did nothing,” he complained.

“They set our vehicle on fire, forcing us to take shelter inside the police station.”

Father Maria Stephen, a spokesperson for the regional bishops’ council, said this kind of attack raised serious questions about a lack of religious freedom.

The Catholics were detained on charges of violating a state law that makes it a criminal offence to attempt to convert any one using fraud, inducement or allurement.

Bishop Joseph Kodakkailil of Satna told ucanews.com that a villager had falsely claimed he was offered 5,000 rupees (US$65) to convert to Christianity.

He said missioners in the diocese had been experiencing hostility for the past two years.

Shibu Thomas, founder of Persecution Relief, an ecumenical forum that records persecutions against Christians, said the latest violence constituted the 48th attack on Christian carolers in India this Christmas season.

Overall, more than 650 attacks on minority Christians have been reported in the Hindu-majority nation so far in 2017.

By Sinem Cengiz*

Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy said people do not become leaders due to fate or their characteristics, but due to the social circumstances at that time — zeitgeist (spirit of the time). Nowadays, Russian President Vladimir Putin is reading the zeitgeist in the Middle East. He visited three critical countries on Monday, having breakfast with his Syrian counterpart, lunch with his Egyptian counterpart and dinner with his Turkish counterpart.

In Turkey, he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This was their eighth meeting in a year, indicating how much bilateral relations have improved since the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara.

In Monday’s talks, agenda topics included the US decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move its embassy there, details of Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, and the latest developments in the Syrian conflict. Erdogan discussed Jerusalem with Putin by phone a day after the US decision. The two leaders agree on the matter, and Putin threw his full support behind Turkey during a press conference in Ankara.

Following the Putin-Erdogan talks, the next meeting in Astana was announced. Turkey and Russia are central to the Astana peace process, which includes Iran. As the Syrian conflict is approaching an endgame, the three countries have further engaged in a process of cooperation.

Putin’s surprise announcement of a partial withdrawal of Russia’s military from Syria may contribute to further improving Turkish-Russian relations. In his first visit to Syria since 2015, he said the war on terror there is almost complete, and the time has come for a gradual pullback of Russian forces. This means the Syrian crisis has entered a new phase in which Moscow plans to lead the process in close cooperation with Ankara and Tehran.

Turkey and Russia are planning to hold a congress of Syrian National Dialogue in Sochi, in which Moscow aims to bring together the Syrian government and opposition. The congress, according to Moscow, aims to address the adoption of a new constitution, the parameters of future Syrian statehood, and the organization of elections under UN auspices.

Turkey objects to the inclusion of the Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), because of their links with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara sees as a terrorist organization. In light of this, Moscow has reportedly proposed that the congress include all Kurdish groups except the PYD.

With his one-day tour of the Middle East, Putin sent a clear message to all relevant actors that Russia is emerging as a regional powerbroker at a time of declining US influence. With a cautious and well-planned strategy based on shuttle diplomacy in the region, he appears willing to fill the vacuum that the Americans are leaving behind.

• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East.

The Pakistani government’s decision to shut down at least 10 organizations without providing valid reasons violates rights to freedom of expression and association, Human Rights Watch said Friday. Organizations affected include prominent groups working on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and development issues.

On December 14, 2017, several international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), including Open Society Foundations and ActionAid, told the media that they had received letters from the federal government rejecting their applications for registration. The government has not published the list of affected groups, but according to media reports, none have been provided with reasons for the decision.

“The Pakistani government’s closure of international organizations without allowing these decisions to be contested shows disturbing disregard for the well-being of ordinary Pakistanis who benefit from them,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “The government should be facilitating the vital work of independent groups, not obstructing it with intimidation tactics.”

The “Policy for Regulation of INGOs in Pakistan,” announced on October 1, 2015, contains vague and overly restrictive regulations that have harmed the work climate for many international groups. The regulations require all INGOs to register and obtain prior permission from the Ministry of Interior to carry out any activities in the country, and restrict their operations to specific issues and geographical areas. The ministry is broadly empowered to cancel registrations on grounds of “involvement in any activity inconsistent with Pakistan’s national interests, or contrary to Government policy”—terms that have vague meanings and can be used for political reasons to target critical organizations or individuals.

Pakistan’s government has the responsibility to prevent fraud, financial malfeasance, and other illegal activities by INGOs, but Pakistan already has other laws and regulations that address such concerns. The INGO regulations severely restrict rights to freedom of association and expression for Pakistanis working for INGOs, as well as for foreign nationals. These rights are protected under the Pakistani constitution and international human rights law.

International groups make significant contributions to Pakistan in safeguarding and promoting health, nutrition, education, sanitation, food security, and the rule of law and human rights, among many other areas. International humanitarian and development organizations working in Pakistan employ thousands of Pakistanis, contribute hundreds of millions of US dollars to the national economy, and, working alongside their local partners, reach an estimated 20 million Pakistanis with assistance and services every year.

Under the regulations, all international organizations are required to obtain permission in advance from a government “INGO committee” chaired by the secretary of the Ministry of Interior before carrying out any activity in Pakistan. The committee has the power to rescind that permission at any time, for vaguely defined reasons.

The regulations provide for a right of appeal only on decisions by the INGO committee to cancel registration. The appeals process, to a Special Ministerial Committee, will be final, denying the groups any recourse through an independent judicial process.

The Pakistani government should revise the policy for INGOs so that it does not contravene the rights to freedom of expression and association, and cannot be misused for political reasons to restrict the peaceful activities of nongovernmental organizations.

“The recent action against nongovernmental organizations comes amidst a shrinking space for free expression and dissenting voices,” Adams said. “Placing arbitrary restrictions on international groups is likely to increase the climate of fear for domestic organizations.”

By Jim Garamone

Successive U.S. administrations have warned of Iran’s malign influence in the Middle East, but lying in a hangar at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling here is concrete proof that the Iranian regime is exporting arms to sow instability and promote violence throughout the region.

In the hangar are three intact Iranian weapon systems and debris from a fourth, recovered from the battlefields of the Middle East that can be directly traced to Tehran.

“In October, President [Donald J.] Trump announced a new strategy to address the totality of Iranian threats and malign activities: nuclear; ballistic missile development and proliferation; counter-maritime operations; cyber; and support to terrorism and unconventional warfare,” said Laura Seal, a Defense Department spokesperson. “Part of the president’s strategy is to clearly show how Iran continues to defy the international community by violating United Nations resolutions.”

The equipment in the hangar is proof of Iran’s malicious strategy, Seal said. “We present this evidence so that we, our allies and international partners — including organizations like the [United Nations] — can be clear eyed about Iran’s activities as we work together,” Seal said.

Specifically, the hangar contains “objects that provide evidence of Iranian weapons proliferation in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions 2216 and 2231,” Seal said.

The U.N. has repeatedly sanctioned Iran for its illicit proliferation. The United States was part of the negotiation team that finally hammered out a deal with Iran to halt its nuclear program. The other nations were China, Russia, Great Britain and France. That deal did not include the other malign activities Iran engages in around the Middle East.

Iran would like to see an Iranian crescent going from northern Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon to the Mediterranean. The regime would also like to extend its hegemony throughout the Persian Gulf and onto the Arabian Peninsula. Iran is operating through and supplying the Houthis in Yemen, officials said.

Iranian-Made Weapons

The weapons systems on display were retrieved from battlefields in the Middle East by U.S. partners in the region — primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Seal said.

The four systems are a short-range ballistic missile, an antitank guided missile, an unmanned aerial vehicle and exploding boat technology. “All four include parts made by [the] Iranian government-run defense industry, and all could have only come from Iran,” Seal said.

There are pieces of two Iranian Qiam missiles launched from Yemen into Saudi Arabia. One targeted the Yanbu oil facility, and the other was aimed at King Khalid International Airport. “Only Iran makes the Qiam,” Seal said.

Another piece of equipment is an Iranian-made antitank guided missile called a Toophan. “This one was obtained by Saudi Arabia on the battlefield,” Seal said. The missile is a high-precision, direct-fire weapon with a range of about 2.4 miles. The Houthis in Yemen use them to target infrastructure and vehicles, officials said, noting that the Houthis do not have the technology to manufacture these weapons.

The display also showcases a Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicle operated by Houthi forces, which was recovered by Saudi Arabia. “The Qasef-1 can be used as a one-way attack drone — diving on targets Kamikaze-style and detonating its warhead upon impact,” Seal said. “Only Iran makes the Qasef-1. It is a member of the Ababil UAV family, designed and produced by the Iranian government.”

Finally, the display features the guidance system from an Iranian Shark-33 boat. This is an explosive-laden, unmanned boat used in an attack the Saudi Arabian frigate HMS al Madinah. That attack killed two and injured three and left a 5-by-6.5-foot hole in the ship’s hull, Seal said.

“There are more than half a dozen pieces of evidence demonstrating that these components are directly traceable to Iran,” she said. “What makes the Shark 33 so dangerous isn’t just that it can explode. It has a guidance system allowing it to track and hit a moving target without an operator on board, so the boat can be deployed to blow up a ship without sending someone on a suicide mission. The computer and sensors serve as that unmanned guidance system for the Shark 33 — and they are supplied by Iran.”

Finally, the boat’s onboard camera captures a still image of its location every time the guidance software turns on. “Images found on the Shark 33’s computer show it inside what is probably an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps facility in eastern Tehran,” she said.

The display is the first step of U.S. strategy to clearly show how Iran continues to defy the international community. “It is clear Iran is arming dangerous militia and terror groups with advanced weaponry to sow instability and violence,” Seal said. “But we are not on a road to war with Iran — just the opposite. The U.S. wants Iran to act as a responsible nation and enhance security and stability in a region that has suffered from Tehran’s efforts to undermine international order by instigating violence and political chaos.”

By Ivan Angelovski

Balkan governments need to ask the US and Saudi Arabia more questions following revelations that their arms deliveries are routinely diverted to Syria and into the hands of ISIS, a report says.

EU-backed weapons inspectors have discovered that arms from Central and Eastern Europe make up a third of ISIS’s arsenal, says a new report released on Thursday.

The report by the British-based Conflict Armament Research, which has a mandate from the EU to trace weapons in conflict zones, confirmed the findings of Balkan Investigative Reporting Network’s series of investigations into weapons transfers to Syria.

BIRN earlier revealed how two major supply-lines, one funded by United States and the other by Saudi Arabia, have been moving large quantities of Soviet-style weapons from the Balkans to Syrian rebels in breach of international legal agreements on the arms trade.

The three-year study, ‘Weapons of the Islamic State’, found that leaks in these pipelines had “significantly augmented the quantity and quality of weapons available to IS forces”, posing a continued threat to regional and global security.

Conflict Armament Research discovered that more than half of ISIS’s new weapons in Syria came from Bulgaria.

The report also highlighted equipment from Romania and Serbia which had ended up in the hands of the Islamist militant group.

Damien Spleeters, Conflict Armament Research’s head of operations for Iraq and Syria, explained that these weapons had been bought by the US and Saudi Arabia, often on the basis of a legally binding end-user certificate, which guarantees that the equipment will not be diverted to another country.

“As far as our evidence shows, the diverters [Saudi and the US] knew what was going on in terms of the risk of supplying weapons to groups in the region,” Spleeters explained.

In its report, CAR insists that “battlefield capture” alone cannot explain the quantity and speed with which Islamic State got it hands on some of these weapons.

The report documents an anti-tank weapon produced in Bulgaria and exported to the United States on December 12, 2015, and found in the hands of ISIS only 59 days later – on February 9, 2016.

“An EUC [end-user certificate] is there for a reason: it’s there to put some kind of trust between parties in export and import of weapons,” said Spleeters.

“Now if you have a party that’s a big importer of weapons like USA or Saudi Arabia that are systematically breaching EUC you’re right to ask a question whether they are the good partner in terms making an arms deal with them,” he added.

He said that exporting countries such as Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria insisted they were unaware of the diversions to Syria, but he argued that more questions now need to be asked about exports heading to the US and Saudi Arabia.

“It’s been taken for granted that when US or Saudi Arabia are buying weapons it’s no questions asked to what’s going to happen with them. And what we have shown with evidence from the field is that the questions should be asked,” Spleeters said.

“I do hope [the exporting countries] will review all evidence and make the right decision,” he added.

The United States has announced three new Department of Defense programs for Lebanon to help in its capability to conduct border security and counter-terrorism operations.

The programs, funded through the Department of Defense’s “Building Partner Capacity” program, have a combined value of more than $120 million and were announced in Lebanon by Ambassador Elizabeth Richard and Gen. Joseph Votel, head of U.S. Central Command. Richard and Votel visited the country and met with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Minister of Defense Yaacoub el-Sarraf, and Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces Gen. Joseph Aoun.

The first program involves provision of a rotary-wing close air support capability of six new MD 530G light attack helicopters and associated equipment and training. The U.S. Embassy in Lebanon said the package is worth more than $94 million.

The second program gives Lebanon’s armed forces additional command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities through the delivery of six new Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicles and associated equipment and training. The program comes in at a value of more than $11 million.

The third program, at more than $16 million, gives the Lebanese military the ability of joint fire support and close air support through the delivery of communications equipment, night vision devices, and other equipment and training.

“The announcement of these programs reaffirms the U.S. Government’s commitment to the Lebanese-American partnership and support of the Lebanese Armed Forces in their capacity as the sole defender of Lebanon,” the Embassy said in a press release.

Original source

“The five-pointed red star, one of the symbols of communism, the Russian army and the Kremlin, is celebrating its 100^th anniversary today, Dmitry Lyskov of Vzglyad reports, noting that it is still surrounded by controversy as many Russians consider it to this day to be “an emblem of Satanists and Masons.”

Given the ongoing controversy about allegations that the killing of the Imperial Family was a ritual murder, a subject Lyskov has also explored (vz.ru/society/2017/12/6/898080.html), his comments about the history and meaning of the red star are particularly intriguing now (vz.ru/society/2017/12/15/899446.html).

The idea that the red star is a satanic symbol has circulated in post-Soviet Russia for a long time. In 2014, for example, LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky asked the defense ministry to look into its continued use because, he said, the five-pointed red star for “certain Orthodox” Russians “is associated with satanic symbols.”

Several Russian Orthodox writers have gone further. One argued that “nothing reflects so clearly the anti-Christian and satanic essence of bolshevism as its symbols,” including the red star (rusk.ru/st.php?idar=112449). And another argued the red star is “at one and the same time masonic and satanic” as well as Jewish given that “the most important task of masonry is the destruction of Christianity” (belrussia.ru/page-id-2308.html).

But Lyskov says that this is more than a little much given the history of the appearance of the red star in 1917. Had it contained all the meanings these authors say, one would have expected the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement to use it as a mobilizing tool against Red forces. The fact is that they didn’t.

Indeed, many White officers wore on their uniforms stars of the same shape because those had been introduced into the tsarist military in 1827 by Nicholas I who was copying French uniforms of the time of Napoleon. They thus had no reason to view the red star as anti-Christian, satanic or masonic.

Moreover, as many Russians knew, the five-pointed star had a long history as a Christian symbol, tracing its origins to the pre-Christian Pythagoreans but enshrined in Christian symbolism and even informing the works of perhaps the greatest Russian icon painter Andrey Rublov.

Efforts to transform the star into an anti-Christian symbol appear to have their origins in the work of Louis Constant, a nineteenth century French promoter of the occult, but as Lyskov points out, “it isn’t completely clear how such an odious figure could serve as an authority for a believer.”

It is true, the Vzglyad writer says, that there were some in the White Russian emigration in the 1920s and 1930s who did talk about “the occult roots of Bolshevism” and who linked that to what they saw as a Jewish conspiracy against Russia and Christianity. But such people remained extremely marginal even when they were supported by the Nazis.

Soviet citizens knew little of this or of the actual history of the red star. But when the sluice gates of information were opened during perestroika, Russians were exposed to all kinds of information, some reliable but some not; and they often had great difficulty in distinguishing the one from the other.

“In our atheistic society, had had ideas both about religion and the pre-revolutionary past that had been distorted by communist ideology, even the most improbable notions fell on fertile ground, up to and including satanic treatments of a two centuries-old army symbol which they began to call ‘the Bolshevik star.’”

And on the basis of a common anti-communism, these ideas penetrated and combined in a “paradoxical” way with those of Russian Orthodoxy, completely confusing the situation. And some Orthodox radicals even began insisting that overcoming communism requires the elimination of all red stars (belrussia.ru/page-id-2308.html).

The actual history of the appearance of the red star is still clouded in much mystery and dispute, Lyskov says; but it appears that it originated with Red military commanders who viewed the star as a sign of the army and acceptable as long as it was red, the color of the revolution, and featuring a hammer and sickle.

No one at the outset of the Soviet period had any intention of interjecting “any mystical, occult or anti-Christian meanings in the new symbol of the new army; and the Bolsheviks did not come up with anything fundamentally new in this area that represented a complete break with the history and culture of the country.”

“But in order to understand this,” the journalist concludes, “one must know one’s history.” And for Russians, there are now as there have been in the past real problems in that regard.

India joins the regime at a time when export regulation of dual-use technology items have become increasingly complex.

By Rakesh Sood*

Last week, India joined the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) as the 42^nd member. A brief statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs thanked the members for their support for India’s candidature and declared that “India’s entry into the Arrangement would be mutually beneficial and further contribute to international security and non-proliferation objectives”.

WA is one of the four non-proliferation related export control regimes – the other three being the Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These are not treaty based but ad hoc groupings of like-minded countries.

Though WA in its present form is the youngest of the four regimes, its precursor, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was set up in 1950 in an attempt to deny the Soviet bloc access to Western equipment and technologies. With the end of the Cold War, CoCom was wound up because many east European countries became EU and NATO members of EU. With proliferation becoming the new threat, CoCom was reborn as the WA, with the original 17 Western CoCom members as also Russia and a number of former communist states together with Argentina, South Africa and now, India. The basic objective of WA is to contribute to regional and international peace and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies thereby preventing destabilising acquisitions or acquisitions by non-state actors.

Member states harmonise their national export policies relating to conventional weapons, covered in the Munitions List. Its 22 categories cover small arms and light weapons, tanks and armoured vehicles, marine vessels, aircraft and helicopters. A second control list is the Dual Use Goods and Technologies List divided into 9 categories covering special materials, processing machinery and equipment, electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors, aerospace and marine systems. Regular exchanges of information take place and member states report all transfers and denials to destinations outside the WA.

With diffusion of technology accelerated by globalisation and the ICT revolution, WA’s role has become more significant. Unlike nuclear and space technologies, which were developed by governments for military use, the new ICT and related technologies like encryption, blockchain systems, surveillance and big data analytics have been developed by the private sector and found early applications in the commercial world. This makes export regulation of dual use technology items both necessary and also complex.

The other three regimes originated during the Cold War but have evolved subsequently. Use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s became the trigger for setting up the AG in 1985. The original membership of 15 Western nations has now expanded to 41 plus the EU. AG seeks to prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by controlling exports or sensitive chemicals, biological organisms and materials, relevant equipment and technologies. India is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention and will probably join the AG in 2018.

Discussions for curbing missile proliferation began among the G-7 countries in 1983, the same year that India launched its missile programme. In 1987, the MTCR was launched to curb proliferation of missiles with a range of 300 kms and a capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg ie., a nuclear capable missile. Subsequently, the control lists were expanded to cover drones and dual use items including ground and launch support equipment. Last year, India joined the MTCR as the 35^th member state.

The NSG (originally called the London Club) came into being in 1975 with seven countries (USA, USSR, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Japan) to address nuclear proliferation challenges by focusing on export controls. The immediate catalyst for it was the Indian PNE in 1974. After the Cold War, NSG control lists were expanded to cover dual use items and technologies.

Membership also grew and currently stands at 48; China became a member in 2004. This decision was politically driven and overlooked China’s proliferation record during the 1980s and 1990s.

After the 1998 nuclear tests, India’s approach towards these regimes began to change. Global terrorism, rising threat of WMD proliferation and the objective of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power contributed to the shift. The 2008 special waiver by the NSG was an acknowledgement of India’s non-proliferation credentials and made possible because of strong US backing. With US support for India’s full membership in all four regimes in 2010, India stepped up its engagement and gradually brought its export control lists and practices into harmony with the regimes.

The abortive push for NSG membership in 2016 failed to take into account the changed geopolitics of a weaker US and an assertive China. Having learnt its lesson, the Modi government chose to pursue its objectives quietly. Given China’s open opposition, the NSG membership will have to wait for better relations between the two countries.

This article originally appeared in The Print.

The most oft-repeated objective of the re-launching of European defence is to achieve strategic autonomy for the EU. Despite its frequent invocation, the concept of strategic autonomy has different meanings and purposes.

By Félix Arteaga*

Strategic autonomy is an old goal of European defence. In general, the concept refers to the indispensable military capabilities necessary to allow a strategic actor to engage in autonomous action. In specific terms, the concept comprises political, operational and industrial components. These can be combined in different proportions, generating in turn different interpretations of strategic autonomy. This analysis presents the dominant interpretations in the EU and reviews their past evolution and current state, as well as the expectations of, and controversies stemming from, the development of EU strategic autonomy.

Analysis

The concept of strategic autonomy has different meanings, depending on which of its three dimensions –political (strategy), operational (capabilities) or industrial (equipment)– is emphasised over the others. The relative mix of these elements has varied over the course of the history of European defence construction, depending on the circumstances. After the Saint Malo declaration, and under French-British sponsorship, the European Council of June 1999 in Cologne introduced the concept of ‘autonomy of action’ to allow EU action in international crises whether operating independently, if NATO should decide not to intervene, or where NATO as a whole is not engaged (the Berlin Accord Plus in 2003 facilitated such cooperation). Following the Franco-British principles to neither duplicate NATO efforts nor create a European army, initially the objective of ‘autonomy of action’ meant force objectives of 50,000 to 60,000 troops capable deploying within 60 days and for up to 12 months (Headline Goal 2003). The autonomy of action provided by this EU rapid reaction force was mainly focused on the operational aspects of the EU autonomy of action.

The European Security Strategy, approved in 2003, made no mention of the concept of strategic autonomy, limiting the global action of the EU to support multilateral security frameworks. The force goals of 2003 were replaced with other more realistic objectives (Headline Goal 2010) and a Capability Development Process was introduced (see Figure 1). The planning process –delegated by the Member States to the European Defence Agency– follows a sequence which moves from a delineation of strategic needs (level of ambition) to determine the operational needs (capabilities) that are later translated into industrial decisions (capacities). The logic of the sequence points to the importance of establishing solid strategic premises from the beginning; otherwise, the concept of strategic autonomy is reduced to its operational dimension and becomes little more than a military equipment catalogue.¹

As the European Security Strategy of 2003 lost its relevance with time, European strategic autonomy began to be driven more by its industrial and technological component. In 2011, as the defence industry suffered a crisis without precedent due to the impact of the economic recession on defence budgets, the Commission decided to pursue more strategic autonomy for the EU. In addition to being able to act without depending on the capabilities of third parties (operational sovereignty), the Commission’s concept of autonomy had an industrial focus that included access to essential technologies and security of supply (technological sovereignty). Facing the risk of losing technological capabilities and installed industrial capacity, the Commission opted to save the ‘European Defence Technological and Industrial Base’ (EDTIB) by liberalising the market, eliminating offsets and restricting government-to-government sales. In exchange for opening up access to common funds for defence, the Commission offered even to purchase, procure and maintain military equipment.

This logic, expressed in the Commission’s July 24, 2013 Communication, changed the necessary balance between the three dimensions of the concept, as industrial interests, the market and equipment became more central than strategy. But a ‘capabilities-driven’ strategic autonomy would lead to the procurement of equipment before knowing how and for what it would be employed. This would muddle the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To avoid such an imbalance, the Member States, in the European Council of December 2013, ruled out the idea of allowing the Commission to play the leading procurement role, but the Council recognised the importance of the defence industrial base (EDTIB) for increasing the strategic autonomy of the EU.² Without an updated strategic orientation, however, strategic autonomy continued to develop on its industrial dimension until the European Council, in July 2015, tasked the High Representative with overhauling European Strategy.

The new Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the Union submitted to the European Council in June 2016 did not contain an explicit definition of strategic autonomy. It did reiterate the importance of the industrial component for the strategic autonomy and defence policy of the EU,³ and proposed developing a specific defence strategy that would determine the level of ambition, the tasks, and the capabilities requirements and priorities of the Member States. However, the defence strategy was never finally prepared, and in November 2016 the Council instead adopted as its priority ambition to intervene in external conflicts to manage crises, strengthen the capacities of vulnerable countries and protect the population. Such levels of ambition limit the strategic autonomy of the CSDP by excluding collective defence from its purview.⁴ Consistent with such levels of political ambition, the EU could act together with third parties, when possible (preferably with NATO, building upon the EU-NATO Warsaw Agreement of June 2016) or unilaterally, when and where necessary.

At the same time, and in coordination with the implementation process for the Global Strategy, the Commission has continued to adopt measures to develop the industrial and technological base of EU defence. In its White Paper on Defence of 7 June 2017 (Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence), the Commission extended its industrial focus of autonomy to include other aspects associated with quantity and quality of defence spending, critical technologies and the regulation of strategic investments by foreigners.

The concept of strategic autonomy among the Member States of the EU

Only a few of the larger countries have their own criteria for strategic autonomy that can be applied to the EU.⁵ France sees both national and European strategic autonomy as mutually reinforcing in the sense that they augment its possibilities for action; it is therefore interested in developing European strategic autonomy as much as possible. France’s concept of strategic autonomy is defined in its 2013 White Book on National Defence and Security, which aspires to see France capable of influencing events without depending on the means of others, lending it independence of evaluation, decision-making and freedom of action. This sense of autonomy is more deeply rooted in France than in other European countries because, as a nuclear power, France needs a wide scope for freedom of action; it also has a highly developed industrial and technological base controlled by the public sector (technological sovereignty).

Germany has not defined its own concept of strategic autonomy, although some documents –such as the Defence Industry Strategy of 2015 and the White Book on Security Policy of 2016– identify some of its basic elements. In the industrial realm, Germany’s objective is to preserve its critical national technologies and to expand them through relevant European cooperation.

Italy shares with Germany the lack of formal definition and the primacy of industrial over strategic interests, as established in Law 56/2012 (controlling industrial sector investment) and in the White Book of 2015. The law also distinguishes between sovereign technological capabilities –national and collaborative– which correspond to the two levels of national and European autonomy in Italy’s official doctrine.

Spain’s concept of strategic autonomy was outlined by the Council of Ministers on 29 May 2015, and associated strategic autonomy with possession of capabilities to attend to the national interests, as defined in the National Security Strategy of 2013. Such capabilities should provide the armed forces with operational advantage and freedom of action in its independent and multinational interventions. In recent documents –as in the Spanish contribution to the Commission Document of June 2017– Spain supported a notion of strategic autonomy with a more ambitious political dimension which would allow the EU to ‘influence’ in the course of affairs in serious conflicts, like that of Syria, but it also supports the primacy of security over industrial interests: the European defence industry should emerge at the end of the process of constructing true European defence, ‘not at the beginning of the story’.⁶

From among these national conceptions can be discerned a focus on complementarity which consists of preserving freedom of action while engaging in the protection of strategic, operational and industrial interests, complementing national with European autonomy. These countries see it as necessary to augment the strategic autonomy of the EU because it complements (although it does not substitute for) their own national capabilities, and they understand that it can be development through European cooperative efforts. They do not view it as a zero-sum gas in which any progress towards European strategic autonomy reduces national strategic autonomy (which can be guaranteed only by national mandates). A complementarity focus is clear in the document which these four countries, leading the push for ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (or PESCO) in defence, directed to the other Member States with proposed criteria for PESCO to reinforce the strategic autonomy of both ‘Europeans and of the EU’.⁷

The complementarity focus requires additional national effort –not less– if the desire is to increase the final value of strategic autonomy. Without it, neither the integration of national capabilities within the CSDP nor priority investment in cooperation will add any value to European strategic autonomy –beyond its nominal ‘europeanisation’–. This focus is also found within the Commission’s research programmes and funds, as they seek to stimulate –not to demobilise or replace– the budgetary and industrial contributions of individual Member States.

Due to the same complementarity focus, each Member State will attempt to make European strategic autonomy to favour their own strategic, operational and industrial priorities, depending on their geography and industrial capacities, and on the existence (or not) of shared threats. Although all Member States share the need to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU, the specific development of capabilities and equipment will be conditioned by these differences in national characteristics and priorities, thereby testing the system of annual coordination of national planning (ie, the Common Annual Review of Defence, or CARD) to be implemented within the PESCO.

The pre-requisites of strategic autonomy

Independently of definitions and interpretations, the concrete viability of strategic autonomy depends on certain pre-requisites. At the political level, the essential pre-requisite is that such autonomy be underpinned by a coherent strategic culture. It does no good to claim a high level of political ambition if ultimately there is insufficient will to execute it. The EU now has certain capabilities –such as its battlegroups– which could act autonomously, but they have not been used due to various political, financial and operational motives of the Member States. The same could be said of Member-State capabilities which have not been placed at the disposal of the CSDP’s military missions during the processes of force generation. Strategic cultures shift with each change in government, coalition or electoral process, placing at risk the realisation of strategic autonomy. Even the Franco-German impulse behind the progress of the EU strategic autonomy could be in danger if the strategic culture of the coming Jamaica coalition in Berlin diverges over defence expenditure or combat missions. Still, the likely approval of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ will facilitate the decision-making process for acting autonomously –one of the priority objectives of such cooperation– and increase the number of CSDP military operations, if and when these missions do not awake the ghosts of different national strategic cultures (reticence or inclination to use force, social or parliamentary opposition or budgetary difficulties, among others).

The second conditioning factor is budgetary. As already mentioned, strategic autonomy requires additional budgetary effort. This new money must come from national budgets and common EU funds. In contrast to NATO, which requires its Member States to achieve a common spending level of 2% of GDP in 2024, the EU does not set the same goal for its members. To the present, the new money contributed by those countries involved in the NATO spending commitment has been rather modest. Measured as a percentage of GDP, the countries of the EU saw an average increase of 0.09% from 2014 to 2016, while according to NATO data only Greece, Estonia, Rumania and Poland reach the 2% target, while Spain (0.92%), Belgium (0.91%) and Luxembourg (0.44%) occupy much lower places on the overall list, as shown in Figure 2.

This budgetary effort as measured in percentage terms is not very significant because the largest percentage increases come from countries like the Baltic states, whose real budgets are very small. As a result, their spending increments do not contribute much value-added to strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the countries with the larger defence budgets, or where GDP is growing, as in Spain, face difficulties to increase their larger budgets in real terms. For instance, Germany should add €24.99 billion to its defence budget of €39.51 billion in 2017 to reach the target of 2% of GDP this year. Italy would need to add €15.98 billion to its current €20.79 billion, the Netherlands €6.2 billion to its current €8.69 billion and Spain €10.74 billion to its current budget of €12.49 billion.

For a large number of EU Member States it is difficult to reconcile budget austerity and the eurozone deficit limits with a significant increase in their defence budgets. This is particularly true of France and Spain, which have Commission proceedings against them for excessive deficits. The French case demonstrates the difficulty of increasing defence spending even when there is a real political will to do so. President Emmanuel Macron wanted to increase the defence budget from 1.77% of GDP in 2017 to 2% in 2025. For 2018, an increase of €1.5 billion was expected in order to fulfil his campaign promise. But the need to contain the deficit (€50 billion) to comply with the European deficit limit instead forced Macron to reduce the defence budget by €900 million. To justify higher defence spending as a priority, Member States will compete to obtain higher industrial and technological returns in order to compensate for their contribution to strategic autonomy. On the contrary, if the distribution of costs and benefits is not balanced, it will be difficult to avoid the increasing dissatisfaction of the net contributors.

For its part, the Commission has broken the EU taboo on the use of common funds for defence, and it is proposing to increase the use of such funds for operations and capabilities research and development. The European budget will now cover the deployment of battlegroups, in addition to the common costs of CSDP operations, although the principal cost of military operations (approximately 80% of expenditure) will continue to be covered by the participating Member States. The European Defence Fund will contribute new money for research (€90 million) and development (€500 million) until 2020. From then on, the financial proposals of the Commission will depend on the budget available within the Pluriannual Financial Framework 2021-25, including the co-financing of up to 30% of the capabilities required for strategic autonomy, some €1.5 billion of the €5 billion annually that the Member-States will have to complement (for each euro contributed by the Commission, the Member States will have to contribute three or four). Nevertheless, it cannot be foreseen how much money the Commission will have available to stimulate strategic autonomy because the budget will decline with the exit of the UK (by some €10 billion) and the percentage that is devoted to defence will have to compete with other budget items, putting the community executive in the same spending dilemmas as national executives during times of austerity.

Conclusion

The definition of European strategic autonomy requires a re-definition of the concept of each Member State’s national sovereignty. As Member States lose military capacity for guaranteeing their own individual sovereignty, they should determine which national defence tasks can be ‘europeanised’, their desired degree of subordination to common planning, the individual capabilities that they will renounce and the level of specialisation they will pursue. These are decisions that are irreversible because the capabilities and areas of sovereignty which they abandon cannot be regained in a context of limited resources. The contribution to EU strategic autonomy compensates for the loss of sovereignty only if and for as long as the Member States continue to maintain the last word on the use of force. On the other hand, such a contribution will aggravate the loss of sovereignty and autonomy of the Member States if they lose control over the collective decision-making process, especially if the large countries end up imposing their decision-making autonomy on the others.

Strategic autonomy has a focus on complementarity, which requires an additional effort. The countries which are not disposed to –or simply cannot– realise this strategic, operation and industrial effort, will only be able to contribute to European strategic autonomy to the detriment of their own, contributing national resources to collective programmes without any returns to national autonomy. Since the commitments taken on by the Member States of the PESCO will be binding, each will need to carefully calculate if they have the necessary resources, or not, to support national missions as well as those undertaken in the name of EU strategic autonomy.

At the time of this writing, it appears that PESCO will be launched by unanimous decision with a sufficient majority of Member-States to participate in it. This will strengthen EU strategic autonomy, but the real boost in its political (strategic), operational (capabilities) and industrial (equipment) dimensions will depend on the level of commitment and follow-through required by the PESCO governance model which is finally approved by the participating Member States.

About the author:
*Félix Arteaga, Senior Analyst for Security and Defence, Elcano Royal Institute | @rielcano

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute. The original version in Spanish: La autonomía estratégica y la defensa europea

Notes:
¹ As of July 2008, the required capabilities included network operations, anti-landmine measures, integrated crisis management, cultural knowledge, ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target, acquisition and reconnaissance) architecture, medical assistance, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) defence, logistical aid to third parties, or measures against improvised explosive devices or against portable anti-air missile systems, among many others.

Soon after word came out Monday that someone had detonated a bomb in a pedestrian tunnel of the New York City subway system, people were saying the alleged bomber should not be afforded respect for his constitutional rights and should be shipped off to the United States military’s Guantanamo prison in Cuba. Fox News Senior Judicial Analyst Andrew Napolitano, however, argues in a new video commentary that it is important that the US government respect alleged bomber Akayed Ullah’s rights guaranteed under the US Constitution — including rights to be represented by a lawyer and to have a jury trial.

“We have hired a government to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,” says Napolitano. “If it begins cutting corners for people it hates and fears,” he asks, “what will stop it from cutting corners for the rest of us?”

Watch Napolitano’s video commentary here:

Napolitano, who is a member of the Ron Paul Institute Advisory Board, wrote in more detail about the matter in a Wednesday editorial.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

Jerusalem is Israel’s capital, said Donal Trump on December 6.

Benjamin Netanyahu said efforts to deny the “millennial connection of the Jewish people to Jerusalem” were “absurd”. “You can read it in a very fine book – it’s called the Bible, just a few days later.

So, what is the next?

Simply, I do not want to quote anybody from the Islamic background to avoid being subjective by choosing specific quotes. Why? Because of the background of the author of this essay, having in mind media (il)literacy of the majority of the readers in any (Islamic and non-Islamic country in the world). Whatever I say I am, people (as said above: “majority”) will read an essay thinking about some “theory of conspiracy” of the author and that he has been paid by somebody to write as it is.

Unfortunately (if you really know who paid me, would you be so kind to tell him/her to pay me than, finally!) nobody paid me but my conscience and experience for the almost 38 years of writings.

Nevertheless, having in mind that “conspiracy theories does not exists, but it works” (S.H., 2010) as soon as, the so-called “war against ISIL/ISIS was declared finished”, suddenly, although expectedly, Trump said what he said about moving USA Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The Military Industry in USA (and anywhere in the world) need a places where to sell “products”. Eo ipso, there should be a new neuralgic spot on the Earth and what is better than the one on which for both (read Israelis and Palestinians) have Holy Ground. Also, what about others (the whole world, as a matter of fact) who already choose a side, prior even military conflict (let us pray hard that it will never start the real, big one, at least) have started.

How we will all survive that big, possible, conflict?

I am afraid that we will not, having in mind who is the new US President and the way how he is thinking. Did we forget “alternative facts”?

I am afraid that we will not, having in mind also people over there in the majority of Islamic countries, calling for the boycott of cooperation with USA if they do not withdraw their recent decision about the US Embassy in Israel.

So, shall we leave the Earth?

Maybe (although, in which way, that is the major question), but before that we should ask the United Nations to have 24/7 sessions of the Security Council to address just one question: How to avoid World War III in the nearest future? Or do we have that already going on, but we just don’t know that yet?

How to organize those United Nations Security Council sessions?

In the way to implement this: “More communications, less conflicts”. As much as we talk, as less conflict will exist. When we stop talking between each other, the guns will continue to talk in their way of talking. So, dear world leaders, let us all put aside our ethnic, race, political, national and/or religion background and think about the world of humans who has the same color of the blood. Does anybody have green and/or blue color of blood? No, literally under our skin we all have RED color of the blood. All other things are not important, but the only one – as less as possible (not at all, if I may say) – to have that color of the blood on our hands anywhere in the World.

Please, I am not whispering any more. I am crying for the help of humans in the World to stop this ridiculousness on all sides and to sit down and talk, and talk.

I have a proposal: Can we make an American Embassy in Jerusalem as the representation of USA that will recognize both countries (Israel and Palestine) and continue on the agreed way towards Peace talks with the making an exception within the World diplomacy – maybe two separate entrances in the same building. Please, do not lough at me. Think seriously and you will see that there is a solution.

Although, what about the military industry in the World?

If there is a single open minded person anywhere within the administration in any country of the world, he/she should fight for transferring military industry into some other more human and more people satisfying production – just check out some possible thoughts and focuses like here.

We are at the edge of civilization within the World as global sin and Jerusalem might be ante portas and the beginning of the end of civilization we know.

The interest is above all in the current civilization. Can we make that interest to be focused, finally, towards humanity, instead of towards money?

Also, above all, can we ask the women in the World to be more involved in the finding of the solution and solving this issue? They are more reasonable than us, males, anywhere in the World.

This time, the answer cannot be blown away by the wind of destruction. Simply, it must not be.

Sun Tzu had the Art of War.  Von Clausewitz had On War.  Britain used divide and conquer to maintain control of its colonies.  Now Israel has transformed the strategy into a fine art in its manipulation of its Arab neighbors.

Earlier this week, Israel’s intelligence minister, Israel Katz, who has already announced his intention run for Likud Party leadership should Bibi Netanyahu be forced to step down due to corruption investigations against him, published an interview on a mysterious Saudi website often used by the Saudis and Israelis to float trial balloons they fear might be controversial in the Arab world.

Ironically, Katz is an intelligence minister who oversees no intelligence agencies.  An Israeli security source once commented:

“Wake me up when at least one intelligence agency will become subject to Katz. For now, I regard him as transportation minister and I take him into consideration only when he speaks about Tel Aviv Light Rail.”

Among other news, Katz invited Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed ibn Salman (MbS) to make an official state visit to Israel. He also asked MbS to reciprocate with a state visit by Netanyahu to Riyadh.

What’s most laughable about this is that the website which published the interview, buried the lede by refusing to include the invitation to exchange official visits. That was a bridge too far for the Muslim Guardians of the Faith.

As a result, Katz was forced to publicize his own interview by telling the media what the original source wouldn’t even mention. A rather shameless bit of self promotion.

MbS has, of course, already visited Israel, but that trip was secret, since the Saudis weren’t prepared to tell the Arab world they were preparing to bed down with the very Israelis who’d been the enemies of the Arab world for generations.

Katz also made a vague pitch to the Saudis: that they and Israel, and potentially other parties, should invade Lebanon in order to rid the country once and for all of Iran’s “terrorist ally,” Hezbollah.

He offered the suggestion in a typical Israeli fashion, saying while the latter was a peace-loving country and didn’t want war, if Iran and Hezbollah provoked one, Israel would send Lebanon back to the Stone Age:

“What happened in 2006 will be a picnic compared to what we can do. I remember a Saudi minister saying they will send Hezbollah back to their caves in south Lebanon. I am telling you that we will return Lebanon to the Stone Age.”

“At the same time, we don’t want war, and we have no interest in destroying Lebanon, but we will not accept a Lebanese assault on us. For example, I recently suggested to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu that we act militarily…[and] apply sanctions on Hezbollah and Iran and that, under the leadership of the United States and with the consent of China and Russia, we intervene militarily if there is a need.”

This is nothing new. Israeli generals trot out these threats every time they either want to look tough, throw the fear of God into the Lebanese, or persuade the rest of the world that they’re prepared to incinerate the entire Middle East to get their way, just as Samson toppled the Canaanite temple, killing himself along with his enemies.

The sad fact for the Israelis is that no one believes them, but they keep making the same threats anyway. Of course, Israel can do enormous damage to Lebanon and its civilian population. And it will face no war crimes charges despite the enormous damage done to the country.

But the point is that not only don’t the threats intimidate, even as Israel carried out its massive military campaign, it loses regardless. It hasn’t won a war since 1967. Its invasions of Gaza and Lebanon ended, at best, in what might be called draws. But when you are a major regional military power and your enemy is a militia, a draw is a defeat.

The “innovation” (or insanity) in Katz’s statement is that he invites the Saudis to join in a new military adventure by invading Lebanon to depose Hezbollah and Iranian power. He also seems to believe that the Russians and Chinese will somehow endorse this nonsense.

But the scariest part of all this is that MbS is just rash enough to swallow this line from the Israelis and get drawn into an even more catastrophic military adventure than the current failed Yemen intervention.

Israel’s Arab Strategy: Divide and Conquer

Israel has the greatest success when it divides individual Arab states or the Arab world against itself. It’s done this countless times in the past. In Lebanon it created the Christian South Lebanon army to act as a buffer against Lebanese Shiites. In the 1980s, in order to defang Arafat, Israeli intelligence agents aided in the founding of Hamas. It also performed a similar role in order to counter PLO influence in Lebanon, by aiding in the founding of Hezbollah. In Syria, the dog it picked in the fight to tipple Bashar al-Assad was the al Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra militia.

Of course it learned this strategy at the hands of the British, who used it time and again to play off rival tribes or ethnic groups against each other, and thereby weaken any potential opposition to its colonial rule.

The Israeli courtship of Saudi Arabia is part of a similar strategy: to exploit natural enmities & rivalry among Muslim sects (Shia vs Sunni) and states, in order to weaken them & render them impotent in opposing Israeli interests.

With Sunnis fighting Shia, the Palestinian conflict becomes a sideshow in the eyes of the Muslim world, and Israel is free to maintain its suffocating Occupation.

Nor does the world feel under any obligation to intervene. It figures if the Arab world is divided and places lower priority on solving the Israel-Palestine conflict, why should we bother?

It’s important not to collapse onto cynicism or despair in the face of such machinations. The Arab and Muslim world should develop a coherent, coördinated strategy figure Israel and the U.S. (and even Saudi Arabia possibly) to pay a price for their betrayal of Palestine. Diplomatic sanctions, UN recognition of Palestine as a member state, transformation of BDS from a grassroots movement into a national policy fur those progressive states which are will g to successfully solidarity with Palestine.

Entering Dangerous Times

These are especially dangerous times, when war looms on the horizon. It may be no accident that just as Fatah and Hamas appeared ready to unite in a solid front against Israel, that the U.S. and Israel concocted this insult to Palestinian intelligence: the Jerusalem proclamation. This development has sucked the air out of the regional conversation, and no one is paying any attention to Palestinian reconciliation.

Similarly, Israel’s bombing of an Islamic Jihad tunnel in Gaza and the deaths of one of the group’s top commanders in the assault, along with the Shabak assassination of two IJ militants who may have been planning an attack, has led to boiling tensions in Gaza. Both sides, Israel and the Gaza militant factions are spoiling for another fight, it appears. Those who suffer the most naturally will be the Gaza civilians who will die in the ensuing slaughter.

Such a war would suit Netanyahu just fine as a distraction from the four corruption investigations besetting him. No police commander or State attorney would commence a prosecution of Netanyahu in the middle of a war. And after the war ends, in what Bibi hopes will be a major IDF victory, no prosecutor would have the guts to bring down a leader who just took his nation to victory.

This is Israel’s geo-strategic strategy in a nutshell: cynicism raised to the highest level.

This article was published at Tikun Olam