Quantcast
Channel: Eurasia Review
Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live

On The Verge Of A US-China Trade War – Analysis

0
0

The latest round of Trump tariffs got a tough response from Beijing. Chinese authorities declared that they would fight back against US plans at any cost.

By Manoj Joshi

The world is teetering on the brink of a trade war between China and the US.

US President Donald Trump fired a new shot in the trade war on Thursday (5 April) when he said he had directed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to consider an additional $100 billion tariff following China’s decision to retaliate against an earlier $50 billion worth of proposed tariffs.

For the record, Trump tweeted on 4 April, the day the USTR listed the new tariffs on a slew of Chinese goods, “We are not in a trade war with China, because that was lost many years ago…”

An earlier round of tariffs saw the US announce 30% tariffs on imported solar panels and washing machines in January. This was followed by 25% tariff on steel and 10% on aluminium on the grounds of national security, though Mexico and Canada were exempted.

On 22 March, Trump announced that the US would impose tariffs on $50 billion worth of goods. The US targeted industries like aerospace, information and communications technology, robotics and machinery. On the same day, the USTR issued a lengthy report detailing the manner in which China forced American companies to transfer key technology and trade secrets and Chinese proclivity for stealing data through hacking.

On 2 April, China announced tariffs on US goods worth $3 billion on some 130 American products like fruits, nuts, wine and steel pipes, as well as pork and recycled aluminium. On 4 April, following the publication of the list of items that the US would target, China listed products worth $50 billion imported from the US which would now be subject to 25% tariffs, these included soya beans, automobiles and chemicals.

The US imported $505.6 billion worth of goods from China in 2017, of which the largest category were computers and computer accessories ($77.1 billion), mobile phones ($70.3 billion), telecom equipment ($33.5 billion) and toys, games and sports goods ($26.7 billion). The current USTR lists avoid many of these items so as to spare the ordinary consumer the pain of price hikes.

The USTR action, which would cover several thousand separate tariff lines, will be reviewed further after the public notice and comment process, including hearing. It is only after all this happens that the agency will issue a final determination on the list of products that will be subject to the additional tariffs, which could now approximate $150 billion worth of Chinese imports.

There is considerable worry about where this escalation cycle can land up. There are many complexities that escape Trump’s simplistic understanding of the trade deficit issue. Actually, the issue is not just between China and the US. A “Chinese” product comprises elements from other countries.

The logo on the iPhone notes, “Designed in California, assembled in China”. The iPhone costs Apple $220. It is assembled in China for $6.50, but the rest of the cost is for its sophisticated components made in Germany, South Korea, Japan and the US. In other words, any “trade war” between these two giants will have consequences for many other smaller countries — there will be collateral damage.

The Economist says that 30% of the value of goods that China exports to the US is added elsewhere — Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and so on. If the situation worsens, “countries entwined in Chinese supply chains will suffer” and in its estimation, Japanese suppliers could be the worst hit in absolute terms.

As this analysis points out, Chinese value addition has the lowest value addition in the high tech sector. In the case of computers and electronics, “less than half the value added in Chinese exports come from China”. It notes that even while Chinese industrial policies are charged with trying to build up its state-owned enterprises, they account for an increasingly declining share of exports. Anyway, the big worry now is that China’s retaliation could be escalated to cover major firms like GM or Apple, even if Chinese workers are affected by it.

President Xi Jinping is expected to address the Boao Forum next week. In keeping with the Chinese posture, he will put across the country as a victim of American capriciousness and as one which is willing to play by the rules. It is also initiating a complaint in the WTO that the US was in serious violation of global trading rules by targeting Chinese goods for tariffs.

China has already signalled that it is willing to make concessions, such as those related to the opening up of the finance sector. When Trump visited China in November 2017, Beijing offered concessions like raising caps on the foreign ownership of banks and securities firms. Global firms have been cautious here because they would have to use Chinese telecom equipment for their operations and store data there as part of its laws. Chinese vice finance minister Zhu Guangyao had said that the country would allow foreign investors to own 51% of Chinese securities firms, fund managers and futures companies and allow them to own 100% three years later. The current limit on foreign ownership is 25% for large publicly traded securities firms and 49% for most other businesses. He also promised that China would raise the allowed foreign investment in insurance companies which was 50% for most companies to 51% in three years and 100% in five years.

But given the USTR focus, it seems unlikely that they will be willing to accommodate American demands which are increasingly focusing on their industrial policy that comes under the rubric of “Made in China 2025.”

This policy is key in order to modernise the country’s economy, move up the innovation chain and avoid the middle-income trap, which is something most Western economists have been telling China it must do. The Communist Party of China is fully aware of the fact that its power rests on its ability to ensure China’s positive economic trajectory. So it is unlikely to be deterred from its task by the steps taken by the Trump administration at this time.

It is not surprising that the latest round of Trump tariffs got a tough response from Beijing. Chinese authorities declared that they would fight back against US plans at any cost. Official spokespersons of the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs said that while China did not want a trade war “we are not afraid of it.”

This article originally appeared in The Wire.


Beyond Bombs And Bullets: A Comprehensive Approach Needed To Defeat ISIS – Analysis

0
0

By Zakir Gul, Ph.D.

Many articles with similar ideas have been written about the current situation with ISIS and what will happen to the terrorist organization in the future. Most of these articles, however, ask incomplete or incorrect questions, which leads to inaccurate assessments of the safety of the world when ISIS is defeated. The articles typically ask questions such as: Can it be claimed that removal of ISIS from the territory in which it operates mean the end to ISIS, or is it only the displacement of terrorism? Shall we celebrate the defeat of ISIS or still be concerned about it? These questions, unfortunately, are incomplete and do not address key elements of the issue. The critical, and more appropriate, questions to ask are: Will the violent and extreme mindset and ideology end when ISIS is defeated? Is it possible that ISIS will transform itself or merges with another terrorist group? Is hard power the solution?

ISIS is just another body into which the violent and extremist ideology of jihadi Salafism has entered. The body dies, but the soul does not. When the body dies, the bad soul will enter another body of a different name. In the case of a defeated ISIS, the organization will die physically but survive as others take up its cause. As long as the violent and extremist ideology and dark soul of ISIS survives, there will always be a body for the soul to wear. The jihadi Salafist ideology will live a new life in a body transformed into another shape and structure.

Failure to ask the right questions means being unable to see and diagnose the problem correctly, intervene correctly, respond correctly, offer the correct solutions, and correctly assess the outcome rightly. In other words, a mistaken first step often leads to subsequent missteps and dire consequences in the long run. For example, when tar is on fire, the expected and first response would be to douse the fire with water; however, the compounds in the tar render water ineffective in putting out the fire and may even make the situation worse.In terms of terrorism, ISIS is the tar, and the commonsense first response would be to use all power available to eradicate the organization.

The literature on terrorism acknowledges that terrorism and radicalization are complex and multidimensional concepts that involve social, psychological, political, financial, and educational issues. Given this mix of factors, could a military and/or law enforcement intervention be the solution to terrorism and radicalization? The answer is “no.” Could the hard power be the solution to some psychological factors (i.e., alienation) or political factors (i.e., political exclusion and oppression) of joining terrorist groups? Again, the answer is “no.” The answer will always be “no” until the solution offered addresses the multiple dimensions of the problem with a comprehensive, but individualized, approach. A reliance on bombs, bullets, and warfare alone will not suffice.

For example, if an individual joins a terrorist group because of a family issue—such as forced marriage, domestic violence, or alienation from close relatives, lack of love and respect among family members—then the approach should focus on family structures and family environments. If an individual whose spouse, children, or extended family members were killed by government security forces longs for revenge and is recruited as a suicide bomber, a military/law enforcement solution alone will not solve the underlying problem. Nor is it the correct approach when an individual has joined a terrorist organization in response to the lack of democratic and human rights. If militants are recruited and exposed to propaganda in virtual environments, then the counterterrorism approach should address those virtual environments to neutralize the terrorist indoctrination. If potential militants are easily swayed by radicals misinterpreting and exploiting religious scriptures because they are poorly educated and lack religious awareness and knowledge, then the counterterrorism approach should focus on counter-narratives and religion-awareness programs. A continued emphasis on tanks, gunfire, and bombs, is a waste of precious money, time, and effort, and lives and, worse yet, justification of terrorist narratives.

This article was published by Modern Diplomacy.

One Democratic State: What’s Happening? – OpEd

0
0

By Blake Alcott*

One Democratic State (ODS) has the wind at its back. The last two years have seen a flurry of organizing for ODS, increasingly since December 2017 when the US/Israel axis rejected the central Palestinian demand for its capital, Jerusalem, thereby rendering the Palestinian ‘state’ of the two-state solution once and for all unacceptable.

But ODS is not a reaction to the infeasibility, impracticality, impossibility or ‘death’ of the two-state solution. First, ODS always said the two-state solution is primarily undesirable, whether it is feasible or not: it partitions the homeland, does not involve real sovereignty, and leaves the refugees and the Palestinians in Israel out in the cold.

Rather, ODS has always been based on first principles: The unity of Palestine, human rights, citizenship for all who live between the river and the sea and the absolute inalienability of the right of return as citizens and property restitution for the ethnically-cleansed Palestinians wherever they live.

Such a clear position, thwarted by the Zionism of the powers that be, was held by the Palestinian leadership from 1918 until 1948 in testimony before the King-Crane Commission in 1919, resolutions of the seven Palestine Arab Congresses between 1919 and 1928, petitions to the British Mandatory and League of Nations in the 1930s, positions at the St James Roundtable talks of 1939, at the Anglo-American Commission in 1946 and at the UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1947.

While the PLO Charters of 1964 and 1968 lack detail about the envisaged independent Palestinian state, until 1974 the Palestinian National Councils pursued one secular, democratic state in all of Palestine, supported by 99% of Palestinians. This leadership then over a period of fifteen years gradually abandoned ODS in favor of the Bantustan solution promised by the Oslo accords twenty years later.

That is, until the late 1980s the core of the two-state solution – accepting partition, accepting Jewish ethno-religious rights in Palestine, ditching the refugees – was never really worth talking about. The Galilee-based Abnaa al-Balad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine rejected the PLO change, keeping the ODS vision alive under severe repression by the Zionist entity. The revival of the ODS vision after the Oslo disaster was led by such as Edward Said, Ghada Karmi, Azmi Bishara and Tony Judt.

Between 2004 and 2007 the books appeared: Mazin Qumsiyeh’s Sharing the Land of Canaan, Virginia Tilley’s The One-State Solution, Ali Abunimah’s One Country, Ghada Karmi’s Married to Another Man. Conferences were held in Madrid, Southampton, Haifa, Boston, London, Stuttgart, Munich, Zürich, Dallas, Toronto. Articles were written, anthologies appeared: Jamil Hilal’s Where Now for Palestine?, Lowenstein & Moor’s After Zionism, Hani Faris’s The Failure of the Two-State Solution, as well as Ofra Yeshua-Lyth’s The Case for a Secular New Jerusalem.

As well as these authors, leaders like Omar Barghouti, George Bisharat, Susan Abulhawa, Ilan Pappe, Nur Masalha, Leila Farsakh, Haim Bresheeth, Annemarie Jacir, Joseph Massad, Salman Abu Sitta and Norton Mezvinsky all came out publicly for ODS. BADIL and academics such as Walid Khalidi, Victor Kattan, Rex Brynen, Naseer Aruri, Francis Boyle, Rosemary Sayigh and John Quigley worked ceaselessly for the right of return, which can happen only within the ODS framework.

Finally, organisation

The political party National Democratic Assembly (Tajammua, or Balad), currently part of the Joint List in the Knesset, has for the last twenty years advocated an Israel that is ‘the state of its citizens’, not of Jews only, while standing strongly by the right of return. Its program would render the areas occupied in 1948 truly democratic, but was less specific on re-unification of Palestine and the modalities of return. ODS – that is, bog-standard democratic ideology – was the reason for the effective exile of its then leader Azmi Bishara in 2007.

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) of course also implies ODS. If the three conditions stated in 2004 for calling off the boycott were fulfilled – sovereignty for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, absolute equality for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Return – you would have what might be called Two Democratic States. But if one adds the fourth BDS demand, that for Palestinian self-determination, which since Woodrow Wilson’s day adamantly included rejection of partition of the homeland, re-unification into a single state follows rigorously.

Three declarations similar to ODS but leaning somewhat towards the contrasting bi-national solution appeared in 2006-2007, written by Palestinians in Israel: The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel of the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Democratic Constitution of Adalah, and The Haifa Declaration of Mada al-Carmel, the Arab Center for Applied Social Research.

The sites 1not2 and One Democracy, based in England, and One Democratic State, based in Texas (website presently hijacked), carried the torch internationally for some time. The latter group is led by Samir Abed Rabbo, author of the Munich Declaration of 2012 which unites three further groups formed in 2013: in May the Popular Movement for One Democratic State on the Land of Historic Palestine, also in May the Jaffa ODS group, and in July in England the group ODS in Palestine Ltd. The straightforward, one-page Munich Declaration builds upon and is consistent with several ODS declarations that went before, written by people named above.

Most of the fifty members of the Popular Movement for ODS live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Turkey, Switzerland, England and the US. It is registered as a Swiss Association at Handelsregisteramt Zürich, Nr. CHE-390-290.948. Its Board members include Radi Jarai, Imad Saed, Ibrahim Saad, Ghada Karmi, Munir Abbushi, Ilan Pappe, Sameer Sbaihat, Walid Abu Tayeh and myself.

Most of the thirty members of ODS in Palestine Ltd live in England, some remaining anonymous in order to avoid the wrath of the apartheid state. It is registered as a Company Limited by Guarantee, Nr. 08615817. It has organised talks on ODS by Ghada Karmi, Ilan Pappe, Karl Sabbagh, Salma Karmi, Awad Abdelfattah, Ruba Salih and Gideon Levy, made a large metal key of return which stands in front of St Mary’s Cathedral in Edinburgh, and seeks to complement the solidarity work being done on other fronts by focusing on the ODS solution.

Two further groups have emerged in 2016 and 2017. The One State Foundation is a non-membership group registered in Holland. Its three Board members are Hamada Jaber, Ofer Neiman and Angelique Eijpe, a Dutch diplomat. It laudably publishes in Arabic, English and Hebrew, and its Facebook page already has around 6,000 likes. Another group, organised primarily by Jeff Halper, is made up almost exclusively of Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel, and has been meeting in Haifa and Exeter. It leans somewhat towards the collective political rights of groups of citizens, defined on ethnic criteria, rather than the strictly individual-rights approach of ODS.

Other active individuals insist that the word ‘secular’ should appear in the name or title of an ODS movement or group, but it remains to be seen if they will become publicly visible as such a group.

Finally, some liberal Zionists as well as the group Independent Jewish Voices have put forth the idea of a true democracy for all now living between the river and the sea, but their position of compromise on right of return and retention of the Israeli Law of Return is incompatible with ODS.

Debates and Unity?

The right of return is the linchpin of the liberation of Palestine. This right means that any Palestinian wishing to return to places of origin (homes) in the territory now called Israel, from which they were displaced since 1948, could literally do so. Over 8 million Palestinians fit this description, and could join the almost 2 million Palestinians now living in the 48-occupied territory.

It also means that they all would be re-enfranchised as citizens of Palestine – whatever the formal structure of that state is, and whether or not they immigrated to Palestine. It also means full restitution of their property and compensation for losses incurred by dispossession and displacement since 1948. As in 1947, well over 90% of the land of historic Palestine would be under Palestinian private or municipal or waqf ownership.

While the right of return, respect for the human rights listed for instance in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and normal democratic rules of governance unify all of these groups and individuals, there are some areas of debate.

Most importantly, should ethnic or religious groups be explicitly granted political rights in Palestine? The century-old tradition of a state of its citizens, a continuation actually of the Ottoman regime from 1908 onwards, which included Muslims, Jews, Christians, Armenians, Druze, Europeans, and Circassians, was overturned by Britain with the words of Herbert Samuel and Winston Churchill in the White Paper of 1922, stating that “the Jewish people… is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance.”

That is, it is not some Jewish individuals, but all Jews anywhere, that have political rights in Palestine. The British had adopted this Zionist nation-state goal. Of course this notion, like the idea that Hindus or Druze or Roman Catholic Christians, say, have political claims to Palestine by virtue of their genes or religion, is not to be taken seriously.

The fear of many supporters of ODS, however, is that acknowledging any collective rights defined in terms of race or religion could open the door to some such bi-nationalism, the ideology that there are two (actually there are more) ethnically-defined ‘nations’ in historic Palestine with equal collective rights: the old, false picture of parity, two sides with equal ethical claims fighting for one state.

It is often overlooked that the collective claims of Palestinians are not defined racially, but rather multi-racially as the land’s indigenous people. Their claims are justifiable in terms of collective self-determination, but the collective is territorially and historically defined, not racially.

Of course it is possible that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), one of the two large Palestinian political groups, is making political claims for Muslims which would trump those of non-Muslims. Its new Document released last May, after all, states that Palestine’s “frame of reference is Islam” and that it is “an Arab Islamic land”.

Hamas of course envisions a re-unified independent Palestine and supports right of return without any ifs and buts, but likely differs from ODS in regarding as “Palestinians” only “Arabs who lived in Palestine until 1947”, leaving the question of the citizenship of non-Arabs open. While ODS would treat all present Israeli Jews also as citizens, albeit comprising a minority, Hamas on this formulation would have to adopt a concept of ‘non-Palestinian citizen of Palestine’. Similarly, the Islamic Movement in Israel would have to square the circle of a state which is both democratic and either ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’.

Another debate is over the word ‘secular’, which in English means not atheism or state opposition to religion, but rather merely the separation of state and religion (and ethnicity). However, in Arabic and in the political history of Palestine and the wider Near East the term does apparently carry such connotations. Thus, the Munich Declaration in Articles 4 and 5 describes a secular state without using the word.

A final issue is the exact nature of the restitution of property. The wheel must not be re-invented, as precedents abound, not least pertaining to the property of Jews confiscated in the 1930 and 1940s in Europe. The view applied in those cases took property rights strictly, and in the case of Palestine would mean that once ownership reverts to Palestinians or a Palestinian political or religious institution, the restored owners would have the right to say what happens on that land and who lives and works there. That is what ownership normally means.

The contrasting view would abrogate this conception of property rights in order to assure that no Jewish individual – or, for that matter, no Palestinian resident on other Palestinians’ land – would be evicted; the search is for a politically necessary collective compromise in spite of the inalienability of property rights in international law. Here, it seems, the human rights of dispossessed Palestinians might have to be weighed against the humanitarian situation of people, descendants of recent immigrants, who were born into residency and life in Palestine.

ODS is a Positive Vision

Again, in portraying ODS we don’t have to even mention the two-state solution, or its demise, its impossibility or even its blatant violation of most of the rights of the vast majority of Palestinians. Whatever the ethics and practical politics of the two-state farce, they are a negative distraction and can be safely ignored.

What’s more, ODS can be argued for while avoiding any obsession with Israel, what it does, what it wants, who it is. The argument proceeds from Palestinian rights, period. Such focus on Israelis – on whether they will ‘accept’ ODS or not – is even a form of normalization. A shift from criticizing Israel to ignoring it might be salutory.

Anything other than the one undemocratic, apartheid state now existing, which bars 7 million Palestinians from entering Palestine, much less returning to it, must be achieved by extreme and manifold outside pressure on the Israeli state. While ODS wholeheartedly welcomes any Jewish Israeli, it tends to take a sober look at dialogue with Zionism, a dialogue that has been going on in vain for over 100 years – the more so as between 80 and 90% of Jewish Israelis hold firmly to Zionism.

Working on convincing Palestinians to stand behind ODS, on the other hand, holds promise – the more so as at least half of them are sympathetic to it. While visiting Lebanon last year I met no Palestinian who did not support ODS. Recent polls of only West Bank and Gaza Strip residents even show over 40% support, and since ODS is the only solution that does justice to the Palestinians in the diaspora, it is a safe assumption that ODS has an overwhelming majority when all Palestinians are asked.

Encouraging is the movement of Diaspora Palestinians which, as the Palestine Abroad Conference, co-chaired by Majed Al-Zeer of the Palestinian Return Centre, held a meeting attended by over 5,000 people in Istanbul in February 2017. While I know little about this group, its program is likely to be uncompromising on right of return and de-partition of the homeland.

Like other international supporters of all the rights of all Palestinians, I have had to pick and choose from among Palestinian positions. There is no unifying position. What’s more, there is no vision. Like other seemingly impossible yet ultimately successful quests – anti-slavery, say, or women’s suffrage, or anti-South African Apartheid or, indeed, Zionism – it seems to me the Palestinian cause needs a vision.

The two-state solution is anything but a vision. While no non-Palestinian should argue for one second with any Palestinian who has paid the dues, who believes that suffering has gone on long enough, and that one must take anything that would count as a Palestinian state in the homeland, we do have the option of respecting Palestinians who hold that two-state position but working with those Palestinians and Jewish Israelis who want democracy beyond ethnicity, religion and colonialism, and the return, as citizens, of all Palestinians.

* Blake Alcott is an ecological economist and the director of One Democratic State in Palestine (England) Limited. The author welcomes any information on ODS or bi-nationalism activity sent to blakeley@bluewin.ch. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com.

Saudi Arabia: Activist Marks Two Years Behind Bars

0
0

The prominent Saudi human rights activist Fahad al-Fahad has served two years in prison since his April 2016 arrest and subsequent conviction on charges tied solely to his peaceful social media activity, Human Rights Watch said. He is one of more than 20 prominent Saudi activists serving long prison terms on charges such as “breaking allegiance with the ruler” or “inciting hostility against the state” that do not constitute recognizable crimes.

When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman was asked in February 2018 by The Washington Post whether he would consider releasing imprisoned activists prior to his trip to the United States in late March, he replied, “If it works, don’t fix it,” but he later said that he would consider “reforms” in this area, The Washington Post reported. The Atlantic reported on April 2 that he told Jeffery Goldberg, “there is a different standard of freedom of speech” in Saudi Arabia, indicating that speech is limited around topics of Islam and national security and when criticizing people by name.

“As Mohammad bin Salman parades himself across the world spending millions to bill himself as a reformist, many Saudis are thrown in jail and forgotten for the ‘crime’ of calling for badly needed reforms,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “If the Saudi Crown Prince wants to do something that would warrant the reformist label, a good start would be the immediate release of imprisoned activists and dissidents who never should have been arrested in the first place.”

Authorities arrested al-Fahad, a former labor ministry consultant, on April 6, 2016. The Specialized Criminal Court, a terrorism court that has handled most cases of peaceful dissidents since 2014, sentenced him in June 2017 to five years in prison, including time served, a 10-year travel ban, and a ban on writing and media work. The judgment does not indicate the length of the ban on writing, but a Saudi activist with direct knowledge of the case told Human Rights Watch that the Saudi judge said in the courtroom that the ban was for life. Al-Fahad is in al-Dhahban prison north of Jeddah.

Al-Fahad’s charges included violating the Saudi cybercrime law via tweets criticizing the Saudi criminal justice system and government corruption and “inciting hostility against the state, its structure, and its justice systems.” He was also accused of assisting the now-banned Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association and “sympathizing with its members” by publishing its statements and attending meetings.

Several other activists have been sentenced to prison since the beginning of 2018.

On January 25, the court sentenced Mohammad al-Oteibi and Abdullah al-Attawi to 14 and 17 years respectively on charges of “forming an unlicensed organization” and other vague charges relating to a short-lived human rights organization they set up in 2013. None of the alleged “crimes” listed in the charge sheet resemble recognizable criminal behavior, and none took place after October 2013.

The court sentenced Essam Koshak, to four years in prison and a four-year travel ban on February 27 for tweets in which he called for an end to discrimination against women and criticized Saudi Arabia’s treatment of jailed rights advocates. And on February 28, the court sentenced the prominent activist Issa al-Nukheifi to six years in prison for critical tweets. Both are in Riyadh’s al-Malaz prison.

The authorities have prosecuted nearly all activists associated with the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association, one of Saudi Arabia’s first civic organizations, which called for broad political reform in interpretations of Islamic law. A Saudi court formally dissolved and banned the group in March 2013. The members faced similar vague charges, including disparaging and insulting judicial authorities, inciting public opinion, insulting religious leaders, participating in setting up an unlicensed organization, and violating the cybercrime law.

Other Saudi activists and dissidents serving long prison terms based solely on their peaceful activism include Waleed Abu al-Khair, Abdulaziz al-Shubaily, Mohammed al-Qahtani, Abdullah al-Hamid, Fadhil al-Manasif, Sulaiman al-Rashoodi, Abdulkareem al-Khodr, Fowzan al-Harbi, Raif Badawi, Saleh al-Ashwan, Abdulrahman al-Hamid, Zuhair Kutbi, Alaa Brinji, and Nadhir al-Majed.

“Outlandish sentences against peaceful activists and dissidents demonstrate Saudi authorities’ complete intolerance toward citizens who speak out for human rights and reform,” Whitson said.

Germany: Several Dead, Around 30 Injured After Vehicle Plows Into Crowd

0
0

A vehicle has rammed into an outdoor dining area of a cafe in the western German city of Muenster. Three people, including the suspect, were killed in the incident, according to authorities.

The number of dead was confirmed by the regional interior minister, Herbert Reul, during a press conference. Around 30 people are estimated to have been injured, though the final figure is yet to be announced. At least six among the injured are in critical condition, German media report, citing police sources.

Police have cordoned off the area and asked people to avoid it. The nature of the incident remains “unclear,” police said in a Twitter post urging everyone to “avoid speculation.” According to some media reports, police are looking for explosives in the suspect’s car that was driven into the crowd. However, there has been no official confirmation of this from police.

Police officers are also currently verifying the information about other potential suspects, who reportedly got out of the car and fled the scene, a local police spokesman, Andreas Bode, told German media. He also confirmed that police had found a “suspicious object” in the car, but refused to provide any details about it. He also said that it is still unclear if the object is an explosive device.

Photos from the scene appear to show a grey minivan, seen among scattered chairs and tables in a narrow street. The café in question, called the Kiepenkerl, is popular among locals and tourists. It is located in the historical part of the city. The street where the incident took place is also located in the vicinity of several major shopping centers.

The driver of the vehicle has taken his own life, German police confirmed to the country’s DPA news agency. Authorities say that currently they are not looking for any further suspects, and that the danger is likely to be over.

The incident might have been a terrorist attack, the German Rheinische Post said, citing police sources. However, no official confirmation has been issued.

The German Suddeutsche Zeitung daily, citing its own sources, says that the man who allegedly plowed the car into an outdoor dining area in Muenster was a 48-year-old German who had mental-health issues, and that there is no evidence suggesting that the incident was a terrorist attack. At the same time, it also reported that the police are now searching the man’s apartment for explosives.

A Kurdish demonstration was scheduled to take place in central Muenster later on Saturday. The protesters planned to rally against the Turkish operation targeting Kurdish militias in northern Syria. Around 1,500 people were expected to take part, according to German Focus magazine. Following the incident, the demonstration was called off by the authorities.

Malaysia: Parliament Dissolved To Clear Way For Elections

0
0

By Hareez Lee and Hata Wahari

Prime Minister Najib Razak on Friday announced the dissolution of Malaysia’s parliament, paving the way for what is expected to be a tightly contested general election within weeks.

Malaysia’s Election Commission will now set dates for nomination of candidates and the 14th general election, which by law must happen within two months after the dissolution of parliament and will likely take place before Ramadan begins around May 15.

In a televised address from his office in Putrajaya, Najib, 64, said he had had an audience with Malaysia’s king and received his consent to dissolve parliament on Saturday.

“In accordance with Article 55 of the Federal Constitution, his Majesty has given his blessing for the dissolution to take effect on Saturday, April 7,” he said.

Najib then launched into a campaign speech, asking voters to deliver a new mandate for the Barisan Nasional coalition that has ruled Malaysia since independence.

“We have delivered, and we will continue to deliver,” said Najib, whose United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is the linchpin of the ruling coalition. “We will develop this country from Perlis to Sarawak and Sabah … so there is no one left behind.”

Unprecedented

The election is unprecedented in that nonagenarian former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has come out of retirement to lead the opposition in its bid to unseat Barisan. Mahathir led UMNO when he was prime minister for more than two decades.

“UMNO is beyond resuscitation, beyond turning around. It has become very bad, it has become, obviously, very corrupt. The leaders are corrupt. They don’t express the views of the people,” Mahathir told BenarNews in 2016.

In the coming election, the party that wins a simple majority in the 222-seat parliament will form the next federal government. Barisan Nasional currently holds 130 seats.

But this year’s general election promises to be a stiff challenge for Najib, 64, because his coalition will be vying against an opposition alliance led by still-popular Mahathir, 92.

Once Najib’s mentor, Mahathir quit UMNO in 2016, accusing party leaders of shielding the prime minister from corruption allegations tied to 1MDB, a state investment fund started by Najib. Mahathir has been nominated to serve as the next PM should the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition defeat Barisan at the polls.

For the past three years, Najib’s name has been linked to a scandal involving hundreds of millions of dollars allegedly stolen from the fund known as 1Malaysia Development Berhad, but he has denied allegations that he committed any wrongdoing.

Najib has acknowledged receiving close to U.S. $681 million in his personal bank accounts, but said the money was a political donation from Saudi Arabia’s royal family. The prime minister and 1MDB officials have denied the embezzlement allegations.

The controversy over the 1MDB scandal has stoked negative opinion polls against Najib, but the opposition has struggled to make a serious dent in Najib’s rural support, analysts say.

“This government is a credible and trustworthy government and fulfills promises, because. I believe politics is not just promises but the ability to fulfill promises,” Najib said in his speech Friday, claiming that Barisan had fulfilled “99.4 percent” of its promises.

Prime minister in waiting

In 2008 elections, Barisan Nasional lost the two-thirds majority that UMNO and its partners had enjoyed since 1957. Najib was sworn in a year later, in a move aimed at stemming the ruling party’s lagging popularity amid a slowing economy.

In 2013, the opposition made further inroads, winning 52 percent of the popular vote. But Najib and his allies ultimately held on to power by securing 133 seats in parliament.

Anwar Ibrahim, who headed the bloc that challenged Najib in the last election, has been in jail since 2015 on a sodomy conviction following a trial that a U.N. rights panel deemed politically motivated. He is due to be released on June 8.

Mahathir has pledged to relinquish the prime minister’s post to Anwar after that date should the opposition prevail in the upcoming elections.

The opposition bloc Pakatan Harapan is made up of the United Malaysian Indigenous Party (Bersatu or PPBM), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), People’s Justice Party (PKR) and Amanah.

Malays and other indigenous groups account for nearly 70 percent of Malaysia’s population of 31 million, with ethnic Chinese making up 23 percent and ethnic Indians and others the remainder. Most Malaysian political parties are race-based, including UMNO.

But Islam-based parties also have a role to play, with some observers saying the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), which allied with the opposition bloc in 2013, could tip the balance in favor of the incumbents this year.

PAS’s 2015 push to implement a Sharia penal code in northern Kelantan state, its power base, fractured the opposition bloc at the time. It has since reformed with UMNO deserters and a newly formed moderate Islamic party.

Experts weigh in

Following Najib’s announcement on Friday, Malaysian political analysts expressed a range of views on the electoral prospects for both the ruling Barisan bloc and the opposition Pakatan alliance heading into national polls.

According to recent surveys of voters conducted by a think-tank, the Darul Ehsan Institute, the two sides were polling fairly evenly, but with support for Pakatan and its constituent parties growing to 41 percent against Barisan’s “static” 42 percent. Sixty-one percent of people surveyed by the institute said they supported Mahathir, versus 39 percent who said they backed Najib.

Young voters who had been so-called “fence sitters” were “now making their stand by choosing PH,” Redzuan Othman, the institute’s CEO, told BenarNews on Friday.

“Overall, the public still sees Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim era as the golden period of our country,” he said, noting that 72 percent of ethnic Chinese survey respondents said they supported Mahathir, compared with 61 percent and 57 percent of support for him, respectively, from ethnic Indian and Malay respondents.

Analyst Wong Chin Huat, of the Penang Institute, said Barisan would retain control of parliament on polling day if voter turnout was low.

“If there is an increase in the number of voters turning up, it shows that people are angry with the government and that will not benefit BN and will foil attempts at gerrymandering,” he told Benar.

Ibrahim Suffian, program director at the Merdeka Center, a think-tank, predicted that Najib’s coalition would face an uphill challenge in winning the popular vote in this year’s general election. But Barisan would hold on to power through controversially redrawn electoral maps that were approved by parliament last week, he said.

According to critics, the altered electoral boundaries would give Barisan an unfair advantage by skewing the upcoming vote in its favor through packing more voters into districts currently held by the opposition.

“Not only BN will be given a new mandate but there is a probability that it will get back a two-thirds majority based on the approved redrawing of the electoral map,” Ibrahim said.

“BN will win more parliamentary seats and PH will get the majority in popular votes but will not be able to form a government,” he told BenarNews.

Sri Lanka: Sirisena Stresses Responsibility To Ensure Benefits For Country, People

0
0

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena said he would continue to work to strengthen the government with the support of all the parliamentarian extending cooperation to the government for the benefit of the country and the people. He said that he extends an invitation to all the 225 MPs to join the efforts of the government, irrespective of party differences.

The President made the above statement addressing the heads of media institutions at the President’s House in Colombo. Replying to a question he said that future of the current cabinet ministers and the proposed reshuffle would be discussed at the Central SLFP Committee meeting scheduled to be held on Monday (April 9) and the reshuffle will be studied by a joint committee of the two parties and it would be done in a scientific manner. He said that he had discussed regarding this with the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe yesterday.

President Sirisena, referring to the alleged corrupt practices at the election of chairpersons of local government institutions, said that the legislation pertaining to local government bodies must be amended. He pointed out that the election of over 8,000 members to local government bodies was an unnecessary burden on the government and proposed that the number of members must be reduced to 4,000 at the next election. He said that the increase of members has led to unethical practices and corruption as evident from the incidents happened during the election of chairpersons. Legislation pertaining to local government authorities had lead to a situation where the people’s mandate is not being accepted, he further said.

Sirisena remarked that the political parties that have won elections merging with opposition parties do not add any value to the people’s mandate.

Answering a question on UNHRC meeting in Geneva, President Sirisena said that Sri Lanka’s position was well explained by the Ministers Tilak Marapana, Dr Sarath Amunugama and Faizer Mustapha. He said that the government will not agree to appoint any foreign judges.

PMD

Referring to the demands of the TNA, President Sirisena revealed that TNA leader R Sampanthan told him that whatever the solution, it will have to be implemented with the consensus of the majority Sinhalese.

Sirisena said that the proposed new constitution is a matter for the Parliament and the Parliamentary Committee appointed for this purpose is working to find a consensus agreeable to all the parties concerned.

Hungarians Go To Polls In Test Of Orban, Fidesz Strength

0
0

(RFE/RL) — Hungarians are heading to the polls in a parliamentary election that will test the strength of rightwing Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Orban’s ruling nationalist Fidesz party looks set to win about 50 percent of the vote in the April 8 vote, according to preelection polls, setting the anti-Europe, anti-immigrant leader up for his third consecutive term as prime minister.

The surveys forecast that Fidesz will far surpass the totals the radical nationalist Jobbik (SAY: YOH-beek) party, the Socialists, and several smaller left-leaning and green groups.

However, the polls and a recent setback for Fidesz in a key municipal election indicate the ruling party may not claim margins as big as those recorded in 2010 and 2014.

That puts in doubt whether Orban can capture a two-thirds majority, as he did eight years ago, giving him the power to change the country’s constitution.

Some 8.3 million residents in Hungary are eligible to vote. They will cast two ballots — one for a candidate in their district and one for a party list, with 199 parliamentary seats up for election. Hungarians outside the country voting by mail choose only party lists.

The 54-year-old Orban, who also served as prime minister from 1998-2002, campaigned on a strong anti-immigrant platform and on April 6 called this vote an “election of fate” and a chance for Hungarians to reclaim their country.

“They want to take away our homeland again,” he said at Fidesz party rally in a town about 70 kilometers outside of the capital, Budapest.

“Parties that serve foreign interests and politicians who take foreign pay want to govern and turn Hungary into an immigrant country,” he added.

Orban began his political career as a liberal activist in the late 1980s, but he has been accused by critics of abandoning Hungary’s postcommunist democratic path for an increasingly authoritarian direction.

Over the past eight years, Orban’s government has expanded control over the media and, through allies in the business sector, gained influence over the banking, energy, construction, and tourism sectors.

Some critics also accuse Orban of being too accommodating to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Orban was once a critic of Putin. But after his party’s 2010 election victory, he called for transforming Hungary into an “illiberal state,” citing Russia and Turkey as templates for success.

Orban has also repeatedly criticized U.S.-Hungarian billionaire philanthropist George Soros, whom he accuses of meddling in Hungarian politics and leading the liberal opposition.

EU leaders will be closely watching the results, with a big victory by Orban’s party likely to boost to similar rightwing nationalists in other Central European countries, particularly Poland and Austria, and increase concerns about EU cohesion.

Jobbik was formerly one of Europe’s most far-right, anti-Semitic, and anti-EU parties, but it has attempted to rebrand itself as a more-centrist entity.

Party founder Gabor Vona, who was a student when he set up Jobbik in 2003, has asked the country’s Romany minority for forgiveness for previous attacks and has sent Hanukkah greeting cards to Hungary’s Jewish population.

“I am ready to say sorry again if needed to the Romany or Jewish community,” Vona recently told AFP.

Socialist-led parties ruled Hungary and defeated Orban in the 2002 and 2006 general elections before falling to Fidesz in 2010.

The Socialists are backing 42-year-old Gergely Karacsony — who heads Dialogue, a small liberal and green party — for the prime minister post.


US Congress Should Prevent Saudis From Going Nuclear – Analysis

0
0

By Kingston Reif, Daryl G. Kimball and Kelsey Davenport*

Curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and the technologies to make them has long been and remains strongly in the U.S. national security interest, especially in the troubled Middle East.

As President Donald Trump decides in the coming weeks whether to continue implementing the successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, lawmakers could soon be asked to consider a lower-profile, but nonetheless hugely consequential, agreement which would provide for civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

Energy Secretary Rick Perry led an interagency delegation to London in late February to discuss a pact, known as a 123 agreement, with a Saudi delegation led by Minister of Energy and Industry Khalid Bin Abdulaziz al-Falih. A 123 agreement, named after a section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, sets the terms for sharing U.S. peaceful nuclear energy technology, equipment, and materials with other countries.

The Trump administration has not commented on the status of the talks and no agreement was announced during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington the week of March 19.

Though Saudi Arabia says that it is seeking nuclear power for peaceful purposes to diversify its sources of energy, recent statements by the Saudi leadership have cast doubt on the kingdom’s commitment to its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) not to acquire nuclear weapons.

In a bombshell interview with CBS News March 15 bin Salman warned: “Without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” The Saudi government has also made it clear that it seeks to make its own nuclear fuel.

Engaging in nuclear cooperation with a country that has threatened to leave the NPT carries significant risks. The Trump administration should insist on nonproliferation safeguards that go beyond those required by existing U.S. law, including a Saudi commitment not to engage in uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing activities. These activities are considered sensitive because they can be used to make fuel for nuclear power reactors and for nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the administration’s interest in revitalizing the U.S. nuclear industry, disdain for the Iran deal, and desire to strengthen the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia casts doubt on whether it will use the significant leverage it has over the kingdom to push for adequately strong safeguards.

If Trump walks away from the Iran deal – as seems increasingly likely – and strikes a pact with Saudi Arabia that does not include a Saudi pledge not to enrich or reprocess, the prospects for a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear fuel-making race in the Middle East will greatly increase.

Fortunately, bipartisan opposition in Congress to an agreement that does not block Saudi fuel-making appears to be mounting. Lawmakers should closely scrutinize any agreement with Saudi Arabia to ensure that it contains adequate safeguards. And if it does not, Congress should use its authority to put conditions on the agreement to ensure it does not leave the door open to further proliferation of nuclear fuel-making technologies in the Middle East.

In addition, as Congress reviews the agreement and prepares to consider potentially other agreements in the near future, Congress should strengthen the nonproliferation standards and procedures for congressional review of 123 agreements.

123 Agreements and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

The United States has appropriately sought to deny the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them through several avenues, including the terms of nuclear cooperation agreements.

After the Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in 1978 to mandate that nuclear cooperation agreements include tougher bulwarks to prevent U.S. nuclear assistance from being diverted to military uses. The amendment put in place nine provisions, including the requirement that recipients of U.S. civil nuclear cooperation have in place full-scope international safeguards and may not conduct activities such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing unless Washington first consents. The Atomic Energy Act has not been updated since 1978.

In recent years Washington has urged states seeking nuclear cooperation with the United States to agree to a legally-binding commitment to forswear the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing as a complement to other U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of these technologies.

This so-called “Gold Standard” was enshrined in a 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the renewal in 2014 of a pact with Taiwan. Three of the past four 123 agreements that the United States has negotiated not involving a nuclear-armed state have included either a legally or politically binding commitment not to enrich or reprocess.

In addition to the UAE, the United States has negotiated several nuclear cooperation agreements with other partners in the Middle East, including Morocco (1980) and Egypt (1981). The agreements with Morocco and Egypt expire in 2022 and 2021, respectively.

Over the past decade, the United States has also conducted discussions on cooperation with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But these discussions have not resulted in agreements, in large part due to the unwillingness of either country to forswear enrichment and reprocessing.

Saudi Arabia’s Interest in Nuclear Power

Saudi Arabia has ambitious plans for nuclear power. The kingdom says it wants to construct 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 to 25 years at a cost of more than $80 billion. Many observers believe Riyadh will be hard pressed to build even half that many. The kingdom has solicited bids for the first two reactors and hopes to sign contracts by the end of this year.

The Trump administration has pledged to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry and sees in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions a major commercial opportunity. The administration is currently conducting a review of U.S. policy toward civil nuclear power.

Riyadh claims that the primary motivation for its pursuit of nuclear power is to help meet the country’s rising demand for electricity and conserve its oil resources for export. However, it is questionable whether Saudi Arabia needs nuclear power to meet these objectives.

According to several analyses commissioned by the Nuclear Policy Education Center, development of the kingdom’s natural gas resources and investment in renewable energy sources such as wind and solar would be safer and more economically rational alternatives.

Until recently, Saudi Arabia’s official position had been that it would choose not to enrich or reprocess. The kingdom has no near-term practical need for these capabilities and they would be more expensive than relying on the open market for enrichment services.

In a May 2008 U.S.-Saudi memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation, Saudi Arabia declared “its intention to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel and to not pursue sensitive nuclear technologies, which stands in direct contrast to the actions of Iran.”

The Saudi government, however, would not agree to forgo fuel cycle capabilities in negotiations with the Obama administration and is now stating publicly that it intends to acquire them (though on what timeline is uncertain).

In an interview with Reuters in March 2018, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy and Industry Khalid Bin Abdulaziz al-Falih stated: “It’s not natural for us to bring enriched uranium from a foreign country to fuel our reactors.” Al-Falih also said he hopes Washington will “help us with the fuel cycle,” suggesting that Riyadh may be seeking Washington’s blessing and active assistance to enrich or reprocess.

In reality, relying on the international market is what most states with nuclear reactors do to fuel them. How Saudi Arabia would acquire fuel-making technology is unclear and there would be significant obstacles. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of 48 supplier countries who implement export guidelines to try to prevent peaceful nuclear trade from contributing to nuclear proliferation, adopted new guidelines in June 2011 that strongly discourage the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. For its part, the United States does not transfer this technology to anybody. Riyadh could seek to acquire it from Pakistan or North Korea, neither of which are members of the NSG. But this would present its own problems.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear power and interest in enrichment appears motivated primarily by its security competition with Iran, which has violently manifested itself in the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Riyadh also believes the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is highly problematic, both because it limits and does not eliminate Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity and, in Riyadh’s view, enhances Iran’s position in the region.

Recent statements from the country’s leadership suggest the kingdom wants to keep open the option to acquire nuclear weapons under the cover of a NPT-compliant civilian nuclear power program. Disturbingly, neither Trump nor any member of his administration has publicly condemned Bin Salman’s threat to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does.

It has long been U.S. policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including to U.S. allies and partners. The administration’s silence is even more worrisome in light of statements from Trump during the 2016 election campaign that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by U.S. allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia is “going to happen anyway.”

The Case for Stringent Nonproliferation Conditions

The likelihood that Saudi Arabia will actually decide to engage in enrichment and/or reprocessing – to say nothing about acquiring nuclear weapons – is unknown but would face significant hurdles. Saudi statements could be designed to deter Iran and/or elicit greater protection from the United States.

Developing the capability to produce nuclear fuel is time-consuming, technically challenging, expensive, and, in a region as volatile as the Middle East, potentially threatening to one’s neighbors. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly told Trump in a March 5 meeting at the White House that the United States should insist on a Saudi commitment not to enrich and reprocess.

Most importantly, Saudi acquisition of the capability to make the key explosive ingredients of nuclear weapons runs a high risk of undermining the kingdom’s alliance with the United States. There is no other country – or technology – that Riyadh’s leaders can turn to that can provide the same level of proven support and protection.

But Saudi Arabia’s increasingly unabashed nuclear hedging is a threat to the nonproliferation regime that the United States has led for decades. To be consistent with the U.S. historical record of seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the Trump administration should seek safeguards in any 123 agreement that go beyond the existing nine nonproliferation conditions required by the Atomic Energy Act.

As Harvard University Senior Fellow and former Bush administration official Will Tobey testified to Congress last month (March 2018), “the United States has never before contemplated, let alone concluded, a nuclear cooperation agreement with a state that is threatening even provisionally to leave the [nuclear] nonproliferation treaty.”

At a bare minimum, the United States should insist that Saudi Arabia sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which allows for expanded agency access to information, sites, and materials to guard against diversion for illicit activities. No non-nuclear country has ever built nuclear weapons under the Additional Protocol.

Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that has yet to adopt the Additional Protocol (Iran has signed and is provisionally implementing it). Washington has not in recent years negotiated a 123 agreement with a state that had not signed up to the measure.

The United States should also seek a prolonged, legally-binding Saudi commitment not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing that does not sunset for the duration of the agreement. The absence of a ban on them would depart from the policy pursued by both the Bush and Obama administrations and open the door for the kingdom to pursue fuel cycle capabilities without U.S. approval if it uses technology or materials provided by other suppliers. A typical 123 agreement requires that the U.S. consent to any request to enrich or reprocess U.S.-origin materials or fuel.

In addition, an agreement that does not include the “Gold Standard” could lead the UAE to invoke a provision in its 123 agreement that allows for amending the agreement if Washington strikes a more “favorable” 123 pact with another Middle East country. Egypt’s 123 agreement, which is up for renewal in 2021, contains a similar provision.

Whether the Trump administration is insisting on these safeguards in discussions with the Saudis is unknown. It has not yet briefed Congress on the talks since they formally began.

In testimony at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing March 22, Perry suggested that the Saudis should adhere to the Additional Protocol. But he refused to say whether the United States is pushing for a prohibition on fuel-making or would consent to or assist in the development of a Saudi fuel-making program. (A permissive agreement that facilitates Saudi fuel-making would exacerbate the negative consequences described above.)

Critics of insisting on tougher nonproliferation standards in an agreement with Saudi Arabia, particularly restrictions on fuel cycle technologies, argue that the United States lacks leverage to convince Riyadh to accept these terms. They also argue that such terms could prompt Saudi Arabia to engage in cooperation with countries, such as Russia and China, that would demand less stringent nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear safety provisions than those contained in the Atomic Energy Act.

These arguments are unconvincing for several reasons.

First, the administration has significant leverage in this case. While the U.S. nuclear industry no longer holds the preeminent supply position that it once did, countries still value the imprimatur of legitimacy for their nuclear efforts that comes with a 123 agreement. More importantly, Saudi Arabia relies heavily on the United States for military and economic support and president Trump is pursuing an expansion of cooperation with Riyadh in these areas. Given the dangerous downsides of the proliferation of nuclear fuel-making in the Middle East, the administration should attempt to use the influence this assistance provides.

Second, 123 agreements set the conditions for nuclear trade, but they are not contracts and do not automatically result in commerce. Even if Washington strikes a deal with Riyadh, there is no guarantee the kingdom will choose U.S. vendors. Regardless, as Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski of the Nuclear Policy Education Center note, Russia and China may not be appealing partners for Riyadh. U.S. nuclear technology has a better record of safety and reliability than what Russia and China have available for export. Meanwhile, Russia is the top supplier of nuclear reactors to Riyadh’s archenemy Iran.

South Korea, which is building four of its APR 1400 reactors in the UAE, is likely to be the most desirable vendor for Saudi Arabia. But given the reliance of this reactor on U.S. technology, exporting it to the kingdom could require a Saudi 123 agreement with Washington. This provides the Trump administration with another significant point of leverage.

Flawed Comparisons to the Iran Deal

Opponents of the 2015 agreement restricting Iran’s nuclear program claim that it undermines efforts to impose restrictions on Saudi enrichment and reprocessing since the Iran deal does not prohibit Iranian uranium enrichment activities.

This too is a deeply flawed – and dangerous – argument. The Iran deal, which is not an agreement for nuclear cooperation, severely and verifiably restricts Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, does not yet have fuel cycle capabilities and does not need them to produce nuclear energy.

The deal also requires – in perpetuity – stringent monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program under the Additional Protocol, which the Saudis have not yet signed.

During the early years of the Bush administration when Iran’s nuclear program was much smaller, pursuing a deal that eliminated Iran’s uranium-enrichment program may have been feasible. But by 2013 when the Obama administration began negotiating with Iran, such an outcome was not possible.

Obama administration officials also clearly stated that acknowledging Iran’s uranium enrichment program did not change longstanding U.S. policy that there is no “right to enrich” under the NPT as claimed by some states or alter U.S. opposition to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia is concerned that the Iran deal leaves Tehran with too much nuclear capacity, especially after certain limitations on enrichment and fuel cycle activities begin to expire in the mid-2020s. Even more concerning from Saudi Arabia’s perspective is Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region. Bin Salman stated in a recent interview that Iran’s leadership “makes Hitler look good.”

These anxieties will need to be responsibly managed and addressed. But instead of walking away from the Iran deal, the Trump administration should continue to vigorously implement and enforce it. If Trump kills the deal, Iran could respond by resuming nuclear activities limited by the agreement.

This would greatly increase the odds that Saudi Arabia will choose to quickly follow a similar path, and perhaps the UAE, Egypt, and other regional states as well.

Attempting to counter Iran by facilitating Saudi fuel-making is also unwise. A cascade of fuel making in the Middle East would have profoundly negative consequences for regional security and the nonproliferation regime. The Iran case demonstrates the crisis that can ensue when a state takes steps toward nuclear weapons while maintaining that its program is entirely peaceful.

Additionally, to address legitimate concerns about the future of Iran’s nuclear program after certain restrictions expire, the administration should pursue opportunities to build on the agreement in ways that strengthens nonproliferation in Iran and regionally and reduces Iran’s incentives to expand its enrichment program.

Strengthening Congressional oversight

A growing number of lawmakers are justifiably raising concerns about a potential 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that does not block the kingdom from engaging in fuel-making.

“The idea of Saudi Arabia having a nuclear program with the ability to enrich is a major national security concern,” Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) said at a March 21 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the implications of civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh. “Unfortunately from the little we do know from the administration it is looking at this deal in terms of economics and in terms of commerce and national security implications only register as a minor issue – if at all.”

Similarly, Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI), the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Perry at the March 22 hearing that he “and many others” would oppose a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia that does not include a fuel-making ban.

Once the executive branch submits a signed cooperation agreement to Congress, lawmakers have 90 days in continuous session to consider the pact, after which it automatically becomes law unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing it.

If the Trump administration presents lawmakers with a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that does not contain adequate nonproliferation safeguards, Congress, which has the right to vote on the final agreement, should condition its approval on the adoption of several requirements. Options include:

  • a provision that would automatically terminate the agreement if it is ever determined that Saudi Arabia has sought or has acquired enrichment and reprocessing technologies, for any reason;
  • an annual certification from the president that Saudi Arabia is not seeking, nor has any nuclear technology supplier discussed the transfer of, enrichment and reprocessing technologies to the Saudis;
  • a provision that Congress must approve as an amendment to the agreement any decision by the United States to provide consent to Saudi enrichment and reprocessing; and
  • a commitment from the Trump administration that the United States will use all available means to encourage other members of the NSG to refrain from transferring sensitive fuel cycle technology to any state that does not already possess such technology.

In addition, it is also past time that Congress pursued revisions to the Atomic Energy Act procedures for Congressional review of 123 agreements.

On March 21, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen and Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) introduced HR 5357, the Nuclear Cooperation Reform Act of 2018. The bill, which mirrors legislation unanimously approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2011, would add new requirements to the nine conditions already in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act that, if met, would be subject to the same Congressional “fast track” approval process as current law.

Agreements with states that cannot meet the higher set of standards would be subject to a more rigorous process requiring affirmative Congressional approval. Among the new requirements for “fast track” approval would be:

  • the application of the Additional Protocol; and
  • a pledge from countries that do not already possess enrichment and reprocessing capabilities not to acquire these capabilities and/or facilities to conduct them.

A common argument in opposition to earlier versions of the legislation was that by requiring more stringent standards, it would deny NPT members their rights under the treaty.

But asking that states forego enrichment and reprocessing is not about denying rights; it is about asking countries not to exercise rights in the context of a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States.

In any event, under the bill, Congress could still pass agreements without a fuel-making ban. Such agreements would simply require a higher bar for approval than those containing a ban. This would provide powerful leverage to the executive branch negotiating team in its discussions with the Saudis and future talks with other potential partners.

Another argument is that by requiring tougher standards, other countries will not agree to nuclear cooperation with the United States and instead turn to other suppliers for nuclear trade.

Similar arguments were made at the time Congress was considering the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act via the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, and they were found to be wanting by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others.

The modifications to existing law proposed in the Ros-Lehtinen and Sherman legislation are less stringent than those enacted in 1978 and these amendments did not inhibit the United States from successfully renegotiating most of the existing 123 agreements at that time.

In light of the growing interest in nuclear power in geopolitically sensitive regions of the globe; the inclusion of the “Gold Standard” in the UAE and Taiwan agreements; and the new NSG rules adopted in 2011, it is prudent to update the Atomic Energy Act to better address the proliferation risks of today – and tomorrow.

*Kingston Reif is Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy and Daryl G. Kimball is Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. Kelsey Davenport is the Association’s Director for Nonproliferation Policy. This article appeared as Issue Brief on April 5, 2018 with the caption ‘The Risks of Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Role of Congress’. It is being reproduced with permission from the Association. – The Editor.

Hindu Group Upset At Parading Of Hindu Gods At Rio Carnival

0
0

A US-based Hindu group is upset over reported parading of Hindu deities during the world’s largest carnival in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in February, calling it highly inappropriate.

According to reports, performers dressed as Lord Ganesha and other Hindu deities danced as a part of the carnival in the Rio de Janeiro streets, which also included performances by dancers dressed as Hindu sadhus.

A float also reportedly included statues of Lord Ganesha and Lord Brahma and portrayal of Lord Indra.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, in a statement in Nevada, said that Hindu deities were highly revered in Hinduism and were meant to be seriously worshipped in temples or home shrines and not to be trivialized in carnivals which involved public revelry, street partying with elements of circus, demonstration of grotesque bodies with exaggerated features and fancy/wild costumes, etc.

Inappropriate usage of Hindu deities or concepts for entertainment and other agendas was not okay as it hurt the devotees, Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, indicated.

What was the point of unnecessarily dragging Hindu gods, whom Hindus venerated and seriously addressed their prayers, in an extravagant atmosphere associated with a carnival? Rajan Zed asked.

Zed urged organizers of this carnival to offer a formal apology.

Rajan Zed also urged Mayor Marcelo Bezerra Crivella of the city of Rio de Janeiro, Governor Luiz Fernando Pezão of the state of Rio de Janeiro and President Michel Temer of Brazil to create a mechanism so that Hindu deities were not trivialized in the future carnivals.

Hinduism was the oldest and third largest religion of the world with about 1.1 billion adherents and a rich philosophical thought and it should not be taken frivolously. Symbols of any faith, larger or smaller, should not be mishandled, Zed noted.

Rajan Zed further said that Hindus were for free artistic expression and speech as much as anybody else if not more. But faith was something sacred and attempts at trivializing it were disturbing for the followers, Zed added.

Single Award or Multi-Cloud?: Public Policy And Department Of Defense Cloud Computing – Analysis

0
0

The lack of clarity in the current JEDI procurement process

On September 13, 2017, Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a Memorandum on Accelerating Enterprise Cloud Adoption and established a Cloud Executive Steering Group (CESG) led by Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ellen Lord. The CESG is the executive entity reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary to promote the rapid implementation of a Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI), the initiative to accelerate movement to the cloud.

From inception, the CESG was widely seen as favoring a single-award cloud services provider (CSP), following in the direction taken by the Intelligence Community (IC) in its selection of Amazon Web Services (AWS) as its service provider, which took effect in 2013.

Undersecretary Lord buttressed this impression with her remarks at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 2, 2017 by stating, “We are, no kidding, right now writing the contract to get everything moved to one cloud to begin with and then go from there.”1 Subsequently, a JEDI strategy document leaked to the press indicated there would be a “Single-award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract” and a “Single Cloud Services Provider (CSP) to deliver services for cloud computing infrastructure and platform services.”2

In a second memorandum issued January 4, 2018, Deputy Secretary Shanahan removed Undersecretary Ellen Lord from both leadership and membership on the CESG, and in her place appointed now-Chief Management Officer Jay Gibson to lead the CESG. Defense Digital Service (DDS) Director Chris Lynch would lead the acquisition, and USN Capt. David McAllister of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) would lead the transition of select DoD components or agency systems to the acquired commercial cloud solution. 3

These developments offered considerable scope for speculation, but they further reinforced the impression that a “top-down,” single-award approach to cloud services was likely. Of particular note were the absence of representation of the service branches on the CESG and the omission of any statement of intention regarding their current cloud efforts.

Any lingering doubt ended at a JEDI Industry Day meeting on March 7, 2018. A Defense Department official announced there would be a single award to one provider. In a subsequent conference call with reporters, DoD defended its decision not to pursue a multi-cloud approach.4

Public policy and the DoD’s competitive procurement of services

There is a strong presumption in both law and regulation that DoD will acquire products and services from the private sector on the basis of competitive procurement processes. The exceptions here, quite minor, concern the residual government “arsenal” element of the industrial base, including the national nuclear enterprise to develop, manufacture, support, and test nuclear weapons and other minor, highly specialized items for the DoD or Military Departments.5

There is inevitable tension between the public policy aspiration for competitive source selection for the DoD and mission demands. Urgency may dictate a decision to procure from a sole source. Long and favorable experience with a specific product or service provider may also provide a powerful reason to sustain an existing procurement relationship with a vendor. As the number of vendors in the DoD industrial base has declined substantially (20% in FY 2017), DoD has worked energetically to strengthen the competitive procurement process.6

Also potentially noteworthy is that Deputy Secretary Shanahan, in his prior role in both defense and civil acquisition as a Boeing executive, strongly supported competitive source selection for Boeing’s vendors.

Major public policy issues that should be addressed by the Department of Defense in its procurement of cloud services:

  1. Does the IC cloud – Commercial Cloud Services, or C2S, run by CIA – serve as an instructive model for the JEDI cloud? In particular, does the IC’s experience with C2S vindicate DoD’s stated preference to make a single award, and is the C2S marketplace the right structure to emulate to ensure that DoD users have access to best-of-breed commercial applications?
  2. Do the unique costs associated with migrating mission-critical platforms and applications to JEDI argue for a more deliberative, mission-by-mission approach to cloud acquisition on the part of DoD? Do the cost, operational and security benefits of an all-encompassing cloud-based architecture outweigh the cost, time, and risk, of incremental adoption of multiple cloud-based architectures based on fielding priorities—for example, to accommodate certain workloads that must run continuously?
  3. Does a single award risk limiting the DoD’s access to innovation given the competitive commercial market for cloud services among vendors? Many large enterprises ensure access to innovation by utilizing a multi-cloud approach.
  4. Does the cloud eliminate the integration and information-sharing challenges between and among different platforms and applications, or do these challenges remain the same for the cloud as for on-premises services?
  5. The Third Offset, the latest iteration of a strategy that seeks to overmatch adversaries through technology, forms the basis of JEDI. In a period when China and Russia have had significant access to U.S. commercial innovation, does DoD best ensure that it keeps ahead of their cloud capabilities through a single-award or multi-cloud approach?
  6. How should DoD balance the imperative of interoperability and data exchange with allies’ interest in utilizing the offerings of their countries’ own Cloud Service Providers?
  7. Does potential utilization of different cloud service providers for different functionalities (such as data storage, backup and recovery, database and warehousing) contribute effectively to cyber and data security, or does it create added vulnerabilities?
  8. Does a cloud-based architecture served by a single supplier create significant or unique security and mission performance risks?
  9. Does a heterogeneous supplier base create significant or unique security and mission performance risks?
  10. What contract structure would produce the best value for the government in DoD procurement of cloud services? Would the contract structure differ based on whether DoD is contracting with a single source or multiple sources?
  11. Should DoD consider an “industrial base” approach to data management, encouraging the commercial viability of numerous CSPs to ensure market breadth and depth for long-term DoD needs?Would the existing model
  12. of procuring cloud-based services through large omnibus contracts implemented by multiple task-orders be effective in propagating a competitive cloud-based service market for the DoD?

Background: The DoD’s “Rush to the Cloud”

The Department of Defense (DoD), following the lead of the Intelligence Community (IC), is moving rapidly to adopt cloud-based IT architectures. The perceived urgency relates to such factors as security, data integration, and advanced military mission considerations, as well as the legacy financial pressures of the sequestration era.

Security. First, the widespread success of adversary cyber operations against decentralized US Government and defense industry networks has resulted in a vast loss of data on defense R&D programs for scores of advanced weapon systems (greater than 50 terabytes).7 These losses have been exploited by adversary States, reducing the time they require to field advanced capabilities. While there are compelling cost and efficiency arguments for a shift to a cloud-based architecture, these security concerns have been the most widely shared rationale for the need to “go to the cloud.”8 The security issues have also led DoD to propagate modern information security practices to its core defense industrial base, albeit with only mixed success.9

Data integration. DoD’s military operations, logistics systems, and planning activities have become increasingly dominated by data-driven processes. The pervasive nature of data in turn has increased the role and influence of officials responsible for IT and correspondingly diminished the influence of the conventional acquisition process.

Military missions. No less significant is the evolution of modern concepts of military operations at the tactical and operational levels. Modern military operations and the weapon systems they utilize require and generate vast quantities of data. Tactical and operational exploitation of multiple data series requires real-time integration, which the DoD has found to be facilitated by cloud-based rather than decentralized IT architectures.

Cost. DoD’s leadership believes that transitioning to cloud-based architectures will produce significant cost-savings in the acquisition, management, and operation of IT networks and systems. Cost issues have increased in importance in the sequestration era, particularly given criticism of cost overruns in the F-35 program.

The example of the IC and its salience for the DoD

DoD leadership has derived its current perspective from the experience of the IC. In 2012, as it evolved its strategy for IT modernization, the IC saw the indispensable role that cloud-based computing could play in information assurance and mission success.

The IC also recognized that the benefits of a cloud-based strategy embedded in the organization’s digital transformation would require its propagation at scale.10

The IC consolidated its cloud based services under a single-award service provider, Amazon Web Services, in 2013. The DoD believes that the IC—85 percent of which consists of DoD-funded entities – has been successful in implementing and benefiting from the rapid transition of its 17 agencies to a cloud-based architecture.

The IC’s favorable experience with a single-award cloud services provider has developed supporters in the DoD. However, the IC practice of sustaining long-term single-award incumbencies is inconsistent with law and public policy for DoD regarding competitive procurement of products and services.

In addition, the cloud services market, likely to double in size in less than five years, is already robust, with hundreds of vendors offering various services. Public, private, and hybrid clouds are available, and most services previously conducted on decentralized computer networks are now implemented in the cloud. This was not yet the case when the IC made its cloud award in 2013. Almost all large enterprises now utilize multiple cloud service providers for their data management needs.

About the author:
*William Schneider
, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute.

Source:
This article was published by the Hudson Institute (PDF).

Notes:
1 “One Cloud To Rule Them All At DOD?”. 2018. FCW. https://fcw.com/articles/2017/12/06/pentagon-lord-cesg- cloud.aspx.
2 “Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure”. November 6, 2017. U.S. Department of Defense. http://www.nextgov.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/121217fk1ng.pdf via
“Pentagon’s Next Cloud Contract Could Be Worth Billions”. 2018. Nextgov.Com. http://www.nextgov.com/it- modernization/2017/12/pentagons-next-cloud-contract-could-be-worth-billions/144506/.
3 “Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure”. 2018. U.S. Department of Defense. http://www.nextgov.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/121217fk1ng.pdf and “Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Accelerating Enterprise Cloud Adoption”. September 13, 2017. Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4059163-DoD-Memo-Accelerating- Enterprise-Cloud-Adoption.html
4 “DOD Defends Its Decision To Move To Commercial Cloud With A Single Award”. 2018. Fedscoop. https://www.fedscoop.com/dod-pentagon-jedi-cloud-contract-single-award/.
5 Else, Daniel. 2011. “The Arsenal Act: Context And Legislative History”. Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42062.pdf.
6 Gould, Joe. 2018. “American Exodus? 17,000 US Defense Suppliers May Have Left The Defense Sector”. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/12/14/american-exodus-17000-us-defense- suppliers-may-have-left-the-defense-sector/.
Brennan, Ken. 2017. “Improving the Department of Defense Services Acquisition Tradecraft: What’s New In 2017”. Powerpoint Presentation, 2017. https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/sa/docs/ImprovingServicesAcquisitionTradecraft2017.pdf.
7 Gertz, Bill. 2018. “NSA Details Chinese Cyber Theft Of F-35, Military Secrets”. Washington Free Beacon.
8 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2013. “Task Force Report: Cyber Security And Reliability In A Digital Cloud”. Washington: Defense Science Board, Department of Defense. https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/CyberCloud.pdf.
9 Department of Defense. 2016. “DoD’s Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity (DIB CS) Program: A Public- Private Cybersecurity Partnership”. Washington. https://www.fbcinc.com/e/cybertexas/presentations/Room_302_Wed_1- 145PM_Vicki_Michetti_DIB_101_Cyber_Texas_Aug15.pdf
10 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2018. “Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise Strategy 2016-2020”. Washington.https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/CIO/IC%20ITE%20Strategy%202016-2020.pdf.
This document superseded an earlier directive by the Director of National Intelligence,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2018. “Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise Strategy 2012-2017”. Washington. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_ITE_Strategy.pdf.

Genetics Of Modern Heirs Of Incas Shed New Lights About Their Origins And Lineages

0
0

A multinational South American team from Peru, Brasil and Bolivia led by the Universidad de San Martin de Porres at Lima, Peru, published the first genetic study on the modern descendants of the imperial Inka lineages in the journal Molecular Genetics and Genomics. This work supported by funds from the Genographic Project (Geno 2.0), shows new insights about the Inkas origins and lineages.

The Inka people arrived to Cusco valley and in a few centuries they built the Tawantinsuyu, the largest empire in the Americas. The Tawantinsuyu was the cultural climax of 6,000 years of Central Andes civilizations overlapping modern countries of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, the South of Colombia and the North of Argentina and Chile. In contrast with the richness of archeological and cultural evidence, pre Columbian history vanishes in time as it intermingles with myths due to the lack of writing systems before the arrival of the European chroniclers.

Very little is known about the Inka origins and some genetic information could help reconstruct part of their history. Unfortunately the mummies and bodily remains of the Inka emperors, worshiped as gods, were burnt and buried in unknown locations due to religious and political persecution by the Christian Conquistadors and Inquisitors, so no direct material remain to study their DNA.

“Thus for now, only the genetic analysis of modern families of Inka descent could provide some clues about their ancestors,” said geneticist Jose Sandoval, first author, working at Universidad de San Martin de Porres at Lima, Peru.

There were two foundational myths for the origin of the Inkas before they established in Cusco valley to build their capital city. One is that Manco Capac and Mama Ocllo, considered children of the Sun God and founder parents of the civilization, came from Lake Titicaca about 500 km southwards from the border of North Bolivia and South Peru, more or less the same region where Tiwanaku empire existed a few centuries before.

The second myth narrates that four Ayar brothers, with divine powers, came out from the caves inside of a hill in the area of Paccarictambo, 50 km south of Cusco and only one of them, Manco, arrived to the Cusco valley. Concerning the succession of the rulers (between 12 to 14), most chroniclers mention only one patrilineal heritage, however other authors think that it was a complex selection of military and administrative skills not necessarily electing the son of a previous Inka.

“A unique patrilineal cluster would be expected in the first case. In the second case, two or more patrilineal pattern will be evident” said geneticist Ricardo Fujita, senior author, also at Universidad de San Martin de Porres”.

The research team included historian Ronald Elward, who studied documentation of twelve Inka noble families and followed up from the conquista times to their contemporary descendants.

“Most of them still living in the towns of San Sebastian and San Jeronimo, Cusco, Peru, at present, are probably the most homogeneous group of Inka lineage,” said Elward.

Markers for Y chromosome and mtDNA were used for the genetic analysis of these families and compared with a database for 2400 native individuals from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil.

“The results show distinctive patrilineal origins to two founder individuals who lived between 1000 to 1500 AD, a period between the decline of former Tiwanaku (south) and Wari (north) contemporary empires, and the rise of the Inca empire a few centuries later,” said geneticist Fabricio Santos from the Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais at Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

The first patrilineal haplotype named AWKI-1 (awki means crown prince in quechua language) is found in the putative families descending of 2 earlier Incas Yahuar Huacac and Viracocha. The same pattern of the Inca descendants was also found in individuals living south to Cusco, mainly in Aymaras of Peru and Bolivia. The second patrilineal haplotype named AWKI-2 was found in one descendant of a more recent Inca, Huayna Capac, father of the two brothers (Huascar and Atahualpa) who were fighting a fraternal war over the empire at the arrival of the Conquistadors.

“AWKI-2 is also found in dozens of individuals from different locations in the Andes and occasionally in the Amazon, suggesting a populational expansion,” said Dr. Santos.

“In addition to San Sebastian and San Jeronimo, most locations of AWKI-1, AWKI-2 were southwards to Cusco including the basin of lake Titicaca and neighboring Paccarictambo, in agreement with the two foundational myths of the Incas,” said Ricardo Fujita, adding, “probably two pictures at different times of the same journey with final destination Cusco.”

“It is also remarkable that in these contemporary Inka noblility families there is a continuity since pre Columbian times,” said Ronald Elward. The analysis of their mtDNA suggested a highly varied matrilineal marker whose counterparts are found all over the Andes reflecting a high genetic flow.

“This probably reflects the political alliances by arranged marriages between Cusco nobility and daughters of lords of kingdoms and chiefdoms all over the empire,” said Jose Sandoval.

This work is the continuation of several studies performed by the team to reconstruct South American history by Genetics and also funded by a previous grant of the Genographic Project (Geno 1.0) led in South America by Fabricio Santos. Two published works included the unique ancient roots of the Uros, people from the Floating Islands of the Lake Titicaca and the Quechwa-Lamistas in Peruvian Amazon.

Modern Uros are Aymara speaking people that some have thought to be people from the Aymara ethnia who profited tourism by living on the floating islands. However the team showed that they were genetically isolated people who had lost their original Uro language, shifting to more the widely used Aymara language.

On the other hand the Kechwa-Lamista are Amazonian people who speak the Andean Quechua language and they were presumed descendants of Andeans Chancas, former enemies of the Incas, and were chased by them towards the Amazon. DNA showed that they are actually descendants of linguistically different Amazonian people who were gathered by Catholic missions and were taught the Quechua language (learned by the missionaries at the Andes) for a better evangelization.

“In some cases Genetics shows us something different than the official history. What is no written or badly written in historical records, can be revealed by what is written in our DNA, ” said Ricardo Fujita.

“This study is just the tip of the iceberg in trying to solve part of several enigmas of one of the most remarkable civilizations. The DNA of one Inka monarch bodily remain or of one direct descendant who lived at the beginning of the Spanish colonization could give more certainty about the Inca lineage, and our team is looking forward to it,” said Jose Sandoval.

Sowing Strips Of Flowering Plants Has Limited Effect On Pollination

0
0

Researchers at the Centre for Environmental and Climate Research at Lund University have studied how pollination varies in different agricultural landscapes, by placing pots with either wild strawberry or field bean in field borders. Plants that were placed in a small-scale agricultural landscape, with pastures and other unploughed environments, were better pollinated than plants in landscapes dominated by arable land.

The researchers also investigated how sown flower strips, i.e. flower plantings which farmers often create to benefit pollinators, affected pollination in the different landscape types. In landscapes dominated by arable fields, pollination increased adjacent to the flower strip.

A few hundred metres further away, however, the sown flower strips had no effect on the pollination of wild strawberry and field bean. In more small-scale agricultural landscape, the sown flower strips instead reduced pollination of adjacent plants, likely because the increased amount of flowers resulted in competition among flowers for pollinating insects.

“In our study, pollination was highest in small-scale agricultural landscape, with pastures, meadows and other unploughed habitats. Wild bees are important pollinators and manage better in a landscape with a lot of field borders and other unexploited environments. In intensively farmed landscapes, where such environments have disappeared, we can increase pollination, at least in the immediate vicinity, by sowing flowering plants to attract pollinating insects”, said Lina Herbertsson, one of the researchers behind the study.

Farmers can receive financial support to implement measures that promote biodiversity, some of which may also benefit pollinating insects. An evaluation is currently underway of the EU’s common agricultural policy, CAP, which among other things regulates the support for greening measures, aimed at reducing the climate impact of European agriculture and promoting biodiversity in the agricultural landscape.

“Our study underlines the importance of carefully designing measures intended to increase biodiversity, in order to achieve the desired effect. The same measure could have different impact in different places. If we want to increase pollination in varied agricultural landscapes, it seems to be a better strategy to restore and maintain pastures and meadows, and to manage field borders in a way that favours the local flora, rather than adding sown strips of flowering plants”, concluded Lina Herbertsson.

Connection Of Sea Level And Groundwater Missing Link In Climate Response

0
0

About 250 million years ago, when the Earth had no ice caps and the water around the equator was too hot for reptiles, sea level still rose and fell over time. Now, an international team of researchers has developed a way to track sea-level rise and fall and to tease out what caused the changes in the absence of ice sheets.

“Today’s models suggest .3 to 2.5 meters (1 to 8 feet) of sea-level rise during the 21st century, mainly due to ice sheet melting and thermal expansion,” said Mingsong Li, postdoctoral fellow in geoscience, Penn State. “However, we know that sea level fluctuated even during times when there were no ice sheets on Earth. The question is, what caused the fluctuation?”

The researchers reported in a recent issue of Nature Communications that the effects of the Earth’s tilt on the amounts of water in the oceans and in groundwater account for the changes in sea levels during this period, the Early Triassic.

“When sea level falls, ground water levels increase,” said Li. “We find that lakes increase biodiversity of pollen, and other species that liked those ecosystems flourished. When lakes decrease, the diversity of pollens and species decreases.”

The existence of lakes and rivers depends on the levels of the groundwater. If groundwater decreases, the sizes and depths of lakes decrease as well, so the size and diversity of lakes and rivers serve as a proxy for how close to the surface the water table — the top of the ground water — resides.

The normal proxies that are used to indicate sea-level changes are heavily dependent on information obtained from ice sheets, but during a time when those ice sheets did not exist, other proxies were necessary.

The researchers looked at the sediments that form near the edges of where oceans were. If an area is near the ocean shore, the sea depth is fairly shallow. This shallowness causes mixing and disturbance of the sediments, including sea life, that create the layers of sedimentary rock the researchers examined. Tides, storms and other disturbances in shallow water will stir up the bottom, while further from shore, where the water is deeper, turbulence cannot reach the ocean floor, allowing sediment to settle undisturbed.

Researchers can date the sequences of sediment deposited on the ocean floor and, using this turbulence model, track the edges of the ocean, indicating sea-level rise.

While this research was done with sediments from South China, the sea levels during the Early Triassic behaved globally.

“The Earth’s tilt contributes to a polar temperature gradient,” said Li. “With a large tilt, more water is going into the atmosphere from the middle and higher latitudes. More rainfall is hitting the central continents and more water enters the groundwater.”

During this time, there were the oceans and a large central lake called the Germanic Basin. Evaluation of the area where this lake existed shows the expansion and contraction of this groundwater-linked body of surface water.

The researchers found that the wobble of the Earth Tilt has a periodicity of about 33,000 years, but that within that time span, there is another seesaw of wobble every 1.2 million years. If all of today’s groundwater became seawater, sea level would rise more than 1,000 feet.

Current estimates of sea-level rise by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change consider only the effect of melting ice sheets, thermal expansion and anthropogenic intervention in water storage on land. Li believes that the balance between groundwater and seawater should be considered because the amounts of sea-level rise or fall that can occur due to a shift from groundwater to seawater could be large.

Li notes that about two-thirds of the world’s cities with over 5 million people each are located in low-lying coastal areas less than 30 feet above current sea level.

Hawaiian-Language Newspapers Illuminate An 1871 Hurricane

0
0

A major hurricane struck the islands of Hawai’i and Maui on August 9, 1871 and wrought widespread destruction from Hilo to Lahaina. A recent study by two scientists, a Hawaiian language expert, and an educator from the University of Hawai’i at Manoa (UH Manoa) revealed how historical Hawaiian-language newspapers expand knowledge of this and other natural disasters of the past. The storm of 1871 was known from ship logs and English newspaper accounts, but the Hawaiian-language newspapers added significant new information allowing the team to document the intensity and track of the storm for the first time.

Following the introduction of the English language by missionaries and the collaborative effort with literate Hawaiians to create Hawaiian orthography, literacy rates in Hawai’i rose from near zero in 1820 to between 90% and 95% by midcentury. King Kamehameha III’s call for national literacy was strongly advocated by the ali’i (royalty), and by 1831, the royal government financed all infrastructure costs for 1,103 schoolhouses–and a teachers’ college, the first such school west of the Rocky Mountains.

From 1834 to 1948 more than a hundred independent newspapers were printed in Hawaiian. This newspaper archive comprises more than a million typescript pages of text–the largest native-language cache in the Western Hemisphere. Newspapers became an intentional repository of knowledge, opinion, and historical progress as Hawai’i moved through kingdom, constitutional monarchy, republic, and territory.

A team led by Puakea Nogelmeier, professor of Hawaiian Language at UH Manoa, director of the UH Institute of Hawaiian Language Research and Translation (IHLRT) and co-author of this study, has worked for years to convert Hawaiian-language newspapers to a word-searchable digital format that is publicly available. The IHLRT is associated with the University of Hawai’i Sea Grant College Program’s Center for Integrated Science, Knowledge, and Culture, one of six centers of excellence administered by Hawai’i Sea Grant.

Recognizing the value of Hawaiian newspapers as sources of data for the day-to-day events of the past, Steven Businger and Thomas Schroeder, professors in the UH Manoa School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (SOEST), partnered with Nogelmeier and his graduate students to extend translation research in the Hawaiian language papers, looking specifically for geophysical stories, including the hurricane of 1871. They produced a digital database of more than 4,000 articles related to meteorology and geology.

What they found in the translations was a timeline of the 1871 storm hitting–Waipi’o, then Kohala, then on to Maui–and detailed descriptions about the resulting destruction. One account relays “there were 28 houses blown clean away and many more partially destroyed. There is hardly a tree or bush of any kind standing in the valley.” Another mentions “the wooden houses of the residents here in Hawai’i were knocked down.”

The existence of such a powerful hurricane, uncovered in the historical record, more clearly defines the hurricane risk faced by the people of Hawai’i today.

“Puakea’s vision has helped conserve Hawaiian language of the past and is opening a window on the historical record that has been long overlooked in Hawai’i,” said Businger, lead author of the study and professor of Atmospheric Sciences in SOEST.

Businger and JIMAR continued to support the effort to search Hawaiian-language newspapers for articles relating to floods, droughts, high surf, storms, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions.

“The goal of the ongoing work is to extend our understanding of geoscience back into historical, post-contact, and pre-contact times to project and prepare for future events,” said Businger. “It is important to note that there would be much greater destruction if a storm of similar intensity and track were to occur today.”

The translated articles are also being used in place- and culture-based geoscience education and curriculum development.

“These translations are important for STEM education because the articles show that universal public education during the Hawaiian Kingdom led to highly-literate citizens, always observing, commenting, communicating, and sharing information that others were free to comment on,” said Pauline Chinn, professor in the UH Manoa College of Education (COE) and co-author of the study. “These are the fundamental processes of science inquiry–sharing of data and interpretations in a public forum for commentary and critique.”

With support from NSF, Businger, Nogelmeier, and Chinn searched 1870-1900 Hawaiian-language newspapers for articles relating to floods, droughts, and storms, enabling detection of El-Nino-La Nina patterns. Chinn, Nogelmeier, Kahea Faria, assistant specialist in COE, and four graduate students continue expanding the IHLRT database of articles on ‘aina-based phenomena, specifically to create a resource for teachers and public.

“Incorporating articles into place-based K-12 STEM lessons provides students with historical knowledge of ecological, cultural, and economic changes as Hawai’i entered the global economy,” said Chinn. We find students, especially those identifying as Native Hawaiian are more interested in future courses and careers related to STEM, Hawaiian language and culture after these lessons. “We are hopeful that knowing the past can help us to understand where we are now and provide pathways for the future.”


Carbon Taxes Can Be Both Fair And Effective

0
0

Putting a price on carbon, in the form of a fee or tax on the use of fossil fuels, coupled with returning the generated revenue to the public in one form or another, can be an effective way to curb emissions of greenhouse gases. That’s one of the conclusions of an extensive analysis of several versions of such proposals, carried out by researchers at MIT and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).

What’s more, depending on the exact mechanism chosen, such a tax can also be fair and not hurt low-income households, the researchers report.

The analysis was part of a multigroup effort to apply sophisticated modeling tools to assess the impacts of various proposed carbon-pricing schemes. Eleven research teams at different institutions carried out the research using a common set of starting assumptions and policies. While significant details differed, all the studies agreed that carbon taxes can be effective and, if properly designed, need not be regressive.

An overview report on the 11 studies appears in the journal Climate Change Economics, along with reports on the individual team results. The MIT and NREL team included former MIT postdoc Justin Caron, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Co-Director John Reilly, and Stuart Cohen and Maxwell Brown of NREL.

Reilly, who is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, says the groups looked at several options for a carbon tax and use of the resulting revenue. They considered two different starting values ($25 and $50 per ton of carbon emissions produced), and two different rates of increase (1 percent or 5 percent per year), as well as three different approaches to dispensing the revenue: an equal rebate to every household, a tax break for individuals, or a corporate tax break.

Of the different levels of fees, the team found, not surprisingly, that the highest starting value and the highest rate of increase produced the greatest emissions reductions. But the study showed that even the lowest taxation rates could in themselves lead to reductions sufficient to meet the U.S. near-term commitment under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, Reilly said.

However, the most efficient way of achieving those reductions, in terms of overall impact on the economy, is to use the revenue to reduce taxes on capital — corporate profits or investment income. Given the relatively high capital taxes in the U.S. (at the time this study was completed) such cuts spur economic growth more than cuts in other taxes or direct rebates to households. However, that option is also the most regressive, with its impact disproportionally falling on lower-income households.

At the other extreme, the option of sending equal payments to everyone was found to be the least efficient for the overall economy, but also the least regressive. Individual tax breaks came in somewhere in between on both criteria.

But the researchers said another scenario, combining the basic strategy of providing tax breaks to corporations but adding a rebate to the low-income families most affected by the tax, could virtually eliminate the regressive aspects of the tax at very little cost in overall efficiency, and thus might be the most appealing option. It could have appeal both for conservatives concerned about the costs of such a program, and for liberals concerned about its possible impacts on those at the lower end of the economic spectrum.

“It’s sort of an obvious solution,” Reilly said, “to take some chunk of the money and use it to focus on the poorest households, and use the rest to cut taxes. It doesn’t seem like a hard thing.” He continued: “It is important to realize that this study was completed before the tax reform that took effect in January that slashed corporate income tax rates. Given that these tax rates have now been cut, and that those cuts will contribute to a growing deficit, we might better consider the revenue as a contribution to closing the deficit.”

Reilly’s team used an economic model developed at MIT to assess the impacts of different policies on the world’s likely climate trajectory, and combined that with a model of the nation’s electrical system, developed at NREL. This combination allowed the team to do a much more detailed assessment of the way different policies would affect decisions by the power producers and distributors — a key point, since the electricity sector has the most immediate potential for changes that could reduce emissions, and is the biggest contributor to emissions overall.

While some versions of the carbon-pricing plan were found to be more efficient overall in terms of their impact on the economy, the study found that those impacts are actually quite modest — even without taking into account potential advantages such as better health due to lowered pollution levels. The least-efficient policies still achieved significant emissions reductions, with an overall impact of just four-tenths of a percent on economic growth. For the more efficient options, the same reductions could be achieved at zero cost, or even a net gain to the economy, the researchers found.

Their analysis indicates that starting with a $50 per ton carbon tax and increasing it by 5 percent per year would lead to a 63 percent reduction in total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, Reilly says. “So that’s in line with what people are talking about, which is needing a 50 percent reduction by 2050, globally,” he says, “and getting to net zero beyond that.”

Caron, the paper’s lead author, who was an MIT postdoc during most of this research but is now a professor at HEC business school in Montreal, said that all of the different research teams largely found similar results, though there were differences in the details. “Qualitatively, we all agree on many of the main conclusions.” That includes the fact that carbon taxes can indeed be an effective way to curb emissions.

“By taxing carbon,” Caron said, “we will collect a lot of money that can be used to supplant other taxes that we like less. Why tax something that we like?” And, he adds, by using just a small portion of that revenue — less than 10 percent — it’s possible “to compensate the lower-income people and neutralize the regressivity.”

The actual Paris agreements involved a range of different targets by different nations, but overall, Reilly said, the carbon-pricing scheme is predicted to exceed the targets for emissions reductions for 2030 and 2050, “so that’s a healthy reduction.” But even at the lowest end of the policies they studied, with a $25-per-ton initial tax,” that “would be adequate to meet the U.S. pledge in Paris” for 2030. But the rate of increase is important, the study says: “Five percent a year is sufficient. One percent a year is not.”

Reilly said, “all these tax scenarios at worst meet U.S. commitments for 2030, and the $50 tax is well exceeding it.”

Many experts say the Paris Agreement alone will not be sufficient to curb catastrophic consequences of global climate change, but this single measure would go a long way toward reducing that impact, Reilly said.

Who Are The Best Gift-Givers? Not Who You’d Think

0
0

Have you ever bought a gift for a friend, simply because it’s a gift that you would like yourself?

If so, that was likely a time that you projected your own attitudes onto your friend, assuming your friend shared your preferences. Such activity is called “social projection” and is the focus of new marketing research from Baylor University’s Hankamer School of Business.

The study, “I Love the Product, but Will You? The Role of Interpersonal Attachment Styles in Social Projection,” is authored by Meredith David, Ph.D., assistant professor of marketing, and published in Psychology & Marketing. Research results are based on the surveys of 1,272 people across five studies.

The research reveals that people who are “secure” in interpersonal settings are the ones most likely to engage in social projection (making choices on behalf of others based on their own preferences). Conversely, those who are “anxious” in such settings are less likely to assume that others share their own preferences and less likely to make choices for others based on their personal attitudes.

“You’d think that secure people with lots of friends and healthy personal relationships would have a better idea of what someone would like as a gift, but that’s not the case,” David said. “This research shows that individuals who are anxious in interpersonal situations and who have fewer close, personal relationships are better at predicting what a person may like.”

Securely attached individuals, David explained, are people who expect others will be available and supportive when needed. Anxiously attached individuals have less positive expectations about interpersonal-related situations and constantly worry about relationships.

“The findings of this study are counterintuitive and contrary to much of the literature, which says secure attachments are most desirable and attachment anxiety is only associated with negative behaviors and outcomes,” David said. “My research suggests that secure attachments may not always be the best or most optimal.”

Making choices for others

Secure individuals, David said, tend to be older, in a committed relationship and earn a higher-income. Anxious individuals tend to be younger, single and earn a lower income.

A securely attached person is more apt to choose a gift based on his/her own preferences. An anxious person is more apt to consider what the recipient may like, and will make a choice based less on his/her own personal preferences.

“A key takeaway is that secure people (people who have healthy relationships and feel comfortable in interpersonal settings, etc.) should be mindful of their propensity to assume others like what they like,” David said. “Gifts should be thoughtful, and securely attached folks need to take caution when selecting and buying gifts. Importantly, these individuals should strive to put their own preferences aside when considering what others may like.”

Research implications for marketers

David said her research can impact many areas of the market, including gift-giving and marketing to gift buyers, as well as human resources and hiring.

One example given in the study is that of a company that lists on its website a group of products that have been deemed “good gifts” for purchase. Based on the results of this research, the company could see a greater return if its target market consists mainly of securely attached individuals.

“Specifically, the findings show that less-anxious, more securely attached individuals are more likely to project their attitudes onto others,” David said. “Thus, it is likely that, while shopping online, [securely attached] individuals are more likely to assume that others would also like products from that store.”

Thus, a potential sale.

Research implications for those who make hiring decisions

David said human resources professionals and hiring managers may benefit by considering the attachment styles of job candidates and using the research to guide their evaluations as to which candidates may perform better in certain roles.

“For example, it is not uncommon that marketers and salespeople must predict preferences of the customers, at least as they relate to new products, pricing promotions etc. Sales and product development positions may be better suited for anxiously attached individuals; whereas financial, technical or market research positions may be a better fit for secure individuals,” David said.

When Health Care Hurts: High-Deductible Plans Raise Financial Risk

0
0

High-deductible health plans are touted for their money-saving potential, but a new USC study finds that they can greatly increase the risk of high out-of-pocket healthcare costs for Americans who are low-income or chronically ill — and may topple them into financial disaster.

“These plans do have lower premiums and might seem affordable, but if you are low income or chronically ill, they might end up hurting you because you face a significantly higher risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket costs,” said Neeraj Sood, the study’s corresponding author and an expert on high-deductible plans at the USC Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics. “People often don’t understand health insurance and thus might not know that enrolling in high deductible plans exposes them to significant financial risks.”

Prior research has defined excessive financial burden for a consumer as spending more than 3 percent of his or her income on health issues.

With that in mind, researchers at the USC Schaeffer Center calculated the increased risk of excessive financial burden for certain groups of consumers after they switched from traditional coverage to high-deductible plans. The likelihood of financial trouble was higher for all enrollees on the high-deductible plans, but especially those who were low income or have a chronic condition.

In fact, more than half of the low-income enrollees and over one-third of those with chronic conditions faced excessive financial burden after enrolling in a consumer-directed health plan.

The study showed that enrollment in a high-deductible health plan also raised the probability of high out-of-pocket spending on health care. The percentage of those likely to spend more than $2,000 on care, for example, increased by nearly 10 percentage points among the full sample and the lower-income subgroup. The percentage of chronically ill patients paying that much on care grew by 15 percentage points.

“If you are low income or have a chronic condition, or both, and your employer switches to high-deductible insurance, then you are significantly increasing your chance of facing an excessive financial burden or even financial disaster,” said Sood, a professor at the USC Price School of Public Policy.

The study, published in the American Journal of Managed Care, was based on a 25 percent random sample of claims data from OptumInsight Clinformatics Data Mart, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group.

The study covered claims filed in a full three-year period from 2011 through 2013 for commercially insured subscribers and their dependents. For comparison, the study focused on a control group that included 653,155 consumers on traditional plans and 36,387 consumers on high-deductible plans. Their ages ranged from 18 to 64.

Do consumers have skin in the game?

More Americans have signed up for high-deductible plans coupled with tax-preferred savings accounts for health care expenses — also known as “consumer-directed health plans,” since they hit the market in 2004. About 4 percent of covered workers were enrolled in a consumer-directed health plan in 2006. Now, 28 percent are, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation.

“If this trend continues, it is imperative that we better inform individuals of the significant out-of-pocket burden they may face when they actually seek care,” Sood said.

Advocates of the plans say high deductibles give consumers more skin in the game to become judicious price shoppers for health care services and stash money in their HSAs for basic care and emergencies.

Critics argue that the high-deductible plans shift too much responsibility to consumers and deter them from seeking even basic care, so that they end up seeing a doctor in an emergency with a more expensive health problem.

Consumer tendencies aren’t resulting in savings

Research has shown that consumers frequently choose worse plans despite being offered options that have lower premiums and a lower financial risk of out-of-pocket spending.

The study is the latest in a series by the USC Schaeffer Center to examine how high-deductible plans affect consumers and health care.

“These plans do save money, but they don’t seem to be saving money in smart ways,” Sood said. “Our research has shown that consumers on these plans do not increase their use of preventive care, which would reduce overall costs. We don’t see an increase in price shopping for care. We also don’t see a reduction in use of unnecessary medical services.”

The premiums for high-deductible plans are lower than traditional plans. In 2013, employee premium contributions for single coverage averaged $726 a year for high deductible plans with an HSA, vs. $1,027 for a traditional plan.

Study co-author and USC Schaeffer Center researcher Erin Trish noted that different types of workers may prefer different types of health insurance options from their employer.

“Consumer-directed health plans are an attractive option for some consumers, particularly higher-income households that benefit from tax-preferred savings accounts and can afford to pay high out-of-pocket costs if needed,” said Trish, who is also a research assistant professor at the USC Price School. “But our study shows that they can have negative consequences for more vulnerable populations.”

What Makes A Bestseller: Fiction, Thriller And A Christmas Release

0
0

Books that are fiction, thrillers or mysteries, have high initial sales numbers and are released around Christmas are more likely to be bestsellers, according to a study published in the open access journal EPJ Data Science.

A team of researchers from Northeastern University, Boston, used a big data approach to investigate what makes a book successful. By evaluating data from the New York Times Bestseller Lists from 2008 to 2016, they developed a formula to predict if a book would be a bestseller. They found that general fiction and biographies were more likely to make the bestseller list more often than other genres and that those with a higher initial place on the list were more likely to stay on it for a longer amount of time.

Professor Albert-László Barabási, lead author of the study, commented: “The most surprising result was that we found a universal pattern to book sales: all hardcover bestsellers, regardless of genre, follow a sales trajectory governed by the same factors. This allowed us to create a statistical model to predict sales of a book based on its early sales numbers.”

The researchers found that although fiction books sold more copies than non-fiction books, non-fiction titles were more likely to retain their bestseller status once achieved. An example of this was ‘Unbroken’ by Laura Hillenbrand, a non-fiction title that stayed on the bestseller list for 203 weeks, longer than any other book in the study. The fiction title that stayed on the list the longest was ‘The Help’, which stayed for 131 weeks; this may have been due to a popular film adaption.

The authors also found that fiction writers had more repeat success with getting on the list than non-fiction writers. Books in the romance category were more likely to be written by female authors and male authors were more likely to be authors of non-fiction books. The researchers found no gender disparity among bestselling fiction authors but most non-fiction bestsellers were written by men.

The author’s evaluated sales numbers and patterns from 2,468 fiction titles and 2,025 non-fiction titles from the New York Times Bestseller Lists 2008-2016 to create their formula for predicting how well a book would sell and whether it would be a bestseller. Three key parameters were found to be important to the formula: the audience, sales numbers from the author to date and time after publication.

Professor Barabási explained: “The analysis of bestseller characteristics and the discovery of the universal nature of sales patterns with its driving forces are crucial for our understanding of the book industry, and more generally, of how we as a society interact with cultural products.”

The authors caution that the formula cannot account for events like awards a book may receive movie adaptations and celebrity endorsements. Although these factors may influence book success, they are relatively rare occurrences.

Women Who Believe Their Sex Drive Changes Can Better Cope With Low Libido

0
0

Women who believe that their sex drive will change over time are better able to handle difficulties with sexual desire, according to a study from the University of Waterloo.

Siobhan Sutherland, a PhD candidate, and Uzma S. Rehman, a professor of psychology at Waterloo, conducted the research. They sought to determine how a woman’s belief about sexual desire as either changing or unchanging over time affects her ability to cope with desire difficulties, such as problems getting in the mood or maintaining arousal.

Their findings suggest that women who see their sexual desire as variable and rate themselves as likely to have problems with it are less likely to behave negatively by ignoring or avoiding the sexual problem. Conversely, they also found that women who believe that desire is unchanging are less likely to try to overcome sexual-desire problems when they arise. The participants did not have a diagnosis of any clinical sexual dysfunction.

“Women who believe that sexual desire levels remain the same may feel that challenges with sexual desire, such as low sex drive, are impossible to overcome and therefore they try to avoid or ignore the problem,” said Sutherland, the study’s lead author and a recipient of the prestigious Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship.

In two online studies, the researchers randomly assigned readings designed to result in different beliefs about sexual desire. The participants were then asked to indicate how true it is that they have experienced or are likely to experience a problem with sexual desire. They then completed a test to measure how they handle desire problems.

“Our findings suggest that holding a belief that sexual desire changes over time may protect women against responding helplessly to their sexual problems,” said Sutherland. “Gaining a better understanding of how women’s beliefs affect their coping with sexual desire challenges can help to refine psychological interventions for women’s problems with sexual desire.”

The researchers surveyed 780 women of mixed ages and ethnicities in the U.S. The findings appear in the Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy.

Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live




Latest Images