Eight civilians were killed on Friday in a US-led international coalition attack on Dheeb Haddaj village, southeast of al-Shaddadi city in Hasaka southern countryside, Syrian state media SANA reports.

According to SANA, citing civilian sources, the coalition’s jets attacked the Dheeb Haddaj village, resulting in the death of 8 persons.

The US-led coalition warplanes shelled the houses of citizens in al-Fadel village near al-Shaddadi last month, killing 25 civilians, according to SANA.

An Afghan lawmaker said the Taliban fighters have seized more than half of the 70 military armored vehicles that have been at the disposal of security forces in the northern province of Faryab.

The Afghan security forces in the province of Faryab had 70 armored vehicles, but the Taliban have taken 36 of them, Abdul Satar Darzabi, a member of the Afghan Parliament representing the province of Jowzjan announced.

Many of the armored vehicles have been taken by the Taliban as spoils of war after the fall of small towns and security posts, or have been purchased from the Afghan military commanders, he added.

In separate comments, Gol Mohammad Pahlawan, an MP from Faryab, said 11 of the total of 14 towns in his province have been surrounded by the Taliban, noting that the morale of assailants is higher than the security forces.

Decrying the growing corruption among the security organizations under the national unity government, Pahlawan said some of the security forces have had to sell the weapons at their disposal to make ends meet.

The lawmaker also took a swipe at the American and NATO forces for their double standards towards the ongoing situation in Afghanistan, saying the Afghan Mujahideen should be armed if the Afghan security forces are unable to ensure security.

The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated noticeably in recent months. The radical Taliban movement, which had previously seized considerable territory in rural areas of the country, has launched an offensive against large cities. Additionally, the influence of Daesh (also known as ISIL or ISIS) terrorist group has increased in the country.

Afghanistan is in a state of political and social turmoil, with government security forces fighting the Taliban. The instability has persisted in the country since the US launched a military operation in 2001 to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks.

Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko discussed enhancement of cooperation in security and defense sector with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a telephone call, the Ukrainian presidential office said in a statement.

According to the statement, Poroshenko thanked the American side for providing Ukraine with anti-tank Javelin systems, and the they also discussed security challenges posed by the implementation of Nord Stream 2 project.

Poroshenko and Pompeo coordinated positions in the context of announced conclusions on the downing of MH17 flight and highlighted the importance to keep sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia.

For his part, Poroshenko emphasized the importance to maintain pressure on Russia to get all Ukrainian hostages released.

Poroshenko also informed the Secretary about reforms implementation in Ukraine in the context of cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, in particular with regard to building efficient anti-corruption infrastructure.

Finally, Poroshenko invited Pompeo to visit Ukraine, according to the statement.

They call themselves non-profit professional societies, but they often act as enabling trade associations for the companies and businesspeople who fund them.  At their worst, they serve their paymasters and remain in the shadows, avoiding publicity and visibility.  When guided by their better angels, professional societies can be authoritative tribunes for a more healthy and safe society.

I am referring to the organizations that stand for their respective professions – automotive, electrical, chemical and mechanical engineers; physicians; architects; scientists; and accountants.  The people working in these occupations all want to be members of a “professional” association, not a “trade” association.

So let’s start by distinguishing how a “profession” is supposed to differ from a “trade.”  First, profit is not to be the end-all of a profession and its practitioners. Moral and public interest codes of ethics are supposed to be paramount when they conflict with maximizing sales and income.

The National Society of Professional Engineers’ code of ethics stipulates that an engineer has a professional duty to go to the appropriate authorities should the engineer be rebuffed by employer or client who was notified of a dangerous situation or product.

Physicians have a duty to prevent the trauma or disease which they are trained to treat. A half-dozen physicians in the 1960s aggressively pressed the auto industry to build more crash-protective vehicles to prevent trauma casualties they had to treat regularly.

A profession has three basic characteristics.  First is a learned tradition – otherwise known as going deep and keeping up with a profession’s literature and practices.  Second is to continue a tradition of public service.  Third is to maintain the independence of the profession.

How do professional societies measure up? Not that well. They are too monetized to fulfill their public service obligations and retain their independence. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has had a notorious history of following the technological stagnation of the auto companies. Their standards almost never diverge from what is permitted by GM, Ford et al.  Indeed, the SAE’s standards committees are mostly composed of company engineers whose employers provide funding and facilities for any testing.

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is waist-deep in the automation and artificial intelligence drive.  You’ll not hear from that Society about the downsides, collateral risks and undisclosed data by the companies in this portentous area.

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has not distinguished itself regarding the safety of gas and oil pipelines, allowing industry lobbyists to take over the federal regulator without as much as a warning whistle.  This history was exposed years ago by a retired DuPont engineer, Fred Lang.

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) knows about the scores of vulnerable plants resisting regulatory efforts to safeguard their premises from sabotage that could destroy a nearby town or city.  Ask Rick Hind, former legislative director for Greenpeace, about this evasion (See: “Chemical Security Testimony by Greenpeace’s Rick Hind”).

The American Medical Association (AMA) received peer-reviewed studies by Harvard and Johns Hopkins Schools of Medicine pointing to at least 5,000 patient deaths per week from preventable problems in hospitals – from malpractice to hospital-induced infections.  Despite this clear medical emergency, the AMA refuses to move into high drive against this epidemic.  Mum’s the word.  Where the AMA shouts out is against the law of torts and the civil justice system that, every once in a rare while, hold negligent or criminally behaved physicians accountable to their victims.

Possibly the most complicit profession facilitating, covering for, and explaining away corporate greed and deception is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Too many corporate accountants specialize in complex cooking of the books for their corporate clients.  The Wall Street crash in 2008-2009 is a major case in point. Donald Trump knows about such accountants from his business career of obfuscation.

The American Institute of Architects (AIA), after a long period of submissiveness, woke up to the energy waste/pollution crisis of modern buildings and developed standards with labels to give builders incentives toward more responsible construction. But by and large, it remains a profession, apart from modern technologies, which has left its best days back in the 18^th and 19^th centuries (e.g., the classic cities of Europe).

Now what about the scientific societies? The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has led the way for nuclear arms control and other weaponized discoveries of the warfare state. On the other hand, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) — by far the largest membership organization and publisher of Science magazine — has been utterly timid in putting muscle behind its fine pronouncements.

The large street protests by scientists in Washington, after the Electoral College selected Donald Trump, were started by young social and physical scientists. They stood up for scientific integrity and conscience and opposed Trump’s defunding of such governmental organizations as the National Science Foundation and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  These scientists’ efforts have been met with some success.

What most Americans do not know is that many of the state and federal safety/health standards are taken in considerable measure from the weak “consensus” standards advanced by professional societies. These societies, so heavily marinated with their respective industries, see their important role of feeding their industry standards into state, national, and international standards which are enforceable under domestic law or treaty.

Maybe these societies continue a learned tradition at their annual meetings, workshops, and in their publications.  But they far too often fail to maintain their profession’s standards of independence (from commercial supremacy) and commitment to public service.

These professional societies, and other associations not mentioned here, need to be brought out of their convenient shadows into the spotlight of public scrutiny, higher expectation, and broader participation.

The last decade has been a difficult one for the European Union. In the wake of the 2009 debt crisis, much debate has arisen around its nature, its powers, its governance and its policies. The situation got only worse when the migrant inflow boomed in 2015, triggering a EU-level crisis. In this strained socio-economic context, diverging views on the EU as a polity have emerged at the political level both inside the single member states and inside the organization’s institutions.

Recently, two events have revived once more the debate. The first is the re-election of Viktor Orbán, a prominent conservative and Eurosceptic politician, as Prime Minister of Hungary. The second is the statement by France’s President Emmanuel Macron that the EU is facing a “civil war” on its fundamental values resulting from different opinions between its Western and Central-Eastern members.

This affirmation seems exaggerated, at least at a first glance. But in such a turbulent political context, it raises a legitimate question: is the EU on the edge of a civil war?

To answer this question, the first thing to do is determining in which conditions a civil war does start. Essentially, this happens when two or more socio-political groups belonging to the same political entity disagree on the existing and/or future institutional order; and, being unable or unwilling to peacefully find a compromise through the existing institutional mechanisms, opt for armed conflict to impose their view and determine who will (re)shape the existing order by the use of coercion. Usually, a civil war opposes one group fighting to preserve the standing institutional framework (along with the prerogatives it enjoys thanks to it) and another group who wants to dismantle it (and set up a new order more favorable to its interests).

That said, history is full of examples of civil wars; from those which paved the way to the end of the Roman Republic centuries ago to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen. But one is particularly significant due to its similarities with the situation the EU is facing today: the American Civil War.

The US Civil War, also known as War of Secession, was an armed conflict that split the United States between 1861 and 1865. The contenders where two: one was the Union (the North), formed by states that remained loyal to the government of the United States; and the other was the Confederacy (the South), made up of states which seceded from the US and form a separate political entity known as the Confederate States of America (CSA). Usually, this war is portrayed as a fight over the issue of slavery, with the Union supporting its abolishment and the Confederacy favorable to its preservation. But even though slavery was indeed a central issue in sparking the conflict, the situation was far more complex than a clear-cut black-vs-white clash between conservative and progressist ideals. As a matter of fact, there were also major political, juridical-institutional and economic factors linked to the debate over slavery and human rights.

To understand this, it is necessary to perform a rapid historical overview on the prelude to the conflict. After being recognized as a sovereign polity by the Paris Treaty that officially ended the War of Independence in 1783, the United States began developing and expanding to the West. Rapidly, new states were founded and admitted to the Union. But the economic outlook of the member states started diverging: those located in the North embraced industrialization, whereas the states in the South remained essentially agricultural. There, rich landlords owned vast plantations, and exploited a large workforce of black slaves to work them. With time, this North-South gap became more and more marked, and it ultimately assumed a political dimension as well.

As a matter of fact, the Northern states needed cheap manpower to sustain their rapid industrialization. The mass of black slaves living in the South was the ideal solution, but it was impossible to hire them since they were a private property of the Southern landowners. Consequently, the North states started calling for slavery to be abolished, provoking the firm opposition of the Southerners who needed slaves to cultivate the plantations that were the base of their local economy.

Besides, the two sides also diverged over trade policies: the North wanted protectionist measures to shelter its developing industry, while the South supported free trade as a mean to continue exporting its agricultural products abroad. This led to an intense constitutional debate over slavery, and ultimately over the power of the federal government to introduce and enforce legislation on the matter all over the US territory.

Again, the opinion diverged between the North and the South: essentially, the former claimed the central government had this authority, whereas the latter considered this as a violation of the constitutional limitations on the powers of the federal institutions. So, the debate took a dimension that went beyond the issue of slavery and focused on the nature of the US as a polity. The Union favored a strong central government having large powers, while the Confederates defended the rights and prerogatives of the single member states. The combination of all these factors finally led them to secede from the US in 1861 and form an alternative polity, the Confederate States of America (CSA). The name itself is significant, as it reveals the different way these states interpreted the Constitution and conceived America as a political entity: they wanted a Confederation, so a polity granting more powers to the member states; in contrast to a Federation where the central authorities have larger constitutional competences.

Now, there are striking similarities between the situation of the US before the Civil War and that of the EU today. The latter has also expanded during the previous decades by admitting new member states, with the most important “enlargement wave” taking place in 2004 with Central and Eastern European countries; and the most recent new member being Croatia, which joined the organization in 2013. Again, similarly to America at the eve of the Civil War, the EU is also facing an intense debate over human rights that has greater economic, political and “constitutional” implications (there is not a proper EU Constitution, but the general sense of the term is still applicable to the Treaties at the base of the EU). In this context, two camps are identifiable, the complexity of reality notwithstanding.

As I argued in another article, one is formed by the original (or at least more ancient) members of the EU, concentrated in Western Europe; while the other includes the more recent ones, located in the Central-Eastern part of the continent and whose core is made of the four countries forming the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; known also as V4).

The starting point to understand the divergence between these two “factions” is the migration crisis. As a matter of fact, the former group is demanding the Central-Eastern partners to accept a larger share of migrants. But the Visegrád states oppose these requests. As in the 1850s America, the issue is not merely humanitarian, since there are economic and political reasons behind the respective positions. Countries like Italy, Greece and others (including France and Germany to some degree) worry that the migrant flow will put their socio-economic order under stress and that it may hamper the sluggish recovery from the recent debt crisis.

In contrast, the V4 and other states oppose such policies of migrant redistribution because they may slow down their ongoing economic development. But the divergence is also a matter of past experiences. Western countries have a long tradition of immigration from abroad (often as a consequences of their colonial past) and their societies are more used to the presence of foreigners; thus explaining their softer stance on immigration. This is not the case of Central-Eastern European states, that therefore prefer stricter measures in regard to immigration.

Finally, similarly to America before the civil war, the current debate in the EU also has a prominent institutional dimension. This can be explained from a historical perspective. Countries from the Western part of the continent took their current form as a result of a centralization process, which makes them more willing to accept devolving parts of their sovereignty to a supranational entity like the EU. That is why (in spite of mounting Eurosceptic forces) they remain favorable to further European integration; especially in the case of France, that appears willing to become the driver of deeper integration through devolving more powers to supranational institutions and by crating a true fiscal union (even though this met resistance from Germany).

On the contrary, the Visegrád states and those aligned with them oppose strengthening the powers of the EU institutions and want to preserve their fundamental sovereign rights. The reason lies in their past: these countries arose after the collapse of larger multinational polities affected by severe institutional deficiencies, and also had a long history of foreign domination and meddling which ended only in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result, they see the EU as another cumbersome supranational entity that will put them in a subordinate position and are therefore unwilling to devolve more powers to it.

This underlying contrast over the powers of European institutions is the most important aspect in the current debate, because it will have direct repercussion over the future of the EU. Now, the problem is that, while opinions are discordant among the member states; the complex institutional mechanisms of the EU do not facilitate the search for a compromise. Introducing deep changes (both in the sense of increased integration and of more protection of the states’ sovereignty) requires a revision of the Treaties that form the bloc’s “constitution”; but this demands in turn a long and multi-stage procedure where reaching a consensus is hard and where a single “wrong” step can block the entire process (think of the French and Dutch referenda that sunk the proposed Constitutional Treaty in 2005). Considering that the divergences are growing, finding a common agreement over the EU, its powers and its values may be impossible; and this could lead to an institutional stalemate.

And what then? Will the EU plunge into civil war as the US did in the past?

Not necessarily. Modern-day European states and their societies are strongly averse to war, which is already a huge safeguard against extreme solutions. And if it is true that European powers have been fighting themselves for centuries, it is also true that the EU was established after the trauma of WWII also as a mean to put a definitive end to that continuous bloodshed. Moreover, in spite of its slowness and difficulties, the EU proved capable to adapt and preserve itself during the past. In more cynic terms, since the EU is not a state, even if one or more of its members decided to unilaterally “secede”, it would not have its own military means to enforce its rule and re-bring them in as the Union eventually did with the Confederates in 1865. Finally, this scenario is unlikely for the simple fact that the Treaty on the European Union (Art. 50) contains provisions allowing a member state to withdraw; as the United Kingdom decided to do after the 2016 vote on Brexit.

But it is exactly a mass Brexit-like scenario what can raise concerns over the long-term tenure of the EU. A full-scale civil war seems unlikely (unless the international situation becomes so severely deteriorated in economic and political terms to bring states to the point of using war to secure their interests); but if the existing divergences continue to mount and no solution is reached, then it is still possible that some member states (most likely the V4 ones) will decide to leave the EU. The consequences are difficult to predict, ranging from an easier path to greater integration between the remaining like-minded members to a dissolution of the organization. In any case, the EU would be weakened at the international level, possibly leaving room for alternative blocs. All this would bring uncertainty in political and economic terms, and (especially if the EU were dismantled), it would certainly be a turning point in European History, as the Civil War was in America’s.

*Alessandro Gagaridis is an independent International Relations analyst and owner of the website www.strategikos.it

Language change in the regional and local media in Ukraine is proceeding in a single direction, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting Reports. More than 200 publications are shifting either from Russian to Ukrainian entirely or issuing Ukrainian-language editions in addition to the Russian ones.

The committee reports that as of June 1, 209 publications (196 local and 13 state) had shifted either into Ukrainian entirely or into two editions, one of which was Ukrainian. “Not one” moved in the direction of issuing only a Russian-language edition, the Kyiv agency continued (qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/v-ukraine-stalo-bolshe-ukrainoyazichnih-smi/193038/).

While this number is a relatively small proportion of all publications at that level, it is important for three reasons. First, it means that Kyiv’s declarations about language change are being carried out rather than ignored as some have assumed. Ukraine is becoming a Ukrainian language country.

Second, it represents a return at least for a transitional period to the Soviet practice of putting out such publications not in a single language but in both the predominant local language and Russian, a pattern that when the editions are identical otherwise, will promote Ukrainian language knowledge among non-ethnic Ukrainian citizens.

And third, it suggests that those publications which have tried to remain Russian-only are not in a position to compete with those that are either bilingual or Ukrainian-language, a measure of popular attitudes about language even more than the result of any directive from the central government.

By Wilawan Watcharasakwet

Thai police filed criminal charges Friday against a Cambodian man who allegedly posted a false report about the Thai prime minister on his website, officials said.

Ratanak Heng, 21, was arrested on Thursday in Phnom Penh by Cambodian police at the request of the Thai government, Maj. Gen. Surachate Hakpal of Thailand’s Tourist Police told reporters.

Surachate said he took Ratanak under his custody before flying him to Thailand the same day.

The Royal Thai Police’s Technology Crime Suppression Division charged Ratanak with violating the country’s strict computer crime law after he allegedly uploaded on May 23 while in Cambodia a Thai-language post saying that Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha had lambasted Thais who complained about a recent hike in fuel prices.

Prayuth told Thai motorists to refuel their cars with water instead, according to the blog post.

Prayuth made no such comment, a Thai government spokesman said, and authorities ordered a quick investigation. Thai police said the false information might undermine the country’s national security.

“I apologize for causing this,” Ratanak told reporters as he arrived at Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi airport on Thursday. He acknowledged that the blog was his but said another person who had used it “caused this damage.”

If convicted, Ratanak will face imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of 100,000 baht (U.S. $3,175) or both.

He was released on bail after a Cambodian diplomat issued a verbal guarantee that he would show up during the police probe, authorities said.

“Ratanak denied that he posted the fake story about Thai premier because he can’t read and speak Thai,” Col. Siriwat Deepor, a police inspector, told BenarNews. Instead, the Cambodian blamed his business partner for the erroneous report, Siriwat said.

Six Thais have also been charged with knowingly propagating false and harmful digital information. They confessed to sharing the story but claimed they had no ill intent, police said.

“We will seriously enforce the rule of law,” Surachate said. “This action shouldn’t happen ever again because this confused people and affected national security.”

Prayuth took power on May 22, 2014 after leading a coup that toppled the government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Since then, the military junta has detained political leaders and imposed an array of laws aimed at gagging dissent, rights activists said.

Concerns about how Thai and Cambodian leaders treat those who disagree with them “are far from new and are far more complex than often presented,” according to a recent article in The Diplomat, a Washington-based magazine on international affairs.

“But those concerns have intensified over the past few years, with fears about an authoritarian alliance of sorts emerging between the ruling junta in Thailand led by Prayuth Chan-o-cha and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen as they seek to suppress dissent and consolidate their authority at home,” the magazine said.

As of March, the Thai junta had prosecuted at least 94 people on charges of violating strict laws against Lese-Majeste, under which offenders can be sentenced to up to 15 years for sharing a story on Facebook and other offenses, according to iLaw, a legal education advocacy group.

In addition, iLaw said, at least 75 people have been charged with sedition.

Google decided not to renew a controversial AI contract with the Pentagon after receiving backlash from its employees, reports say. The company’s staff earlier said they didn’t want the product to be used for war.

Diane Greene, the CEO of Google Cloud, said the tech giant won’t renew its contract with the Pentagon, Gizmodo and the New York Times report citing sources.

According to the information, during a weekly staff meeting, Greene explicitly cited the backlash among Google employees over ties with the US Defense Department, as many of them said the policy runs counter to the company’s ‘Don’t Be Evil’ principle. The phrase served as company’s motto from its founding days but was dropped from the official code of conduct in 2015, following Google’s reorganization, with Alphabet Inc. created as its parent company.

The contract in question, which expires in 2019, deals with Project Maven. It was officially launched last year by the US Department of Defense Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team. The project’s goal is to create an AI program that will improve the targeting of drone strikes. The program would analyze video footage from drones, track the objects on the ground, and study their movement, applying the techniques of machine learning. Anti-drone campaigners and human rights activists complain that Maven will pave the way for AIs to determine targets on their own, without the help of human operators.

Internal emails, reviewed by Gizmodo, suggest that Google’s leadership was initially very enthusiastic about the project, as it could lead to more military contracts in the future. The company’s staff, on the other hand, rallied against the idea of company research being used to develop warfare technology.

Dozens of employees reportedly resigned in protest, and more than 3,000 employees signed a petition demanding the contract be canceled and a clear policy preventing involvement with the military be implemented. According to the reports, Google’s leadership agreed to roll out a new policy next week.

Leaked internal emails also revealed that Google tried to conceal the scope of its dealings with the Pentagon. The head of company’s cloud division once told employees that the budget for Project Maven was “only” $9 million, when it was soon to be increased to $15 million. The emails also showed plans of eventually expanding revenue from Maven and similar projects to $250 million.

Google was worried it could get negative press because of Maven, and that the company’s involvement with the project would taint its reputation, the leaked emails suggest. “This is red meat to the media to find all ways to damage Google,” one scientist from the cloud division wrote in 2017.

South Africa’s Health Minister, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, says proposed changes to the Intellectual Property Policy will do away with prolonged patents and open up the pharmaceuticals sector for more affordable generics to be manufactured.

The Minister said this when he, together with Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies, briefed the media on the first phase of the Intellectual Property Policy on Thursday.

The proposed changes to the policy will, among others, pave way for the introduction of substantive search and examination of patents to do away with companies that use loopholes to extend patents on drugs by decades and in the process, stop other manufacturers from accessing their research knowledge to manufacture the same drug and sell it at a lower price.

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in Doha, which was signed in 1995, gave pharmaceuticals room to register patents on drugs they researched and manufactured for a 20-year period. Thereafter, the research is made public for other companies to use.

Motsoaledi said the new proposals to the policy will mark a new dawn in the pharmaceuticals sector.

“With extraordinarily expensive pharmaceuticals… we might find a solution, especially with the issue of the substantive search and examination for patents.

“… Most health activists have been complaining about this issue. When the TRIPS flexibilities were agreed upon in 1995 in Doha, it was agreed that all the companies that manufacture originator drugs through research are given a 20-year patent period, meaning after 20 years, everybody who has the skill could manufacture a similar drug. That drug has to be [labelled] a generic.

“Generics and originator drugs are exactly the same thing chemically. It is just that they are manufactured by different people,” Motsoaledi said.

The flexibilities that were agreed upon left room for abuse, as companies would partially modify their drug and register them as a new patent.

“Now the problem is that… at the expiry of the 20 years, instead of generics flowing and drugs getting cheaper, the companies do what… is called evergreening, which means you [take] drug, change one molecule and apply for a patent as a new drug and you are given another 20 years.

“So meaning the 20 year period will not come to an end — it is forever (sic).”

The new policy would change this practice.

“This policy brings that to an end because through substantive examinations, we will be able to tell a company that there is not substantive change on the drug – it is still the same drug that has been there for 20 years,” he said.

Striving for better access to health

Giving the background to how the policy has evolved over the years, Davies said in 2008, the department was mandated by Cabinet to develop a national Intellectual Property Policy, under the coordination of an Inter-Ministerial Committee, around intellectual property matters. The policy was approved by Cabinet in 2013.

He said after broad consultations with stakeholders, it was decided that further research was needed and that there was a need to have a phased approach in the development of the policy.

“What we have now released is phase one, which went through a process of consultation and it is being approved by Cabinet,” said Motsoaledi, adding that there is also an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Intellectual Property.

Davies said another challenge in the past was that companies would register patents in South Africa for drugs that are already available in other markets at a lower price due to the fact that substantive examinations are currently not being done.

The examinations will also introduce a system of objections to patents before and after they are registered.

“So what we are doing right now is we have developed a team and there will be a pre- and post-patent objection process that takes place. So people can challenge the granting of a particular patent, either before or after it is registered and then that will go through a substantive examination of patents,” said Davies.

The lessons that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has learnt after years of activity in the Sahel have crystallised in the creation of Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn, or JNIM. This paper analyses JNIM propaganda to shed light on this new alliance and its relationship with the regional organisational structure of AQIM.

By Sergio Altuna Galán*

Through an analysis of its official propaganda, this paper undertakes an analysis of Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn (JNIM), a new alliance made up of groups loyal to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel region. With this movement, AQIM not only seeks to extend the reach of its influence in the Sahel and West Africa, but also to establish a secure refuge far from Algeria. Among the four thematic categories into which, for the moment, the audiovisual production of this group can be divided, the battle theme is dominant, leaving the ideological terrain to AQIM. Furthermore, the creation of JNIM allows the regional structure of AQIM to project –propagandistically– levels of violence that would otherwise be impossible currently. The presence of foreign actors in the region, including Spain, has increased significantly in recent years and both the rhetoric used by the organisation in its communiques and the terrorist actions carried out during its first year of existence make clear that this contingent of foreigners is a priority objective.

Analysis

On 2 March 2017 a number of publications were posted on the messaging application Telegram on accounts linked to al-Qaeda, informing of an important imminent announcement. ‘One banner, one group, one Emir’,¹ an enormously attractive slogan, preceded an image no less impactful: five of the most wanted terrorist leaders in the entire Sahara-Sahelian region were meeting in the same room to announce the creation of a new jihadist coalition loyal to al-Qaeda, Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn, (Support Group for Islam and for Muslims, JNIM in its Arabic initials). Identically dressed, in a scene stripped of nearly all objects that might distract attention –save for a computer and a flag (a variant of rāyatu at-tawḥīd, often erroneously called the flag of the Islamic State)– their image and their message clearly projected a central overriding idea of unity, a message which permeates the group’s media production at all its levels. Considering the sociodemographic characteristics of the region, the composition of this top leadership is significant in that it attempts to transmit a message of integration, plurality and equality within the community of the faithful, and it makes clear the importance of ethnic diversity among the group’s executive leadership.

From left to right in the original video can be seen:

• Amadou Diallo (alias Amadou Koufa), a Fulani originally from Mopti, leader of the Macina Liberation Front, a majority-Fulani group made up mainly of former MUYAO militants and affiliated to Anṣār ad-Dīn.
• Djamel Okacha (alias Yahya Abu al-Hummam), an Algerian Arab with nearly 20 years of jihad experience, mostly in Algeria, Mauritania and Mali, and appointed Emir of the Saharan Region of AQIM in 2012, after serving as commander of Katībatu-l-Furqān.
• Iyadh Ag Ghali (alias Abu-l-Fadhel), a Tuareg of the Ifoghas tribe, leader of Anṣār ad-Dīn and Emir of JNIM since its creation.
• Muhammad Ould Nouini (alias Hassan al-Ansari), an Arab from Tilemsi in Mali, co-founder of al-Murābiṭūn with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and right-hand man of the latter until his death on 14 February 2018.²
• Abderrahman al-Sanhaji (alias Abderrahman al-Maghrebi), a Moroccan of Berber origin and cadi of the Sahara Region of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

In contrast with AQIM –which to this day is a group comprising mainly North Africans, with Algerians occupying the most important posts–, JNIM tries to distance itself from the existing tribal contexts in the geographical areas in which it operates. Nevertheless, the new alliance not only encourages the presence of Fulanis, Tuaregs, Bambaras, Sahelian and North African Arabs, muhājirūn,³ etc, but it also points to the equal and homogenous nature of its enemies (the Malian armed forces, the Mauritanian government, France and its neocolonialist policies…), establishing in this way a narrative thread by way of constant ‘us versus them’ comparisons, treating these enemies all as racists, usurpers, enemies of Muslims and, ultimately, dehumanising them, as is typical of jihadist propaganda.

The foundation of JNIM, unity for the sake of a lasting project for the Sahel

AQIM has long had ambitions for a project in the Sahel. Conscious of the limitations posed by the North Africa scenario (at least until the beginning of the revolutions linked to what in the West is known as the Arab Spring), the large surface areas, the porous borders and the weaknesses of states in the Saharo-Sahelian belt all made this arc of instability an area of great attraction for the development of AQIM activities. As a result, the organisation has always been highly interested in the region. Fully aware of the difficulties facing its activities on the Algerian front and emphasising the capacity to adapt, which the global jihadist movement has historically proved to have, in 2008, not long after swearing loyalty to al-Qaeda, AQIM established one of its most important brigades in the Sahel region, the Katība Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād.

A reading of the ‘Timbuktu letters’ gives an idea of the discrepancies already then existing at the heart of the organisation on how to manage the Sahelian project. The letters are the original correspondence between the shūrā (the consultative council) of AQIM and its affiliates in Mali, discovered by Associated Press in Timbuktu once French intervention put an end to the project of building a form of Islamic state in the north of the country between 2012 and 2013.⁴,⁵ In a letter addressed to Belmokhtar, reprimanding him for his indiscipline, the top AQIM leadership argued that ‘the large number of (jihadist) organisations is the healthy result of a correct decision that will continue to bear fruit; do not think that a region as large as France and Belgium combined is too small for four or five jihadist organisations: there is room for these and more’.

From the same documents it can be surmised that Belmokhtar, nevertheless, preferred a more autonomous and decentralised structure that cut through the intermediate links in the line of communication with the organisation leadership, without having to pass through the regional branch of al-Qaeda in the Sahel. As it was, on a number of occasions he side-stepped the shūrā of AQIM to communicate directly with al-Qaeda Central to explain that, in his opinion, ‘they are giving orders (on how to act in) a region where none of them have lived and that none of them know’. Iyadh Ag Ghali, in a more recent interview published in the magazine al-Masrā,⁶ confirmed that the new alliance put an end to a long period of setbacks among a good part of the jihadist militants in the region when he claimed that ‘the union (of these groups) did not occur earlier due to particular problems and other circumstances’, stressing that, knowing the difficulties in the particular case of al-Murābiṭūn and his return to the al-Qaeda network, with ‘tolerance in the face of difference and with an exchange of points of view, everything is possible’.⁷

With extensive knowledge of the terrain and with years of activity in the region already behind him, in 2012 Belmokhtar was defending the idea of establishing a new branch of al-Qaeda in the Sahel following the model of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which itself ended up forming an autonomous branch of al-Qaeda in Yemen in 2009 after abandoning its severely weakened project for Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Abdelmalek Drukdel, the Emir of AQIM, after having undergone the experience of controlling territory in the north of Mali, appeared to have modified his earlier ideas and was now more inclined to build a project based on the model of al-Qaeda of the Land of Two Rivers (the Islamic State of Iraq, as of mid-2006) and by fusing the different groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda in the region.⁸ Now, analysing the events with a certain sense of perspective, it seems that the strategy that finally won was a combination of both.

Although JNIM swore loyalty to the AQIM Emir, and then, following the logic of the organisation, reconfirmed the oath to Ayman al-Zawahiri and to the mullah Haibatullah, the current leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and second in line of succession (after Akthar Mansur) to the Mullah Omar (to whom Bin Laden himself swore an oath of allegiance earlier on), the JNIM project began as a single organisation dependent on AQIM but with sufficient independence to self-manage on a day-to-day basis. JNIM has a local leader, but many of its top members are close to the regional leadership and enjoy the confidence of its Emir. Most JNIM militants are from the region where they operate –principally Mali– but intermediate ranks and emerging figures from the Maghreb are still preponderant. All of this, no doubt, has a dual intention for the future: on the one hand, to keep the new organisation on track and to avoid repeating the defeats of the Islamic State; and, on the other hand, to secure a possible haven in case the AQIM leadership, pursued in Algeria, is forced to move its base of operations. The Maghreb branch of al-Qaeda has languished for some time without undertaking any successful, large-scale attack in Algeria, and the Algerian armed forces and security services have reduced their capacities to a historical minimum.⁹

In any event, disagreements over the project have not completely disappeared. In an interview with the magazine Inspire in August 2017, Drukdel claimed that ‘the Algerian front (the historical headquarters of the AQIM leadership) has been bogged down for some time in a long war and suffers from the nearly complete absence of individuals willing to support the cause, either domestically or internationally. Meanwhile other fronts in Tunisia, Libya, the Sahel and the Sahara are experiencing a jihadist awakening without precedents’.¹⁰ Nevertheless, although the new organisation renewed its oath of direct allegiance to Drukdel in its foundational communique, the Emir of AQIM seems to have wanted to avoid any mention of the new coalition during this long, 17-page interview… What is more, noticeable inconsistencies are evident in the various congratulatory messages sent after the creation of the new entity. JNIM introduces itself as ‘the union of three jihadist groups in Mali: Anṣār ad-Dīn, al-Murābiṭūn and the Sahara branch of AQIM’,¹¹ while Drukdel, in a self-congratulatory AQIM video sent after the creation of JNIM, mentions ‘the union of four jihadist factions in the Sahel and Sahara’.¹² Al Qaeda Central, for its part, directly congratulated Abdelmalek Drukdel for the union of ‘our brothers from the different jihadist groups in Mali’,¹³ and in this way acknowledged for him a fundamental role in the fusion of the different groups.

One significant fact is that other than the congratulatory video mentioned above, AQIM has made no mention since its inception of any of its activities in the Sahel via JNIM. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri has mentioned several times the Sahel in his speeches; he even devoted a video almost exclusively to the return of France to the region, encouraging the peoples of the Maghreb and the Sahel to rise up against the invader.¹⁴ Furthermore, in the more than 10 official videos released during its first year of existence, JNIM barely makes reference to the main AQIM leaders, with the exception of Abu-l-Hassan Rashid al-Bulaydi and Abdelhamid Abu Zayd; and while other figures linked to the global jihad do appear, they are leaders with no direct connection to the Sahelian cause, like Uthman Dukov, Abu Basir al-Wuhayshi, Abu-l-Bara’a al-Samrawi and Omar Ould Hamaha, among others.

As if this were not enough, the role of Belmokhtar within the organisation is also unknown. He was present, through his right-hand man, in the foundational communique and he is a key figure for understanding how Jihadist Salafism has laid down roots in the southern Sahara and northern Sahel. Yet nearly nothing is known of him, including what his current functions are in the new alliance. On the other hand, he does not appear to like the organisation’s hierarchical restrictions, and his historical disagreements with the top AQIM leadership since the creation of Katība Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād are well-known –the break with AQIM and the creation of al-Mulathamūn, the subsequent fusion with MUYAO to create al-Murābiṭūn, the return to the AQIM network, the carrying-out of operations without the consent of the AQIM leadership, and others– but his current location and role in JNIM (if he has any) are unknown.

JNIM propaganda

Just as AQIM employs al-Andalus Media as its principal organ for broadcasting propaganda, the organisation has also provided JNIM with its own media brand, az-Zallāqa. The latter’s meaning also has a link to Spain: the term refers to how slippery the ground was with the blood shed when the Almoravid troops of Ibn Tashufin defeated the Christian army of Alfonso VI at the Battle of Sagrajas (in Badajoz province, Spain) in 1086.¹⁵ Similarly to how AQIM named its media wing al-Andalus Media ‘to remind Muslims in general and the inhabitants of the Islamic Maghreb in particular that their history is closely linked to that of al Andalus, and that their duty is to wage jihad in the name of Allah until the last strip of illegitimately usurped Islamic land is recovered’,¹⁶ JNIM is also deeply wrapped up in the idea of reconquering the Iberian peninsula. Therefore, a study of the audiovisual productions of both groups shows how direct the transfer of technical knowledge between AQIM and its new Sahelian faction is. This has been evident since the first videos released by az-Zallāqa: the headers and bumpers that open and close the productions and the typefaces used by both groups are very similar.

In fact, limiting the analysis to only the AQIM videos devoted to the Sahara, the similarities are such that it can be concluded that the same team is producing both sets of videos. Comparing the most recent JNIM productions, such as ‘ردع الطغاة 1 و2,’¹⁷ with the latest videos produced by the Saharan Region of AQIM, such as ‘من عمق الصحراء 1 و2,’¹⁸ it is immediately clear that there is a nearly perfect overlap between them, in both the arguments presented and the sequence of the narrative. They both include images of training camps and drilling, displays of military muscle, exhortations and the planning of terrorist operations, both wide-angle and close-up views of terrorist attacka and elegies to martyrs fallen in battle. The type and manner of shots taken, and the technical elements employed (the use of drones, body-cameras and landscapes), are also nearly identical between the two groups of productions.

An analysis of the official audiovisual productions of JNIM between 2 January 2017 and 31 March 2018¹⁹ reveals that four main narratives or thematic areas are portrayed: war/jihad, victimisation and dehumanising the enemy, ʿaqīda and minhaj, and the handling of hostages. Of the 13 documents analysed, seven were devoted to warlike topics and the thread of their narratives focused on successful terrorist operations, calls to armed uprising against the crusading French invader or against apostate governments, the glorification of martyrdom, etc. They were based on the same frameworks and perspectives that have previously been used by al-Qaeda and its satellite organisations. An important point on the belligerent narrative is that, despite the inclusion in the documents analysed of explicit violence, they attempt to differentiate themselves from other jihadist groups in the region by not including scenes of brutality, sadism, torture, decapitations and other aberrations often present in the communications of groups within the orbit of the Islamist State. In the interview mentioned above of Iyadh Ag Ghali by al-Masrā, the Emir of JNIM made clear the organisation’s military policy: ‘expanding geographically as much as possible, undermining our enemy by attacking him wherever he may be, inciting the people to do the same and protecting them, and securing popular support’.

Given the new group’s well-known promoters, it does not appear to feel the need to stray too much into the strictly ideological; during its first year of existence, JNIM only devoted two videos to ideological issues. Still, the group’s first audiovisual production clearly establishes that its priorities are to pursue ‘jihad in the name of Allah, beginning with the commitment of the faithful to the principles of ahl as-sunna wa-l-jamā’a, especially with regard to the application of takfīr, and abandoning the path of innovation (الإرجاء) and extremism (الغلو)’.²⁰ Furthermore, in a document entirely devoted to the elections in Mali, Abderrahman al-Sanhaji elaborated on the concept of monotheism (tawḥīd al-ūlūhiya), condemning the elections in the following terms: ‘Democracy is in itself a religion, a religion contrary to Islam, and the parliament is a polytheistic shura’.²¹

On the other hand, as described at the beginning of this paper (although not as its core narrative), the concept of unity is an idea that permeates all of JNIM’s audiovisual production; the well-known aḥādīth –‘There is mercy in unity and punishment in division’²² and ‘Allah’s Hand is over the jamā’a’–²³ are repeated in many documents, not only to stress the importance of the progress made but also to leave the door open to other factions –for instance, the group of Abu Walid As-Sahrawi, which broke away from al-Murābiṭūn in 2015 and is now loyal to the Islamic State– to unite with the project in the future. In the same way, although only one of the videos is primarily devoted to this topic, the dehumanisation and demonisation of the enemy is a recurrent sub-theme. The West in general and France in particular –presented as an ‘occupying force corrupting our religion, and its collaborators and agents, pillagers of our wealth and our goods’–²⁴ is the target of most of the threats, followed by the governments in the region –especially Mali’s– and the FCG5S,²⁵ in that order, as the most quoted targets in the group’s audiovisual productions.

As regards the G5-Sahel and its Joint Force, its presence in JNIM’s discourse has been growing although surprisingly the force did not begin to attract the group’s attention until the end of 2017. Mentions of the G5-Sahel, ‘a still-born project for which France has had to beg from the UN, the US and the Gulf states to cover, without success, the €450 million of its budget’,²⁶ have been growing both in frequency and in significance while JNIM’s references to MINUSMA,²⁷ one of the group’s main targets of attack, have declined slightly. In any case, Drukdel makes it clear that his policy of attacking the enemy further afield has not changed much, although some nuance has been added over time: ‘the line separating the near and the far enemy is no longer clear; in some Arab countries (sic) the near enemy is America due to its notable presence. Ayman al-Zawahiri (sic) has already clarified that to fight the distant enemy, and not the proximate one (sic) is to ignore twice the reality that the far enemy only acts through the near enemy’, and he also defends the results achieved by al-Qaeda during the past year, reminding his colleagues that to ‘keep working and exercising pressure on the (far) enemy could undermine the enemy’s alliances, as when Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq once its capital had been attacked’.²⁸

Dealing with hostages is also a recurring theme in JNIM’s audiovisual productions: three entire videos treat the issue. Nevertheless, the kidnapping industry is characteristic of AQIM and one of the pillars that turned it into the economically most prosperous branch of al-Qaeda in 2012.²⁹ Between 2003 and 2011 AQIM (known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat until 2006) kidnapped a total of 57 people (54 of them from the West). The group currently has five hostages of different nationalities (Romanian, Colombian, French, Australian and Swiss) and, in addition to demanding ransom, it uses this type of production to intimidate the West in an attempt to dissuade any private investment or cooperation project in the region. In the words of one of the video’s narrators, ‘many do not understand why the mujahidin take civilians hostage; we as Muslims should guide ourselves by the sharia and not by the international laws created by apostates’,³⁰ supporting his actions with the following quote from the Quran: ‘So when you meet those who disbelieve strike their necks, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favour afterwards or ransom until the war lays down its burdens. And if Allah had willed, He could have taken vengeance upon them, but [He ordered armed struggle] to test some of you by means of others. And those who are killed in the cause of Allah – never will He waste their deeds’.³¹

To lend their arguments greater legitimacy and to ground their narrative in a kind of retributive justice, the same video includes quotes from the medieval theologist Ibn Taymiyya and images of prisoners at Guantánamo. In the same way, in case there remained the slightest doubt, they also use a fragment from a speech by al-Zawahiri (inspired by an earlier quote by Osama bin Laden) that makes it clear that the current trend to kidnap Westerners will not change: ‘security is a common good; when we are safe you will be safe and if we can live in peace the same will be true for you. If (on the contrary) you attack us and kill us, we will also attack and kill you; this is the correct equation’.

A comparison of the audiovisual productions of AQIM and JNIM since the latter’s creation reveals the complementary nature of the narratives in the productions of the two groups. JNIM concentrates on productions with a warlike thematic content, while AQIM continues to have a greater responsibility for ideology. However, setting aside the audiovisual documents published by AQIM (14 out of the total 20) that are a series of lectures on Islamic jurisprudence based on Bulūgh al-Marām and delivered by Abu-l-Hassan Rashid al-Bulaydi (who died in 2015),³² AQIM has only published a total of six original audiovisual documents, half of those released in 2016.

It is essential for the jihadist movement to generate a large number of publications; a reduction in the rate of publication, together with the increasing similarity of the two groups, seems to suggest that for the moment AQIM and JNIM are sharing media resources. The limitations on the ground that restrict the possibility of successful terrorist operations in the Maghreb –due in large part to the action of the Algerian and Tunisian security forces– together with the restructuring currently affecting the Libyan groups in their orbit after they suffered significant desertions in 2015, have put the main responsibility for maintaining high levels of violence on JNIM. It goes without saying that although the groups making up the new alliance have been cooperating with each other since at least 2012, the JNIM project is only one year old and its role within AQIM will continue to evolve, adapting itself to circumstances in the future.

Quotes from the Quran in JNIM propaganda, a call to jihad, independent of the daʿwa

To complete the analysis of JNIM’s media production, to consolidate the data shown in Figure 1 above and to shed some more light on this new alliance, it might be useful to make a quantitative analysis of the Quranic citations employed by JNIM. In order to determine the theme of the verse –or group of verses– used in each citation, and with the aim of maintaining as much homogeneity as possible, we have used the exegetic text Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm by Ibn Kathir, a respected and erudite Sunni historian. In the same way, and although there is no consensus on how to determine which suwar (or chapters) are from the Meccan period and which from the Medinan, for practical purposes we have relied on the traditional division between Meccan and Medinan suwar established by Theodor Nöldeke.³³

The verses from the Meccan period (which date from 610-622) were revealed in a polytheistic context and their themes are different from those of the Medinan period (622-632). As shown in Figure 2, Medinan āyāt (or verses) are overrepresented in JNIM propaganda in comparison with the Meccan ones, which are shorter and generally more poetic and include the majority of verses related to the reaffirmation of the faith and the adoration of God. Medinan suwar, on the other hand, were revealed once the construction and expansion of a proto-Islamic State became a fundamental issue; as such they have more normative content regulating innumerable aspects of the life of the faithful, including in war and jihad.

From a total sample of 13 audiovisual documents and 78 official communiques –mostly short texts celebrating successful operations–,³⁴ 55 Quranic citations have been identified (38 from the Medinan period and 17 from the Meccan). As shown in Figure 2, and consistent with the different narrative categories of JNIM audiovisual productions mentioned above, most of the Quranic citations used by JNIM (22) have some relation to war and jihad. Although this may appear to be the usual among Salafist-Jihadist groups, it is not. In 2012 a study of more than 2,000 fundamentalist texts dating from 1998 to 2011 and originating in groups in the Middle East and North Africa concluded that most of the Quranic citations used by these groups were not the most warlike but rather those whose themes were victimisation, dishonour and divine punishment.³⁵ The same study claimed that most of the citations could be divided into three categories: (1) calls to action; (2) affirmations of faith; and (3) imperatives for battle. For practical purposes (given the limited nature of our sample), it has been considered useful to add the additional category of demonisation of the enemy.

JNIM dedicates no small number of Quranic citations to support its vision of the Western presence in the Sahel –neocolonialist, oppressive, corrupt, exploitative, impoverishing…– and to legitimise its actions. Nevertheless, the most cited Quranic verse in its propaganda –repeated three times– has nothing to do with war, although it does with the enemy: ‘O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people’.³⁶ It is also worth mentioning that of the six citations which are repeated at least once –Quran 03:28, 05:51, 08:30, 08:36, 21:107 and 47:04– only one comes from a Meccan sūra.

Another interesting aspect of the use of the Quran in JNIM communications is that the āyāt of sūra ‘The Repentance’ –among the most cited by extremist jihadists as its content focuses on the wrath of God–³⁷ is not even among the most cited by the group. In the study sample, citations from the suwar ‘The Spoils of War’ are the most frequently used (11 citations), followed by those extracted from ‘The Table Spread’ (eight citations) and ‘The family of ‘Imrān’ (five citations).

Conclusions

It is true that the sample analysed here covers a relatively short period of time. As a result, we will no doubt need to wait and see how the organisation evolves. However, it does seem clear that it is not in a daʿwa phase, at least as far as its Internet propaganda diffusion is concerned. This should not be surprising: Internet penetration in the Sahara-Sahelian region is still limited and the group’s communications through its propaganda not only seek specific objectives but are also directed at a different audience, either Western or Arabised. Obviously, this does not mean that the group will not engage in proselytising and recruiting activities on the ground, employing a different strategy and applying different tools. Conscious of the region’s linguistic heterogeneity and of the status of Arabic within it, JNIM has made significant efforts to translate its publications into French, thus amplifying its global impact.

From the analysis undertaken in this paper, it is clear that JNIM is subordinate to the designs of AQIM; the new alliance inherited at birth a good number of the military and technical capacities of the regional body, but at least for the time being it has been relegated to the background when it comes to broadcasting ideology. The introduction of nuances to the Islam of West Africa and the Sahel –a strategy that could significantly increase its attractiveness– is conspicuously absent, constrained by the Salafist doctrine of al-Qaeda. Furthermore, although the presence of local militants is noticeable in the group’s audiovisual productions, the preponderance of North Africans in the middling ranks –emerging figures and AQIM leaders in the JNIM’s top brass– guarantees that it will not distort the regional brand. However, while this helps secure loyalty to the leadership and ensures maximum impact in certain areas like the north of Mali, it also limits its potential for rooting itself in other areas.

Under siege in Algeria and practically reduced to survival mode there, AQIM has managed to reformulate its strategy –trying to put an end to the disagreements of the past– within a scenario of enormous potential to develop its activities. In a context in which the Islamic State loses attractiveness, AQIM –through its different factions and ideologically-sympathetic branches, already the predominant group in the region– has been able to position itself perfectly to incorporate the groups disenchanted after the collapse of the caliphate and integrate them into its structure when the possibility presents itself. In this way AQIM ensures a larger and better structure in a region to which it would not in the least be unreasonable it considers moving its leadership headquarters if it is unable to reverse the situation in Algeria.

Furthermore, as explained throughout this paper, through their many successful terrorist operations, the existence of JNIM helps to mitigate in some way the decline of the military power of the leadership of al-Qaeda in North Africa. During the new entity’s first year in existence, the media production of both groups (AQIM and JNIM) has been complementary and consistent: a complete product that helps to prevent the failures of the regional leadership structure from becoming widely known. This trend could change in the future, although it does not appear that the importance of JNIM will decline in the short term; rather, if anything, it will increase.

Just as in other countries in the region, the presence of Spain in the Sahelian zone –a consequence, among other things, of the increase in the level of the terrorist threat– has risen significantly in recent years. Following the directions of the regional leadership, JNIM has not only named its media branch in clear reference to a significant historical battle in which the Christian Reconquest was halted, if only temporarily, in the first interview by Iyadh Ag Ghali as the organisation’s first Emir, he referred to Ibn Tashufin as one of the figures to emulate. Bearing in mind his antecedents, both the messenger and the message are credible. The reasons adduced here, together with the group’s historical demands as to al-Andalus, make Spain a very appealing and legitimate target for the organisation.

About the author:
*Sergio Altuna Galán, Research Associate in the Elcano Royal Institute’s Global Terrorism Programme | @wellesbien

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute. Original version in Spanish: Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn: análisis del proyecto de al-Qaeda para el Sahel a través de su propaganda

Notes:
¹ The slogan is from a JNIM propaganda poster before publishing its foundational communique (2/III/2017). This and other original documents cited in this paper are part of the author’s personal files and are available on request.

Fourth-wave feminism, with its focus on intersectional issues and justice for women, is defined by social media use, making it accessible to everyone around the world. Regardless of their location, people can publicly show support for women, easily share their personal stories online, and do their best to battle sexism.

Because this is now a truly global movement, it begs the question: Which countries lead the way in women’s equality, and which can do better?

Different parts of the world have their own beliefs about women’s equality, so determining a universal measure is difficult. For the sake of this article, we’ll take a look at just a few of many important factors to think about when examining women’s equality worldwide. Here are some of the countries who lead the way in women’s equality and a few that need to catch up:

Leading Countries

Iceland

For almost a decade straight, the Global Gender Gap Report has ranked Iceland first for gender equality. They have the smallest gender gap in the world. Two women have held the position of Prime Minister — one of whom was the first openly gay person elected as head of government in history — and Iceland has the highest percentage of female political empowerment in the world. The Icelandic government has even pledged to end the wage gap by 2022. They have a long history of striving for gender equality that has continued to influence their political and social climate today.

Rwanda

Rwanda has slowly but surely become a more progressive country for women’s equality. After the 1994 genocide devastated the population, women had to step into positions previously held only by men. Women are equally represented at virtually all levels of government, from the Supreme Court to Parliament to positions at sub-national levels of government. There are other legal and institutional protections in place, such as imposing harsh consequences for rape and banning domestic violence. However, despite these protections, many women report a social climate that doesn’t reflect the legislation in place. Social attitudes must change and shift the focus of feminism in Rwanda from what women can do for their country to individual needs.

Straggling Countries

The United States

The United States has been thought of as a country of opportunity for all, but in many ways, including gender equality, that is not the case. Legal and institutional protections are in place, but socially, women are not treated the same way as men. Ohio University notes that though women make up half of the workforce in the U.S., they only hold 16 percent of executive positions. According to a recent study from Earnest, a gender wage gap exists in jobs across all levels of experience, from managerial roles to servers. Women also fight to have their voices heard in politics and to enter the political sphere as elected officials. By accessing high-power economic and political positions, women in the U.S. have the chance to influence greater change across the country.

Yemen

Yemen has been ranked consistently as one of the worst countries in the world for gender equality. Women in Yemen face social and institutional inequality at almost every level. They are purposefully excluded from education, politics, and economic activities. When there is legislation in place protecting women’s rights to education or access to justice, they often go unenforced. Women of all ages experience sexual, physical, and psychological violence, especially in poor, rural areas.  Cultural attitudes of both men and women alike must shift in order to close the gender gap and correct institutional injustices.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea is believed to be one of the worst places in the world for gender violence. The percentage of women who have experienced physical and sexual violence at the hands of men is staggering: 67 percent have experienced domestic abuse, over 50 percent have been sexually assaulted, and over 90 percent of women and girls have faced some form of violence when attempting to access public transport. Women who have experienced gender violence face a severe lack of resources for them to seek counsel and justice. Because of this, UN Women has declared Papua New Guinea a priority country for advancing gender equality.

Women’s equality has come a long way, but it still has a long way to go. The Global Gender Gap Report states that the overall global gender gap can be closed in exactly 100 years, if current trends continue. However, they also note that the gap is widening; in 2016, it could have been closed in 83 years. There is no easy fix for this issue, as each region of the world has different needs. Maintaining a nuanced understanding of worldwide gender equality is the only way to find a long-lasting solution.

*Avery T. Phillips is a freelance human being with too much to say. She loves nature and examining human interactions with the world. Comment or tweet her @a_taylorian with any questions or suggestions.

Bangladesh’s space age has begun with the successful launch of Bangabandhu-1 satellite by SpaceX into orbit on 11 May, providing Bangladesh the status of one of the 57 nations having own satellite. As the country is developing in terms of economic development, growth, GDP, women empowerment, human resource development, expanding connectivity, improving communications as well as technological advancement but the future space based Bangladesh might be going to face some sort of mixed experiences.

Obviously, the satellite is going to construct our dreamed ‘Digital Bangladesh’ providing huge prospects for the nation but several internal, external, and strategic challenges cannot be ignored.

Now the question is that how the satellite is going to shape Bangladesh’s national power as well as national security order in this age of globalization? How is the state going to manage its internal and external challenges for assuring greater sustainability in the space age? In which way the nation would handle the strategic challenges enforced by the spaces powers in the near future?

In order to compete with the globalized world as well as to materialize the vision of digitalization, the current government of Bangladesh decided to make its own satellite. Following these targets, the state acted in a rational manner to visualize its space age such way that France made the satellite, the USA took it to orbit, and Russia leased the orbital slot to Bangladesh.

There are basically threefold prospects of the spacecraft for Bangladesh: expanding and developing telecommunication and internet services around the country, enabling the telecommunication sector to reduce dependency on satellite services provided by space powers and earn foreign revenues, and detecting as well as managing natural disasters and greater national security.

The satellite will provide benefits regarding economic, social, agricultural, communications, and natural disaster management purposes, and is the result of policy-makers finally being able to focus on a project and take the necessary measures to see it through. This satellite network will facilitate certain sectors such as telemedicine, distance learning, online research, video conferencing, defense, detecting sea piracy, and disaster management. It will also improve the direct-to-home services, making people’s access to worldwide television entertainment faster and easier.

The satellite’s advanced communications will bring immense economic gains as well. Currently, Bangladesh annually spends more than $14m on renting satellite bandwidth from foreign operators. Bangbandhu-1 will save Bangladesh $210m throughout its 15-year span. Bangabandhu-1 is also expected to provide services to other Asian states such as Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan- given that it is properly set-up, of course. Which means that Bangladesh stands to earn approximately $1bn by leasing out the transponders and another $1.5bn by selling other related services.

Even we are dreaming to gain a sustainable space age though there would be lots of internal and external challenges waiting for Bangladesh. First, the government borrowed €155m (approximately BDT 1400 crore) from HSBC Holdings for the procurement and launching of the country’s first space satellite, Bangabandhu-1. The BTRC has been estimated to earn the investment by selling the satellite services at home and abroad within eight years; but specific Public-Private Partnership, focused plan and market strategy has not been sketched properly yet. Also worldwide capacity of satellites are usually sold before the launch but we are yet to take any such move.

Bangladesh entered into the glorious space age but space sovereignty is still not a reality for the nation. The state tried to acquire its own orbital slot several times but it was not allowed and finally it had to borrow orbit slot from Russia. Even the country is still very hopeful to get permission for establishing its own space sovereignty from ITU though the current technological, technical, human resource and space operation standard might not be in favor of the nation. For establishing space sovereignty Bangladesh has to improve in these sectors following the global space standard.

The only space research center in Bangladesh is SPARRSO (Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization). It has been applying peaceful space and remote sensing technology, in the field of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, geology, cartography, water resources, land use, weather, environment, geography, oceanography, science, education, science-based knowledge and other related space research areas. It also provides the government with the development of space and remote sensing technology of different countries and gives advice for the formulation of national policy to the government. But the organization is not globally well-connected and has not been developed as the space powers did during their emerging period. It is not a focused organization that only does its business to operate, develop, navigate, and sustain Bangladesh’s space projection. Now the government has to frame rational and strategic policy and organization to visualize its space age. If we would like to get any benefit by using the satellite then our space success highly depends on technologically standard procedure of making communication satellite and the policies and people working behind it.

Indeed, Bangladesh’s neighboring states, targeted as marketplace for the nation’s space service, are almost dependent on China, India, Japan, Russia, USA and other space powers for their space activities due to these space giants’ standard and cost-effective services, networks around the globe, market-oriented cost and supply, huge number of satellites, uninterrupted information and data flow, and ever increasing space-connectivity investment. Where Bangladesh has only Bangabandhu-1, India has 84 satellites and China has 244.

China is providing a low-cost space service to neighboring states in order to expand its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ strategy and is also developing space technology to improve and expand connectivity web around the world. India is also doing well to counter the Chinese connectivity dream by initiating a ‘Cotton Route’ where space connectivity, customer friendly space services, and a huge number of Indian TV channels and Bollywood are gaming a competitive chessboard for these space superpowers. Both states target Bangladesh as one of the key players and customers for their space governance. So, space balancing is going to a dilemma for Bangladesh, and rational action and strategic decisions to expand nation’s space age would a crucial one.

Definitely, the growing space exploration and activities is going to strengthen and expand Bangladesh’s soft power projection within the global space order. Around the last decade, the country experienced a tremendous economic growth and technological development managing lots of obstacles and crises. Now the challenge is bigger as like as our dream. So, Bangladesh has to consider these challenges in order to visualize its sustainable space age where establishing space sovereignty, framing standard space policies and legal framework, balancing global space powers, considering and preparing for competitive satellite market, establishing academia for space exploration, ensuring national security, and managing internal dilemma, external threats and strategic challenges smartly would be must.

*Abu Sufian Shamrat, Master of Social Sciences (M.S.S.) in Political Science from Dhaka University, is an independent researcher as well as a social activist based out of Bangladesh. He writes on political, social, global, as well as strategic issues in the leading national and international dailies and journals i.e. South Asia Journal, Eurasia Review, Modern Diplomacy, IndraStra Global, South Asia Monitor, Hindustan Times Syndication, Foreign Policy News, and so on. He can be reached at shamrat08du@yahoo

The modern university is a tertiary colonising institution. Like the old mercantilist bodies – the Dutch East India Company and its equivalents – the educational world is there to be acquired by bureaucrats, teachers and, it is hoped, suitable recruits.

To that end, a good degree of amorality is required. Scruples are best left to others, and most certainly not university managers, who prefer counting the sums rather than pondering deontological principles. Such a point seems very much at the forefront of an arrangement between the Melbourne Graduate School of Education (MGSE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The MGSE, which seems, in acronym, similar to a salt brand, struck gold in its arrangement to reform the Kingdom’s school curriculum – some 36,000 schools in all comprising 500,000 teachers.

“This project,” stated the Minister for Education Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al-Issa, “will have a significant impact on the development of the new educational process in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” It will require “patience”, and the contributions of “international experts”.

Irons were already being laid in the fire the previous year, with thirty teachers from Saudi Arabia engaging a six month program “designed,” according to the MGSE dispatch, “to transform their teaching knowledge, skills and attitudes.”

The search for such experts is part of a broader Saudi mission, the “Vision 2030” ostensibly designed to produce a new generation of “critical” thinkers. “A system of transmitting existing knowledge,” opined Al-Issa to a gathering of education and business figures at the Yidan Prize Summit in Hong Kong last year, “is no longer adequate. We need to rethink education from preschool through graduate schools and we need to do this urgently.”

Al-Issa has spread matters broadly, with his ministry signing an agreement with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in November 2017 “to explore opportunities to further deepen cooperation on the design and implementation of education reform in Saudi Arabia.”

The Melbourne University newsroom was beaming with remarks sweetened by success. MGSE’s Dean Jim Watterston kept it vague and professional. “We look forward to working with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to deliver evidence-based research methods into classrooms.” The impression given by Watterston is a system of education that enlightens rather than indoctrinates, something distinct from what passes for Saudi teaching fare.

Which brings us to the sticking, and even fatal point behind the whole ghastly business. As the chief Sunni state wages remorseless war on Yemen, in the process robbing cradles and breaching human rights in the name of geopolitical goals, business is still to be done. Australian education envoys, sent by overly managed universities, are the ideally blinkered. Given that it remains the country’s third largest earner of gross domestic product, principles would be a needless encumbrance.

What gives this whole matter of pedagogical enterprise between the MGSE and Saudi Arabia a good lashing of irony is that the Kingdom is at war with what it deems extremism. Only its own Wahhabi brand, the same sort that inspired those who flew the murderous missions on September 11, 2001 against US targets, is tolerated.

Saudi Arabia, for one, boasts an education program that lends itself to the standardised, hardened teachings of Wahhabism. Nina Shea, director of the Centre for Religious Freedom of the Hudson Institute, told the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade in July 2017 how “violent and belligerent teachings” abounded in the curriculum like dandruff.

Two years after the 9/11 hijackers reaped sorrow, the National Dialogue in Saudi Arabia sported the findings of a scholarly panel commissioned by King Abdullah. The religious studies curriculum, in particular, “encourages violence towards others, misguides the pupils into believing that in order to safeguard their own religion, they must violently repress and even physically eliminate each other.”

According to Shea, not much had changed. The textbooks authorised by the Ministry of Education still taught “an ideology of hatred and violence against Jews, Christians, Muslims, such as Shiites, Sufis, Ahmadis, Hindus, Bahais, Yizidis, animists, sorcerers, and ‘infidels’ of all stripes, as well as other groups with different believes.” If you hate, hate well, thoroughly and diligently.

Behind the current agenda of the Ministry of Education is an effort to root out rival Islamic doctrines, a program that is only critical in its evisceration and selective censorship. In March this year, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS television that the dreaded Muslim Brotherhood had found its way into the Saudi school system, a carcinogenic force that needed a good dose of administrative chemo.

The Kingdom, he promised, will “fight extremist ideologies by reviewing school curricula and books to ensure they are free of the banned Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda”. This act of pedagogical cleansing was promised to be harsh, seeking to “ban books attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood from all schools and universities and remove all those who sympathise with the group.”

Short shrift, in other words, is being given to the functions of actual critical thinking, the very stuff Watterston boasts about somewhat uncritically. But that will not bother him, or those who have put their signatures in this particular form of international engagement. The perks are bound to be endless. Like the selling of arms, education is a business designed to line pockets, feed the parasites of management, and enhance an empty brand. Forget the students – they are the last in the dismal food chain. Even more importantly, ignore the politics of it all.

Lebanon, a country that is slightly smaller than the state of Connecticut and has a population of barely 4.5 million, provides considerable insight into the dilemmas, disputes and problems plaguing the Middle East. Why? Because Lebanon is a microcosm of the region. It embodies many of the divisive issues and conflicts of the region: the Sunni/Shia tensions, Muslim/Christian tension, Saudi Arabia/Iran conflict, US/Iran conflict, Arab/Israeli conflict, sectarianism/secularism and the struggle between democracy and autocracy. Developments in Lebanon are often a reflection of developments in the Middle East.

On May 6 the world witnessed the Lebanese going to the polls for the first time in nine years. The election results highlight six critical trends in the politics of Lebanon and the Middle East.

1) Iran and its allies are going nowhere.

Lebanon: The Iranian-backed Lebanese political party/militia Hezbollah reaffirmed it popularity and prominence among the Shia of Lebanon. It convincingly won all contested Parliamentary seats except one despite its intervention in the Syrian civil war, participation in a dysfunctional Lebanese government, the expulsion of community members from Gulf States and the targeting of the Shia community by Salafi-jihadists. Through its political alliance with Shia partner Harakat Amal, Hezbollah continues to maintain a political monopoly in the Shia community. The election also demonstrated that the emergence of popularly supported alternative voices (i.e. ant-Iranian) in the Shia community has been virtually stifled.

The Middle East: The Iranian regime has further entrenched itself in Syria. Iranian missiles launched from Syria toward Israel demonstrate that Iranian forces and its allies operate beyond the control of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and intend to do more than just prop up the Asad regime. In Yemen, the Iranian-backed Houthis refuse to capitulate to continual aerial bombardments and blockades. And in Iraq, former militia leaders of the Iranian-supported Popular Mobilization Units turned 1st-time politicians – the Fatah Alliance – will represent a significant presence in the next Iraqi Parliament.

2) The Sunni community is weak and in disarray.

Lebanon: Saad al-Hariri and his Future Movement have witnessed the dramatic reduction of their presence in the Lebanese Parliament as representatives of the Sunni community during the last three elections (2005- 36 seats, 2009- 26 seats and 2018- 21 seats). Hariri’s virtual monopoly of the Sunni community in 2005 has evaporated. In the wake of Hariri’s political demise, no particular opponent has emerged as a challenger at the national level. Rather multiple elites are exerting power over local fiefdoms. The weakening of Hariri and the political fragmentation in the community makes it increasingly difficult to veto or challenge the policies of Hezbollah and its allies.

The Middle East: Similar dynamics exist at the regional level. Saudi Arabia has largely failed to assert itself as the leading Sunni power in the region and halt the growing Iranian regional presence. The Saudi effort to create a united front against Iran and its allies, has been fraught with divisions and self-interests. Several Gulf Cooperation Council members refused to back the Saudi-led intervention of Bahrain. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have recently terminated diplomatic relations. Oman refused to participate in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and Morocco just withdrew its troops from the coalition. A unified policy regarding Syria has eluded Saudi Arabia and other opponents of the Asad regime. This failure has been remarkably demonstrated by Saudi-supported groups fighting other Saudi-supported groups and Turkish allies in Syria.

3) Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been a failure.

Lebanon: Saudi Arabia has poured millions of dollars into Lebanon through its allies (i.e. Hariri) only to witness Hezbollah and its allies gain increasing amounts of control. Two miscalculations are particularly notable. The Saudi-backing of the Lebanese government’s attempt to dismantle Hezbollah’s communication network and remove the Beirut Airport security chief and Hezbollah ally spectacularly backfired. Not only were Saudi Arabia’s Lebanese allies defeated, Hezbollah and the Shia community gained veto power in the subsequent Doha Agreement. The most egregious Saudi failure in Lebanon may have been the “resignation” of Hariri as Prime Minister from Riyadh and the ensuing claim that Lebanon had declared war on Saudi Arabia. Hariri ultimately rescinded his resignation and the declaration of war became a moot point. It would be naïve to believe that these developments have not further contributed to Hariri’s recent election losses in the Sunni community.

The Middle East: Saudi policy throughout the region has produced similar results. After imposing a nearly year-long air, sea and land blockade, Saudi Arabia has failed to bring Qatar to its knees. Saudi support for Syrian opposition has produced few tangible results. Areas controlled by the Syrian opposition in western Syria grow smaller by the day. The Saudi intervention in Yemen has resulted in the Houthis launching missiles at Riyadh. And the intervention has been blamed for exacerbating a humanitarian disaster in Yemen. Over 1 million cholera cases have been reported since the spring 2017 and almost 2 million children are acutely malnourished.

4) Sectarian identity continues to be the default option.

Lebanon: Political parties (i.e. Sabaa) and independents (e.g. members of Beirut Madinati) proclaiming to be for all Lebanese and not representing sectarian identities fared poorly in the election. Only in electoral district #1 of Beirut were they able to win a seat. In the Christian community, the usual suspects – the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Lebanese Forces (LF) – gained a majority of the seats. Both parties present themselves as Lebanese parties, however the overwhelming majority of their supporters are Christian. Money and media play a role in their popularity, however the veiled sectarian discourse utilized by figures such as FPM Deputy and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil generates further support. Bassil’s warnings against the resettlement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon produces concerns among many Christians that they will become an oppressed minority in an Islamic society. Similar fears existed in the Christian community during the latter half of the 20th century regarding Palestinian refugees and contributed to a 15-year civil war. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, also successfully appealed to the Shia community by presenting the Salafi-jihadists in Syria as an existential threat to the community.

Middle East: The emergence of ISIS and the mounting hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia have exacerbated the Sunni/Shia divide and re-awakened fears in religious minorities. On the eve of the Iraqi elections, the Yazidis of western Iraq maintain militias as they live in suspicion and fear of their Sunni neighbors and the Shia-led government in Baghdad. The former militia leaders of the Popular Mobilization Units have been rewarded by the Shia community with a sizeable parliamentary bloc for their military victories over ISIS. In February, courts for the Sunni-led Bahraini government upheld the dissolution of the predominantly Shia political party Al-Wefaq because it has been perceived as a threat to Bahrain’s security. Bahrain has argued that dissent created by Al-Wefaq and other oppositional figures is provoked by Iran.

5) Increasing Voter Apathy.

Lebanon: Voters failed to show up at the polls on May 6th. Less than half the electorate voted. This comes in the wake of 54% voter turnout in 2009. Low voter turnout also occurred for the 2016 municipal elections.

Middle East: Tunisia witnessed low voter turnout for its municipal elections on May 6th. Egyptian presidential elections in March dropped to 41% of the population after turnouts of 47% (2014) and 51% (2012). Reports from Iraq indicate a record low voter turnout for their May 12th Parliamentary elections.

6) Civil Society is an ineffective instrument of change and under threat.

Lebanon: In comparison to most countries in the region, Lebanon enjoys a rather well-developed and diverse civil society. For all its diversity and development, Lebanon’s civil society has not generated much change in Lebanese voting habits, political behaviors, policies or been immune to pressures from the government. Civil society members who became politicians in 2018 failed to enter the halls of power with the exception of one. Corruption remains rampant. The reliability of basic services – electricity and water – continues to be a distant dream. And environmental degradation ensues at an unprecedented rate. After considerable protests from civil society members, the garbage crisis of 2015 only elicited a temporary and ultimately ineffective solution by the government. In January of 2018 piles of garbage washed ashore on the beaches north of Beirut after heavy rains. Attacks on the press (e.g. Hanin Ghaddar and Marcel Ghanem) and public figures for criticism of the Lebanese state, Lebanese allies and religion have become increasingly prevalent.

The Middle East: Similar scenarios are being witnessed throughout the region. Turkey, Egypt and Yemen have drastically curtailed press freedoms during the last several years. Recently, an Egyptian human rights activist was detained for criticizing the inability of Egyptian authorities to protect women from sexual harassment. In Saudi Arabia, women’s rights activists were arrested as the lifting of the ban on female drivers approaches. Numerous media outlets in Turkey have been shut down and numerous journalists have been arrested in the wake of the Turkish coup. Former news director at al-Jazeera, Ibrahim al-Helal, was sentence to death in absentia in June by Egyptian authorities. Bahraini authorities have threatened to draft legislation that would target social media users who are critical of the government. Egypt and Jordan have ensured more control over civil society by approving laws regulating funding and membership of non-governmental organizations operating in their territory.

What do these six trends suggest?

Stability, economic development and democracy will be rather non-existent for Lebanon and the Middle East.

The further entrenchment of sectarianism in Lebanon and Middle Eastern societies will lead to the continued weakening of the state and national identity. Sects will ensure their safety and prosperity before the safety and prosperity of the state. Their safety and prosperity will be exploited by external actors (i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia) and make them vulnerable to trans-national identities. This exploitation will often place these increasingly divided societies on the precipice of conflict.

A weakened state and national identity will not respond to the basic needs of all of its citizens, encourage more corruption and further empower elites and parties. These conditions will engender further disillusionment by the public with politicians and the democratic system – voter apathy will intensify. It will also discourage economic growth and foreign investment.

Governments will be afflicted with intransigence and the failure to create and/or implement policy. Temporary solutions that resemble kicking the can down the road will prevail.

*Eric Bordenkircher, Ph.D., is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Claremont McKenna College and a research fellow at UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development. The views represented in this piece are his own and do not necessarily represent the position of CMC, UCLA or the Center for Middle East Development.

(RFE/RL) — Thousands of opposition supporters have protested outside Macedonia’s main government building in the capital of Skopje to demand an early election.

The VMRO-DPMNE party, which ruled from 2006 to 2017, held a large anti-government demonstration on June 2 against the left-wing government’s one-year rule and wants an early election held in March or April next year.

Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, 43, took power in May 2017 after 11 years of conservative rule amid a deep political crisis sparked by a wiretapping scandal in 2015.

The opposition claims the government is incompetent, has wrecked the economy, lowered wages and pensions and allowed corruption to flourish.

It also claims the government has damaged national interests by negotiating with Greece over a possible new name for the country.

Hristijan Mickoski, the leader of the VMRO-DPMNE, said his party will not support any constitutional effort to change the name of the country.

“We are very clear on this subject,” he told the protest crowd.

Macedonia’s dispute with Greece dates back to 1991, when it peacefully broke away from Yugoslavia, declaring its independence under the name Republic of Macedonia.

Athens objected to its neighbor’s new name, saying it implied a territorial claim over Greece’s northern province of Macedonia, which borders the Balkan country.

Zaev has pushed for a compromise agreement with Greece that envisages Macedonia adding a modifier to its name, such as “Northern” or “Upper,” but nationalists in both countries have resisted a deal.

Because of the issue, Greece has blocked Macedonia’s bids to join the European Union and NATO.

All pro-government militias and paramilitaries in Syria will be discontinued after the upcoming offensives in the Dara’a and Al-Quneitra Governorate, Al-Masdar News cited a military source as saying.

According to the source, all militias and paramilitaries will be discontinued and their fighters will be reenlisted in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), unless they have already fulfilled their military duty.

Of these paramilitaries and militias that will be discontinued, these were the groups named by the source: National Defense Forces (NDF); Syrian Marines; and Military Shield Forces.

With the discontinuation of these groups, only the Syrian military and federal police will be armed inside the country.

A senior military official dismissed speculation that the Iranian forces might withdraw from Syria, saying the Iranians, unlike the US military forces, have gone to Syria at the request of the Damascus government.

“Iran and Syria enjoy deep relations that would not be influenced by the propaganda measures of anyone,” Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri, an advisor to Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces told Tasnim on Sunday.

The biggest fear of the Zionist regime of Israel is the presence of Muslim fighters in its proximity, he explained, saying now that this has come true, the US and Israel are making desperate efforts to change the situation.

“But they (US and Israel) should know that this condition is not going to change,” he underlined.

“Unlike the American military forces and the regional reactionaries, the Iranian advisors are present in Syria at the request of the Syrian government and people,” Jazayeri noted, adding, “We are waiting to see a day that Syria and the other regional countries would witness an era without the annoying and troublemaking aliens.”

Elsewhere in his comments, Jazayeri said there is no bright future for the Zionist regime of Israel, and the US will also have to leave the region.

His comments came after the Israeli media outlets released reports that Iranian advisors and Hezbollah fighters have begun to withdraw from Syria.

Syria has been gripped by civil war since March 2011 with various terrorist groups, including Daesh (also known as ISIS or ISIL), currently fighting against the central government.

In the meantime, Iran has remained a close ally of Syria and supports its legitimate government in the face of foreign-backed militancy.

At least 20 people have been injured and six are missing or killed, after the Volcan de Fuego in Guatemala erupted, shooting smoke and rocks 10 km into the air and forcing a mass exodus from nearby villages blanketed by ash.

Six people have been reported dead or missing so far, mainly in the community of El Rodeo, the National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction in Guatemala (Conred) confirmed, while at least another 20 were injured. Local reports indicate that some 2,000 people have fled the area.

Four people died after lava set a house on fire, while two children were burned to death while standing on a bridge watching the eruption unfold, Cabanas added, according to Associated Press.

After awakening on Sunday, and for the second time this year, the Volcan de Fuego (Volcano of Fire) has generated strong pyroclastic flows in the Barrancas de Cenizas, Mineral, Seca, Taniluya, Las Lajas and Barranca Honda localities, Conred said.

After shooting up some 10,000 meters into the air, the residue “advanced more than 40 kilometers” with the direction of the wind, Conred said, noting that the eruption “generated strong reverberations with shock waves causing vibration in roofs and windows at a distance of 20 kilometers.”

There were no immediate reports of any casualties, but authorities are advising those close to the crater to evacuate the area. The International Airport La Aurora closed its runway due to the volcanic ash as a precautionary measure.

The eruption, the strongest recorded in several years, is now affecting the municipalities of Antigua Guatemala, Alotenango, San Antonio Aguas Calientes, Santa Catarina Barahona, Ciudad Vieja, San Miguel Dueñas, Acatenango, San Andres Itzapa, Patzicia, Saragoza, Patzún and Tecpán Guatemala. Locals, meanwhile, have shared dramatic photos and videos showing a massive ash column reaching to the sky.

By Daoud Kuttab

A parliamentary tug of war is taking place in Jordan in an attempt to defuse public anger at an IMF inspired income tax law that has caused widespread protests.

Unions called for another one-day strike on Wednesday amid a groundswell of daily protests against the tax increases.

About 3,000 people demonstrated amid a heavy security presence on Saturday night and into Sunday morning near the prime minister’s office in Amman, waving Jordanian flags and signs reading “we will not kneel,” AFP reported.

In another part of the capital, security forces used tear gas to prevent hundreds of demonstrators from joining the rally, Jordanian news websites reported.

Further protests were expected over Sunday night.

In parliament on Sunday, two competing ideas were discussed to try and end the crisis.

Some politicians want to withdraw the draft law as a way of easing tensions and reintroduce it after proper discussion and debate. Others have called for a quick extraordinary session of parliament with the idea that the law would be rejected.

More than 80 out of 130 members of the lower house have signed the petition saying that if put to a vote they would reject the law.

Tarek Khoury, a maverick oppositional member of parliament, told Arab News that the idea of putting the draft law to a vote in parliament is dangerous.

“People need to know that even if the lower house rejected the draft law it would then be automatically transferred to the upper house, and if it passes in the upper house then a joint session would meet and a two thirds majority will be needed to make any change.”

Khoury said a much better route would be to withdraw the law and hold serious discussions about it to allow the ideas to mature.

“What is the rush? This law if passed will only become effective as of Jan. 1, 2019, we have plenty of time for serious discussions and then we can have it introduced to the people’s house,” Khoury said.

Rumors are swirling that if no progress is made and the protests continue, King Abdullah would have no choice but to ask for the resignation of prime minister Hani Al-Mulki.

The government last month proposed the new law, which would raise income tax on employees by at least five percent.

The measures are the latest in a series of economic reforms since Amman secured a $723-million three-year credit line from the International Monetary Fund in 2016.

The senate convened hours after protests ended on Sunday to discuss “ways of dealing with draft law… in the interest of all parties,” Jordan’s official Petra news agency said.

Protests have gained momentum with different groups joining the opposition to the draft law. A group of businessmen have deviated from the Chamber of Commerce to create a national council that opposes the law. Khalil Hajj Tawfiq, head of the food merchants union is to head a committee that will join the protests.

The speakers of the lower and upper houses canceled official iftars for Sunday and Monday night respectively.

In the capital Amman, residents in the poorest Tafileh neighborhood said they planned a Sunday night march toward the prime minister’s office.

Ali Abous, head of an umbrella group for 15 unions and professional associations with half a million members, told AP a strike was planned for Wednesday.

The doctor’s professional association also called action on that day unless the government withdrew the law.

Meanwhile, the Jordanian Bar Association asked its members not to attend any court sessions on Wednesday as a form of protest.

Rudy Giuliani has caused quite a stir on social media, after saying that US President Donald Trump would “probably” be able to pardon himself. He was answering a question related to Robert Mueller’s ‘Russiagate’ probe.

The president’s personal attorney made the remarks on ABC’s ‘The Week’ program on Sunday. Asked whether Trump has the power to pardon himself, Giuliani claimed the president “probably does,” adding that the constitution “doesn’t say he can’t.” The former New York mayor later conceded that such a course of action would lead to “impeachment.”

“It would be an open question,” Giuliani told the show’s host, George Stephanopoulos. “I think it would probably get answered by, gosh, that’s what the constitution says.”

Giuliani also claimed that Trump had the authority to end the investigation into him in comments that come hot on the heels of the publication of a 20-page document sent to Mueller from Trump’s legal team earlier this year. The special counsel’s investigation centers on accusations of collusion between Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and Russia.

The document outlines the president’s legal strategy and argues that Trump cannot be indicted, subpoenaed or found guilty of obstruction of justice because he is the nation’s “chief law enforcement officer.” The document also argues that Trump “could, if he wished, terminate the inquiry, or even exercise his power to pardon if he so desired.”

Speaking on CNN, former US attorney Preet Bharara said: “It would be outrageous” for a sitting president to pardon himself. “I think [if] the president decided he was going to pardon himself, I think that’s almost self-executing impeachment,” Bharara told CNN’s ‘State of the Union.’

On the same show, Republican House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy said the president “should not” pardon himself. “The president is not saying he is going to pardon himself. The president never said he pardoned himself,” McCarthy said. “I don’t think a president should pardon themselves.”

The remarks caused a stir online. Many hit out at the idea of the president abusing the pardon power, while others raged at the perceived double standard employed by his personal attorney.

Trump has consistently rubbished the investigation into potential collusion between his campaign and Russia, labelling the probe “fake news” and a “hoax.” Only once before has he directly referenced his own presidential powers. Writing in a tweet in July 2017, the president asserted his “complete power to pardon” in response to the investigation into Russia’s alleged meddling in the 2016 election.