By Giancarlo Elia Valori
The issue of Sinai and its jihad is
increasingly important, also considering Hezbollah’s new strategy in Southern
Lebanon, as well as the current deployment of Iranian, Syrian, Russian and
various Sunni and jihadist forces between the Golan Heights and the Bekaa Valley,
on the border between Syria and Israel.
The
“sword jihad” in the Sinai peninsula, however, dates back to many
years ago.
In
2011, precisely at the peak of tension both in the West and within some of the
so-called “moderate” Islamic forces operating in the Maghreb region,
during the various national “Arab springs”, the Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis
group (ABM) was created in the Sinai peninsula.
As
was easy to foresee, unlike what CIA believed at the time, the destabilization
of the old regimes had strengthened and not weakened the jihadist
organizations.
ABM
was the new network of exchange, training, intelligence and fundraising of the
local jihad that, for the first time, played its own autonomous role.
For
all the organizations of the Egyptian-Palestinian “holy war”, the
opportunity of Mubarak’s fall was too fortunate to be missed.
In
the void of power (and of welfare for the Sinai populations), the
newly-established ABM easily succeeded in winning the local populations’
support.
It
should also be noted that, albeit always careful in its approach – except in
the strategic void occurred with Morsi’s government linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood, which lasted from June 30, 2012 to July 3, 2013, when the coup of
the Head of the military intelligence services, Al Sisi, ousted him from power
– Egypt was interested only in the security of Sinai’s oil networks, not in the
support of local populations.
Even currently, with the emergence of Sinai’s jihad,
Egypt bears the brunt of its strategic oversight and the poor social and
political analysis of the peninsular system around its canals.
Nevertheless Al Sisi-led Egypt has very little
money- hence some simplicity in its analyses is quite understandable.
The activity to make the Sinai networks safe had already started as
early as Mubarak’s time and has continued until the current government of Al
Sisi, who knows all too well that – after the “cure” of the Muslim
Brotherhood -he cannot completely trust his own police forces or his
intelligence services, and hence is thinking of somehow “delegating
security” for the Sinai peninsula also to third parties.
At
that juncture, however, the news was spread that the Israeli forces were using
precisely Palestinian elements to collect primary intelligence on the Sinai’s Isis,
one of ABM current developments.
ABM
was one of the first groups outside the Syrian-Iraqi system to swear allegiance
to the “Caliph” Al Baghdadi.
Israel used those intelligence networks only
to support Egypt in its specific local
war on terror, considering that Daesh-Isis still had at least 2,000 active
elements in the peninsula that, for the time being, were not specifically
targeted to the Jewish State.
On
January 11, 2019, for example, the Egyptian Armed Forces successfully hit and
hence killed 11 terrorists, who were already making operations against the city
of Bir-el-Abad in Northern Sinai.
It
was even said that the Israeli intelligence had infiltrated the local
Daesh-Isis. This was also confirmed by Egyptian President Al-Sisi himself who,
in an interview with the American TV channel CBS on January 3, 2019, reaffirmed
the existence of close cooperation between the Israeli intelligence services and
the Egyptian forces in all the anti-jihadist operations in Sinai.
Clearly, the goal of ABM – which had meanwhile
quickly converged into Al Baghdadi’s “Caliphate” –was the stable
deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel.
It
should also be noted that the continued terrorist action against the oil and
gas networks in Sinai forced Jordan to look for and buy oil and gas elsewhere.
Obviously the permanent insecurity of networks
in Sinai slowed down and often blocked the prospects for expansion of the
Israeli gas and oil in their connection both with Egypt and with the long Arab
Pipeline network reaching Damascus and, through Turkey, the European market.
Hence, since 2013, with the successful coup
staged by Al Sisi, the ABM – which was already part of the pseudo-Caliphate
system – has been focusing on one goal: the fight against the Egyptian armed
forces and power.
Hence Sinai’s new jihadist network is composed
of Wilayat al Sinai, i.e. the pseudo-Caliphate network; some groups linked to
Al Qaeda, such as Jund al Islam, a structure
operating above all in Sinai’s Western desert, as well as Ansar al Islam
and other groups, always active in Sinai’s Northern peninsula.
There are also militant groups that are
explicitly linked to the Islamic Brotherhood, such as Hassm (the acronym of the
“Army of Egypt’s Forearms”) and Liwa al Thawra, also known as
“the Banner of the Revolution” which, however, operates above all in
Egypt, between Alexandria, Cairo and Suez.
It
should also be noted that last February both the Islamic “State” of
Daesh-Isis and Al Qaeda itself uploaded a video in which Ayman Al Zawahiri
harshly criticized the behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and above
all in Sinai.
Hence in 2014 Al Sisi militarized Sinai.
Although not much is known about it, it is a
low-intensity war that has already exacted a toll of several thousand victims.
The
ABM, renamed Wilayat al Sinai after its affiliation with Daesh-Isis, was still
supported by much of Sinai’s population, while the economic crisis of the
region worsened with the embargo imposed by Egypt, with a view to stopping oil
smuggling and the widespread arms trafficking.
At
that juncture, Al Sisi launched its great Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018, a
military action which began on February 9, 2018, and was organized between the
Nile Delta and Northern and Central Sinai.
In
fact, everything began after the attack on the Al-Rawda mosque of November 24,
2017. It should be noted that Al-Rawda is a mosque linked to the Jayiria Sufi
sect, a mystic “order” widespread particularly in Sinai, especially
in the Bir el-Abed area.
Thanks to the effective results of that great
operation, Egypt also closed the Gaza border and the Rafah border that,
however, has been recently reopened.
It
is worth noting that the “great operation” had been launched shortly before the Egyptian
political and presidential elections of March 2018.
Hence these are the terms of the equation:
strong anti-Egyptian jihadist threat in Sinai; limited forces available to the
Egyptian army and intelligence services and above all the issue of the
International Monetary Fund’s loan to Egypt, which has strategic and military
importance also in Sinai.
Therefore Al Sisi’s military credibility is
one of the essential factors of his financial salvation.
In
fact, in November 2016, the IMF granted to Egypt an Extended Fund Facility
worth 12 billion US dollars.
All
the applicative reviews, including the last one of February 4, 2019, have
already been approved by the Fund’s board.
So
far, however, the reforms implemented by Al Sisi’s regime have always been
evaluated positively by the
aforementioned board.
And
also by many private investment banks, which could also take over from the IMF
at the end of the Extended Fund Facility.
Hence macroeconomic stabilization but, first
and foremost, resumption of the GDP
growth.
Tourism, the primary sector of the Egyptian
economy, has again started to perform very well. The same holds true for
migrants’ remittances and for the product of the non-oil and manufacturing
sector, which the IMF has identified as the key to Egypt’s future – a sector
which is recovering and, anyway, is also
growing steadily.
The
social protection put in place by the Egyptian government, essential for
“keeping the crowds under control” (and, often, also local jihadist
terrorism) provides food for children, basic commodities and medicines, with a
recent and significant increase of the liquidity available in the many smart
cards already distributed to the poor people.
The
takafol and karama programs, designed to support the poor families’ standard of
living, already apply to over 2.2 million households, i.e. 9 million Egyptians.
Too
many poor people and hence many candidates to swell the jihad ranks, with a
very effective network now available, including para-Caliphates, Al Qaeda and
all the rest, but especially the network of Muslim Brotherhood’s “young
people”, who are refocusing on a “slow-paced”, but equally cruel, brutal and effective jihad.
Hence, without making it explicitly known to
Israel, Egypt has already placed Hamas in the frontline of its low-intensity
war in Sinai.
In
late November 2018, the former ABM group in Sinai had also already seized a
shipment of Iranian weapons, especially kornet missiles, that went from Iran to
Hamas through the Gaza Strip.
For some years, however, the relations between the Palestinian Islamic
jihad and Egypt have weakened, thanks to the well-known support that the
Palestinian group of Gaza, also linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, has provided
to the Sinai jihad. Hence currently the real strategic link lies in the
structural clash between Daesh-Isis and Hamas in the Sinai peninsula.
Obviously, the primary goal of the Israeli
secret services is always to get good intelligence on the Al-Baghdadi system in
the peninsula, but Hamas does not certainly remain silent.
In
fact, in early January 2019, the Interior Minister of the Gaza Strip –
obviously a Hamas leader – arrested as many as 54 aides of the Israeli forces
who, according to Hamas, were operative of Shabak, the Israel Security Agency.
In
Sinai, however, Isis still has a very close relationship with Hamas and is
still the main carrier of arms smuggling in the Gaza Strip.
Currently, however, the real news is that the
“Caliphate” has harshly broken with the Muslim Brotherhood’s
group that rules in the Gaza Strip.
As
a result, as previously said, Egypt has enlisted precisely Hamas in its fight
against the so-called
“Caliphate”.
Therefore also Qatar’s portentous funding granted only to Al Sisi’s regime is not useless here. This is
an essential factor to understand the new strategic equation of both Qatar
and present-day Egypt.
It
was exactly in early January 2018, however, that the “Caliphate”
openly declared war on Hamas.
Later, in March 2019, there have also been severe attacks on Israeli
civilian positions, starting from the Gaza Strip.
The
Israeli intelligence services have also ascertained that the specifically
military wing of Hamas, namely the “Izz-ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades”,
have already agreed with the Egyptian Armed Forces to fight the
“Caliphate”, especially in the areas on the border with the Gaza
Strip.
The
Egyptian intelligence services have also notified Israel, the United States and
Saudi Arabia of the fact that they know the military-financial transactions of
the Egyptian regime with Qatar very well. They have also informed Russia that
the agreement between Hamas and the Egyptian forces is designed to permanently
“recovering” Gaza’s Palestinian group, while in October 2018 Egypt
had also arranged a short agreement between Hamas and Israel to reduce tension between the two areas.
In
essence, pending the forthcoming end of military activities in Syria, a new
tripartite order is being created, in the Middle East, between Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and the Emirates. All these three actors really want Israel to
participate in the whole stabilization of the region.
This obviously implies the stable solution of
the Palestinian issue, possibly with a new joint leadership –also different
from the current one – and hence a new division of the areas of influence also
within the Palestinian world.
Egypt wants to directly control the Gaza
Strip, i.e. Hamas and the smaller local networks of Fatah and the Palestinian
Jihad again in the Gaza Strip, but without forgetting the military and
financial ties of these three organizations with Iran.
In
the design of the new Arab tripartite agreement, Iran shall leave quickly.
Egypt is here imagining a sort of unification
between the various groups of the old Palestinian resistance movement, with new
organizations of political representation within the Gaza Strip and possibly
also in the PNA’s Territories.
Nevertheless many problems will obviously emerge: the Palestinian
National Authority, de facto expelled from the Gaza Strip, has had no news or
ideas about the state of security in the Gaza Strip for at least ten years.
Egypt, however, does not want to put only in
Hamas’ hands the whole issue of Sinai stability, as well as its sensitive, but
fundamental relations with Israel.
Al
Sisi is mainly observing – with extreme care –
the role played by the number 2 leader of the PNA, Mohammed Dahlan, who
has good relations with Hamas, but is still accused by Fatah of being “the
one who lost the Gaza Strip in 2007”.
In
any case, currently Egypt and Israel have excellent relations (Al Sisi and
Netanyahu have regular phone conversations every week), while it should be
recalled that it was exactly the emergence of the Sinai jihad that enabled
Egypt to militarize the areas in which that had been forbidden exactly by the Peace Treaty with
the Jewish State.
Another central issue is the cooperation
between Israel and Egypt on energy issues.
Recently an agreement has been signed to
enable Egypt to import Israeli natural gas to liquefy it.
Egypt absolutely needs the Israeli support,
considering that – in this context – the struggle against Turkey was and still
is an all-out struggle.
Nevertheless this new collocation of the
military agreement between Egypt and Hamas has also put Israel in difficulty,
which was not consulted, before this alliance, about the Gaza Strip.
The
pact between the group of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and Egypt
became known to Israel only when Hamas pointed out to Egypt that there had been
breaks in the “truce”, which the Israeli army still did not know in
all its strategic value and relevance.
In
any case, Israel has tripled the sale of electricity to the Gaza Strip, while
as many as 11,000 trucks were sent from the Jewish State to support the
population of the Gaza Strip.
Qatar alone provided over 15 million US
dollars of aid to the political and humanitarian organizations of the Gaza
Strip.
Indeed, Hamas wanted above all a refund or
monetary support from Israel, but much greater than expected, at least for the
funds that the PNA’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, had decided autonomously to remove
from the autonomous administration of the Gaza Strip.
As
usual, the response was obviously a terrorist one, with bombs thrown at the IDF
troops and the Jewish population outside the border.
Despite of the above mentioned stabilization
projects, Hamas wants to make the most of the climate prevailing for the
Israeli upcoming elections scheduled for next April.
Certainly the next target of the Palestinian
groups will be the joint Israeli-US exercise scheduled for March 4 next.
It
will be a very important military exercise: a United States European Command
(USEUCOM) battery composed of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missiles will be made operational, right on the border between the Gaza Strip
and the Jewish State.
The
THAAD system will soon be added to the Israeli defense systems, along with the
Iron Dome, mainly operating against short-range missiles; the Arrow system,
intercepting long-range missiles in their exo-atmospheric phase and David’s
Sling to hit tactical ballistic missiles.
Both the THAAD and the Arrow systems are
already included in the USEUCOM’s early warning network, using a series of
radars located on a US base in the Negev desert.
A
base that, however, already monitors any missile launch from Iran.
Obviously the THAAD network is a US implicit suggestion not to give in to the flatteries and blandishments of the Sunni treaty on the new areas of influence between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – a treaty which is still written in the Sinai sand.
*About the author: Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France.”
Source: This article was published by Modern Diplomacy