By MISNA

“Tons of fireworks lit up the port”, said to MISNA Father Marcello Ghirlando, a Franciscan very captivated by the passion for soccer in Tripoli.The Mediterranean Knights, Libya’s national football team, have qualified for the 2014 Africa Nations Championship (Chan) and now beating Ghana is more than a dream.

“Thousands of people watched the match on large-screen in the squares and bars and after the penalty kicks shootout, the city went mad”, added Fr. Marcello.

Zimbabwe, another surprise in the championship, only lost after seven kicks, with a goal by the usually goalie Elmutasem Abushnaf.

Father Marcello would not make predictions on the final, because he claimed to not be an expert. He however stressed that Libya is celebrating, “because after recent losses over the past two years, they don’t havde much more than soccer”. Only national players will be on the field, not the over-paid stars like in Europe. The next match will be in Cape Town , in South Africa, on Saturday.

The article Libya National Team In Finals, Tripoli Celebrates appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By MISNA

Another 11 senators handed their resignations to President Goodluck Jonathan and defected to the opposition, reports the national media. This deals a fresh blow to the increasingly divided ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

The PDP still holds a majority in the senate, but will need opposition consensus to pass bills. Thirty-six lawmakers have resigned so far, causing the loss of the absolute majority in the House, in addition to several governors, especially from the northern states.

The majority defected to the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC), which now counts 33 senators on 109 members. The ACP leadership has called for a block on all bills, including the 2014 budget. The party is demanding an end to the “interference” of the central government in the oil-rich Rivers State, headed by Rotimi Amaechi, one of five governors who defected from the PDP in 2013.

The internal constrasts also stem from the possibility that President Jonathan will run for a new term in office in 2015, violating an internal agreement of an alternation of leaders from the mostly Christian south and Muslim north.

The article Nigeria: 11 Ruling Party Senators Defect To Opposition appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By VOR

Secret documentation collected by Pakistani field officers gives detailed information on 330 US drone strikes that have occurred in Pakistan since 2006. The document is the fullest official record of drone strikes in Pakistan to have yet been published. It provides rare insight into what the government understands about the campaign.

It also provides details about exactly when and where strikes took place, often including the names of homeowners. These details can be valuable to researchers attempting to verify eyewitness reports – and are often not reported elsewhere. But interestingly, the document stops recording civilian casualties after 2008, even omitting details of well-documented civilian deaths and those that have been acknowledged by the government.

The CIA-run program is estimated to have killed 2,371 people.

The most complete official record of American drone activity in Pakistan yet published provides an account as to the time and place of each strike, even including in some cases the identity of the homeowners.

The document is unique in that it provides a “strike-by-strike account,” opening the window on Pakistan’s view of each incident with that of other authorities.

Strangely, the retrieved data stops recording civilian casualties after 2008, while even failing to mention details of civilian deaths that have been widely acknowledged by the Pakistani authorities. It also inexplicably excludes information from the year 2007.

The news watchdog said the leaked documents are based on information filed to the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) Secretariat each evening by local Political Agents in the field. However, TBIJ noted that the leaked documents are just one of several sources of information the Pakistani government has on US drone activity in the country.

Although the document records civilian casualties in the early years, from 2009 these almost disappear. Even well-documented cases of civilian deaths are omitted. These include at least two incidents where the tribal administration is known to have admitted to the families that it knew civilians had died.

Among the civilian deaths that go unmentioned is one of the most high-profile attacks of the past 18 months – an October 2012 attack that killed Mamana Bibi, an elderly woman, as she was in a field. Her grandchildren were nearby, and several were injured by debris.

‘If a case as well-documented as Mamana Bibi’s isn’t recorded as a civilian death, that raises questions about whether any state records of these strikes can be seen as reliable, beyond the most basic information,’ said Mustafa Qadri, a researcher for Amnesty International, who investigated the strike for a major report published last autumn. ‘It also raises questions of complicity on the part of the Pakistan state – has there been a decision to stop recording civilians deaths?’

In the first part of the report, 746 people are listed as killed in the drone strikes, at least 147 of the victims are said to be civilians, 94 of which are thought to be children. From 2009 to Sept. 2013, it is estimated that 1, 625 people were killed by drone strikes, a figure that closely matches those of the TBIJ.

The London-based journalism watchdog emphasized that some entries in the report included ambiguous language, hinting that possible civilian deaths are being deliberately concealed.

In a report dated August 11, 2011, the New York Times quoted US officials, who spoke on the condition anonymity, that the US Drone program “has killed more than 2,000 militants and about 50 noncombatants since 2001,” a hit-miss ratio that the paper described as a “stunningly low collateral death rate by the standards of traditional airstrikes.”

Meanwhile, Islamabad has so far refused to confirm the authenticity of the latest leaked information obtained by TBIJ, but it is not refuting the document’s claims of high civilian deaths.

The article 330 US Drone Strikes In Pakistan, According To Leaked Document appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By James M. Dorsey

Multiple conflicts between Egypt’s military-backed government and the country’s foremost soccer clubs that pit militant soccer fans against both Egypt’s autocratic leaders and club managers could force world soccer governing body FIFA to suspend Egypt.

The disputes reflect the broader crisis that has shipwrecked Egypt’s transition from autocracy to a politically more liberal society following mass anti-government demonstrations in 2011 that forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign after 30 years in office. Militant soccer fans played a key role in the toppling of Mr. Mubarak and resistance to subsequent military rule.

In Egypt’s latest twists and turns, sports minister and former national soccer team player Taher Abou Zeid has spotlighted the Middle East and North Africa’s incestuous relationship between sports and politics that FIFA largely chooses to ignore. FIFA has a history of enforcing its nominal ban on political interference in football only when that intrusion becomes so flagrant that the soccer body is left with no choice but to act.

Mr. Abou Zeid twice in the last six months sought to replace the management of Cairo arch rivals Al Ahli SC and Al Zamalek SC, Africa’s two top performing clubs. He succeeded in the case of Zamalek that has been managed by an interim board after Mr. Abou Zeid sacked its elected chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, last October. Fans of both clubs have long denounced management as corrupt and demanded that they resign.

Controversial Al Ahli chairman Hassan Hamdi proved a tougher nut to crack. Mr. Hamdi was being investigated on corruption charges and had his assets frozen under President Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president who was deposed by the military last July.

Mr. Abou Zeid initially dismissed Mr. Hamdi and his board on January 18 after the Al Ahli management refused to participate in a one-year, $10 million premier league broadcast deal with state-owned broadcaster, Egypt Radio and Television Union (ERTU).

The deal was designed to infuse cash into financially troubled clubs that have suffered as a result of professional leagues having been suspended for much of the last three years and fans being banned from matches since they resumed in late 2013. Mr. Hamdi felt Al Ahli, Egypt’s most popular club with an estimated 50 million supporters, was better served by signing a separate agreement worth $5.8 million with Lebanon’s Future Media Company.

In contrast to Zamalek’s Mr. Abbas, Mr. Hamdi successfully persuaded Egyptian Prime Minister Hazem Al-Beblawi to override Mr. Abou Zaid’s decision. Al Ahli’s board elections should have been held last year but were postponed because of the political crisis engulfing the country.

The ERTU deal was also designed as an affront to state-owned Qatari broadcaster Al Jazeera, five of whose reporters and producers have been detained on suspicion of spreading false information harmful to state security and membership in a terrorist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been banned and criminalized since Mr. Morsi’s overthrow.

The ERTU has accused Al Jazeera of illegally using its equipment during the coverage of protests against Mr. Morsi’s overthrow on Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square. Hundreds were killed when security forces last August brutally cleared the square where pro-Morsi protesters were camped out. ERTU ignored Al Jazeera’s rights to African Cup matches by broadcasting in March a match between Egypt and Ghana. Two weeks later, Mr. Abou Zeid ordered the EFA not sell the rights to Egypt’s premier league to Al Jazeera three months after the network had acquired the rights for a period of three years.

Relations between Qatar and Egypt have deteriorated because of the Gulf state’s support for the Brotherhood and its hosting of prominent figures associated with the group, including popular preacher Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, who regularly denounces Egyptian strongman Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and calls for the overthrow of the military-backed government.

In a January 22 letter to the Egyptian Football Association (EFA), FIFA secretary general Jerome Valcke gave the soccer body until February 5 to report on the state of affairs. “Should the current situation persist, we would have no choice than to refer the case to the appropriate FIFA bodies for consideration and possible decision, including sanctions which might lead to a suspension of the EFA,” Mr. Valcke warned.

Mr. Abou Zeid’s attempts to remove the management of Al Ahli and Zamalek has done little to endear him to militant fans who constitute one of the largest organized civic groups in Egypt. The fans have vowed to disrupt the minister’s bans on spectators.

Hundreds militants fans demonstrated in central Cairo in the walk-up to the January 25 anniversary of the popular revolt against Mr. Mubarak denouncing both the military-backed government as well as Mr. Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. Days earlier, Zamalek fans stormed the stands during their club’s match against Haras El-Hodoud in protest against the spectator ban.

“We removed Mubarak, but not the system that is still in place. We will not stop until we achieve the goals of the January 25 revolution: bread, freedom and social justice,” one of the militants said.

Despite perceptions that a majority of Egyptians support the overthrow of Mr. Morsi and the return of a military-backed strong government, the militant’s comments against the backdrop of the results of a referendum on a new constitution earlier this month reflect a sentiment that is boiling among youth who constitute a majority of the Egyptian population.

As a result, the referendum’s outcome may not truly reflect the public mood. Most importantly, few youth were among the 38.6 percent of Egyptians who cast their vote. It is unclear what percentage of the 61.4 percent that abstained from voting did so as a protest against the military’s revival of the autocratic state and what percentage stayed home for other reasons.

The article Conflicts Wracking Egyptian Soccer Reflect Country’s Political Malaise – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Richard Silverstein

I can’t think of anything more dry and boring than talking about a diplomatic “framework.”  It’s enough to give diplomacy a bad name.  A framework is not a deal, it’s not tangible, it doesn’t mean much–unless both sides want it to.  And usually two sides that can agree on a framework could also agree on a deal, so there’s no need for a framework.

Tom Friedman offers his typically Olympian wisdom in today’s column, in which he doles out bits of Kerry’s purported framework.  I’m sorry for being so blunt, but this sucker is gonna tank, and I’ll be happy when it does.  That may sound callous.  But ultimately, it’s not.  To explain, I’ll juxtapose two short passages from Friedman’s summary of the provisions in Kerry’s plan in order to point out its fatal flaws:

Has the number of Israeli Jews now living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank become so much larger — more than 540,000 — that they are immovable?…

It [the framework] will call for the Palestinians to have a capital in Arab East Jerusalem and for Palestinians to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. It will not include any right of return for Palestinian refugees into Israel proper.

What’s so egregious in the calculus of the Kerry plan is the assumption that in order for Palestinians to undo an Israeli injustice, the theft and resettling of their land with half a million Jewish settlers, they must also turn their backs on the prospect of righting another Israeli injustice: the forced expulsion of 1-million Israeli Palestinians in 1948.  In this purported framework, what have Israelis given up?  Sovereignty over the Territories, land which most Israelis could easily dispense with anyway.  So for the average Israeli this is a great deal: he or she gives up something she doesn’t really care for anyway and gets a refugee-free Jewish country and a cleansed moral conscience.  Such a deal!  Who could refuse?

When you read the second paragraph above, you realize that the price the Palestinians are being asked to pay for removing settlements (and only part of them), is abjuring all claims for the return of refugees and recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people.  So the question you must ask is: are the Palestinians that desperate that they would prefer a deal offering half a state and the retreat from sacred Palestinian principles; to no deal at all?  My money is on the latter.  I’ll tell you why.

Clearly, if they had their druthers, Abbas and the rump West Bank Fatah leadership would cave and go for a deal.  But I don’t believe either Palestinians in the West Bank and certainly not in Gaza would allow them to do so.  I predict an internal Arab Spring or Intifada that would literally prevent leaders from signing a deal.  If this were to happen, it would be a good thing.

Whenever Abbas goes too far in caving to Israeli interests, there is a storm of criticism and he retreats.  That will happen this time too if he has the effrontery to bargain away Palestinian national rights.

On the Palestinian side, there is simply no leader, when you put the deal this way (and opponents will, trust me), who could support it.  That is why no deal is better than this shabby one.  Yes, it will mean continuing bloodshed, continuing deterioration of Israel’s democratic values, things will get worse.  There is no way around this.  But there are times, and unfortunately this is one, when one side has too much power and thinks it can lord it over the other.  Time will wear down the dominant party and rob it of its superior strategic position.

Palestine will never beat Israel on the battlefield.  But like Joshua blowing his horn at the walls of Jericho, those instruments will eventually chip away at the impregnable fortress that is Israel.  An advantage will become a deficit.  Superiority will turn to desperation and decline.  Only then, when Israel’s hubris has been humbled, like Pharaoh’s heart, will a just, fair negotiated solution be possible.

When Kerry fails, you’ll undoubtedly see a picture with Bibi smiling like the cat that swallowed the canary.  When peace talks fail it’s music to the Likud’s ears.  They think they can live forever.  They think Israel can hold out forever.  But the fortunes of nations, like people, rise and fall.  You’re up one day or decade and down the next.  Israeli hubris will lead to overreaching.  The world will eventually vote with its feet and abandon Israel, the garrison state.  Eventually, it will have no choice but to settle for the half a loaf it probably could’ve had in 1948 (if not then, then certainly after 1967), if Ben Gurion had conducted affairs differently.

Friedman in concluding his column, warns that the failure of the Kerry project will doom the two-state solution.  If it does, it won’t be such a bad thing.  I say this as someone who once embraced the two state solution.  I say it as someone who doesn’t really know or understand what will replace it and whether it will be workable.  But finally I say this as someone who understands that Israel has made a mockery of the two-state solution; turned it into a Potemkin village behind which sits the wretched refuse of Occupation.  You can only dishonor an idea so long before it becomes a rusting, useless hulk.

So I, with a heavy heart, hope for failure for Kerry’s initiative.  It is the only path to a real solution.

This article appeared at Tikun Olam

The article Kerry’s Israel-Palestine ‘Framework’ Is DOA – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Al Bawaba News

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair offered his firm backing to Egypt’s government on Thursday, saying the Muslim Brotherhood was “taking the country away from its basic values of hope and progress.”

Blair told Abu Dhabi-based Sky News Arabia during a visit to Cairo to discuss the Middle East Peace Process that the Egyptian army intervened to overthrow elected President Mohammad Mursi at the will of the people. “But in order to take the country to the next stage of its development, which should be democratic, we should be supporting the new government in doing that,” Blair added.

“This is what I say to my colleagues in the West: the fact is, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to take the country away from its basic values of hope and progress,” Blair said.

He first expressed his support for the Egyptian army last year when he said that “chaos” would have been the alternative to military intervention.

Blair did not acknowledge the military’s violent clampdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters during the past few months and his office has not commented on how the West could support democracy without first condemning such actions, according to an article by the Guardian.

Side stepping the issue, Blair said it was better not to discuss the past in comments he made following his meeting with Egyptian army leader Abdel Fatah el-Sisi on his trip to Egypt.

“You know, we can debate the past and it’s probably not very fruitful to do so, but right now I think it’s important the whole of the international community gets behind the leadership here and helps.”

Former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd criticized Blair’s statements.

“We should not go out of our way to clap our hands and say ‘that’s marvelous’ as Tony Blair has done. We should keep our counsel, keep our wits about us, and wait for the last act of the drama which may be some years away,” he said, The Independent reported.

Mursi, Egypt’s first freely elected president, was ousted on July 3, 2013 a year after taking office following mass protests backed by the army. Many have labeled the ouster a military coup and still consider Mursi the rightful president of the country.

Blair had previously supported Egypt’s former President Husni Mubarak, who was toppled in January 2011 during Egypt’s uprisings.

Original article

The article Blair Backs Egypt’s Government And Criticises Brotherhood appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By EIA

Qatar is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, and the country’s exports of LNG, crude oil, and petroleum products provide a significant portion of government revenues.

Like many of its neighbors, Qatar relies on its energy sector to support its economy. According to the Qatar National Bank (QNB), Qatar’s earnings from its hydrocarbons sector accounted for 60% of the country’s total government revenues over the past five fiscal years (through fiscal year 2012-13). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that Qatar earned $55 billion from net oil exports in 2012, and QNB estimates that the oil and natural gas sector of Qatar accounted for 57.8% of the country’s gross domestic product in 2012.

Qatar was the world’s fourth largest dry natural gas producer in 2012 (behind the United States, Russia, and Iran), and has been the world’s leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter since 2006. Qatar is also at the forefront of gas-to-liquids (GTL) production, and the country is home to the world’s largest GTL facility. The growth in Qatar’s natural gas production, particularly since 2000, has also increased Qatar’s total liquids production, as lease condensates, natural gas plant liquids, and other petroleum liquids are a significant (and valuable) byproduct of natural gas production.

Qatar produced nearly 1.6 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of liquid fuels (crude oil, condensates, natural gas plant liquids, gas-to-liquids, and other liquids) in 2013, of which 730,000 bbl/d was crude oil and the remainder was non-crude liquids. While Qatar is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the country is the second-smallest crude oil producer among the 12-member group. Natural gas meets the vast majority of Qatar’s domestic energy demand, so the country is able to export most of its liquid fuels production. Given its small population, Qatar’s energy needs are met almost entirely by domestic sources.

Qatar’s fiscal year 2012-13 budget assumed an oil export price of $65 per barrel, and with the average export price of the country’s Qatar Land export stream averaging nearly $110 per barrel over that period, the government earned significantly higher revenues than expected.

Sector organization

The state-owned Qatar Petroleum (QP) controls all aspects of Qatar’s upstream and downstream oil and natural gas sectors, including exploration, production, transport, storage, marketing, and sale of crude oil, natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, gas-to-liquids (GTL), refined products, and petrochemicals and fertilizers.

Qatar often focuses its natural gas development on integrated large-scale projects linked to LNG exports or downstream industries that use natural gas as a feedstock. These projects tend to include investment from international oil companies (IOCs) with the technology and expertise in integrated mega-projects, including ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total. The Qatargas Operating Company Limited (Qatargas), which operates four major LNG ventures (Qatargas I-IV), and Ras Laffan Company Limited (RasGas), which operates three major LNG ventures (RasGas I-III), lead Qatar’s LNG sector. Each venture has an individual ownership structure, although QP owns at least 65% of each.

The Qatargas consortium includes QP, Total, ExxonMobil, Mitsui, Marubeni, ConocoPhillips, and Shell, while RasGas is 70% owned by QP and 30% owned by ExxonMobil. The two LNG companies handle all upstream to downstream natural gas transportation themselves, while the Qatar Gas Transport Company (known as Nakilat) is responsible for shipping Qatar’s LNG.

In the oil sector, while QP owns and operates the onshore Dukhan field and the offshore Maydan Mahzam and Bul Hanine fields, IOCs operate the remaining offshore fields via production sharing agreements (PSAs). In an effort to increase production and reserves and to mitigate natural gas-related capital expenditures, QP offered more favorable terms for PSAs in recent years. Today, more than half of Qatar’s oil production comes from foreign oil companies via PSAs. However, Qatar recently began moving toward using more joint-venture (JV) agreements, which tend to offer higher returns to the state.

Qatar’s electricity sector has several important entities, including the Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC), which owns and manages the country’s electric and desalinization plants. The Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation owns and operates the country’s electricity and water distribution networks.

Oil

Qatar’s crude oil production is the second lowest in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasing production of non-crude liquids—most of which is a byproduct of natural gas production—is contributing to gradual growth in total liquids production.

Qatar has been a member of OPEC since 1961. With proved reserves of crude oil estimated at 25.2 billion barrels by the Oil & Gas Journal (as of January 2014), Qatar holds the 9th largest reserves in OPEC and 13th largest in the world. Qatar’s crude oil and lease condensate production ranks 19th in the world, with most of the country’s production sent abroad as exports.

In 2012, Qatar’s non-crude liquids production surpassed its crude oil production for the first time in the country’s history. Recent growth in non-crude liquids is the result of the country’s robust natural gas production, which produces many heavier hydrocarbons in addition to natural gas. With high levels of natural gas production expected to continue, Qatar’s non-crude liquids supply is also likely to remain high.

Exploration and production

Three oil fields account for more than 85% of Qatar’s crude oil production capacity.

Oil exploration activity in Qatar is ongoing, although not to the degree seen in other oil producing countries. The last major discovery in Qatar came in 1994 (the Al Rayyan field), and any supply growth in the near term is likely to come from increased output at Qatar’s existing fields, particularly through the use of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques. Operators have used EOR techniques in several fields, including Al-Shaheen, Dukhan, Bu Hanine, and Maydan Marjam. Qatar’s oil production comes from just a few fields, led by the Al Shaheen, Dukhan, and Idd al-Shargi, which combined, account for more than 85% of the country’s crude oil production capacity.

Qatar’s total liquids production, which includes crude oil, condensates, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, was 1.6 million bbl/d in 2012, a slight decline from 2011 but up by more than 70% since 2003. Qatar produced over 1.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil and condensates in 2012, according to EIA estimates.

The Qatar National Bank (QNB) expects Qatar’s crude oil production levels to reach 800,000 bbl/d by 2017 as Qatar Petroleum’s $6.6 billion development plan (2010-2014) for crude oil projects continues. A previous government crude oil production capacity target of 1.2 million bbl/d no longer appears feasible, although investment from IOCs could also help boost, or at least maintain, crude oil production levels.

Qatar’s non-crude liquids production has grown significantly over the past several years largely as a result of increased natural gas production in the country. EIA estimates that non-crude liquids production accounted for over half of Qatar’s total oil supply in 2012, which EIA expects to continue in the short- and medium-term. Based on statements from government officials, some industry sources believe Qatar’s condensate production could surpass 800,000 bbl/d by 2015 and reach nearly 1 million bbl/d by 2016. QNB reported in August 2013 that Qatar held condensate reserves of more than 22 billion barrels, although it is unclear under what economic and technological conditions those reserves would be considered economically viable.

Imports and exports

Qatar was the second-smallest crude oil exporter among OPEC members in 2012, ahead of only Ecuador.

Qatar does not import any crude oil and only occasionally imports petroleum products, since the country’s production and refining sectors more than meet domestic demand. In fact, because Qatar’s natural gas meets so much of Qatar’s energy demand, the country exports most of its crude oil and petroleum product production. Qatar exports petroleum and petroleum products from three major export terminals: Umm Said (Mesaieed), Halul Island, and Ras Laffan. QP’s offshore pipeline network brings crude oil from offshore oil fields to Halul Island where oil can be processed for export. Onshore, most oil is sent to the Mesaieed (Umm Said) terminal for refining or export.

According to the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2013, Qatar exported 588,000 bbl/d of crude oil and 464,600 bbl/d of refined petroleum products in 2012. In 2012, Qatar sent nearly all of its crude oil to Asian markets and the majority (86%) of its refined product exports to Asian countries, according to OPEC estimates. Most of Qatar’s refined products (60% or more) go to Japan.

Qatar has three main crude streams: the Qatar Land, Qatar Marine, and Al Shaheen. The Qatar Land and Qatar Marine blends are both lighter crudes, while the Al Shaheen is slightly heavier. The Qatar Marine and Al Shaheen streams have high sulfur content, while the Qatar Land’s sulfur content is slightly lower.

Refining and consumption

Qatar’s refining capacity exceeds domestic demand for petroleum products, thus enabling the country to export most of its refinery output.

Petroleum consumption in Qatar rose by more than 70% from 72,000 bbl/d in 2003 to 189,700 bbl/d in 2012. Qatar has two operating refineries with a combined crude oil refining capacity of 338,700 bbl/d according to the Oil & Gas Journal, and the combined output is more than enough to meet Qatar’s domestic demand. That surplus output enables Qatar to export refined products, and both refineries are near major oil export terminals, one at Umm Said and the other at Ras Laffan. There are plans to double the refining capacity at Ras Laffan to handle more condensates from the country’s natural gas fields by 2016, when the Phase II expansion at Ras Laffan begins operations.

Natural gas

Natural gas is at the center of Qatar’s energy sector. Already the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), several recent developments in the country’s natural gas sector could boost production in the short term.

As of January 2014, Qatar had the third-largest proved reserves of natural gas in the world at 885 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), according to the Oil & Gas Journal. Nearly all of Qatar’s reserves are in the country’s North Field, which is part of the world’s largest natural gas deposit. Iran’s South Pars and Qatar’s North Field together comprise the entire deposit.

There is currently a moratorium on new projects in Qatar’s massive North Field while operators continue to examine ways of sustaining high levels of output over the longer term. The moratorium, initially scheduled to end in 2008, will run through at least 2015 after several extensions. Nevertheless, growth from other fields and new projects could result in overall output growth, although likely at low levels.

Qatar spent many years developing its natural gas resources—particularly in the North Field—and in 2012, Qatar was the second-largest dry natural gas producer in the Middle East and the fourth-largest producer in the world. With its relatively low domestic energy demand, Qatar is able to export nearly all of its natural gas production. As such, Qatar has been the world’s leading exporter of LNG since 2006, and is a member of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF).

Qatar’s growing natural gas production has increased its output of condensates and natural gas plant liquids, which are valuable byproducts of natural gas production. Qatar is also at the forefront of gas-to-liquids (GTL) technology, which processes natural gas into heavier hydrocarbons, such as distillates and naphtha.

Exploration and production

Nearly all of Qatar’s natural gas production comes from the North Field, which is part of the largest non-associated natural gas field in the world.

Qatar’s dry natural gas production reached 5.5 Tcf in 2012, up from just 1.1 Tcf ten years earlier. The vast majority of Qatar’s production comes from the North Field, although some smaller fields contribute production volumes as well.

The $10.4 billion Barzan Gas Project should boost Qatar’s natural gas production from the North Field in the near term. The project consists of both onshore and offshore developments, including offshore platforms, pipelines, and a gas processing unit. Announcements by government officials and ExxonMobil indicate that the project—which began in 2011—will begin operations in 2014 and be capable of processing 1.4 Bcf/d of natural gas.

While nobody expects another discovery like that of the North Field in 1971, exploration in Qatar may still uncover commercially viable natural gas resources. In May 2013, QP and Wintershall announced the discovery of natural gas in Block 4 (North) off the coast of Qatar. The discovery may contain more than 2.5 Tcf in recoverable reserves, and Wintershall expects production of between 200 and 400 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d).

Gas-to-liquids

Qatar is a global leader in gas-to-liquids (GTL) technologies, and the country has two operational facilities. GTL technology uses a refining process to turn dry natural gas into liquid fuels such as low-sulfur diesel and naphtha, among other products. Qatar is one of only three countries—with South Africa and Malaysia being the others—to have operational GTL facilities, although pilot projects in a number of other countries are underway.

Qatar’s Oryx GTL plant (QP 51%, Sasol-Chevron GTL 49%) came online in 2007, but due to initial problems, it was not fully operational until early 2009. At full capacity, the Oryx project uses about 330 MMcf/d of natural gas feedstock from the Al Khaleej field to produce 30,000 bbl/d of GTL products. Officials have discussed a 100,000 bbl/d expansion of the Oryx facility in the event Qatar lifts the moratorium on North Field developments.

The Pearl GTL project (QP 51%, Shell 49%) uses 1.6 Bcf/d of natural gas feedstock to produce 140,000 bbl/d of GTL products as well as 120,000 bbl/d of natural gas liquids and liquefied petroleum gases (LPG). The plant’s initial phase commenced in early 2011, and the first shipments of gasoil were sent out in June 2011. After initiating the second phase of development, Pearl GTL achieved full capacity in October 2012. In addition to being the largest GTL plant in the world, the Pearl GTL project is also the first integrated GTL operation, meaning it will have upstream natural gas production integrated with the onshore conversion plant.

Consumption

Qatar’s natural gas consumption continues to rise as the country’s overall energy demand rises along with its economy.

Qatar meets all of its internal natural gas demand from domestic sources. Natural gas consumption has grown quickly over the past several years, nearly tripling between 2003 and 2012. This tracks closely with overall natural gas production, which more than quadrupled over the same period. In 2012, consumption reached 1.3 Bcf/d, growing 30% from the 2011 level. The electricity and water (desalinization) sectors account for most of the natural gas consumption in Qatar.

Exports

Qatar exports nearly 85% of its natural gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG), and it has been the largest exporter of LNG in the world since 2006.

Qatar is the world’s second-largest exporter of natural gas, exporting nearly 4.3 Tcf in 2012, and the country was again the world’s largest LNG exporter, as it has been since 2006. Most of Qatar’s exports go to markets in Asia in the form of LNG, while the country sends a small amount of natural gas via the Dolphin Pipeline to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.

Qatar’s LNG export capacity is the highest in the world at 77 million tons per year (MMt/y), approximately 3.7 Tcf, split between Qatargas (42 MMt/y) and RasGas (35 MMt/y). The companies added 5 of the country’s 14 trains in 2009 and 2010. The latest, the 14th train (Qatargas IV Train 7), came online in January 2011 with a capacity of 380 Bcf/y (7.8 MMt).

Historically, most of Qatar’s LNG exports were part of long-term, oil-indexed contracts, but over the past few years the country began to shift to more short-term contracts and spot-market sales. In 2012, Qatar exported over one quarter of its LNG as short-term or spot-market sales (19.9 MMt according to QNB), accounting for more than a third of short-term and spot-market sales in the world.

Several recent agreements between Qatargas and international LNG importers are of the short-term variety, including a deal based on continental European prices rather than oil-indexation for the first time in the company’s history.

Qatar has over 90% of its LNG production volumes committed as part of supply purchase arrangements (SPAs) between 2014 and 2020. LNG production growth elsewhere in the world over the next few years may challenge some of Qatar’s remaining spot volumes, although with the majority of its LNG already sold, the impact on Qatar’s natural gas exports should be limited in the near term.

The Dolphin Pipeline—which currently has a capacity of approximately 2 Bcf/d—transported 1.9 Bcf/d in 2012 according to Dolphin Energy Limited (DEL), which operates the pipeline. UAE received approximately 1.7 Bcf/d in 2012, while the remainder (approximately 200 MMcf/d) went to Oman. DEL plans to expand capacity of the pipeline to 3.2 Bcf/d, full design capacity, in 2015.

Electricity

Despite rising electricity demand, Qatar had a surplus generating capacity of approximately 2.5 gigawatts, or nearly 30%, in 2012.

With one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the past few years, energy demand in Qatar rose significantly, particularly electricity demand. All of Qatar’s current generating capacity is natural gas-fired, although there have been some discussions on potential solar power projects over the past several years. Qatar is not currently pursuing coal or nuclear generating capacity.

Between 2000 and 2010, Qatar’s electricity consumption grew from approximately 8.0 billion kilowatthours to 20.5 billion kilowatthours. That growth has continued, and Qatar’s Minister of Energy and Industry stated that consumption in 2012 grew by an additional 13%.

To meet rising electricity demand, Qatar continues to invest in its generating capacity. Qatar plans to boost generating capacity from between 8.3 and 8.8 gigawatts (GW) in 2012 (according to various estimates) to 15 GW in 2015. Qatar already invested over $8 billion to expand the country’s transmission and distribution networks, and it has budgeted an additional $4.1 billion for water and power projects between 2012 and 2015. A recent plan, announced in March 2013, proposes to spend $22 billion on water and power projects between 2014 and 2022, adding 140 new electrical substations and 2.1 MW of generating capacity over the first 5 years of the project.

Notes

Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of January 30, 2014.
Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

The article Qatar Energy Profile: Largest Exporter Of Liquefied Natural Gas In World – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPCS

By Rupak Bhattacharjee

The trial of Bangladeshi war criminals that began on 21 November 2011 has generated many controversies. In March 2010, the Awami League (AL) government constituted the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) for the trial of persons accused of committing heinous crimes in the 1971 war. The accused have been tried under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act and the Collaborators Act – both promulgated in 1973. Most of the accused war criminals belong to the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami. In fact, its entire leadership has been held responsible for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. So far, eight Jamaat leaders – Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Quader Mollah, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, Ghulam Azam, Mohammad Mojahid, Mueen Uddin and Ashrafuz Zaman – have been awarded either life sentences or death punishment. Besides, several other top leaders including its present Ameer (chief) Matiur Rahman Nizami, Abdus Subhan, AKM Yusuf, Azharul Islam and Mir Quasem Ali are in detention and facing trial.

The ICT has also indicted Jamaat as a political party. The investigation agency of the ICT has launched a formal probe into the alleged war crimes committed by Jamaat as an organization in 1971. The tribunal said, “Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party under Professor Ghulam Azam intentionally functioned as a criminal organisation.” The ICT says that militias created by the Jamaat like Razakar, Al-Badr, Al-Shams and Peace Committee worked as auxiliary forces of the Pakistani Army and actively opposed Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan.

All the Jamaat leaders convicted or facing trial were key organisers or commanders-in-chief of these militias in their respective localities. The dogmatic religious leaders collaborated with the Pakistani Army throughout the Liberation War and summarily executed scores of intellectuals, students, nationalist leaders and freedom fighters.

For the last forty years, the families of victims have been relentlessly campaigning to bring the perpetrators to justice. Numerous pro-liberation organisations including Ekattarer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee (Committee for Uprooting Collaborators and Killers of 1971) led by Saheed Mata Jahanara Imam organised several demonstrations in the 1990s. The campaign for the trial of war criminals transformed into a mass movement at Shahbag, recently renamed as Projjanmo Chattor (Generation Square), following AL’s assumption of power in 2008.

Initiating the trial process was a major election pledge of the AL, the party that once championed the cause of independence under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujib. However, the conviction of war criminals, predominantly of Jamaat origin, has resulted in a highly volatile situation in the country. In the prevailing socio-political scenario, the Bangladeshi polity has become sharply polarised into two camps. A majority of the people identify themselves with the ideals of the independence struggle starting from the 1952 Language Movement culminating in the birth of a Bengali nation through a protracted and bloody Liberation War. However, some conservative politico-religious and reactionary forces that firmly resisted Bangladesh’s independence are not at ease with the concept of secular nationalism. The latter group emphasises the distinct religious identity of the Bangladeshi population and yearns to reform the society based on shariah.

In a landmark judgment in August 2013, Bangladesh High Court scrapped Jamaat’s registration with the Election Commission and disqualified it from contesting future elections since its charter breached the secular provisions of the Constitution. Dhaka’s legal experts maintain that the ruling did not declare the party unlawful but only barred it from participating in the polls on constitutional grounds. The Jamaat challenged the verdict before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court which eventually upheld the High Court order. The Islamist party has been pushed against the wall. A bill was placed in parliament on 16 September 2013 to bar those convicted under the Collaborators Act from becoming voters.

The conviction of prominent Jamaat leaders has sparked violent protests across the country with party activists attacking the police, burning down houses of tribunal and Supreme Court judges and AL leaders, killing witnesses and ransacking Hindu temples. Human Rights Watch says that nearly 150 people have been killed since the first verdict was announced on 21 January 2013.

Bangladesh’s resilient civil society has strongly condemned Jamaat’s violent activities. Dhaka’s leading Bengali daily Prothom Alo criticised the Jamaat in its editorial, saying that “legal battle and street vandalism do not go hand in hand” and called “the new generation of the party leadership to decide if they continue to shoulder the misdeeds of their leaders during the Liberation War.”

The Jamaat says that the trial is politically motivated and its key ally, the BNP, has termed it a ‘farce’. The AL government denies the charge and has cautioned political rivals against defending well-known war criminals who are objects of public derision because of their despicable acts in the country’s war of independence. The schism between the pro and anti-liberation forces has always persisted in the polity. The trial proceedings of war criminals have only sharpened these cleavages and the current trend is likely to continue for sometime.

The article Bangladesh: Implications Of Jamaat-E-Islami’s Indictment – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dean Baker

The economy grew at a 3.2 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter following a 4.1 percent rise in the third quarter. This is the best two quarter performance since the fourth quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 when the economy grew at 4.9 percent and 3.7 percent annual rates, respectively. Consumption grew at a 3.3 percent rate, accounting for 70.6 percent of the growth in the quarter. Investment continued the weakness it has shown over the last two years, growing at just a 3.8 percent annual rate. Somewhat surprisingly, housing fell at a 9.8 percent annual rate, its first decline since the third quarter of 2010.

Within consumption, the category of food services and accommodations grew at a 10.2 percent annual rate and accounted for 13.2 percent of the growth in the quarter. This category, together with food sold in stores, accounted for almost 19.0 percent of 4th quarter growth. Health care spending continues to be contained, with consumer spending on health care services rising at just a 2.7 percent rate over the last year.

The personal saving rate for the quarter was 4.3 percent, the second lowest in the recovery and well below the 10 percent average for the post-war era and even for the stock bubble driven decade of the 1990s. It is also worth noting that savings is measured out of income-side GDP rather than output side. In recent quarters, income-side GDP has run well ahead of output side GDP. Insofar as this gap represents an error in measurement on the income side — for example if capital gains are showing up as income — this would imply the true saving rate is considerably lower than the reported rate.

While non-residential investment is largely back to its pre-recession share of GDP, reports of increased business confidence are not being reflected in increased investment. Non-residential investment is up by just 2.1 percent over its year-ago level. Nominal spending on information processing equipment actually fell at a 6.7 percent annual rate in the quarter. (The fall in real terms was smaller, due to a drop in prices.)

The drop in housing construction was a sharp turnaround from the last five quarters in which housing had growth at a double-digit rate and contributed an average of 0.38 percentage points to GDP growth. The decline was driven by a sharp drop in the “other structures” category, which followed a big increase in the third quarter. This will not be repeated in future quarters, so housing will again to add growth, but probably not as much as in 2012 and 2013.

After rising rapidly in third quarter, the pace of inventory accumulation accelerated even more in the fourth quarter to a $127.2 billion annual rate, the fastest pace on record. This will mean less growth in future quarters, as slower accumulations subtract from growth.

Imports were little changed in the quarter, while exports grew at 11.4 percent annual rate. As a result, trade added 1.33 percentage points to growth. Interestingly, the growth in goods exports sharply outpaced the growth in services exports: 15.1 percent compared to 3.4 percent. This was third consecutive quarter in which this has been the case.

Federal spending was a large drag on growth, contracting at a 12.6 percent annual rate. This reduced growth by 0.98 percentage points, as both defense and non-defense spending declined at double digit rates. State and local spending grew at a modest 0.5 percent pace, the third consecutive quarterly increase.

Inflation hawks will find no grounds for concern in this report with the GDP price index rising at a 1.3 percent annual rate. The core PCE rose at just a 1.1 percent rate.

Future quarters will almost certainly see sharp reversals in several components figuring prominently in this report. Housing will again contribute to growth, while the government sector will be a much smaller drag. On the negative side, consumer spending is likely to slow and imports will again grow. Also, slower inventory accumulation will be a drag on growth. The net effect should mean modest growth in the 2.5-3.0 percent range in 2014.

The article US Fourth Quarter GDP Driven By Consumption, Health Care Spending Continues To Slow‏ – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By TransConflict

Despite the fact that the Brussels Agreement and the November election is a first step towards the bridging of differences between Kosovo on the one hand and Kosovo Serbs and Serbia on the other, the process of integration of Serbs into the Kosovan system will require time, good will on all sides and, above all, legal and political clarity.

By Gëzim Krasniqi

Kosovo’s state-building process and the establishment of a separate citizenship regime has been challenged by local Serbs since its independence in 2008. The challenges have been mainly in northern Kosovo, as well as the state of Serbia, thus turning it into a contested and internally divided state. However, after three years of stalemate, and a status-quo in the north Kosovo that practically cemented the division of Kosovo into Albanian and Serb-dominated parts, the EU utilised the International Court of Justice opinion on the legality of the declaration of independence of Kosovo to bring both parties together at the negotiating table. Following the adoption of an EU-Serbia resolution at the General Assembly of the UN (A/RES/64/298), a ‘technical dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia began in March 2011 and produced several agreements on the return of civil registries and cadastre records, and on the freedom of movement of persons.  Regardless of the initial progress, tensions rose  in summer 2011 following the decision of the Kosovo government to send special police to the northern border crossings with Serbia in order to enforce a trade boycott of Serbian goods, thus triggering a violent reaction by local Serbs which left a Kosovan policeman dead and other international soldiers and policeman wounded.  This led to a series of other violent incidents and the establishment of a system of roadblocks to prevent free movement between the north and the rest of Kosovo. However, the EU eventually succeeded in re-launching the dialogue and through the use of strong leverage on both sides, EU negotiators obtained agreements on customs stamps and on the integrated management of the border crossings and representation of Kosovo in regional cooperation.

After ten rounds of often gruelling talks in the EU-facilitated dialogue, Kosovo and Serbia reached a landmark agreement on 19 April 2013, as the respective prime ministers initialled an agreement aimed at normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo. This agreement titled ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’ is a 15 point document that establishes the parameters for inclusion of northern Kosovo within Pristina’s legal framework, while increasing the degree of autonomy for the four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo. It foresees the creation of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, initially comprising four Serb northern municipalities of Kosovo, while leaving the door open for other Serb-dominated municipalities. The Association/Community will have governing authority over five key areas: economic development, health, education, urban and rural planning. The agreement foresees the dismemberment of the Serbian security structures through their absorption into Kosovo equivalent structures and creation of new local institutions emerging from free and fair elections organised by Kosovo with the help of the OSCE. The last point of the agreement contains a commitment by Kosovo and Serbia not to block each other in their EU integration path.

While the agreement will eventually enable Kosovo’s institutions to establish nominal control in the northern part of the country (through the integration of the existing judicial and security structures into the Kosovan system), certain elements of the agreement will enhance the position of northern Kosovo as a special territory within the country. This is evident in two fields: judiciary and policing.  According to point 9 of the agreement text, there shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic). This imposed changes in the present organisation of the police in Kosovo, thus elevating northern Kosovo to the status of a separate region. Likewise, as regards the organisation of the judiciary, the agreement foresees the establishment of a panel composed of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges by the Appellate Court in Pristina to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. A division of this Appellate Court, composed of both administrative staff and judges will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). In an another attempt to separate northern Kosovo from the rest of the country, including the Serb-dominated municipalities south of Mitrovica, the Serbian government demanded that NATO provides written guarantees the Security Force of Kosovo (KSF), or a future Kosovan army, will not be present in northern Kosovo. This landmark agreement was followed by other agreements on the implementation of the April agreement, especially on the issue of elections, as well as on energy and telecommunications. However, a key momentum in the implementation of the agreement was the 3 November 2013 municipal elections, which would be the first Kosovo election organised through the territory since the new country’s declaration of independence.

Although the April 2013 Agreement has been criticised for not containing the words “citizens” and “rights”, the issue of elections and participation of Serbs in them sparked debates on many citizenship related matters such as voting rights for deportees, ID cards, symbols etc. Whereas Kosovo agreed to allow Serbs to use any (including Serbian) ID cards during the vote, additional technical negotiations were required on the issue of voters residing in Serbia and the design of the ballot papers.  Local Serbs and Serbia insisted that Kosovo’s coat of arms does not appear on the ballot paper for, according to them, it violates the ‘status-neutral’ character of the agreement, thus prompting the Kosovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to redesign ballot papers.  Also, Serbia demanded that all the Serbs that are originally from Kosovo but have moved or been deported to Serbia after the war exercise the right to vote. Although Serbia submitted through the OSCE around 40,000 applications of displaced Kosovo Serbs who wanted to register to vote in Kosovo’s municipal elections, only half were added to the voters’ list before the election. Considering the strategic importance of the participation of northern Serbs, Kosovo’s institutions have pushed the CEC to violate its rules in deciding about various issues, including the ballot papers and voters’ lists.

The November vote, considered a landmark one due to the fact that it was organised throughout the territory of Kosovo for the first time, was characterised by a higher turnout from local Serbs and interruption of voting in three polling stations in North Mitrovica as masked men stormed polling stations. Despite this, the November election, which in the northern part was facilitated by OSCE, was considered “A Positive Step Forward for Democracy in Kosovo” by the EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM, 2013).  Nonetheless, the repeated election in North Mitrovica on the 19 November, and the run off on 1 December 2013, resulted in the election of new Serb mayors and local councils in 10 Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo.

Although these elections represent a milestone in the implementation of the Brussels agreement, it is too early to predict the real effects of the Kosovo-Serbia agreement on the consolidation of Kosovo’s citizenship regime and integration of Serbs from northern Kosovo. The first signs are not very promising though. To begin with, Kosovo authorities and local Serbs failed to agree on the procedures regulating the inaugural sessions of the new Assemblies in the north. After days of intense negotiations mediated by the EU officials in Kosovo and Brussels, the newly elected officials signed the documents endorsing the oath of office only after the Kosovan coat of arms was covered. However, the newly elected mayor of North Mitrovica, KrstimirPantić, refused to sign the document, thus invalidating his mandate. Pantić’s refusal to assume office, which apparently is also related to the inner power-struggle within Serbia’s ruling coalition, means that new elections will be held in North Mitrovica on 23 February, thus prolonging the status quo in the north and postponing the creation of the Association of Serb Municipalities. Tensions rose even higher in mid-January following the assassination of Dimitrije Janićijević, a former mayoral candidate in North Mitrovica from the local Liberal Party, an ethnic Serb party that is part of Kosovo’s Albanian-dominated coalition government. Although there were no arrests after the crime, local officials believe this was part of a backlash by hardliners against an EU-brokered accord to end the country’s ethnic partition.

Despite the fact that the Brussels Agreement and the November election is a first step towards the bridging of differences between Kosovo on the one hand and Kosovo Serbs and Serbia on the other, the process of integration of Serbs into the Kosovan system will require time, good will on all sides and, above all, legal and political clarity. For, although the agreement presupposes that Kosovo’s legal system is supreme in the territory of Kosovo, Serbia’s insistence on the ‘status neutral’ character of the agreement can easily become an insurmountable barrier to the implementation of its provisions. A precedent has been set already with the refusal of Serbs and Serbia to use Kosovan IDs to vote or the Kosovo institutions’ logo on ballot papers because, according to them, it amounts to a claim that Kosovo is a sovereign state, which Serbia continues to reject.  Certainly this leaves an open door to the Kosovan Serbs to oppose various Kosovan legal provisions and institutional decisions, thus leading to a political stalemate and the continuation of the status quo.

Moreover, most of the agreements achieved in Brussels are very abstract and legally ambiguous, thus leaving space for different interpretations by the two parties. Even during the local election campaign in Kosovo, Serbs and Albanians behaved like they weren’t participating in the same elections in one country. Whereas for Kosovo the election was interpreted as a step towards the removal of Serbia’s presence in Kosovo, for local Serbs and Serbia this was seen as a way of legalising and legitimising the already existing local Serb institutions.  As a result, experts of both parties have been engaged in endless discussions about the terms of implementation of these agreements up to the point of de facto renegotiation. Judging from this, one can foresee a new round of extensive and long negotiations on the statute and functioning of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities. To begin with, the agreement uses a dual name for the Association of Serb Municipalities. So, as Marko Prelec from the International Crisis Group points out, while for Serbia it is a Zajednica (union or community) of municipalities, a governing entity newly established by the agreement, for Kosovo it is merely an inter-municipal association like one that already exists to help local governments coordinate and share expertise.

Irrespective of the fact that as a result of the Brussels Agreements Kosovo will be able to establish nominal control over the entire territory of Kosovo, the April 2013 Agreement has de facto created a self-governing sub-state political unit within Kosovo, which despite its legal ties to Kosovo does not recognise it as an independent polity. In addition, the April agreement reinforces the existing asymmetry of rights between Kosovo Serbs from the north and those Serbs living in the other parts of the country, thus creating two separate categories of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. Likewise, Serbia’s heavy involvement in the Kosovo elections through the creation and support of a single Serb list – the ‘Serbian Civic Initiative’, at the expense of other Serb political parties and associations in Kosovo, divided local Serbs even further and undermined democratic competition and pluralism amongst local Serbs in Kosovo.  Moreover, fearing a low turnout in the November 2013 elections, the Serbian institutions coerced local Serbs in Northern Mitrovica to go and vote. This certainly casts doubt on the democratic and free character of these elections.

Last but not least, the fact that the Brussels Agreement was negotiated and agreed without the participation of the local Serbs, who indeed opposed it, risks turning it into a dead paper. Likewise, the failure to address and solve citizenship-related issues such as the right to return, restitution of property, the issue of ID cards, which remain essential for Kosovo’s Serbs, but also for Albanians from the north, risks rendering the agreement a mere symbolic act.

In short, despite its symbolic importance and its effect on Serbia’s EU integration path – the opening of membership negotiations – and  also Kosovo’s – the initiation of the Stabilisation and Association talks - the Brussels Agreement has not answered or solved many crucial issues regarding the issue of sovereignty, citizenship related issues, and most importantly, the integration of local Serbs into the Kosovan society and polity. As the recent debates on the ‘status neutrality’ and Kosovo’s state symbols show, EU’s approach of ‘constructive ambiguity’ in dealing with the Kosovo-Serbia relations, might be sufficient to get the main negotiators, Ashton, Thaçi and Dačić the Nobel Prize, yet fail to solve the Kosovo impasse.

Gëzim Krasniqi holds an MA in Human Rights and Democracy in South East Europe from the Universities of Sarajevo and Bologna and another MA in Nationalism Studies with distinction from the Central European University (Budapest, Hungary). Gëzim is currently undertaking his PhD in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh and also working as a part-time research assistant on the CITSEE research project at the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests are nationalism, nationalist movements and citizenship issues. 

This article was originally published by Citizenship in Southeast Europe and is available by clicking here.

The article North Kosovo: New Reality, Old Problems appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By TransConflict

TransConflict presents an open letter by Edgar Khachatryan, director of Peace Dialogue from Armenia, a member of the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation, addressed to all those individuals and organizations involved in the negotiation process related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

By Edgar Khachatryan

A few hours ago I would not even think of taking this step. However, it was only a few hours ago. It was a few hours ago when I did not fully realize that I could not deal with this situation in the region anymore, when I was simply listening to the news broadcasts through local and international media regarding yet another ceasefire violation.

Only a few hours ago I realized that, perhaps, before I did not have the courage to voice everything that I am going say in the following letter. To be more precise, I simply realized that one day somebody has got to say the things that I am going to say now.

Now I am trying to picture what possible answers I would receive from each of you in case I would have had the chance to address my proposition to each of you personally. I am trying to formulate numerous possible responses that I may receive from you; however I understand that none of those answers can justify the deaths of the Armenian or Azerbaijani young soldiers or the losses and the firearm injury cases among the civilian population.

I am a citizen who is equally sorry for the deaths of all the soldiers. Be sure that I do not see a difference between a widowed woman, a child growing up without a father, or a parent who lost his/her child. I am sure that the pain and the grief of these people know no boundaries or nationalities.

It would be a narrow-mindedness to announce that it is an easy task to do. However, I think that when accepting the positions of the presidents, you were well aware of the difficulty and the responsibility that you were to deal with when taking on the obligations of the first person in your respective countries. Regardless of the circumstances, it is not possible to represent the interests of your own society at the same time ignoring them. Is there any country which has interest in losing its own citizens? Do you believe that the pain of the family that lost a son become bearable in case another family who is considered to be the guilty party loses a son too? We all know very well that the violence can give birth to only new, more intense and more brutal violence.

Therefore I call upon you to be consistent and do everything possible and impossible to end the ceasefire violations. For many years, from numerous platforms, you have announced that there is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and have reassured that you are interested in finding a way of this situation through negotiation process. Well then stop the propaganda prepared for your “domestic” audience and do whatever you have promised to do.

I urge you to show political will and put an end to the continuous bloodshed and the human losses. Stop blaming each other. Do not try to assure me that the bloodshed and the losses are justified and that they serve to some greater ideas. The greatest idea and value is the human life. Do not sacrifice your own citizens just to cover up your own inability in finding a diplomatic solution to the issue.

I call upon all the societies involved in the conflict to give up the militaristic propaganda that has been spread for some political reasons and to be more demanding. Demand from the authorities to take actions in the interest of their nations! No violence and no war is in the interest of any nation.

My dream is not too idealistic and deep in my heart I cherish the hope that there will be people among both my fellow countryman and the Azerbaijani people, as well as among my colleagues or just ordinary citizens who will share my worries and will join my plea.

I would be more than happy if the international organizations supporting the governments of the countries involved in the negotiation process and the people in these countries are able to do everything possible to find a reasonable way out of the situation. I assure you that there is hardly anyone among the citizens who may think that a new war will contribute to the solution of the problem. Therefore I expect equal intolerance towards the existing situation from your side too and specific actions to prevent bloodshed in the region.

Edgar Khachatryan is the director of Peace Dialogue, a member of the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation.

This open letter is addressed to the president of Armenia, Serj Sargsyan, and the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliev, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Ambassadors Igor Popov, Jacques Faure of France, and James Warlick – Andjey Kasperchik, the personal representative of the OSCE CiO, as well as to all the individuals and organizations involved in the negotiation process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The article Nagorno-Karabakh: Time To End Ceasefire Violations – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By OilPrice.com

By Nick Cunningham

Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs firmly stated the central government will take action, “including fiscal measures,” if Kurdistan begins exporting oil without coming to an agreement with Baghdad. The remarks came as Minister Hussain al-Shahristani spoke at a conference in London on January 28. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) announced in mid-January that oil had begun to flow through a pipeline towards Turkey and that exports would officially start by the end of the month.

Shahristani argues that Kurdish oil must be exported through the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), a government-owned entity responsible for marketing Iraq’s oil. He reiterated that oil extracted from any region of Iraq, including Kurdistan, is the “property of the Iraqi people,” meaning that it is owned by the central government.

The tough statement follows similar threats from other Iraqi government officials in recent weeks as the Kurds prepare to export oil to Turkey. On January 17 Iraqi Oil Minister Abdul Kareem Luaibi said Iraq will take legal steps to punish Turkey, Kurdistan, and the international oil companies involved in exporting oil. And on January 12 Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki promised to cut KRG’s share of the national budget if it begins exports without approval from the central government.

The conflict escalated when Baghdad followed through on Maliki’s threat. It released a draft national budget on January 15 that completely cut off funding for Kurdistan, a move meant to put pressure on the KRG to heed the central government’s demands. Kurdish ministers walked out of the cabinet session when the budget was released.

The central government has been angling to prevent Kurdistan from unilaterally exporting oil to Turkey, but that does not mean Baghdad doesn’t want Kurdish oil to flow. Indeed, according to the budget, the central government is requiring 400,000 barrels of oil from Kurdistan to be exported, and any shortfall will be made up by deducting from Kurdistan’s share of national revenues. Kurdistan is entitled to a 17% share of revenues collected as part of Iraq’s revenue sharing arrangement. The KRG argues that those funds are often not delivered.

Yet it also appears that Kurdistan is pushing for much more than merely to export oil on its own terms. Ali Balu, a former head of Iraqi parliament’s oil and gas committee recently stated that within a few years “Kurdistan is going to be rid of its status as a region within Iraq,” according to an article in Rudaw, a Kurdish news web site. Balu went on, “a plan is underway for Kurdistan to be an independent state in the near future.”

Exporting oil from Kurdistan is a key step in the KRG’s plan to eventually declare independence from Iraq. Clearly, Baghdad is not oblivious to this fact, seeing which way the winds are blowing. This is why the central government is so adamant about centralizing the oil export process. Both sides may be unwilling to give in, but the situation appears to be coming to a head, as Kurdistan expects to initiate exports within days.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Iraqi-Government-Threatens-Action-Against-Kurds-as-Oil-Exports-Set-to-Begin.html

The article Iraqi Government Threatens Action Against Kurds As Oil Exports Set To Begin – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Geopolitical Monitor

By Zachary Fillingham

Israel-Egypt border near Eilat, cc Wilson1161The downing of an Egyptian military helicopter on the Sinai Peninsula last week reflects a deepening Islamist insurgency that has become better trained, armed, and funded since the Morsi government was toppled by the army last July.

Five Egyptian soldiers were killed in the attack, which was claimed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) – an extremist group that began with targeting Israeli border patrols in the Sinai back in 2011 before turning against Egyptian security forces after the fall of Morsi. Just days after the helicopter incident, an explosion was reported along a natural gas pipeline in another attack claimed by ABM. This was not the first time the group has targeted energy infrastructure in the area.

One notable feature of ABM is that the group appears to be well-armed. A Russian-made Strela 2 portable surface-to-air missile was used in the Sinai helicopter attack, which points to the presence of sophisticated weaponry from the Libyan war. There have been other indications of Libyan weapons making it to the Sinai recently – most notably in reports of Strela 2s being smuggled to Hamas in Gaza and the Egyptian military’s interception of a massive arms shipment last October – and now we are seeing these weapons being put to use in ways that will surely compound the strategic and political challenges facing the Egyptian military.

Where ABM came from remains a source of considerable disagreement. According to the Egyptian military, the group is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, though the political expedience behind this line of reasoning is fairly obvious. Others believe that ABM maintains close links with Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, which would explain the apparent nod to the Israel-Palestine conflict in its name (Ansar Beit al-Maqdis translates into ‘Champions of Jerusalem’).

Though the group’s backers remain a question at present, the threat posed by ABM is beyond doubt. In addition to last week’s helicopter and pipeline attacks, ABM has been linked to the attempted assassination of Egypt’s interior minister and the string of bomb attacks that shook Cairo on January 24, damaging the Cairo Security Directorate among other government targets. These attacks suggest ABM is expanding beyond its original operating area in the Sinai and it can now execute complex operations in the heart of Egypt.

The geographic challenges posed by the Sinai region make it difficult for the Egyptian army to mount an effective response. For one, at over 60,000 km2 it’s a huge area to police, especially given that the Egyptian military is already stretched thin in its current role as guarantor of Egyptian political stability. The army’s past methods in pacifying the region have also been called into question. During a sweep of the Sinai last year, which actually produced a stark drop in attacks, reports surfaced describing a hard-handed and indiscriminate approach on the part of the Egyptian military.

Morsi garnered a comfortable majority of votes in the Sinai region, as the local population has long complained of its marginalization in the Egyptian political establishment. So when targeted attacks against government forces began to multiply after Morsi’s ouster, it’s not surprising that suspicions towards the local population boiled over in the army. However, this attitude risks building on an already-considerable foundation of grassroots animosity towards the Egyptian state, and in doing so increases the likelihood that Bedouin and other tribesmen will find common ground with the foreign extremists streaming into the area.

The diminishing security outlook in the Sinai poses some regional challenges, particularly for Israel. The landing path for the airport in the Israeli Red Sea resort of Eilat skirts the Sinai Peninsula, leaving commercial liners susceptible to terrorist attacks. There is also a wider threat to Eilat, made glaringly evident on January 21 when two rockets were fired on the city from across the border in Egypt. Such attacks present unique difficulties for Israel, because a direct military response would risk inflaming Egyptian public opinion and in doing so shine the populist spotlight on the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty – a pillar of Israeli security that has thus far survived the ongoing upheavals in Egypt.

Though it may be tempting for the Egyptian military to use ABM attacks as an ongoing justification for the Muslim Brotherhood’s exile from legitimate politics, the Sinai stands alone as its own serious threat to the stability of the Egyptian state. With a military government in Cairo faced with economic breakdown, shifting regional power dynamics, and a population feeling either politically exhausted or totally disenfranchised, there is a risk that a protracted ABM campaign might actually achieve its intended effect and erode the authority of the Egyptian state.

Zachary Fillingham is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com

The article Extremism On The Rise In Egypt’s Sinai – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By American Forces Press Service

Navy Vice Adm. Michael S. Rogers is President Barack Obama’s nominee to become the next commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a DOD news release issued today.

Hagel also announced that he has designated Rogers to serve as director of the National Security Agency, and chief of the Central Security Service, according to the release.

“I am pleased that President Obama has accepted my recommendation to nominate Vice Adm. Michael Rogers as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. And I am delighted to designate him also as Director of the National Security Agency,” Hagel said in a statement issued today. “This is a critical time for the NSA, and Vice Adm. Rogers would bring extraordinary and unique qualifications to this position as the agency continues its vital mission and implements President Obama’s reforms.”

In his statement, Hagel noted that Rogers is “a trained cryptologist” with a Navy career spanning 30 years.

Rogers currently serves as the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command commander and commander of the U.S. 10th Fleet. If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, he will replace Army Gen. Keith B. Alexander, who has served as the NSA director since 2005, and the Cyber Command commander since 2010, the DOD release said.

“As commander of the Navy’s 10th Fleet and U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, he has already demonstrated his leadership and deep expertise in this critical domain,” Hagel said of Rogers. “I am also confident that Adm. Rogers has the wisdom to help balance the demands of security, privacy, and liberty in our digital age.”

Additionally, the release said, Richard Ledgett has been selected to serve as the NSA deputy director. In his new role as the senior civilian at NSA, Ledgett acts at the agency’s chief operating officer. He replaces J. Chris Inglis, who retired from the position in January.

“If confirmed, Vice Adm. Rogers will be joined by an exceptionally able Deputy Director and senior civilian leader, Rick Ledgett, whom I congratulate on his appointment today,” Hagel said in his statement. “Rick brings outstanding qualifications to the job. And I know that both he and Vice Adm. Rogers join me in thanking Gen. Keith Alexander for his remarkable leadership of the NSA and Cyber Command for nearly a decade.”

The article Rogers Tabbed As Next US Cyber Command Chief appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By American Forces Press Service

By Cheryl Pellerin

Poland continues to be an important strategic ally through NATO, in Europe and around the world, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said here today during a joint press conference with his Polish counterpart Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak.

Hagel spent the day with Polish military and government leaders. In each meeting — with Siemoniak and Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski — the secretary emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Poland strategic alliance, noting Poland is a strong U.S. partner and a good friend.

The secretary said he would continue that emphasis tomorrow during meetings with Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

“I want to particularly acknowledge and thank Poland for its contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland was a partner with the United States in both of those wars at great sacrifice,” Hagel said.

“Over the last few years we have opened up a new chapter of friendship, of partnership that dates back to America’s independence, when Poland’s great Gen. Casimir Pulaski volunteered to serve under George Washington,” the secretary added.

Pulaski was so good at leading U.S. troops on horseback that he’s considered the father of American cavalry, Hagel said. Hundreds of U.S. monuments, memorial plaques, streets and parks are named in his honor.

For Hagel, the U.S.-Poland relationship is personal.

“My grandmother’s maiden name was Konkolewski,” he said, “and her parents were married in a little village here in Poland [called Kiszkow] that I will have the occasion to visit tomorrow. This is the location of the rebuilt church where they were married, and the minister gave me copies of the marriage license.”

The United States and Poland, whose defense cooperation is strong and enduring, Hagel said, are bound by culture, history and personal relationships, and by shared interests in peace and security.

Hagel began his first official trip to Poland as defense secretary this morning in a snow-covered urban landscape under cloudy Warsaw skies, in temperatures that a gusty wind dragged into the single digits.

This afternoon he visited Piłsudski Square and its Tomb of the Unknown, which holds the unidentified body of a young soldier who fell during the Defense of Lwów. The battle for control of that city took place in the early 1900s between attacking forces of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and local Polish civilians who were later helped by regular Polish Army forces.

At the tomb the secretary laid a wreath and signed the guest book.

“I am grateful for the opportunity to salute the brave fallen Polish soldiers represented here at this solemn monument,” he wrote, signing the entry “Chuck Hagel.”

Afterward, at the Ministry of National Defense, Hagel met with Siemoniak before the joint press conference.

In his opening statement, the defense minister praised the United States’ decisive role in such historical events as the early years of Poland’s struggle for independence, and Poland’s entry 15 years ago into the NATO alliance.

Siemoniak said Poland is ready for concrete action to modernize its armed forces through the great financial effort that is taken by its citizens and through organizing regional security policy.

“The effectiveness of these actions and our efforts depends on the support and presence of the United States,” Siemoniak added. “There is no thinking about the safety of Poland and this part of Europe in the 21st century without the United States.”

For his part, Hagel noted tangible examples of growing U.S.-Polish military cooperation, including in missile defense, where the United States and Poland continue to work bilaterally and through NATO to respond to ballistic missile threats.

“The United States is firmly committed to deploying a U.S. missile defense system to Poland. We look forward to this system coming online in 2018 as part of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach,” Hagel said.

A second example of cooperation is the groundbreaking joint aviation detachment at Powidz Air Base, where Hagel will travel tomorrow.

There, he said, American and Polish airmen train and work side by side every day. The detachment sends an important defense capability message to U.S. allies and partners, the secretary said, adding, “The message is that the United States remains committed to European and Polish defense.”

It also shows that the United States and its allies are open to new and innovative ways of thinking about how militaries can collaborate and bring more value to single and joint capabilities, Hagel said.

“The United States greatly appreciates Poland inviting us and hosting that detachment,” he added.

The two nations also are working to expand training and exercises through the aviation detachment, including regional partners such as Romania, which is the latest NATO member to acquire F-16 fighter jets.

Because Poland has demonstrated its leadership, willingness and commitment to play a significant leadership role in Central Europe, Hagel said, the U.S.-Poland partnership and the joint action site are particularly important and well suited to future exercises and training opportunities.

These are but a couple of the concrete, tangible expressions of American’s strong security relationship with Poland, the secretary said, and they clearly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Central and Eastern Europe, and they form a foundation to support an enduring partnership with these countries in this region well into the future.

“As Poland explores options for its own missile defense capabilities,” Hagel said, “there is an unmistakable opportunity for us both to forge even closer cooperation in this area, leveraging cutting-edge technology and enhanced NATO capability.”

This, he added, will benefit Poland, the United States and the entire transatlantic alliance.

“The minister and I also discussed today a continuing commitment to supporting Poland’s defense modernization efforts,” the secretary said.

“In an era of fiscal pressures that reside on both sides of the Atlantic,” Hagel added, “this investment is particularly required to move our alliance further, deeper, closer into the 21st century, ultimately allowing both our militaries to collaborate much closer on more findings in the future.”

Following Poland, Hagel will travel to the Munich Security Conference in Germany to participate Saturday with Secretary of State John Kerry in a joint panel and to meet with counterparts and officials from other nations on the sidelines of the conference.

These will include a first meeting with the new German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, British Secretary of State for Defense Philip Hammond, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili, Ukrainian Defense Minister Pavlo Lebedyev and Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon.

The article Hagel Hails Poland As Important Strategic Ally appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By RT

United States Attorney General Eric Holder said Thursday that the Department of Justice will seek the death penalty against Dzhokar Tsarnaev, the 20-year-old ethic Chechen man accused of being involved in last year’s deadly Boston Marathon bombing.

“After consideration of the relevant facts, the applicable regulations and the submissions made by the defendant’s counsel, I have determined that the United States will seek the death penalty in this matter,” Holder said in a brief statement released Thursday afternoon.

No trial is currently set for Tsarnaev, but the attorney general said prosecutors will ask that he be sentenced to die if he’s found guilty of using a weapon of mass destruction.

“The nature of the conduct at issue and the resultant harm compel this decision,” Holder said in a statement released Thursday.

In an official Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty filed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on Thursday, US attorney Carmen Ortiz wrote that Tsarnaev is worthy of execution because he intentionally killed, inflicted serious bodily injury and participated in acts that resulted in death.

“Tsarnaev intentionally and specifically engaged in acts of violence,” Ortiz wrote at one point, “knowing that the acts created a grave risk of death to a person or persons, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that the participation in the acts constituted a reckless disregard for human life.”

Ortiz added that Tsarnaev “betrayed his allegiance to the United States” by killing and maiming US citizens after receiving asylum, encouraged others to commit acts of violence and has shown no remorse for his alleged crimes.

Along with his late brother, Tamerlan, Tsarnaev is accused of carrying out an attack at the annual foot race last April that left three people dead and more than 260 others wounded. Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 26, died in a shoot-out with police days after the tragedy before his younger brother was apprehended.

In all, Dzhokar Tsarnaev has been charged with 30 federal counts regarding his alleged role in the attack.

The article Tsarnaev To Face Death Penalty In Boston Bombing Case appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Observer Research Foundation

By Nidhi Sinha

The situation in Ukraine has deteriorated sharply with violence marring the anti-government protests. Opposition activists claimed that five people were killed in clashes, while government has acknowledged the death of two and a police officer.

The sudden deterioration has led to Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s first president after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to warn that the country was on the “brink of civil war” while asking the parliament (Verkhovna Rada)to “act with great responsibility”. Political forces in Ukraine are engaged in talks aimed at diffusing the situation. As part of the compromise measures outlined by President Viktor Yanukovych, the Parliament (Rada) is debating an amnesty for protestors arrested during the agitation.

In the last week, 10 of the 27 regional governments have been overturned and government buildings taken over by the protesters in a direct challenge to the President’s authority. President Yanukovych’s supporters have termed these as violations of law and claim external support is being provided to the protesters.

The sticking points for a final compromise are, however, Yanukovych’s insistence that the protestors immediately leave their current camps in Kiev and elsewhere, while the opposition maintains that the barricades will be pulled down only when the President steps down, announcing early parliamentary and presidential elections.

These waves of demonstrations started in November last year after Yanukovych decided not to sign the association agreement with European Union. This, followed by acceptance of the Russian $15 billion economic bailout package coupled with lowering of prices for natural gas supplies, created the public perception that Ukraine was moving away from the EU towards the Moscow-promoted Eurasian Union.

The Ukrainian government justified the decision on economic grounds, arguing that the Russian offer was more beneficial to Ukraine than whatever the EU had offered, because the Russians did not impose any conditions similar to the IMF conditions embedded in the EU financial offer. Additionally, there were fears that the EU insistence on elimination of tariffs and monopolies would lead to the decimation of Ukrainian manufacturing, which would buckle in the competition with more efficient European producers.

Ukraine has a population of around 45 million and current GDP of 176 billion US$. In 2012, 26 per cent (about $17.6 billion) of its exports went to Russia and 25 per cent to EU. Ukraine is also a key transit route for Russian energy supplies to Europe.

Ukraine, juxtaposed between the East and the West, has been trying to work out its internal cleavages. The 2004 “Orange revolution” in protest against a rigged presidential election is a reminder of the political divisions present in Ukraine. The Western part tilts towards Europe and the Southern and Eastern parts historically feel much closer to Russia.

There have been fears expressed that if the situation in Ukraine worsens, it could spread across the border to Russia. While that appears highly unlikely at present, an escalation of the confrontation raises the spectre of a civil war in Ukraine. Even if the political elites are able to arrive at a compromise, the government will still be faced with choices – EU or Russia – that could lead to the division of the country.

It was not surprising, therefore, that Ukraine was at the centre of the recent EU-Russia summit in Brussels. If Ukraine is to avoid a division, it is important that Russia and EU agree on reconciling their differing perceptions about Ukraine’s future. Russia has declared that it is going to maintain a $15 billion loan to Ukraine even if the opposition came to power, but it is going to wait for the new government before releasing more aid.

Whichever government emerges in Ukraine, it would have to first deal with the economic crisis afflicting the country. Ukraine is Europe’s second poorest country with a state debt of about $73 billion, of which about $37 billion is foreign debt.

Considering that both Russia and EU are competing within the Ukraine space, the best way forward for Ukraine would be to strike out a deal with both the East and the West. It cannot afford to accept one-sided deals that provide only partial economic improvement while being a pawn in the geo-strategic designs of major powers as this in the long run will lead to splintering of the country.

(The writer is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

The article Ukraine: Heading Towards Civil War? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Joel S. Hirschhorn

There are times when hatred is a needed, logical and moral stance to take.  Evil, injustice and corruption are fine examples of what to appropriately hate.  For the overwhelming majority of people it is now rational to hate the super rich, notably the thousands of billionaires holding most of the world’s wealth and wielding power over political and economic systems.  They have been successfully raping the global economy and while doing that have kept increasing their wealth as well as economic inequality afflicting ordinary people.  One dollar, one vote describes the new reality.

Before discussing some basic reasons to hate the super rich consider some facts about them.

How many billionaires are there?  According to the inaugural Wealth-X and UBS Billionaire Census 2013, the global billionaire population reached a record 2,170 individuals in 2013, with a combined net worth of $6.5 trillion.  What happened after the most recent global economic meltdown?  Some 810 individuals became billionaires since the 2009 global financial crisis.  In other words, plain millionaires moved up to billionaire status.

But the super rich include many more than the billionaires, because the top one percent on the economic scale have monster size wealth, according to a new report Working for the Few.  The one percent of the richest people in the world have $110 trillion.  That equates to some 65 times the total wealth of the bottom half of the world’s population.  But among the millions of the top one percent, the richest 85 people, true billionaires, have wealth equal to the bottom half of the world’s population.  As to the US, the wealthiest one percent captured 95 percent of post-financial crisis growth since 2009, while the bottom 90 percent became poorer.  That leaves 9 percent, about 30 million Americans, in the upper class that did very well as they strive to make it into the top one percent.

When people talk about economic, wealth or income inequality they are really talking about the incredibly small fraction of the richest people relative to the larger population that still are not sharing in the global jackpot, no matter how hard they work.  Inequality means that money is not being fairly distributed.  There have been times in history when prosperity was shared, as in the several decades after World War II.

No surprise that only 7 percent of Americans, according to a Gallup report, currently feel “very satisfied” with our nation’s distribution of income and wealth.  Similarly, a new NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that 81 percent of Americans believe the economy is working very or fairly well for the wealthy, compared to 22 percent for the middle class.

Why hate the super rich and the rising economic inequality that benefits them?

This distorted economic system means that democracy is more delusional than real.  Consider this: Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said, “We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of the few, but we cannot have both.”  Truly wise words.

The near total lack of public confidence in Congress, both major political parties and the whole political system by Americans goes hand-in-hand with the perverted economic system.  You have every right to hate the super rich because for a long time in many visible and invisible ways they have intentionally manipulated the political system to create and maintain the unjust economic system.  Their economic power gives them political power.  Rather than one person one vote, think in terms of one dollar one vote.

Hate the super rich because their degree of wealth and power is obscene.

Hate the super rich because they persecute the vast majority of people worldwide.  Some of the super rich play up their charitable activities, but that does not negate all the evil consequences of economic inequality on the daily lives of billions of people.

Hate the super rich because their greed is ungodly.  If true democracy is to be restored, then Americans need to be much more than dissatisfied.  They need to get more emotional.  They need to hate.  Then they must convert that hatred into political demands and actions.

Contact Joel S. Hirschhorn through http://articlev.wix.com/statusquobuster.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

The article Hate The Super Rich – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By MINA

A 4,000-year-old clay tablet from ancient Mesopotamia revealing details of the ark before Noah was on Thursday displayed at the British Museum in London.

Dr Irving Finkel, an expert on ancient Mesopotamian and cuneiform script with the British Museum, said the clay tablet was “one of the most important human documents ever discovered.”

Finkel recently deciphered the tablet which is light brown in color and about the size of a smartphone.

According to the language on the tablet, the boat was a round vessel, and the surface area would have been 3,600 square meters, with walls six meters high. The walls would then have been coated with bitumen.

“It was gigantic, it works out at about two thirds of a football pitch,” said Finkel.

“It would have been ideal, it would never sink and it would be a light boat to save all the animals,” he added.

This was a giant version of a craft which the Babylonians knew very well, Finkel pointed out, in daily use up to the late 20th century to transport people and animals across rivers.

Finkel said he was “107 percent certain” that the ark described in the tablet had never been built.

He said the cuneiform text was written in about 1750 BC, and is part of a much longer Babylonian story about the flood and what led up to it, also known from the Book of Genesis in the Bible which was written much later.

Later in the year, there will be a television documentary inspired by the discovery of the tablet, showing workers attempting to build it from the instructions on the tablet.

The article 4,000-Year-Old Tablet Reveals Details Of Ark Before Noah appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By MINA

Turkey’s armed forces have attacked a convoy of al-Qaeda-linked rebel vehicles in Syria, Turkish media reported.

The attack on Tuesday evening was in retaliation for cross-border fire earlier in the day, when a mortar shell fired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during clashes with the Free Syrian Army landed on Turkish territory.

A pickup truck, a lorry and a bus were destroyed in the attack. There were no reports of casualties.

The article Turkey Attacks Al Qaeda ‘Rebels’ In Syria appeared first on Eurasia Review.