The Upper Egypt court sentenced 529 supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to death on Monday on charges of murdering the deputy commander of the Matay district police station in Minya during riots in the aftermath of the dispersal of the Rabaa sit-in in August, Ahram Online reported.

“The court has decided to sentence to death 529 defendants and 16 were acquitted,” lawyer Ahmed al-Sharif told Reuters. The ruling can be appealed.

The court also acquitted 16 other defendants.

Only 123 of the defendants were present. The rest were either released, out on bail or on the run, Al Jazeera reported.
The sentence has been handed to the Mufti, who issues legal opinions and edicts, to approve a death sentence, Egyptian state television reported, according to Al Jazeera.

The ruling can be appealed.

Original article

Now that Crimea has decided to unite with Russia and Russians have welcomed Crimea’s move with happy hearts, the Western half of the world, especially USA and European Union, are talking at length about imposing sanctions on Russia in order to bring Vladimir Putin to his senses. However, the task seems easier said than done — Uncle Sam is simply not in a position to impose long-term sanctions on Russia.

Economic and political ties between the United States and Russia are surely not exemplary. Yet, one key American industry relies heavily on a particular import from Russia: fuel for nuclear power plants.

Nuclear Metabolism

American dependency on Russia for its nuclear fuel is not a new concept. It dates back to the early 1990s, when the HEU-LEU scheme was launched after the demise of the Soviet Union. Under this scheme, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Russian nuclear warheads is processed into Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for USA’s nuclear power plants.

While there are plans of reducing the need for nuclear energy, United States still receives 100 GW of its power from nuclear sources (compare this with Russia’s nuclear energy production of 230 GW). As a result, in 2014 itself, 48 million pounds of Uranium will be needed to satiate American nuclear power plants. Going by the data released by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the total Uranium Oxide produced within the United States is roughly 4.8 million pounds — yes, barely 10% of the total demand.

Quite obviously, this is not a new trend. Back in 2012 as well, USA had to purchase over 80% of its nuclear fuel from foreign sources.

Relying on Russia

Acquisition of Uranium (ore and/or concentrate) is just one side of the story. The bigger task is the conversion of the acquired Uranium into usable nuclear fuel — a process popularly known as ‘enrichment’.

As of now, nuclear enrichment is the responsibility of private firms in the USA. However, among all such private firms, the American ones constitute no more than 20%. Foreign enrichment facilities constitute the rest: European firms and work units undertake approximately 35% of the total enrichment task, and the remainder lies in the hands of Russian enterprises.

In simple words, there are not many “home” enrichment facilities in the USA, and nuclear enrichment is accomplished primarily with the help of foreign facilities such as those from Europe and Russia.

Therefore, even though the HEU-LEU scheme ended recently, USA is keen on extending its lifespan by means of renewal. The real details of the renewed HEU-LEU scheme remain to be seen. But by all means, it is highly doubtful that American dependency on Russian help will come to an end, especially because the capacity of America’s own enrichment facilities is limited, as per the data from World Nuclear Association. With Uranium supplier USEC planning to file for bankruptcy, the role of foreign facilities in general and Russian facilities in particular will rise manifolds.

Conclusion

If sanctions are imposed on Russia, USA might choose to make up for the missing nuclear imports and enrichment services from Russia by increasing the amount it imports from rest of the world; but even that will help only in parts.

In a nutshell, when it comes to nuclear energy, America will have a hard time finding an alternative to Russian help. Thus, while European Union can indeed deliver on its promise of imposing sanctions against Russia, United States of America cannot do so, simply because if mutual sanctions were to come into effect, the primary loser will be America’s own nuclear industry.

he West is stuck in reactive mode to what it perceives as a Crimean crisis; it needs instead to prepare for a strategic competition with Russia of unforeseeable duration for influence over Ukraine.

By David B. Kanin

A reporter on France 24 recently asked Anne Brasseur, Chair of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, why Russian President Putin made his grab for Crimea.  She said she did not know and then pronounced standard pieties.[1] Ms. Brasseur is not the only voice in the West either to express uncertainty at why Putin is behaving as he is, insist he has made a big mistake, or both.  This narrative, which likely just covers the sense of surprise and weakness over a move by Moscow the West cannot reverse, is based on the teleological notion that armed enforcement of national security interests not sanctioned by the Western “International Community” just is not done.  It is, of course; Russia’s actions make sense in a traditional conceptual context.

What does Russia want – and will Russia get it?

There are two issues involved in the Ukrainian dynamic.  The first partly involves Putin’s carefully honed image as a virile potentate.  He has been either President or Prime Minister for a while now, and he is not the first long-serving ruler to feel the ground shift under his feet as some of his subjects/constituents tire of his act.  (I would like to be a fly on the wall if ever Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan get into a discussion of power and frustration).

There is much more involved in recent events than the Russian president’s personal legitimacy, however.  As I have noted on this site before, if Moscow irrevocably loses influence in Ukraine Russia will have had its power pushed farther east since the time of Catherine the Great and Potemkin.  This catastrophe would happen on the watch of a man whose reputation depends on an image of strong leadership and personal virility, but Putin is not the only Russian who genuinely believe this would be an unacceptable result of hostile and purposeful planning – and rhetorical hypocrisy – coming from the West.

The second issue is the Ukrainian variant of the creeping failure of representative democracy that has become evident since the global financial crisis of 2008 but actually started a bit earlier.  Current problems with the democratic narrative resemble somewhat conditions in the 1930s, when political bosses and economic elites could not make decisions or adapt to economic emergency.  The main difference now is the lack of what in the earlier period appeared to be vibrant and attractive alternatives to the tired democracies in Fascism and Communism.  Today, each autocrat or patronage boss chooses his or her combination of democratic forms, family- or crony-based economic networking, and public relations to cobble together a system of power and privilege.

Sometimes, as in Egypt, Bahrain, or other Middle Eastern states outside of Tunisia, this has involved the failure to establish a functioning democratic system.  In much of southeastern Europe (to include EU members Romania and Bulgaria, as well, as various shards of former Yugoslavia), it has been marked by the perverse morphing of democratic forms into covers for kleptocratic structure.  In Bangladesh and Thailand it has highlighted dueling oligarchies (what will “democracy” in Myanmar look like as the generals, Aung San Suu Kyi, and their Burman-based system make deals with Kachin and Shan minorities, but de-legitimize the Muslim Rohingya?)

Ukraine’s stumbling system combines Russian-style business oligarchism with southeast European Potemkin democracy.  The heroes of 2004’s Orange Revolution proved to be just as incompetent and prone to corruption as the pro-Soviet/Russian group they overthrew.  The fact that pro-Western politicians lost legitimacy and the last election lends credibility to Russians’ and others’ belief that hypocritical Westerners orchestrated a coup against a freely elected government that had done nothing wrong except to reject conditions Brussels put on financial assistance.  The decision by the current heroes in Kyiv to enable local oligarchs to maintain power in Kharkiv and Donetsk is an important red flag [2] - such “temporary” arrangements often become permanent and could undermine the new government’s popular appeal.

These issues provide the backdrop for a long-term tug-of-war.  Russia’s seizure of Crimea is only the latest round in an intense competition with the West over Ukraine’s physical space, strategic orientation, and economic affiliation going on since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.  Putin and his advisors almost certainly are aware that Crimea was a low-hanging fruit.  They will have a much greater problem restoring Russia’s hegemony over the rest of Ukraine.  For that reason, more than minor further Russian military action is unlikely for now – Moscow knows it would face resistance even in the Donbas in case of a bald-faced kinetic attack.

For this reason, the Ukrainian tussle likely will settle into a classic cold war-style struggle for influence between Western and Russian acolytes, moneymen, propagandists, and various local interests.  The poor performance of the “good guys” after 2004 should give us pause – there is no guarantee that the champions of representative democracy are going to perform better going forward than they have so far.

Comparisons with the Balkans – a digression

The sudden return of Crimea to Russia’s bosom has sparked occasional efforts to draw parallels with what happened to former Yugoslavia after 1990.  In my view, most of these are not very useful.  The Balkans is a peripheral region (in geo-strategic terms) with a history of sucking in great powers who make the mistake of betting too much on winning local contests and gaining points in larger rivalries.  Whether after 1815, before World War I, or in the wake of the collapse of Communism, these unwary outsiders have found themselves either in a bigger conflict than they expected or else responsible for local clients who have lightened the big powers’ purses and manipulated their sense of self-importance.

Make no mistake – since the days of the Teutonic Knights, the Polish Commonwealth, Ottoman power, and such forgotten concepts as “Livonia,” Ukraine has had the misfortune of being a central stake in much bigger games.  Location is part of the reason for this, along with the critical fact that communications and movement of people, goods, and services in this region is much easier than in the Balkans.  The people now called “Ukrainians” have had more room to move but much less in which to maneuver than the peoples living in southeastern Europe.

Also, during the first few years of Yugoslavia’s collapse Russia, a power critical to European stability, was at least as much the West’s partner as its adversary.  Regarding Ukraine, that clearly is not the case.

Forced comparisons between Kosova’s contested independence and Russia’s decisive seize of Crimea are, at best, facile.  The Kosova imbroglio involves the effort of a 90 percent Kosovar majority to escape efforts by Belgrade to reimpose a repressive regime invoked from Belgrade after 1913 (not 1389), lifted by Tito in 1974, and slapped back in place by Milosevic after 1987.  Kosova’s rejection so far by five EU members creates a huge obstacle to the fragile state’s long-term prospects.  On the other hand, Russia’s quick, decisive embrace of Crimea makes international rejection of this coup de main irrelevant.

Nevertheless, two minor analogies do deserve mention.  First Russia’s seizure of Crimea serves somewhat the same purpose as its dash to the airport in Pristina in 1999.  Moscow had noticed how, during the Bosnian war a few years earlier, France had used its control over the airport in Sarajevo to maximize its influence over local events.  The Russians did not want to be shunted aside by a triumphal NATO, and used their presence in Pristina to maintain at least some influence during the immediate post-bombing (and, subsequently, post-Milosevic) era.  In this context, it is important to understand that Moscow is counting on the West to refuse to recognize its absorption of Crimea – this will enable Russia to act like a hostage taker and involve itself in negotiations over the rest of Ukraine something like a kidnapper involves him- or herself with a hostage’s family.  In a sense, Western acceptance of Russian sovereignty in Crimea could actually weaken Moscow’s larger strategic position – but only if it took place in the context of muscular Western assertion of dominance in the rest of Ukraine.

Second, the effort of Crimea-less Ukraine to maintain long-term Western attention to its effort to escape Russia’s embrace might come to resemble the strategy used by Milo Djukanovic, Montenegro’s Big Man, after 1996.  Djukanovic made the mistake of believing Milosevic would lose power after he botched local elections in Serbia.  When he did not, Djukanovic had to assume the identity of a liberal democrat and find a way of convince the West to support the independence for a small physical space that was (and is) largely his personal fiefdom.  In part, he did this by provoking a series of minor armed skirmishes with Serbian forces at the airport in Podgorica and along the border with Serbia.  Expectations of possible Russian military movements into Ukraine should not blind Western observers to the possibility Ukrainian decision-makers might eventually attempt to provoke the Russian military, especially if over time Western attention to Ukraine begins to wane.

The West’s response should be a marathon, not a sprint

Putin has played one of two cards he has – local military superiority.  Whether he plays the energy card depends on what happens next.  In any case, an effective Western response depends in whether Washington and European capitals can agree to establish and stay a course that can erode Moscow’s advantages over time.

There is little evidence so far of such resolve on either side of the Atlantic.  Strategists on all sides know the Europeans have no stomach for a renewed economic and strategic East-West conflict.  Meanwhile, while the Russians greatly overestimate America’s ability to conceive and implement complex and hostile plots, the Europeans doubt Washington’s attention span and have seen little indication strategic thinking is America’s strong suit.

The immediate problem is that the West is stuck in reactive mode to what it perceives as an immediate Crimean crisis; it needs instead to prepare for a strategic a competition with Russia of unforeseeable duration for influence over Ukraine.  The crisis mentality is reflected in the focus on sanctions – over time, European private actors and governments will evade such punishments for the sake of economic interests and the EU’s ideological and emotional devotion to dialogue.  Washington, meanwhile, knows it needs to work with Moscow in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere.  The West needs a plan to calibrate its residual attention to Ukraine (and re-Russianized Crimea) when Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, or Korea once again take over American headlines, or when problems outside the Ukrainian space remind the Europeans of their diminishing global clout.

The longer-term ideological and practical issue is that the West needs to encase its approach to Ukraine inside a strategy designed to repair the damage done to the efficacy of representative democracy.  As things stand, it is not clear the American democracy can make decisions or whether the EU is a democracy at all.  Notables in the former Soviet space, Eastern Europe, and farther afield have learned how to absorb Western political and rhetorical forms into their autocratic and patronage-based structures.

The West has considerable economic and cultural weapons it can use to resist Russian efforts to re-absorb Ukraine – even if it cannot push the Russians back to its 18^th century borders it might be able to negate the advances Stalin made in 1945.  But this will be possible only if the Americans and Europeans can conceive and implement policies that restore their domestic functionality and strategic credibility.  The first step is to recognize that sanctions are just a stop-gap, that Crimea is lost, but that the rest of Ukraine can be won if – unlike after 2004 – local friends of the West treat their constituents honestly, manage the country competently, and prove they are capable of doing more than making noise in the streets.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Footnotes:

1) I saw this interview on the morning of 8 March.

2) Maria Danilova, “Ukrainian Oligarchs get Key Posts in Bid for Unity,” Associated Press, March 7, 2014.

By Srikanth Kondapalli

The Ukrainian political crisis, like the earlier crises in Egypt, Libya and Syria, is proving to be a nightmare for China, despite Beijing’s maintenance of a calm stance on the surface. The referendum in Crimea is potentially applicable to Taiwan and Tibet. While the attempted 2004 and 2008 plans for referenda in Taiwan failed as it could not muster the required 50 per cent voter turnout, Beijing was palpably upset over the move. China is also wary of the Dalai Lama’s November 2007 statement that suggested a referendum for a decision over the future set up of the Tibetan leadership.

Given the impact of such a position on its minimalist foreign policy goals (such as the referendum issue over Taiwan and Tibet) and its maximalist goals (such as the rise of China, trade, conventional weapons import, nuclear agreement, etc), China is attempting a walk on the razor’s edge Hence, Beijing abstained from the UN Security Council draft resolution of March 16, 2014, proposed by the western countries and vetoed by Moscow, while calling for respecting “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The Ukrainian crisis also upsets the Chinese applecart – which it had assiduously built with Kiev since 1992. China and Ukraine have cobbled up a “strategic partnership” since 2011, and have mutually beneficial relations in trade, investments, conventional weapons transfer, and even a nuclear security agreement since December 2013. The $10 billion Beijing-Kiev bilateral trade is largely in favour of the former (with $7 billion in exports). Furthermore, apart from the construction of Kiev airport light rail and a power station, China plans to provide an estimated $8 to 10 billion in aid to the (compared to the $15 billion bail-out promised by the EU) in addition to developing over 7 million acres of land in eastern Ukraine.

In the light of the Western arms embargo on China following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Ukrainian military exports to China proved crucial. These include turbofan engines, tankers, amphibious landing craft, gas turbines, diesel engines, self-propelled guns and even an aircraft carrier (Varyag, renamed Liaoning following refurbishment). These could be in jeopardy after the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, who visited China several times. During Yanukovych’s December 2013 visit, both sides approved a “Strategic Partnership Development Plan” for a four-year period from 2014-2018. Significantly, both signed an agreement according to which China will “provide Ukraine nuclear security guarantee when Ukraine encounters an invasion involving nuclear weapons or Ukraine is under threat of a nuclear invasion.”

China is wary of an impact of the “coloured revolutions” on its domestic political situation, as well as in Xinjiang and Tibet. It had expressed concerns over the spread of Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003, Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004-2005 and Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution” in 2005. China and Russia countered the West-sponsored UN human rights criticism of the “saffron revolution” in Myanmar in 2007.

Working with Russia proved to be beneficial to China in military technology transfers, trade, coordination at the UN, space in Central Asia (via the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and in its “pivot” to the West through the silk route to Europe. China – a major beneficiary of the West in terms of trade and technology – is also attempting to partner with the NATO which has made a presence on its western border with Afghanistan post the 9/11 attacks.

Since 2002, China had been engaging the NATO on counter-terrorism, piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and crisis management. This indicates that in the backdrop of the crisis in Ukraine, China is attempting a balancing act between Russia and the US/EU, even as expands its influence.

This balancing act means that China does not want to alienate Russia with whom it signed a “strategic partnership” in 2001 and interacts extensively on the international and regional order issues at the UN and in the multilateral institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS, etc. China needs Russia for military technology as well as to counter the US “rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.” Russia’s “pivot” towards Ukraine could also provide China with strategic opportunities in the Asia-Pacific, Africa and South America.

This not the first time China is performing the balancing act between Russia and the West. For instance, in the backdrop of Russia’s military response towards Georgia over the Abkhazia and South Ossetia issues, at the August 2008 SCO Dushanbe Summit, it decried the “use of armed force to resolve problems” and called for “respect of the basic tenets of international law.” It also stated that “not long ago, the members of this organization expressed deep concern about tensions generated in the situation surrounding South Ossetia, and called upon each relevant party to resolve peacefully current problems through dialogue.”

This indicates that without being explicit in its criticism of Russia, China has been conducting its foreign policy with caution and pragmatism, while also protecting its domestic interests.

Srikanth Kondapalli
Professor, Chinese Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Analysts have two contrary views regarding growth of Islamic banking in Pakistan. While some say that the growth has been substantial others still believe the progress has been far below the potential. The third point of view is that that the government, regulators and players have been striving hard and the outcome depends on how the public at large responds. Yet another point of view is that whatever Pakistan has achieved in a decade others took much longer time in achieving these milestones.

Some critics say the decision of the government to allow operation of conventional and Islamic banking run in parallel in a country where Muslims are in majority was imprudent. However, they tend to ignore the harsh reality that Pakistan can’t live in isolation and the country has to align itself to the global financial system, which is predominantly not compliant to Shariah covenants. Therefore, allowing the two systems run in parallel was need of the time but sooner than later the entire domestic system has to be made fully Shariah compliant, simply because Riba is not permissible in Islam. However, Pakistan will have to remain part of conventional banking, even if it don’t desire.

While it may be true that the growth of Islamic banking in Pakistan has been substantial because the country has benefited from other countries, it is also a fact that the Shariah Scholars from Pakistan are playing a leading role in developing Shariah compliant asset and liability products around the globe. In fact Pakistan has been helping some of the central banks of other Muslim countries as well as the entrepreneurs in making their banking Shariah compliant. Not only the contribution of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has been enormous, Meezan Bank has also become a role model for those who wish to make their banking system Shariah compliant.

However, it is necessary to remind all that the debate regarding definition of Riba still going on in Pakistan seems an effort to create doubts about the system. The concept of Riba was fully defined and its elimination from business is obligatory for each Muslim. The debate that some of the products are still not fully Shariah compliant seems irrelevant because it is the collective responsibility of all the segment of the society to work for the common objective of elimination of Riba from the economy of Pakistan. However, it is necessary to point out that Shariah Scholars and practitioners must also change their mindset and accept the criticism as an endeavor to eliminate short comings which are being highlighted.

According to Shariah ‘debt is not tradable’ but Sukuk, especially Sovereign Ijarah Sukuk issued by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) have been structured in such a way that it allows the government to mobilize fund, subscribers to earn Shariah compliant income and above all facilitate Islamic banks to manage their liquidity as well as meet statutory liquidity requirement stipulated by the central bank of Pakistan. However, an area that needs special focus is recovery of funds when an issuer commits default. This has happened in Pakistan in the past and effective solutions or arrangements have to be made to ensure that no issuer commits default.

Though, some of the practitioners and even the regulars may be shy in admitting that the Sukuk issued by Maple Leaf Cement suffered from some structural shortcomings, but it is a fact that Shariah scholars never doubted the intention of issuer. It was strongly believed that issuer will not commit a default deliberately but situation turned real odd for Shariah Scholars, banks and even the investors. It is believed that all the stakeholders have learnt a lesson from this default and adequate precautionary measures are being taken in the Sukuks issued subsequently.

Pakistan needs billions of dollars to revamp its energy sector, especially for the construction of hydroelectricity units to overcome its electricity shortfall. The added advantage will be substantial reduction in cost of generation that can pave way for reduction in tariff. While some of the stakeholders are ready to go ahead the only concern is billions of rupees accounts receivables, massive corruption in state owned distribution companies. K-Electric (formally Karachi Electric Supply Company) has taken advantage of available liquidity by floating Sukuk and all eyes are set on it. It has to be monitored microscopically to avoid default, else Pakistan will never be able to float dollar denominated Sukuk. The GoP must also realize that investors are fully cognizant of investment opportunities in energy sector but are abstaining only because they don’t have faith in the system.

It is also necessary to pinpoint that focus of Islamic banks has remained in urban areas and corporate sector. Islamic banks will have to go extra miles to create supporting infrastructure for lending to SMEs and farmers. Growers need billions of rupees to improve production and productivity. Lending to farmers is also part of GoP’s key objective of achieving food security. It is also necessary to bring it to the notice of Islamic banks that nearly 40 percent of agriculture produce goes stale before reaching the market. It on one hand deprives the farmers from legitimate return and on the other hand deprives the country from earning extra foreign exchange by exporting surplus produce.

Islamic banks should especially focus on construction of modern warehousing and logistic facilities. In fact banks can construct their own warehouses and facilitate in storage and selling of the produce particularly food grains and oil seeds. Enhancing production of edible oil in Pakistan can save US$ 2 billion currently being spent on import. Islamic banks must develop the skill to ‘thinks out of book’ and reap healthy return.

By Ajit Kumar Singh

With less than a fortnight to go for the all important Presidential Elections scheduled to be held on April 5, 2014, a wave of terror strikes has enveloped the length and breadth of Afghanistan. In the most recent of major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities) at least nine persons, including four foreigners and five Afghans (including two children and two women), were shot dead by Taliban terrorists inside the luxurious Serena Hotel complex in national capital Kabul, in the night of March 20, 2014. The attackers managed to smuggle pistols past security checkpoints and then hid in a bathroom, eventually springing out and opening fire on guests and hotel guards. All the four terrorists were killed in the subsequent operation by the Security Forces (SFs). The attack took place despite recent security reports rating Serena Hotel, guarded round the clock by dozens of security guards armed with assault weapons, among the highest-risk locales in the city. The hotel is frequented by foreign officials and the Afghan elite.

In another incident earlier in the day, Taliban terrorists killed at least 11 people, including the Police Chief of Jalalabad District, and wounded another 22, in a suicide bomb attack and gun battle at a Police Station in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar Province. The assault began with two explosions just before dawn targeting the Police Station and a nearby square, close to compounds used by international organizations, including the United Nations. The initial attack was carried out by two suicide bombers, one of them driving a three-wheeler vehicle. Afghan SF personnel, with the help of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helicopter gunships, launched retaliatory fire. The ensuing gun battle lasted for over three hours, at the end of which six Taliban terrorists, all of them wearing suicide vests, were killed.

On March 18, 2014, a suicide bomber riding a rickshaw blew himself up outside a checkpoint near a market in Maymana, the capital of Faryab Province, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring another 46. The explosion took place some 200 metres away from the Provincial Governor’s residential compound.

On January 17, 2014, at least 21 persons, including 13 foreigners and eight Afghans, were killed in a suicide bombing by the Taliban, at a Lebanese restaurant, Taverna Du Liban, in Kabul. Wabel Abdallah, the International Monetary Fund’s Resident Representative in Afghanistan, was among the dead. Three attackers were also killed. The restaurant, popular among foreigners and wealthy locals, is located in an area that houses several diplomatic missions.

According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management’s (ICM’s) South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since the beginning of 2014, a total of 682 persons, including 141 civilians, 101 SF personnel and 440 terrorists, have been killed in terrorism-related incidents across Afghanistan (data till March 23, 2014). The country has recorded at least 45 major incidents in 321 deaths during this period. More worryingly, 21 out of these 45 incidents were suicide attacks, accounting for 132 killings.

Violence recorded a significant escalation through 2013. SATP data indicates that at least 6,363 fatalities were recorded through 2012, including of 2,754 civilians, 893 SF personnel and 2,716 terrorists, rising to 7,074 fatalities in 2013, including 2,959 civilians, 1,413 SF personnel and 2,702 terrorists – an increase of 11.17 percent in overall fatalities.

More worryingly, civilians continued to face the brunt, with civilian fatalities increasing by 7.44 percent in 2013. According to United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the number of civilians killed through 2013 surpassed civilian fatalities in all the previous years since the beginning of war in 2001, barring 2011, when the civilian fatalities stood at 3,021. UNAMA, however, started compiling data only from 2007, in which year 1,523 civilian deaths were documented across Afghanistan.

Other parameters of violence, includng suicide attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks also witnessed an increase in 2013, as compared to the previous year. As against 101 suicide attacks in 2012, year 2013 recorded 107 such attacks, according to UNAMA. 73 of 107 suicide attacks in 2013 targeted civilians, killing 255. Throughout 2013, the use of IEDs remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. 962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injuries occurred in 2013 due to IED explosions, as compared to 868 civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries in 2012.

Indeed, varying media sources estimate that the Taliban, which lost power in 2001 as the US and its allies launched Operation Enduring Freedom in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, has regrouped and now dominates an estimated 40 to 60 per cent of Afghanistan.

More than 50,000 ISAF combat troops who are still in Afghanistan are due to leave by the end of the year. Afghan Forces now control almost 93 per cent of their territory and lead 97 per cent of all security operations across the country. They are also responsible for over 90 per cent of their own training activities. Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) troops have demonstrated their capabilities in a number of successful operations, but difficulties persist, as is evident in the failure to stall the rise in violence. US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, thus told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 11, 2014, that, on the battlefield, Afghan Forces often score tactical victories against Taliban insurgents, but had difficulties holding cleared territory, particularly when Police units were involved. Clapper also observed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) had, improved but still suffered from “extensive desertion problems”. About 30,000 Afghans deserted from the ANA in 2013, out of a total strength of 185,000, Clapper disclosed. The head of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, added, at the same forum, that Afghan troops had made “modest progress”, but still needed international assistance with logistics, air transport and intelligence.

Clearly, the current situation demonstrates tremendous vulnerabilities in the ANSF, and the need for a continued and significant presence of ISAF troops, if the state is to retain its structure and dominance in future engagements. Nevertheless, the process of the premature drawdown of ISAF Forces continues to accelerate. On March 16, 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) handed over another two bases to Afghan Forces. From 137 UK bases in the country, there now remain just two bases – Camp Bastion, which is the main base for UK personnel, and observation post Sterga 2, both of which are in Helmand Province.

On February 25, 2014, the White House announced that US President Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare for a possible complete withdrawal of troops, following Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s refusal to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, despite the US and Afghanistan agreeing to details of the BSA and the agreement being endorsed by a council of 3,000 Afghan tribal elders, the Loya Jirga. Karzai has stated that he will only sign the BSA if the US publicly starts a peace process with the Taliban and ensures transparent elections this year. Indeed, according to a February 3, 2014, media report, President Karzai has been engaged in secret contacts with the Taliban. Aimal Faizi, Karzai’s spokesman, characterized the contacts as among the ‘most serious’ the presidential palace had with the Taliban since the war, adding, “The last two months have been very positive. These parties were encouraged by the President’s stance on the bilateral security agreement and his speeches afterwards.” Despite coalition reservations, the Karzai Government has also gone ahead with its decision to release detainees at Bagram Prison in Bagram District, Parwan Province. It has so far released 120 detainees – 55 on March 20, 2014, and 65 on February 13, 2014. The US Forces had handed over the prison at Bagram Air Base to full Afghan control on March 25, 2013.

The final word on the BSA, however, will only be heard after the Presidential Elections of April 2014. Indeed, soon after Obama’s telephonic conversation with Hamid Karzai on February 25, 2014, the White House issued a statement noting, “We will leave open the possibility of concluding a (security agreement) with Afghanistan later this year. However, the longer we go without a (deal), the more challenging it will be to plan and execute any U.S. mission.” Crucially, all the nine candidates who are in fray for the President’s post have supported the signing of the BSA, though none of them have stated this openly, with the exception of Abdullah Abdullah, who was the runner up to Karzai in the disputed 2009 elections. Abudllah observed, “It is in the interest of Afghanistan to sign the BSA.” The pact would allow the US to keep as many as 10,000 troops in the country to focus on counterterrorism and the training of Afghan security forces.

The BSA alone, however, cannot ensure peace in Afghanistan. Unless the Taliban’s safe sanctuaries and infrastructure of support in Pakistan are dismantled, Pakistan-backed Islamist extremists will continue to wreak havoc in Afghanistan. In his final address to Afghanistan’s Parliament on March 15, 2014, Karzai declared, in an obvious reference to Pakistan, that the US could bring peace to Afghanistan if it went after terrorist sanctuaries and countries that supported terrorism. Similarly, Major General Stephen Townsend, who commands US and NATO Forces in eastern Afghanistan, noted, “Until the Pakistanis do something about the safe havens, that’s going to be a problem. (Terrorists) can recruit and train and equip and prepare to launch in Pakistan.”

The most immediate concern is, of course, conducting a free and fair Presidential election. Indeed, in 2004, the fatalities during the campaign period (September 7 to October 7) stood at 196. The elections, which were conducted on October 9, 2004, were by and large fair. As a result, violence in the post-election period remained low. On the other hand, in 2009, a total of 1,173 persons were killed during the campaign period (June 16 to August 18), and the elections, which were held on August 20, 2009, were marred with controversy so much so that a runoff election was declared on November 7, 2009, which was finally called off on November 2, when second runner up Abdullah Abdullah decided, on November 1, not to contest, citing the “inappropriate actions of the Government and the election commission”. The violence and lack of transparency in the elections catalyzed the growth of the Taliban. Present developments indicate that this process might well be repeated in the present round of polls. Since the beginning of the campaign on February 2, 2014, 534 persons have already been killed in Afghanistan, till March 23. The campaign will last till April 2. Unless this rising violence is contained at the earliest and an environment where free and fair elections can be conducted can be established, the outcome could bode ill for the future of Afghanistan.

Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

By Veronica Khangchian

India’s troubled Northeast continues to witness varying levels of insurgency related violence, as well as tensions between various ethnic groups, with troubles further compounded by external agencies and a proliferation of new rebel formations. Nevertheless, insurgency-related fatalities in the region have seen sustained and dramatic improvements, from a recent peak of 1,051 in 2008, collapsing to 246 fatalities in 2011. Though 2012 saw a reversal of this trend, with 316 killed, the region saw a significant improvement in 2013, with 252 killed. A multiplicity of enduring insurgencies has weakened considerably, either disintegrating or seeking peace through negotiated settlements with the Government. However, the mushrooming of new militant outfits and splinter groups in the region, the worst of which is witnessed in Garo Hills of Meghalaya, continues to renew the menace in the region.

The two States worst afflicted by insurgency in 2012, Nagaland and Manipur, recorded dramatic declines in insurgency related fatalities. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal database, Nagaland dropped dramatically from 61 [six civilians and 55 militants] in 2012 to just 32 [11 civilians and 21 militants] in 2013. Internecine clashes within the State also declined from 43 incidents in 2012, resulting in 53 persons killed and 23 injured, to 18 incidents in 2013, resulting in 12 killed and 11 injured. 2012 had witnessed intense factional killing between Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (NSCN-K) and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK), which visibly slowed down in 2013. Factional killings amongst the Nagas had spiked after the formation of NSCN-KK on June 7, 2011, and the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), a Manipur based outfit, on February 25, 2011. Further, seven incidents of fratricidal clashes [resulting in nine killed and two injured] between Naga militant groups were recorded outside Nagaland in 2013, as against such 13 such incidents [resulting in 27 killed and 10 injured] in 2012. Fatalities in Nagaland had registered an upward trend, till they peaked at 145 in 2008, but fell drastically in 2009 and 2010, in the aftermath of the signing of the Covenant of Reconciliation in mid-2009. However, this emerging trend saw a reversal after the emergence of ZUF and NSCN-KK in 2011. Nagaland faces fresh challenges in 2014, carrying forward tensions from the December 2013 incidents between the Rengma Nagas and Karbis of Assam. 2014 has already recorded 11 fatalities, including 10 civilians and one militant.

In Manipur, according to the SATP database, total fatalities, at 110 [25 civilians, 12 Security Forces-SFs, 73 militants] in 2012, reduced to just half, at 55 in 2013 [21 civilians, six SFs and 28 militants killed in 10 incidents]. 2013 recorded 76 incidents of bomb blast, in which 24 people were killed and 103 were injured; 107 incidents of explosion had been recorded in 2012, though the total fatalities were nine, and 90 persons were injured. Of the 107 blasts in 2012, Corcom (the Coordination Committee of six Valley-based groups) was responsible for 33; 28 of the 76 incidents in 2013 were attributed to CorCom. 2013 data also demonstrates the greater lethality of bomb attacks, despite the reduction in incidence. Fratricidal clashes between Naga militants also declined in frequency. There were at least 10 clashes between the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) – at times a combined force of ZUF and NSCN-K – and the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), which resulted in 25 fatalities in 2012. There were just seven such incidents and nine fatalities through 2013. 2014 has already recorded 10 fatalities [two civilians, three SFs and five militants]. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a member of Corcom, was involved in the three SF killings.

According to SATP, 101 persons, including 60 militants, 35 civilians and six Security Force (SF) personnel, were killed in 71 incidents of killing through 2013 in Assam. There were 91 killings in 2012, including 45 militants, 31 civilians and 15 SF personnel, in 64 incidents of killing. This marginally reversed a continuously declining trend since 2009, when fatalities were 392 (158 in 2010, 94 in 2011). The current scale of violence is far below its peak in 1998, when the State recorded 783 terrorism-related fatalities. Ingti Kathar Songbijit faction of National democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS) emerged as the most lethal group in the State, with a confirmed involvement in 19 fatal incidents, resulting in 25 deaths; followed by Karbi People’s Liberation Tiger (KPLT), involved in 11 incidents of killing, resulting in 16 fatalities. The Anti-Talks faction of ULFA (ULFA-ATF), which rechristened itself ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I) continued to maintain its strike capability, and was involved in at least 12 killing incidents resulting in 14 deaths. On March 16, 2014 [the party's 'Army Day'], ULFA-I asked its members to re-strengthen the outfit, fearing that certain members had a nexus with the SFs. At least eight ULFA-I cadres, including its ‘operational commander’ Pramod Gogoi alias Partha Pratim Asom, were executed on the instructions of the ULFA-I’s ‘commander-in-chief’, Paresh Baruah, for ‘conspiring with Police and Security Forces to engineer a mass surrender of cadres over the past four months. Seven cadres were executed in December, 2013, while they were trying to flee the Myanmar base to surrender to police. ‘Operational commander’ Partha Pratim Asom was executed on January 15, 2014 in Mon district of Nagaland. The State has already recorded a total of 38 fatalities in 2014 [15 civilians, one SF, 22 militants]. NDFB-IKS was involved in 11 of the 14 civilians killed and in the killing of SF personnel. Of the 22 militants killed, five were known to belong to NDFB-IKS, three ULFA-I and three KPLT. Worryingly, on March 13, 2014, NDFB-IKS released a video-clipping to announce the launch of an ‘operation’ to assassinate State politicians, Director General of Police (DGP) and Superintendents of Police (SPs). The video-clipping revealed that NDFB-IKS has sent its 35-member “Iragdao Brigade” to launch the “2nd Urailang Operation.” Sources said the militants have been asked to sacrifice their lives if need be to accomplish the mission. A March 17, 2014, report observed that, according to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) the NDFB has killed as many as 70 people in Assam during through 2010-14. In January 2014, State Police Headquarters declared 15 members of the NDFB-IKS, including its chief Songbijit Ingti Kathar (IK Songbijit), as ‘most wanted’. Assam Police said valuable information leading to the arrest of these 15 NDFB-IKS militants would be worth INR 9.5 million. In a significant development, 2,009 cadres of the Dilip Nunisa faction of Dima Halam Daogah (DHD-N), surrendered en masse on March 9, 2013. The outfit had signed a Memorandum of Settlement [MoS] with the Government on October 8, 2012. In another positive development, a six months long tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement was signed between the Ranjan Daimary faction of NDFB (NDFB-RD), the Central Government and the State Government, on November 29, 2013.

In Meghalaya, according to the SATP database, insurgency related fatalities increased from 48 in 2012, to 60 in 2013. After dramatic declines between 2004 and 2008, there has been a continuous year on year increase in fatalities in the State. Worryingly, SF fatalities have spiked from just two in 2012 to nine in 2013. 2013 also recorded six major incidents (each resulting in 3 or more fatalities) in which 22 persons were killed [9 militants, 5 SF personnel and 8 civilians].Insurgent violence had declined after the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) on July 23, 2004, but resurfaced again with the formation of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), followed by the emergence of various new and splinter groups. The GNLA continues to be responsible for the largest proportion of violent activities in the State. On January 5, 2013, a draft agreement was signed between the ANVC and ANVC-B with the government. During 2013, the State also saw several agitations relating to demands relating to statehood and Inner Line Permit (ILP) arrangements. 2014 has already recorded 15 fatalities [six civilians and nine militants].

In Arunachal Pradesh, at least four militants [three from NSCN and one from ULFA-I)] were killed in the State in three encounters through 2013. Three militants [two from NSCN-K and one from NSCN-IM] were killed in 2012 in factional clashes between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K. Significantly, there were no civilian or SF fatalities, and no factional killings, in 2013. Worryingly, however, 2014 has already recorded five fatalities in the State, with two civilians and three militants killed. Outgoing Arunachal Pradesh Governor, General (Retired) J.J. Singh, on May 23, 2013, observed that the insurgency in the eastern Arunachal Districts -Tirap, Changlang and Longding – could be solved only after a permanent solution to the vexed Naga issue was reached.

The stabilisation process in Tripura gained further momentum through 2013, without a single terrorism-related fatality through the year – a signal achievement secured for the first time since 1992. 2012 had recorded two fatalities, both militants, in two separate incidents. Significantly, at its peak in 2004, the militancy had claimed as many as 514 lives, including 453 civilians, 45 militants and 16 SF personnel. Of all the factions of the NLFT, Biswamohan Debbarma faction of National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT-BM) alone remains active, though mounting pressure by the SFs resulted in the surrender of 14 of its cadres in 2013 alone. In a further setback, NLFT-BM ‘Chief of Army Staff’, Pasaram Tripura alias Parshuram alias T. Thomas alias Wathak (51) surrendered in Agartala in West Tripura District on January 10, 2014. Further, NLFT-BM ‘second-in-command’ Panther Debbarma alias Pandit surrendered before the Police along with his wife and an associate at Kanchanpur under North Tripura District on March 13, 2014, after they escaped from the NLFT’s base camp in the Jupui area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. Debbarma disclosed that NLFT had few weapons and the outfit had been marginalised due to continuous surrenders and desertions among members over the past three years.

In Mizoram, unresolved challenges including talks between the Mizoram Government and the insurgent Hmar People’s Convention – Democracy (HPC-D), as well as the unfinished repatriation of Bru (Reang) refugees from neighbouring Tripura were further compounded by occasional activities of militant groups from adjoining States engaging in abduction and arms smuggling. Despite an enduring peace after an agonizing twenty years of insurgency, a variety of issues, principally the result of ethnic tensions and overflows of insurgency from the neighbourhood, continue to rankle in Mizoram.

The Northeast had also witnessed several agitations demanding the creation of new States through 2013, particularly following the resolution of the Congress Working Committee (CWC), on July 30, 2013, to sanction statehood to Telengana by bifurcating Andhra Pradesh in South India. In Assam, statehood demands include agitations by the Bodos for Bodoland; Koch-Rajbongshis for Kamatapur; Karbis and the Dimasas for an autonomous or full-fledged State. In Meghalaya, the Garos renewed their stir for Garoland; and tribals in Tripura, under the banner of the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT), demanded a separate state. In Manipur, the Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC) revived its demand for a ‘Kuki State’, even as the Eastern Naga Peoples Organization (ENPO) in Nagaland resumed its demands for a ‘Frontier Nagaland’ State.

Other concerns also persisted. According to April 18, 2013 report, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) was planning to strengthen its base in the Northeast. A six page letter sent to 13 States, by the UMHA on CPI-Maoist efforts to expand to new areas, noted that the Maoists planned to strengthen their Eastern Regional Bureau: “The North-East is another region where the CPI (Maoist) is trying to spread its wings … with the objectives that include strengthening the outfit’s Eastern Regional Bureau, procurement of arms/ammunition/communication equipment.” The Maoist efforts to increase bases in the North East region are now directly supervised by Prashant Bose, Politburo Member and ‘second in command’ of the CPI-Maoist.

In November 2013 UMHA declared Assam a Maoist afflicted State, with the Joint Secretary (Northeast) Shambhu Singh noting that a review of law and order indicated that “Maoist presence in Assam and border areas of Arunachal Pradesh has been noticed and hence their activities were noticed in Golaghat, Dhemaji, Lakhimpur and Tinsukia Districts of Assam and Namsai area of Lohit District in Arunachal Pradesh.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing a conference of State Governors in New Delhi on February 12, 2013, noted that Left Wing Extremism’s (LWE) geographical spread in the country was showing a shrinking trend, though it was expanding in Assam, which was “worrisome”. On February 5, 2014, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi disclosed that CPI-Maoist had entered into an understanding with militants based in the Northeastern region as well as with Pakistan’s external intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to spread its network in his State.

Meanwhile, on March 14, 2014, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), the political body of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had signed an agreement with the CPI-Maoist in 2008, congratulated CPI-Maoist for their successful strike against Security Forces (SFs) in Sukma District of Chhattisgarh on March 11, and declared that RPF and CPI-Maoist were ‘strategic partners’.

There were also reports of Northeast militant groups forming a common platform to fight the ‘enemy’. This was disclosed by Paresh Baruah, ‘commander in chief’ of ULFA-I, who declared that all the groups have realized the fact that there is need for fighting the “common enemy” together and after a series of talks among the various outfits, the decision was taken to form the proposed common platform. He said that the move in this regard started three to four years earlier and final shape had been given recently: “More than 90 per cent of the work of forming the common platform has been completed and only the name of the platform has to be declared… Though the name of the platform is yet to be announced, the words ‘west-south east Asia’ would be included in the name.” Baruah added that outfits that had started “so-called talks” with the Government would not be included in the platform.

Significantly, on January 19, 2014, Assam DGP, Khagen Sarma stated that the ISI was behind the unification bid of Northeastern militants: “It is the Pakistani ISI and other external forces that are behind the fresh initiative taken by ‘commander in chief’ of ULFA-I to form a common force on all the insurgent groups based in Northeast to fight Indian security forces.” Earlier, in 2012, there had also been reports of China encouraging the CPI-Maoist, militant groups from Jammu & Kashmir and from the North East region to unite to form a single ‘united strategic front’ against the Indian State.

In March 2013, Minister of State for Home Affairs M. Ramachandran stated that insurgent groups in the Northeastern region were getting arms and ammunition from China. Subsequently, Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushilkumar Shinde disclosed, “There are reports that the insurgent groups operating in the north eastern states of India have been augmenting their armoury by acquiring arms from China and Sino-Myanmar border towns and routing them through Myanmar. Significantly, India and Myanmar have agreed to cooperate to prevent cross border movement of armed groups, share information on seizure of arms and check arms smuggling/drug trafficking”. Shinde added that the agreement was reached during the 20th Sectoral Level (Joint Working Group) Meeting between Myanmar and India held in Bagan, Myanmar, from June 19-20, 2013. The UMHA has described the 1,643-kilometre-long India-Myanmar border – the locus of cross-border movement of militants, illegal arms and drugs – as ‘extremely porous’.

In a significant breakthrough, on August 30, 2013, the NSCN-IM arms supplier, identified as Wuthikorn Naruenartwanich alias Willy Narue, was arrested by Bangkok Police on India’s request. He had brokered a USD 1 million deal involving supply of some 1,000 firearms, including 600 AK-47s and ammunition, with Chinese arms dealers.

On March 7 and 8, 2013, in the biggest arms haul in Mizoram thus far and one of the biggest in the Northeast, Mizoram Police and Assam Rifles seized 31 AK-47 assault rifles, one Singapore-made Light Machine Gun (LMG), one US-made Browning automatic rifle, 809 rounds of ammunition, and 32 magazines, from a farmhouse near the Lengpui Airport, on the outskirts of State capital, Aizawl. The arms were smuggled from Myanmar and were meant to be delivered to the Parbotia Chatagram Jana Sangata Samiti (PCJSS), a group claiming to fight for the rights of the indigenous people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) tribes of Bangladesh.

Militant groups operating in Northeast continues to maintain camps in neighboring countries. Significantly, the Border Security Force (BSF) submitted a list of 66 militant camps operating from Bangladesh, to the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), during a three-day bi-annual border coordination meeting [March 7-9, 2014] between the BSF inspector-generals and BGB’s region commanders held in Shillong (Meghalaya). The Venkaiah Naidu-led department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee had recommended, in March 2013, increasing pressure on countries bordering the Northeastern region during trade discussions to close down Indian rebel training camps operating on their soil.

The North East Students Organisation (NESO), on March 25, 2013, asked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to expedite the ongoing peace process with various rebel groups in India’s Northeastern states and reverse the “unabated influx of illegal migrants from neighbouring countries”, which had brought a serious demographic change in the North East. NESO urged the Prime Minister to extend the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, to the entire Northeastern region. Worryingly, United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs data indicated that, in 2013, India was home to 3.2 million Bangladeshi residents. India remained the favourite destination for Bangladeshi migrants in 2013, the UN report added.

Delays in bringing negotiations with various militant formations to a conclusion, irreconcilable ‘settlements’ with different ethnic groupings, the mushrooming of splinter insurgent formations, a continuing politics relying excessively on ethnic identity mobilisation, and poor governance have combined to keep insurgencies and disorders alive across the Indian Northeast, with both the regional States and the Indian Government displaying little sagacity in their approach to the region’s enduring problems. However, exhaustion, disintegration and the loss of ideological motivation have undermined most insurgent organisations in the Northeast, giving its people some relief, though the threat of insurgent violence remains a permanent sceptre hanging over their heads.

Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Spanish and Moroccan authorities should affirm procedures to protect rights for migrants and reject summary returns at the border, said Human Rights Watch.

Spain is expected to use a March 26, 2014 meeting with Morocco about migration to push for an explicit mechanism allowing for immediate, summary return of irregular migrants from Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves on Morocco’s Mediterranean coast.

“Pushing people back across the border without due process or screening for protection violates Spanish, European, and international law,” said Judith Sunderland, senior Western Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch. “All the more so because migrants forced back into Morocco face violence and other abuse at the hands of Moroccan security forces.”

The March 26 meeting in Tangier will include discussion of how to carry out the existing bilateral readmission agreement between Spain and Morocco at a time when their treatment of migrants is under scrutiny. Spanish measures to secure its borders with Morocco, including the use of barbed wire fences around the enclaves and anti-riot weapons, are in the spotlight after 15 migrants drowned while swimming to Ceuta in early February. And a Human Rights Watch report in February detailed Morocco’s harsh treatment of migrants near its borders with the enclaves.

Human Rights Watch, other nongovernmental organizations, and Spain’s independent human rights institute, have documented unlawful summary returns to Morocco from the Spanish enclaves. Statements from migrants indicate that Spanish Guardia Civil who patrol the enclave borders hand over some migrants to Moroccan security forces through gates along the fences without any due process. Spanish immigration law prohibits such returns and guarantees irregular migrants the right to legal counsel and an interpreter during deportation proceedings.

Spanish authorities have long denied that its border forces are carrying out summary returns, but recent statements from Madrid suggest it now wants to legalize this practice through an explicit agreement with Morocco within the framework of its bilateral readmission agreement. The agreement, signed in 1992 but operational only since 2012, provides for minimal formalities to facilitate the return of third-country nationals. Undermining the already weak human rights safeguards in the agreement would be a step in the wrong direction, Human Rights Watch said.

Spain’s interior minister, Jorge Fernández Díaz, has indicated that he wants to change the country’s immigration law to allow for summary expulsions from the enclaves. He has gone so far as to argue that migrants should not be considered to have entered Spanish territory until they have crossed the “police line.”

“The argument that a person is not actually in Spain until he gets past a police officer boggles the mind,” Sunderland said. “Spain cannot move the border as it sees fit, nor can it side-step EU law and international human rights standards.”

International and EU law prohibit refoulement – that is, forcible returns to a place where a person would face a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes a right to asylum, while the EU returns directive sets out minimum procedural safeguards for returns of undocumented migrants and requires Spain to take due account of certain individual circumstances as well as its nonrefoulement obligations.

Migrants in large groups regularly attempt to scale the 6-meter (almost 20-foot) fences separating Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco. On March 18, 2014, some 500 migrants managed to climb over the fences at Melilla in the largest successful attempt in recent years.

According to official statistics, over 4,300 people entered the two enclaves irregularly in 2013, compared with 2,804 in 2012. In November 2013, Spain reinstalled barbed wire on the fence surrounding Melilla – it had been removed in 2007, though it has been atop Ceuta fences since 2005. Spain is also installing mesh designed to prevent climbing and has also announced it would extend the breakwaters separating Ceuta and Morocco.

After the migrants drowned trying to reach Ceuta on February 6, 2014, and initial denials, Minister Fernández confirmed that Spanish Guardia Civil agents had fired rubber bullets and teargas into the water. The EU home affairs commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, expressed concern that the firing of rubber bullets may have provoked panic among the swimmers and contributed to the deaths. Videos appear to show Spanish agents leading survivors from the beach straight back to Moroccan territory.

An investigative judge in Ceuta is leading the criminal investigation into the deaths of the 5 migrants whose corpses washed up on Ceuta shores. Spanish authorities have insisted that all 15 drowned in Moroccan territorial waters, and the media reported that the judge intends to close the investigation, for lack of jurisdiction, if that is proven accurate. Moroccan authorities had not yet provided information on any similar investigation into the deaths of the 10 migrants whose bodies were carried by the tide to Moroccan beaches.

Although Minister Fernández conceded that it “would have been better” had the Guardia Civil not used rubber bullets and has since given orders against their use at the enclave borders, he and Arsenio Fernández de Mesa, the head of the Guardia Civil, have staunchly defended the behavior of border agents on February 6 and on the enclaves border generally. The ruling Popular Party used its absolute majority to block a motion in parliament to debate the creation of an ad hoc committee to investigate the February 6 events, though the deputy interior minister, Francisco Martínez, appeared before a parliamentary commission on March 19 to present the government’s account of what happened, including with audio and video recordings. Martínez insisted that the migrants drowned because they had misjudged the high tide and could not swim, not because of the rubber bullets and tear gas. No one has resigned or been disciplined.

“It is paramount for the judge to conduct a thorough and diligent investigation into possible criminal responsibility, all the way up the chain of command,” Sunderland said. “The investigation should get to the bottom of whether the actions of the Guardia Civil played a role in the deaths, whether in Spanish or Moroccan waters.”

Moroccan security forces frequently beat, otherwise abuse, and sometimes steal from sub-Saharan migrants who fail in their attempt to reach Ceuta or Melilla or who are returned to their custody by the Guardia Civil in those enclaves, Human Rights Watch said. While a new migration and asylum policy that went into effect in September has led to some improvements for migrants in Morocco, Human Rights Watch research in January and February 2014 found that Moroccan security forces still use violence against sub-Saharan migrants along the border with the Spanish enclaves. Spain should halt all forcible returns of sub-Saharan migrants to Morocco until Morocco can guarantee their humane treatment, Human Rights Watch said.

“Large scale attempts to climb over the fences at Ceuta and Melilla pose genuine security concerns, and Spain has a right to secure its borders,” Sunderland said. “But these challenges do not absolve Spain of its duty to respect human rights, including the right to seek asylum and to protect migrants against inhuman treatment.”

o avoid another failed effort at federal reunification in the new round of Cyprus negotiations, all sides should break old taboos and discuss all possible options, including independence for Turkish Cypriots within the European Union.

New political will in Cyprus, Turkey and the international community for a settlement is fanning hopes the current round of talks on a bizonal, bicommunal federation can succeed. Yet, no new factor has appeared to change the content of the five failed rounds of negotiations over four decades. In its latest report, Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality, the International Crisis Group examines why the current framework has proved fruitless and suggests opening a debate on the idea of an independent Turkish Cypriot state within the EU.

Alongside the existing UN-facilitated talks, the sides should explore on what terms they might agree such a European solution, which would not only benefit the island’s flattened economy but also end decades of uncertainty and perceived isolation.

All sides need to face the reality that the problem is not so much today’s divided status quo, but its non-negotiated status. A settlement that takes this into account is the only way to provide both communities with a solid legal, political and economic framework on which to build their futures.

Any deal must be consensual and backed by voluntary Greek Cypriot agreement. To win Greek Cypriot consent to an independent Turkish Cypriot state, both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would have to agree to pull back all or almost all of Turkey’s troops, give up the international guarantees that accompanied the island’s independence in 1960, compensate Greek Cypriots for the two thirds of private property in the north owned by them, be generous in handing back occupied territory and agree that the Greek Cypriots inherit their part of the coast, new natural gas deposits and all.

Greek Cypriots would have to support an independent Turkish Cypriot state becoming a full part of the EU. That is currently taboo but could be a way to answer their deep wish to reunite the island in everything that matters, including currency, basic norms and regulations, EU laws and visa regime.

“Exploring the terms for two independent Cypriot states in the EU may persuade the sides they do in fact prefer to negotiate a federation”, says Hugh Pope, Crisis Group’s Deputy Program Director for Europe and Central Asia. “But to reach any deal at all, the two sides will have to do much more public diplomacy to earn each other’s trust; will have to build on recent direct communication between the Cypriot sides, Athens and Ankara; and be realistic about what they want and can achieve”.

“Without a settlement, the frictions of the non-negotiated partition will simply continue, and regional cooperation will continue to be blocked by this decades-old obstacle”, says Paul Quinn-Judge, Crisis Group’s Europe and Central Asia Program Director. “What all Cypriots want and need most is an end to uncertainty and a long-term perspective on which to base their and their children’s lives”.

By Jonathan Cook

For the first time since the US launched the Middle East peace talks last summer, the Palestinian leadership may be sensing it has a tiny bit of leverage.

Barack Obama met the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in Washington last week in what Palestinian officials called a “candid and difficult” meeting. The US president hoped to dissuade Abbas from walking away when the original negotiations’ timetable ends in a month.

The US president and his secretary of state, John Kerry, want their much-delayed “framework agreement” to provide the pretext for spinning out the stalled talks for another year. The US outline for peace is now likely to amount to little more than a set of vague, possibly unwritten principles that both sides can assent to.

The last thing the US president needs is for the negotiations to collapse, after Kerry has repeatedly stressed that finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is imperative.

The US political cycle means Obama’s Democratic party is heading this autumn into the Congressional mid-term elections. A humiliating failure in the peace process would add to perceptions of him as a weak leader in the Middle East, following what has been widely presented as his folding in confrontations with Syria and Iran.

Renewed clashes between Israel and the Palestinians in the international arena would also deepen US diplomatic troubles at a time when Washington needs to conserve its energies for continuing negotiations with Iran and dealing with the fallout from its conflict with Russia over Crimea.

Obama therefore seems committed to keeping the peace process show on the road for a while longer, however aware he is of the ultimate futility of the exercise.

In this regard, US interests overlap with those of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel has been the chief beneficiary of the past eight months: diplomatic pressure has largely lifted; Israeli officials have announced an orgy of settlement building in return for releasing a few dozen Palestinian prisoners; and the White House has gradually shifted ground even further towards Israel’s hardline positions.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, have nothing to show for their participation, and have lost much of the diplomatic momentum gained earlier by winning upgraded status at the United Nations. They have also had to put on hold moves to join dozens of international forums, as well as the threat to bring Israel up on war crimes charges at the International Criminal Court.

Abbas is under mounting pressure at home to put an end to the charade, with four Palestinian factions warning last week that the Kerry plan would be the equivalent of national “suicide”. For this reason, the White House is now focused on preventing Abbas from quitting next month – and that requires a major concession from Israel.

The Palestinians are said to be pushing hard for Israel’s agreement to halt settlement building and free senior prisoners, most notably Marwan Barghouti, who looks the most likely successor to Abbas as Palestinian leader.

Some kind of short-term settlement freeze – though deeply unpopular with Netanyahu’s supporters – may be possible, given the Israeli right’s triumph in advancing settlement-building of late. Abbas reportedly presented Obama with “a very ugly map” of more than 10,000 settler homes Israel has unveiled since the talks began.

Setting Barghouti free, as well as Ahmad Saadat, whose PLO faction assassinated the far-right tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi, in 2001, would be an even harder pill for the Israeli government to swallow. Cabinet ministers are already threatening a mutiny over the final round of prisoner releases, due at the end of the week. But Israeli reports on Sunday suggested Washington might consider releasing Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, possibly in return for Israel freeing more Palestinians, to keep the talks going.

Simmering tensions between the US and Israel, however, are suggestive of the intense pressure being exerted by the White House behind the scenes.

Those strains exploded into view again last week when Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s defence minister, used a speech to lambast Washington’s foreign policy as “feeble”. In a similar vein, he infuriated the White House in January by labeling Kerry “obsessive” and “messianic” in pursuing the peace process. But unlike the earlier incident, Washington has refused to let the matter drop, angrily demanding an explicit apology.

The pressure from the White House, however, is not chiefly intended to force concessions from Israel on an agreement. After all, the Israeli parliament approved this month the so-called referendum bill, seen by the right as an insurance policy. It gives the Israeli public, raised on the idea of Jerusalem as Israel’s exclusive and “eternal capital”, a vote on whether to share it with the Palestinians.

Washington’s goal is more modest: a few more months of quiet. But even on this reckoning, given Netanyahu’s intransigence, the talks are going to implode sooner or later. What then?

Obama and Kerry have set out a convincing scenario that in the longer term Israel will find itself shunned by the world. The Palestinian leadership will advance its cause at the UN, while conversely grassroots movements inside and outside Palestine will begin clamoring for a single state guaranteeing equality between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Israel’s vehement and aggressive opposition on both fronts will only serve to damage its image – and its relations with the US.

An unexpected voice backing the one-state solution emerged last week when Tareq Abbas, the Palestinian president’s 48-year-old son, told the New York Times that a struggle for equal rights in a single  state would be the “easier, peaceful way”.

Bolstering Washington’s argument that such pressures cannot be held in check for ever, a poll this month of US public opinion revealed a startling finding. Despite a US political climate committed to a two-state solution, nearly two-thirds of Americans back a single democratic state for Jews and Palestinians should a Palestinian state prove unfeasible. That view is shared by more than half of Israel’s supporters in the US.

That would constitute a paradigm shift, a moment of reckoning that draws nearer by the day as the peace process again splutters into irrelevance.

- Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books).  He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: www.jonathan-cook.net. (A version of this article first appeared in The National, Abu Dhabi.)

By Alexander Müller

U.S. President Barrack Obama has arrived in The Hague for a summit on nuclear security. However, the meeting is most likely to be dominated by the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The G8, having been replaced by the Russia-free G7, is aiming at fashioning a response to Russian President Vladimir Putin and planning further sanctions if Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine.

So far the EU has imposed sanctions on 33 individuals consisting of travel bans and asset freezes. The U.S. has added another 20 Russians to its own blacklist.

European and American officials argue that the only way for Russia to peacefully resolve the crisis lay in returning to the negotiation table with the international community and Ukraine.

The EU also pledged to move toward economic sanctions against Russia’s energy, economic, and defense sectors should military action in Ukraine escalate.

Nevertheless, a consensus regarding economic sanctions may prove difficult given European countries’ varying dependency rates on Russian oil and gas.

The G7 leaders have also decided to suspend preparations for the June meeting at the Olympic venue in Sochi. The summit is designed to enable the U.S. and the EU to coordinate their positions and policies more effectively.

The Hague conference will occur against the backdrop of a mounting Russian troop presence along Ukraine’s eastern border. NATO’s senior general, Philip Breedlove, warned that Russia had amassed troops on the border and that the force was very sizeable, and in full combat readiness.

Amid fears of a new invasion, Breedlove also stated that NATO was considering mobilizing troops and positioning its forces accordingly, in order to defend the Baltics if need be.

NATO officials have also indicated that member states should move troops and hold war games of their own closer to Russian borders, in order to demonstrate unity and determination in aiding Ukraine.

In the meantime, Russian military forces have seized another Ukrainian air and naval base on the Crimean peninsula. Since its actions last week, Moscow is gradually taking-over Ukrainian military facilities in the region.

In response to this takeover, Kiev has issued a general withdrawal from Crimea and is pulling its forces out in the face of potential Russian threats or military pressure. The Ukrainian government also ordered a general evacuation.

The decision had been taken by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry to re-deploy its forces, as Kiev would not risk the lives and health of its service personnel and their families.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan.

Preliminary results in the just concluded Parliamentary Elections (Majlis), showed that the government aligned candidates secured a comfortable majority with 46 seats and the MDP securing only 19 with other independents managing 4 seats so far.

The result is a major setback for the MDP which had termed the current elections as one of “do or die” situation. What is worse, the MDP did not get the same proportion, in fact much less than the votes it had obtained both in the presidential and local council elections.

The disappointment was in Male itself where the MDP just managed 7 out of 13 seats with the rest going to the PPM of the government. The Addu City continued to be the stronghold of the MDP, with the party getting 5 out of 7 seats.

Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon, daughter of Gayoom described the election result as one where the “Maldivians have said yes to President Yameen’s strong leadership.” The Vice President said that the results showed that the people had faith in the government. The PPM would now be able to give a religious twist to the results by claiming that they will be able to defend Islam more vigorously as claimed by the party earlier.

The theme- that Islam could only be defended by the ruling party was made by Gayoom himself in one of his election meetings when he said that in the rule of MDP for three and a half years, he feared that Islam could disappear from the country.

In another instance in a direct message to Nasheed, President Yameen made the extraordinary claim that criticising the Supreme Court Judgements is similar to criticising the “tenets of Islam.”

What Nasheed will have to contend in future is that his opponents will not hesitate to use the Islamic card shamelessly where it suits them and he will continue to be shown as anti Islamic and that Islam will be in danger if ever he comes to power.

One can understand the difficulties that will be faced by Nasheed in future too when opposition to all decisions- democratic or otherwise will be painted as “anti Islamic” and believed to be so by the common people.

Two issues come to my mind- first- there is no hope of judiciary being reformed any time in the near future. The second will be the complete legitimisation of the February coup of 2012.

Ibrahim ‘Ibra’ Ismail who had a role in drafting the 2008 Constitution described the results as a “huge set back” for the democracy movement. He added that with the tyranny of the judiciary combined with the tyranny of the majority, they will see the right to dissent, right to exercise people’s will, the right to live freely, curtailed.

Indeed the Supreme Court and not the Election commission should be congratulated for having conducting the elections without any major problem. When a few of the contending candidates did not sign the voters’ list as mandated by the Supreme Court, the Election Commission had to seek directions from the court for proceeding with the elections.

Hard days are ahead for the MDP and for Nasheed himself. He needs to stay on course at least to prevent Maldives going back to “Gayoomism”- a reference to the dreaded three decades of authoritarian rule by former president Gayoom.

By C. S. Kuppuswamy

President Thein Sein, in his address at the Chatham House, UK on 15 July 2013, had asserted that the ongoing civil war (since Independence) in Myanmar will end soon.  Swift and aggressive follow up action was witnessed resulting in two rounds of talks–one amongst the ethnic groups at Laiza (The Kachin Independence Organisation Headquarters) from 30 October to 02 November 2013 and one between the Government and the ethnic armed groups at Myitkyina on 04-05 November 2013.  Since then a number of informal meetings and official meetings have taken place amongst the ethnic groups as well as between the ethnic groups and the government agencies.

Hopes of an early break through by March 2014 have been in vain and the latest is that a joint committee with nine members from the government and nine from the ethnic groups will work on a draft for a nationwide ceasefire to be signed by 01 August 2014.

There are varying views on the successful culmination of this process by this date with some considering it extremely positive and some expressing serious doubts because of the incompatible demands of the ethnic groups and the reluctance on the part of the government.

Laiza Talks

17 armed ethnic groups, met for the first time at Laiza (The KIO Headquarters) from 30 October to 02 November 2013.  The major outcome was the creation of a 13 member Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) for further talks with the government and arriving at a “11 point common position of ethnic resistance organisations on Nationwide Ceasefire” which was eventually presented to the government in the Myitkyina talks.

Myitkyina Talks

In a landmark meeting the 13- member NCCT formed at the Laiza summit had talks with the government’s Union Peace-making Work Committee headed by President’s office Minister Aung Min at Myitkyina (Kachin State capital) on 04-05 November 2013.

A press release at the end of the talks indicated that the NCCT had presented its 11 point common position to the government delegation and the government in turn handed over its own 15 point proposal for arriving at a nationwide ceasefire.

Both sides agreed to have a follow-up meeting in Hpa-an ( Karen state capital) in December 2013 (which has been postponed a number of times and is still to take place).

Law Khee Lah Conference

Since the government proposals given to ethnic groups for consideration (during the Myitkyina talks) had a number of contentious issues, the armed ethnic groups again met at Law Khee Lah (Karen State) from 20-25 January 2014, to consolidate their position in relation to a nationwide ceasefire.

Briefing Paper No. 20 of February 2014 of the Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies indicates that during this meeting

• A number of changes were made to the original draft and it was decided that the revised version would be presented to government in February 2014. One of the key conditions set out in the 30-page draft ceasefire is that a political dialogue will have to start within 90 days after signing the nationwide ceasefire.
• The NCCT sought assurances from the Government that any ceasefire agreement would allow them to exert authority in relation to running of their individual state during the cease fire period and prior to political dialogue.
• The meeting also reaffirmed the six main points necessary for ethnic groups to move towards peace in the country. These include:

1. A Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

2.  A Framework for Political Dialogue

3. A National Dialogue

4. Union Conference and Signing of Accord

5. Adoption of Accord by Parliament

6. Implementation of Accord

In addition to the six points, a number of other issues were raised including the formation of a Federal Army, the creation of ethnic based states, and the use of terminology in the NCA when referring to the armed ethnic groups themselves.

Conference at Myanmar Peace Centre

A two day conference (March 8-9, 2014) was held at the Myanmar Peace Centre, Yangon between the ethnic armed groups and representatives from the Government wherein it was proposed that the nationwide ceasefire would be signed by August 1, 2014 (Eleven Media Group– 12 March 2014).

This media report also states that “Five ministers, four lieutenant-generals, one major-general, and one colonel from the military, as well as three parliamentary MPs and a deputy attorney general attended the Yangon conference from the government’s side. Eleven delegates attended from the ethnic armed groups’ side”.

Naing Han Tha from NCCT said that both sides reached many points of understanding during the two-day conference, so the signing of the nationwide ceasefire is drawing nearer. However, many challenges remain. These include- how to establish a federal state as demanded by ethnic groups, how to amend the 2008 Constitution, and what troop settlements will look like in the future.

The government

The government had talks with 14 ethnic groups individually and had signed ceasefire agreements in 2010-11. But for the first time, the government (Union Peacemaking

Work committee) had talks with most of the ethnic groups together as a group in November 2013 at Myitkyina.  Since then there has been a flurry of activity by having a number of meetings with ethnic groups individually as well as with their umbrella bodies within the country and also in Chiang Mai (Thailand).  President Thein Sein had also met individually some leaders of ethnic groups who had called upon him at Naypyidaw.

A budget request of 7 billion kyats (US $ 7.1 million) for Burma’s peace process and national reconciliation efforts has been submitted to parliament as a designated appropriations item for the first time (The Irrawaddy—16 January 2014).

Ethnic Armed Groups

As in the past the ethnic groups have not been able to put up a united front and rivalries between different groups have slowed down the process.  The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and the Working Group for Ethnic Coordination (WGEC) had fallen apart due to differences of opinion as to who should take overall control of the process of negotiations with the government.

However 16 armed groups have been able to get together at the Laiza talks to form a 13-member Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team which has been recognised by the government for further negotiations at the Myitkyina talks.

It is pertinent to note that one group (Restoration Council of Shan state-RCSS) which took part in the Laiza talks did not sign the agreement at the end of the talks for supporting the nationwide ceasefire and two groups ( the biggest ethnic armed group United Wa State Army- UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Army-NDAA known as the Mongla militia) did not even participate in the talks.

As the talks with the government proceed there is apprehension that further differences may crop up amongst the ethnic groups and this weakness could be cashed by the government.

The Military

The Military was not involved in the peace process till recently.  On the contrary, military offensives were being launched and continue to be launched on some pretext particularly in the Kachin and Shan states even while the peace talks are in progress.

Perhaps for the first time, Lt Gen Myint Soe of the Ministry of Defence was part of the government delegation in the Myitkyina talks with some of his aides. At the end of the talks while talking to a reporter of Radio Free Asia he said that the government could not accept the idea of a federal army as proposed by the ethnic groups in the talks.

The Commander-in-Chief Snr Gen Min Aung Hlaing had reportedly made some provocative remarks in November 2013, while defending the offensives in Kachin State and casting the blame for violence on Kachin ethnic rebels and that the Tatmadaw would “forever follow the policy laid down by Snr Gen Than Shwe” (The Irrawaddy- 24 January 2014).  This has caused some apprehensions among the ethnic groups on the military’s support for the peace process.

International Involvement

Norway is one country which has been involved in the Myanmar peace process in a big way.  The Norwegian led Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) formed in March 2012 is a multi-million dollar scheme supporting humanitarian and peace efforts in Myanmar.  Norway also heads the Peace Donor Support group—a consortium of international donors which has pledged over US $ 500 million in developmental aid to support the process.

The Government of Myanmar opened the Myanmar Peace Centre in November 2012 in Yangon as part of an agreement with the Norway-led Peace Support donor Group. It was established to assist the Union Peacemaking Central and Working Committees in the peace process.

A media report of January 2014 indicates that this initiative (MPSI) is likely to conclude consequent to an internal review as there is no added value in its work.  Some complex local circumstances and influx of other actors have also been cited as reasons for this closure.

Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office (EBO) is also known to be funding the Working Group for Ethnic Coordination (WGEC)  formed in June 2012-another umbrella body of ethnic groups.

An institute called the Pyidangsu Institute has been established in Chiang Mai on 27 February 2014 which will act as a study centre and secretariat that will support the various ethnic minority groups and help in developing a common approach.  Norway and Sweden have promised to fund the institute.  The institute is also planning to open an office in Yangon (The Irrawaddy—28 February and 20 March 2014).

Japan-based Nippon foundation is also involved in the process and has reportedly funded the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC).  Japan pledged a US $ 100 million grant in January 2014 in addition to an earlier grant of US $ 12 million. Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) has submitted a report in October 2013 about proposals for development projects for Karen and Mon states with the purpose of facilitating the eventual return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons.  This report has come under criticism from the Karen National Union for failing to address the challenges created by decades of armed conflict.

China, despite its avowed policy of non interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours has got involved in the peace negotiations between the KIO and the government by hosting some talks at Ruili (in Yunnan close to the Myanmar border) as well as by sending observers for the talks.   Perhaps this is to preclude US from taking this initiative in an area close to its borders.  It is also exerting pressure on the Myanmar Government by supporting the UWSA – the largest ethnic armed group with arms.

US, as part of its revised engagement policy with Myanmar, has also started taking great interest in the ongoing peace process.  US Ambassador Derek Mitchell visited the Kachin  State twice during the year (2013).

Some analysts have however criticised the undue influence exerted by the western nations and China in this process without understanding the complexities of this problem which has been festering this nation for over five decades.  Ashley South a consultant for the MPSI   accused international donors of carelessly pumping funds through government channels without delivering capacity-building support at the local level (DVB, 12^th January 2014).

Major Hurdles in the Peace Process

Federal Structure – Federalism has been equated with disintegration of the country under military rule and hence this word was not even mentioned then.  However President Thein Sein has hinted at federalism for national reconsolidation in his union day address this year.  There is confusion as to what sort of a federal structure the ethnic groups want in order to achieve at least limited autonomy in their states and what the government is perhaps willing to concede in this regard.  Bertil Lintner writes “So are there any successful models Myanmar could follow? There seems to be only one: India. India has 28 states and seven union territories, and although the Indian constitution does not mention “federation” or “federalism,” the basic structure of the country is federal”. (The Irrawaddy, March 8, 2014)

The 2008 constitution has also to be amended if the country has to adopt a federal structure.  Hence this may not happen in foreseeable future.

Federal Army—Ethnic armed groups are demanding the creation of a ‘federal army’ that will include all nationalities. In the initial stages when the Burmese army was formed prior to independence it had Karen battalions, Chin battalions as well as Shan, Arakanese and Mon units.  The ethnic groups want the Tatmadaw to be reorganised on similar lines which is not acceptable for the present day commanders of the Bamar predominant armed forces.

Disarmament–The government proposals indicate that ethnic groups should submit to the government a full account of the troops, arms and ammunition under their control and disarm after signing a ceasefire.  The ethnic groups have their own security concerns, apprehensions and mistrust for disarming before a political settlement is reached.

News Analysis

The formation of a joint committee in March 2014 with an equal number of members from the government agencies and the ethnic groups to draft a nationwide ceasefire agreement by August 2014 indicates that this time there is genuine interest from both sides to finalise this long pending issue.

However there are some irreconcilable differences between the government agencies (The Peacemaking Team and the Military) and amongst the ethnic groups on the modalities, time frame and even on the terminology to be used in the nationwide ceasefire agreement.  Some even wonder whether the Peacemaking team and its leader Aung Min (President’s Office Minister) has the mandate for taking decisions on behalf of the government.

There is an impression that the peace process is being hastened with the 2015 elections in view.  Perhaps this may result in a non-representative agreement which may not be respected for long.

Despite all the meetings, talks and entreaties the non-Burman groups still do not have the trust in the government, the military and the Burman-predominant NLD and are apprehensive on getting a fair deal in this peace process.

Despite declaring a unilateral ceasefire in February 2013, the launching of military offensives in Kachin and Shan states on some pretext or other (such as illegal logging) even while the peace talks are in progress is likely to derail the process.  Perhaps the military wants to have a better bargaining position in such areas in any future settlement.

As of now the China-backed United Wa State Army – the largest of the ethnic armed groups is not included in this process as their demand is for an autonomous Wa state. Presumably the government wants to postpone a decision in this regard till a settlement is reached with the other groups.

The government is seen to be laying more emphasis on economic development than on political, cultural and social demands of the ethnic groups.  This is much to the dismay of especially the unarmed civilian non-Bamar ethnic population.

The signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is just the first phase and perhaps the easiest of the peace process.  The hard part comes when political dialogue is initiated.  There is therefore a long road ahead to achieve the elusive ‘national reconciliation’ with stake holders  having different and conflicting views.  Peace- lasting and permanent is still elusive.

This paper may please be read in conjunction with the following papers by this author posted on this site.

a)       Paper No. 5536 “MYANMAR: Will the Peace Process Materialise?” dated 03 August, 2013 (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1327).

b)      Paper No. 5599 “MYANMAR: Nationwide Ceasefire” dated 11 November 2013 (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1400).

By N. Sathiya Moorthy

Human Rights (HR) NGOs across the world may have cause to condemn the Sri Lankan Government for the detention of three civilians, including a woman and a Christian priest, under the draconian anti-terror laws. They now also have cause to celebrate, because two of the three arrested persons, have since been released. The celebrations pertain more to the power of ‘collective voice’, as they have unilaterally concluded, than possibly for the freedom of those thus detained.

The Government statement said that the three persons were detained in relation to a specific case, while the anti-terror security agencies were searching for an ‘LTTE operative’ who has returned home from overseas and was looking for the buried armed cache of the terror group, banned still by most nations in the West, as well. The question is if detaining some person, or persons, for interrogation in a specific case, or their release after such interrogation, should be made the subject of HR discourses and protests, as an extension of and addenda to the UNHRC proceedings.

This is not to cast a slur on any of those detained. Among those arrested, the woman, Jeyakumari, has been in the forefront of anti-Government protests in the Tamil areas, particularly in relation to ‘missing persons’. Her photograph was reportedly on the front pages of newspapers, among the ‘war victims’ jumping at the convoy of visiting British Prime Minister David Cameron in the Northern Province in November last. Whether it has to be linked to the absconding ex-LTTE cadre, who is also charged with shooting at a police officer, could be based on investigations into the lady letting the wanted man live on her premises.

The priest, Fr Praveen, is a known HR activist, it is said. But the Church in the Tamil areas has taken more than an active role through the decades of ethnic war and violence, too. Such pro-active approach did not – has not – stopped with providing succour to the needy, a job that the Church and priests are well-trained and well-equipped to address, both in spiritual and temporal terms.

It is not as if Ruki Fernando, the HR activist arrested with Fr Praveen, was a terror-suspect, either. He was known as a HR activist and nothing more. Yet, in Sri Lanka of the war years, HR activists and HR NGOs, including INGOs, were known to have facilitated movement of goods and cadres for the LTTE terror network. In specific cases, their vehicles were known to have been ‘taken over’ by the LTTE (confiscated or otherwise), and used to transport ready-to-explode explosives, especially to the Capital city of Colombo.

This is one sordid aspect of the ethnic war that is yet to be investigated by anyone, including the Sri Lankan Government. Instead, the latter was satisfied with banning the activities of INGOs, or curtailing their movement, as their numbers had grown over the decades of war and violence, and increasing, at times disproportionately, to the havoc wrought by the Boxer Day tsunami of 2004. A more thorough record-keeping on the part of the NGOs and the Government would instead have helped them both to serve the affected/afflicted people better.

Boosa, bagram and the bay

With the arrest of the three, Boosa camp is back in the news. News reports say that it’s there the three arrested persons were taken initially. To the uninitiated of the post-war era, Boosa was Bagram and Guantanamo Bay put together in the Sri Lanka of the Seventies and the Eighties. The interrogation methods in and the ever-incomplete list of ‘missing persons’ taken to Boosa may have been the single largest way the State security agencies ‘recruited’ ever-willing youthful cadres for the emerging ranks of Tamil militant groups at the time, and without effort.

The mention of Boosa is thus a cold, and at times, crude reminder of the air of permissiveness that had haunted the Tamil areas, particularly after the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983, which took thousands in toll. The question is if that air of permissiveness is returning to the Tamil North all over again – if it has not returned already – and if the need for a mention of Boosa just now is only a part of the process that had made the name read ‘historic’ in the annals of Tamil militancy.

Crude and crass as the Boosa interrogation might have been, it was preceded by an era of bank-robberies and attack on security forces by Tamil militant groups, competitive in their own ways, to make a mark, also to impress the unsure youth to fight for the ‘just cause’ (?) and join the heist-group in preference to the rest. As far back as the mid-Seventies, the infant LTTE had mauled Alfred Duraiappa, the popularly-elected Mayor of Jaffna, and investigating police officers of the crude and cruel calibre like Bastian Pillai, both fellow-Tamils. That ‘Pogrom 83′ was a product of an LTTE ambush that killed 13 soldiers is also recorded.

It is in this context that the ‘air of permissiveness’ in the Tamil areas needs to be properly understood. The security agencies have since claimed that in searching for LTTE absconder Gopi in Jeyakumari’s accommodation, they had recovered some weapons. This claim again may be contestable, yes, but it in such contestable claims by either side that an ‘air of permissiveness’ has had its origins in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, too.

By the time the contested ‘facts’ (?) are proved one way or the other, in episode after episode, the ‘air of permissiveness’ would have given way of a thicker air of hostility between the State and the community in question – an ‘air’ that could be shot across, leaving a gaping hole in the middle. It is this that the Government, the Tamil leadership and the HR activists should be concerned about even more. So should be the international community, which should be turning inward and asking questions.

‘White Van’ is back?

Whether it could be linked to the TNA-controlled Northern PC’s resolution, calling for an international inquiry into ‘accountability issues’, passed some time ago, is unclear. Yet, the detention of the three has since been accompanied by other reports, alleging the reappearance of ‘white van disappearances’, attack on police officers, rushing to answer a call of harassment of a woman, by unidentified persons, and a multi-ethnic protest against the UNHRC resolution in the strategically-located Trincomallee town, once propped up as the capital of a merged Tamil North-East – but mentioned no more in that context.

Elsewhere, as a part of the internal TNA one-upmanship and otherwise, senior leaders are reported to be organising mass protests in Tamil areas supporting the UNHRC resolution. In doing so, specific references are being made to the ‘last battle’ in Mullivaikkal, from where the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) had freed 300,000 Tamil civilians, held hostage by the LTTE. That the LTTE used them as human-shields and hence canon-fodder, literally, and that the SLA did not target any of those hapless civilians has been forgotten in a jiffy.

Velupillai Prabhakaran had crassly and cruelly designed the ‘human shield scheme’ through all of the 30-year war, and had built upon it, one civilian hostage over another, with every loss of LTTE cadre-life, by vowing to keep his/her orphaned parents under his personal care. This crudity has not even been acknowledged, either by the Tamils, the TNA or the international community. While the international community was sure that the LTTE was left with anything upward of 7000 fighting cadres even ahead of the end-game of the war, no mention has been made since about this background, if it was one, of the purported victims in that battle of Mullivaikkal. This does not mean that no ‘accountability issues’ existed on the side of the armed forces.

Worse than the ‘white van’ and attack on police officers – condemnable as the cause for future worsening of the ground situation – may be the casualness and sarcasm that seems to have accompanied a TNA member telling the Northern Provincial Council that if Gopi, the wanted man, was really an ex-LTTE cadre, he would not have missed his mark, the police officer who had reportedly gone to apprehend him. Though made in half-jest, it is a reflection of an era of casual, but at times deliberate, permissiveness and acceptance of such acts by the larger Tamil community that had once facilitated Tamil militancy to take deeper roots than would have been possible otherwise.

From adversity to hostility

If the UNHRC process in distant Geneva has achieved anything over the past two or three years, when it was all initiated, it is in regard to converting what was still continuing ethnic adversity in the post-war Sri Lanka into the ‘historic hostility’ between the communities, and between the Tamils and the State, which the LTTE had managed to infuse and induce, effortlessly, in its time. This is a trend that should have been discouraged and eschewed, instead.

In the name of ‘accountability’ and the rest, the world has given to a nation that was very badly in need of post-war confidence-building measures (CBM) between communities, a sure recipe for ethnic disaster. The Government and the TNA that were talking about a political settlement to the vexatious ethnic issue post-war, even if over-cautiously, stopped talking even about talks about talks, after the international community got ‘engaged’.

Today, to revive any talk about reviving ‘the’ talks would require another series of CBMs, which are both imaginative and effective. The ‘accountability’ investigations that the West wants, and a ‘truth and reconciliation commission’ of the South African variety, are anything but the CBM that will work on the ground. They could make the lurking ranks of ‘Tamil separatists’ overseas over-confident, and kill the confidence and morale of the Sri Lankan State, and not just the Government of the day, less than confident, nearer home than overseas.

Better or worse still, it could render the current crop of TNA moderates wanting to work within a ‘united Sri Lanka’ irrelevant. Sri Lanka’s stability is thus being threatened, and no easy ways being found even on the ‘accountability’ front, leave aside a permanent solution to the core aspects of the decades-old ethnic dispute. If anything, the entire issue and the Geneva vote are being ‘auctioned’ among the international community, not for ‘maximum effect’ but for ‘maximum support’. The Tamils back home seem to be learning their prime lesson in international diplomacy and deal-making. The blame of wanting to learn on the job of international diplomacy, and failing each time they attempt to be such quick-learners that the community is otherwise being credited with, should go to them.

Learning from experience

Going by the Sri Lanka-related events and developments on the global arena, it looks as if the international community has not learnt any lessons from the recent past in and of the country. Be it the Indian neighbour, or the distant Norway, or whoever had attempted to help resolve the ethnic issue, war or no war, had to give up after a point – or, were given up after a point. They did not understand Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans, starting with the Tamils, enough. In turn, Sri Lanka understood their ‘template models’ on level-playing ground, peace-building and ‘accountability’, even less.

It’s all based on and/or drawn from a society-specific culture that is unfortunately steeped in a divisive history. It is as hard to imbibe as it is harder to infuse another set of socio-political behaviour, which is the hallmark for any external model to work – and work wonders, too. The Sinhala-Tamil history would show that neither has learnt enough about the other, nor about themselves. For ‘outsiders’ thus to try and impose an ‘external model’ that has not worked elsewhere without being accompanied by disastrous, long-term consequences for the local stakeholders as nations and communities, cannot be imposed on Sri Lanka now – and expects positive results to flow from the same. It cannot be an ‘Orange Revolution’ in Sri Lanka. Such efforts can only end up as a ‘red revolution’, if at all, of the colour of the blood all over again.

thus for Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans to decide if they want to go back to those days with each other’s blood in their hands, or walk in unison, hand-in-hand, where possible, but at least with extended arms ready to shake rather than to battle, otherwise!

It’s the missing CBMs that they should be talking about between them just now – and not about somebody else’s diplomatic ICBMs of the sanctions variety, instead. After all, sanctions would affect the already afflicted Tamils even more than the rest of the Sri Lankan community, as it has done elsewhere, too. That is, unless of course, the sponsors of global sanctions, of whatever kind, have already decided to violate it themselves, to help the Tamils alone – which would push sovereignty issues to the forefront and push ‘accountability’ deeper still, eliminating a political resolution for good! It’s all about ‘the day after’, not just the past jutting into the present, and stopping there!

(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter, Delhi)

Courtesy: The Sunday Leader, Colombo, March 23, 2014

President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has today met the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Jacques Faure of France, and James Warlick of the United States of America – as well as Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk.

They discussed the current state of and prospects for peace talks over the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

(EurActiv) — The South Stream pipeline project, which carries Russian gas to Europe, bypassing Ukraine, may be “dead”, following the EU summit in which leaders decided that the Union should increase its energy independence from Russia.

The Italian oil major ENI, one of the key shareholders in South Stream, has second thoughts about the project, while the Russian tycoon presented as the winner of the tender to build the Bulgarian stretch of the pipeline, appears on the US blacklist adopted in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The US sanctions block Gennady Timchenko’s assets, and should prevent his firm from carrying out any transactions on EU territory, blocking the pipeline’s construction.

According to Reuters, Timchenko’s company, Stroystransgaz, has been chosen to build the Bulgarian part of the South Stream pipeline. Timchenko’s name does not appear on the EU’s own blacklist of persons, whose assets were frozen by European leaders on Friday.

The Russian businessman is reported to have a 63% share in Stroytransgaz.

The total cost for the construction of South Stream is estimated at €17 billion, while the pricetag for the Bulgarian sections is €3.5 billion.

Tender caught by surprise by US list?

Bulgaria’s energy minister, Dragomir Stoynev, however denied reports that Stroytransgaz had been awarded the tender. The Bulgarian daily Standart quoted him on Saturday as saying that he did not know who the winner would be.

The tender’s winner should have been announced on Friday, but the announcement was postponed until the following, week without explanation. Eleven companies had submitted bids for the tender.

The construction of the pipeline near the Bulgarian city of Varna, where the onshore section starts on EU soil, is expected to begin in June. Gazprom’s CEO, Alexey Miller, has said that the first gas to be carried by South Stream would reach Europe in December 2015.

The Bulgarian minority government, in which the socialists are the leading partner, still has hope for South Stream. The main opposition force, the centre-right GERB party of former prime minister Boyko Borisov, was one of the project’s promoters when he was in power.

But even before the US and EU sanctions were announced, Paolo Scaroni, the CEO of Italian energy company ENI, which is a key shareholder in South Stream, called the future of the pipeline “somewhat gloomy”. Besides Gazprom and ENI, the other shareholders are France’s EDF and Germany’s Wintershall.

Scaroni said the Ukraine crisis could threaten the complex permitting process for the project. “It will put into question the many authorisations that European countries must give to complete the project,” Scaroni said, Reuters reported on Thursday.

Earlier this month, Gazprom said Italy’s Saipem had secured deals worth €2 billion to build the first stage of the offshore section of the pipeline.

But on Friday, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy announced that EU leaders had decided to reduce energy dependency, “especially with Russia”, by reducing energy demand, diversifying supply routes and expanding “indigeneous” energy sources, particularly renewables. He did not mention opposition to any new Russian energy project, such as South Stream.

However, as EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger recently indicated, following the Crimea crisis, Brussels is no longer interested in mediating the legal imbroglio between the six EU countries participating in the South Stream project and Serbia, an EU candidate country (see background).

Between a rock and a hard place

Without EU backing, the six countries face the choice of carrying on with the South Stream project, and face procedures of infringement of EU law, or being sued by Russia for nor delivering on signed contracts.

One of the messages from the summit has been that facing Gazprom, individual EU countries stand no chance of obtaining any long-term advantage, as Gazprom, Russia’s gas export monopoly, which is majority-owned by the state, uses them as pawns in a “divide-and-rule” strategy with the Union.

The EU summit last Friday also gave its blessing to a €11-billon package over the next couple of years, to save Kyiv from bankruptcy, conveying the message that it would do its utmost for Ukraine to become a successful democracy.

If South Stream was to become reality, Russian gas flows would profit others. In 2012, 84 billion of cubic meters (bcm/y) of gas went through Ukraine. South Stream’s capacity is 64 bcm/y, meaning that most of the €2 billion yearly Ukrainian income from Russian transit taxes would be lost if the pipeline was built.

EU sources told EurActiv that South Stream was “certainly not a project where one would safely invest”, while EU sources quoted by The Daily Telegraph, said the project was “dead”.

By Paul Ciocoiu

The European Union and non-member countries in the region are supporting diplomatic efforts to put an end to the Ukrainian crisis and ensure a peaceful settlement of what many say is the worst impasse since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Despite the government’s steps to strengthen national defence, Kiev renewed calls for a diplomatic solution. Officials in the region also agree that diplomacy has to be the sole means to solve the Ukrainian crisis.

“Dialogue has a determinant role in settling this deadlock; neither armed forces nor other forms of pressure should be involved,” Laszlo Borbely, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in Romania’s parliament, told SETimes. “I am not a big fan of sanctions, but EU had to send Russia a clear signal so it forces it to sit at the negotiation table.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed documents that formally annexed the Crimea Peninsula to Russia, despite objections from Ukraine and western states.

Ukraine officials, meanwhile, formally signed a political association agreement with the European Union — the same document that President Viktor Yanukovych rejected, triggering Kiev’s original political crisis that led to widespread protests. Yanukovych fled Ukraine rather than face charges for the deaths of demonstrators and has taken refuge in Russia.

As part of the diplomatic efforts to tackle the standoff in Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dispatched a team of observers from different countries, including Romania, Turkey and Albania. Moscow continues to reject the observers in Crimea.

“On behalf of the OSCE, I express readiness to mediate in the dialogue for the sake of peace and stability,” said the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Ranko Krivokapic. “Ukraine is currently at historical turning point. In any case, political change and development of the country in any way must not threaten its territorial integrity.”

Albert Rakipi, executive director of the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS), told SETimes that Albania’s participation with two observers in the OSCE mission is a demonstration of the country’s positive will and support for all the Western policies regarding Ukraine.

“This is part of a more active concept in the foreign policy,” Rakipi said.

Diplomats and other high-ranking officials have been visiting Kiev to discuss the situation in Crimea.

Moldova’s Prime Minister Iurie Leanca voiced “a message of support and solidarity with Ukraine on the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” while visiting Kiev last week. He had discussions with Ukraine’s Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Verkhovna Rada (parliament) Speaker, acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, MPs Vitali Klitschko and Petro Poroshenko, according to Moldova’s government website.

Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Titus Corlatean also met with Turchynov, Yatsenyuk and his counterpart Andriy Deshchytsya in Kiev last week. The two sides signed a deal to enhance trust and security between Romania and Ukraine which mostly regulates organisation of military drills in the areas close to the common border.

While visiting Kiev, Corlatean also met the Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland, and Austria’s Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz to discuss peaceful solutions of the crisis.

Earlier, Greece Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Evangelos Venizelos, whose country holds the EU’s rotating presidency, and Bulgaria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Kristian Vigenin visited Kiev to urge self-restraint, calmness and dialogue within international law between Ukraine and Russia.

Macedonia is also looking at Ukraine with concern, officials in Skopje said.

“Macedonia calls for taking all necessary measures for immediate calming of tensions and the need to establish political dialogue on all issues facing the citizens of Ukraine, and whose resolution is necessary by involvement of all sides. Macedonia calls for restraint and responsibility in these critical times for Ukraine,” said Macedonia’s foreign ministry statement to SETimes.

Former Macedonian Ambassador in London, Risto Nikovski, said the events in Ukraine call for a firm global reaction.

“This is a European and world event,” Nikovski told SETimes. “This is a serious change and serious earthquake. What happens there, Macedonia and other countries in the region should condemn, because there it is a fight for territory and dominant influence. Here we have violation of the norms of international behaviour by interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine.”

Correspondents Miki Trajkovski in Skopje and Linda Karadaku in Tirana contributed to this report.

By Ebrahim Omar

Qatar recently issued a new law that tightens license and registration requirements for real estate developers and requires that investors have a clean criminal record.

Law No. 6 of 2014, issued in mid-March by Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, also toughens requirements for those managing construction projects.

Under the new law, developers who operate without a license or sell housing units fraudulently can be imprisoned for a year and fined 50,000 Qatari riyals ($13,700). Those who fail to start a project within six months of its approval date may be fined up to 200,000 Qatari riyals ($54,600).

The law can curb recurring problems such as late delivery of projects, and clearly identifies the parties authorised to carry out real estate sector development, said Roots Real Estate general manager Ahmed al-Arouqi.

“The continuation of such problems would present the real estate sector with more challenges in the future, especially with the construction boom taking place in Qatar, which opened the door for the meddlesome and inexperienced to work in the real estate sector,” he told Al-Shorfa.

“The law restricts work to those with expertise and financial solvency, which is a great step to protect the real estate sector,” he said.

“Issuing permits for real estate development and monitoring completion rates by government institutions are all steps that provide investors with the confidence their projects are safe,” he said.
Added protection for all parties

The law protects all parties involved in the construction sector, including developers, investors and banks, said Qatari businessman Nasser Sulaiman Haider.

“The law has regulated the sale and purchase of real estate in the early stages and eliminated fraud,” he told Al-Shorfa. “It also has guaranteed the rights of those who buy ready-made residential units, and those who have hired contractors to construct luxury homes.”

On the other hand, he said, the law presents a stumbling block to speculators and amateur contractors and brokers.

The new law provides a reference point for those working in the real estate sector, said Abdulaziz al-Hammadi, the general manager of Iqar development and investment firm.

It will serve to lessen potential conflicts, particularly in light of Qatar’s real estate boom and its preparations for the 2022 World Cup, he said, in addition to protecting real estate wealth, the national economy and citizens who wish to build their homes without manipulation or fraud.

By Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira

Russia’s actions towards Ukraine and Crimea have inaugurated a New Cold War in Russia’s relations, and it will inevitably change Russia’s relations with the states in its Near Abroad, and the West. One of the priority projects of Vladimir Putin, especially since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012, has been the evolution of the Eurasian Customs Union (2010) and the Associated Economic Space (2012). As a part of this process, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia aim to sign the founding documents on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014. The parties thus plan to launch the Eurasian Union in January 2015. The present article demonstrates how the February revolution in Ukraine, and especially the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, challenges the Eurasian project. In particular, the interpretation of the Eurasian initiatives as Russia’s hegemonic project directed towards states in its Near Abroad has gained increased prominence.

The vision over the Eurasian project as Russia’s counterweight to the European Union (EU) influence over countries in Russia’s Near Abroad has become more significant as well. In contrast, valuable features of the Eurasian Customs Union and Economic Space as primarily pragmatism-driven, efficiency-oriented initiatives, have been downplayed. Eventually, such a refocusing of the Eurasian project undermines Russia’s perspective of projecting the political integration among the post-Soviet space on another level.

The Many Faces of the Eurasian Project

Eurasian Customs Union has been a priority of Vladimir Putin since his presidential campaign in 2011. According to then Prime Minister Putin, the Eurasian Customs Union represented “a model of a powerful supranational union, capable to become one of the poles of the modern world, and linking Europe and the Asia-Pacific region”.1

In reality, however, the Eurasian Customs Union and the Associated Economic Space have been as ambiguous as they have been ambitious, and the project seemed to evolve around changing central themes. Among such faces of the Eurasian Customs Union and the Associated Economic Space were (a) the initial emphasis on the effectiveness and economic pragmatism, (b) the global outlook of the project and associated aspirations to act as bridge between the EU and regional organizations in Asia-Pacific, (c) Russia’s regional hegemony project and (d) Russia-led aspirations to create a project capable of acting as a counterweight to the EU’s influence in its Near Abroad.2

Initially, Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in August 2012 provided an important impetus for the effectiveness and pragmatism as central driving force of the Eurasian project: Vladimir Putin declared that the Economic Space was to be guided by norms and principles of the WTO.3 The rapid evolution of the Customs Union and the Economic Space, including the implementation of the Customs Union Code and the establishment of the Eurasian Commission in November 2011, as well as the Court and the Crisis Fund, supported this particular vision of the project.

In this sense, Eurasian Customs Union differed from the other post-Soviet institutions characterized by ineffectiveness and inertia. Early on, Moscow emphasized the “Asian” facet of the Eurasian Customs Union, namely the prospect for strengthening ties with the Asia-Pacific – a dimension of the project reinforced by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Vladivostok in September 2012. However, such a global outlook was undermined by shift in perspective toward using the Eurasian Customs Union as a political and strategic counterweight to the EU.

In addition, internal disagreements prevailed among members when it came to the political vision of the project. Specifically, Russia’s insistence on the exclusion of the trade in oil and natural gas from the provisions regulating the Customs Union and Economic Space frustrated Belarus and Kazakhstan.

At the same time, the way the new participants were attracted to the project contradicted the idea of economic pragmatism and effectiveness. Remarkable examples of Russia’s non-pragmatic interpretation of this project was the “integration discount” offered to Belarus in 2012,4 Russia’s assertive gas diplomacy, and a range of other measures regarding Armenia, which announced aspirations to join the Eurasian Customs Union to the detriment of the integration with the EU in September 2013.5 The most recent example of such intensive and continuous Russia’s foreign policy activism vis-à-vis states in its Near Abroad was the large-scale campaign targeting Ukraine, aimed to reorient it from signing the Association Agreement with the EU. Russia’s actions became especially focused on Ukraine prior to the EU’s Eastern Partnership Vilnius summit in November 2013, where the Association Agreement was to be signed. In this light, the hegemonic dimension and the dimension of a counterweight to the EU is the only explanation that consistently accounts for Russian foreign policy.

Ukraine as a Challenge to the Eurasian Project

In spite of the importance assigned to Ukraine in Russia’s integration project, the February 2014 revolution, the Crimea referendum on 16 March 2014, and the region’s subsequent accession to the Russian Federation made the accession of Ukraine to the Eurasian Customs Union highly unlikely. To those Ukrainians supporting integration with the EU, participation in the Eurasian project decision was never acceptable,6 while a large part of those supporting the decision had to review their position after Crimea’s referendum. To pro-Russia Ukrainians, rapprochement with the motherland is not associated with the loss of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.7

Eventually, after Moscow used all its soft and hard power instruments, it could still not count on Ukraine as a building block of the Eurasian project, which would have instilled new dynamism into this initiative and eventually improved its global perspectives. At this moment, the events in Ukraine raise a question on the actual character of the Eurasian project: is the rejection of the Eurasian integration limited to Ukraine, or does it have a spill-over effect on other post-Soviet states as well? The question is especially relevant considering the large population of Russian- speakers in the member states of the Eurasian Customs Union. Also related, is there a possibility of upholding the initial prospects of the Eurasian project as an efficiency-oriented initiative, which brings the integration among the post-Soviet states on a new level?

As for economic effective-ness and pragmatism, Ukraine’s February revolution and the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation radically challenged these two features originally underpinning the Eurasian project. Firstly, Russia’s propaganda campaign in Ukraine, the involvement in Ukraine’s revolution, and Russia’s actions in Crimea overall were certainly not a matter of economic calculations.

President Vladimir Putin’s recurring statements on the duty to protect the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and the “betrayal” if Russia failed to do so8 are illustrative. Secondly, the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation implies significant costs for Russia, including a large-scale modernization and the establishment of the water, gas and electricity supply routes from Russia, which are especially significant given the high unemployment rate and the necessary welfare payments to the population on the peninsula.

Thirdly and most importantly, after Crimea it is hard to believe in effectiveness and pragmatism as the major driving force of any Russia’s foreign policy actions. Mistrust will inevitably increase among Eurasian Union participants, notwithstanding Russia’s insistence of the formally equal status of all the members. To other member states in the would-be zone, Russia’s hegemonic position in the Eurasian Union will be associated with a loss of sovereignty. Such tensions dominate the project already, and they are visible in disagreements among the participants about the amount of Russia’s subsidies and trade exceptions for the sensitive products, such as oil, gas, tobacco, and alcohol. Eventually, the interpretation of the Eurasian project as based on economic efficiency is dubious. For this to become the driving force of the project, Moscow would need to invest a lot of time restoring the credibility of its integration intentions and of the adherence to the implementation of the agreed provisions. As for the member states of the future Eurasian Union, if their political leaders decide to move on with the project, this particular step will need additional clarification and explanations vis-à-vis their own populations.

More importantly, Ukraine’s 2014 February revolution brought the political dimension of the Eurasian project under even more strain. Even before, the disagreements between members were significant: while supported and promoted in Moscow, the political dimension of the project was constantly rejected in Belarus and Kazakhstan. This is the case of the supranational Eurasian Council; or the Eurasian Parliament, an idea launched by the President of Russia’s Duma in 2012, which was not supported in Belarus or Kazakhstan. Both countries always insisted on the room of maneuver in terms of foreign policy, and Moscow’s calls for a monetary union have not received much of a reply.

Ukraine’s February revolution demonstrates, once again, how much the positions of the members can diverge. Back in 2010, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, a country widely acclaimed as Russia’s closest ally, caused for a diplomatic crisis with Kyrgyzstan by hosting the ousted Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. This action not only confirmed Lukashenko’s antagonist stance to the color revolutions, but also stood in contrast with Moscow’s official position. In March 2014, the Belarusian president once again demonstrated a position diverging from Moscow’s, by recognizing the territorial integrity of Ukraine and his willingness to dialogue with the leadership of Ukraine, considered “illegal” in Russia.9

Kazakhstan’s leadership was more reserved, limiting itself to stressing the economic dimension as the only direction of the Eurasian project. All these actions seemed to reinforce the preexisting mistrust in the political integration and supranational institutions in the Eurasian project.10

At this point, it is premature to announce the political death and disappearance of the Eurasian project. How- ever, the Ukrainian revolution and the referendum in Crimea seem to move this initiative closer to its predecessors in a range of Russian-led initiatives in the post- Soviet space. Unless countered with Moscow’s readiness to invest its time, effort and money in new measures to promote integration and bring the other members more fully on board, the prospects of the Eurasian project are uncertain. The proclaimed intentions of the three countries, scheduled to bring tangible results as soon as 2015, do not guarantee that the planned agreements will be eventually implemented. This means that the Eurasian project, de facto, is in danger of being reduced to the shadow financial transfers between Moscow, on the one hand, and Minsk, Kazakhstan and potentially Yere- van, on the other hand, in the face of the increasingly dif- ferent interests – and fears – of its participants.

About the author:
Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira
Research Unit in Political Science and International Relations (NICPRI), University of Minho. Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira’s Post-Doctoral research is financed by FCT [SFRH/BPD/63834/2009], as it is her research within the framework of the project on EU Partnerships [PTDC/CPJ-CPO/113251/2009].

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoint 142, March 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF),

Notes:
1. Vladimir Putin, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making” (Izvestia, 3 October 2011).
2. ‘Near Abroad’ is a term of Russia’s political vocabulary referring to the states which emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where Russia claims to have special interests.
3. Vladimir Putin, “Russia’s accession to the WTO” (Interfax, 11 November 2011).
4. The accession of Belarus to the Eurasian Customs Union was accompanied by the lowering of the gas price to US$ 165.6 per 1000m3. See Alena Vieira and João Mourato Pinto, “EU’s Eastern Partnership, the Russia-led Integration Initiatives in the post-Soviet Space, and the Options of the ‘States-in-
Between’” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 127, June 2013).
5. Michael Emerson and Hrant Kostanyan, “Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership and replace it with a disastrous neighborhood policy of his own” (CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2013)..
6. According to Razumkov Center polls, about 30% were in favor of joining the Russia-led Custom Union, while at least 40% were supporting integration with the EU, throughout 2011-2013. Razumkov Centre, “What integration course for Ukraine?” (2014).
7. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that according to Kiev’s International Sociology Institute (KISS) polls about 26% support Ukraine’s unification with Russia. KISS, “What kind of relations do Ukrainians what with Russians?” (2014).
8. Vladimir Putin, “Otkaz ot pomoshchi v Krymu byl by predatel’stvom” [Refusing help to Crimea would equal betrayal]. (Vzglyad, 18 March 2014).
9. Ukraine’s economic and trade importance to Belarus should be emphasized in this respect: Ukraine account for about 10% of the Belarusian exports (BBC Russian, 12 March 2014).
10. Shanna Kanafina, “EvrAzEC: Kuda stremitsya troika” [EurAaEC: where are the three states heading to] (Karavan, 7 March 2014).

By Michael Lombardi

Compared to the past two years, the U.S. housing market will not have a great year in 2014.

In fact, key indicators are now pointing to a top in the housing market recovery:

The National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index fell to 47 in March, coming down more than 16% from 56 in January. (Source: National Association of Home Builders, March 17, 2014.) When this index is below 50, homebuilders view housing market conditions to be poor. This tells me that those who are closest to the housing market—the homebuilders—are becoming concerned.

And existing-home sales are declining. Existing-homes sales in the U.S. housing market fell 7.1% in February from a year ago and registered at the lowest pace since July of 2012. January’s existing-home sales were disappointing, too.

The backbone of any housing market recovery, first-time homebuyers, continue to be absent from the recovery. The president of the National Association of Realtors was quoted as saying, “The biggest problems for first-time buyers are tight credit and limited inventory in the lower price ranges… In our recent consumer survey, 56% of younger buyers who took longer to save for a down payment identified student debt as the biggest obstacle.” (Source: “February Existing-Home Sales Remain Subdued,” National Association of Realtors, March 20, 2014.)

(At least he didn’t blame the poor weather conditions as the reason homes sales declined in February!)

Sadly, potential home buyers have more troubles coming their way, as interest rates are expected to rise. Between February of 2013 and February of 2014, the 30-year fixed mortgage rate, tracked by Freddie Mac, has increased by 22%, from 3.53% to 4.30%. What happens if mortgage rates go up to five or six percent as they were in 2007? Home buyers will run further away from the market because homes will become even more unaffordable for them.

With homebuilders’ confidence plunging, demand for homes declining, and home buyers facing rising mortgage rates, the real estate market is in for a weak 2014, possibly even a contraction.

This article Why the U.S. Housing Market Is Headed for Trouble in 2014 was originally posted at Profit Confidential