By Andrew Korybko

Ukraine is in the throes of an imminent human rights crisis, as the red flags of oppression are visible to all objective observers that care to acknowledge the obvious. The near-death beating of Oleg Tsarev and the intimidation of Mikhail Dobkin, both Eastern Ukrainian presidential candidates, are proof, if any more was even needed, that the upcoming “elections” in Ukraine will be neither honest nor representative of the population at large. On top of that, the Kiev junta’s military operations against the pro-reform activists in the east accentuate the violent oppression that has become characteristic of EuroMaidan and its coup plotters. With all of this occurring, the West is ignobly turning a blind eye towards the same human rights values it bombastically (in a literal sense) promoted in Resistant and Defiant (R&D) states such Serbia and Libya.

Distractions from Democracy

The most visible hallmarks of a democracy are its rule of law and respect of democratic processes, neither of which are present in most of Ukraine at the moment. It is only in the east, where concerned civilians are protesting the undemocratic seizure of power by the junta and demanding a political referendum, that such values are present. The West is ironically ignoring the fact that these people, not the $5 billion recipients of “democracy” in the Western half of the country, are the ones truly upholding democratic principles. This is due to Russophobia and an aversion to anything and anyone that is in any way positively affiliated with Russia, as many of the Eastern activists speak Russian as their native language and are biasedly lumped together as “pro-Russian” because of this. Such a label carries implicit Russophobia, since it discredits the democratic pro-reform activists in the eyes of the casual Western observer and falsely objectifies them as “Russian agents” and “separatists”. Through information management tactics, the West is pursuing the strategy of distracting their audience (and most importantly, their own citizens) from the fact that democracy is being defended in the east, and their “dog in the fight”, the illegal junta, is actually the largest hypocrite of “Western values” in Europe since Croatia’s Tudman (also a strong Western ally during the Yugoslav Wars).

The Dark Side of Western-Imposed “Democracy”

While the public is distracted from the defense of democracy in the east and misleadingly deflected towards thinking that the junta is some kind of democratic council, the dark side of Western-imposed “democracy” hangs heavy over the east’s head. On a high-level application, the tragic events that have befallen Tsarev and Dobkin are highly symbolic of a coordinated campaign of fear and intimidation against the citizens of Ukraine’s east.

Violence against presidential candidates, especially those representing minority interests to a certain extent, is always condemned when it happens in the West. It is not difficult to imagine the outrage and 24-hour media coverage that would ensue if an African-American or Hispanic presidential aspirant in the US was savagely beaten close to death by a white nationalist mob, which would be the closest Western equivalent of what happened to Tsarev. Forcibly stopping Dobkin’s vehicle and assaulting his aides is absolutely contrary to Western ideals, and pouring anti-septic solution on a presidential candidate in the US would likely result in a jail sentence, not freedom from an investigation. Although the junta is paying lip service to Tsarev’s victimization by announcing an investigation, it is likely to only be one in the nominal sense, as “the inmates are running the asylum” and even if caught, the perpetrators are only facing the slap-on-the-wrist charge of hooliganism.

The Impact of Intimidation

The aggression against Tsarev and Dobkin victimizes many more people than just those two. A free and fair vote cannot occur when candidates are physically intimidated and nearly killed on the street by mob violence. Having this happen to candidates sends a strong statement to their representative supporters that they too can be targeted and that no one is untouchable. This is worse than the previous widespread tearing down of Lenin statues, which besides symbolizing anti-communist lustration, can also be seen as intrinsically anti-Russian. The anti-Russian mob violence has now spread from being directed against symbolic objects to symbolic people. With Russian-affiliated individuals, especially political ones, being under threat by the militant Pravy Sector, the Ukrainian government should have provided the two presidential candidates with some sort of protection. Why were Tsarev and Dobkin denied the same sense of security that Tymoshenko has?

A truly representative election cannot occur when a significant minority that represents the geographic and economic majority, as well as their presidential candidates, is intimidated and the state is helpless or unwilling to help. The attacks against Tsarev and Dobkin can be seen as a type of anti-Russian lustration designed to scare their supporters. This adds support to the argument that federalization is the only means of guaranteeing that these individuals can be justly represented within the larger Ukrainian state. Without federalization and constitutional reform, the same cycle of nationalist mob violence and intimidation will only continue and get worse each time, until it finally culminates in a huge tragedy.

Kiev’s “Tank Democracy”

Russia’s commissioner for Human Rights, Konstantin Dolgov, accurately described the political system in Ukraine when it called it “the Maidan tank democracy”. The junta’s use of force against the Eastern pro-federalization activists is not only immoral and criminal, but it is being committed under totally false pretexts. The only expression of democracy witnessed on the side of the regime during this time is the willingness of some soldiers to choose defection and join the side of the protesters. Rather than speaking honestly and saying that they want to crush all dissent to their regime, the junta is trying to legitimize their actions under the pretexts of an “anti-terrorist operation”. When a “governing” authority is using deadly force against its own citizens under the false and misleading pretext of “anti-terrorism” (in order to desperately retain its tenuous foreign-supported $5 billion clasp on power), it is an affront to all the people in the world currently fighting against real terrorist insurgencies, particularly in Syria.

In showing no hesitancy in breaking fundamental norms of international law within view of the entire world, it is small wonder that the citizens of the east would feel frightened that the junta would continue to trample upon human rights in the corners of Ukraine where no media observers were present. The junta has shown that it will resort to force to resolve political deadlocks and opposition. Instead of freely allowing a referendum on creating a federation and let it pass or fail by democratic means, they are violently suppressing it by force. Ukraine is sadly beginning to behave like a Cold-War era third-world dictatorship, albeit one brought to power by mercenary snipers. As dictatorship after dictatorship have learned throughout history, genuine people’s movements do not die when their advocates die, and military force only hardens the resolve of the resistance to the regime.

More Silence, More Suffering, More Shams

The violence against presidential candidates and the killing of civilians under false and manipulated pretexts has to be taken together and cannot be separated. A coordinated push at full-spectrum intimidation and broad collective punishment for the Russian-populated east is in effect. This is in essence a combined geographic and race-based “flogging”. Under such oppressive circumstances, “elections” have no hope of being fair, free, representative, or honest, and they thus become nothing more than a ballot-stuffing ritual for the junta’s predetermined victors. The larger tragedy is that all of this could have been avoided had Yanukovich been able to serve out his term and Ukraine democratically vote for the change that it wanted in 2015. Due to foreign meddling and covert destabilization, this is unfortunately not the case, and a human rights crisis is unfolding in front of the world’s eyes under the management of the CIA. To make matters worse, the West’s silence is only increasing the suffering of the victims, and by choosing to ignore the human rights violations against the east, it is proving that its selective enforcement of the “Responsibility to Protect” and “Humanitarian Intervention” doctrines was never anything more than a simple sham to sell war.

Andrew Korybko is the American Master’s Degree student at the Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO).

By Cornelis van Zweeden

Croatia will implement wide-ranging economic reforms to improve the economy, which has declined since 2008. The package, sparked by pressure from the European Commission (EC), will focus on reforming the labour market, improving public finances and restoring competitiveness.

“We are strongly committed to structural reforms, without which it will be difficult to create healthy conditions for economic recovery and growth,” Dubravka Belas, a government spokesperson, told SETimes.

Details of the reforms will be revealed by the end of this month, Belas said.

Last month, the EC urged Croatia make improvements, saying the country faced “excessive macro-economic imbalances, which require strong policy action.”

However, pressure from Brussels should prove to be a bonus in the medium term, analysts said. “We expect EU membership to further strengthen Croatia’s institutional framework in ways that benefit its credit profile,” Atsi Sheth, vice president at the ratings agency Moody’s, told SETimes.

Upon its entry to the Union in 2013, Croatia gained access to the huge EU internal market. At the same time, access to neighbouring countries’ markets such as Bosnia and Herzegovina became more difficult as Croatia was obliged to leave the Central European Free Trade Agreement.

“This impedes the role exports could play in Croatia’s economic recovery,” Sheth said.

Although the EC survey offered a grim reading, officials in Brussels said there is room for optimism.

“We believe that Croatia also has areas of strength, such as the banking sector, which has proved resilient during the five-year recession,” Simon O’Connor, an EC spokesperson, told SETimes.

“Banks are well capitalised and capable to absorb negative shocks,” O’Connor said. The Institute of Economics in Zagreb said it was expecting investments to pick up by 2.6 percent this year.

“The adoption of the law on strategic investments should facilitate investments,” Dubravka Alibegovic, the institute’s director, told SETimes.

Alen Kovac, the chief economist at Erste Bank in Zagreb, said tourism revenues are promising.

“The sector has been developing well, even throughout the crisis, and we continue to see it as a lasting supportive factor,” Kovac told SETimes.

The country’s access to 8.2 billion euros in EU funds for the 2014-2020 period is a “big mid-term opportunity,” he added.

The amount of EU aid available through 2020 is eight times more than the pre-accession funding Croatia was entitled to in the 2007-2013 period.

Croatia used just 56 percent of the pre-accession funds, but the remainder can be accessed until 2016, O’Connor said.

According to the EC, optimal use of the funds could increase the country’s GDP by 3 percent. EU funds are available for capacity-enhancing projects that do not easily attract commercial money.

“We expect to see EU funds used for the development of the railway infrastructure and the logistics business,” Kovac said.

By Vishal Chandra

I want my vote to be valid and safe; meaning no one should be given a chance to commit wrong. Whoever wins, I will accept it. It doesn’t matter if it’s Abdullah, Zalmai or Ghani. – An Afghan farmer, Kabul, Tolo News

On April 5, 2014, the Afghan nation voted to elect what is supposed to be the country’s first post-ISAF and post-Karzai government. This was the third time that presidential and provincial council elections were held in the country since the overthrow of the Taliban regime over a decade ago. The entire election process, however, is supposed to conclude with the third round of parliamentary elections which should be due sometime next year. This basically means that the April elections mark the beginning of a long-drawn complex process extending over a year. The whole exercise in due course will test the strength and credibility of the Afghan institutions and the resolve of the Afghan people to take the political process to its logical conclusion.

Fragile Hope

It is not merely about change in leadership; it is about ushering the country into a ‘decade of transformation’ (2015-24) by further institutionalising a relatively inclusive political culture which could cater to the rising scepticism as well as aspirations among the Afghan people. It is about building a political order which is in tune with the changing socio-political realities, mindful of the several challenges ahead, the most important being, how to keep the international community engaged. Like the incumbent president, the next leadership in Kabul too will have to confront similar challenges: managing divergent perceptions and factional interests, competing patronage networks and parallel power structures at the sub-national level, seemingly irreconcilable ideological positions of the Pakistan-sponsored Haqqani-Taliban network and, most critically, sustaining the current constitutional framework to the extent possible.

The most immediate challenge before the incumbent government and the relevant election and security institutions is to sustain and strengthen the people’s engagement in the process. It is about institutionalising the trust and confidence that the Afghan people have shown in the democratic exercise, which now depends on the integrity and strength of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the ability of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) to address violations of various kinds and at every level of the process in a timely and convincing manner. The success of April 2014 elections could soon turn into fatal despair if both Afghans and the international community fail to take advantage of the political momentum generated by the election process to further build on the achievements of the past decade.

Compared to the previous two presidential elections held in 2004 and 2009, the April 2014 elections are largely seen as elections with a difference, especially in terms of its timing, background profile of presidential candidates, increased popular participation and a surprisingly low level of violence on the polling day. Though it is still too early to fully assess its overall impact in terms of giving a new direction to the Afghan polity, nevertheless, the election process witnessed unprecedented surge in voter registration and voter turnout, increased women’s participation, wider media coverage including televised presidential debates, youth and civil society activism, support from various local religious heads and, most importantly, the process hardly saw any direct political interference from outside. The preparation for elections was entirely managed by institutions manned and led by Afghans. The Afghan security institutions too, particularly the national army, police and the intelligence, made all out efforts to create conducive security environment across the country for the electorates to exercise their right. As per the preliminary estimates, about seven million of the 12 million or nearly 58 per cent of the eligible voters participated in the polling process, which is said to be the highest since the first presidential election held in October 2004. However, these figures are provisional and could be revised as more information trickle in. The preliminary results are expected to be announced by the IEC on April 24, followed by final results by May 14.

The cross-ethnic/factional alliances that most of the presidential candidates have attempted by nominating vice-presidential nominees from diverse socio-political backgrounds, could be interpreted in three ways: firstly, the idea is to overcome various political limitations and electoral vulnerabilities due to the polarised nature of the Afghan polity; secondly, the inevitability of networking with dominant sub national power structures to extend government’s influence to the provinces as well as to keep the potential opposition under check; and thirdly, the need to strengthen one’s legitimacy and credibility as a political actor both at the domestic and external level by widening the support base.

Interestingly, all eight presidential candidates in the fray are Pashtuns including Dr Abdullah who is part Pashtun and part Tajik. The Pahstun tribal dynamics in the south could play a relatively strong role compared to previous elections, though old commanders and leaders particularly from the minority ethnic groups in central and northern Afghanistan would continue to have a significant role at a more operation level. It was too obvious that almost all the candidates formed coalitions keeping an eye on diverse ethnic interests, and regional and local power dynamics. For instance, Dr Abdullah, former foreign minister and earlier a close aide of former Jamiat commander Ahmed Shah Masoud, has Mohammad Khan, a Pashtun and a member of the political wing of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, and Mohammad Mohaqiq, a veteran Hazara leader from Hezb-e Wahdat, as his vice presidential compatriots. Similarly, Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai, formerly World Bank executive and later finance minister and chairman of the Transition Commission of Afghanistan, who along with Abdullah is considered to be among top contenders, has influential Uzbek commander from Jowzjan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Sarwar Danish, a Hazara and former justice minister, as his vice presidential candidates. A glance through the profiles of vice presidential nominees of leading candidates suggest that they could be potential power brokers as efforts to either avoid possible runoff as part of a deal between the top two contenders or to negotiate post-poll alliances gather momentum. In fact, presidential candidatures often are a kind of mini-coalition when seen together with the politically influential background of the vice-presidential co-nominees.

Continuing Challenges

The unexpectedly low level of violence across the country, though encouraging, says more than what is being generally understood. The string of high profile and well-coordinated attacks, including those within the Kabul city, carried out by the Afghan Taliban and their allies in the run up to the April election, suggests that the huge presence of Afghan army and police could not have alone deterred the Taliban from disrupting the process. For the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban leadership and the Haqqani network, it is a continuing struggle against a West-sponsored political process which simply does not fit into their ideological or socio-political narrative. There is a huge psychological side to the ongoing war where favourable public perception and ground support is considered critical for success by all sides. The Haqqani-Taliban leadership are apparently gauging the mood of the nation by closely observing people’s response to the election process. Causing massive casualties among the masses on the polling day would have only worked against the Taliban in view of the enthusiastic response of the people in general and the tremendous faith voters displayed in the national security forces, which have so far shown resilience despite the looming uncertainty and several logistical deficiencies.

President Karzai’s ambivalence over the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US might have inadvertently helped in turning the nation’s attention to the significance of the April elections as the last available option to prevent the country from sliding into a civil war. Karzai’s aggressive posturing on BSA could not have been merely on account of his personal anger at the West. Certain tactical political considerations may have dictated his approach on the issue as he tried to develop a more independent foreign policy and also renewed his efforts for reconciliation with the Taliban. However, when one looks at the wider picture, particularly the trans-border nature of the armed opposition in Afghanistan and developments within Pakistan especially regarding Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s ongoing reconciliation initiative towards Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, there is no credible reason to believe that there will be any let up in violent attacks by the Haqqani-Taliban network inside Afghanistan. In fact, Taliban are most likely to rather intensify their strategy of carrying out high profile attacks against government structures across the country, irrespective of the outcomes of the April elections.

As the possibility of a run off between two top presidential contenders remain high, and more and more complaints of electoral fraud starts coming in, the Afghan Taliban and their backers within the Pakistani military establishment would be keen to exploit political dissatisfaction that might subsequently set in. Notably, none of the ‘former’ Taliban, particularly those who are based and relatively active inside Afghanistan, joined the presidential fray. The position and perception of the dominant hardcore segment within the Taliban is most unlikely to change, a clear indicator of the looming threat to the next government in Kabul from across the Durand Line. Political stability and sustainable economic growth will thus continue to elude Afghanistan unless the political transition is perceived as legitimate by the people and a functional balance of power emerges within the country with the formation of the next government.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/BallotoverBulletinAfghanistan_vchandra_180414

The extraordinary and gratuitous brutality of Islamist terrorists in Syria, the progressive destabilization of West Asia, as well as the cumulative disengagement of the West – led by the US – from Afghanistan, have pushed South Asian conflicts out of the focus of international attention.

The process has been enormously enabled by broadly, often dramatically, declining trends in violence and fatalities in this region, suggesting a generally positive direction of change. In many theatres, virulent and enduring movements of terrorism and widespread armed violence have receded, though much remains unresolved. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database total terrorism and insurgency linked fatalities in South Asia have dropped from a peak of 29,638 (of which 15,565 were in Sri Lanka alone) in 2009, to just 6,668 in 2013. 1,343 persons have already been killed across the region in the first quarter of 2014, suggesting a continuation of this trend, though developments in the AfPak region have significant disruptive potential in the foreseeable future.

In particular, Sri Lanka has seen no terrorism-linked fatalities after 2009, the year in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were comprehensively defeated, and which saw a peak of at least 15,565 fatalities, according to partial data compiled by SATP. An international network of surviving LTTE elements and sympathisers in the Diaspora continue with propaganda activities, including strident posturing in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu, but the capacity for violence on Sri Lankan soil has been entirely obliterated.

Similarly, fatalities in Nepal have collapsed from a 2002 peak of 4,896, with a sharp deceleration in violence after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 2006, which brought the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) over-ground and into the Parliamentary process, subsequently to form a Government after the Constituent Assembly elections of April 2008. Sporadic violence by various splinter groups, including a proliferation of armed formations in the Madhesh region, persisted in the years following, but 2013 recorded no insurgency-linked fatalities, and this remains the case in the first quarter of 2014.

Bangladesh has also seen enormous containment of terrorist formations, with the decimation of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami – Bangladesh (HuJI-BD) after the serial bombings of August 2005. However, street violence by an 18-Party Opposition combine led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and including radical Islamist formations, claimed at least 379 lives in 2013. The Islamist radical combine, prominently including Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI-BD) and its student wing, the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS), Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Hizb-ut-Towhid, has sustained violent demonstrations and a campaign of murderous attacks in protest against the successive convictions of senior JeI leaders for War Crimes during the 1971 War of Liberation, and the execution on these charges of Abdul Qader Mollah, the notorious ‘butcher of Mirpur’ and Assistant Secretary General, JeI, on December 12, 2013. A January 2014 General Election that saw a boycott by the combined Opposition, resulted in Shiekh Hasina’s Awami League (AL) securing a whopping 79.14 per cent of the vote and 234 of 300 seats in Parliament, with various allies winning the remaining seats. The legitimacy of the elections has been questioned both by the domestic Opposition and by the international community, as a result of the boycott, but Prime Minister Hasina has remained adamant that a voluntary boycott by the Opposition cannot undermine the constitutional validity of her mandate. While acts of terrorism have virtually disappeared from the Bangladeshi scene, radical Islamist formations continue to engage in massive violence, with the collusion of the Opposition BNP, creating a constant threat to the stability of the state.

A rash of incidents in 2008 principally connected with the incipient Communist Party of Bhutan (CPB), resulting in 10 fatalities, were the last manifestation of extremist violence in Bhutan and, though the issue of the Ngolops (Bhutanese refugees of Nepali origin), who had been pushed back into Nepal, remained substantially unresolved, the country has seen no significant disturbances since.

Even in theatres where terrorist and insurgent violence remains considerable, an overall decline is visible. Thus, India has seen a drop in total insurgency- and terrorism-linked fatalities, from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to 885 killed in 2013; with the most dramatic plunge was registered in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), from 4,507 in 2001, to 181 in 2013. Maoist violence, which peaked in 2010, with 1,080 fatalities, also registered a sharp contraction, with a total of 421 killed in 2013. In the multiple insurgencies across India’s Northeast, fatalities collapsed from a peak of 1,317 in 2001, to a total of 251 in 2013. Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K, which resulted in 364 fatalities in 2008, saw 29 killed in 2013.

Nevertheless, developments through 2013 indicated that there was little scope for complacency. Indeed, J&K registered a rise in fatalities, from 117 in 2012, to 181 in 2013, demonstrating the fragility of these gains,. This was compounded by an escalating campaign of cease fire violations by Pakistan’s Army with at least 195 violations recorded through 2013, resulting in 10 SF fatalities, as against 93 such violations in 2012, resulting in three SF fatalities. In the Maoist belt, fatalities rose from 367 to 421 between 2012 and 2013; Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K accounted for one fatality in 2012, and 29 in 2013. In the Northeast, at least two States registered an increase in total fatalities between 2012 and 2013: Assam, from 91 to 101; and Meghalaya, from 48 to 60.

Moreover, 205 of the country’s 640 Districts continued to be afflicted by varying intensities of chronic subversive, insurgent and terrorist activity in 2013, including 120 Districts where the Maoists remained active; 20 Districts in J&K afflicted by Pakistan-backed Islamist separatist terrorism; and 65 Districts in six Northeastern States where numerous ethnicity based terrorist and insurgent formations operate. This is, of course, down from a peak of 310 Districts so listed in 2010, principally as a result of the abrupt contraction of the Maoist rampage which had escalated enormously in the 2009-10 period. In 2012, the number of afflicted Districts stood at 252, according to Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) assessments.

Significantly, a wide range of extraneous factors, often unrelated to state policy or strategy, have influenced these trends, and grave dangers of reversal – including the impact of developments in Afghanistan and a creeping implosion in Pakistan – exist.

Pakistan, consumed by internal turbulence, continues to externalize its instability through proxy wars and support to Islamist terrorism in Afghanistan and India, even as it seeks to opportunistically harness other insurgencies (including the ethnic extremist movements of India’s Northeast) in the neighbourhood, to its campaign of regional destabilization. Nevertheless, Pakistan has also recorded a decline in domestic violence, though current levels remain alarming, and though much of the decline is accounted for by the diminution in terrorist fatalities that has resulted from the operational paralysis of state Forces. According to SATP’s partial data, at least 5,379 terrorism-related fatalities were recorded across Pakistan in 2013, as compared to 6,211 fatalities in the preceding year [since media access is heavily restricted in the most disturbed areas of Pakistan, and there is only fitful release of information by Government agencies, the actual figures could be much higher]. Much of the decline was accounted for by the drop in terrorist fatalities, from 2,472 terrorists killed in 2012, to 1,702 killed in 2013. Confirming the reluctance of state Forces to confront the terrorists is a significant drop in SF fatalities as well, with 676 SF personnel killed in 2013, as against 732 in 2012. Civilians, however, continue to pay the price for state inaction, with 3,001 killed in 2013, almost the same as the 3,007 killed in 2012. Crucially, the number of civilian fatalities in Pakistan now exceeds the number of civilian fatalities in neighbouring ‘war torn’ Afghanistan (an estimated 2,959 in 2013), widely regarded as the most volatile and unstable country in South Asia. Terrorism in Pakistan has already resulted in at least 1,092 fatalities, including 551 civilians, 183 SF personnel and 358 militants in just the first quarter of 2014.

Despite the overwhelming damage terrorism has inflicted on Pakistan, the country’s establishment shows no signs of abandoning this device as an instrument of state policy, particularly for its strategic ambitions in India and Afghanistan. These proclivities assume dangerous proportions in view of the ‘withdrawal’ of US and NATO Forces from Afghanistan, and the high-stakes scramble for control of Kabul that is expected to follow. Violence has already escalated in Afghanistan, with Pakistan goading its proxies to go for the kill; a total of 7,074 persons were killed in 2013, as against 6,363 in 2012, with civilians taking the brunt of the violence (2012: 2,754 killed; 2013: 2,959 killed). Terrorist and SF fatalities have also remained high, with 2,702 terrorists killed in 2013, as against 2,716 in 2012; and 1,413 SF personnel [including 160 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel] killed in 2013, as against 893 (including 402 ISAF personnel) killed in 2012. The most dramatic increase was in Afghan National Police (ANP) fatalities, which spiked from 262 to 1,082 between 2012 and 2013.

The outcome of this contest, however, may prove even more devastating for Pakistan than it could be for its neighbours. For one thing, Kabul’s adversaries are anything but united under the banner of the Pakistan-backed ‘Taliban’. A range of tribal and regional warlords, many of them deeply inimical to the Taliban, exercise disruptive dominance over wide areas in the country. The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities who, in combination, comprise nearly half the country’s population, moreover, would resist the Pashtun dominated Islamist formations tooth and nail, and are securely allied to the state institutions now centered in Kabul. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP, with a combined strength of nearly 345,000, despite problems, has not proven unequal to the task of confronting Pakistan’s proxies and, even with limited assistance from a residual NATO Force, including the services of US drones, cannot be expected to roll over after 2014. Crucially, despite overwhelming Taliban threats, the Presidential election of April 5, 2014, passed relatively peacefully, with not a single major attack on the polling process recorded through the day. The elections saw a voter turnout of an estimated 58.33 per cent, as against 38.8 per cent in the 2009 elections, underlining the credibility and legitimacy of the process and, potentially, of the regime that would be installed once it is over.

If this assessment is broadly correct, the consequences for Pakistan could prove devastating. An attritional war in Afghanistan, with no clear victor, will eventually – most likely, quickly – provoke a blowback into Pakistan, as Pashtun Islamist extremist forces combine to seek a clear dominance of Pashtun regions on both sides of the Durand Line. An escalating Pashtun insurgency would compound Pakistan’s present problems of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorism, and the multiple insurgencies and terrorist movements already afflicting every one of Pakistan’s four principal Provinces.

Pakistan, thus, remains the sickness of South Asia, threatening other countries in the region with its contagion, even as its own institutions and society succumb to its progressive contamination. Despite repeated exposure of its role in supporting terrorist groups and operations in the neighbourhood and beyond, Western commentators and Governments continue to extend the cover of an incredible ‘credible deniability’ to Islamabad, largely because no consensus is available on punitive action against this persistently rogue, nuclear-armed, state.

Irrespective of the trajectory of current movements of armed violence in South Asia, moreover, the region can be expected to remain plagued by instability. A demographic explosion, coupled by poor – often abysmal – governance undermine the prospects of any easy solutions to its many problems. Thus the year 2000 population of 23.74 million in Afghanistan is expected to rise to more than double to 48.03 million by 2020, and further, to 80.26 million in 2040; Bangladesh, from 128.92 million, through 181.18 million, to 226.66 million; Bhutan, from 564,000, through 717,000, to 950,000; Nepal, from 24.43 million, through 35.68 million, to 46.66 million; Pakistan, from 142.65 million, through 211.7 million, to 278 million; and India, from 1.02 billion, through 1.33 billion, to 1.53 billion, respectively, over the same period. The only exception to this ballooning trend is Sri Lanka, where populations are approaching near stability, at 19.85 million in 2000, to a projected 22.9 million in 2020 and 23.88 million in 2040.

The crisis of governance is visible in a multiplicity of indices. The Global Competitiveness Report lists 148 countries by Public Trust in Politicians; Bangladesh ranks 132nd; India, 115th; Pakistan, 110th; and Sri Lanka, 92nd (Nepal is not included). The Corruption Perception Index of 177 countries, has Bangladesh at 136; Pakistan at 127; Nepal at 116; India at 94; and Sri Lanka at 91. The Worldwide Governance Index of 179 countries ranked Pakistan at 162; Bangladesh at 146; Nepal at 145; India at 143; and Sri Lanka at 126. Significantly, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal are all listed among the 30 ‘worst performing countries’ on the Failed State Index of 2013. Each of the South Asian countries, though with wide variation, also fares poorly on human development and poverty indices, has large underbellies of neglect, polarized populations, and a divisive politics, that lend themselves easily to provocations to violence.

South Asia has tremendous potential, for development and for extreme violence. Which propensity will be realized will depend largely on the sagacity of national leaderships in each of the constituent countries. Regrettably, the evidence of the past years and decades has given little evidence of any surfeit of this attribute in the region.

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission,  is following with concern the recent events in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, “which are not conducive to the climate of trust and cooperation needed for the current peace negotiations to succeed,” according to a spokesperson.

According to Ashton’s spokesperson, “The High Representative condemns the recent killing of an Israeli man in the West Bank and calls for an immediate end to all acts of violence.”

The spokesperson said that Ashton also sees with great concern the recent announcement that nearly one square kilometre near the Gush Etzion settlement has been declared as “state land” by the Israeli Defence Ministry, that the latter has authorized a new settlement in Hebron, that demolitions of Palestinian property are continuing in Area C and East Jerusalem with resulting displacement of vulnerable populations.

Ashton “deplores in particular the recent confiscation of EU Humanitarian Assistance provided to vulnerable civilians in the Jabal Al Baba Community in the E1 area. The EU calls on the Israeli authorities to reverse these decisions,” the spokesperson said.

“The High Representative calls on the parties to show utmost restraint and responsibility in order not to jeopardize the current negotiation process, and to refrain from any steps which could undermine trust and threaten these negotiations,” the spokesperson said, adding that Ashton “fully supports the tireless efforts of U.S. Secretary of State Kerry in pursuing peace and trusts that both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas are committed to finding ways to continue negotiations.”

The most Earth-like planet yet discovered has been found right in our neighborhood according to a report in an April 18, 2014 issue of the L.A.Times from the journal Science.

By sifting through observations from more than 100,000 distant stars, astronomers say they have discovered the first definitive Earth-sized planet that orbits in a habitable zone where water could exist in liquid form — a necessary condition for life as we know it.
Scientists don’t know whether the planet has water or a protective atmosphere. But they said the landmark discovery gives astronomers great hope that a bumper crop of Earth-like planets is waiting to be found near by,

“This is really a tip-of-the-iceberg discovery,” said Jason Rowe, an astronomer who spent a year analyzing data gathered by the Kepler space telescope.

The planet is 10% bigger than Earth, and its parent star is a red dwarf, smaller and dimmer than our sun but that is good news because red dwarfs are the most common star in our galaxy
UC Berkeley astronomer Geoffrey Marcy, who discovered the first exoplanet said. “This is the best case for a habitable planet yet found. The results are absolutely rock solid.”

The discovery marks a milestone in the quest to find planets that are not just Earth-sized, but truly Earth-like, said Doug Hudgins, NASA’s program scientist for the Kepler mission.

Out of 1,800 or so confirmed exoplanets, fewer than two dozen are in a habitable zone, where it’s not so hot that water would boil off into space and not so cold that it would remain permanently locked in ice.

Kepler-186f is also close to us, in galaxy terms, since it is about 490 light-years away. It circles its home star, Kepler-186, in just 130 days. Of the five planets in the system, its orbit is furthest out.
The orbit of Kepler-186f would fit inside that of Mercury but since its star gives off less energy than our sun, it is still in a habitable zone.

Some scientists have argued that M-dwarf stars such as Kepler-186 may not be hospitable to life, since they tend to produce more flares and damaging radiation than larger and brighter G-type stars such as our sun but that might result in a faster rate of evolution for life forms that live in the water and under the surface of the planet.

“I believe that planets are very diverse and a whole range of them could be habitable,” said Sara Seager, an astrophysicist at MIT who was not involved in the study.

That’s an encouraging sentiment, given that planets like Kepler-186f could be easier to find than planets exactly like Earth. Before it was hobbled last year by a broken gyroscope that robbed it of its precision-pointing ability, the Kepler telescope stared at a patch of roughly 150,000 stars and watched for dips in the starlight as planets passed in front.

Based on how frequently such dips in starlight appear, scientists can calculate how quickly a planet is circling — and thus, how close to its star it must be. They can estimate a planet’s size by measuring the depth of the shadow it casts on its star.

Close-in planets with shorter orbits complete these transits more often, which makes them easier to find. Around our sun, those planets would be baked. But around a red dwarf like Kepler-186, the climate could still be mild.

Such planets are also easier to find because they block relatively more of their stars’ light. And given that M-dwarf stars account for 70% of the stars in the Milky Way, there could be billions of Earth-sized planets in the galaxy waiting to be discovered.

Assuming that 10% of M-dwarfs within 100 light-years of us have an Earth-sized planet in a habitable zone, there could be 10 to 20 in that relatively close range, Rowe said.

I predicted, in a book about the Jewish mystical tradition, that I wrote more that 30 years ago that based on statements from the Kabbalah, we would find evidence of extra-terrestrial life during my life time, and encounter extra-terrestrial intelligent lifeforms within the next century or two.

At that time we had not one extra-solar planet had been discovered and some scientists claimed that solar systems were exceedingly rare.

They were wrong. The hunt for planets outside of our own Solar System has made remarkable advances in recent years.

The first was found just 20 years ago; now, nearly 2,000 have been spotted – many by the Kepler telescope.

Now scientists estimate that most stars have planets, although very very few are habitable.

The SETI Institute is dedicated to the search for intelligent life on other planets, and identifying potentially Earth-like planets closer to home would mean that the radio signals our civilization sends into the universe could reach our theoretical neighbors in a matter of decades, Rowe said. If humans ever develop high-speed interstellar travel those Earth-like planets would probably be the best ones to visit.

My book on Jewish mysticism contained a chapter on ETIL-extraterrestrial intelligent life. There I explained the formula of Professor Drake, a founder of the SETI Institute, for estimating the probability of ETIL in our galaxy.

The first of seven factors was the percentage of stars with planets. I conservatively estimated that 10% of stars like out sun would have a least one planet. The most recent scientific estimate (2012) is that each star of the 100+ billion in our Milky Way Galaxy is estimated to host “on average … at least 1.6 planets.”

Of course, some stars have 3, 4, or more, planets and some have no planets; but it is very likely that a majority of main sequence stars do have planets. This supports my assertion, based on Kabbalistic teachings, that God didn’t create a galaxy with over 100 billion stars, and then leave it devoid of intelligent, spiritually aware lifeforms, with only one exception.

I now believe the first earth size planet, at the right distance to support an atmosphere and carbon based life, (the second factor) will be discovered in the next few years. Then within the next generation scientists will discover life bearing planets (factor three).

But our discovery of ETIL extraterrestrial intelligent life will depend not on our scientists, but on our own moral efforts, because the last factor, and the most important factor, is primarily a spiritual and moral factor.

The vast distances of interstellar space means that even at the speed of light (186,000 miles a second), communication between advanced intelligent lifeforms is more likely to occur over many generations, rather than decades.

But even that is not the key factor. The last and most important of the factors, the spiritual or moral factor is: how long will an intelligent technologically advanced civilization survive.

If the lifetime of technologically advanced societies is only measured in centuries rather than millenniums, the chance that any two would be living in the same area, and in the same era, are extremely remote.

The answer depends on each species achieving on its own planet a world wide state of peace and global harmony; rather than destroying their own world through war or some type of pollution.

If self destruction is the norm, the chance that any two intelligent species will be alive in the same era becomes exceedingly remote.

If the Divinely inspired prophets of the Hebrew Bible, who spoke of an eventual Messianic Age are correct for us here on planet Earth, (and thus for all ETIL; God is the God of the entire universe), then contact with ETIL is inevitable.

But science and technology are not by themselves the answer. As human society became scientifically and technologically more advanced during the 19th and 20th centuries; it also changed more rapidly, fundamentally and violently in the last century of the second millennium than ever before in history. Doctors saved the lives of millions.

Dictators sacrificed the lives of millions. Populations exploded and birthrates declined. Technology produced both worldwide prosperity and pollution at the same time. Knowing all this, should we look upon the third millennium with optimistic hope or with fatalistic trepidation?

Are the world and our society heading towards a wonder-filled new age, or toward a doomsday; or are both occurring concurrently because breakdown is always a prelude to breakthrough?

I am among those who believe in the Biblical vision of a Messianic Age, and I use the insights of the Prophets of Israel to provide guidance in understanding the social, economic, scientific and cultural upheavals sweeping society.

Usually, especially among the Armageddon crowd, it is the dramatic dangers of the pre-Messianic tribulation that are emphasized. I will focus on the positive signs developing throughout the world that accord with the Messianic vision of the Biblical Prophets.

In most religious traditions, redemption is defined in terms of individual enlightenment or personal salvation. However, the Prophets of Israel conceived redemption as a transformation of human society that would occur through the catalyst of the transformation of the Jewish community.

This transformation, which will take place in this world at some future time, is called the Messianic Age. The transition to the Messianic Age is called the birth pangs of the Messiah. The birth of a redeemed Messianic world may be the result of an easy or difficult labor.

If everyone would simply live according to the moral teachings of his or her religious tradition, we would ourselves bring about the Messianic Age. But, if we will not do it voluntarily, it will come through social and political upheavals, worldwide conflicts and generation gaps.

The Messiah refers to an agent of God who helps bring about this transformation. The Jewish tradition teaches that this agent of God (and there may be two or three such agents) will be a human being, a descendant of King David, with great leadership qualities, similar to Moses or Mohammed.

The arrival of the Messianic Age is what’s really important, not the personality of the agents who bring it about, since they are simply the instruments of God, who ultimately is the real Redeemer.

The Messianic Age is usually seen as the solution to all of humanity’s basic problems. This may be true in the long run but the vast changes the transition to the Messianic Age entails will provide challenges to society for many generations to come.

For example, the Prophet Isaiah, 2700 years ago, predicted that someday there would be a radically new world in which Jerusalem would be fulfilled with joy for “no more shall there be in it an infant that lives only a few days.” (65:20) Before the mid 19th century the annual death rate for humans fluctuated from year to year but always remained high, between 30 and over 50 deaths per 1,000 individuals.

Those elevated, unstable rates were primarily caused by infectious and parasitic diseases. The toll from disease among the young was especially high. Almost 1/3 of the children born in any year died before their first birthday;n some subgroups, half died. Because childbirth was hazardous, mortality among pregnant women was also high.

A century ago, the infant mortality rate in Jerusalem (as in most of the world) was 25-30%. Now it is less than 1%. For thousands of years almost every family in the world suffered the loss of at least one or two infants; now it happens to less than one out of a hundred.

If this radical improvement had occurred over a few years, it would have greatly impressed people. But since it occurred gradually over several generations, people take it for granted.

Also, it seems to be part of human nature that most people focus on complaining about the less than 1% that still die (an individual family tragedy heightened by the fact that it is unexpected because it is so rare) rather than be grateful that the infant mortality rate has been reduced by over 98%.

Also, people are quick to point out that as a result of the great reduction in the infant mortality rate, the world’s population has expanded tremendously, which is, and will continue causing major social and economic problems in non-Western societies.

The answer to this problem is birth control, which has already radically affected birth rates in Europe, North America, and Japan. For example, in Japan the number of children born in a woman’s lifetime declined within 70 years from 4.72 in 1930, to 2.13 in 1970, to 1.34 in 2001, a 70% decline.

In Islamist Iran it has declined from 6.5 children per woman a generation ago to 1.7 today, an even greater decline in a much shorter time. Sixty-four of the world’s nations now have birth rates lower than the 2.1 children per woman required to keep a population stable.

In another generation or two, populations will be declining throughout the world, but since that will occur in the future and since we are suffering the negative consequences of over population now, very few people see the whole transformation as a Messianic one in spite of the fact that it is a fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy.

Finally, the great increase in the number of people who live long enough to become “elders” provides us with a new set of challenges I.e.a 5-10 year increase in life expectancy is bad news for pension plans and good news for health care workers.

Initially, declines in infant, child and maternal death rates make the population younger by expanding the base of the age pyramid. Yet, that improvement in survival, along with social and economic development, leads to a drop in birth rates and the beginning of a population with an increasing percentage of elderly people.

In 1900 there were 10-17 million people age 65 or older, making up 6.2% of the population. By the year 2050, people over 65 will number at least 2.5 billion – about 1/5 of the world’s projected population.

Barring catastrophes that raise death rates substantially, or a huge inflation in birth rates, the human population will achieve an age composition within our children’s lifetime, which will be absolutely unique in human history.

These improvements in human health are unprecedented in human history. Truly in the next 100-200 years we will be coming close to Isaiah’s prophecy, “One who dies at 100 years shall be reckoned a youth, and one who fails to reach 100 shall be reckoned accursed.” (65:20). but such radical change will necessitate major changes in the way we think and act when faced with decisions about life and death.

Yet who among us would want to return to the high mortality rates and early deaths of previous centuries? The challenges we now face are not those of survival, but of opportunity.

The fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy has thus gone un-noticed and uncelebrated. But even when the events are rapid and dramatic, people rarely connect them to their Messianic significance for very long.

The amazing rescue of 15,000 Ethiopian Jews in an airlift lasting less than 48 hours stirred and inspired people for a few weeks. Subsequently, the difficult problems the newcomers faced (similar to those of the 900,000 recent Soviet immigrants) occupied the Jewish media.

Now both are taken for granted. The miracle has become routine. But if you had told the Jews of Ethiopia two generations ago that they would someday all fly to Israel in a giant silver bird, they could only conceive of this as a Messianic miracle.

And if you had told Soviet Jews a generation ago that the Communist regime would collapse, the Soviet Empire disintegrate, and hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews would emigrate to Israel, they would have conceived it only as a Messianic dream.

In our own generation therefore we have seen the dramatic fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy: “I will bring your offspring from the (Middle) East and gather you from the (European) West. To the North (Russia) I will say ‘give them up’ and to the South (Ethiopia) ‘do not hold them’. Bring my sons from far away, my daughters from the end of the earth.” (43:5-6) Isn’t it amazing how people adjust to living in a radically new world and forget the past.

Indeed, the Prophet Isaiah himself said, “Behold, I create a new Heaven and a new Earth, and former things shall not be remembered.” (65:17)

Where does the Messiah fit in with all of this? He will still have lots to do when he arrives. Most Orthodox Jews would not commit themselves to any individual as a Messiah unless he successfully rebuilds the ancient Temple in Jerusalem.

This would fulfill the prophecy of Zachariah, “He shall build the Temple of the Lord, and he shall bear the glory, he shall sit on the throne and rule, there shall be a priest before the throne, and peaceful counsel will exist between both of them.” (6:13)

Now that almost half (six out of fourteen million) of the Jewish people have returned to the Land of Israel, and resurrected a Jewish State, one might think that rebuilding a temple of the site where Solomon originally built one almost 3,000 years ago, would be relatively simple.

And it would, except for the fact that a Muslim Shrine called, The Dome of the Rock, presently occupies the site. Often erroneously called the Mosque of Omar, it is not a mosque and it was not built by Omar.

It was built in 691 by Abd-Al-Malik and it is regarded by Muslims as the third holiest site in the world. Any attempt to replace the Dome of the Rock would provoke a Muslim Holy War of cataclysmic proportions.

There is, however, a lot of vacant land on the Temple Mount, and a Jewish house of worship could be built adjacent to the Dome of the Rock provided the Muslims would cooperate.

Most observers agree that anyone who could arrange such Jewish-Muslim cooperation would really be the Messianic Ruler of Peace (Isaiah 9:5) Christian support for such a cooperative venture would also be very important, and anyone who can bring Jews, Christians and Muslims together in mutual respect and cooperation would surely fulfill the greatest of all Messianic predictions:

“They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning knives; nation shall not take up sword against nation, they shall never again teach war.” (Isaiah 2:4)

Indeed, such Jewish/Christian/Muslim cooperation would not be possible without great spiritual leadership in all three communities. Thus, each community could consider its leadership to be the Messiah.

This would fulfill the culminating verses of Isaiah’s Messianic prophecy as enlarged upon by Micah (4:3-5), “They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning knives. Nation shall not take up against nation, they shall never again teach war, but every man shall sit under his grapevine or fig tree with no one to disturb him, for it is the Lord of Hosts who spoke. Though all peoples walk each in the name of its God, we will walk in the name of the Lord our God for ever and ever.”

If each people truly follows the best of its own religious teachings the Messiah will surely have arrived, and God’s Kingdom will be established on planet Earth. Then we will be ready to join in the cosmic conversation of other technologically and morally advanced ETIL civilizations.

By Ebrahim Omar

Real estate experts and economists are warning that rising land prices in Qatar, especially in Doha, could have a negative impact on real estate and foreign investment.

The cost of land has seen a steady increase in recent years, with current prices estimated to have risen by 500% since 2010, Roots Real Estate director Ahmed al-Arouqi told Al-Shorfa.

Al-Arouqi warned of increasing prices in the coming years, “especially after the government launched projects for the 2022 World Cup”.

Land prices have increased significantly this year in various parts of Doha, he said.

The highest prices can be found in al-Abraj area of al-Dafna, where land can cost 2,500 Qatari riyals ($685) per square foot, followed by Pearl Island at 2,000 riyals per square foot ($550), then Lusail City at 1,500 riyals ($410), he added.

“This will negatively affect the Qatari private sector and foreign investors alike,” he said. “Feasibility studies for real estate investment projects have become useless because the final product, housing units, would be too expensive and the returns on property rents unprofitable.”

“This colossal rise in land prices is artificial and does not reflect real prices,” said Qatari businessman Ahmed Hussein al-Khalaf, who serves on the board of directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Al-Khalaf attributed this inflation in prices to speculation.

“The high cost of land in various Qatari cities will impact real estate investments and raise the price of villas, apartments, hotels, malls and commercial areas to an unreasonable degree,” he told Al-Shorfa.

He cautioned that such inflation could lead to the flight of foreign investors because the high price of real estate will raise rents and the cost of living in general.

Opening new areas for development

Al-Khalaf called on the Qatari government to open new areas, such as the suburbs of Umm Salal Ali, al-Wakra and al-Wukair, and annex them to the capital, in order to widen the availability of land for real estate development.

“The rise in land prices across all Qatari municipalities is incomprehensible, and has contributed to inflation, since the cost of land needed for any project is now a high proportion of the total cost of the project,” said businessman Abdul Aziz al-Emadi, former chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Al-Emadi said he expected that projects related to the World Cup would further raise land prices, and appealed to the government to intervene by opening new areas of land for development at affordable prices in order to achieve a balance in prices.

The high cost of land is not limited to Doha, but extends to other parts of the country, he said.

Al-Emadi warned against what he described as manipulation by speculators, calling on the government to intervene “to find a root solution to this phenomenon, which negatively affects the Qatari economy”.

By Siham Ali

The Fes Festival of Sufi Culture, which runs through Saturday (April 19th) in Morocco’s spiritual capital, is more than just entertainment.

At a time of growing fundamentalism and radicalism, Sufi Islam can combat backward ideology, participants and visitors agree.

The annual celebration “allows people to discover the spiritual heritage of Sufism in Morocco and the world in its various cultural, spiritual and social forms of expression”, festival director Faouzi Skalli explains.

“Dozens of artists and visitors of various nationalities come every year to celebrate peace and tolerance,” says Curro Piñana, a performer from Spain.

The eighth edition of the week-long event is dedicated to Arab-Andalusian mystic and philosopher Muhyiddin Ibn Al Arabi.

But the many Sufi brotherhoods, including the young singers from the Tariqa Boutchichiya, are the heart of the festival.

The goal of all participants is to encourage peace and tolerance, says Abdelwahed Afilal, a member of the national Samaa ensemble.

“Sufism is an experience that purifies the soul. Perfection comes with learning and perseverance,” he says.

Morocco has always paid particular attention to Sufism, through several Brotherhoods throughout the country, sociologist Samira Kassimi told Magharebia.

“These brotherhoods play a very important role in the spread of knowledge, best practice and the principles of tolerance and peace,” she said.

The festival’s organisers say that Morocco’s Sufi religious brotherhoods have acquired international influence over time and formed many branches in different countries.

“The roles of these Sufi paths of learning, civic and spiritual education, commitment to human development and peace mediation, in addition to a deep and creative cultural legacy, have formed a model for Islamic culture in Morocco,” Skalli says.

The Fes festival “marries the spiritualism of Sufism with social action”, sociologist Maria Sanoussi notes.

Exposing young people to Sufi Islam may help deter them from extremism, she says. Many of them are being encouraged by their families to move towards the Sufi path.

“Experience has shown that they have been able to make a success of their future and live in harmony with their principles and goals,” she adds.

Hicham Sibari, 28, discovered the path of Sufism five years ago, thanks to his uncle.

“I never miss the Sufi music festival in Fes, even though I live in Agadir,” he tells Magharebia.

“Following the path of Sufism enabled me to find spiritual peace and move forward in my personal life and my career at a time when I was lost,” he adds.

His friend Hamza points out: “Sufism can prevent young people from becoming easy prey for religious fanatics, who have no hesitation in exploiting them to achieve their devilish goals.”

Hamza knows what he is talking about; one of his friends almost stumbled onto the path of extremism.

“Luckily, he found people close to him who helped him climb out of the abyss of fanaticism,” he says.

By Alexander Müller

The ongoing political tensions between Russia and the West surrounding Crimea, and the continuing social unrests in Ukraine, serve as a trial for German foreign policy. Germany is expected to figure prominently in the crisis given the strong ties between Moscow and Berlin. The crisis may also demonstrate that Germany’s policy towards Russia could risk becoming obsolete, and that the German-Russian relationship appears to have arrived at a crossroads. The Ukraine crisis should therefore compel Germany to assume European leadership and to shoulder greater international responsibility. Germany has considerable resources but also suffers from considerable constraints. Specifically, the major obstacle to benign German hegemony may be the Germans themselves.

Foundations of power

Germany has often been coined an economic giant and a political dwarf. German power is strongly correlated to its economic muscle. It is officially ranked 4th worldwide in terms GDP[1]. It exercises its power through groupings such as the G8. This bestows the country with international influence, eminence, and relative independence in decision-making. Furthermore, Germany emerged from the financial and Euro crises relatively unscathed and in good condition compared to other European countries. The success of German economic power stems from a solid manufacturing base, and the presence of globally operating German enterprises that draw worldwide admiration. Nevertheless, the country has been criticized for its strong export-oriented economy and budget surplus.

Geography constitutes another important factor in German power. Located in the heart of Europe, it lies at a central crossroads of trans-European flows of goods, services, people and capital. As a result of its location, it retains strong economic, political and social ties with its neighbors. If Germany desires to assume leadership in the EU, it should capitalize on such relations in order to gain the favor and confidence of its partners. Concurrently, Germany must act as a mediator between the different views, interests and attitudes prevalent in Europe. Though Germany remains a large country, it is too weak and too small to dominate the continent. German power is therefore dependent on the relations with its European neighbors and the ability to cooperate with them.

Germany and the EU

Since German power is embedded within a European context, the EU both enhances and impedes German foreign policy capabilities. The EU provides Germany with a mechanism and network of cooperation through which it can interact with its neighbors and merge the different interests and viewpoints. In addition, by being integrated in Europe, Germany is protected from geopolitical isolation and it remains a key anchor in European stability. Given its EU membership, Germany’s weight in European and global politics is multiplied, which enhances its ability to shape policy. If Berlin manages to assert its position within the EU, it will receive the support of a potent union of 28 states including two classical great powers with Britain and France. However, it faces the challenging task of incorporating and balancing the interests of its key partners, whilst preserving European unity when it comes to foreign policy.

More importantly, Germany has been a driving force for European integration and in EU political reform. It rose to this position during the Euro crisis as a result of its aptitude for sustainable crisis management. Hence, it must aid the Eurozone in recovering from the crisis and developing towards a fiscal union. Nevertheless, Germany’s role should not be confined to the stewardship of Europe’s economics and finances. If German politicians could relieve themselves of the Ostpolitik, it may induce a fresh start and renewed commitment to a common European foreign policy.

Ostpolitik: Outdated or in need of revision?

Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe and Russia were generally pursued within the framework of the country’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy). Conceived by the Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt in the 1960s, the policy was based on mutual dialogue and détente, and advocated the belief that bilateral trade, cultural exchange, and personal contacts would gradually erode communism over time[2]. However, Germany’s recurrent attempts at modernizing Russia’s economy, and thereby developing its political system, have failed. Reforms have not compelled Russia to realign itself with and join the West in some form of associate capacity. Investing considerable economic, political and social capital in its relations with Russia, Germany may have realized that those efforts have been to no avail.

The Ukraine crisis demonstrates the necessity of a new German policy towards Russia. Berlin has been intent on consistently pursuing a diplomatic track with Moscow, with the aim of deescalating the crisis. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Chancellor Angela Merkel hoped that Russia would fulfill its obligations and agree to an international “contact-group”, in order to initiate some form of dialogue between Moscow and the transition government in Kiev. Conversely, the Kremlin signaled that is has no intentions of negotiating with Ukraine’s interim leaders, which it accuses of being radical, violent, corrupt and incompetent. Germany was forced to conclude that Russia is unwilling to cooperate or deescalate. This proved a major blow for German diplomacy but also acted as a catalyst to re-think its relations with Russia. Rejection of German diplomatic efforts on part of Russia may cost Moscow its most valuable ally in Europe. The Kremlin has often employed Germany to advance its interests in the EU and thwart European initiatives harmful to Russia[3]. For certain, the Ostpolitik is outdated and in need of urgent overhaul.

Enter Merkel

Under Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany has assumed a more hardline approach towards Russia. Ms. Merkel repeatedly criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin in attempting to steer Russia’s neighbors away from the EU. She also remains outspoken about the Kremlin’s attempt to quell the media, banning NGO’s on the basis of espionage accusations, the spread of corruption, and violation of human rights. Previous Chancellors rarely dared to address such issues and Merkel’s predecessor, Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, considers Putin as “an impeccable democrat”.

From a European perspective, Ms. Merkel’s tough stance towards the Russian regime has fostered a sense of unity within the EU regarding Moscow. Merkel’s ability to match hard words with concrete action, such as approving the first phase of sanctions, may have tied her hands. Merkel may talk tough but she remains reluctant to oppose the Kremlin, given her strong influence in Moscow. However, retreating now would undermine this rare occasion of European unity and cohesion. The time has for Germany to decide whether it values its relations more with Brussels or Moscow, or whether it will opt for a middle-route.

Internal opposition

In truth, Germany may appear reluctant to confront Russia since German political culture restrains action. German political elites do not wish to risk irritating Russia nor are they willing to jeopardize their economic ties with Moscow. A new German foreign policy is constrained by the preference of German politicians to maintain the status quo rather than altering it. Thus, the substance of Ostpolitik has become distorted. Vital normative components are excluded, with the main focus concentrating on trade and economic exchange. The Ostpolitik is ultimately pursuing an obsolete strategy, hoping that commercial activities will induce societal change in authoritarian countries.

The main opposition to Merkel and a new German foreign policy may originate from within government circles. The Social Democrats are traditionally perceived as Russian sympathizers and favor the Ostpolitik approach[4]. Merkel’s coalition partners believe that a modern and contemporary version of Ostpolitik offers the best approach for fostering change and democratic transition in Russia. The Christian Democrats condemned Russia for its deteriorating human rights record and suppression of pro-democracy movements, while the Social democrats toned-down the rhetoric and the language and continue to see Russia as an indispensable partner. Obviously the difference in values, interests and obligations has spawned a rift within the German coalition government. The Social Democrats may undermine European unity given their pro-Russian stance. A fractured German policy and the accompanying fissures would have serious ramifications on the EU’s response.

The economics of a partnership

Critics have accused Germany of not getting tough with Russia due to the country’s strong ties with Moscow. Bilateral trade is at a record high of €76 billion, and Germany enjoys a lucrative relation with the Kremlin given that 6,500 German firms operate in Russia[5]. As such, German businesses and lobbyists have heavily criticized Merkel’s policies for further EU sanctions. Industry leaders argue that damaged trade ties would jeopardize investments, and invite potential Russian retaliation via property confiscation and asset freezes. The unenviable position of imposing economic sanctions against Russia would not only hurt German firms but also exhaust diplomatic alternatives and end the Ostpolitik. German politicians remain intent on keeping the Ostpolitik on life-support. However, Merkel downplayed such allegations and stated that Germany could absorb the loss of Russian trade incomes. In part, the interdependence is reversed. Germany is Russia’s 3rd biggest trading partner whereas Russia only achieves rank 11 on Germany’s customer list[6]. Nevertheless, only time will tell whether Germany manages to balance its economic and political interests concerning Russia.

Europe’s anti-power

The ultimate obstacle to a more active German foreign policy continues to be the German public and popular political mentalities. German society has a profound aversion to all things military, and the public is convinced that the use of force is wrong[7]. This pacifist outlook has rebuffed its allied partners. However, Germany’s allies expect it to share in the burden and participate in military operations and not just provide logistical support. Germany also has no national narrative to reinforce its foreign policy. Germans do not consider themselves defenders of universal values or international peace. The country has developed the notion of an “antipower”. Upon the collapse of the Nazi regime, Germany constructed its political identity and social system around the rejection of classic power politics.

Germany’s role as conductor of European affairs is also inhibited by an outdated strategic culture. It remains timid, pacifist and avoids strategic discourse. 50 years of allied custodianship relieved Germany of the need to defend itself and guarantee its survival. This bred a culture of irresponsibility and ignorance. Germany abstained in Libya, caveats emerged in Afghanistan, it chartered its own path during the Eurocrisis, and remains reluctant to contribute to NATO development. It continues to rely on its allies for security, which undermines its foreign policy capabilities, as Germans do not view military power as a useful tool in achieving geopolitical objectives. Germany refuses to assume leadership given the feelings of guilt and reservation prevalent in Germany since the Second World War[8]. German prefers to lead from the rear and remain politically modest. Berlin does not realize how important Germany is in global affairs nor does the German government seek to exploit its power on the international stage.

Conclusion: A more engaged Germany?

For one, the crises in Ukraine and Crimea have compelled Berlin to re-evaluate the nature of its relationship with Russia. It is no longer Moscow’s advocate, but it has failed to formulate a strategic vision of both Germany’s and Europe’s future relations with Moscow. In this regard, German politicians should abandon the Ostpolitik since it does not correspond to current political realities, and is no longer applicable to Germany’s relationship with Russia. Instead, Berlin should tackle the challenging security and geopolitical questions materialized by today’s interdependent, globalized and multipolar world.

Germany needs to provide leadership in a EU seeking to reform and re-energize itself. It must foster a new sense of identity, mission and purpose within the union. Berlin also has the eminent role of shaping a unified and coherent EU foreign policy. Yet so far Berlin has been found wanting on leadership and strategizing. If Germany manages to discard the obsolete Ostpolitik, then it could consolidate the EU around a long-overdue European foreign policy, especially towards Russia.

Germany is a powerful nation, but its power is confined. Despite its reluctance, Germany must embrace its strength and become the confident leader Europe needs. Pressure is mounting and time may be running out. The US is disengaging from Europe and shifting its attention towards Asia. Washington is indisposed to invest in European security or managing crises in the EU’s neighborhood. To maximize its potential and international profile, Germany must work with and capitalize on its good relations with European and global partners. Berlin’s future approach should be characterized by cooperation with France in Africa, and with Poland in Eastern Europe.

However, it remains to be seen whether the shift in German-Russian relations will induce Berlin to become more active on the European and global scene. Nevertheless, without a strong and assertive Germany there can be no strong, self-confident, harmonious EU. Germany must start investing in an order from which it benefitted during the past decades.

[1] IMF (2013). “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects”. World Economic Outlook Database 2013. Retrieved April 2nd 2014.

[2] Ash, T.G. (1994). “Germany’s Choice”. Foreign Affairs, Vol.73 (4): pp.65-81.

[3] Baran, S. (2007). “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage”. The Washington Quarterly, Vol.30 (4): pp.131-144

[4] Carnegie International. (2013). “Germany: When Will the Ostpolitik Finally End?”. Retrieved April 1st 2014 from: http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53374

[5] EUobserver. (2014). “Doing Business with Russia: A German Dilemma”. Retrieved March 31st 2014 from: http://euobserver.com/economic/123505

[6] Meister, S. (2014). “The Lessons of Crimea”. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved March 30th 2014 from: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_the_lessons_of_crimea

[7] Alter, P. (2000). The German Question and Europe: A History. London: Arnold.

[8] The Economist. (2013). “Germany and Europe: The Reluctant Hegemon”. Retrieved April 3rd 2014 from: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579456-if-europes-economies-are-recover-germany-must-start-lead-reluctant-hegemon

By Gustavo Placido Dos Santos

In May 2013 the President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, declared a state of emergency in the three northern states worst hit by Islamist insurgency: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Nigerian military forces have since initiated a major operation in the north-east aimed at eliminating Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”), which has targeted public infrastructures, closed schools, destroyed local economies, killed many people and forced many more to leave their homes.

According to the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance, since 2013 Boko Haram’s attacks have displaced around 300,000 people. Most have fled to other states, the remainder seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Recently, the government relief agency, the National Emergency Management Agency, declared a humanitarian crisis affecting more than three million people. Yet the group has shown remarkable resilience and even intensified its assaults.

Apart from a deteriorating economy, poor basic services and rampant corruption, the north suffers weak education and few job opportunities. According to the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization, the number of children in Nigeria without access to education increased by 3.6 million between 2000 and 2010, and one in six (10.5 million) do not attend formal schooling. In 2008 half of northern children did not attend school and matters have since deteriorated: in Borno all secondary schools have been shut down, affecting 120,000 students. Neglect has also allowed a misappropriation of education facilities – in particular the Almajiri boarding schools, whose teachers preach fundamentalism and instill hatred towards the West, making them a fertile ground for violence.

Sustainable Development

Against this backdrop, in November 2013 Jonathan inaugurated 64 fully-equipped Almajiri Model Schools, aimed at including out-of-school children in the system. The federal government designs the curriculum, provides teaching and learning materials, develops teachers’ capacities and guarantees sustainable food. Once established, the schools are handed over to state governments and monitored to ensure compliance with minimum academic standards.

Some members of the president’s security team, instead of targeting Boko Haram youths with brute force, are seeking to enroll repentant militants into vocational schools, where psychologists will give counseling and a “pacifist” version of the Qur’an will be taught.

Such programmes will only bear fruit in the long term and only if implemented alongside sustainable economic development. Federal and state governments need to safeguard the functioning of these schools while improving security, reducing corruption, promoting investment (including in infrastructure) and allocating resources more fairly. Genuine political commitment is crucial to address the root causes of the violence and instability that has ravaged the region.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) should also be targeted by government policies. Guaranteeing basic living conditions and providing vocational and entrepreneurial skills may pre-empt large numbers of youths becoming susceptible to Boko Haram’s appeal.

Nigerian authorities need to adopt a national legislative and institutional framework on IDPs, possibly based on the Kampala Convention of 2009, which guides government, donors and humanitarian agencies in preventing displacement and promoting the welfare of those displaced.

The Neighborhood

Boko Haram members have found safe havens across the long and porous north-eastern borders with Cameroon and Niger. Open confrontation has been avoided by the authorities and military hostilities would almost certainly worsen the situation. Although the group confines most of its activity within Nigerian borders, however, the possibility of a shift towards international jihadism should not be discounted. Neighboring countries would then likely face a direct threat to their fragile stability. This needs to be pre-empted by improved border security, through effective intelligence and policing – as opposed to military force – and, again, supportive living conditions.

In Niger, Boko Haram has stepped up its recruiting efforts across the country’s impoverished south-east. National authorities initially played down the threat but to neglect Boko Haram could derail the country – already facing insurgency threats in the north – and Nigerien authorities have beefed up patrols and intelligence, even arresting some militants. Cameroon meanwhile is used by Boko Haram as an operational base and to kidnap westerners for ransom, from which to acquire weapons and attract members or secure the release of detained militants.

In both countries, fear of escalating tensions has worked against a more proactive approach on the part of the authorities. It becomes all the more urgent that they strengthen their intelligence services, while guaranteeing public safety, welfare and development – including for the thousands of Nigerians seeking refuge in their territory. Failure to protect the latter would provide an opportunity for Boko Haram to extend its operations, whether by taking advantage of the susceptibility to militancy of the youth in particular or by exploiting the socio-political instability where disgruntled and vulnerable refugees are concentrated.

As Boko Haram becomes increasingly unbounded, the neighbors of Nigeria need to place its stability at the core of their strategic thinking. Yet they face their own insurgency threats, have inefficient legal systems, lack resources and are largely governed by corrupt and weak regimes – and so their ability to contain fundamentalist violence is correspondingly reduced. For the sake of socio-political stability in the region, therefore, international assistance should be requested and furnished. International actors with solid democratic institutions, mature legal systems, available resources, “counter-terrorism” expertise and strategic interest in the region should create synergies with affected countries for the sustainable containment of violent non-state groups.

International Collaboration

The case for international intervention is enhanced by the inability of the Nigerian authorities to quell the instability and avert the unfolding humanitarian crisis. If the state has failed to achieve its traditional role of protecting its citizens, the “responsibility to protect” hooves into view. As a major military and economic African power, Nigeria would almost certainly politicize and so evade such calls for international intervention.

In the face of a seemingly irresolvable social disaster yet a reluctance to allow deployment of an international force, however, Nigerian authorities should consider willingly collaborating with the international community – key to exiting the scenario of bloodshed, poverty and underdevelopment. The EU and the US in particular have “counter-terrorism” programmes which, if molded to the specific needs of affected countries and regions, could bear fruits against non-state violence.

Via the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the US has been providing civilian and military assistance to countries across the Sahel and North Africa. But the partnership focuses almost exclusively on security, weighted against the civilian component. US military support to Nigeria’s armed forces has thus failed to produce the desired results, demonstrating its ineffectiveness if the roots of instability are not addressed.

On the other hand the EU, which has recognized al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – purportedly linked to Boko Haram – as a major threat, has elaborated a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011), which makes clear that tackling non-state violence and promoting development go hand-in-hand.

The United Nations has also been stepping up efforts to counter instability in the region. In 2013, the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel was established, seeking to bring together the disparate responses of governments, the region and the international community. Its key objectives are to make governance more inclusive and effective, build capacities to counter cross-border threats and strengthen the resilience of the Sahelian people.

Another positive development was the establishment of the Sahel Region Capacity-building Working Group, comprising countries from the region and other influential international actors – such as Canada, the US and the EU.

The international community, in particular the EU and the US, should break with its one-size-fits-all approach, look at each country’s particularities and focus less on external factors. By promoting better governance, greater democratic control and capacity-building, it can open the way to more secure borders, more accountable and efficient local management and socio-economic development.

From the Nigerian side, a good starting point would be the lifting of the state of emergency, the withdrawal of military forces and their replacement by police and security forces advised and trained by international actors. This would likely result in less abuse of power – thus addressing part of the popular disgruntlement towards public authorities which has been feeding violence – and, paradoxically, probably drive Boko Haram to soften its aggressive stance in the absence of an immediate threat.

Resolving the Conundrum

Guaranteeing border security would go half-way to weakening Boko Haram’s ability to acquire finance, men and firepower. But without a full commitment by Nigeria and neighboring countries none will be able to keep this dangerous insurgent at bay. So the international community has to step in – but with reshaped and refocused interventions which address the roots of instability. Success also depends on a long-term, comprehensive, socio-economic development plan for the region, with a focus on skills for the young, job creation and basic infrastructure.

The daunting task of rebuilding Nigeria will depend, above all, on Nigerian authorities putting aside political rivalries, tackling corruption and pursuing the public interest. Even if all these steps are duly applied, however, Boko Haram will not disappear overnight. Patience and dedication will be critical.

About the author:
Gustavo Placido Dos Santos
Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 143, April 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF)

This article was also published at openDemocracy [http://www.opendemocracy.net/].

By Vicente Ferreira Da Silva

The events leading to Crimea’s secession from Ukraine are not a series of ad-hoc moves, but part of a calculated plan by Russia’s leaders that fits Alexander Dugin’s vision of ‘Eurasianism’.

Accordingly, Russia is determined to follow its own Eurasian path, while the real goal of Eurasianism is the formation of a new political integration bloc. The European Union (EU) and NATO response must set limits on Russia.

A Retrospective View

Following the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not disappear as did the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, NATO grew in size and depth, welcoming former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic states, as members. As a result, in 1999 NATO changed its strategic concept, and the scope of NATO interventions expanded to remote 65oE and 70oE meridians of Afghanistan. In 2002, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council reinforced the relationship between NATO and Russia. Later, at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO’s new Strategic Concept was published in response to the changing international security environment. This “Active Engagement, Modern Defense” concept reaffirmed the importance of strategic cooperation with Russia, and it strengthened the political consultations and practical NATO-Russia cooperation. The world has undergone radical change since the Cold War. In the 1980s, who would have thought that NATO and Russia would be partners?

However, almost all of this happened in a period of Russian economic weakness and political disorientation. After President Boris Yeltsin’s 1999 resignation, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, took over control of Russia. Putin’s presidency coincided with an outstanding economic recovery1 and soon Russia re-emerged as an economic and energy superpower. Yet nostalgia proved irresistible in 2014, when Vladimir Putin demonstrated that he had been living in the Cold War era. Russia’s new economic capacity permitted an increase in military spending. The political posture of the Russian leadership changed as well, as evidenced by Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007 and the 2008 Georgia war. Thus, Russia’s agenda clashed anew with NATO enlargement, which from 1999 to 2004 grew to include Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Thus, Russian concerns over NATO resurfaced.2 Finally, the 2010 Russian Federation Military Doctrine expressed disapproval of NATO Eastern expansion and listed NATO as an external threat.3

A Russian Spring?

Russia’s subsequent actions indicate that Moscow has devised a new strategy aimed at the restoration of Russia’s past glory. Some preparatory steps along this route, including Russia’s exit from
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, should have been viewed as a tactical move rather than diplomatic protest.4

Such steps are consistent with a realization of a general assertive
Russian strategy that paved the way to war with Georgia in 2008. In fact, Russian hawks were convinced after the intervention in Georgia that they had found a way to prevent further NATO enlargement.5 President Dmitry Medvedev’s statements in November 2011 echo that conviction.6 The naval base in Gudauta, Abkhazia, and Russia’s “Sevastopol agreements” with Ukraine, which
extended the Black Sea Fleet lease until 2042, advanced Russia’s military doctrine and also contained NATO.

NATO cannot grant membership to a country hosting a non-member military base on its territory. So far, Russia’s strategy has worked: neither Ukraine nor Georgia has joined NATO since Russia invaded them.

Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and inclusion into the Russian Federation may be seen as a continuation of the same strategy. Earlier this year, when Putin realized that Viktor Yanukovych was going to be impeached by the Ukrainian Parliament and that Ukraine would not join the Eurasian Customs Union, Putin responded according to the script he used with Georgia in 2008, the only difference being that Crimea requested formal inclusion in the Russian Federation. On March 18 the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation was signed.7

Seen from this perspective, Viktor Yanukovych’s call for a referendum towards a ‘federalization’ of Ukraine is just an act in Vladimir Putin’s screenplay. The fact that the city of Donetsk8 and Eastern Ukraine9 are already being targeted confirms that Russia likely is not going to stop. Furthermore, Odessa may follow the same path.10 Observing these events, one must assume that the most likely scenario is the creation of a new Eastern bloc of satellite states headed by Moscow. Having in mind both the psychological profile of the current Russian leaders, particularly Vladimir Putin, and the sequence in the evolution of Russia with the West, tiny regions like Transnistria11 or Gagauzia12 are going to be disputed, as well.

Friends or Foes?

Russia does not have a high opinion of the European Union on defense and security issues, not only due to the EU’s lack of competence in this area but also because the EU is no match to Russia in military terms. Moreover, aware of its energy predominance over Europe, Russia favors bilateral negotiations with the EU member states. In addition, Russia not only challenged but also rejected EU’s most fundamental fea- ture, its normative power or “Model Power Europe”.13 In fact, Russia was able to promote Europeanization from the East by reversing the political conditionality and asymmetry within the EU-Russia relation.14

Concerning Ukraine, EU actions were disappointing, to say the least. However, this is not surprising: EU action parallels what happened during and after the 2008 Georgia war. Back then, the Extraordinary European Council suspended negotiations with Russia until Russian troops’ withdrawal from Georgia. Talks resumed, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian troops had not withdrawn. Given the fact that the EU did not ponder political alternatives to these actions, the inevitable question arises about what the EU cherishes most, its energy or its values.15

For its part, NATO decided to suspend cooperation with Russia, but Russia’s leadership does not seem too offended.

Alexander Lukashevich, Russia’s foreign ministry spokesman, recalled that this is not the first time such a gesture was assumed by the West and that after Russia’s war with Georgia NATO-Russia military cooperation resumed.16 But while Russia is not worried about the interruption of a dialogue with NATO, Moscow does fear the integration of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Thus far, Western sanctions do not seem to have had an effect on the Kremlin strategy.17 Quite the contrary.18 Hence, if “freezing assets” is not an issue for Russians, what is? The Kremlin propaganda at the same time does its best to discredit any proactive policy by the West towards Crimea. According to the notorious Director General of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, Dmitry Kiselev, even the present response of the West, restrained though it is, deserves the following label: “Western behavior borders on schizophrenia”.19

Boldness: Unexpected and Necessary

None of the three countries that are victims of Russia’s actual or potential separatist policy – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – can join NATO or the EU with a ‘pending’ territorial conflict with a neighbor. Therefore, the cost of their accession may well be giving up a part of their country. If these states are willing to pay such high price, NATO must welcome them as members as soon as possible.

Speeding up Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldovan accession to NATO would be the bold move. Membership Action Plan would not be sufficient.20 Moscow, which has always claimed that NATO enlargement was a broken promise, may be surprised by a swift, unified response, as those in the Kremlin have come to expect feeble behavior and sluggish responses from the EU and even from NATO.

A bold move by NATO would finally set limits on Russia’s assertiveness. New Russian interventions in Georgia and
Moldova are possible.21 Alexander Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, reaffirmed Russia’s warning about Ukraine and Georgia membership. But will Russia really intervene if these countries became NATO members? After all, if we are before a novum frigus bellum we know it will not be the same as the previous Cold War. The division lines are already different, perhaps to a higher degree than is commonly thought. Any move that checks Russia’s influence is welcome.22

Already some positive signs that could be the necessary precondition for such actions are appearing. NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has stated that “Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is in blatant breach of its international commitments and it is a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.23 In Athens on April 5, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that the EU “should be very firm on international law and the rules that must apply”. Referring to the banner “Crimea is in my heart” placed behind Vladimir Putin during a rally last month, Bildt went further noting that we should wonder what else Putin cares about.24 Indeed, one must ask what is going to be the cost of the resurgence of Russian greatness, and how far Russia’s leadership might go. However, we know one thing already: any sign of hesitation from the West will be interpreted by Moscow as a license to proceed with Russia’s previous course. Presently, Russia is well ahead in the triggering of events. Should the EU and especially NATO conform?

Now is the time for decision. Deciding according to convenience means a loss of credibility. It also shows a marked lack of values. EU countries must show cohesion and speak with a single voice. NATO must act according to its essential purpose. A refocusing and ‘returning’ to Europe on the part of NATO, rather than a stubborn maintenance of the “Asian pivot”, is wise. And taking a stand against Russia confirms NATO’s raison d’être.

The author gratefully acknowledges the doctoral research scholarship SFRH/ BD/28/632/2006 provided by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT).

About the author:
Vicente Ferreira Da Silva
PhD candidate, Political Science and International Relations, Minho University

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoint 144, April 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF).

Notes:
1. International Monetary Fund, “Russia – Gross Domestic Product, constant prices” (IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013).
2. Vladimir Putin, “Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council” (President of Russia, 4 April 2008).
3. Dmitry Medvedev, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (President of Russia, 5 February 2010).
4. Yuri Zarakhovich, “Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty” (Time, 14 July 2007).
5. Denis Dyomkin, “Russia says Georgia war stopped NATO expansion” (Reuters,
21 November 2008).
6. Dmitry Astahov, “Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia prevented NATO growth –
Medvedev” (Ria Novosti, 21 November 2011).
7. Bridget Kendall, “Crimea crisis: Russian President Putin’s speech annotated” (BBC News, 19 March 2014).
8. Maria Finoshina, “Eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk rallies in favor of independence referendum” (RT, 5 April 2014).
9. “Ukraine crisis: What is happening where?” (BBC News, 14 April 2014).
10. Anastasia Vlasova and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukrainian nationalists, pro-Russian
separatists stage rival rallies in Odessa” (KyivPost, 6 April 2014).
11. Christian Oliver, “Tiny Transnistria becomes the frontline in east-west
struggle” (Financial Times, 4 April 2014).
12. Tiago Ferreira Lopes, “Post-soviet Unfrozen Dilemmas: Profiling Gagauzia”
(State Building and Fragility Monitor, No. 7, March 2014).
13. Laura Ferreira-Pereira, “The European Union as a ‘Model Power’: Spreading
Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in the Wider World”, in Federiga Bindi (ed.), The European Union Foreign Policy: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
14. Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The many patterns of Europeanization: European Union Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”, in Teresa Cierco (ed.), The European Union Neighborhood. Challenges and Opportunities (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
15. Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on Ukraine” (European Union, 20/21 March 2014).
16. Timothy Heritage, “Russia says NATO reverts to Cold War-era mindset” (Reuters, 2 April 2014).
17. “Russian Deputy PM Plays Down Western Sanctions” (Ria Novosti, 15 March 2014).
18. Igor Ivanov, “Western Sanctions Are a Sign of Weakness” (The Moscow Times, 27 March 2014).
19. “Western behavior borders on schizophrenia” (Ria Novosti, 5 April 2014).
20. Joshua Kucera, “Ivanishvili: We Will Get NATO MAP in 2014” (Eurasianet.org, 2 May 2013).
21. Nicu Popescu, “After Crimea: Putin’s Balance Sheet” (EUISS, Issue Alert No. 24, 4 April 2014); Giorgi Menabde, “Kremlin’s Followers in Georgia Become Active” (The Jamestown Foundation, 3 April 2014).
22. “Eurasian Economic Union Treaty Could Be Signed by May” (Ria Novosti, 3 April 2014).
23. Fred Dews, “NATO Secretary-General: Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Is Illegal and Illegitimate” (Brookings Now, 19 March 2014).
24. Demetris Nellas, “EU Working With Russia, Ukraine to Defuse Crisis” (Associated Press, 5 April 2014).

Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has won re-election, a result that paves the way for him to serve a fourth term, despite poor health.

The Interior Ministry released official preliminary results on Friday that show Bouteflika captured almost 82 percent of the vote. He faced five contenders in Thursday’s polling.

The 77-year-old president, who is backed by the ruling National Liberation Front party, was widely expected to win.

However, he has made few public appearances since suffering a stroke, last year. On Thursday, he arrived in a wheelchair at an Algiers polling station where he cast his ballot.

His main challenger, former prime minister Ali Benflis, alleged massive voter fraud even before the final results were announced. Also, some opposition party supporters had called for an election boycott.

Bouteflika first took power in 1999. In 2008, he amended the constitution to allow for the unlimited re-election of sitting presidents.

The manager of the stricken Fukushima nuclear power plant has admitted not having full control of the facility. Contrary to the statements of the Japanese PM, TEPCO’s Akira Ono said attempts to plug the leaks of radioactive water had failed.

“It’s embarrassing to admit, but there are certain parts of the site where we don’t have full control,” Ono told reporters touring the plant this week, reported Reuters. Last year, the Japanese PM attempted to assure the world that the situation at the stricken nuclear power plant was under control.

However, over the last couple of months the clean-up procedure at the plant has been fraught with difficulties.

Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO), the plant’s operator, has consistently faced contaminated water leaks at the Fukushima plant.

Water has to be pumped over the facilities stricken reactors in order to keep them from overheating, but this process creates large quantities of contaminated water which has to be stored in tanks on the site.

Ono acknowledged to press that in TEPCO’s rush to deal with the stricken facility following the earthquake-triggered tsunami in 2011, the company may have made mistakes.

“It may sound odd, but this is the bill we have to pay for what we have done in the past three years,” he said. “But we were pressed to build tanks in a rush and may have not paid enough attention to quality. We need to improve quality from here.”

TEPCO will have to improve the quality of the tanks so the plant can survive the next 30-40 years of the decommissioning process, Ono went on to say.

The plant’s manager said that the number one aim was to keep the radioactive water from getting into the ocean.

“The ultimate purpose is to prevent contaminated water from going out to the ocean, and in this regard, I believe it is under control,” Ono said. But a series of leaks have obliged officials to “find better ways to handle the water problem.”

In the latest blunder at the plant, TEPCO mistakenly flooded the Fukushima facility’s basements with radioactive cooling-tank water. Earlier this week the Japanese newspaper the Asahi Shimbun reported that around 200 tons of water had found its way into waste disposal facilities under the power plant. TEPCO said they were working to fix the leakage as soon as possible.

Cleaning up Fukushima is becoming an increasing headache for the Japanese authorities. Experts predict that fully decommissioning the stricken plant is a process that could take decades, costing the country billions of dollars.

Following the multiple meltdown of the Fukushima plant in 2011 that was triggered by a tsunami, the Japanese government pledged to abandon nuclear power by 2010. However, in spite of public outrage, the government was forced to reactivate its nuclear power plants because of massive energy shortfalls.

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan applied to Turkey’s constitutional court on Friday to challenge the alleged violation of his and his family’s rights by social media, a senior official in his office told Reuters.

Erdogan’s government blocked Twitter and YouTube in March, drawing international condemnation, after audio recordings, purportedly showing corruption in his inner circle, were leaked on their sites.

The Twitter block was lifted earlier this month after the constitutional court ruled that it breached freedom of expression, a decision Erdogan has since said was wrong and should be overturned. YouTube remains blocked in Turkey.

The senior official said Erdogan had made the application to the constitutional court via his lawyer in a complaint over the failure to implement court rulings requesting the removal of content violating his rights. The prime minister was seeking 50,000 lira ($23,500) compensation.

Turkish officials held talks with a delegation from Twitter in Ankara this week to try to resolve the dispute. But there was no immediate deal to open a Twitter office in Turkey or for it to pay Turkish tax, two of Ankara’s key requests.

Access to Twitter was blocked on March 21 in the run-up to local elections to stem a stream of leaked wiretapped recordings. Erdogan said he would “root out” the network.

A car bomb has exploded outside a mosque in the central Syrian city of Homs on Friday, April 18, killing at least 14 people, BBC News reported.

The explosion occurred as worshippers left the Bilal al-Habshi mosque in the neighborhood of Akrama after attending Friday prayers, state TV said.

The area is largely populated by President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite sect.

Homs has been a key battleground between government forces and rebels, with large parts of the city in ruins. Earlier this week, the army launched another major offensive to recapture opposition-held areas in Homs’ Old Quarter.

Syrian state TV blamed Friday’s bombing on what it called “terrorists”, and said the casualties included woman and children.

Activist groups on the rebel side said as many as 30 had died, describing the bomb blast as a “massacre” carried out by the regime.

The attack came as fighting was raging a short distance away in the Old Quarter, where more than a thousand rebel fighters are believed to be holding out against the renewed government offensive, according to the BBC.

An official military statement said that army forces were moving slowly forward and tightening the noose on the rebel-held areas, which have been under siege for over a year and a half.

The clashes in Homs have claimed thousands of lives, and large areas of the city have been reduced to rubble.

Under an agreement brokered by the United Nations, a brief truce was established in February and around 1,400 trapped civilians were evacuated from the Old Quarter. But further negotiations broke down and heavy fighting erupted again.

The UN special envoy for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, earlier appealed for talks to be resumed on lifting the siege, saying Old Homs had again become a “theatre of death and destruction”.

By Aakash Tolani

On April 13, hundreds of Sindhi activists from the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz staged a demonstration and sit-in at the National Highway in the northern Sindhi town of Sukkar. They demanded the registration of an FIR against the murder of Maqsood Qureshi and Salman Wadhiyo, who were killed on March 21. On March 23, similar protests in Karachi were recorded where thousands of JSQM activists gathered on Karachi’s MA Jinnah Road, carrying the burnt and bullet-riddled bodies of their leaders to record their protest peacefully.

Mr Sunan Qureshi, chairperson of the JSQM and nephew of one of the deceased, Maqsood Qureshi, accused the state of Pakistan and its security agencies for the murders of Sindhi leaders including his father and former JSQM chief Bashir Khan Qureshi who had been assassinated in April 2012.

Some commentators and Sindhi journalists have been quick to term the protests as the first signs of the revival of the Sindhi nationalist movement. But there are questions about if the case for a possible insurgency in Sindh is a valid one at all.

For one, the Sindhi cause remains a divided one. There are separatists and anti-state actors like Mr Qureshi’s JSQM and the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz which is headed by Mr Shafi Burfat, as well as a couple of factions led by the likes of Mr Abdul Wahid Arisar and Mr Riaz Chandio. There are others that are do not demand separation from Pakistan but are fighting for the rights of Sindh within the framework of the Constitution of Pakistan. These groups include the Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party led by Dr Qadir Magsi, the Sindh United Party led by Syed Jalal Mehmood Shah, grandson of GM Syed, and the Qaumi Awami Party led by Mr Ayaz Latif Palijo.

Interestingly, neither the separatist parties nor the ones fighting for Sindhi rights within the political and constitutional framework, have ever taken centre stage in Sindh. In fact, the Pakistan People’s Party has always remained the choice of the Sindhi voter. The unparalleled and unhindered success of the PPP in Sindh is shows the Sindhi voters’ preference for a constituttional political process over a separatist agenda to resolve their grievances.

Some Sindhi analysts are hopeful that an alliance of Sindhi nationalistic parties can challenge the status quo of the PPP which serves in alliance with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. However, the 10-party Sindhi coalition which was formed in 2013 to challenge the PPP-MQM domination was a complete failure. This was because the Sindhi parties had conflicting ideologies and no real interest in addressing the grievances of the people.

The alliance included the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) on the one hand and Right-wing religious parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League (Functional), the Jamiat-e-Islami, the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek on the other. Left-secular, Sindhi nationalistic parties such as the National People’s Party, the Sindh United Party, the Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party and the Qomi Awami Tehreek were also part of the grouping. Interestingly, the coming together of Sindhi nationalist parties and the Punjabi dominated PML-N was supported and criticised at the same time.

A leader of the Sindh United Party during the 2013 election campaign had said: “In the 1990s, (Nawaz) Sharif was considered a Punjabi industrialist and a follower of dictator Zia-ul Haq, but the perception has completely changed since then….now, Sindhis are accepting the PML-N because of Sharif’s frequent visits to Sindh, especially to the flood-hit areas, and his interaction with the Sindhi civil society and nationalist parties.” Critics of the alliance said that the Sindhi nationalists had always been against Punjab in their political discourse and could not suddenly become friends with the PML-N.

Further, the Kalabagh Dam issue remains a major bone of contention between Punjab and Sindh. This did not help the Sindhi nationalist parties as the PML-N’s has maintained a dichotomous stand over the subject. In the words of a Sindhi analyst: “One brother, Shahbaz Sharif, stands in Lahore and claims that his party will construct Kalabagh dam at all cost. The other brother, Nawaz Sharif, visits Sindh and promises that the Kalabagh dam will not be constructed without consensus of all Provinces.”

Nonetheless, the 10-party alliance shows that the Sindhi leadership, despite its previous anti-Punjab stance, is now willing to form alliances with the Punjabi-dominated PML(N). For the Sindhi cause, this means further divisions. The PPP is increasingly becoming isolated in Sindh while Sindhi nationalist parties are losing their credibility by joining hands with the PML(N).

It is important to note that none of these Sindhi-dominated or Sindhi nationalistic parties are espousing a separatist ideology. Also, public opinion is not heavily in favour of these parties either. In other words, neither the Sindhi separatists nor the nationalists have significant popular support — certainly not the kind that will make them capable of fuelling a full-scale insurgency.

Lastly, comparisons between Sindh and the erstwhile East Pakistan need to be discarded. Sindhi leaders have actively participated in and led national Governments in Pakistan. The Sindhi masses are part of the mainstream Pakistani economy. A Sindhi may have his fair share of grievances, but to redress them, it is unlikely that he will resort to a complete disapproval of the state. He still has faith in the constitutional framework of Pakistan, and will rather seek amends via official channels.

In addition to this, ever since the rise of the PPP and the Bhuttos, most Sindhis have moved past the victim narrative. On the contrary, a strong Pakistani identity has struck roots in Sindh and Sindhis feel that they can be the change-makers and positive contributors to the Pakistani society at large.

Also, a fair share of Sindhi grievances have been brought upon the community by their own ‘Wadera’ feudal system. This has led some sections of the struggling Sindhi leadership, such as the minority Hindu-Sindhi, non-PPP candidates, to join the PML(N), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and other parties. But few can deny that the new-age Sindhi leadership is finding non-PPP platforms approachable and this may help it recast itself.

Also, this shift of the non-PPP Sindhi leadership to other non-Sindhi parties, and their subsequent victories there, though limited, is shows that much of Sindhi society is looking to the rest of the country to bring about change in the Province. Better connecting Sindh to the Pakistani mainstream is now seen by many as a solution to their internal grievances.

(The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

Courtesy : The Pioneer, April 16, 2014

Some view the improvements in current accounts for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain as short-lived – the result of a temporary compression of import demand that is likely to be reversed as the recession eases. This column argues the contrary, based on the fact that their improving trade balances reflect better export performance. This development points toward a fundamental stabilisation of the competitiveness of these economies.

By Raphael Auer

Current-account (CA) rebalancing is a necessary step for the Southern EZ countries to overcome their debt and external balance of payments crises.¹ Figure 1 documents the impressive speed and magnitude of the southern EZ’s CA rebalancing. The green solid line plots the evolution of the rolling 12-month CA balance of these four economies.² The figure also documents the evolution of some of the subcomponents of the CA: the 12-month balance for the services trade (blue dash-dotted line), income trade (yellow dashed line), and goods trade (red dashed line).³

From the low point in 10:2008 to the most recent data in 10:2013, the combined CA balance of these four nations has increased by €232 billion at an annualized rate. The vast majority of this development was due to an improvement in the goods and services trade: at an annualized rate, the balance in the goods trade increased by €162 billion and the services trade by €28 billion.⁴

Source: BIS and Datastream.

Competitiveness

For example, Friedman (2014) argues that imbalances “have apparently only been ‘solved’ by recession. This means, instead of a single imbalance solved, we now have two imbalances simply offsetting one another – one in currencies, and on one in domestic demand”. Earlier, Sinn and Valentinyi (2013) argue that rebalancing in the EA, when measured in terms of convergence of relative unit costs and relative prices, is far from complete. Bems and Di Giovanni (2014) document that for the case of Latvia, expenditure switching from imported to domestic varieties is an important channel of external adjustment during times of crisis. Their microeconomic study highlights that short-term income shocks can have strong effects on international imbalances, thus emphasizing the concern that rebalancing will reverse once the current crisis abates. This finding also gives a microeconomic underpinning to earlier work by Milesi-Ferreti and Lane (2012), who document that after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, it was not real exchange rate developments but rather demand compression that was at the heart of international rebalancing.

With this debate in mind, it is expedient to point out that CA-rebalancing is increasingly driven by export growth rather than import compression. Figure 2 shows how exports and imports of goods and services have fared since the beginning of 2008. The red line displays the evolution of the rolling 12-month sum of exports, while the blue line documents the evolution of the rolling 12-month sum of imports.

Three phases need to be taken into account when examining how exports and imports of goods and services have contributed to external adjustment since 2008: the great trade collapse, the recovery from this collapse, and the developments after the intensification of the European debt crisis in mid-2011.

Figure 2. Southern EZ’s exports and imports of goods and services

Source: BIS and Datastream.

First, during the great trade collapse,⁵ the increasing balance of goods and services trade was driven by the strong collapse of imports. From the peak in 10:2008 and until 10:2009, both exports and imports collapsed, but imports collapsed by around €55 billion more. From 10:2008 to 10:2009, the reason underlying the improvement of the Southern EZ’s CA balance was thus import compression.

Second, during the recovery from the great trade collapse that took place from 10:2009 to 07:2011, both exports and imports recovered, and did so at roughly the same rate, so that the balance of goods and service trade did not change. Exports increased by €90 billion and thus reached their pre-crisis level in 07:2011. During the same period of time, imports increased by nearly the same amount (€89 billion).

Third, in the time since 07:2011, the balance of goods and services trade increased sharply, which was primarily due to a strong export performance. After the recovery from the great trade collapse and including the most recent data (10:2013), exports grew by around €82 billion at an annualized rate, while imports decreased (by around €57 billion per annum).

Thus, over the last two years, the continued increase in the CA of the Southern EZ was more and more driven by export growth and less and less so by import compression. Since 07:2011, the Southern EZ’s CA balance has improved by around €139 billion on an annual basis, of which well over half can be attributed to export growth.

Inspection of the respective national data shows that this development is common across all four economies and for exports of both goods and services. The upper panel of Figure 3 displays the cumulative growth of goods exports since 07:2011. In the two-and a quarter years since then, exports grew an impressive 20% in Greece (blue line), 15% in Portugal (yellow line), 13% in Spain (red line), and 7% in Italy (green Line).

Figure 3. Growth of goods and service exports

Source: BIS and Datastream.

For services (see lower panel of Figure 3), the strong export performance is well underway in Italy and Spain and just beginning in Greece and Portugal. Italy and Spain have seen their service exports grow by over 10% since 07:2011. Growth started later than Portugal, and only very recently in Greece. In all four economies, the recent upswing in service exports is in particular due to tourism.⁶

These patterns point towards a fundamental stabilization of the EZ’s economic cohesion in the sense that the imminent recovery of domestic demand in the Southern EZ will not lead to the re-emergence of the large CA imbalances that prevailed before the financial crisis and that also contributed to the severity of the European debt crisis.⁷

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Swiss National Bank.

About the author
Raphael Auer
Deputy Head, International Trade and Capital Flows, Swiss National Bank and Research Affiliate, CEPR

Footnotes

1. Given that the data for Cyprus are missing, the Southern EZ is defined as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

2. All figures in this column display rolling 12-month balances summed over the four economies in the Southern EZ. For example, in Figure 1, the green solid line plots the 12-month CA balance of the Southern EZ, which is equal to the sum of the 12 most recent monthly trade balances. This summation yields a monthly measure of the annualized balance that is unaffected by the strong seasonality of the data and short-term fluctuations. The same procedure is used to construct three subcomponents displayed in Figure 1.

3. The CA balance is equal to the sum of the services trade balance, the goods trade balance, the income balance, and the balance of current transfers. Since the latter are small, they are not included in Figure 1.

4. Auer (2013) examines how these CA balances and the sudden stop in private capital flows led to the emergence of large imbalances in the use of European Central Bank liquidity by the EZ’s national banking systems and the associated Target2 imbalances.

5. For a description of the patterns of world trade during this collapse, see Baldwin (2009) and the references cited therein.

6. These statements are also corroborated by a look at data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, which show that the exports of the Southern EZ are also increasing relative to exports of all advanced nations; that is, these economies are gaining market share on global export markets.

7. Of course, these patterns also imply that the EZ as a whole could remain a large CA surplus area, as there are no signs that the CA surplus in the remainder of the EZ is diminishing at the current juncture.

References

Auer, Raphael (2013), “What drives Target2 Balances? Evidence from a Panel Regression?”, paper prepared for the 57th Panel Meeting of Economic Policy.

Baldwin, Richard (2009),“The great trade collapse: What caused it and what does it mean?”, VoxEU.org, 27 November.

Bems, Rudolfs and Julian di Giovanni (2014), “Income-Induced Expenditure Switching”, mimeo, CREI.

Friedman (2014), FT Insight, Financial Times print edition, 27 February.

Milesi-Ferreti, Gian Maria and Philip R Lane (2012), “External Adjustment and the Global Crisis”, Journal of International Economics, 88(2): 252–265.

Sinn, Hans-Werner and Akos Valentinyi (2013), “European imbalances”, VoxEU.org, 9 March.

In this week’s address, the President offered his warmest greetings as millions of Americans celebrate Easter this Sunday and recounted the Passover Seder he hosted at the White House earlier this week, joining Jewish families around the world in their celebration. The President looks forward to taking part with his family in the hope and joy of the Easter season and reminds all Americans, no matter their faith, of the common thread that binds us.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
April 19, 2014

Hi, everybody. For millions of Americans, this time of year holds great meaning.

Earlier this week, we hosted a Passover Seder at the White House, and joined Jewish families around the world in their retellings of the story of the Exodus and the victory of faith over oppression.

And this Sunday, Michelle, Malia, Sasha, and I will join our fellow Christians around the world in celebrating the Resurrection of Christ, the salvation he offered the world, and the hope that comes with the Easter season.

These holy days have their roots in miracles that took place long ago. And yet, they still inspire us, guide us, and strengthen us today. They remind us of our responsibilities to God and, as God’s children, our responsibilities to one another.

For me, and for countless other Christians, Holy Week and Easter are times for reflection and renewal. We remember the grace of an awesome God, who loves us so deeply that He gave us his only Son, so that we might live through Him. We recall all that Jesus endured for us – the scorn of the crowds, the agony of the cross – all so that we might be forgiven our sins and granted everlasting life. And we recommit ourselves to following His example, to love and serve one another, particularly “the least of these” among us, just as He loves every one of us.

The common thread of humanity that connects us all – not just Christians and Jews, but Muslims and Hindus and Sikhs – is our shared commitment to love our neighbors as we love ourselves. To remember, I am my brother’s keeper. I am my sister’s keeper. Whatever your faith, believer or nonbeliever, there’s no better time to rededicate ourselves to that universal mission.

For me, Easter is a story of hope – a belief in a better day to come, just around the bend.

So to all Christians who are celebrating, from my family to yours, Happy Easter. And to every American, have a joyful weekend.

Thanks, God bless you, and may God bless this country we love.

The Pentagon may deploy more ground troops in Poland, although the number may be much smaller than what the eastern European NATO member wants to see. Washington is seeking to reassure allies amid fears of a Russian aggression.

Warsaw and Washington may announce the deployment of additional American troops in Poland next week, Polish Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak said following a meeting with his US counterpart, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the Pentagon on Thursday.

He added that Poland would play a leading role in the NATO build-up of troops in Eastern Europe, “under US patronage,” the Washington Post reported. He added that the US needs to “re-pivot” back to Europe from Asia to counter “Russian aggression” in Ukraine.

Siemoniak earlier called on the Pentagon to deploy as many as 10,000 American troops in his country. Poland already hosts some 100 to 150 US military servicing a battery of surface-to-air Patriot missiles, which was deployed in 2010 to give Warsaw more confidence for hosting elements of the NATO anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe.

The Polish minister’s calls were mirrored by NATO’s top military commander, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, who said in an interview this month that one of the options the alliance has on the table is to move a 4,500-member combat brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Europe.

The Pentagon so far has not given any details about the planned deployment, saying it has multiple options under consideration. But a senior US official told Fox news on Friday that around 130 soldiers may be sent to Poland on a rotational basis.

The US military also announced on Friday the dispatch of a US Army company of about 150 soldiers to Poland to take part in a two-week land-forces exercise.

NATO’s military response to the Ukrainian crisis was to deploy additional aircraft for patrols in European airspace and to send American warships into the Black Sea.

Relations between Russia and the West became strained after an armed coup in February deposed President Viktor Yanukovich following months of protests. Moscow considers the events to have been orchestrated by the EU and the US and does not recognize the post-coup authorities as legitimate.

Moscow reserved the right to use its military force in Ukraine, should massive violence occur there targeting ethnic Russians. It also accepted Crimea, when it voted to break up from Ukraine and become part of Russia. Russia is eyeing the ongoing turmoil in eastern Ukraine cautiously, where Kiev is trying to suppress anti-government protests with the use of military force.

NATO members in Eastern Europe are concerned that the Russian military is strong enough to defeat their national militaries and have been calling on the US to ensure their protection from possible aggression. Moscow believes that the alliance is seeking justification for its existence by blowing the tension over Ukraine out of proportion.

A day after US president Barack Obama signed a bill barring Iran’s UN envoy-designate from entering the country, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said that a dispute with world powers over the Arak heavy water reactor has been “virtually resolved.”

“Iran has made a proposal to the P5+1 [group of world powers] to make certain changes in Arak and they have accepted. This question is virtually resolved,” Salehi said.

Tehran has been engaged in negotiations with six world powers aimed at clinching a comprehensive agreement on its nuclear drive.

A deal may involve the Islamic republic slashing its number of centrifuges, changing the design of a new reactor at Arak and giving UN inspectors more oversight.
The bill that Obama signed into law Friday passed both houses of Congress over envoy-designate Hamid Abutalebi’s links to the students who seized the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and held American diplomats hostage for 444 days.

In a sign of thaw in the Tehran stance a senior Iranian military official urged the foreign ministry to name a new envoy to the UN.

The semi-official Fars news agency also quoted General Mohammad Bagherzadeh as saying that Abutalebi should remain close to his mother because the family lost two sons during the 1980-88 war with Iraq.

The Arak reactor, located 240km southwest of Tehran, could provide Iran with plutonium capable of being used to make a nuclear bomb.

Iran insists the 40 megawatts reactor, whose construction is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is for peaceful medical research activity only.

It and the world powers — Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States plus Germany — are to resume technical talks next month in New York ahead of further negotiations on a lasting nuclear deal, a senior Iranian official said Saturday.

The talks would take place from May 5 to 9, deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqchi told the state broadcaster Irib.

In November, Iran clinched a deal with the world powers under which it froze some nuclear activities in return for some minor relief from crippling Western sanctions.

Original article