For three days in May, Pope Francis paid a visit to Jordan, Palestine and Israel. In the homeland of Jesus Christ, Christians are a discriminated minority. Every time the Pope goes on a state visit, he wears two hats on his head: First, he is the religious leader of Catholics around the world and secondly, he is head of the Vatican City State. Besides his religious program there is always an official one that is brokered between the two political parties.

Because Pope Francis wanted to visit Jordan and the Palestinian people, he avoided to land in Tel Aviv. He flew directly by helicopter from Amman to occupied Bethlehem where he said Mass in attendance of the Palestinian political and religious dignitaries. On his way to Jerusalem, he stopped at the “Apartheid Wall” for a short prayer. With his right hand and his forehead he touched the wall. This symbolic gesture is worth a thousand words and made Netanyahu furious.

Already, the Israeli government was extremely dissatisfied with the papal itinerary and tried to save what could be saved. The Pope had to see Israel’s President Shimon Peres who is considered by most Israelis as an icon of hypocrisy. He is loved by the Israeli voters so much that he has never won an election. Of course, Pope Francis had also met Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu who probably dragged him to the grave of Theodor Herzl.

How could allow Vatican diplomacy Pope Francis to make such a political faux pas? Not even the heads of state visit Herzl’s grave and lay down a wreath in his honor. “It is not the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris”, as Uri Avnery rightly mentioned. Herzl is not only considered the spiritus rector of the State of Israel, but also of its racist Zionist ideology.

By his visit, Pope Francis has not only paid tribute to this racist ideology but has devalued his grand spiritual gesture toward the Palestinians. Was Pope Francis ill advised by his religiously naïve acolytes or was his visit done with intent? That each head of state has to visit Yad Vashem, is needless to say.

Pope Francis should have skipped his visit to Israel in the first place,1 which would have been a strong symbolic gesture. According to its teachings, the Catholic Church cannot recognize an occupation regime. The social doctrine of the Catholic Church legitimizes resistance against any occupation and oppression that has been going on for 47 years. Besides religious rhetoric, Pope Francis should have talked about legitimate resistance against Israel’s occupation in Palestine. Why didn’t he say to Netanyahu: “Mister Netanyahu, tear down this wall.”

1. http://between-the-lines-ludwig-watzal.blogspot.de/2014/05/should-pope-francis-skip-israel.html

The post Pope Francis Has Visited Palestine – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

After witnessing Narendra Damodardas Modi’s historic electoral feat, one may speculate over the prospects of a son of Assam in propelling himself to the much coveted prime ministerial position. This article dwells on the odds that are stacked against a PM aspirant from this state.

Now that the ‘dual-power centre’ strategy and ‘power without accountability’ metaphor has earned such bad press after a deluge of revelations in the memoirs written by Sanjaya Baru, P.C. Parekh and Arun Maira, no scion of the Gandhi-Nehru family would tinker with the thought of handing over the reins of prime ministership to someone outside the family in a future Congress regime. This literally seals the fate of any PM hopeful from the Congress party in many years to come. A leader from the state who aspires to become PM will have to emerge from a party other than the Congress where the high-command culture is more accommodative. But let us look at how the geo-economic and socio-political drawbacks of the state would encumber the rise of a potential PM candidate from among the state’s political leadership.

Gujarat’s western flank is a coastal belt, but Assam is landlocked and trade starved. Gujarat’s coast is bustling with trade related activities in the SEZ’s that dot the once decrepit landscape of the forbidden Kutch.

According to a 2011 issue of The Economist, the state accounted for 5% of India’s population, 16% of the industrial output and 22% of the trade. The Northeast has very little in terms of trade with Bangladesh and Myanmar, due to issues related to terrain and security. And a dearth of political will and bureaucratic sloth has impeded the much needed connectivity to realize our ‘Look East’ dream.

Assam is the most heterogeneous state and Assamese society is riven with ethnic discords. Fear of the ‘other’ often spirals into a bout of violence and bloodshed. Ethno-exclusivist and protectionist impulses fuel internecine hostilities. Dispur has never hosted regular events like the ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ summits to rope in potential investors from the Diaspora. Can such a state ever attract much-needed investments?

Prolonged rainfall and savage floods destroy the work culture and hampers industrial growth. The dismal power scenario holds back potential investors. Except for a few important players in the tea sector and nouveau riche property magnates, the state can hardly boast of an entrepreneurial class that can match that of Gujarat’s.

Without any support from the corporate class, it is unthinkable to market the popular appeal of a leader. It has been widely reported that the Adanis and Ambanis – prominent Gujaratis – pumped huge resources into Modi’s campaign. The media campaign was built around the popular lore of ‘jo dikhta hain, woh bikta hain’ or ‘what is visible, sells’.

But the Congress did not marshal the phenomenal resources it had at its disposal. When the Congress’ media blitz failed to evoke response after the first flush of a multi-crore campaign, the party perhaps chose to fight another day. Even during our freedom movement, prominent industrialists like Ghanshyam Das Birla had rallied behind Gandhiji, who pitched for ‘swadeshi’ which was basically a call for indigenization. It gave a fillip to indigenous industries. Congress’ call for ‘swadeshi’ spurred industrial doyens like P.C. Roy who embarked on the expansion of Bengal Chemicals from 1905 onwards. In the absence of support from fellow Assamese corporates, a state leader with mass appeal will have to plough a weak furrow.

Extensive organizational support is pivotal for a successful prime ministerial campaign. A leader must win the acceptance of the maximum number of members in an organization. One reason why Modi was nominated as the PM candidate of the BJP was because of the unprecedented clamour of the BJP rank and file for ‘NaMo as PM’.

It has been reported that after the last lap of polling, Rajnath Singh visited Keshav Kunj, RSS’ Delhi office at Jhandewalan, and expressed his gratitude to the Sangh cadres who added ballast to the BJP’s firepower in Modi’s campaign. The nomination of Modi as BJP’s PM candidate was the culmination of the long-drawn efforts of Balasaheb Deoras, third RSS chief from 1973-94, to induct OBC’s into the Sangh’s fold and help them rise through the ranks. Modi is known to belong to OBC. Modi had at his beck and call a formidable base of motivated cadres who worked till the last vote was cast.

A PM hopeful from Assam must also have access to the war chest of a well-knit and well heeled organization with nation-wide reach.

Next, a winning strategy has to be in place. BJP turned the recently concluded electoral contest into a presidential one, propagating the electrifying tagline, ‘Abki baar, Modi sarkar’ or ‘This time Modi administration’, which sounds familiar to what US governments are routinely called. The present incumbent of the White House is called Obama administration and its predecessor was called Bush administration and not Democrat or Republican administrations.

The BJP sounded the bugle of ‘badlav’ or ‘change’ which resonated with the voters, especially the youth. Obama had also run his campaign on the plank of ‘change’. Rather than on specifics, campaign speeches are high on rhetoric. It is crystal clear that the road to Delhi goes through UP. A PM aspirant from the state must hone his Hindi speaking skills to pull crowds to his rallies in the Hindi heartland and seize their imagination with his agenda. Public speaking must be his forte. Only a charismatic and interactive orator can be a giant vote catcher with credentials and a vision that stands out. A contender for the PM post must be adept at managing egos, placating party bosses, firefighting dissent, working with regional satraps and co-opting allies. He must also have his own band of loyalists like those for Modi in the NGO, ‘Centre for Accountable Governance’, who ran the highly successful ‘Mission 272+’ campaign. The PM hopeful must be able to weave regional pride with national perspectives into the tapestry of his winning strategy.

The post Can Assam Elect A PM? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The World Watch List (WWL) Research team of Open Doors International has released a Top 10 Violence List of countries in which Christians have experienced the most violent incidents for their faith in Jesus Christ.

The World Watch Top 10 Violence List, which is based on persecution incidents between Nov. 1, 2012, and March 31, 2014, is topped by Nigeria. The others, in order, are: Syria, Egypt, Central African Republic (CAR), Mexico, Pakistan, Colombia, India, Kenya and Iraq (For a complete country summary of the Top 10 Violence List, see www.opendoorsusa.org/downloads/pdf-downloads/violence-top-10-countries-2014.pdf).

In all countries where Christians are persecuted, researchers recorded 3,641 churches and Christian properties destroyed and 13,120 other forms of violence against Christians such as beatings, abductions, rapes, arrests and forced marriages.

Open Doors researchers also released information on the Top 10 Violence List in the category of faith-related killings during the 17-month reporting period. Nigeria was No. 1 with a total of 2,073 Christian martyrs. Nigeria is followed by Syria 1,479, CAR 1,115, Pakistan 228, Egypt 147, Kenya 85, Iraq 84, Myanmar (Burma) and Sudan 33 each and Venezuela 26.

Of the overall compilation of 5,479 Christians killed for their faith around the world, Nigeria, Syria and CAR make up 85 percent of the total. The estimated average of Christians killed for their faith per month in the reporting period is 322.

Researchers say the total number of martyrs is “a very minimum count and could be significantly higher.”

“The alarming increase of violence against Christians in Nigeria over the past months highlights the lack of religious freedom they have and the daily dangers they face from the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram and other violent Islamic organizations,” says Open Doors USA President/CEO Dr. David Curry. “Going to school, attending church or identifying yourself as a Christian is a very brave decision in Nigeria. It is turning into a bloodbath. Christians in the West must stand in the gap with our prayers and support.”

Observers might be surprised to find North Korea, the 2014 World Watch List’s No. 1 country as the worst persecutor of Christians, absent from the Top 10 Violence List.

“When it comes to counting the numbers of Christians martyred, it is impossible to get an accurate number for North Korea,” says Jan Vermeer, Open Doors field worker for North Korea. “This is not because there are no Christians being killed for their faith. It is a fact that thousands of Christians are starved, abused and tortured in North Korean’s extensive prison system. But due to an inability to derive sufficiently accurate figures about the reasons for killing Christians in this most secretive society, North Korea is excluded from the total number of killings.”

Sources for the World Watch Top 10 Violence List include external media and Internet searches, as well as Open Doors Field Operations, which directly works among and with persecuted Christians.

“The list shows that violence against Christians for faith-related reasons is spread all over the globe -from India, to African and Middle Eastern countries, and to Latin America,” says Frans Veerman, director of World Watch Research. “Islamic extremism, tribal antagonism and organized corruption are the main persecution engines fueling violence, with Islamic extremism being the major engine in seven of the top 10 countries.”

Veerman adds: “Egypt is very high because of increased harassment and attacks by mobs and Islamist groups. Also, Latin America is well established in the Top 10. Mexico ranks No. 5, but is not ranked on the WWL, and Colombia No. 7. Latin America has always known high levels of corruption and state and insurgent violence. Christians are perpetually caught in the crossfire between tribes, guerrillas who are drug runners, landlords who are violent and soldiers running their own rackets.”

The World Watch Top 10 Violence List is a continuation of the 2014 World Watch List (www.worldwatchlist.us), and thematically covers the violence portion of the World Watch List questionnaire. It also includes the World Watch List reporting period (November 2012-October 2013), but has been extended to include updated information. The top 10 countries on the WWL, in addition to top-ranked North Korea, are Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Maldives, Pakistan, Iran and Yemen. The WWL was released on Jan. 8.

World Watch Research is the international research department for Open Doors International.

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(Civil.Ge) — U.S. President Barack Obama has announced about planned USD 1 billion fund to boost its military support to NATO’s Eastern European allies, as well as partners, among them Georgia.

During a visit to Poland, the U.S. President urged the Congress on June 3 to support the USD 1 billion “European Reassurance Initiative” to increase U.S. military deployments in Eastern European allies and to support partners.

“We’ll increase the number of American personnel – Army and Air Force units – continuously rotating through allied countries in Central and Eastern Europe. And we will be stepping up our partnerships with friends like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as they provide for their own defense,” President Obama said at a joint news conference with his Polish counterpart Bronislaw Komorowski in Warsaw.

“I’m calling on Congress to approve up to USD 1 billion to support this effort, which will be a powerful demonstration of America’s unshakeable commitment to our NATO allies,” said Obama, who has started his four-day visit to Europe.

The White House said that the European Reassurance Initiative will enable the United States in the next year to undertake series of measure, which, among others, will also include building of “partner capacity of close friends such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense.”

Among the primary measures, offered in the plan, are increased exercises, training, and rotational presence of the U.S. troops across Europe but especially in NATO’s Eastern European allies, as well as increased participation by the U.S. Navy in NATO naval force deployments, including “more persistent deployments” to the Black and Baltic seas.

Officials in Tbilisi have welcomed the announcement.

This is a “very concrete message, which will yield very concrete results,” Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze said. She also said that consultations on details have yet to start.

“This is a very important message for Georgia, for strengthening of our long-term security and stability,” Alex Petriashvili, the state minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, said in a written statement. “I am sure that consultations will be intensified in this direction both bilaterally with the U.S. and multilaterally with other partners.”

The post Georgia In Obama’s ‘European Reassurance Initiative’ Plan appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fabiana Frayssinet

The advertising department of Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta was on a roll in early 2004 when it published a map that dubbed a large area of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay the “United Republic of Soy”.

In this “republic” more than 46 million hectares of transgenic soy are sprayed with 600 million litres of the herbicide glyphosate and are largely responsible for the deforestation of 500,000 hectares a year in the past decade, according to estimates by the international non-profit organisation GRAIN.

The expansion of agricultural biotechnology in South America has occurred under governments described as progressive, and has fuelled a debate between those who see it as scientific and economic progress and those who stress the social, environmental and political damage caused.

According to GRAIN, global biotech corporations stepped up their campaign to spread transgenic or genetically modified (GM) seeds in 2012, when most of the Southern Cone countries had governments that were critical of neoliberal policies and that were in favour of a state that played a strong role with respect to social, educational, health and economic questions.

The two agricultural powerhouses in the region, Argentina and Brazil, are now among the world’s leaders in GM crops, which require large amounts of pesticides and herbicides.

This has to do with “the blind belief among progressive sectors in scientific and technological advances as providers of well-being and progress,” GRAIN Latin America spokesman Carlos Vicente told Tierramérica.

“The corporate power behind GM crops is not questioned, and the socioenvironmental impacts are not analysed,” he said.

There is also an element of “pragmatism,” he said, referring to “the alliance with agribusiness to maintain governability,” especially in Argentina, where taxes on the enormous exports of soy “are a major source of revenue for the state,” Vicente said.

Paradoxically, these earnings help finance “the social programmes that provide assistance to those who are expelled by the agribusiness model,” added the spokesman for GRAIN, an international NGO that promotes food security and works to support small farmers and social movements in their struggles for community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems.

In Argentina, the U.S. biotech corporation Monsanto controls 86 percent of the market for transgenic seeds, and is the company that generates the most noise. But others are quietly advancing, like Syngenta, Raúl Montenegro, the head of the Environmental Defence Foundation (FUNAM), told Tierramérica.

In his view, the struggle against the construction of a plant to process transgenic corn seed in Malvinas Argentinas, a poor community east of the capital of the central Argentine province of Córdoba, prompted other corporations to keep a low profile and “avoid announcing the location of their future installations.”

On the list, Vicente includes other companies that control millions of hectares, such as Germany’s Bayer and BASF, the U.S. Cargill, Switzerland’s Nestlé, and the Argentina-based Bunge.

Rural exodus

Syngenta did not respond to Tierramérica’s request for an interview. But its communiqués are clear enough.

In a statement on its 2013 fiscal results that says Latin America is spearheading Syngenta’s growth, the company stressed that its 14.68 billion dollars in revenue were driven by seven percent growth in Latin America and six percent growth in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. In North America, meanwhile, sales fell two percent.

The strong performance in Latin America was driven by Brazil, where “Syngenta’s expanding soybean seed portfolio registered significant gains with the launch of new varieties,” said the company’s Chief Executive Officer Mike Mack.

These corporations make their profits at the cost of an increase in health and environmental problems caused by pesticides, the displacement of small farmers and indigenous people, and the growing concentration of property ownership, said Vicente.

But, he added, these are only seen as “collateral damage” by the governments of “the United Republic of Soy.”

In Argentina, President Cristina Fernández and her ministers “repeat ad nauseam that ‘we produce food for 400 million people’ when what we actually produce are 55 million tonnes of soy bean forage,” he added.

Enrique Martínez, former president of the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI), reminded Tierramérica of Monsanto’s lobbying for a law on seeds “that would validate not only patents on species but also the charging of royalties and the regulation of ownership of harvested seeds.”

Martínez, head of the Evita Movement’s Institute for Popular Production, said he believes the law won’t be approved, due to the pressure of public opinion.

In his opinion, the government does not defend an agricultural model based on transgenics. “What it does is argue that the market works well in automatic terms, based on the supposition that productivity improves in a systematic manner, and that this benefits the community,” he said.

But that logic “is not correct,” he said. “We need studies that show that Monsanto has appropriated the majority of the immediate economic benefits, turning farmers into simple hostages of this scheme.”

He added, however, that “biotechnology should not be reviled as the cause of our problems.

“That is a sectarian way of looking at things,” he said. What is needed, he argued, is “the democratisation of knowledge and know-how, to enable an expansion of the actors so that production is not concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.”

Environmental questions “are only one aspect,” he said. “The key is the construction of value chains that depend on the decisions of a corporation. That is what must be fixed.”

Economist João Pedro Stédile, a leader of the La Vía Campesina global peasant movement and Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST), said the phenomenon did not reflect an ideological contradiction on the part of progressive governments.

“The movement of capital over agriculture to impose a dominant model based on monoculture, transgenic seeds and toxic agrochemicals has its own logic that does not depend on governments,” Stédile told Tierramérica.

Governments “fool themselves” because of the volume of production and the positive trade balance that this agribusiness model provides, but it does not generate development or distribute wealth, he argued.

Of the 70 million hectares of land under cultivation in Brazil, 88 percent is dedicated to soy, maize, sugar cane and eucalyptus, he pointed out. “So naturally social problems and protests against that model without a future are going to increase,” Stédile said.

And biotech companies know that.

The vice president of Monsanto Argentina, Pablo Vaquero, warned in March that the conflict that has blocked construction of a plant near the city of Córdoba in central Argentina “is a threat to the entire productive model.”

“Today they come out against Monsanto, but it is an excuse to attack the entire sector,” he said.

Vicente says a broad debate on these issues is still needed.

But he stressed achievements such as the blocking of the seeds law in Argentina, restrictions on spraying in some municipalities, and the awareness raised by the National Campaign Against Agrotoxics and for Life.

This story was originally published by Latin American newspapers that are part of the Tierramérica network.

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By Issam Eido for Syria Comment

Clouds of ambivalence and uncertainty have obscured Syria’s religious landscape from the beginning of the revolution. In the particular way that the conflict developed across space and time, every individual affiliated with a religious group became compelled—sooner or later—to take sides. Needless to say, any declaration of alignment in the conflict carries serious consequences, especially for religious shaykhs who are looked to for guidance. If even tacitly supportive of the revolution, the position taken by shaykhs can lead to killings, arrests, or torture by the regime’s officers.

On the other hand, a shaykh might lose his followers or be accused of being a spy or in-league with regime intelligence if he exhibits even nominal support for the opposition. Hence, the first stage of suffering was the dreadful obligation to choose a side, something that weighed on ulema everywhere and exacerbated whenever a shaykh’s popularity was on the rise or when there was specific danger in the area where he lived. Accordingly, the way that the conflict developed can help us understand the reason for the declarations of each shaykh at particular points in time, as well as explain (in some cases) why the focus was on one shaykh more than others.

The Syrian revolution has two trajectories: geographic and temporal:

The geographic trajectory of the revolution conferred upon the ulema—the Arabic word for Muslim religious and legal authorities—the responsibility to tell the truth about what was happening in the area where they resided. Accordingly, we understand that the first religious defection to occur was that of the mufti of Dara‘a, and that the first shaykhs who were exposed to killings, imprisonment, and other dangers were the shaykhs of Dara‘a. These were followed by those of the city of Homs whose shaykhs rebelled in their entirety, supporting the revolution from the oldest to the youngest. They subsequently suffered displacement, prison, or evacuation, including such shaykhs as Anas Swaid, Mamdouh Junaid, Adnan al-Saqqa. This city, therefore, didn’t experience the contravention of public expectations by any shaykh who had gained the trust of the people before the revolution.

Moreover, some shaykhs of the city were leading demonstrations and giving speeches in public places, such as Shaykh Junaid. The city of Hama was the third city to engage strongly in the revolution, but it lacked prominent religious leaders because most of its significant figures were killed, arrested, or evacuated during the events of the 1980s. Since then, fear of persecution has led most of its shaykhs and students to follow ulema from Damascus and Aleppo.

As for Damascus, the revolutionary activity was divided between the city and its countryside. While the countryside was among the most active regions of the revolution since its beginning, demonstrations in the city were limited to a few mosques such as the al-Hasan and al-Rifai mosques. Therefore, we can understand the great weight of responsibility that the ulema of these places took on. While the countryside of Damascus didn’t witness any support for the regime on the part of any prominent shaykh (in particular in Dariyya, Muddamiya, Doma, and Harasta), the people of Damascus heard vague statements and declarations coming from their ulema.

Among the Damascene ulema we do not find a direct and obvious declaration inviting people to demonstrate against the regime, yet most of their statements contained calls for an end to oppression, an urging for justice, and calls for political change and reform. However, the continuity of demonstrations that were occurring at the al-Hasan and al-Rifai mosques exposed their shaykhs to direct harm. Shaykh Kurayyemal-Rajeh was only placed under house arrest (by the Minister of Endowments), but Shaykh Usama al-Rifai was directly assaulted by security forces and armed shabiha on the holiest night of the Islamic calendar (the night of al-Qader, near the end of Ramadan). Then, Al-Rajeh and Al-Rifai departed the country, and founded a new association of ulema about which I will speak later.

As Aleppo joined the revolution later in 2012, most of its ulema avoided overt opposition of the regime. However, most of its prominent ulema did sign statements urging all to end the killing and oppression, and requesting relief for affected people, especially those in Homs. Still, these ulema were subjected to some degree of questioning, but not to the same extent of those in other cities, as the regime sought to give the impression that Aleppo was its spoiled child.

With regard to the temporal trajectory, the Syrian revolution underwent a number of major transitions: The first stage was peaceful protests; these were followed by the defecting of many soldiers from the regime’s army; then there was the establishment of the Free Army; then the discussion surrounding the announcement of Jihad; and finally the present situation with the emergence of civil and militant Salafi groups.

Before delving into the details of this trajectory, I should point out that traditional Islamic thought, which occupies almost all the discourse of Syrian religious individuals, groups and institutions, is generally a conservative form of thought. Namely, it generally conforms to the established traditions and norms, and does not possess a spirit of initiative and change. In addition, it is—in the Syrian case—moderate. Accordingly, its pronouncements are always late and after-the-fact, which causes it to lose its sheen.

In the first six months of the revolution, the religious groups were moderate. They did not prefer change by force and only issued vague statements. But this situation changed during Ramadan of 2011 when the regime used heavy military force in Hama. The revolution’s trajectory quickly began to shift toward an armed revolution, in particular after the first military defection, that of Husain al-Harmoush. Many official persons followed his lead, such as the mufti of Dara‘a and the later striking announcement of defection of young women from the Qubaisyyat, a group for Muslim women that is known for its political quietism.

In examining this trajectory, we see that the structure of the religious groups started to disintegrate and crumble as a result of multiple factors: the defections of followers, the departure of shaykhs from the country, the loss of shaykhs’ popularity, and members adopting a new outlook and changing allegiance to other groups with different ideas about how to manage the situation. The changing structure of these groups was very deep.

We can classify Syria’s old and newly-emergent religious groups according to the following six categories:

• First: Groups that support the revolution explicitly: most religious groups and their shaykhs in the Syrian countryside around most cities explicitly announced their support for the revolution. Some observers attributed this to a rural reaction against cities and against the official religious and political discourse that for many years had marginalized the countryside. But this analysis does not apply to some groups who worked for years prior to the revolution to develop a moderate or reformist religious discourse concerned with values of dignity, justice, and equality such as Shaykh Jawdat Saedd and Muaz al-Khateeb’s group. In addition, we find that most religious groups and leaders in Dara‘a, Homs, Hama, and most northeastern Syrian cities explicitly announced their support the revolution. There are also some ulema who openly declared their opinion in support of the revolution, such as Shaykh Ihsan Badarani—the religious advisor to the previous president Hafiz al-Assad. Badarani had been marginalized by the Syrian regime and religious institutions throughout Bashaar al-Assad’s reign, and some attributed his support for the revolution to this marginalization.

• Second: Groups that support the regime explicitly: It is difficult to identify a religious group that supported the regime, except the ministry of endowments’s official institutions, its branches in cities, and some institutions that are associated with the ministry, such as the Abu al-Nour (Kuftaro) Institute. The ministry of endowments strove throughout the revolution to establish new groups and associations under different titles such as “The Association of Damascene Ulema” claiming that ulema actually supported the regime. These new associations often included some imams of mosques and some directors of official institutes like the directors of Abu al-Nour and al-Fateh Institutes, as well as some muftis. But the most prominent figures of these associations were the internationally renowned al-Buti and the grand Mufti Hassoun. While the Hassoun’s attitude was not surprising, al-Buti’s statements, speeches, lessons, and fatwas were surprising and generated many discussions and debates in online forums. This resulted in him losing most of his followers as we see in a record on the internet showing that only 20 to 40 students continued attending his lessons compared with a huge number of students who were attending prior to the revolution. Ultimately, al-Buti and many of his students were massacred during one of his weekly lessons in March 2013 in a well-known Damascus mosque, although there are conflicting reports about who was responsible.

• Third: Groups that nominally support the regime: Most groups whose attitudes are ambiguous are Sufi groups and the Qubaisyyat (the group for religious Muslim women). While some activists claim that these groups support the revolution, others provide records that prove their support for the regime. In the case of the Qubaisyyat, the regime strove to display them as supporters by means of some pictures that showed them meeting with the president—an event that many said happened under coercion. As for Sufi groups, the ambiguity of their attitude was to be expected, as these groups are concerned mainly about individual and spiritual affairs rather than public ones. This, however, led to many questions about the role of these groups. Ambiguity was the general feature of most Sufi groups in Aleppo, such as the Keltawiyya, some of whose followers leaked a record indicating that their Shaykh Mahmoud Hout supported the regime and insulted the rebels. But afterwards, other followers leaked a record which indicated his criticism of the regime. It would be mistaken to assume that this pattern of ambiguity applied to all Sufi groups, as there were instances that stood in stark contrast, such as that of Shaykh Abu al-Huda al-Yaqubi in Damascus and Shaykh Mahmoud Abu al-Huda al-Husaini in Aleppo whose support for the revolution was explicit early on. Some attributed this to their higher levels of education.

• Fourth: Groups that nominally support the revolution: Most Damascene and some Aleppan ulema fell into this category during the first year of the revolution. This ambiguity started to change when the revolution reached Aleppo and Damascus. A good example of where we can see this ambiguity is in the Shari‘a faculties of universities where most of the lecturers supported the revolution with indistinct, opaque language. They were reluctant to exhibit overt support because they were suffering concern on two fronts: the fear of the official channels of Syrian intelligence as well as pressure from their own colleagues.

• Fifth: New groups outside Syria: in the first year of the revolution, some new organizations were established by Syrian ulema, most of whom had already been living outside of Syria before the revolution began. One example is the “Syrian Ulema Association” whose head is Shaykh Ali al-Sabouni and whose vision is basically traditional. This organization issued many statements that are considered the first religious statements against the regime. The “Syrian Islamic Forum” was established in Istanbul by a number of Syrian ulema. These had escaped from the country with a few exceptions like Shaykh Anas Swaid from Homs. Although this institute relies on shari‘a as the source of law, it sees citizenship as a right for all Syrians, and it describes itself as moderate and committed to developing an open and deep Islamic discourse. There is also the “Islamic Organization of Sham (Greater Syria)” that was also established in Istanbul at the end of 2011 by ulema unknown to most Syrians, and which presented itself as an extensive Islamic reformist organization that considered citizenship a right for all Syrians. However, the most important organization founded during the revolution was “The Ulama of al-Sham Association” which was created quite late (Sept. 2012) in Doha by several ulema who escaped from Syria, such as Shaykh Kurayyem al-Rajeh, the association’s head, Shaykh Usama al-Rifai the deputy, Saria al-Rifai, Rateb al-Nabulsi, Mamdouh Junaid, Adnan al-Saqqa, and Abd al-Kareem Bakkar. These scholars aimed to support the revolution through “Jihad al-Kalima”—a jihad through words—to form a religious reference point through which they could advise rebels on how to act according to shari’a, propagate a moderate discourse that dismisses sectarian behavior, and deal with all Syrians as equals.

• Sixth: New groups growing inside Syria: Most of these groups have been founded in exceptionally violent circumstances, and have generally emerged as a reaction to brutal acts of the regime, or as relief groups and judicial councils in the areas that moved out of the regime’s control. These groups can be classified according to three types: ulema, judges, and armed militants. However, these groups generally have two common features: they are young and rural. Since the armed groups emerged as a reaction to the regime’s brutality, they generally promote extreme attitudes which often adopt the Salafi vision. As for other groups, they are almost all students of Syrian universities, in particular the shari‘a colleges, a fact which bolstered their credibility and gave them a level of trustworthiness. We see this in the countrysides of Aleppo and Damascus in such examples as the Association of Ulema in Jabal al-Zawia and the local judgment council in the countryside of Aleppo.

We can now conclude with several points:

• Most official religious institutes have continued supporting the regime, in particular the Ministry of Endowments and its institutes, such al-Fateh, Abu al-Nour, and the Syrian Mufti.
• Most traditional institutes, in particular mosques providing lessons, ceased their activities as most ulema fled to neighboring countries.
• New groups emerged inside Syria, most of whose ideas are based on criticizing the official and traditional religious and legal discourses, in which most of these growing groups believed that these religious and legal discourses were one of the most important reasons for the continuity of the Ba‘ath regime.
• However, the traditional ulema still have popularity among Syrian people especially in Damascus where conservative and moderate Damascenes consult the opinions of these ulema regarding every event.
• The general religious landscape of Syria is currently characterized by two primary views: that of the late prominent Shaykh al-Buti who strongly supported the regime, and that of the many religious groups who believe that the battle represents a religious and sectarian conflict. This fact prompted many wise ulema and groups outside Syria to strive to conduct a non-sectarian revolution that would emphasize a citizenship of greater inclusivity. However, with the continuous brutality of the regime, the lack of any convincing political solution, and the passive role of the international community, Syria continues to be entrenched in sectarian conflict, remaining an ideal environment for the operation of extremists.

About the author:
Issam Eido is a Neubauer Collegium Visiting Fellow and a Visiting Instructor of Islamic Studies and Arabic in the University of Chicago Divinity School. Dr. Eido’s research focuses on the Qur’an in late antiquity, hadith studies, and Sufi and Arabic literary and poetic studies. Graduating with his PhD in 2010 from Damascus University, he also served that institution from 2010-2012 as Lecturer in the Department of Qur’anic Studies and History of Islamic Sciences. In 2012 he was a Fellow of the “Europe in the Middle East/Middle East in Europe” research program at the Forum Transregionale Studien in Berlin. At the University of Chicago, he currently teaches Qur’anic Arabic.

The post Religious Groups And Scholars Of Islam In Syrian Revolution – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — The European Commission asked the Bulgarian government to suspend work on Gazprom’s South Stream gas pipeline, pending a decision on its conforming with EU law, it was announced today (3 June). But the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which is the senior partner in the country’s minority government, was quick to reply that its construction will continue as planned.

The Commission has opened an infringement procedure against Bulgaria, and has asked the country’s authorities halt the building of South Stream, it announced today.

“We don’t block South Stream, but we want the project to be in line with EU law,” said Sabine Berger, spokesperson for energy commissioner Günther Oettinger. Her colleague Antoine Colombani said on behalf of internal market commissioner Michel Barnier that the Bulgarian authorities had been informed by letter and explained the of breach to EU legislation on public contracts.

On 27 May, Bulgaria awarded the construction of South Stream on its territory to the Russian Stroytransgaz consortium. A major shareholder (63%) in Stroytransgaz is the Volga Group, which is owned by Gennady Timchenko, who was placed on the US’s sanctions list against Russia in mid-March. Timchenko is believed to be the 6th richest man in Russia, according to Forbes, and has close ties to President Vladimir Putin.

On the same day when EU leaders held their last summit, Commission President José Manuel Barroso made it clear that the EU executive would impose infringements on Bulgaria regarding South Stream.

‘Urgent to act’

Colombani said that it was “urgent to act”, because work on building the pipeline in Bulgaria was about to start.

Bulgaria has said it had conducted the South Stream tender according to normal procedures, and that the tender announcement had been published last December. Colombani said, however, that EU internal market rules covering the award of public contracts had not been respected by Bulgaria.

“To be more precise, South Stream Bulgaria, which has been set up for this project, has been awarded to design, finance and operate the gas pipeline without the transparent and competitive procedure which is expected in such cases,” he said.

A second concern, according to Colombani, was that the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Bulgaria provides for the possibility for subcontracting part of the works to other firms, “in preference to Russian and Bulgarian bidders without publication in the official journal”.

EurActiv has been reporting since last December that the EU executive had raised these concerns in a letter dated 14 August 2013, which analysed the Bulgaria-Russia agreement in great detail [read more]. However, the Bulgarian authorities have been dismissing such claims.

“The position of the Bulgarian Socialist Party is that we must show character and conclude the building of South Stream,” said Dimitar Dabov, a high official of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). BSP leader Sergei Stanishev is President of the Party of European Socialists (PES).

Dabov said that Bulgaria had complied with all the requirements regarding South Stream.

‘Highly politicised line’

“If there is pressure, it’s political pressure”, Dabov said, as quoted by Dnevnik, the EurActiv partner in Bulgaria.

EurActiv also spoke to Russian Ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, who also said that if confirmed, the Commission’s approach “appears to be in line with a highly politicised line towards the South Stream project”.

The full text of the interview with Chizhov will be published tomorrow.

The post Bulgaria To Build South Steam Despite Commission Warnings appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The power struggle continues in Tripoli between the new government of Ahmed Miitig, who yesterday seized the official parliament building backed by his loyalist forces, and the government headed by Prime Minister Abdallah al Thinni. The Libya Herald however specifies that although force was used in Miitig’s move, “there was no violence or shooting”.

Miitig’s election last month with a vote of the General National Congress (GNC) was contested by al Thinni and a part of the political forces, which filed a complaint to the judiciary. The decision of the supreme court on the ‘legality’ of Miitig’s election and of confidence to his government is set for Thursday.

Suppporters of the new Premier welcomed Miitig’s entry in the parliament building as a “symbolic victory”, while his opponents defined it as an “occupation” of the building, given that a ruling has not been issued yet.

Confusion and instability reigns also in Benghazi, main city of Libya’s eastern Cyrenaica region. At least 19 people, including five civilians, were killed in violent clashes between the formed headed by tge renegade general Khalifa Haftar and Islamist militias, including the Ansar al Sharia. After an attack by the Islamists against regular army forces in Benghazi, air forces commanded by Haftar responded with air strikes conducted by combat helicopters. The renegade General last night claimed that his forces control 80% of the city and their capacity to defeat Ansar al Sharia.

The post Libya: Power Struggle Between Two Governments, Chaos In Benghazi appeared first on Eurasia Review.

For decades social critics have bemoaned the influence of sports and entertainment spectacles in ‘distracting’ workers from struggling for their class interests. According to these analysts, ‘class consciousness’ was replaced by ‘mass’ consciousness.

They argued that atomized individuals, manipulated by the mass media, were converted into passive consumers who identified with millionaire sports heroes, soap opera protagonists and film celebrities.

The culmination of this ‘mystification’ – mass distraction –were the ‘world championships’ watched by billions around the world and sponsored and financed by billionaire corporations: the World Series (baseball), the World Cup (soccer/futbol), and the Super Bowl (American football).

Today, Brazil is the living refutation of this line of cultural-political analysis. Brazilians have been described as ‘football crazy’. Its teams have won the most number of World Cups. Its players are coveted by the owners of the most important teams in Europe. Its fans are said to “live and die with football” . . . Or so we are told.

Yet it is in Brazil where the biggest protests in the history of the World Cup have taken place. As early as a year before the Games, scheduled for June 2014, there have been mass demonstrations of up to a million Brazilians. In just the last few weeks, strikes by teachers, police, construction workers and municipal employees have proliferated. The myth of the mass media spectacles mesmerizing the masses has been refuted – at least in present-day Brazil.

To understand why the mass spectacle has been a propaganda bust it is essential to understand the political and economic context in which it was launched, as well as the costs and benefits and the tactical planning of popular movements.

The Political and Economic Context: The World Cup and the Olympics

In 2002, the Brazilian Workers Party candidate Lula DaSilva won the presidential elections. His two terms in office (2003 – 2010) were characterized by a warm embrace of free market capitalism together with populist poverty programs. Aided by large scale in-flows of speculative capital, attracted by high interest rates, and high commodity prices for its agro-mineral exports, Lula launched a massive poverty program providing about $60 a month to 40 million poor Brazilians, who formed part of Lula’s mass electoral base. The Workers Party reduced unemployment, increased wages and supported low-interest consumer loans, stimulating a ‘consumer boom’ that drove the economy forward.

To Lula and his advisers, Brazil was becoming a global power, attracting world-class investors and incorporating the poor into the domestic market.

Lula was hailed as a ‘pragmatic leftist’ by Wall Street and a ‘brilliant statesman’ by the Left!

In line with this grandiose vision (and in response to hoards of presidential flatterers North and South), Lula believed that Brazil’s rise to world prominence required it to ‘host’ the World Cup and the Olympics and he embarked on an aggressive campaign. . . Brazil was chosen.

Lula preened and pontificated: Brazil, as host, would achieve the symbolic recognition and material rewards a global power deserved.

The Rise and Fall of Grand Illusions

The ascent of Brazil was based on foreign flows of capital conditioned by differential (favorable) interest rates. And when rates shifted, the capital flowed out. Brazil’s dependence on high demand for its agro-mineral exports was based on sustained double-digit economic growth in Asia. When China’s economy slowed down, demand and prices fell, and so did Brazil’s export earnings.

The Workers Party’s ‘pragmatism’ meant accepting the existing political, administrative and regulatory structures inherited from the previous neo-liberal regimes. These institutions were permeated by corrupt officials linked to building contractors notorious for cost over-runs and long delays on state contracts.

Moreover, the Workers Party’s ‘pragmatic’ electoral machine was built on kick-backs and bribes. Vast sums were siphoned from public services into private pockets.

Puffed up on his own rhetoric, Lula believed Brazil’s economic emergence on the world stage was a ‘done deal’. He proclaimed that his pharaonic sports complexes – the billions of public money spent on dozens of stadiums and costly infrastructure – would “pay for themselves”.

The Deadly ‘Demonstration Effect’: Social Reality Defeats Global Grandeur

Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rousseff, Lula’ protégé, has allocated billions of reales to finance her predecessor’s massive building projects: stadiums, hotels, highways and airports to accommodate an anticipated flood of overseas soccer fans.

The contrast between the immediate availability of massive amounts of public funds for the World Cup and the perennial lack of money for deteriorating essential public services (transport, schools, hospitals and clinics) has been a huge shock to Brazilians and a provocation to mass action in the streets.

For decades, the majority of Brazilians, who depended on public services for transport, education and medical care, (the upper middle classes can afford private services), were told that “there were no funds”, that “budgets had to be balanced”, that a “budget surplus was needed to meet IMF agreements and to service the debt”.

For years public funds had been siphoned away by corrupt political appointees to pay for electoral campaigns, leading to filthy, overcrowded transport, frequently breaking down, and commuter delays in sweltering buses and long lines at the stations. For decades, schools were in shambles, teacher rushed from school to school to make-up for their miserable minimum-wage salaries leading to low quality education and neglect. Public hospitals were dirty, dangerous and crowded; under-paid doctors frequently took on private patients on the side, and essential medications were scarce in the public hospitals and overpriced in the pharmacies.

The public was outraged by the obscene contrast between the reality of dilapidated clinics with broken windows, overcrowded schools with leaking roofs and unreliable mass transport for the average Brazilian and the huge new stadiums, luxury hotels and airports for wealthy foreign sports fans and visitors.

The public was outraged by the obvious official lies: the claim that there were ‘no funds’ for teachers when billions of Reales were instantly available to construct luxury hotels and fancy stadium box seats for wealthy soccer fans.

The final detonator for mass street protest was the increase in bus and train fares to ‘cover losses’ – after public airports and highways had been sold cheaply to private investors who raised tolls and fees.

The protestors marching against the increased bus and train fares were joined by tens of thousands Brazilians broadly denouncing the Government’s priorities: Billions for the World Cup and crumbs for public health, education, housing and transport!

Oblivious to the popular demands, the government pushed ahead intent on finishing its ‘prestige projects’. Nevertheless, construction of stadiums fell behind schedule because of corruption, incompetence and mismanagement. Building contractors, who were pressured, lowered safety standards and pushed workers harder, leading to an increase in workplace deaths and injury. Construction workers walked out protesting the speed-ups and deterioration of work safety.

The Rousseff regime’s grandiose schemes have provoked a new chain of protests. The Homeless Peoples Movement occupied urban lots near a new World Cup stadium demanding ‘social housing’ for the people instead of new five-star hotels for affluent foreign sports aficionados.

Escalating costs for the sports complexes and increased government expenditures have ignited a wave of trade union strikes to demand higher wages beyond the regime’s targets. Teachers and health workers were joined by factory workers and salaried employees striking in strategic sectors, such as the transport and security services, capable of seriously disrupting the World Cup.

The PTs embrace of the grandiose sports spectacle, instead of highlighting Brazil’s ‘debut as a global power’, has spotlighted the vast contrast between the affluent and secure ten percent in their luxury condos in Brazil, Miami and Manhattan, with access to high quality private clinics and exclusive private and overseas schools for their offspring, with the mass of average Brazilians, stuck for hours sweating in overcrowded buses, in dingy emergency rooms waiting for mere aspirins from non-existent doctors and in wasting their children’s futures in dilapidated classrooms without adequate, full-time teachers.

Conclusion

The political elite, especially the entourage around the Lula-Rousseff Presidency have fallen victim to their own delusions of popular support. They believed that subsistence pay-offs (food baskets) to the very poor would allow them to spend billions of public money on sports spectacles to entertain and impress the global elite. They believed that the mass of workers would be so enthralled by the prestige of holding the World Cup in Brazil, that they would overlook the great disparity between government expenditures for elite grand spectacles and the absence of support to meet the everyday needs of Brazilian workers.

Even trade unions, seemingly tied to Lula, who bragged of his past leadership of the metal workers, broke ranks when they realized that the ‘money was out there’ – and that the regime, pressured by construction deadlines, could be pressured to raise wages to get the job done.

Make no mistake, Brazilians are sports minded. They avidly follow and cheer their national team. But they are also conscious of their needs. They are not content to passively accept the great social disparities exposed by the current mad scramble to stage the World Cup and Olympics in Brazil. The government’s vast expenditure on the Games has made it clear that Brazil is a rich country with a multitude of social inequalities. They have learned that vast sums are available to improve the basic services of everyday life. They realized that, despite its rhetoric, the ‘Workers Party’ was playing a wasteful prestige game to impress an international capitalist audience. They realized that they have strategic leverage to pressure the government and address some of the inequalities in housing and salaries through mass action. And they have struck. They realize they deserve to enjoy the World Cup in affordable, adequate public housing and travel to work (or to an occasional game) in decent buses and trains. Class consciousness, in the case of Brazil, has trumped the mass spectacle. ‘Bread and circuses’ have given way to mass protests.

The post Brazil: Workers Struggle Trumps Sports Spectacle – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Politico’s Kyle Cheney and Jennifer Haberkorn have made the case that Republican non-collaboration with Obamacare has brought a completely federally controlled healthcare system closer to reality:

Right now, 36 states rely on HealthCare.gov, the federal exchange, to enroll people in health coverage. At least two more states are opting in next year, with a few others likely to follow. Only two states are trying to get out.

That’s precisely the opposite of the Affordable Care Act’s original intent: 50 exchanges run by 50 states.

The federal option was supposed to be a limited and temporary fallback. But a shift to a bigger, more permanent Washington-controlled system is instead underway — without preparation, funding or even public discussion about what a national exchange covering millions of Americans means for the future of U.S. health care. It’s coming about because intransigent Republicans shunned state exchanges, and ambitious Democrats bungled them.

This is a complete misreading of the implications of the unexpected fiasco of the exchange rollout. It is also similar to an argument that was deemed respectable in limited-government circles back in 2010.

When Obamacare was being rammed through Congress, many believed that Republican governors and legislatures should get a “seat at the table” by establishing state exchanges. They could then ameliorate the worst aspects of the law.

However, others held that any collaboration with Obamacare, beyond the strictest letter of the law (which is more than President Obama can say for his own administration’s performance), would leave the stain of Obamacare on those who rolled with it. In October 2010, I wrote:

States establishing Obamacare exchanges are making a one-way, lose-lose, bet. If Obamacare persists, exchanges will become bloated administrative nightmares. If Obamacare is defeated, states will have wasted time and energy that should have been directed towards that effort. Obamacare is President Obama’s problem. Don’t make it your state’s problem.

The latter argument clearly won the day, and no subsequent development shakes it. Although states retain a large amount of regulatory power over health insurers, that power is no different in a state with a federal exchange than in a state with a state exchange.

Compare Obamacare to Medicaid. State revenues fund almost half of Medicaid, which should allow the states some measure of sovereignty over that program. Nevertheless, Medicaid is micro-managed by a bloated federal bureaucracy, and states complain bitterly about the tight strings attached to federal funds. A state health-insurance exchange could hardly mitigate federal control of Obamacare, given that all the money flowing as tax credits through exchanges is federal.

If Republican-governed states had set up Obamacare exchanges, they would have either “succeeded” (like Connecticut’s) or failed (like Oregon’s). States where exchanges had “succeeded” would have been dug in deeper in Obamacare, with newly empowered state bureaucrats invested in the law’s progress, undermining the state’s attempts to advance alternative, patient-centered reforms. States where exchanges had failed would simply shut them down and yield to a federal exchange — the same outcome as not having set up a state exchange at all.

States that did not set up Obamacare exchanges should remain confident that they made the right choice.

* * *

For the pivotal alternative to Obamacare, please see the Independent Institute’s widely acclaimed book: Priceless: Curing the Healthcare Crisis, by John C. Goodman.

The post What If More States Had Set Up Their Own Obamacare Exchanges? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nicholas Rostow

The struggle against terrorism—more specifically, the effort to prevent terrorist attacks—has raised difficult legal and policy issues including so-called targeted killing, or the killing of specific individuals because of their involvement in terrorist organizations and operations. As we shall see, this form of targeted killing involves domestic and international legal authorities and policy and prudential issues. A substantial number of countries confronting what they consider to be terrorist attacks and threats engage in targeted killings. Each has to resolve questions about authorities and prudence because, while terrorists are always criminals, they also may be lawful military targets. The dual character of terrorists leads to the conclusion that, as a matter of policy, a state should weigh the totality of the circumstances and conclude that no other action is reasonable to prevent a terrorist attack before engaging in the targeted killing. Careful analysis in advance may preempt problems later.

This essay addresses the question principally from the American perspective. It examines the authority, as a matter of U.S. law, for the United States to kill individual terrorists and the international legal context for such operations. The operating premise is that the targeted killing of al Qaeda leaders is emblematic of the subject under review in contrast to such domestic police action against terrorists as the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and execution of Timothy McVeigh, who was principally responsible for the bombing of the Federal office building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.1 The essay concludes that authority in domestic and international law exists for such operations and that, as a policy choice, the United States would do well to apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the conflict with terrorists whether or not it is legally required. In any event, policymakers need to weigh the consequences of targeted killing operations because, like all military operations, unforeseen results—positive and negative—are likely.

Authorities for Targeted Killing

As spokesmen for the U.S. Government have emphasized,2 America’s use of force against terrorists takes place in the context of “armed conflict.” For practical and legal reasons they distinguish the conflict with al Qaeda and similar organizations from counterterrorism law enforcement at home or in other countries, which principally involves the police. This delimitation is commonsensical. It is also is important. One does not want the U.S. Government engaging in military operations on American soil absent extraordinary circumstances. Authority for using the military instrument abroad against terrorists in the context of “armed conflict” comes from the Constitution and statute, and the use of armed force needs to comply with the international law of armed conflict (also known as the laws of war or international humanitarian law).

More than 200 years of practice have confirmed that the President has the responsibility to direct the Armed Forces to defend the country. The President accordingly had constitutional authority to order counterattacks by U.S. forces against terrorists who had engaged in attacks against the United States and its citizens even before September 11, 2001.

Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have not had to rely on their constitutional authority alone. After September 11, 2001, Congress gave the President broad authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”3 This statute provided explicit authority for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and against those the President determined were involved in the September 11 attacks. The words “necessary and appropriate” limit the use of the military instrument to those situations where police action, by the United States or the state in which the terrorist is found, is impossible. Had the perpetrators resembled Timothy McVeigh and been subject to arrest inside the United States, the use of the Armed Forces would have been neither necessary nor appropriate. One therefore should not expect drone attacks in London.

In states unable or unwilling to take action to prevent their territories from being used by terrorists, the legal and practical situation is different. A use of force, as against Osama bin Laden, may be lawful as well as the only practicable course, especially when a host government withholds its cooperation. On balance, it became more important to the United States and to the international multilateral effort to suppress terrorism to capture or kill bin Laden than to be sensitive to a breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and amour propre.

The conduct of military operations pursuant to these constitutional and statutory authorities has to conform to U.S. legal obligations regarding armed conflict. In the main, the rules for American use of force are contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and subsequent treaties to which the Nation is a party or, as in the case of some articles of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which Washington regards as accurate statements of the customary international law of armed conflict. In 2010 the State Department Legal Adviser stated that the United States applied “law of war principles,” including:

First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the subject of the attack; and

Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.4

In other words, if the target is lawful under the laws of armed conflict, a state may use weapons, including weapons delivered by remotely piloted, unmanned aerial vehicles, against such targets. In this sense, targeted killing is high technology sniping.

This analysis rests on the premise that the United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda as a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a conclusion that itself reflects a process of analysis. Under longstanding principles of international law, a state bears responsibility for uses of force from its territory about which it knew or should have known.That responsibility includes a duty to prevent and, if prevention proves impossible, suppress. When a state is unable or unwilling to discharge such international legal obligations, the victim state presumptively has rights of self-defense. Thus, when Afghanistan was the base from which the 9/11 attacks were conducted and when Afghanistan was unwilling or unable to take action against the perpetrators, the United States enjoyed the right to use force in self-defense to attack those actors in Afghanistan. This legal analysis provides the basis for the U.S. use of force in Afghanistan commencing in 2001.

Laws of War and Targeted Killing

Confusion has bedeviled discussion of the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. Assuming that al Qaeda is a true non-state actor, governments have had to decide whether the United States is in international armed conflict with al Qaeda and, if so, what rules apply. These questions are rooted in the language of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

By their terms,the Conventions apply to conflicts among the “High Contracting Parties” or to “armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”5 This language means, respectively, conflicts between or among states and civil wars.6 Based on that language, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the conflict with al Qaeda was a global, non-international armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applied because that seemed to be the only part of the Conventions that could apply to non-state actors.7 While the effort to avoid placing alleged terrorists in a legal no-man’s-land is laudable, the Supreme Court’s effort in this regard involved intellectual incoherence. As it must, the executive branch adheres to the Supreme Court decision. At the same time, without violating that decision, the U.S. Government may follow an intellectually coherent and simpler approach than the Supreme Court’s by following the Geneva Convention lead.8

The Geneva Convention Approach

The Geneva Conventions, binding as they are on all states, provide a useful guide to governments. They do so whether one uses military or law enforcement instruments against terrorists. If a government treats terrorists outside its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of a state capable of using the criminal law against terrorists as subject to the Geneva Conventions, then its course is clear. If it captures a terrorist fighter, that fighter may be prosecuted for violations of the Geneva Conventions and then returned to prisoner of war status once a sentence,if any,is served.Prisoner of war status ends with the end of the conflict.Today it is difficult to foresee an end to the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda notwithstanding the deaths of so many al Qaeda leaders and followers.

Treating terrorists as if they are not combatants and are not entitled to prisoner of war status may be legally correct; it nonetheless puts a government in a policy and legal straitjacket. Terrorists inevitably fail the requirements set forth in the third Geneva Convention to wear a uniform, carry weapons openly, obey the laws of war, and operate in an organized fashion under a commander responsible for his or her subordinates, with rigorous systems of command and control,in order to enjoy the privileged status of combatant and prisoner of war upon capture.9 The terrorists’ failure in these respects does not make it easier to deal with detainees, as the American experience during the past 11 years demonstrates. As a result, a new approach is needed. That approach should be rooted in the law and in common sense. The Geneva Conventions provide both.

For the United States, acting as if terrorists captured in battlefield conditions are combatants and therefore prisoners of war would have a number of benefits. First, it would limit challenges to the legal status of detainees because they would not be held in what might appear to be legal limbo. As a result, whether they were held in prisoner of war facilities within the United States or at Guantánamo Bay would not matter in legal terms. Detainees would not acquire more rights by being held as a prisoner of war within the United States than they do in Guantánamo Bay, and the administration should be able to close the prison facilities there without increasing its legal exposure. Second, it would clarify the status of prisoners for prison guards by making clear that the prisoners were not in a penitentiary status unless convicted of a crime. Third, it could improve the international reputation of the United States, which stands sullied as a result of allegations of torture and questions about its authority to hold alleged terrorists indefinitely, even those who might be acquitted at trial.

Conclusion

Since 9/11, the United States has traveled far in its quest to diminish, if not eliminate, the risk of terrorist attack. In the process it has revealed much about its willingness to engage in targeted killing and the conclusion that this tactic is useful and “wise” as well as legal.10 The argument for wisdom is that technology permits such a high degree of accuracy that collateral damage — the killing of bystanders — and the risk to American lives are reduced. The third test of wisdom is an act’s consequences. The wise strategist will weigh consequences of chosen tactics. For example, the negative consequences of the frequent U.S. use of remotely piloted aircraft—drones—to attack al Qaeda in Pakistan in 2011 led to an intense “Pakistani animus toward unilateral U.S. action [with] huge implications for America’s counterterrorism aspirations in the country.”11 To avoid negative consequences does not require inaction, but rather an effort at forethought and foresight. It is something that cannot be guaranteed even if one abides by the law. So far the United States has followed U.S. and international law by engaging in targeted killing as a combat tactic against military targets. Keeping to this line will be clarifying and simplifying even though one may argue that the law does not require treating terrorists as if they were military targets. Lawfulness by itself does not guarantee wisdom. But it is a good starting place.

About the author:
Dr. Nicholas Rostow is Distinguished Research Professor and Senior Director in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. He is also a Senior Research Scholar at the Yale Law School.

* Courtney Lang, class of 2015 at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, ably assisted in the preparation of this essay for publication.

Source:
This article was originally published in the March 2014
Strategic Forum (PDF) by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1. See generally, Nicholas Rostow, “The Laws of War and the Killing of Suspected Terrorists: False Starts, Rabbit Holes, and Dead Ends,” Rutgers Law Review 63, no. 4, Summer 2011, 1215.
2. See Harold Hongju Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, March 25, 2010; Eric Holder, Remarks at the Northwestern University School of Law, March 5, 2012.
3. Joint Resolution, “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” September 18, 2001, P.L. 107-40 [S.J. Res. 23].
4. Koh.
5. Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, reprinted in Documents on the Laws of War, ed. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, 245 (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2000).
6. Rostow, 1231 (relying on Dinstein).
7. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
8. See Rostow, 1231–1232.
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, in Documents on the Laws of War, 246 (Art. 4A(2)).
10. Compare Chris Toensing and Ian Urbina, “Israel, the US and ‘Targeted Killings,’” Middle East Report Online, Middle East Research and Information Project, February 17, 2003, to John O. Brennan, transcript, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 30, 2012.
11. Thomas F. Lynch III, The 80 Percent Solution: The Strategic Defeat of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and Implications for South Asian Security, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, February 2012), 15.

The post Targeted Killing Of Terrorists – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel met today in Brussels with the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Hagel and his Baltic nation counterparts discussed a number of common security concerns, Pentagon officials said, including recent actions by Russia in and along the Ukrainian border and the subsequent reassurance measures taken by the United States and NATO.

The secretary thanked the three nations for their continued participation in these reassurance measures, officials added.

“The Baltic nation representatives thanked Secretary Hagel for the ongoing support from the United States,” officials said in a statement summarizing the meeting. “The four leaders also discussed their continued cooperation and the future implementation of the $1 billion European Reassurance Initiative President Barack Obama announced earlier today.”

The post Hagel Meets With Defense Ministers From Baltic Nations appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ivana Nikolic

After Serb leaders in northern Kosovo said they were quitting election-related activities in a dispute over ballots, Serbia’s Prime Minister has said that Kosovo Serbs should vote in the election.

Ahead of general elections in Kosovo on Sunday, Serbia’s Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vucic, has advised Kosovo Serbs not to boycott the elections.

“I don’t think it is smart for them not to vote,” Vucic said in Belgrade on Tuesday, adding that he planned to talk to Serbian representatives in Kosovo to convey his views.

“We will not leave this decision to the mayors of local municipalities to vote or on not, without previous agreement with Belgrade,” he explained.

Vucic spoke after local leaders in Kosovo said they were abandoning the election campaign in a dispute over the composition of election committees and the presence of Kosovo state insignia on ballot papers.

They also claim that the Kosovo authorities have changed the rules to make it more difficult for minority parties to enter the Kosovo parliament.

Earlier, the Serbian authorities appeared to support the decision of the Serbian leaders in northern Kosovo.

On Monday, the new head of the Serbian government’s office for Kosovo and Methohija, Marko Djuric, on his first visit to Kosovo, said local Serbs should vote on the basis of decisions made by their local municipalities.

Some Serbian parties in Kosovo have made it clear they will boycott the vote on June 8, whatever the position of the Serbian government.

The nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, is one. The party’s representative in Kosovo, Marko Jaksic, said participation in the election meant recognizing the independence of Kosovo and thus violating the Serbian constitution.

“The fact that Vucic is telling the Serbs to vote on Sunday is not surprising. This regime signed the Brussels Agreement in order to come into power,” Jaksic told BIRN, referring to the EU-led agreement on normalisation of relations signed in 2013.

“Serbian politicians in the Kosovo parliament will be nothing else but a mere décor,” he added.

The post Vucic Tells Kosovo Serbs Not To Boycott Election appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US President Obama has announced a plan to invest $1 billion in stepping up its military presence in Eastern Europe amid the Ukrainian crisis. The White House will send more troops and equipment to the region to “reaffirm” its commitment to NATO allies.

Speaking at a news conference in Warsaw, Obama said America was stepping up its partnership with countries in Eastern Europe with a view to bolstering security. The moves are aimed at upping the pressure on Russia, which Washington has accused of inciting unrest in Ukraine.

In line with the plans, Obama will ask Congress to provide up to $1 billion to finance the deployment of more troops and equipment.

“Under this effort, and with the support of Congress, the United States will preposition more equipment in Europe,” Obama said at the Polish capital’s Belweder Palace.

Earlier in the day Obama met with US and Polish air personnel in Warsaw and said the US had already begun rotating additional soldiers in the region.

“Given the situation in Ukraine right now, we have also increased our American presence. We’ve begun rotating additional ground troops and F-16 aircraft into Poland… to help our forces support NATO air missions,” said Obama, calling the commitment to NATO allies in Europe “the cornerstone of our own security.”

Obama called on Moscow to refrain from further provocation in Ukraine and said it has a responsibility to work constructively with the new government in Kiev. He added that the troop buildup in Eastern Europe was not meant to threaten Russia, but “rebuilding trust may take some time.”

The American president will meet with newly-elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko during his two-day stay in Poland.

Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski praised Washington’s plans to beef up military forces in the region.

“We welcome them as an announcement of a real return by NATO to standing very strongly by the basis of the alliance, which is Article 5, which speaks about the collective defense of the countries’ territories,” Komorowski said.

The post Obama Pledges $1 Billion For More Troops In Eastern Europe appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amit Saksena

Over the past two decades, China has grown exponentially, both in military prowess and economic might. The US, one of the major contributing factors to China’s rise, now realises the importance of countering this advancement. But is its policy of ‘congagement’, apt for the issue at hand?

Inconsistent Engagement

Over the past decade, the US maintained a policy of ‘engagement’ towards China. This has in fact been a tactic to hedge its own bets, without getting into the primary context. Militarily, Washington has been facilitating Beijing’s participation in multilateral defense exercises such as the Cobra Gold and RIMPAC, thus coming clean and allowing China to gauge US intentions in the region. Economically, the US has granted China the Most Favoured Nation status, thereby reducing export control policies and allowing Beijing to operate relatively freely in the US markets.

Washington has tried to maximise bilateral ties while keeping existing disputes in control. Simultaneously, the US continuously tries to bring China into various arms control regimes dealing with WMDs, proliferation, arms trade, etc., and also into international regimes such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Bilaterally, Washington has tried to involve Beijing in the regional issues regarding North Korea, and may also invite it to assist with Iran.

While there can be several intended results from this relationship, the most practical and favorable outcome is that of Beijing’s integration into the international system. If China gets as engaged in international relations as most other Western nations, the probability of a military intervention by Beijing decreases. This is because the leadership in Beijing understands the benefits the current ‘rules of the game’ have to offer, and also to avoid doing anything that would scuttle its own off-shore interests.
However, engagement is a relatively flawed policy, as it does not offer advice on what needs to be done, in the event of Beijing not adhering to current international norms. The primary assumption – engaging China on the international stage as a primary actor, to change its outlook towards a positive direction – is an a priori concept. Should this prove to be incorrect, engagement would have only assisted China in becoming a more threatening adversary in the future.

Containment: Boon or a Bane?

Containment is seen as a more realistic approach of dealing with a powerful China in the future. Under this policy, all elements of the US-China relationship would be subservient to the primary objective: preventing China’s growth. This would entail drastically reducing US-China trade agreements, particularly insuring non-proliferation of technology and military development. Furthermore, Washington will have to enhance its regional presence in the Asia-Pacific, engaging with other nation states in the region, into forming an ‘anti-China’ alliance. The US would also have to convince other potential political and security partners into limiting their diplomatic and trade relations with China.

As realist international theory dictates, rising powers generally tend to assert themselves on the global scene and challenge the predominant power. This challenge often translates in a systematic war with the predominant power. Washington needs to take these containment steps to ensure this ‘systematic war’ is not realised. Also, given its political tradition of imperial rule, China is unlikely to democratise, and this would only lead to an increase in its bellicosity.

In the present geopolitical scenario, containment will be a difficult policy to implement. Obtaining domestic consensus for subordinating other policy goals (such as trade and commerce) to dealing with a Chinese threat that is yet to manifest itself will not be easy. This may even lead to Beijing becoming increasingly hostile towards the US’ interests. Furthermore, policy will require the total cooperation of all leading industrial and military nations of the world to succeed – that which doesn’t seem to be the case. In the last decade, along with the US, other major regional players too have been pivoting to China, and not all of them may want to sever their economic and diplomatic relationship with the latter.

Feasibility of a Middle Path

Not only the Obama administration, but much of the US policy establishment is ambiguous in their reactions towards the growing Chinese economic and military power. Recently, the curious term called ‘congagement’ (a mix of containment and engagement) is making rounds in the US policy circles. It describes the current policy confusion and contortions of Washington towards Beijing Well. Many call this a hedging strategy.

‘Congagement’, however, is built on contradictory policies. The aspects of engagement and containment are incoherent – they do not complement each other. This hedging strategy is unsubstantiated. Hedging is defined as ‘making an investment to reduce the risk of adverse decision movements in an asset’. In the China policy analogy, the US position is that of engaging China in bilateral agreements, facilitating the bridging of the gaps between both countries, while at the same time enhancing its own position to ensure proper counter-measures for any future Chinese threats.

This confusing stance is the primary reason why Washington cannot directly or indirectly retaliate to Beijing’s influence or activities detrimental to its own security. US President Barack Obama’s ambiguous silence on the issue of the South China Sea dispute stands evidence for this. Furthermore, Washington’s inability to react more than just making international statements in the recent case of cyber espionage by China validates this.

Amit Saksena
Research Intern, IPCS
E-mail: amit.saksena@ymail.com

The post US-China: The Problem With Congagement – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Following are the Ghana’s 23-player World Cup squad announced by coach Kwesi Appiah:

Goalkeepers: Adam Larsen Kwarasey (Strxmsgodset/Norway), Fatau Dauda (Orlando Pirates/South Africa), Stephen Adams (Aduana Stars)

Defenders: Samuel Inkoom (Platanias/Greece), Daniel Opare (Standard Liege/Belgium), Harrison Afful (Esperance/Tunisia), John Boye (Rennes/France), Jonathan Mensah (Evian/France), Rashid Sumaila (Mamelodi Sundowns/South Africa)

Midfielders: Michael Essien (AC Milan/Italy), Sulley Ali Muntari (AC Milan/Italy), Rabiu Mohammed (Kuban Krasnodar/Russia), Kwadwo Asamoah (Juventus/Italy), Emmanuel Agyemang Badu (Udinese/Italy), Afriyie Acquah (Parma/Italy), Andri Ayew (Marseille/France), Mubarak Wakaso (Rubin Kazan/Russia), Christian Atsu Twasam (Vitesse/the Netherlands), Albert Adomah (Middlesbrough/England)

Forwards: Asamoah Gyan (Al Ain/United Arab Emirates), Kevin-Prince Boateng (AC Milan/Italy), Abdul Majeed Waris (Valenciennes/France), Jordan Ayew (Sochaux/France)

The post Ghana Announces World Cup Squad appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

It was not a surprise that Gasim’s Jumhooree party was removed from the ruling coalition on 28th of May when Gasim contested for the post of the Speaker of the New Majlis (national parliament) that assembled after the elections.

The surprise if any was that it took this long for the divorce though we had known from the beginning that both the leaders, Yameen of PPM and Gasim Ibrahim of Jumhooree were never on good terms and that both had tolerated each other only to get former President Nasheed defeated.

Yameen had also to wait till the parliamentary elections were completed to get a majority on his own for his party before he could dispense with the support he had from the Jumhooree to climb to power.

Except for the good will gesture shown by President Yameen to take Gasim along on his formal visit to Sri Lanka after his election, the Jumhooree party of Gasim was ignored in the decision making process. In the local council elections, some PPM candidates contested against the Jumhooree party though both were in the same coalition.

Some of the issues where Gasim’ party were ignored included:

• Jumhooree was not consulted in the preparation of the government’s budget.

• In the matter of political appointments, Jumhooree was not given all the posts they were entitled to and were promised.

• In the victory rally that followed the Presidential elections, as also the Majlis elections, Jumhooree was not invited.

• The Jumhooree was not consulted in nominating candidates to independent institutions.

• The ruling PPM decided to let a PPM candidate to stand for election for the Speaker’s post though Gasim had evinced an interest in standing for the election. Gasim later claimed that he decided to run for the post of the Speaker only after consulting former President Gayoom and present President Yameen, Dy. Leader Ahmed Adheeb and Defence Minister (Col. Mohamed Nazim.)

Gasim claimed that he was the right person for the post. He took perhaps rightly for getting the new constitution through in the Special Majlis five years ago where he was the speaker. Despite many difficulties, he claimed that he convened the sessions, “mornings, afternoons and evenings” to get the constitution through in record time. There is no doubt that Gasim exhibited extraordinary administrative and leadership qualities in getting even contentious issues in the constitution passed in quick time. I had mentioned about this in my earlier papers at the time of constitution making.

The PPM’s argument in not choosing Gasim was that since it had the majority in the parliament the post of Speaker should go to one of its members.

In the election that followed in the Majlis, Abdulla Maseeb of PPM was elected with 43 votes compared with 39 votes obtained by Gasim. The MDP voted for Gasim. In the Dy. Speaker’s,
election, the PPM candidate lost by one vote to the MDP candidate Moosa Manik.

The same day, the PPM council met and decided to recall all political posts granted to JP under the coalition agreement. All the ministers from the Jumhooree were sacked immediately.

The present configuration of the Majlis is as follows: PPM 33, MDP 26, JP 15, MDA 5, Independents 5 and Adhaalath 1. For now, the PPM has a majority and from the optimism shown by some of the members, it looks that PPM may encourage some defection from the Jumhooree.

The Vice President claimed that a “ lot will unfold” in the next few weeks.

The PPM led by President Yameen (no one can deny that Gayoom continues to play a serious role from behind the scenes) had been waiting for this moment to get absolute control of the government. The whole operation appears to have been well planned and executed. Now Gayoomism with a touch of authoritarianism is likely to follow.

The main opposition MDP has also played its cards tactically well in supporting Gasim for the post of Speaker and in the bargain got the Dy. Speakers’ post for themselves.

For Gasim, one need not shed any tears as he deserved this. From the Indian point of view, it was ‘good riddance’.

For India, one can expect closer relations with Maldives on all security and economic issues. Recall Yameen’s statement on his return from Delhi that India is the leader of the region.

The post Maldives: Gasim’s Jumhooree Party Thrown Out From Ruling Coalition – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Alexander J. Preiss

This May, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro announced several fiscal strategies intended to resuscitate the country’s struggling economy. The measures, including the issuance of new government bonds and contracts with petroleum extraction partners, come on the heels of Sicad II, a new floating exchange rate that represented a de facto devaluation of the bolivar—the first in four years. [1] President Maduro’s administration refers to these measures as an “Economic Offensive,” intended to “reactivate productive processes in order to guarantee just prices and supply.” [2]

Dramatically titled in typical Bolivarian fashion, the Economic Offensive is essentially a package of micro- and macroeconomic adjustments. These adjustments, however, could indeed have a dramatic impact on Venezuela’s economy. According to Bank of America’s Andean Economist Francisco Rodriguez, they should lead to economic stabilization in the coming months. [3]

Moreover, although Rodriguez and other analysts doubt the long-term desirability of stability without growth, the Economic Offensive should lead to a reduction in shortages and inflation, thereby resolving some of the key drivers of the unrest that began in February. Hardline opposition groups are bound to remain unsatisfied, but the much-needed adjustment should appease the majority of Venezuelans who are mainly concerned with the economy. [4] The Economic Offensive and the resultant economic stability are very likely to ease the tense political situation in Venezuela by late 2014.

The Economic Offensive Takes Shape

Crude and refined petroleum account for over 96 percent of Venezuela’s exports and 45 percent of its budget revenue. [5] However, petroleum production has remained largely stagnant in recent years, with a slight drop in production since 2011. [6] The government has made increasing production a key element of the Economic Offensive, signing a spate of larger contracts with partner extraction firms during May. [7] Contracts with Halliburton, Schlumberger, and Weatherford International total $2.2 billion USD and include $1.2 billion USD in new deals. These contracts brought the total amount borrowed by state-owned oil company PDVSA to $13 billion USD since 2012. [8]

Energy Minister Rafael Ramírez said that PDVSA will invest $24 billion USD to increase production this year, also indicating plans to escalate natural gas extraction via new contracts with Repsol, Eni, Petrobras, and Williams. [9] Although many analysts have pinpointed excessive borrowing as a flaw in Venezuela’s economy, increased hydrocarbon investment should boost government oil revenue in the long term, ultimately reducing the need for high-interest foreign loans. Hydrocarbon extraction generally proves to be a high-return investment.

In addition to revving up hydrocarbon production, on May 14, PDVSA issued $5 billion USD in government bonds in a move to raise the domestic availability of hard currency in dollars. [10] Although Venezuela issued a comparable amount of domestic bonds last year, this is the first time it has done so on the international market since 2008. [11] Caracas daily El Universal also publicized a government roadshow to investment houses in New York and London, further hinting at an increasing external orientation within the Maduro administration. [12] In addition to bringing a dollar influx, the bond issuance reflects an attempt to improve Venezuela’s reputation on international finance markets. The move seems to have worked. Russ Dallen of Caracas Capital Markets reported a healthy demand for the $5 billion USD in bonds. [13]

The most important piece of the Economic Offensive is Sicad II, a new foreign exchange (FX) mechanism implemented on March 24. Sicad II is Venezuela’s third official FX mechanism, complementing a fixed government rate used to import food and medicine at 6.3 bolivars per dollar, and Sicad I, a fixed general rate of 10.8 bolivars per dollar. [14] However, unlike the other two FX mechanisms, Sicad II is a floating rate, which better approximates the true value of the bolivar. It debuted at 51.86 bolivars per dollar and has fluctuated around 50 ever since. [15] In comparison, the black market dollar rate rose to 87.9 bolivars per dollar before Sicad II, and has since stabilized around 70. [16]

While Sicad II only covered seven to eight percent of Venezuela’s FX market at opening, it appears that Caracas hopes to ease into a de facto devaluation of the bolivar by slowly applying the Sicad II rate to an increasing number of sectors. [17] Such an approach favors gradualism over shock therapy, with the goal of easing the painful side effects of deregulation. Ideally, the government seems to expect that the bond issuance will provide short-term cash flow for the process, while increased hydrocarbon production will do so in the long term.

An initial example of this process took place on March 26, when Caracas reached deals with six foreign airlines to pay off $3.9 billion USD in debt, as well as shifting airline tickets to the Sicad II FX rate. [18] As Francisco Rodriguez outlines, this likely will cause a contraction in the sector as middle- and upper-class Venezuelans are no longer able to benefit from artificially cheap ticket prices. [19] However, it also should lead to stability, as the bloated demand for cheap dollars will no longer exist in the sector. As the government applies Sicad II to other sectors, the same process should repeat itself, bringing stability (but also contraction) to the economy as a whole.

Economic Impacts

While most analysts agree that the Economic Offensive will lead to increased stability, many disagree on the broader significance of this change. Francisco Toro, a vocal critic of Maduro and Chavismo, argues that stability without growth does not produce prosperity. According to Toro, the fact that the government is “slowly doing things likely to curb the chaos of shortages, inflation and uncertainty [that did] so much to fuel protest this year… does not mean chavismo (sic) is taking effective steps to make people more prosperous.” [20] Toro also criticizes the implementation of Economic Offensive policies, arguing that Caracas should abandon the slow transition to Sicad II in favor of a shock therapy-style “jump” into the Sicad II rate. [21]

On the other hand, Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research maintains that Sicad II represents an important step in the right direction by rectifying the exchange rate system, which he terms “the most important economic problem… in Venezuela.” [22] Weisbrot, a general supporter of Bolivarianism, argues that, by “drawing currency exchanges away from the black market, and putting a circuit-breaker into the inflation-depreciation cycle that we have seen over the last year or so,” Sicad II will begin to bring down inflation and resolve shortages. [23]

Francisco Rodriguez of Bank of America occupies the middle ground. He concurs with Toro that “in order to generate sustainable increases in living standards, Venezuela would have to tackle the reform of some of those microeconomic distortions that have held down its productivity growth.” [24] However, he continues, “stabilization does imply an improvement in key macroeconomic indicators.” [25]

Social and Political Impact

Despite differing assessments of the long-term implications, all of these analysts agree that Sicad II (and, by extension, the Economic Offensive as a whole) is very likely to stabilize Venezuela’s economy in the near future. Regardless of the developmental value of this change, stabilization would have a palpable social and political impact, particularly on the unrest and street protests that began in February. According to the most recent poll by Venezuelan firm Hinterlaces, 44 percent of middle class Venezuelans believe the economy represents the gravest problem at hand. [26] However, stabilization and the resultant reduction in shortages and inflation should do much to assuage these common concerns.

Many sources have documented the fact that middle and (especially) upper classes are driving unrest in Venezuela. [27] Others have recognized that a hardline faction of the ultra-right is driving the guarimbas and violent protests, while the larger marches tend to consist of mostly peaceful and moderate groups. [28] However, most mainstream sources have conflated the two factions of the opposition. Those informed only by such sources might think that economic improvements would do little to pacify such vehement upheaval. Such analysis, however, misses the point that most protestors are not fervently antigovernment, but simply are upset with the country’s economic struggles and instability.

Based on the forecast of economic stability and the popular focus on the economy, the Economic Offensive should largely pacify much of the opposition, leading to a significant reduction in pressure on the Maduro administration in coming months. Of course, an economic uptick will not singlehandedly resolve the profound political polarization that seems endemic in Venezuela.

Despite a reduction in protestor numbers since late April, much concern remains over non-economic issues, including human rights, civil liberties, and police brutality. The opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democratica (MUD) froze dialogues with the government on May 14, and UNASUR moderators have thus far been unable to facilitate the resumption of talks. [29] The possibility of U.S. sanctions, which are gaining momentum after approval in the House of Representatives on May 28, adds further uncertainty to the situation. [30] While the bill’s sponsors maintain that sanctions would support the opposition, several analysts have proposed mechanisms through which U.S. sanctions could in fact improve the government’s position. [31]

In sum, the Venezuelan political climate remains heated and unpredictable, and the country’s economy is only one of many factors influencing the unrest. Maduro’s Economic Offensive is no panacea for Venezuela’s government or its people—the Bolivarian project thus far seems to be an inextricably polarizing form of societal organization. Nevertheless, the Economic Offensive will likely remove the primary grievance of a substantial portion of the protestors. While it is too early to predict an end to the unrest, Venezuela appears to be on the path toward stability.

Alexander J. Preiss, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

References

[1] Kurmanaev, Anatoly, Corina Pons and Katia Porzecanski. “Venezuela Lets Bolivar Depreciate 88% on New Sicad II Market.” Bloomberg. 25 March 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-24/venezuela-to-start-trading-dollars-for-first-time-in-four-years.html

[2] Bastidas, Yorcellys. “Vicepresidente Arreaza destaca resultados positivos de las fiscalizaciones económicas.” Correo del Orinoco. 21 May 2014. http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/vicepresidente-arreaza-destaca-resultados-positivos-fiscalizaciones-economicas/

[3] Rodriguez, Francisco. “Venezuela in Focus: the Adjustment View.” Bank of America strategy paper. 7 May 2014. https://docs.google.com/a/coha.org/file/d/0BwJa4qkRMTYSQVY0cEg5RUg4S00/edit

[4] Dutka, Z.C. “Polls Reveal Wider Concerns of Venezuelan Public” Venezuelanalysis. 12 May 2014. http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10679

[5] Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Venezuela. Last updated 1 May 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html

[6] Ministerio del Poder Popular de Planificación. Informe Económico Semanal. 16 April 2014. Slide 68. http://www.abc.es/gestordocumental/uploads/Internacional/Informe_Economico_Venezuela.pdf

[7] Rosas, David. “Pdvsa firma acuerdo de 2 mil millones de dólares con trasnacionales para incrementar la producción petrolera.” Correo del Orinoco. 21 May 2014.http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/pdvsa-firma-acuerdo-2-mil-millones-dolares-trasnacionales-para-incrementar-produccion-petrolera/

[8] “Créditos pactados por Pdvsa se elevan a $13 millardos.” El Universal. 22 May 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140522/creditos-pactados-por-pdvsa-se-elevan-a-13-millardos

[9] “Venezuela: The Mother of all Adjustments.” Latin News. 22 May 2014. http://www.latinnews.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=60713&uid=55646&acc=1&Itemid=6&cat_id=794886%20

[10] Ellsworth, Brian. “UPDATE 1-Venezuela’s PDVSA issues $5 bln 2024 bond.” Reuters. 14 May 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/venezuela-pdvsa-bonds-idUSL1N0O015C20140514

[11] Ibid.

“Venezuela: The Mother of all Adjustments.” Latin News. 22 May 2014. http://www.latinnews.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=60713&uid=55646&acc=1&Itemid=6&cat_id=794886%20

[12] Salmerón, Victór. “Gobierno prepara road show en Nueva York y Londres.” El Universal. 22 May 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140522/gobierno-prepara-road-show-en-nueva-york-y-londres

[13] llsworth, Brian. “UPDATE 1-Venezuela’s PDVSA issues $5 bln 2024 bond.” Reuters. 14 May 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/venezuela-pdvsa-bonds-idUSL1N0O015C20140514

[14] Kurmanaev, Anatoly, Corina Pons and Katia Porzecanski. “Venezuela Lets Bolivar Depreciate 88% on New Sicad II Market.” Bloomberg. 25 March 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-24/venezuela-to-start-trading-dollars-for-first-time-in-four-years.html

[15] Ibid.

“Tasa del Sicad II cerró la jornada de este viernes en Bs. 49,97 por dólar.” Correo del Orinoco. 30 May 2014. http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/tasa-sicad-ii-cerro-jornada-este-viernes-bs-4997-por-dolar/

[16] Weisbrot, Mark. “SICAD II is Important Step Toward Resolving Exchange Rate Problem in Venezuela.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. 6 April 2014.http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/sicad-ii-is-important-step-toward-resolving-exchange-rate-problem-in-venezuela

[17] Kurmanaev, Anatoly, Corina Pons and Katia Porzecanski. “Venezuela Lets Bolivar Depreciate 88% on New Sicad II Market.” Bloomberg. 25 March 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-24/venezuela-to-start-trading-dollars-for-first-time-in-four-years.html

Pons, Corina. “Venezuela Reaches Deals With Six Airlines to Pay Dollar Debt.” Bloomberg. 26 May 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-26/venezuela-reaches-deals-with-six-airlines-to-repay-dollar-debt.html

Rodriguez, Francisco. “Venezuela in Focus: the Adjustment View.” Bank of America strategy paper. 7 May 2014. https://docs.google.com/a/coha.org/file/d/0BwJa4qkRMTYSQVY0cEg5RUg4S00/edit

[18] Pons, Corina. “Venezuela Reaches Deals With Six Airlines to Pay Dollar Debt.” Bloomberg. 26 May 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-26/venezuela-reaches-deals-with-six-airlines-to-repay-dollar-debt.html

[19] Ibid.

Rodriguez, Francisco. “Venezuela in Focus: the Adjustment View.” Bank of America strategy paper. 7 May 2014. https://docs.google.com/a/coha.org/file/d/0BwJa4qkRMTYSQVY0cEg5RUg4S00/edit

[20] Bolding in original.

Toro, Francisco. “What adjustment is, and what it isn’t.” Caracas Chronicles. 15 May 2014.http://caracaschronicles.com/2014/05/15/what-adjustment-is-and-what-it-isnt/

[21] Toro, Francisco. “Adjustment or collapse? The case for collapse.” Caracas Chronicles. 20 May 2014. http://caracaschronicles.com/2014/05/20/adjustment-or-collapse-the-case-for-collapse/

[22] Weisbrot, Mark. “SICAD II is Important Step Toward Resolving Exchange Rate Problem in Venezuela.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. 6 April 2014.http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/sicad-ii-is-important-step-toward-resolving-exchange-rate-problem-in-venezuela

[23] Ibid.

[24] Rodriguez, Francisco. “Venezuela in Focus: the Adjustment View.” Bank of America strategy paper. 7 May 2014. https://docs.google.com/a/coha.org/file/d/0BwJa4qkRMTYSQVY0cEg5RUg4S00/edit

[25] Ibid.

[26] Dutka, Z.C. “Polls Reveal Wider Concerns of Venezuelan Public” Venezuelanalysis. 12 May 2014. http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10679

[27] Weisbrot, Mark. “Venezuela’s Struggle, Widely Misrepresented, Remains a Classic Conflict Between Right and Left.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. 4 March 2014. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/venezuelas-struggle-widely-misrepresented-remains-a-classic-conflict-between-right-and-left

Weisbrot, Mark. “The Story of Venezuela’s Protests May Be Different From What You Are Told.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. 13 April 2014.http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/the-story-of-venezuelas-protests-may-be-different-from-what-you-are-tol

Corrales, Javier. “Venezuela’s Middle Ground.” Foreign Policy. 22 April 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/22/venezuelas_middle_ground

Zibechi, Raúl. “Venezuela: Petro-‘Socialism’ in its Labyrinth.” Center for International Policy Americas Program. 20 April 2014. http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/11889

[28] Eisen, Arlene. “Venezuelan Capital Sees Rise in Violent Street Bands Following Opposition Withdrawal from Peace Talks.” Venezuelanalysis. 14 May 2014. http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10683

Weisbrot, Mark. “The truth about Venezuela: a revolt of the well-off, not a ‘terror campaign’.” The Guardian. 20 March 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/20/venezuela-revolt-truth-not-terror-campaign

Cannon, Barry. “Opposition in Bolivarian Venezuela: Caught Between Conflict and Compromise.” Venezuelanalysis. 2 May 2014. http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10658

[29] Smilde, David and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz. “Opposition Freezes Dialogue.” Washington Office on Latin America: Venezuela Blog. 14 May 2014. http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com/post/85758319189/opposition-freezes-dialogue

[30] “US House of Representatives approves Venezuela sanctions.” BBC. 28 May 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27615148

[31] See Menendez for the sponsors’ goals. Conyer, Smilde, and León argue that sanctions will allow Maduro to refocus the issue to US interventionism, thereby diverting political pressure by changing the discourse.

Menendez, Robert. “The Venezuelan nightmare.” CNN Opinion. 20 May 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/20/opinion/menendez-venezuela/index.html

Conyer, John and COHA staff. “Congressional Letter to President Obama: Stop Sanctions on Venezuela.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 30 May 2014. http://www.coha.org/congressional-letter-to-president-obama-stop-sanctions-on-venezuela/

Smilde, David. “Sanctions on Venezuela would be counterproductive.” Washington Post. 19 May 2014.http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-smilde-sanctions-on-venezuela-would-be-counterproductive/2014/05/19/fb7516da-decf-11e3-8dcc-d6b7fede081a_story.html

León, Luis Vicente. “¿Sanciones efectivas?” El Universal. 1 June 2014.http://www.eluniversal.com/opinion/140601/sanciones-efectivas

The post Venezuela’s Economic Offensive: An End To The Unrest? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fatma Yilmaz Elmas

The EU citizens, on May 22-25 European Parliament (EP) elections, sent a message to European leaders to take a lesson from their low turnout and their choices to move to the extreme sides of the political spectrum. The EP election results reflected political and social trends of recent years in the EU. It also confirmed what Grimm stated years ago, that the democratic deficit [1] in the EU is a structural problem and cannot be solved with any institutional or legal regulations with only a 43 percent turnout.

Election results: The rise of the far-right

Although the general outlook of the EP with its 751 seats has not changed much compared to the 2009 elections, the voting rate for parties of the far right has visibly increased across the Union. The National Front (FN), led by Marine Le Pen, took first place in the EP elections in France with 24.95% of the vote. In the UK, the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) won the elections with 27%. Likewise, the extreme right-wing Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in Denmark emerged victorious with 26%. In Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) took third place with 19%. Also, in Hungary, the far-right Jobbik Party with a 14% share of the vote managed to become the runner-up in elections there. While the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), which opposed austerity measures, won the elections with 26% in Greece, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn has the opportunity to send three parliamentarians to the EP with 9% of the vote.

The effect of these rates on the parliamentarian distribution in the EP is that the anti-EU Europe of Freedom and Democracy group has increased its seats from 31 to 38 by taking an additional 7 seats. However, Christian Democrats are still the largest group despite losing 61 seats. Thus, this group with around 28% of the vote will be holding 231 of the total 751 seats. Socialists and Democrats with 25% will continue to maintain its 190 seats. However, non-affiliated members, mostly Eurosceptics, received 105 seats in the EP and with which groups they decide to remain close with will be of crucial importance.

The possibility of the far-right establishing a group

At this stage, it is debated whether the far-right will set up a radical political group in the Parliament or not. This is because the EP exhibits a sui generis character in function and structure with regards to the establishment of a group by directly elected EP parliamentarians. In order to set up a political group in the EP, not only must it consist of at least 25 parliamentarians, but it must also represent at least one quarter of the member states, that is, a group must include parliamentarians from at least 7 of the EU’s 28 member states. Thereby, besides the EU giving importance to diversity/pluralism, it seems that it also generally has a “brake mechanism” to work against marginalization. In this sense, even though the 24 parliamentarians from Le Pen’s party in France succeeded in entering the Parliament independently and are part of a majority that could single-handedly set up a group, this will not be sufficient without allying with 6 other member states.

The real problem lies far beyond the proportional increase in votes

The last EP elections showed that protectionist tendencies due to both the long-standing financial crisis in the EU and social fears triggered by pressures of immigration, especially after the Arab Spring, added significant momentum to the nationalist wave. Besides, this situation does not only trigger a major increase in the far right at the domestic level; it also triggers a substantial debate on the future of EU integration. Yet, whereas the participation of social welfare is a precise point of the EU’s projects, the EU integration process had been applauded; especially in last couple of years, the EU integration process have been used as a “scapegoat” leading to a decrease in social welfare mainly because European people have shown more jealous tendencies to share the welfare with the “European others”. For instance, a ‘European Brit or a Frenchman’ has begun to come to the shocking realization that he/she does not share the same values with a ‘European Greek’(!).

However, beyond the major increase in the far-right, caused by conjectural events, the real problem is that the far-right discourse is shifting to central politics and this discourse is transforming into a structural phenomenon that expands throughout Europe. In other words, it is the populist political rhetoric that has been a part of general politics in most European countries and with this comes far-right rhetoric or nationalist elements. Thusly, we can see similar mentality settled in European politics with the following examples: (i) Denmark increased the Schengen walls in the pursuit of the fact that African asylum seekers running away from the ‘Arab Spring’ had been seen as “bogus”, (ii) in 2011 after Germany’s economic austerity policies’ dominance in the EU, Merkel’s Parliamentary Group President Volker Kauder said that “Now, Europe speaks German”, (iii) the “immigration debate” especially on Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants started by the UK’s Cameron with his statement “they should not come to the UK because of the system’s attraction” in 2013.

However, unfortunately, as it can be seen in Great Britain and other countries’ EP Elections results, those populist debates conducted by mainstream parties helped far-right parties to increase their votes. It is obvious with the French far-right’s success in 2014 EP elections, which actually goes back to the “national identity” debate stimulated by former French President Sarkozy in 2009, however, credit is given to le Pen rather than Sarkozy.

The problem is that the populist rhetoric gaining support throughout Europe-in-crisis harms the EU’s main motto, “unity in diversity”, by creating “others” inside Europe itself. This is contributed to by the fact that the EU is spread thin on several debates from the future of the EU to its values, and from its foreign policy to the EU’s role in global politics. Additionally, as well-known academic Christopher Hill, Prof. at the London School of Economics (LSE) emphasized in his speech during a conference on the EU at USAK House, this situation reminds “the domestic governments of their responsibilities”.

Lessons from the EU electorate’s message

EP election results gave a strong message that European citizens are not satisfied with the current state of European leaders/politicians, and also this partly reflects the general national reflex of the EU member states. However, for now, the effects of a far-right tendency can be considered limited. For instance, the EU referendum and migration debates led by Cameron after the economic crisis in Britain caused the rise of UKIP’s votes and voters in Germany showed similar reflexes in the previous general elections at the end of 2013. Surviving the economic crisis in Europe, Germany had been in favor of continuing the economic stability in the previous general election -even though the leadership of Merkel was controversial- and left Chancellor Merkel in her position. German voters also elected the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) with 35% of the vote in the 2014 EP elections. However, they also reflected their concern over the current situation by supporting Alternative for Germany (AfD) with the 7% of the votes.

In this sense, the results and turnout of the EP election remind us of the current problems which urgently require a response and prioritization by the EU. In order to deal effectively with the main issue made use of by populism, the ongoing economic crisis, areas such as unemployment and development need to be placed at the top these priorities. This is because, according to EU opinion polls, EU citizens are pessimistic about the economic crisis and think that “the worst has not come yet”. In this context, besides concrete steps which need to be taken, it is important to overcome the issue of democratic deficit in the institutional structure of the EU and to open up healthy channels of dialogue among EU citizens as well. In short, it seems that “the populist rhetoric of the far-right parties must be countered with a new, more assertive agenda for building a competitive, secure and credible Europe which is responsive to its citizens’ concerns but still able to play an important role in its neighborhood and on the global stage”, as stated by Shada Islam from Friends of Europe stated [3].

Fatma Yilmaz Elmas, USAK Center for EU Studies

[1] Democratic deficit in the EU mostly reflects the idea that the EU seems inaccessible to the ordinary citizens due to the complexity of its institutional structure.

[2]For detailed analysis, see: Fatma Yılmaz-Elmas and Mustafa Kutlay, “Avrupa’yı Bekleyen Tehlike: Aşırı Sağın Yükselişi”,
USAK Analiz No:11, July 2011.

[3] Shada Islam, “No Time to Lose: EU Needs a New Agenda for Action”, Friends of Europe, 28.05.2014 <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Contentnavigation/Publications/ Libraryoverview/tabid/1186/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3779/No-time-to-lose-EU-needs-a-new-agenda-for-action.aspx>.

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By Kanchi Gupta

Since President Rouhani’s election, Iran has made considerable effort towards ‘constructive engagement’ with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE soon after his appointment. President Rouhani also visited Oman and signed an agreement to build a gas pipeline across the Gulf. Despite Rouhani’s calls for improvement in Riyadh-Tehran relations, Saudi Arabia – followed by Bahrain – has resisted Iran’s diplomatic overtures until now. However, Riyadh recently extended an invitation to Tehran’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, indicating towards a possible thaw in relations. In this scenario, let us examine the scope of Saudi-Iran relations and US attempts to balance the regional security architecture against a US-Iran nuclear detente.

On May 13, 2014, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal announced Riyadh’s readiness to negotiate with Iran and resolve differences between the two Gulf States. He said that “anytime (Zarif) sees fit to come, we are willing to receive him”¹. Iran welcomed the development stating that while no written invitation had been received, “a plan for the two ministers to meet is on the agenda”².

This declaration came just short of another round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and P5 +1 in Vienna. Saudi Arabia’s announcement coincided with US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel’s visit to Riyadh for the US-GCC Strategic Defence Dialogue. Hagel stressed on US-GCC and intra-GCC military cooperation in order to counter Iran’s “destabilising activities” and its efforts to undermine GCC stability³. At the Manama Dialogue in December last year, he had stated that the nuclear deal with Iran does not mean that “the threat from Iran is over”⁴.

US Secretary of State, John Kerry welcomed this development and said that the US had nothing to do with the invitation. He stated that the US was pleased to see Saudi Arabia engaged in diplomacy even though there is “longstanding difficulty in that relationship” (with Iran). “We hope that it might be able to produce something with respect to one of the several conflicts in which the Iranians could have an impact”⁵.

The United States is making considerable efforts to reassure the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, of its commitment to the security of the region. As they have pursued nuclear negotiations with Iran, the US has maintained that the “military option is on the table” if the diplomatic route is unsuccessful. At the Manama Dialogue, Hagel listed US military assets in the region and stated that the US has sought to “shift the military balance of the region away from Iran and in favour of our Gulf partners”. Even now the emphasis will be on building their military capabilities, not just through bilateral relationships with the US but also through stronger integration within the GCC.

The US attempted to mitigate the differences within the GCC through the US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF) launched in March 2012. This framework aims to enhance “coordination of policies which advance shared political, military, security and economic objectives” and “deepen the close relations between the two sides”. The third communiqué of SCF reiterates commitments towards US-GCC coordination on an integrated Ballistic Missile Defence system and improving GCC unity in defence planning and procurement of weapons and technology⁶.

Ten days after the Manama Dialogue, President Barack Obama issued a directive selling weapons to the GCC states — mainly missile defence systems under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act. The US, therefore, dealt with the GCC States as a bloc for the first time, instead of selling weapons systems to individual nations within the council⁷. In March 2014, President Obama visited Riyadh to assuage fears of US retrenchment from the region.

Prince Turki Al Faisal, former Saudi intelligence chief responded to these developments stating that they indicate “support for Saudi Arabia’s plan for a unified GCC”⁸. Riyadh’s call for greater GCC integration, however, has not been supported by some member states. Oman rejected the proposal saying it would withdraw from the GCC if the council proceeded with it.

The long-standing animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran has stemmed political and ideological differences, as well as a quest for regional hegemony. While the 1979 revolution in Iran installed an anti-American theocracy in Tehran, Riyadh has sought to balance Iran’s regional ambitions through an American-led security framework in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in ‘proxy-wars’ in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Saudi Arabia’s regional policy is driven by its goal of regime security. On the domestic front, Riyadh faces a threat to its political stability from ideological influences and movements. Iran’s Islamic revolution was symbolic of the possibility of political change and the Ayatollah condemned monarchies as “contrary to Islam”⁹. Thus, Saudi Arabia fears Iran’s ability to export the revolution to its borders, particularly by inciting the Saudi Shia community.

As Iran’s influence spread with the fall of Saddam Hussain in Iraq, Hezbollah’s victories in Lebanon and President Assad’s resilience in Syria, Riyadh made efforts to counter the rise in Iranian power by supporting opposing factions in these countries. These conflicts have given the Saudi-Iranian rivalry an increasingly sectarian character.

The fall of Saddam Hussein was considered a turning point for Shia-Sunni conflict in the region. This period, termed as the “Shia Revival”¹⁰, mobilised Shia communities in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Bahrain and led to the creation of “transnational networks” of mosques and clerics that tie the communities to those in Iraq and Iran. Tehran hosted Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki while in exile and the IRGC trained and equipped militias of Iraqi Shiite parties¹¹.

Syria too is a ground for geopolitical and sectarian rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran. Iran and Syria are allies since the 1979 Revolution and Tehran has provided military and financial assistance to Shia Alawite President Assad’s regime. Riyadh has supported the fractured Sunni rebel factions in an effort to install a friendly regime in Damascus. They also looked to the Obama administration to take military action against President Assad. Washington’s reluctance to take military action and the failure of the Geneva II¹² talks on Syria have resulted in a deadlock.

Therefore, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to persist over regional ambitions and ideological differences. Riyadh may be compelled to improve relations with Iran due to a shift in US-Iran relations and the positive reception of Iran’s overtures by the other GCC States. It is, however, balancing against Iran through a conventional weapons build-up, efforts towards a GCC Union and geostrategic competition with Tehran. The US has attempted to mitigate Saudi fears by bolstering greater military integration within the GCC. A thaw in Saudi-Iran relations remains unlikely unless both states de-escalate their involvement in the Levant.

(The writer is a  Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

1. “Saudi Arabia reveals invitation to Iranian FM”, Al Jazeera, 14 May, 2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/saudi-arabia-reveals-invitation-iranian-fm-20145144401119259.html

2.  Arash Karami, “Iran Foreign Ministry welcomes Saudi overture”, Al-Monitor, 14 May, 2014

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/saudi-foreign-minister-invites-iran-visit.html

3.  Chuck Hagel, Remarks to the Press at US-GCC Defence Dialogue, US Department of Defence, 14 May, 2014

http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1848

4.  “Chuck Hagel reassures Gulf Nations Iran deal will not stop flow of US arms, The Guardian, 7 December, 2013
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/07/chuck-hagel-gulf-iran-deal-weapons

5.  John Kerry, Remarks with Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini after their meeting, US Department of State, 13 May, 2014

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/226060.htm

6.  Joint Communiqué from the third ministerial meeting for the US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, US Department of State, September 26, 2013

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214834.htm

7.  For more information on US defence posture in the Gulf, see Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses”, Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2014

8.  Zachary Fryer-Biggs and Awad Mustafa “Obama Issues directive to sell weapons to GCC”, Defense News, December 18, 2013

http://www.defensenews.com/article/M5/20131218/DEFREG04/312180019/Obama-Issues-Directive-Sell-Weapons-GCC

9.  F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia’s Regional Security Strategy”, in “International Politics of the Persian Gulf”, Syracuse University Press, New York 2011

10.  For more on Iraq-Iran relations see Vali Nasr, “When the Shiites Rise”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61733/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise

11.  Ibid

12.  The Geneva II conference was held on January 22, 2014 to find a political solution to the crisis in Syria

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