(EurActiv) — France wants to increase funding for Frontex, Europe’s border control agency, and ensure border guards. It will raise the issue in the European Council on Friday 27 June. EurActiv France reports.

The French government campaigned for greater border security in the EU elections last month. It is now turning words into action by calling for enhanced security of the EU’s external borders. This is part of the French government’s detailed plan for the next Commission on Tuesday 24 June.

Francois Hollande believes that there should be a greater focus on the surveillance of “Schengen’s external borders by strictly applying the rules provided.” He was to restore Frontex funding, which fell in 2013.

Frontex had to tighten its belt last year due to EU budget cuts led by the Commission. The Warsaw-based institution saw its budget drop from €93 million to €89 million. This came as a surprise to many, given that illegal migration flows across the Mediterranean continue to grow and make headlines.

A range of operations to prevent and better manage illegal migrants were put in pace under the Task Force for the Mediterranean, but they are struggling to get off the ground.

Paris also wants to “advance Frontex missions with the objective of creating a European border guard”. This would help prevent and tackle illegal migration, the French plan says.

According to Elvire Fabry, senior researcher and expert in EU external action at the Notre Europe, Frontex is a key component of EU border control. She argues that the French plan to set up European border guards is a good idea and deserves further developing.

It would require greater cooperation between member states, EU agencies and third countries, but could reduce illegal migration flows to Europe. France proposes changing migration flows by working with third countries and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

France’s proposals clearly focus on Mediterranean migration. One measure includes a Mediterranean migration coordinator, who would report back to the European Council directly.

Lampedusa’s shadow remains

The issue of a more efficient and stronger Frontex has been present since the Lampedusa tragedy, which saw 300 migrants lose their lives trying to reach Europe. The lack of cohesion between EU member states and EU migration policies has also come under fire. It means Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Croatia have been left alone to tackle waves of illegal migration.

Frontex relies heavily on financial contributions and operational support from member states. According to a report by the European agency, the number of detected illegal border crossings in the EU increased from 72,500 in 2012 to 107,000 in 2013. This represents an annual increase of 48%. Since the start of this year, almost 35,000 people crossed the Mediterranean from North Africa to Europe, compared to 43,000 for the whole of 2013, according to statistics from the UNHCR.

Elvire Fabry claims that more money would facilitate the sharing of information and putting in place “intelligent” borders to improve surveillance and control. EU member states have a tendency to put the responsibility of controlling migration on countries of origin and transit countries.

France and Italy in agreement

Elvire Fabry says “less exposed countries, such as those in North West Europe, must think Frontex has enough resources, but countries like Greece and Italy definitely believe they should be increased.”

Italy argues that priority must be given to strengthening EU migration policies and putting in place an effective European asylum policy. It wants Frontex to be bolstered both in terms of human resources and financing, and to be accompanied with a new cooperation system with third countries.

Fabry adds that the distribution of migrants is a concern, although she does not think the theme is to be raised at the Council. “Countries still want to maintain sovereignty over migration policies [...] Illegal migration is also important in order to anticipate Europe’s ageing population problem and as a way of dealing with labour shortages. “This is why the admission of migrants to EU member states is so important in the medium term.”

Greece wants to encourage legal migration because it could renew economic growth. According to the French Foreign affairs ministry, Greece suffers most in Europe from illegal migration. It is more affected than Italy for geographical reasons, but receives less media coverage. Hundreds of small islands surrounding the country make effective boarder control almost impossible.

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Citing concerns over the NSA’s wiretapping of Chancellor Angela Merkel and other top officials’ phones, the German Interior Ministry announced Thursday that it will not renew its contract with Verizon to provide service for government ministries.

As part of an effort to revamp its secure communications networks, the country will instead rely on Germany’s Deutsche Telekom, Reuters reported.

Since the beginning of the NSA scandal, US businesses have expressed concern over the potential blowback of the revelations on their bottom lines. Fearing foreign governments and other firms will no longer trust them to provide secure products and services, they’ve pushed back against the government, demanding more transparency of how the intelligence community operates.

Verizon is one of the first companies that can point to the NSA as a direct cause for a failed business deal. The Interior Ministry released a statement Thursday, saying “the ties revealed between foreign intelligence agencies and firms in the wake of the U.S. National Security Agency affair show that the German government needs a very high level of security for its critical networks.”

Although it was the first company outed by journalist Glenn Greenwald and British newspaper the Guardian as providing the NSA with millions of instances of metadata on a daily basis, Verizon is not the only – or necessarily the first – to do so.

As far back as 2001, the NSA reportedly collected data from AT&T by re-routing information on its network to government computers. Reporting by Wired revealed documents from AT&T technician Mark Klein showing how the feat was accomplished using hardware in a now famous secret room at the company’s San Francisco data center.

Though the US and Germany are allies, documents released over the past year by whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed an American intelligence community with access to a wide variety of German communications. The fallout has been a chilling of relations between the two nations, with the Bundestag (German parliament) especially fierce in its criticisms and demands for answers from the US.

To the consternation of American officials hoping to prosecute Snowden for espionage, the German parliament even invited the leaker to testify about the NSA’s practices in a formal hearing.

Chancellor Merkel, however, has a mixed history with demanding answers from the US.

At first reacting with outrage and comparing the NSA to the Stasi – the communist East German secret police – she also demanded the two nations agree to a “no-spying” pact.

Her attitude changed markedly, however, after meeting with President Barack Obama in May. Stressing the need for unity, Merkel attempted to brush the scandal that has outraged German citizens under the rug. This was not received warmly by opposition parties and many of her constituents, a large number of whom view Snowden as a hero.

Meanwhile, further allegations regarding US surveillance continue to be brought forward. According to a report recently published by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung , NDR and WDR, the NSA had been given access to large swaths of telecoms data by the country’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND). For at least three years raw data was fed directly to the US agency out of Frankfurt — the city is a telecoms hub for much of Europe and beyond.

The former Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, declared last year that if a foreign intel service had been given a tap into the telecoms node in Frankfurt, it would be a violation of Germany’s sovereignty.

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By Jim Garamone

U.S. forces in Baghdad have opened a joint operations center in the city to assess the security situation in the wake of the rapid territorial gains made by Sunni militants, bringing the number of American service members there to about 500, Defense Department officials said today.

An additional four teams of U.S. advisors arrived in the Iraqi capital last night, Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Steve Warren said, bringing the number of teams to six.

Warren described the deployments as enhanced teams commanded by lieutenant colonels that are fanning out across Baghdad and assessing the Iraqi military. President Barack Obama ordered the teams to Iraq following gains made by Syrian-based Sunni militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant who have overrun towns and cities across Iraq’s northern and western provinces as they move closer to Baghdad, facing little or no resistance from Iraqi security forces.

The four teams bring 50 people with them, which puts the number of American assessors on the ground to 90. Warren said an additional 90 personnel have set up the joint operations center in Baghdad, meaning 180 of the possible 300 U.S. service members Obama said he is prepared to send to Iraq have arrived.

Overall, there are approximately 500 American military personnel in Iraq. “Some of them are conducting an advise and assist mission, some are manning the joint operations center, some of them are part of the [Office of Security Cooperation] and yet others are Marines that are part of a [fleet anti-terrorism security team] platoon,” Warren said.

The assessment teams are mostly made up of Army Special Forces personnel. They will advise and assist the Iraqi military at various levels of command.

The teams will take two to three weeks to assess the Iraqi military and make their reports, officials said.

Warren would not comment on reports that Iran is operating drones over Iraq and supplying the Baghdad government with arms. He did however, call on all regional countries to “participate constructively in the situation” in Iraq. The United States does not want ethnic or religious tensions increased.

Warren said the United States will establish another joint operations center in northern Iraq in the coming days or weeks. The commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq is Army Maj. Gen. Dana Pittard.

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By Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Brian T. Glunt

RIMPAC, the world’s largest international maritime exercise consisting of 20 plus nations and hundreds of aircraft, ships and submarines begins today in and around the Hawaiian Islands.

The exercise will provide a unique training opportunity for fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world’s oceans. RIMPAC 2014 is the 24th such exercise since 1971 and for the first time will include Brunei and China.

Ships taking part in an international group sail to Hawaii ahead of the exercise included USS Chosin and USS Howard; along with KDB Darulaman and KDB Darussalam of the Royal Brunei navy; PLA(N) Haikou , PLA(N) Yueyang, PLA(N) Qiandaohu, and PLA(N) Peace Ark from the Chinese navy; and Singapore’s RSS Intrepid. Each of the ships, with the exception of Howard, will participate in RIMPAC.

The 2014 RIMPAC exercise will focus on developing maritime safety and security capabilities. The event is scheduled to take place in the Hawaiian Operating Area and off-shore ranges including: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Bellows Air Force Station, Pohakulao Training Area and Schofield Barracks. Some training events are also scheduled to occur off the coast of southern California.

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On June 25, the Albania’s President, Bujar Nishani attended the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Summit of heads of state in Romania.

On this occasion he had various informal meetings with the regional presidents attending the most important forum in the south eastern region of Europe.

In his official speech Mr. Nishani stated in Bucharest: :I am convinced that we share the same views about the Romanian performance during its SEECP Chairmanship in Office, please allow me to express my high appreciation for President Băsescu and all the Romanian institutions which have exceeded our expectation and objectives of this summit. Since Albania will take over the SEECP Chairmanship in Office, we can find such a rich heritage inherited especially regarding issues connected to the region’s European integration embodied also in the slogan under the Romanian Chairmanship in Office: “Sharing one European Future.”’

In the formal session of SEECP was officially welcomed the Republic of Kosovo as the 13th member nation of this prestigious organization.

Such an integration of Prishtina in this regional body will foster a better economic integration, ensure a greater infrastructure interconnected between Kosovo and its neighboring countries and further promote regional trade. In her statement Kosovo’s President Atifete Jahjaga highlighted: “I want to especially thank the neighboring countries for their firm support that made our presence here possible and to the representatives of the European Union, especially Commissioner Stefan Fule, for not only recognizing the importance of Kosovo’s participation in this forum, but also for giving a context and meaning through concrete actions such as the need to enhance neighborly relations in order to accomplish the enlargement policy throughout his tenure in Brussels.”

In his official statement the President of Romania Traian Băsescu stated:

“Albania, as the next president of the SEECP, under the slogan of “Regional Ownership in action” and in cooperation with SEECP Troika Secretariat of the Regional Cooperation Council, all members of SEECP European partners assume this mandate with conviction and commitment to achieve and fulfill all ambitions and goals. Albania remains committed to strengthening good neighborly relations and enhancing regional cooperation. Albania’s role in the region is an active and constructive, because we believe that Albanian national interests are best achieved by a region that enjoys sustainable peace and stability, which is integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Albanian Chairmanship-in-Office will achieve tangible results for participants of SEECP throughout the region, focusing on strengthening the role of regional activities, promotion of dialogue between members nations of SEECP and strengthen the importance of the organization, which is at the main pillar of our regional cooperation and good neighborly relations which guarantee peace, security and stability in our region and are also preconditions for EU integration.”

In his statement President Nishani underlined: “Our countries are engaged in a common journey of transformations and cooperation that is changing the image of the region which is increasingly offering more means and opportunities to our European partners and also to other foreign investors as well. The mutual interest is to build a modern regional infrastructure, to remove all the non-physical barriers of cooperation by establishing the infrastructure of cultural, tourism, educational, scientific exchanges. The increasing levels of good faith and trust among us, are making South-East Europe an attracting and competing market, in this spirit Albania plays an active and constructive role in the region.”

The South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was established in Bulgaria on 1996. Under the chairmanship in office of Bulgaria, the Southeast European (SEE) countries laid the foundations for regional cooperation in order to create an environment of trust, friendly commercial relations and regional stability. SEECP has distinguished itself for being an original initiative of economic cooperation among the countries in the region launched by themselves and has not been stimulated by any outside actor nor international organizations, it continues to be a genuine voice of integration among South East European nations.

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The state of Ukraine is fragmenting before our very eyes into part of Europe and Russia. The loss of Crimea to Russian annexation and parts of the east to pro-Russian separatists forming a self-proclaimed and installed independent republic is the result of Europe’s faulty political action plan. They sought to take it from Moscow, who had long been the hardline political colonizer of Kiev- a status of ownership that changed hands since Viktor Yanukovych’s government was ousted in a Western backed, pro-EU riot, and mostly bloodless capital coup.

What was for the briefest of times expected to be a new government that would reconcile with Russia while clasping onto Europe and the Euro direction through the aide of the nationally elected government of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, is now turning into a stubborn, retroactive military crackdown of disputed territory.

Crimea is gone now but Poroshenko demands it be returned and he has a list of grievances that must be reconciled in spite of billions of dollars in revolving debt owed to Russia, Russian national property and military installations existing under the threat of previous and further seizure or uncertainty.

The eastern regions are in revolt indigenously, while being supported by Russia- the majority in those parts do not want to return to Kiev politically either and are ethnically unaligned toward a unified Ukraine apart from Russia. There is no political process outside of coercion that will put them back on a Euro track and even if the pro-Russian separatists could be severed from Russia and defeated (taken together as a fantasy) a new rebellious anti-nationalist group would soon arise again.

Fragmentation of Ukraine is the result of modern East-West political rivalry and conquest, with Russia operating at optimal efficiency in seizing what it can and Europe demanding that Russia accept its political and economic losses in Kiev and go home.

While the West is technically backing a more legitimate cause in the form of liberal democracy than Moscow’s united federalism and disregard for laws and human rights, Europe nevertheless runs into the persistent problem of backing nationalist Ukrainians that are equally as oppressive as the outgoing Russian-backed government. It therefore becomes an illigitmate effort for human rights and equality. In other words, the existing domestic politics has no fair and equal play and no respect for the opposition; just as the pro-Russian government lacked those same qualities. IF it does, how can it, yet untested, be trusted by the enemy?

The Kiev and the West continues to perceive the situation incorrectly and unrealistically. In Russia’s mind, it has just this year lost political access to Kiev; access it once possessed without restrictions. Now it finds itself rationally securing all security, economic and ethno-nationalist interests after retreating from the capital.

Moscow is willing to accept a stay of direct military force and a loss of greater political access to Ukraine but unwilling to let go of the eastern security, economic and ethnic regions of Luhansk and Donetsk or even Crimea, which is now annexed Russian territory.

President Poroshenko’s cease-fire deadline ends Friday morning and may or may not be extended. The peace plan that Poroshenko offered might have worked if he was not so vocal against recent Russian abuses and strongly playing to his nationalist base. The combination has fueled a negative outcome. Silence on the matter would have isolated him in Ukrainian domestic politics but wedged him between Ukraine and Moscow as a more legitmate mediator of dispute. Now Moscow perceives him in the same light as the previous ‘illegitimate’ interim government. Throwing Russia a crumb or reestablishing closer ties was the only way of doing any peaceful business under the table. Condemnation, demands and threats have and will only result in more hostility; proven thus far.

Russia may lose a greater piece of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community with the Ukrainian crisis, but Europe is looking greedy. The West must accept that they have lost part of Ukraine as Russia has accepted that they have lost Kiev. Working with Russia must also be part of a legitimate action plan that detours them from further military or paramilitary activities.

Western states are readily preparing to impose more economic sanctions targeting the Russian oil industry in response to what they claim is the failure of Russian diplomatic cooperation in deactivating the separatist militancy and putting them on a track to a more “legitimate” political process. Use of further sanctions pursues a risky course of economic warfare and a further division in European solidarity which is largely united against Russia.

Thousands of refugees are leaving the troubled eastern regions and going into Russia. Tens of thousands have already crossed the border.

*Previously published in In Homeland Security

The post A Ukraine Gained, A Ukraine Lost – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David T. Jones

In summer 2013, there was considerable confusion regarding political prospects for the federal government and the Quebec and Ontario provincial governments. The federal government was beset by scandal, notably fiscal irregularities among Tory senate appointees. There even were questions regarding Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s continuation in office.  Both Quebec and Ontario had minority governments making it only a “matter of time” until official opposition (or the governments themselves) pulled the plug and forced elections.

Now the political situation is considerably clearer. Having patched some of the holes in its ship of state, the Tory government appears to have righted itself, albeit still rather battered. Quebec’s separatist Parti Quebecois was comprehensively defeated, and the Ontario Liberals won a defining majority government.

Separately, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) remain in limbo:  major procurement and/or operational questions remain for all three major services, and now ballistic missile defense is emerging from purgatory.

Finally, U.S.-Canadian bilateral issues are fraught. The word is “Keystone”—earlier an issue “a cloud the size of a man’s hand” has now generated heavily clouded skies. For American officials, it is analogous to a scratch on a well-performing, attractive vehicle.  Canadians do not agree; they repeatedly express puzzlement over decision delay and why “a pipeline” should be generating such angst.

But to specifics.

FEDERAL POLITICS: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES

In the spring and summer of 2013, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his government clearly looked past their “best before” date. They were politically besieged by the Senate scandal in which three Harper appointees were enmeshed in travel/housing fund irregularities with the PM’s chief of staff, Nigel Wright, forced to resign over providing $90,000 in his personal funds to one of the senators to reimburse his inappropriate claims. This specific problem was extrapolated with predictions that Wright would be prosecuted for this action and that a just-begun financial review of the expenses of all senators would reveal comparable difficulties for many more senators than the three already caught in these legal/fiscal toils.

Consequently, there was a steady media drum beat against Harper of the “what did you know and when did you know it” nature expressing predictable skepticism that he could have been ignorant of Wright’s actions and/or the fiscal irregularities of others. Belabored by New Democratic Party (NDP) official Opposition leader Thomas Mulcair in the daily parliamentary Question Period, Harper appeared unconvincing in his denials of foreknowledge of wrongdoing.

Simultaneously, the Liberal Party, having selected Justin Trudeau as its new leader, surged into the lead in polls.  Just-in-time Trudeau benefitted from being the son of iconic Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, but also enjoyed telegenic good looks, personal dynamism, and cute-as-buttons young children.  Such contrasted with the rather stodgy Harper who once said that he became an economist because he didn’t have the charisma to be an accountant.  Yes, a joke, but illustrating an element of self-knowledge reflecting Canadian attitudes toward him.

Liberal enthusiasm was barely muted; for them, Harper was “toast.”  Tories were glum.  Although they made the obvious point that there was no scheduled election until approximately October 2015, many resented the very tight control Harper maintained over the parliamentary caucus.  Nobody predicted outright party revolt; however, MPs had accepted the strict discipline partly because Harper’s leadership, over a decade, moved the Tories into majority rule.  Now he appeared to be stumbling into problems that could have been avoided—a circumstance disconcerting to those appreciating previous sure-handedness.

But the proverbial “a week in politics…” is even more true when a year has passed (again with the caveat that it is still more than a year before the next scheduled federal election leaving obvious opportunities for further twists/turns).

The Tories still trail the Liberals in the polls. They have not recovered their 2011 voters, but remain within striking distance of the lead, and new political demographics make it easier to graph a Tory victory (majority or minority) than even a Liberal minority government.  Some of the positives:

• The much-bruited-about “worst” hasn’t happened. There have been no more disgraced senators and, while investigation into general fiscal irregularities has been glacially slow, the issue is off the front pages even for Ottawa-centric media (it never resonated provincially beyond Ontario);
• The RCMP has announced that it will not bring charges against former PM chief of staff Wright.  His role remains murky but apparently not criminal. Intimations of wrong doing by others remain just that—unspecific intimations;
• The Canadian economy continues to perform well—better than most other G-7 members (notably the USA). Specifically, the budget will be officially balanced with the next announcement in February-March (in fact, it is already balanced).  Such status will provide the government with a surplus that can be distributed in electorally beneficially tax cuts and expenditures.  Canadians will appreciate the end of fiscal restraint and perhaps reward the “good steward” Tories;
• Harper’s foreign policy positions (unswerving support of Israel; tough line on Ukraine) are more popular than critical media depictions. Despite tish-tishing by chattering class and Canadian diplomats who deplore the departure from traditional nuance, foreign policy doesn’t lose elections. Moreover, Jewish-Canadians are now less committed to Liberals; Ukranian-Canadians (approximately 1.3 million) are at least 10 percent of the electorate in 26 ridings (federal electoral districts).  Consequently, Harper projects an image of strength not always a hallmark of “Mr. Dithers” style Canadian leaders. Moreover, withdrawing the last military personnel from Afghanistan eliminates a neuralgic issue for Canadians never convinced that freeing little boys to fly kites in Kabul was worth body bags containing CAF soldiers;
• Political demography, the addition of 30 parliamentary ridings, primarily in areas of Ontario and the West regarded as Tory-leaning, should help Harper’s election chances;
• Moreover, the bloom is off the Trudeau rose.  He has provided media with gaffes on foreign affairs and difficult-to-explain organizational/ideological decisions pointing up his general inexperience. The more he talks, the more he inflicts gratuitous damage.

The Liberals. Polls continue to project a Liberal lead, but such “snapshots” 16-17 months before an election are hardly definitive.  As outlined above, Harper’s Tories are not the 1992-93 Mulroney-Kim Campbell party so battered by inflation, increased taxes, scandal, and repeated failure on constitution revision to be dead-(wo)men-walking.

While Trudeau continues to be more popular than any other political leader, he has yet to prove that he can be trusted to lead Canada.  It is increasingly difficult to give him the “youth and inexperience” pass since he is now 42 and been leader for over a year.  In the key battleground of Quebec, he is either loved or hated.  One observer noted, “He has his father’s arrogance but not his father’s intelligence.” Consequently, his continued “unforced errors” bother those without blindfolds.  For example, he blithely suggested the Russians would take action in Ukraine because they lost an Olympic hockey game to Finland.  Even less explicable was his praise for Chinese economic policy based on their GNP growth.

Comparably difficult to rationalize was his ouster of all Senate Liberals from the party caucus.  Trudeau acted apparently without consulting anyone beyond an inner circle lacking career life experience other than working to make Trudeau party leader.  Nor were any senators alerted prior to his action, which obviously disconcerted many lifetime Liberal Party members believing themselves to be working for party interests and supporting Trudeau.  Perhaps in their new Senate incarnation, they need a symbol equivalent to that of “the artist formerly known as Prince” to handle their nonperson status.

And most recently, in late-May, Trudeau declared that all Liberals running for MP nominations must support “pro-choice” regarding abortion. The announcement left speechless a range of observers including those believing abortion was a matter of conscience not subject to party ideology/discipline, those seeing no chance of it being raised in Parliament, and those that had believed Trudeau’s affirmation when campaigning for leader that he wouldn’t interfere in riding nomination selections and would be “transparent” in his party/political dealings.  However, the back-story for the “pro-choice” decision apparently was concern that a key “star” candidate was being out-campaigned for the riding nomination by a pro-life candidate (and several other ridings either had pro-life candidates and/or old pro-life party warhorses, defeated in the 2011 election but believing Trudeau’s dynamism would get them back into office). Declaring that “pro-choice” was a litmus test for Liberal nomination was a too-clever-by-half move to rid Trudeau of some inconvenient Liberals.  What it demonstrated, however, is that Trudeau does politics “just the same” and effectively neuters criticism of Harper as being “over controlling” regarding his caucus.

The Socialists (New Democratic Party or NDP). Although the NDP is the Official Opposition with 98 seats to 35 Liberal seats, nobody except perhaps some NDP household family members regards it as the government-in-waiting.  Of their 98 MPs, 57 hold Quebec ridings.  Most of these Quebec MPs are first-term victors from the 2011 election, often regarded as ciphers nominated simply to provide an NDP candidate in a no-hope riding.  However, the Jack Layton tsunami[1] swept away virtually all of the Bloc Quebecois MPs (and many Quebec Liberals as well).  NDP leader Layton had one of the great days in Canadian electoral history, but his death in August 2011 raises the obvious question whether the NDP victory was a one-off bubble that will deflate with the next election.

The verdict on NDP parliamentary performance is mixed.  Layton’s replacement as NDP leader, Thomas Mulcair, is excellent in Question Period (QP) with sharp lawyerly questions and adroit followup. He clearly wins most exchanges, notably in comparison to nonlawyer Trudeau who is less experienced in parliamentary give-and-take.  Moreover, Trudeau spends the bulk of his time traveling Canada raising interest (and funds)—probably a better use of his time than spending it in parliament with limited opportunities to shine.  It will, however, lay him open to the same zinger employed in 2011 debate by Layton against then-Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff:  Ignatieff had the poorest attendance record in Parliament of party leaders, and Layton asked why he expected a promotion to prime minister when he didn’t show up for work.  Ignatieff had no rejoinder; Trudeau will need one.

Mulcair remains the NDP’s greatest strength—and weakness.  He isn’t Jack Layton epitomizing the image of the “leader with whom you would prefer to share a beer.”  Indeed, there is a “smiling Tom” who could charm birds from the trees (if he wanted squab for diner), but there is also a long history of an angry, snarky, snarling Tom who emerges not infrequently.  Clearly, the NDP needs the “smiling Tom” as its campaign image.

So far as the Trudeau challenge is concerned, the NDP is ignoring, not attacking, him.  One observer noted with a smile, “We just want him to keep talking.”

FEDERAL ELECTION 2015

It is a mug’s game, but nevertheless amusing to play out election scenarios. Legislation sets a four-year timeframe for the next election, scheduled approximately mid-October 2015.  Although there are techniques to force an earlier election, it is not regarded as likely.

One plausible scenario has the Tories bringing down their federal budget in February-March; it will have a reasonably substantial surplus designed to be dispersed as promised by the Tories when they earlier announced stringent spending constraints and cuts designed to create a balanced budget. Specific spending increases, tax cuts, and projections for even better times to come will outline the Tory election platform. Essentially, Tories will argue they have been good stewards of the economy, bringing it through parlous times, and can be depended upon to provide more of the same.  Tories will campaign on these chickens-in-every-pot themes throughout the summer and call the election in September.

The classic judgment is that governments are not defeated; they defeat themselves. Consequently, opposition campaign themes will be less how NDP/Liberal/Greens will bring a milk-and-honey millennium to Canada than how Harper Tories are systematically failing to make Canada all it can be.  Yes, the economy has survived, but less well than selected other states. And, other than natural resource-rich Alberta/Saskatchewan, economies have sputtered.  Moreover, Harper has failed abysmally in environmental protection; weakened Canada’s international standing with its hard-line foreign policy; and mismanaged the bilateral relationship with the United States. That is, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the Keystone pipeline, Tories bilaterally bungled the entire process.

Moreover, there is an exhaustion factor.  By 2015 the Tories will have governed for nine years—frequently a change point for popular opinion (except perhaps for Tories in Alberta now over 40 years in power).  Asking the electorate for “four more years” could be a stretch. And the continuing economic prosperity may not be the plus Tories expect.  While one could argue in previous elections “Don’t change horses in mid-stream,” Canadians could conclude that the horse has reached the opposite bank and a new rider wouldn’t risk prosperity.

Finally, Harper remains unlovable—respected but endured rather than admired. A U.S. commentator once compared President Nixon to a sanitary fixture: functional and useful but not irreplaceable. Harper is well aware of this liability.  In a eulogy for former Finance Minister Flaherty, Harper noted that Flaherty was a man that even his enemies liked. In contrast, Harper said that he was a man that not even his friends liked. At best, the Tories get approximately 40 percent of the vote.  The other 60 percent ranges between accepting Harper/Tories with irritated indifference to those that hate and despise Harper with almost un-Canadian intensity.

Consequently, the Tory objective is to hold what they have, particularly west of Ontario while limiting losses in vulnerable spots in Atlantic Canada and Ontario, and picking up the bulk of the 30 newly created seats.

Conversely, the Liberals and NDP are in a zero-sum dogfight. Essentially, each needs the other’s seats to have a chance at obtaining a majority or even a minority government. West of Ontario both parties are closer to being endangered species than politically competitive.

BATTLE FOR QUEBEC

At this point, the NDP has 57; Liberals eight; Tories five; and Bloc Quebecois four seats. In 2011, the Tories did what was previously regarded as politically impossible: construct a governing majority without needing Quebec seats.  That reality stands. Consequently, it doesn’t matter to Tories whether Liberals, NDP, or back-from-the-dead Bloc Quebecois hold the Quebec seats.

At this juncture, polls and observers argue over whether the NDP is “holding its own” or whether the Liberals will rebound anywhere between regaining the seven seats they lost in 2011 to sweeping out the NDP from the BQ seats the Layton orange tide seized.  Not that the BQ has given up hope; however, it will need a dynamic leader and new funding sources to mount any significant recovery.  So the projection is for an increase of a few seats by the BQ.  And as for the Tories, they should retain their existing five seats and (perhaps) add a few.

Liberals see it differently. They project winning virtually all Atlantic province seats (32); the bulk of the 2015 Quebec seats (78); recovering most of the 27 Ontario seats they lost (as well as a good portion of Ontario’s 15 new seats); and becoming competitive west of Ontario, most strongly in British Columbia.  Not impossible, but don’t bet your pension on it.

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES (CAF):  A STILL UNRESOLVED MUDDLE

The problems plaguing the CAF remain unresolved.  Essentially, Canadian national security is a partisan issue.  In contrast to the United States, where the political arguments revolve over how best to make U.S. armed forces the world’s strongest and most effective, Canadian parties, other than the Tories, are essentially dubious over the utility and objectives of national armed forces.  Hence, every significant procurement decision is politicized, often highly so, and even for the Tories, defense and “jobs” are coterminous. Hence, there are new requirements that any procurement proposal include judgments regarding how the purchase will increase employment.

Consequently, defense procurement decisions continue to hang fire.

Air Force. The F-35 “follow on fighter” decision for the Canadian Air Force was a hot potato tossed to an Independent Review Panel in 2012. Comprehensive bungling in public relations management of the decision and confusion over lifetime costs (plus increased projected purchasing expenses and furious Opposition criticism) drove the government into this review. Ostensibly, it was to be a transparent process carefully assessing pluses and minuses of the F-35 and competitors.  Results were announced in mid-June without a specific recommendation but weighted to endorsing the F-35.

However, the ultimate decision is not military-technical but political. The F-35 is far and away the best aircraft—if Canada wants to remain NATO-integrated with European and U.S. partners.  However, a clear decision to purchase F-35s will be immediately attacked by Liberals and NDP, particularly targeted by Liberals in the forthcoming election in terms reminiscent of 1993 when Chretien assailed projected EH-101 search and rescue helicopters as “gold-plated” and promised to cancel the contract.  But if the government makes no final decision, F-35 proponents will just keep quiet while opponents will lack a target.

Some propose a temporizing decision to stage another “competition.” Essentially, however, the F-35 already competed against other alternatives and won. To do so again, according to experts, would require adjusting the mission specifications/requirements or the results would be the same. If mission requirements are changed, the question arises whether they have been dumbed down with the Air Force getting a less capable aircraft.  Nevertheless, if the F-35 still wins, critics still will claim that competition was rigged.  At a minimum, it will waste upwards of two years to script and conduct a competition. Moreover, reportedly there are cost benefits to purchasing later in the production run.

So skeptics project there will be no final/final decision until after the 2015 election. Just think of it as Canada’s Keystone XL pipeline imbroglio, but a decision not to decide is still a decision.

Navy.  The air force problems are crystal clear in comparison to the Navy’s muddle.  In 2008 the ambitious “Canada First” defense strategy projected an Arctic icebreaker, Arctic patrol craft, new frigates and destroyers, and new supply vessels. To date, nothing has been accomplished and the program is sinking in cynicism. To wit, the icebreaker plans have not advanced.  The specifications for ice resistance for the Arctic patrol vessels have been reduced to the point that one observer said, “The only ‘Arctic’ element of the vessels will be their name.” The government explored purchasing the projected two supply vessels from European shipyards; however, the estimated costs were above the funds allocated for them—so back to the drawing boards regarding specifications/costs.  It appears that the frigates/destroyers will be morphed into one type of vessel, and the Irving shipyard in Nova Scotia where construction is planned has yet to build required infrastructure.

To add grief to grimace, a fleet oiler caught fire during an exercise and had to be towed to Hawaii; reportedly it is a total loss. It was towed to the West Coast in June to be rendered into scrap, having been assessed as too old/expensive to repair. This leaves the Canadian navy with one oiler.  And the four submarines are vessels that dare not speak their names. Plagued by accident and repair/refit problems, it is rare that more than one is operational at a given time.

The Army.  Actually, the army is in relatively good shape, still able to dine out on its Afghan experience.  Its Delta Force equivalent is well regarded, and the CAF is taking pains to be compatible with analogue NATO-U.S. elements. Although observers expect some force reductions, they hope such will come from logistical/administrative “tail” rather than “tooth.” And they believe that at least for the near term, Canada will be able to deploy a light infantry combat battalion for joint operations with allies, either UN-endorsed or part of a “willing” coalition. This may be sanguine thinking as some observers question the quality of such a unit, larded with reservists, to supplement active duty professionals.

And Now a Wild Hare—Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).  If there was not already sufficient angst in Canada’s defense-security constellation, BMD—like the rise of the undead—has again appeared on the scene.  Both House of Commons and Senate committees have taken testimony and received presentations on ballistic missile defense.  Exactly “why?” and “why now?” remain salient questions.

Nevertheless, the BMD discussion appears serious. Speculation includes appreciation that rogue state nuclear missile threats are rising and that U.S. technical ability to stop such attacks has also improved. CAF reportedly believe that being absent from BMD planning at NORAD is a liability and wants a seat (no matter how small/constricted) at the table.  All concerned appreciate that little to nothing will be asked of Canada—and other than the implicit endorsement of BMD from its participation such is all Ottawa is prepared to give.

Once burned in 2006 when then PM Paul Martin withdrew from what Washington believed was a commitment to BDM participation, the United States is twice shy.  The old adage pertains:  a cat that sat on a hot stove never sits on a hot stove again—or for that matter a cold one.  Thus we are asking no questions of Ottawa regarding BMD.  If ultimately Ottawa sorts the question and proposes to join the NORAD BMD framework, it would presumably find a cautious welcome.  Canada, however, would be well advised to make such a proposal an “all parties” agreement, akin to how it managed military participation in Afghanistan.  We are not interested in a BMD partner dependent on the vagaries of the next election.

Bottom Line.  One observer claimed to be a “cock-eyed optimist” regarding defense funding, citing the prospective end to budget austerity with a return to balanced budget/surplus starting in 2015. CAF members were pleased at the 9 May day honoring veterans of Afghanistan and the announcement that Afghanistan would be engraved on the Ottawa war memorial and battle honors accorded to 92 units.

Others, however, remained pessimistic; their position essentially is that funding will not be available to purchase the equipment projected for Canada First force modernization. Where the cuts will land remains unknown.  More essential, however, is that Canada is (un)willing/able to reach a national consensus on its defense-security role.  Unfortunately, at a time when dynamic senior leadership is necessary, the current Chief of Defense Staff (General Thomas Lawson) is virtually invisible. He has been characterized as the weakest and most ineffective CDS in modern memory.  Lawson reportedly was chosen as an “anti-Hillier,” the noteworthy prominent/competent CDS between 2005-08. Historically, the CDS believed himself equal to the Defense Minister (or at least the Deputy Minister).  Lawson, reportedly, is content to take orders from DND officials without complaint.

QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY EVISCERATES ITSELF

In the spring-summer of 2013, the political potential for Quebec sovereignty was the strongest it had been in this century. The Parti Quebecois (PQ) had won the September 2012 election, admittedly with a narrow minority government, but viewed itself as well-positioned against a weak/corrupt Liberal Party with a new, untested leader.  The other significant party the Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ) had not achieved its pre-election potential.

The PQ sought to create circumstances for a well-timed election that would result in a majority government.  From there it would build momentum through calculated confrontations with Ottawa that could lead to a successful third referendum for Quebec sovereignty.  And indeed Prime Minister Pauline Marois worked deftly.  She adroitly created a wedge issue Quebec “Charter” ostensibly designed to strengthen and assure Francophone rights, primarily with a dress code for public employees that would eliminate obvious religious symbolism.  The Anglophone/Allophone community saw it as prejudicial, but Francophones (with the noteworthy exception of senior former separatist leaders, e.g. Lucien Bouchard, Jacques Parizeau, Bernard Landry, and Gilles Duceppe) largely embraced it, pushing Marois/PQ polling numbers into majority territory.

Thus when the election was called for April 7, the PQ was poised for a majority victory (and Opposition was virtually in despair).  Nevertheless, the outcome was a classic “snatch defeat from the jaws of victory” catastrophe.   Not only was Marois’ party rejected—in the worst defeat of its modern history—but to add insult to injury, she was ousted from her own riding.

So why did what looked like a slam dunk victory backfire so explosively? The PQ simply did not learn from the comparable (actually worse) catastrophe that destroyed the Bloc Quebecois.  One recalls the moment when Mme Marois’ received massive reaffirmation of PQ support immediately prior to the May 2011 election.  Joined by BQ leader Gilles Duceppe, they said, in effect, with a strong Bloc in Ottawa and a PQ victory in the forthcoming provincial election, “everything is possible.”

“Everything” was extrapolated in the minds of beholders as return to sovereignty/referendum politics. And the frightened electorate bolted, overwhelmingly rejecting that federal level option by annihilating the BQ—indeed, even defeating Duceppe in his own riding.

But did the PQ learn from that experience? Hardly. The PQ unveiled its trump card: a star candidacy by Pierre Karl Peladeau (PKP), Quebec billionaire media mogul, who appeared to be icing on the cake for a PQ victory.  But then all the wheels came off the victory parade float. PKP proved that billionaires are not oxen to be happily hitched to the party wagon.  Indeed, PKP was a bull carrying his own china shop; his fist-pumping declaration that he entered politics to promote Quebec sovereignty stampeded the “horses” to the Liberals, and there was no way to round them up.

The explanation that PKP was encouraged to demonstrate “out of the closet” dedication to sovereignty (and thus the prospective bridge between the entrepreneurial “right” and the PQ “left”) seems a disingenuous stretch at best.

More generally, observers describe the PQ campaign as the worst ever from the first day when Marois refused to answer questions, ostensibly so not to detract from the platform. Instead, the “story” became her refusal to answer questions.  And it proceeded apace with unsuccessful, desperate efforts to put the referendum issue back in the box.  PQ polling numbers fell like a stone; they won only the 54-65 demographic and would probably have fared even worse if the campaign had been longer. And “youth” in the 19-25 demographic reportedly places them as its fourth preference.

In another time; in another society, following April 7’s electoral defeat, the leaders of the PQ would have given Mme Marois a revolver with one bullet and escorted her to a closed room.  She claims to “regret nothing.”  But she should.

Essentially, Marois has destroyed the last hopes for Quebec independence in her generation.  She has put proof to Lucien Bouchard’s observation that while he believed Quebec would become sovereign, he didn’t think that it would happen in his lifetime. Even the most dedicated separatists concede the political field to Prime Minister Coulliard’s Liberals for at least one—and possibly two—more elections. Coulliard is regarded as not just highly intelligent, but quickly learning political “ropes” he didn’t need to master earlier as health minister.  Moreover, the endlessly grinding Charbonneau Commission, investigating primarily Charest/Liberal corruptions, may have a few rabbits still to be pulled from hats, but observers expect no major revelations.

A majority PQ government might have been able to manipulate a combination of demands, “grievances,” and weak federal leadership in Quebec/Ottawa into the proverbial “winning conditions” for a referendum. It is not that Quebeckers are hostile to the concept of independence—they just are exceptionally hostile to the process for securing it.

Essentially, the hand of Canada lies lightly on Quebec; Francophones are indeed “masters in their own dwelling,” and the more discerning appreciate Ottawa provides considerable fiscal support.

Consequently, separatists face a from-the-ground-up rebuild.  Amazingly, the most likely PQ leader is PKP who, having destroyed the party, may be the most effective choice to revive it, given his personal energy, money, and relative youth.  His negatives, however, include a vigorously bad temper and a penchant for abrupt (and not always correct) decision making.  A key question will be whether he has the patience to slog through the swamp for eight years?

An ostensibly popular alternative, former BQ leader Gilles Duceppe, declined to run; realistically, he has no “roots” within the current PQ. Media-reported polling popularity would not translate into PQ acceptance of Duceppe as leader.

Quebec sovereignty is not dead, but detecting a heartbeat beneath the lawn is akin to finding Malaysia FL 370.

ONTARIO: LIBERALS NOW—AND FOREVER?

The 12 June provincial election provided another illustration of rip-defeat-from-jaws-of-victory.

The minority Liberal government, much beset by scandal and fatigue during its period governing as a minority, won a clear majority victory.  Premier Kathleen Wynne, a gay grandmother, won a personal victory against daunting odds. Her principal opponent, Tory leader Tim Hudak, who entered the election as putative premier, lost resoundingly (and immediately announced retirement).  The New Democrats (socialist) third party, led by Andrea Howarth, essentially broke even electorally.

For generations Ontario has been the “motor” driving Canada.  However, if not now completely broken, it is badly in need of comprehensive retuning. Ontario was (and still is) the province with the largest population, the largest city in Canada (as well as the national capital), the region with the greatest wealth, and the national cultural center (at least for Anglophones). As a consequence of its demographic and economic power, it also held political primacy; it was a “have” province that, with federal redistribution rules/transfer payments, contributed the greatest amount to Canada’s “have nots.”  Its demographic leverage gives it massive presence in the federal Parliament (121 of 338 seats in next election); it is Canada’s 800-pound gorilla.

Coinciding with this political, economic, and social primacy comes more than a scintilla of arrogance and hubris.  Consequently, Ontario (and particularly Toronto) is the region/city other Canadians love to hate.  They are more than amused that the Toronto Maple Leafs continue to demonstrate even greater athletic incompetence than the (momentarily proficient) Toronto Blue Jays.

But Ontario’s primacy is no more. Ontario has been belabored by the apparently irreversible “rust belt” syndrome also afflicting north-central U.S. states epitomized by the collapse of the automobile industry and associated “big ticket” manufacturing. This contraction is continuing. It is not that Ontario’s economy has collapsed, but bad choices made during periods of wealth and/or residual belief in wealth-to-come has left the province in a parlous state.

Thus Ontario packs a debt that in percentage terms is five times that of California (the professed basket case of USA indebtedness).  It has been accentuated by a plethora of politicized and/or “politically correct” decisions that will burden Ontario voters for decades. Illustratively, the Liberal government has doubled the provincial debt during its tenure. But, quite remarkably, until and throughout the 12 June election, Ontario voters appear surprisingly indifferent to their problem.

Faced with an election in 2011, “Premier Dad” Dalton McGuinty was beset by a legion of his lies:  no tax increases; health care efficiencies; energy production.  For transparently political reasons, he cancelled two gas power plants at a cost of over a billion dollars.  The result was substantial defeat, dropping from a strong majority (70 of 107 seats) to 53 and a minority government.  Playing scapegoat, McGuinty decamped to Harvard permitting his replacement by “Premier Mom” Kathleen Wynne, who rather disingenuously suggested that she had nothing to do with the McGuinty era disasters and scandals, but was almost Paul Martinesque (“mad as hell”) in her professions of political virtue and determination to run a trustworthy, transparent government.  And she continued to apologize profusely for specific errors (signing off on eliminating the gas power plants) throughout the election campaign.

After 15 months of keeping a minority government afloat, while Tories and NDP read the polling entrails to determine whether to vote it down, Wynne presented what experts judged to be a totally unsustainable, pie-in-the-sky budget; it promises increased funds for education, infrastructure, a provincial pension plan and, consequently, an even larger budget deficit.  (Having won a majority, Wynne presumably will move forward with this budget.)

Polls suggested that 78 percent of Ontario wanted a new government and, rather than be voted down, Wynne called for a 40-day campaign with election on 12 June. Why then, with the overhang of scandal, blatant need for financial overhaul, and comprehensive appreciation that Ontario begs for change, did Wynne win?  Perhaps partly because, as one commentator put it, “She’s not a meanie…a very nice lady.” Ultimately, however, her opponents beat themselves. On the left, NDP leader Andrea Howarth retained the legacy of distrust from Bob Rae’s 1990-95 mismanagement of Ontario.  Additionally, she angered many NDP supporters by rejecting an NDP-friendly budget.  On the right, Tory leader, Tim Hudak, having lost once, seemed to have learned the wrong lesson:  be yourself.  Hudak has the charisma of an armchair and promised sacrifice/pain, e.g., eliminate 100,000 public workers, rather than hope/change.  Concurrently, he promised to create “a million jobs”—a commitment that was economically doggy at best and rejected as absurd by assorted technically qualified critics. He was a “take your castor oil” candidate while Wynne was a mistress of misdirection.

Nevertheless, Hudak was widely regarded as having won the only candidate debate on 3 June. While both Wynne and Howarth stumbled and flailed, Hudak appeared calm, controlled, and precise. Polls continued to fibrillate throughout the final week of the campaign with a minority Liberal or Tory government regarded as most likely.

Retrospectively, Hudak appeared undone by his essential tactic:  tough love isn’t what Ontario wants.  He believed he could galvanize the Tory base more than his opponents could stimulate theirs.  Another miscalculation; voting participation increased and not only among Tories. His proposal to cut 100,000 public service jobs (even if most would be eliminated by attrition) struck unions like a bolt of lightning. Public service unions ran unprecedented anti-Hudak commercials (one, depicting Hudak as “The Joker” laughing as a hospital collapsed was sufficiently over-the-top to prompt an apology). Socialist leader Howarth was reduced to claiming that the choice wasn’t between “corrupt [Liberals] and crazy [Tories]” but a certain amount of strategic voting—that rare political phenomenon—appeared to gravitate to Wynne.

With the prospect of four years in majority government, the Liberals may address some of Ontario’s economic challenges.  However, normal economic recovery/progress may also provide desperately needed jobs/tax revenue. Federally, for the 2015 election, political entrails readers suggest Wynne benefitted from running against PM Harper as much as against Hudak.  Federal Tories cannot be comforted by Tory losses in metropolitan Toronto; Harper needs those seats for his majority.  On the other hand, there is a somewhat shaggy political maxim that Ontario prefers to have one party governing in Ottawa and another in Toronto.  For the foreseeable future, it is Liberals in Toronto.

BILATERAL U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS

Keystone, Keystone, Keystone.

Why does the United States continue to delay a decision on the Keystone XL pipeline designed to move Albertan heavy oil to the United States? To Canadian commentators, the delay ranges from inexplicable to deliberately malicious. At the minimum, they conclude that President Obama is in thrall to extreme environmentalists (who have made defeating Keystone their cause célèbre for the decade) and seizing on one procedural/legislative/juridical device after another to semi-plausibly justify decision delay. Currently, any decision has been pushed past the November 2014 election where environmental activists are enlisted to help save a Democratic senate majority. In truth, given the virtually maniacal intensity of the opposition, the potential for further legal challenge, and the essential antipathy by senior administration officials to carbon-based energy, it is easy to hypothesize that there will be no decision until after the 2016 presidential election.

Thus an issue that at inception appeared “a cloud the size of a man’s hand” has extrapolated into serious cloudy skies for bilateral relations.  PM Harper once memorably characterized approval of the Keystone pipeline as a “no brainer.”  Alas, the decision appears to be managed by zombies in Washington. Ambassador Bruce Heyman, in an exchange with former Canadian ambassador to the United States (Frank McKenna) following a recent major address by the ambassador, attempted to characterize attention to Keystone as obsessive concern over a “scratch” on an otherwise well-functioning vehicle. Technically, that may be true—but it is not what the Canadians believe. Keystone is certainly our decision to make.  But its ramifications are sufficient that Canadians would be fools to be indifferent to the outcome.

Consequently, we are preparing a “you’re another” blame game to the effect that it is really PM Harper’s fault for blithely characterizing the Keystone decision in memorable terms (and subsequently saying that he “wouldn’t take ‘no’ for an answer.”). Or by failing to read the writing on the wall as U.S. environmentalists and their financial supporters surged politically at a time when the president needs all the support he can garner.  Or by de facto interfering in U.S. domestic politics by attempting to generate support of a positive pipeline decision.

Blame Canada has its advantages (certainly won’t irritate U.S. citizens other than always hostile anti-administration critics), but it will make the relationship harder on a topic of greater importance to Ottawa than to Washington.

About the author:
David Jones, an FPRI alumnus, is a retired senior Foreign Service Officer who was Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at U.S. Embassy Ottawa. He coauthored Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs—a study of U.S.-Canadian bilateral relations in the twenty-first century.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI and may be accessed here.

[1] The “Jack Layton tsunami” refers to the 2011 election when Layton’s New Democrats almost completely destroyed the Bloc Quebecois in Quebec, picking up about 59 seats and reducing the BQ to four.  The entire NDP performance in the 2011 election was far above expectation, vaulting them into Official Opposition status (for first time ever) and reducing the Liberals to third place (also for first time ever).

The post Canadian Summer 2014: Federal Picture Cloudy, Provinces Clear – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

India was the fourth-largest energy consumer in the world after China, the United States, and Russia in 2011, and its need for energy supply continues to climb as a result of the country’s dynamic economic growth and modernization over the past several years. India’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of approximately 7% since 2000, and it proved relatively resilient following the 2008 global financial crisis.

The latest slowdown in growth of emerging market countries and higher inflation levels, combined with domestic supply and infrastructure constraints, have reduced India’s annual inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) growth from a high of 10.3% in 2010 to 4.4% in 2013, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). India was the third-largest economy in the world in 2013, as measured on a purchasing power parity basis. Risks to economic growth in India include high debt levels, infrastructure deficiencies, delays in structural reforms, and political polarization between the country’s two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The BJP, elected as the majority party in May 2014 to govern India in the following five years, faces challenges to meet the country’s growing energy demand by securing affordable energy supplies and attracting investment for infrastructure development. Highly regulated fuel prices for consumers, fuel subsidies that are shouldered by the government and state-owned upstream companies, and inconsistent energy sector reform currently hinder energy project investment. Some parts of the energy sector, chiefly coal production, remain relatively closed to private and foreign investment, while others such as electric power, petroleum and other liquids, and natural gas have regulated price structures that discourage private investment.

Despite having large coal reserves and a healthy growth in natural gas production over the past two decades, India is increasingly dependent on imported fossil fuels. In 2013, India’s former petroleum and natural gas minister, Veerappa Moily, announced that his ministry would work on an action plan to make India energy independent by 2030 through increased fossil fuel production, development of resources such as coalbed methane and shale gas, foreign acquisitions by domestic Indian companies of upstream hydrocarbon reserves, reduced subsidies on motor fuels, and oil and natural gas pricing reforms. The current petroleum and natural gas minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, who took office in late May 2014, reiterated the goal of making India self-sufficient in energy resources. India is also looking to further develop and harness its various renewable energy sources. These actions would effectively increase India’s energy supply and create more efficiency in energy consumption. India already began implementing oil and gas pricing reforms over the past two years to foster sustainable investment and help lower subsidy costs.

Primary energy consumption in India has more than doubled between 1990 and 2012, reaching an estimated 32 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu). The country has the second-largest population in the world, at more than 1.2 billion people in 2012, growing about 1.3% each year since 2008, according to World Bank data. At the same time, India’s per capita energy consumption is one-third of the global average, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), indicating potentially higher energy demand in the long term as the country continues its path of economic development. In the International Energy Outlook 2013, EIA projects India and China will account for about half of global energy demand growth through 2040, with India’s energy demand growing at 2.8% per year.

India’s largest energy source is coal, followed by petroleum and traditional biomass and waste. Since the beginning of the New Economic Policy in 1991, India’s population increasingly has moved to cities, and urban households have shifted away from traditional biomass and waste to other energy sources such as hydrocarbons, nuclear, biofuels, and other renewables. The power sector is the largest and fastest-growing area of energy demand, rising from 22% to 36% of total energy consumption between 1990 and 2011, according to the IEA. India’s National Sample Survey Organization estimates that about 25% of the population (over 300 million people) lack basic access to electricity, while electrified areas suffer from rolling electricity blackouts. The government seeks to balance the country’s growing need for electricity with environmental concerns from the use of coal and other energy sources to produce that electricity. India’s transportation sector, primarily fueled by petroleum products, is set to expand as the country focuses on improving road and railway transit. The government plans to mandate some alternative fuel use, particularly with biofuel blends, and develop greater use of mass transit systems to limit oil demand growth.

Petroleum and other liquids

India was the fourth-largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products in the world in 2013, after the United States, China, and Japan. The country depends heavily on imported crude oil, mostly from the Middle East.

India was the fourth-largest consumer of oil and petroleum products after the United States, China, and Japan in 2013, and it was also the fourth-largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum products. The gap between India’s oil demand and supply is widening, as demand reached nearly 3.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2013 compared to less than 1 million bbl/d of total liquids production. EIA projects India’s demand will more than double to 8.2 million bbl/d by 2040, while domestic production will remain relatively flat, hovering around 1 million bbl/d. The high degree of dependence on imported crude oil has led Indian energy companies to diversify their supply sources. To this end, Indian national oil companies (NOCs) have purchased equity stakes in overseas oil and gas fields in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caspian Sea region to acquire reserves and production capability. However, the majority of imports continue to come from the Middle East, where Indian companies have little direct access to investment.

Sector organization

India’s upstream petroleum liquids industry is still mainly owned by state-owned firms, although the sector is open for competition and attracts some level of private and foreign investment. The government regulates the fuel price for petroleum products, although the mounting costs of fuel subsidies in recent years have encouraged the government to lift retail price caps on some oil products.

Almost two decades after nationalizing the country’s hydrocarbon resources in the 1970s, the Indian government embarked on the New Economic Policy in 1991 that pushed for open market competition across a variety of energy sectors. The government introduced the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) in 1999 that allowed investors to bid on development blocks with up to 100% foreign control. Currently, the government is preparing to issue the 10th round of bidding for the NELP after more than two years of awarding contracts for the 9th round of the NELP. The 9th round resulted in 13 contracts signed (1 for each block awarded) out of 34 blocks that were offered.

International investment is still relatively low, and most analysts agree that the NELP has had only limited success in reducing India’s oil dependence. India is offering 46 exploration blocks under the new NELP round, including 17 onshore, 15 shallow-water, and 14 deepwater blocks. The round was scheduled to officially open in February 2014, although the government is in the process of determining the structure of petroleum contracts between the government and companies. The current system includes a production-sharing mechanism allowing producers to recover exploration costs during production before sharing profits with the government.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MOPNG) regulates the entire value chain of the oil sector, including exploration and production (E&P), refining, supply, and marketing. The ministry releases five-year plans that serve as rough guidelines to the energy sector. Under the MOPNG, the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons regulates the upstream side of the oil sector, as well as coalbed methane (CBM) projects. Another sub-ministry, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB), acts as a downstream regulator, including petroleum product sales and distribution.

Until 2002, the government set the price of petroleum products through the Administered Pricing Mechanism (APM), which followed the principle of allowing a predetermined return (rather than market-based prices) on investments in the oil sector. After 2002, only certain products (namely kerosene and liquefied petroleum gases, or LPG, often used for cooking or home heating) remained regulated, while oil companies could set their own prices for other fuels. However, many oil marketing companies still set retail prices at below-market levels so they could claim under-recoveries (the difference between a global market price and the local price) from the Ministry of Finance for certain products at favorable rates. The government began domestic fuel price reform and officially deregulated gasoline prices in June 2010 (to take effect in 2012). High international oil prices in recent years and growing demand for oil products have increased the country’s fiscal deficit as a result of its mounting fuel subsidy bill. In January 2013, India began a phased deregulation of retail diesel prices each month to reduce some of the country’s subsidies.

Competition in the oil sector is now relatively open, particularly when it comes to the upstream market. On one hand, two state-owned companies, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India Limited (OIL), control the majority of production and refining activity in India. ONGC is India’s largest oil producer, accounting for about 69% of the domestic production in 2012 according to the company’s annual report. On the other hand, the government has slowly reduced its share of ownership in ONGC in an effort to raise revenue, and several private companies have emerged as important players in the past decade. Cairn India, a subsidiary of British company Cairn Energy, controls more than 20% of India’s crude oil production through its operation of major stakes in the Rajasthan and Gujarat regions and the Krishna-Godavari basin. Private companies like Reliance Industries (RIL) and Essar Oil have become major refiners. Other international oil companies have few stakes in the Indian oil market.

Exploration and production

India held nearly 5.7 billion barrels of proved oil reserves at the beginning of 2014, mostly in the western part of the country. Domestic production has not kept pace with demand in recent years, leading to exploration of deepwater and marginal fields and investment in improving recovery rates of existing fields. In addition, Indian national oil companies are purchasing more upstream stakes in overseas oil fields to increase supply security from imported crude oil.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), India held nearly 5.7 billion barrels of proved oil reserves at the beginning of 2014. About 44% of reserves are onshore resources, while 56% are offshore. Most reserves are found in the western part of India, particularly the Western offshore area near Gujarat and Rajasthan. The Assam-Arakan basin in the northeastern part of the country is also an important oil-producing region and contains more than 23% of the country’s reserves and 12% of the production.

Historically, ONGC dominated the upstream oil sector and relied on production from Mumbai High basin and its associated fields in the western offshore area. India’s total petroleum and other liquids production increase has been very gradual during the past two decades, growing at less than 2% total and peaking at 996,000 bbl/d in 2011. Production has declined slightly to 982,000 bbl/d in 2013. The Mumbai High, Gujarat, and Assam-Arakan basins contain mature fields experiencing production declines, although several redevelopment projects, enhanced oil recovery efforts, and marginal field development projects in these basins are underway to lift production by 2030.

Indian and foreign companies are investing in more frontier developments and marginal fields to help offset production declines from mature basins. In recent years, major discoveries in the Barmer basin in Rajasthan and the offshore Krishna-Godavari basin by smaller companies such as Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation and Andhra Pradesh Gas Infrastructure Corporation hold some potential to diversify the country’s production.

India’s relatively small land-based resource endowment means companies require more upstream technical expertise to tap into offshore reserves, especially in technically challenging deepwater reserves. Foreign companies historically took the lead in exploring new offshore opportunities. For example, Cairn India brought online the largest field, Mangala, of the RJ-ON-90/1 block in Barmer basin in 2009, with a production capacity of 130,000 bbl/d. The Rajasthan fields, including Mangala, produced 179,000 bbl/d in 2013, according to FACTS Global Energy (FGE), and Cairn India reports production from the fields could peak at 300,000 bbl/d. Despite Cairn’s successful drilling in Rajasthan, foreign investment in India has waned in recent years, both because of increased competition from domestic Indian companies and India’s complex exploration and production laws.

The government has encouraged companies to acquire overseas upstream assets as a way to shield the domestic energy sector from global price volatility. Indian companies hold large stakes in Sudan’s GNOP block, Russia’s Sakhalin-1 project, and Venezuela’s San Cristobal and Carabobo blocks. Amerada Hess Corporation sold key oil fields in Azerbaijan to ONGC in 2012. Also, ONGC, OIL, and RIL have taken stakes in gas plays in Mozambique, shale gas assets in the United States and Canada, and oil and gas assets in Myanmar, and the companies are actively pursuing other overseas upstream deals. In 2011, several government agencies agreed to establish a sovereign wealth fund that could also aid in financing overseas energy acquisitions.

Downstream and refining

India’s government promotes the country’s refining sector, and India became a net exporter of petroleum products in 2001. India has several world-class refineries, and the private sector has significant investments in the country’s refining industry.

India’s government started encouraging energy companies to invest in refineries at the end of the 1990s, and the investment helped the country become a net exporter of petroleum products in 2001. In particular, the government eliminated customs duties on crude imports, lowering the cost of fuel supply for refiners. These reforms made domestic production of petroleum products more economic for Indian companies. In its 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012), India’s government set the goal of making India a global exporting hub of refined products.

However, India still imports kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) products for domestic use, and some export-oriented refineries began reorienting production for domestic use in 2009 to help ease shortages of motor gasoline, gasoil, kerosene, and LPG. These products make up 73% of India’s petroleum product consumption, according to FGE. In particular, many rural areas of India use LPG and kerosene along with traditional biomass as cooking fuels (see Biomass and Waste below). The government is encouraging a shift from kerosene used in cooking fuel in rural areas to LPG, a cleaner and less-expensive fuel. Liquid fuels have competed with natural gas in the past few years as the power and fertilizer industries are using natural gas as a substitute for some naphtha and fuel oil supply. Diesel remains the most-consumed oil product, accounting for 42% of petroleum product consumption in 2013.

The refining industry is an important part of India’s economy, and the private sector owns about 38% of total capacity. At the end of 2013, India had 4.35 million bbl/d of refining capacity, making it the second-largest refiner in Asia after China, according to FGE. The two largest refineries by crude capacity, located in the Jamnagar complex in Gujarat, are world-class export facilities and are owned by Reliance Industries. The Jamnagar refineries account for 29% of India’s current capacity. These refineries are close to crude oil-producing regions in the Middle East, which allows them to take advantage of lower transportation costs.

India projects an increase of the country’s refining capacity to 6.3 million bbl/d by 2017 based on its current five-year plan to meet rising domestic demand and export markets, although this projection hinges on all proposed projects becoming operational. Some refinery projects have faced delays in the past few years, and there is now greater competition within Asia from countries such as China that has built large refineries able to process more complex crude oil types. Two refineries, Paradip in Odisha and Cuddalore in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, are scheduled to be operational by 2015, adding 420,000 bbl/d of capacity. Also, refiners have plans to upgrade several existing refineries to produce higher-quality auto fuels to comply with more stringent specifications for vehicle fuel standards. India plans to adopt the equivalent of Euro IV fuel efficiency standards on a nationwide basis by 2015 and Euro V standards on passenger cars by 2016. Refineries have proposed several expansions to existing facilities and a few new refineries by 2020, although the timeline of these projects depends on economic recovery and fuel sales in both domestic and export markets.

Trade

India is a significant importer of crude oil, as the country’s demand growth continues to outstrip domestic supply growth. The Middle East was the major source of crude oil imports to India in 2013, although the Western Hemisphere’s share has risen in recent years.

India has increased its total net oil imports from 42% of demand in 1990 to an estimated 71% of demand in 2012. India’s demand for crude oil and petroleum products is projected to continue rising, barring a serious global economic recession. Oil import dependence will continue to climb if India fails to achieve production growth equal to demand growth.

The Indian Ocean historically has been a major transit route, bringing crude oil from suppliers in the Persian Gulf and Africa to markets in Asia. Tanker sea lanes pass near Indian waters between major chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz (see the World Oil Transit Chokepoints report). The majority of Indian oil ports are located on the country’s western side to receive shipments of crude oil that passes through these routes.

India’s crude oil imports reached nearly 3.9 million bbl/d in 2013, according to Global Trade Atlas. Saudi Arabia is India’s largest oil supplier, with a 20% share of crude oil imports. In total, approximately 62% of India’s imported crude oil came from Middle East countries. The second-biggest source of imports is the Western Hemisphere (19%), with the majority of that crude oil coming from Venezuela. Africa contributed 16% of India’s crude oil imports. Supply disruptions in several countries, including Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Nigeria, in tandem with India’s growing dependence on imported crude oil, have compelled India to diversify its crude oil import slate. Iran accounted for 5.5% of India’s crude imports in 2013, down from 8.3% in 2011-12 as a result of the U.S. and European sanctions imposed on Iranian oil exports. Also, Indian refiners are trying to reduce crude oil import costs by purchasing less expensive crude oil. Prices of Middle Eastern crude oil grades in the past year have been high relative to prices of oil from the Western Hemisphere, prompting Indian companies to import more crude oil from Latin America, primarily from Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico.

Despite being a net importer of crude oil, India has become a net exporter of petroleum products by investing in refineries designed for export, particularly in Gujarat. Essar Oil and RIL export naphtha, motor gasoline, and gasoil to the international market, particularly to Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Netherlands. Reliance Industries has also targeted U.S. markets and leased storage space in New York harbor in 2008. However, the government encourages the companies to focus on supplying domestic markets before selling abroad.

Pipelines and infrastructure

According to the Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas, India’s crude oil pipeline network spans just under 5,900 miles and has a total capacity of 2.8 million bbl/d. Approximately 30 terminals, mostly on the northwest coast, take in crude oil imports. Pipelines run from these ports and producing areas (particularly from Gujarat) to major oil refineries in Gujarat, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana. On the eastern part of the country, pipelines run from West Bengal to the Paradip oil refinery. Refineries are generally located in coastal areas, because the majority of crude oil comes from tanker imports and offshore fields. Central and southern areas have few major pipelines, because the bulk of refining capacity is in the northwest and northeast.

The Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) controls and operates the oil product pipelines and supplies most of the oil products going to the domestic market. Oil product pipelines cluster in the north and northeast parts of India, while central and southern areas must rely on oil distributed through other means, such as cargo trucks. IOC plans to build additional crude oil and product lines including one to move supplies from its Paradip refinery in the eastern Odisha state to growing demand centers in Odisha and adjacent states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

Strategic petroleum reserve

In 2005, the Indian Government decided to set up strategic storage of 37 million barrels of crude oil at three locations (Visakhapatnam, Mangalore, and Padur). The Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL), a special purpose legal entity owned by the Oil Industry Development Board, would manage the proposed facilities, which are expected to be completed by 2015. The government unveiled plans to add another 91 million barrels to the state’s crude oil capacity to protect India from supply disruptions by 2017. The country anticipates having crude oil stocks to cover 90 days of the country’s oil demand by 2020.

Natural gas

Natural gas serves as a substitute for coal in electricity generation and fertilizer production in India. The country began importing liquefied natural gas from Qatar in 2004 and increasingly relies on imports to meet domestic natural gas needs.

Natural gas mainly serves as a substitute for coal for electricity generation and as an alternative for LPG and other petroleum products in the fertilizer and other sectors. The country was self-sufficient in natural gas until 2004, when it began to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar. Because it has not been able to create sufficient natural gas infrastructure on a national level or produce adequate domestic natural gas to meet domestic demand, India increasingly relies on imported LNG. India was the world’s fourth-largest LNG importer in 2013, following Japan, South Korea, and China, and consumed almost 6% of the global market, according to data from IHS Energy. Indian companies hold both long-term supply contracts and more expensive spot LNG contracts.

Natural gas consumption has grown at an annual rate of 8% from 2000 and 2012, although supply disruptions starting in 2011 resulted in declining consumption. Natural gas consumption in India was tied closely to domestic production until imports became available in 2004. In 2012, India consumed 2.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. LNG imports accounted for about 29% of 2012 demand, and LNG is expected to account for an increasing portion of demand at least in the next several years as Indian energy firms attempt to reverse the country’s recent domestic production declines. Increasing LNG imports will depend on the pace of expansion in regasification terminal capacity and pipeline infrastructure connecting gas to markets that currently lack access. The country’s pricing system is undergoing revision to unlock regulated prices that are well below the import price levels. Raising gas prices would provide oil and gas firms with economic incentives for upstream development, especially in deepwater plays and technically challenging fields, and would allow LNG importers to compete more effectively for gas consumers in a higher-priced environment.

The majority of natural gas demand in 2012 came from the power sector (33%), the fertilizer industry (28%), and the replacement of LPG for cooking oil and other uses in the residential sector (15%), according to India’s MOPNG. The government has labeled these as priority sectors for domestic programs, which ensures that they receive larger shares of any new gas supply before other consumers. The fertilizer sector, which is highly price-sensitive, has been able to maintain low fuel costs by using natural gas. The recent unexpected natural gas production declines since 2011 have forced electric generators to seek fuel alternatives, primarily coal. The government is promoting the use of natural gas in the residential sector as an alternative to LPG as a cooking fuel.

Sector organization

In 2013, India began natural gas pricing reforms, and the government approved a new pricing scheme to further align domestic prices with international market prices and to raise investment for the sector.

As with the oil sector, India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MOPNG) oversees natural gas exploration and production activities. MOPNG’s Directorate of Hydrocarbons functions as an upstream regulator and monitors coalbed methane projects. Until 2006, the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) functioned as a near-monopoly operating India’s natural gas pipelines.

However, the government began to reform gas pricing and created the Petroleum Natural Gas Regulatory Board to regulate downstream activities such as distribution and marketing.

Different producers of natural gas have different pricing schemes in India. The government directly sets prices for public sector companies through the Administered Price Mechanism (APM), while joint-venture producers generally index their prices to international rates. LNG prices are completely market-driven and are about triple the price of the APM benchmark on average. The Indian government approved a new natural gas pricing regime in June 2013 in an effort to attract investment critical to increase domestic gas production and mitigate upstream project delays. Most of India’s gas consumers pay rates that are much lower than the prices of imported gas. The proposed pricing scheme would more closely align India’s gas prices to international market rates and attempt to create a more uniform pricing structure. The current APM benchmark rate of $4.20 per million Btu would double under the new formula, according to industry sources. Although the pricing scheme was slated to take effect on April 1, 2014, India’s oil ministry delayed the price increase until after the country’s general elections when the new government is expected to review the new pricing system and determine its course of action.

New private companies such as Petronet LNG Limited have formed in recent years aiming to benefit from growing LNG imports in India by building regasification plants. Privately-owned RIL emerged as an important upstream player in the natural gas market after discovering significant reserves in the Krishna-Godavari basin in 2002. RIL also operates the important East-West gas pipeline from Andhra Pradesh to Gujarat.

International firms have some stake in the natural gas sector. BP owns part of the KG-D6 field in the Krishna-Godavari basin, and Royal Dutch Shell has invested in potential future LNG facilities.

Exploration and production

India had 47 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves at the beginning of 2014, mostly located offshore. The two largest state-owned oil companies, ONGC and Oil India, dominate the country’s upstream gas sector.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal, India had 47 Tcf of proved natural gas reserves at the beginning of 2014. About 34% of total reserves are located onshore, while 66% are offshore, according to India’s Ministry of Oil and Gas. In 2002, energy companies made a number of large gas discoveries in the Krishna-Godavari (KG) basin off of India’s eastern coast, pushing up both the reserve base and production. However, production from some of the more mature fields have declined in recent years, and RIL cut the recoverable reserves of its two major gas fields in the major D6 block (D1 and D3) in the KG basin from 10.3 Tcf estimated in December 2006 to 3.1 Tcf in 2012 because of unexpected declines and reservoir performance problems.

Total gas production in India amounted to around 1.5 Tcf in 2012. The two biggest state-owned companies, ONGC and Oil India Ltd. (OIL), dominate India’s upstream gas sector. ONGC operates the Mumbai High Field, which provides a large amount of India’s natural gas supply. ONGC remains India’s largest natural gas producer, accounting for 62% of the domestic production in 2012 as reported in the company’s annual report. However, the government has encouraged private and foreign companies to enter the upstream sector in recent years. RIL is becoming a major upstream force because of natural gas discoveries in the Krishna-Godavari basin. RIL has a strategic partnership with BP, which has a 30% stake in 21 of RIL’s production-sharing contracts. Other major international oil companies do not have significant investments in India’s natural gas upstream sector. India’s MOPNG estimates that gas production continued to decline during 2013.

The KG-D6 field came online in early 2009, ramping up production to hit a peak of more than 2.4 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) or 876 Bcf per year (Bcf/y), in 2010. However, the field has experienced production shortfalls in recent years, and output dropped to 0.4 Bcf/d (146 Bcf/y) at the end of 2013. RIL and BP plan to tie in production from satellite fields and invest $5-10 billion to restore the production of the D6 block to more than 2.1 Bcf/d (767 Bcf/y) by 2020.

ONGC and Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Limited (GSPCL) are also developing several offshore areas in Krishna-Godavari basin. Another promising producing area is the Cambay basin in western India, where independent company Oilex has done some preliminary work assessing the potential for tight natural gas.

Coalbed Methane and Shale Gas

India began awarding coalbed methane (CBM) blocks for exploration in 2001, although it has taken more than a decade to begin producing at these fields. The Indian Ministry of Oil partnered with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and ONGC to conduct a resource assessment and estimates anywhere between 9 and 92 Tcf of CBM resources both onshore and offshore India. Foreign companies have largely been absent from CBM production, leaving domestic Indian companies struggling to attract enough expertise and technology to develop these resources. Great Eastern Energy Corporation (GEEC) has developed the Raniganj block in West Bengal, with an estimated 1 Tcf of gas potential. Essar Oil and RIL have also been developing blocks in Bengal, although there has not been any significant commercial production. Total CBM production in 2013 amounted to about 5.8 Bcf.

Companies are interested in exploring the Cambay basin in Gujarat, the Assam-Arakan basin in northeast India, and the Gondwana basin in Central India for shale gas resources, although there has been no commercial production or publicly released reserve figures. In its 2013 assessment of global shale gas reserves, EIA estimates India has 96 Tcf of technically recoverable shale gas reserves. Joshi Technologies made the first shale oil discovery in Cambay Basin in mid-2010. India’s oil ministry announced that the government will unveil a shale gas and oil policy in the near future and will begin to sell shale gas development blocks, although it has not made any awards to date.

Pipelines and infrastructure

The two most important companies operating India’s large gas pipeline system are GAIL and Reliance Gas Transportation Infrastructure Limited (RGTIL). GAIL, the state-owned gas transmission and marketing company, operates two major gas pipelines in northwestern India with a combined length of 3,328 miles: the Hazira-Vijaipur-Jagadishpur (HVJ) line running from Gujarat to Delhi, and the Dahej-Vijaipur (DVPL) line. The company services primarily the northwestern region of India and makes up over 70% of the country’s pipeline network. Reliance Gas Transportation Infrastructure (RGTIL, owned by RIL) is the biggest private investor in the gas transmission structure and brought the 881-mile East-West pipeline online in 2009 to link the promising KG-D6 gas field to GAIL’s pipeline network and demand centers in the northern and western regions. However, RIL’s East-West pipeline remains relatively underutilized as a result of lower-than-expected production from the KG-D6 field. Other players like Assam Gas Company and Gujarat State Petronet Limited (GSPL) have significant pipeline assets that service regional demand centers in northeastern India and Gujarat, respectively.

Insufficient pipeline infrastructure and lack of a nationally integrated system are key factors that constrain natural gas demand in India, although GAIL and other companies are investing in several pipeline projects. The country’s natural gas pipeline network totaled over 9,200 miles in 2013, and the current Five Year Plan proposes expanding the gas network to 18,000 miles by 2017. GAIL plans to expand its network and further integrate southern India with the pipeline system in the northwest of the country. In early 2013, GAIL commissioned the 600-mile Dabhol to Bengaluru (Bangalore) pipeline, the first line to connect the southern part of the country to the national grid. GAIL also plans to build a pipeline from its newly commissioned LNG regasification terminal at Kochi in southwestern India to Mangalore and other parts of southern India, although regulatory and land rights issues have delayed the project.

The Indian government has considered importing natural gas via pipeline through several international projects, although many of these have proved unfeasible. In 2005, negotiations over a transnational pipeline between the Indian and Bangladesh governments fell through. In 2006, India withdrew from the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project. However, the government still participates in a pipeline project to import natural gas from Turkmenistan to India. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project, also known as the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, has seen a decade of discussion, although major geopolitical risks and technical challenges have prevented the project from actually starting. However, the countries have made some progress in moving TAPI forward. The partners signed a framework agreement in 2010 and agreed on unified transit tariffs for the route in early 2012. In May 2012, India signed gas supply and purchase agreements with Turkmenistan. In early February 2013, India’s government approved a special-purpose legal entity to which participating members of the pipeline would contribute investment funds. In November 2013, the four participants appointed the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the project’s technical and financial advisor. The ADB estimated the pipeline’s cost at about $10-12 billion.

Liquefied natural gas

Indian companies are investing in new regasification facilities to meet the country’s rising natural gas demand. India was the world’s fourth-largest liquefied natural gas importer in 2013.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become an important part of India’s energy portfolio since the country began importing it from Qatar in 2004. In 2013, India was the world’s fourth-largest LNG importer, importing 638 Bcf, or 6%, of global trade, according to data from IHS Energy. Petronet, a joint venture between GAIL, ONGC, IOC, and several foreign firms, is the major importer of LNG supplies to India. Petronet owns two existing LNG terminals, Dahej (480 Bcf/y) and Kochi (120 Bcf/y). Shell (74% share) and Total (26% share) jointly own the Hazira terminal (240 Bcf/y), which operates as a merchant facility, importing only short-term and spot cargoes at present. India’s total regasification capacity now stands at 936 Bcf, and terminal owners have proposed capacity expansions at all existing terminals. Expansion under construction at Dahej will increase the terminal’s capacity to 720 Bcf by 2016.

Unexpected production declines in India’s KG-D6 gas field mean the country must rely on higher LNG imports. Average imported LNG prices have increased to three times the price of domestically produced natural gas because they are not subject to the government setting prices through the Administered Price Mechanism (see Sector Organization). Indian producers such as RIL have asked the government to raise the wellhead price for gas (the wholesale price at the point of production) as a way of justifying investment into deepwater projects. If the proposed gas pricing reform is implemented, there will be greater investment incentives for domestic gas development that could increase competition for LNG imports.

Indian companies have invested in increasing the country’s LNG regasification capacity in recent years to meet rising demand. In early 2013, GAIL, NTPC, and several other smaller players restarted the Dabhol project, originally proposed by now-defunct Enron, which includes a regasification terminal to fuel three gas-fired power stations. Dabhol LNG also ships natural gas to southern India through the new pipeline to Bengaluru. GAIL is installing a breakwater facility to double Dabhol’s capacity by 2017. Petronet’s LNG terminal at Kochi was commissioned in late 2013. However, the terminal is experiencing low utilization because of delays in the approval and construction of a proposed pipeline to Mangalore and other parts of southern India, according to PFC Energy. The eastern side of India lacks pipeline infrastructure and gas supply following declines in the KG basin; thus companies are quickly planning terminals to come online in the next few years. IOC proposed the Ennore project in Tamil Nadu in southeastern India. Other proposed projects are located along India’s eastern coast include three floating terminal projects at Kakinada and one at Gangavaram. Several proposed regasification projects along the western coast include GSPC’s Mundra terminal in Gujarat, expected to be built by 2016.

Qatar’s RasGas is India’s sole long-term supplier of natural gas, with two contracts for a total of 360 Bcf. In 2013, Qatar was the source of 84% of India’s total LNG imports, according to IHS Energy. India has been an active importer of spot cargoes following interruptions in the KG-D6 field production after 2010 and began receiving LNG cargoes from a variety of exporting countries. Nigeria, Egypt, and Yemen have become India’s largest short-term LNG suppliers.

Indian LNG importers actively sought supply from various new LNG sources and signed several short- and long-term purchase agreements in the past few years. India signed agreements to receive supply from Australia’s Gorgon LNG terminal and several U.S. terminals (Sabine Pass, Cove Point, and Main Pass) and from the portfolio of various global LNG suppliers such as BG, GDF Suez, Gas Natural Fenosa, and Gazprom. As Indian companies become more active in pursuing overseas upstream oil and gas plays, OIL has invested in gas projects in Canada (Pacific Northwest LNG) and an offshore gas project in Mozambique (jointly with ONGC) to secure LNG imports for India.

Coal

Coal is India’s primary source of energy. The country has the world’s fifth-largest coal reserves, and ranked third largest in terms of both production and consumption in 2012. The state retains a near-monopoly on the coal sector. The power sector makes up the majority of coal consumption.

Coal is India’s primary source of energy, and the country was the third-largest global consumer in 2012. The country has the fifth-largest coal reserves in the world. At the same time, the coal sector is one of the most centralized and inefficient sectors in India. Two state-owned companies have a near-monopoly on production and distribution. The country also faces a widening gap between demand and supply. Although production has moderately increased by about 4% per year since 2007, producers have failed to reach the government’s production targets. Meanwhile, demand grew more than 7% annually between 2007 and 2012, and reached 826 million short tons in 2012. Because coal production cannot keep pace with demand, particularly from the power sector, India has met more of its coal needs with imports.

The power sector is the largest consumer of coal, accounting for 69% of coal consumption in 2011, according to the IEA. Because power plants rely so heavily on coal, coal shortages are a major contributor to shortfalls in electricity generation and consequent blackouts throughout the country. Also, coal demand has escalated in the past few years from the power sector, which encountered problems accessing natural gas supply and lower hydroelectricity-sourced generation during the weak monsoon season in 2012.

Steel and cement industries are also significant coal consumers. India has limited reserves of coking coal, which is an important raw material for steel production. The state of Jharkhand holds most of India’s coking coal reserves, but it does not supply enough to meet the industry’s needs. Because of this shortage, India imports large quantities of coking coal from abroad.

Sector organization

India’s government took control of the country’s coal reserves with the 1973 Coal Mines Nationalization Act, establishing Coal India Limited (CIL) in 1975 as the state-owned sole producer and aggregating coal production and investment. After 1993 it tried to encourage foreign and private investment into the coal sector through the National Mineral Policy. By 2000, the government deregulated coal prices, allowing CIL and other companies to increase prices when there is a rise in the cost of production. However, the Ministry of Coal and Mines continues to control the distribution of coal resources and subsidies to various companies. In 2007, the government passed the New Coal Distribution Policy that attempted to allocate limited coal supplies to priority sectors, particularly the power and fertilizer industries, and India’s 12th Five Year Plan calls for CIL to link indigenous coal production with part of the fuel requirements of power plant projects coming online by 2017.

CIL remains the country’s largest coal producer; and they produced about 81% of the country’s coal in 2012, according to the IEA. CIL underwent an initial public offering (IPO) in 2010 and divested 10% of its government share, India’s largest IPO to date. Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL), another public-owned company, was responsible for nearly 10% of the country’s coal production in 2012, mainly to the southern region of the country, according to India’s Ministry of Coal. Other smaller companies operate throughout the country.

Exploration and production

India ranks as the third-largest coal producer in the world. However, the country continues to experience regulatory, land acquisition, technical, and distribution challenges that limit production growth and create bottlenecks hindering efficient transportation of coal to key demand centers.

India had 66.8 billion short tons of proven coal reserves in 2011, the fifth-largest in the world (third-largest reserves in anthracite and bituminous after the United States and China), according to the World Energy Council. The Indian Ministry of Coal estimated proven reserves to be 137 billion short tons in 2012. Indian coal typically has high ash, low sulfur content, and a low-to-medium calorific value.

Most coal reserves are located in the eastern parts of the country. Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha account for approximately 64% of the country’s coal reserves, according to the IEA. Other significant coal-producing states include West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra.

India is the third-largest global coal producer, with coal output nearly doubling between 2000 and 2012 to 650 million short tons. Despite its sizeable reserves and rising production, India has increasing supply shortages and systemic problems with its mining industry. According to an IEA report, about 90% of the country’s coal mines are opencast, or surface, mines (less than 1,000 feet deep), which is more cost-effective and less dangerous for workers but causes more environmental impact. India lacks more advanced technology to engage in large-scale underground mining operations, which keeps productivity levels low. A lack of competition within the coal sector inhibits private and foreign investment that could be used to improve underground mining techniques. Also, many coal deposits are located in areas that pose environmental issues or potential dislocation of people. Regulatory hurdles continue to pose delays in obtaining environmental and land acquisition approvals for mining companies.

India’s coal mines are also located far from the highest-demand markets in southern and western India, posing a significant logistical challenge to coal producers and distributors. Railcars transport the majority of Indian coal, according to CIL. Limited railway capacity, delays to railroad projects, and high transport costs to demand centers are other factors negatively affecting India’s coal output and deliveries to users.

Trade

Although traditionally not a major importer of coal, India has imported small volumes of coking coal for over two decades to meet high demand in the steel and iron industry. The country’s recent supply shortages spurred India’s significant increase of coal imports over the past few years from several key exporting countries. India purchased 179 million short tons from overseas and was the third-largest coal importer behind China and Japan in 2012. India imports thermal (steam) coal used in power plants mainly from Indonesia and South Africa and coking coal for steel production from Australia. Indonesia is the largest source of coal imports to India, accounting for 55% of total coal imports in 2012.

Electricity

India had 249 gigawatts of installed electricity generation capacity connected to the national network in early 2014, mostly coal-powered plants. Because of insufficient fuel supply and power generation and transmission capacity, the country suffers from a severe electricity shortage, leading to rolling blackouts.

As of May 2014, India had 249 gigawatts (GW) of utility-based installed electricity generating capacity, mostly from coal-fired power plants, according to India’s Central Electricity Authority (CEA). Generation capacity from smaller captive power plants, or those that serve specific industries for in-house consumption and may not be connected to the grid, registered about 39 GW in 2014. According to the IEA, installed capacity from coal and natural gas power plants is heavily clustered in the more populated western region of the country, particularly in Maharashtra and Gujarat. For example, Maharashtra, the largest Indian state by GDP (its capital is Mumbai, the country’s largest city), contains 14% of the nation’s generating capacity. Hydropower is the second largest source of electricity, accounting for 16% of India’s utility-based installed capacity in early 2014 and supplying about 13% of the country’s electricity in 2011. The industrial sector has been a key driver of electricity consumption in the past decade, as a result of India’s rapidly expanding economy.

India suffers from severe shortages of electricity, particularly during peak hours of demand, and often experiences shut-downs lasting from several hours to days in certain areas. India suffered an unprecedented electricity blackout for two days in July 2012 that affected an estimated 680 million people across the country’s northern states. This outage highlights the increasing pressure on India’s power system to secure more fuel supplies and infrastructure investment in each stage of power transmission. Utilization rates in Indian power plants using fossil fuels have fallen steadily since 2007 (from a peak of nearly 79%) to about 70% in 2013 because of disruptions in steady domestic fuel supplies and transmission and distribution constraints, according to the IEA and India’s CEA. Deficiencies in coal and natural gas supply to power plants have caused some plant owners to curtail operations and even mothball some plants. Transmission and distribution losses and technical problems in moving electricity between various states also impair system reliability.

Other factors contributing to power shortages are the lag of power capacity expansions and the need to replace older, less efficient units. India has historically fallen short of its capacity addition targets for electricity, although the country has successfully attracted private investment for power plant construction in the past decade. In its 12th Five Year Plan (2012-17), India plans to add 120 GW of power capacity to the grid, with more than half of it composed of coal-fired generation capacity. By early 2014, more than a third of this capacity had been brought online.

In efforts to diversify the generation portfolio and offset some carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel sources, the government is promoting renewable energy use, with a 32-GW planned capacity expansion from sources such as wind, solar, biomass, and waste during the current Five Year Plan. For instance, India launched a national solar mission with a goal of adding 22 GW of solar capacity by 2022.

In addition, significant parts of the country, particularly in rural areas, do not have access to electricity. The Indian government reported overall household electrification in India was 75%, representing more than 300 million people without electricity, in 2011. While 94% of urban households had electricity, only 67% of rural households had access, and often the rural consumers experienced much more frequently interrupted electricity supply. The government began a program in 2005 called Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana to provide all villages electricity within five years through significant investments in rural electrification. While the program has succeeded in electrifying many rural areas, power supply is unreliable and frequent blackouts persist.

Sector organization

The Ministry of Power is responsible for planning and implementing India’s power sector policy, with various subunits handling different parts of the sector, including thermal, hydropower, and distribution. The CEA advises the central government on long- and short-term policy planning. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions set generation and transmission policies.

The source of India’s current electricity regulatory framework is the 2003 Electricity Act, which attempted to reform the state electricity boards, open access to transmission and distribution networks, and create state electricity regulatory commissions (SERCs) to manage electricity on a regional basis. Several key private investors, namely Reliance Power, Tata Power, and Essar Power, have entered India’s power generation sector, and the share of private sector to state-run generation capacity is on the rise. The government has not fully implemented many parts of the Act, and India’s electricity sector continues to face serious challenges in procurement and distribution of sufficient fuel for generation.

Power tariffs for end-users are highly regulated and kept low for the residential and agricultural sectors. Low retail prices often do not match higher generation costs, triggering financial losses for transmission and distribution companies and lower investment in electricity distribution. Higher costs from imported fuels and price swings in international fuel markets create financial constraints for power producers who cannot pass full costs to some of their customers. In order to mitigate supply risk from fuel sources with high price volatility and reduce carbon dioxide emissions growth, India’s government is encouraging more generation from renewable energy sources.

The government established the Power Grid Corporation of India (POWERGRID) to operate five regional electricity grids, while state transmission utilities (with some private sector participation) run most transmission and distribution segments. Although the central government finances electricity development projects, delivering electricity to customers is the responsibility of state governments. Therefore, more-efficient states such as Maharashtra tend to have better electricity availability. The southern grid was integrated with the other four grids at the end of 2013, creating a more unified national grid. However, the transmission sector still requires substantial investment for capacity expansion as well as improved grid management to ensure power supply reliability across states and to reduce technical losses in transmission and distribution.

Different states also have varying energy mixes based on their natural resource endowment. For example, Gujarat is close to major gas fields and LNG terminals, allowing regional power plants to use a larger share of natural gas. Renewable power generation is concentrated in a few states so far. Wind power generation, which makes up the bulk of non hydroelectric renewable capacity, is found in southern states such as Tamil Nadu, and solar power generation is located in Gujarat and Rajasthan. Hydroelectricity is located mostly in the northeastern states.

Fossil fuels

Fossil fuel generation, mostly from coal, accounted for about 81% of total electricity generation in the country in 2011. Coal-fired power plants dominate India’s electricity generation sector and accounted for nearly 148 GW (or 59%) of the utility-based installed capacity in early 2014. India plans to add more than 72 GW in fossil fuel-fired power capacity to the grid, with almost 70 GW from coal-fired stations, between 2012 and 2017. The government is attracting private investment for its Ultra-Mega Power Plants Program, which involves installing large-scale, coal-fired supercritical plants that are more energy-efficient for plant operations. Many of these plants are under construction, and about half of the proposed coal-fired capacity slated to come online during the 12th Five Year Plan (through 2017) are designed with more advanced technology. To alleviate fuel transportation constraints, these plants will be located near domestic coal supplies and the coasts to accommodate imports.

Natural gas fuels most of the remaining share of fossil fuel-fired electricity generation. After the newly developed Krishna Godavari basin (including the KG-D6 field) began producing significant amounts of natural gas and India began importing LNG during the past decade, natural gas use in power began to rise. Since 2011, natural gas-fired generation has waned, and some plants have ceased operation since the KG-D6 field production began to decline. Natural gas-fired generation capacity was nearly 23 GW in early 2014, or 9% of total generation capacity. The government’s expansion plans for gas-fired capacity through 2017 are much lower compared to other fuel sources. It plans to use natural gas-fired power as a supply source for peak requirements.

Hydroelectric

India was the world’s seventh-largest producer of hydroelectric power in 2012, with 115 billion kilowatthours generated. Total utility-based installed capacity of hydropower in early 2014 was nearly 41 GW, according to the CEA.

India benefits from a tropical climate, which gives the country increased hydropower potential, particularly during the summer months. In particular, states with significant river systems such as Himachal Pradesh, Jammu, Kashmir, and Uttarakhand benefit from energy surpluses as a result of abundant precipitation during the monsoon period. However, coal and natural gas generation is related inversely to hydropower capacity; when hydropower utilization falls, for example with a weak monsoon season, coal-fired power plants will generate more electricity to compensate for the shortfall. In 2012, India experienced a drought during the summer and saw a dip in hydroelectric generation which reversed in 2013 when the monsoon season was stronger than normal.

Nuclear

India has 20 operational nuclear reactors at six nuclear power plants with a generation capacity of 4.8 GW, representing about 2% of total utility-based generation capacity. The Kudankulam plant in the southern state of Tamil Nadu was connected to the electricity grid at the end of 2013 and is expected to become operational in mid-2014 according to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, adding another 1 GW to the country’s nuclear capacity. As of April 2014, six additional reactors with a combined 4.3 GW of capacity are under construction and expected to come online by 2017. As India seeks reliable electricity supply to accommodate its swiftly growing power demand, the government has indicated that it plans to increase the nuclear share of total generation from 3% in 2011 to 25% by 2050.

In September 2008, India became a party to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group agreement, which opened access to nuclear technology and expertise through several cooperative agreements. The government has signed several such agreements with countries including the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Canada. In addition, India gained access to reactor parts and uranium fuel from other countries as a result of these agreements.

Indians protested nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster in Japan, and the government responded by organizing safety audits for existing reactors. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) conducted stress tests of all nuclear power plants. The Indian government has a three-stage nuclear development plan to gradually shift from powering reactors with natural uranium to accumulating reserves of other fissile materials such as thorium. While the Indian nuclear sector historically has had limited access to uranium, it has abundant thorium reserves that can power more sophisticated reactors. India’s commitment to the thorium fuel cycle sets it apart from most nations with nuclear power programs.

Biomass and waste

The lack of electricity in some parts of India results in a substantial use of traditional biomass and waste products primarily for household uses in rural areas. A small portion of biomass and bagasse contributes to power plant feedstock.

Rural areas of India tend to rely on traditional biomass (including firewood, animal dung, and agricultural residue) for cooking, heating, and lighting because they lack access to other energy supplies. These sources can be burned directly to produce heat and electricity.

Large parts of India rely on biomass as the primary fuel for cooking. According to the 2011 India census, 62.5% of rural households use firewood as the primary fuel for cooking, 12.3% use crop residue as the primary cooking fuel, and 10.9% use dung. By contrast, more than 3% of urban households use crop residue and dung, and only 20% use firewood as the primary fuel source for cooking. These uses can cause health problems from exposure to waste products and pollution or environmental problems when forests or crops are harvested unsustainably. On the whole, about 66% of India’s total population used traditional biomass for cooking purposes in 2011, according to the IEA.

India also uses biomass in the power sector. According to the CEA, India had at least 3.4 GW of utility-based installed capacity in biomass power and bagasse-based cogeneration plants as of mid-2013. India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy reports the country has 18 GW of potential biomass electricity generation capacity and 5 GW of potential bagasse-based generation. A large amount of biomass used for electricity generation comes from bagasse (crushed sugarcane or sorghum stalks), which can be used in combustion-powered generators. Biodiesel and other liquid biofuels consumption in India is fairly low and mostly comes from several states that mandate 5% blending of ethanol in gasoline.

Notes

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of June 26, 2014.

• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

The post India Energy Profile: Economic Growth Fuels Increased Need For Energy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

I wrote the following article for the “Close Guantánamo” website, which I established in January 2012 with US attorney Tom Wilner. Please join us – just an email address is required to be counted amongst those opposed to the ongoing existence of Guantánamo, and to receive updates of our activities by email.

Last week, largely unnoticed in the mainstream media, a Periodic Review Board (PRB) took place — at a military location in Virginia — for Muhammad Murdi lssa al-Zahrani, one of the last Saudi nationals held in the prison, who joined the board — and was visible to the handful of media representatives in attendance — via video link from Guantánamo. 44 or 45 years old, he was seized in a house raid in Lahore, Pakistan, at the end of March 2002.

The PRBs — which involve representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security, as well as the office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — were established last year to review the cases of 71 prisoners designated for ongoing imprisonment without charge or trial — or for trials that were later dropped — in January 2010 by the high-level, inter-agency Guantánamo Review Task Force that President Obama appointed shortly after taking office in 2009.

Those prisoners who were designated for ongoing imprisonment without charge or trial had those designations made on the basis that they were “too dangerous to release,” even though insufficient evidence existed to put them on trial — highlighting, to acute observers, that there are fundamental problems with the so-called evidence.

Al-Zahrani’s was the ninth review to take place, and of the eight previous hearings (held between November 20 last year and June 12 this year), five decisions have been reached by the board. Three prisoners have been recommended for release (see here, here and here), while two others have had their ongoing imprisonment approved by the board members (see here and here).

These latter two decisions have not been reassuring for US justice, as the supposed evidence is, at best, thin — and I find it unconvincing that either man constitutes a threat to the US. In addition, although it is, in theory, reassuring that three insignificant prisoners have been recommended for release, in practice none of these men have been freed, because they are Yemenis, and the entire US establishment is unwilling to release Yemenis because of the perceived security problems in their home country. As a result, they join 55 other Yemenis who were cleared for release by the task force in January 2010, but are still held.

Three other decisions have not yet been made — for another Saudi, and for the last two Kuwaitis in the prison.

Last Thursday (June 19), as Reuters reported, Muhammad al-Zahrani, who allegedly fought in Afghanistan prior to his capture, where he lost a leg, “appeared at the hearing dressed in a white shirt with a long beard and glasses, which he took on and off throughout the proceedings open to public viewing.”

Two military representatives, appointed to represent al-Zahrani, spoke for him. As Reuters explained, they stated that he had “declined to be represented by a lawyer and until this week had refused to participate in the hearing process,” although they did point out — which Reuters omitted to mention — that he had been cooperative all along, meeting with them and providing them with information.

In detailed testimony that I’m posting below, the representatives made a case for why he should no longer be detained, stating that he did not meet the criteria to be regarded as a significant threat to the United States, and making a powerful topical reference to the recent prisoner exchange — of five Taliban leaders for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, the sole US prisoner of war in Afghanistan — which led to a sustained outburst of manufactured hysteria from Republicans and much of the mainstream media.

This failure to “meet the criteria to be regarded as a significant threat,” the representatives stated, “is especially true in light of mitigating factors put in places to enable the recent release of five Taliban detainees, who were all classified as higher threats than Mr al-Zahrani.” Reuters’ title for the article about the hearing spelled this out clearly. “Guantánamo inmate up for transfer lesser threat than swapped Taliban,” it read.

However, Reuters failed to include what the representatives went on to say, which was very important, as it ought to provide the Obama administration with clear and defensible reasons for releasing other prisoners. “These same mitigators provided sufficient assurance that those five detainees no longer pose a continuing significant threat to United States’ national security,” the representatives wrote, “which implies a lower level threat such as Mr. Al-Zahrani, if afforded similar mitigators like those available in Saudi Arabia, would no longer pose a continuing significant threat.”

In their presentation, the representatives also pointed out that al-Zahrani has indicated that “he has a home, a job to return to, back-pay for his time during detention, and associates within the Saudi Ministry of the Interior to help him as he starts his new life,” and that he wishes to be with his family, in particular to support his mother, as he feels acutely the loss of his father, who died three years ago. His file indicates that. from 1992 to 1999, he “worked in Jeddah as an assistant in the legal department of the Safoula Oil Production Company.”

The representatives also drew extensively on descriptions of what the stress of a regime like Guantánamo does to prisoners, via a psychiatrist’s report that was submitted on behalf of Ghaleb Al-Bihani (ISN 128), who was cleared for release on May 28. They note that the claims he made to interrogators were “purposely exaggerated and conflicting as is typical of many detainees.”

They added, “We do not know why Mr. AI-Zahrani provided false or overstated accounts, nor the circumstances under which he provided them, but the previously cited psychiatrist’s report provides some insight as to why previous detainees have given conflicting statements”; namely, “attempting to ‘improve their situation,’ meaning reducing interrogator use of enhanced interrogation techniques, to regain comfort items removed prior to interrogation, and to have access to medical attention and treatment.”

In addition, as the representatives noted, “some detainees reported that prolonged sleep deprivation led to their reporting conflicting stories as a result of endorsing information they thought the interrogators were seeking, because of confusion or in hope that they would be allowed to sleep.”

They also added that, significantly, “all negative accounts in Mr. Al-Zahrani’s classified dossier that make him out to be other than a low-level fighter have been refuted by either Mr. Al-Zahrani, other detainees, or his interrogators.”

In contrast, the military’s claims about al-Zahrani — including an allegation that he “almost certainly joined al-Qa’ ida” — fail to reflect these important points. “Information about [his] activities before detention is derived almost entirely from his own statements, which largely are uncorroborated but are consistent with al-Qa’ida’s operational practices,” the summary claims, adding that, although al-Zahrani “possibly at times has exaggerated his role in and significance to al-Qa’ida,” he “remains devoted” to the organization — a claim for which there is, simply, no evidence.

Significantly, although the authorities suggest that, in Afghanistan, al-Zahrani “almost certainly cultivated direct and indirect relationships with numerous terrorist leaders who could provide him avenues to reengage” if released, this is actually nothing more than shrill speculation, More realistic is the conclusion that, if al-Zahrani was repatriated to Saudi Arabia, he would be in a position to “return to his family after completing the Kingdom’s rehabilitation program,” because he “has no known associations with at-large extremists, based on his lack of interaction with anyone outside of Guantánamo except for family members who have no identified extremist affiliations.”

The first part of the personal representatives’ statements is followed by a second part, specifically involving a threat assessment that demonstrates “why Mr. Al-Zahrani does not rise to the standard of ‘continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.’” This second part of the presentation involves references to documents that were not made publicly available, but the most important aspect of the presentation does not require any additional information — it is an even more detailed explanation than in Part 1 of why the mitigating factors accompanying the release of the five Taliban prisoners can only support the release of al-Zahrani as well, because he poses a lower threat. It is an argument that I hope to see used again in other review boards to come, as I believe it is an important point.

Periodic Review Board, Muhammad Murdi Issa Al-Zahrani, ISN 713
June 19, 2014
Opening Statement of Personal Representative Part 1

Good morning ladies and gentlemen of the board. We are the Personal Representatives for Muhammad Murdi Issa Al-Zahrani. We will be presenting Mr. Al-Zahrani’s case to you today without the aid of private counsel. Additionally, until recently Mr. Al-Zahrani had elected not to participate during this process, but we want you to know that although he had made the personal decision not to participate, he has been cooperative. He met with us in person and provided information to us via a letter that includes some information about what he would like to do in the future.

We will present a two part statement to you today. I will briefly discuss information about Mr. AI- Zahrani’s detention that will shed light on his current circumstances and frame of mind, and will then project forward to Mr. Al-Zahrani’s life post detention. Then, as this Board’s recommendation is made on the basis of whether a detainee presents a “continuing significant threat to the security of the United States,” my colleague will compare Mr. Al-Zahrani’s threat potential to the standard established for a “continuing significant threat.” On our PRS [Periodic Review Secretariat] website, a “continuing significant threat” is defined as “a threat to the national security of the United States that cannot be mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures implemented by another country, organization, or entity.” What you will come to see is that Mr. Al-Zahrani’s threat potential is largely overstated, due to conflicting information he provided, and that even if his self-described worst case propensities were true, he does not rise to the standard of a continuing significant threat to national security. Why? Because he lacks the capability and his opportunities to impose harm can be sufficiently mitigated.

Mr. Al-Zahrani has spent 12 years at Guantánamo Bay and “presented few significant force protection problems relative to other detainees.” His limited negative conduct while detained is that of an inmate, rather than that of a terrorist. Such resistance and non-compliance with correctional staff is commonplace in penal systems, including in the US, and reflects that of a typical inmate who has been influenced by 12 years of detention, frustration, separation from family, and boredom with no possible end in sight. His limited efforts toward non-compliance while detained have no bearing on any risk he might pose toward the United States. Accordingly, we recommend that the Board discount this information in your assessment of Mr. AI-Zahrani’s future risk potential.

As mentioned, Mr. Al-Zahrani declined to participate in this process until recently, but this should not be seen as a harboring of ill intent toward the United States, nor should it be detrimental to the Board’s recommendation. From the psychiatrist’s report submitted previously on behalf of ISN-128 [Ghaleb Al-Bihani, cleared for release on May 28], episodic refusal to meet and participate in various activities is common among the detainees, and is “often rooted in a detainee’s sense that their indefinite confinement constitutes cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment.” Further, this psychiatrist states, “deprived of the ability to make basic decisions … they may seek to be able to influence decisions in the small arena left to them.” Hence, while it may seem counterintuitive to decline participation in the PRB process, non-participatory tendencies among the detainees can be viewed as “exerting their humanity and autonomy by engaging in what they refer to as ‘peaceful protest’ of their detention.”

In the specific case of Mr. Al-Zahrani, his unclassified dossier also indicates a diagnosis of what the Mayo Clinic classifies as a treatable, stress-related mental illness brought on by any number of significant life changes. Mr. Al-Zahrani’s condition may precipitate from the injuries, as he alludes to in his letter, or his indefinite captivity. In either case, the typical symptoms of this condition may shed some light on why Mr. Al-Zahrani made the choice of not participating until this week.

During Mr. Al-Zahrani’s detention, he has missed significant changes in the lives of many family members. Now, as per his unclassified dossier, his letter to us, and consistent indicators in camp records, Mr. Al-Zahrani desires to be reunited with his family and make up for lost time. Indeed, Mr. Al-Zahrani states his only wish is to see his ailing mother before she passes away; an opportunity he missed when his father died three years ago.

Mr. Al-Zahrani benefits from being a Saudi citizen and according to the unclassified dossier, “the Saudi government has provided the appropriate security and humane treatment assurances to facilitate the transfer of detainees.” Resultantly, “the United States has transferred over 100 detainees, including two in 2013, to Saudi Arabia.” Saudi Arabia has established a robust rehabilitation and aftercare program “focused on changing the attitudes of Saudis who have been involved in terrorism and include detainees transferred from the Guantánamo Bay detention facility. These components [of the program] include counseling, religious instruction, sports, and social and therapeutic activities.” Additionally, family members are able to visit the detainees going through the program. Mr. AI-Zahrani told us he is willing to go through the government program, agree to any terms leading to his release, and will fully cooperate with any stipulations his country places on him. We believe this shows his desire to capitalize on a second chance at life and return home to be with his family.

As we share Mr. Al-Zahrani’s own words with you, we believe you will see that his actions do not imply an unwillingness to cooperate. Rather, you will see a middle-aged, ailing man who desperately wants to return to Saudi Arabia so he can receive the healthcare provided by his country’s nationalized healthcare system, go through the country’s extensive detainee rehabilitation program, reintegrate as a productive member of society, and shoulder the responsibility of taking care of his family.

Per Mr. Al-Zahrani’s letter, which you will hear shortly, his entire family has voiced their commitment to assisting and supporting him during his transition home. This includes financial support, assistance with gaining employment, and embracing him into an extended family support network. We believe his close family structure will be a significant benefit in transitioning Mr. Al-Zahrani to a normal life, but their assistance may not even be necessary. Mr. Al-Zahrani indicates he has a home, a job to return to, back-pay for his time during detention, and associates within the Saudi Ministry of the Interior to help him as he starts his new life.

Mr. Al-Zahrani’s dossier shows the historical information that led to his detention. As you review the additional documentation we have provided, and have the opportunity to ask questions, we urge you to consider the whole picture when making your recommendation. Evaluating Mr. Al-Zahrani’s dossier requires recognition of the fact that any negative information found therein is derived from his own admission; purposely exaggerated and conflicting as is typical of many detainees. This exaggerated information serves to cloud the matter at hand and artificially inflate the “perceived risk” presented by Mr. Al-Zahrani. We do not know why Mr. Al-Zahrani provided false or overstated accounts, nor the circumstances under which he provided them, but the previously cited psychiatrist’s report provides some insight as to why previous detainees have given conflicting statements. It indicates detainees often provide discrepant information, “attempting to ‘improve their situation,’ meaning reducing interrogator use of enhanced interrogation techniques, to regain comfort items removed prior to interrogation, and to have access to medical attention and treatment.” Further, “some detainees reported that prolonged sleep deprivation led to their reporting conflicting stories as a result of endorsing information they thought the interrogators were seeking, because of confusion or in hope that they would be allowed to sleep.” Moreover, all negative accounts in Mr. Al-Zahrani’s classified dossier that make him out to be other than a low-level fighter have been refuted by either Mr. Al-Zahrani, other detainees, or his interrogators.

The fact is, Mr. Al-Zahrani is a man who has stated that he wants to start over. He should be given a second chance because he does not meet the defined threshold of presenting a continuing significant threat to the United States. This is especially true in light of mitigating factors put in place to enable the recent release of five Taliban detainees, who were all classified as higher threats than Mr. Al-Zahrani. These same mitigators provided sufficient assurance that those five detainees no longer pose a continuing significant threat to United States’ national security, which implies a lower level threat such as Mr. Al-Zahrani, if afforded similar mitigators like those available in Saudi Arabia, would no longer pose a continuing significant threat. Thank you for your time and consideration. We are happy to answer any questions you may have throughout this proceeding. With that, I will turn it over to my colleague to discuss our threat analysis methodology.

Periodic Review Board, Muhammad Murdi Issa Al-Zahrani, ISN 713
June 19, 2014
Opening Statement of Personal Representative Part 2

Bottom Line Up Front: Detainee does not rise to the standard of “continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

Ladies and gentlemen of the Board, good morning. During a previous board hearing, I characterized “threat” in terms of motive, capability, and opportunity and discussed the fact that the detainee in that case had demonstrated a lack of motive, that his dossier did not demonstrate sufficient capability, and that in your recommendation, you could ensure a lack of opportunity. As you know, every case is different, and this one will be as well.

Until the very end, Mr. Al-Zahrani explained to us that he did not wish to participate in the PRB process, and my colleague has addressed why that decision may have resulted from his captivity rather than from nefarious intent towards the US. Nonetheless, as a result, we have had to use a different methodology to demonstrate why Mr. Al-Zahrani does not rise to the standard of “continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

Without active participation from Mr. Al-Zahrani, it would be presumptive of us to attempt to refute either his motive or the capability as laid out in his dossier. Instead, in our submission we used a risk/threat methodology, to show that even assuming the worst intent, and the full scope of capabilities as shown in the dossier, Mr. Al-Zahrani still does not meet the standard. In other words, any threat that he might represent can be “sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures implemented by another country, organization, or entity.”

For the methodology used in our submission for Mr. Al-Zahrani’s case, we laid out several representative scenarios which might demonstrate a threat to the US or its interests if Mr. Al-Zahrani is released. I invite your attention to the matrix in Exhibit 3.5.1: Risk Scenarios. For each scenario, we defined the threat that could exist, worst case consequences for that scenario, and existing mitigating factors. All existing mitigating factors were drawn from the dossier. We assigned a severity to the consequences based on the worst case, and assigned a likelihood value to the scenario based on the stated events occurring in spite of the listed safeguards. Based on those values, we have assigned a risk to each threat scenario according to the matrix. Please see Exhibit 3.4.1 Risk Matrix for definitions of Severity, Likelihood, and Risk values, and for the Risk Matrix itself. The matrix used is common to risk assessments, although the severity and likelihood values had to be developed specifically for this application. If any risk met a certain threshold, then we would offer recommendations to the Board to attempt to mitigate the higher risks to a lower risk.

Out of all of the scenarios, the highest existing risk did not meet that threshold. Note that this value takes into account only existing mitigating factors — it requires no special mitigations or security precautions above those currently undergone by all transferees.

In conclusion, the standard for “continuing significant threat to the security of the United States” is higher than the standard for a simple threat. On May 31st, both President Obama and Defense Secretary Hagel stated that the government of Qatar put into place measures that would ensure that the “national security of the United States would not be compromised” by the recent release of five Guantánamo detainees. In so doing, we suggest that the released detainees represent a possible upper bound to a continuing significant threat because the threat that the released detainees represent could be mitigated “through feasible and appropriate security measures implemented by another country, organization, or entity.” We have demonstrated that Mr. Al-Zahrani represents a lower threat than the detainees that have been released and therefore does not rise to the standard for “continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

The post Saudi Prisoner Muhammad Al-Zahrani Seeks Release From Guantánamo Via Periodic Review Board – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Algerians fell behind 1-0 early — very early — after a Russian cross was headed in nicely by Alexander Kokorin. The Russians held the lead until halftime, dominating possession throughout the first half.

The game seemed headed on a similar track in the second half, as Russia came out firing early. Russia really should have put a second goal in, but Algeria keeper Adi Mbolhi made a nice save to keep Russia at just one goal.

Islam Slimani had the decisive goal for Algeria, heading in a service ball that was badly misjudged by Russian keeper Igor Akinfeev. It hasn’t been the best tournament for Akinfeev, whose made great saves but allowed a few howlers.

In any event, the Algerians did just enough to move through to the Round of 16, where they will face Germany on Monday.

Must be said Russia was a huge disappointment this World Cup. They were expected to qualify from what everyone saw as an ‘easy’ group, however their playing style (play not to lose) and the player selection was very questionable, which goes back to coach Fabio Capello who is the highest paid national coach in the world, earning 12 million euros per season!

The post Russia And Capello Disappoint Again As They Exit World Cup appeared first on Eurasia Review.

At least 7 people were killed today at 6:30pm local time in a suicide bomb blast at the Bab al Darwaza market, in the Shiite majority area of Kazimiyah, north of Baghdad.

A few hours earlier, Iraqi government forces conducted a military operation taking back control of the University of Tikrit, hometown of former leader Saddam Hussein, seized by Sunni insurgents two weeks ago. Military sources in Baghdad specified that the operation began last Sunday in an aim to regain control of posts seized by the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

The ISIL insurgents, allied since yesterday with the Al Nusra Front, were also targeted by Damascus airstrikes in the Qaim area in east Syria, near the border with Iraq. Bombings that were applauded by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.

Additional military backing arrived from Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi autonomous region of Kurdistan. “Kurdish forces will do everything possible to defend Kirkuk. If necessary we will deploy all our forces”, said Barzani on a first visit to the oil city seized by Kurd forces June 12 and that now fears an attack by the Sunni militants.

On a political level, the Shiite leader Moqtada al Sadr, who heads the Mahdi army militia, called for a “national emergency government” to “end the exclusion and marginalization of moderate Sunnis, taking into account their legitimate demands”. In a radio-TV message, al Sadr stressed the need to “accelerate the formation of a government with new names and faces from all sectors and no longer based on the usual community quotas”.

Just hours after expressing a contrary view, the controversial Shiite Premier al Maliki recognized the need to move along two parallel lines, “the first on the ground with military operations and the second to reach a political solution through the assembly of the parliament, the election of a speaker and formation of a government”.

The post Iraq: Bomb Attack In Baghdad, Airstrikes Against Insurgents appeared first on Eurasia Review.

President Michelle Bachelet announced a “new cycle” in relations with Chile’s indigenous communities, pledging to “settle an historic debt” the state has with them.

The new cycle will include three steps: “incorporation of the indigenous peoples in the Congress with appropriate institutions, promotion of regional development and the acquisition and return of ancestral land to the communities”.

The President confirmed that after consultations with the indigenous communities, a bill will be presented in parliament for the creation of a ministry of Indigenous Affairs and an Indigenous Peoples Council.

Based on a 2002 census, which is the only official one available, 4.6% of the Chilean population, equivalent to 692,192 people on 17 million, belong to one of the nation’s eight recognized indigenous communities. The government is planning a new census in 2017.

The majority of the indigenous peoples are Mapuche (87.3%), followed by Aymara (7%) and Atacameños (3%). The rest are divided between Quechua (0.9%), Rapanui (0.7%), Colla (0.5%), Alacalufes (0.4%) and Yamana (0.2%).

In the southern Araucania region, where the majority of the Mapuche live, a conflict between the indigenous communities and large farmers and forestry over their ancestral land led to trials and convictions of many Mapuche.

The post Chile: Bachelet Pledges To ‘Settle Historic Debt’ With Indigenous Communities appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The head of Iran’s Medical Drugs Information Centre says the country’s trade in counterfeit commercial drugs, most of which come from Pakistan, has become more lucrative than dealing in illegal narcotics.

IRNA reports that Kheyrollah Gholami spoke at a gathering organized to fight the fake drug trade, saying: “Many have turned to dealing in fake drugs because it has become a highly lucrative business and it needs to be stopped by raising the penalties for it to the level of dealing in illegal narcotics.”

He stressed that pilgrims entering Iran from Iraq have also been a source of these illegal drugs, adding that medical drugs lacking proper permits should not be sold in drug stores.

The head of Inspection and Evaluation for the Food and Drug Administration, Heydar Mohammadi, said drugs for sexual enhancement, weight control, aesthetics, height enhancement, hair growth and body building are among the more prevalent fake drugs on the market.

The Mehr News Agency reports that a weight control drug sold over satellite channels has “caused three deaths” recently.

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By Hossein Ahmadi

There are a number of possible scenarios one can use to delineate the future outlook of Salafi and Takfiri terrorists belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL’s Takfiri terrorists are doing their best to conquer Baiji oil refinery, which can be the biggest trophy for this group. Taking control of the aforesaid refinery will make it the main victim of the ongoing war on terror for the Iraqi government, on the one hand, and a major achievement for the other side. It seems that the ability to export abundant amounts of oil is a major component of the ISIL’s plan to establish its government in northern Iraq with the city of Mosul as its capital.

Before the ongoing crisis, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region had started independent oil sales to foreign customers through Turkey, which had evoked vehement protest from the central government in Baghdad.

On the other hand, this Takfiri group is willing to establish its control over Iraq’s transportation routes to Syria. As a result, gaining control over the Iraqi towns of Al-Qa’im (near Syria border), and Rawa, close to the Euphrates in Anbar Province, will be of very high significance in the strategy followed by Takfiri elements of the ISIL in Iraq. Let’s not forget that they are just a rebel group whose main goal is to conquer large swathes of land on the Iraqi and Syrian soil and form its own independent state. Since 2003 and following the occupation of Iraq by the United States, the activities of this group as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda under various leaderships of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Hamza al-Mujahir, and now, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have been revolved around the aforesaid strategy. The realization of this goal will lead to disintegration of Iraq, which would be a bitter reality both for this Arab country and for the entire region.

A recent fatwa (religious edict) issued by Iraq’s spiritual leader, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, in which the cleric urged Iraqis to take up arms and defend the territorial integrity of their country and prevent disintegration of the country, came in reaction to the above scenario. The great Shia source of emulation has clearly asked the Iraqi people from all walks of life to join Iraq’s security forces, take up arms, and fulfill their duty in defending their country, their people and sacred shrines therein. The decree was a telltale sign of the correct understanding by the high-ranking cleric of the ISIL’s goal to break the country up. After the cities of Mosul and Tikrit fell to this group, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has overcome the primary shock of the ISIL onslaught and now he knows what to do.

The important point, however, is that Maliki cannot resolve the crisis on his own. Therefore, if the United Nations Security Council and the United States government really want to contain the ongoing war within the borders of Iraq and prevent the breakup of the country, limited intervention would seem an unavoidable reality.

However, under the current sensitive circumstances, the Americans do not want to serve the interests of a single party in Iraq and this is the main reason why they have so far failed to make a firm decision on how to intervene in the Iraqi crisis. On the other hand, it has been clarified beyond any doubt that the ideas and actions taken by this terrorist group are not only at odds with the US interests in the region, but pose a dire threat to those interests across the world. As a result, further strength of the ISIL’s Takfiri terrorists will greatly weigh down on regional and even transregional security equations.

It would be a great mistake to allow this terrorist group to bank on and take political advantage of even the smallest mistake of Nouri Al-Maliki’s government to introduce itself as the representatives of the Sunni majority of the Arab country instead of the current impression that it has made as being an inhuman terrorist group. If this happens, the political idea and influence of this terrorist group would expand in Iraq and other Arab countries in the region as a result of which the balance of power would change in favor of such regional countries as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It seems these countries, even if not agreed to the group’s activities in the open, are providing them with strategic support behind the scenes because the strategic goals and interests pursued by the Takfiri terrorists of the ISIL not only pose no threat to the interests of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but are also in line with the strategic interests of these countries.

The United States’ support for Maliki’s government should not elicit serious criticism from other governments. The current government of Iraq has arisen from democratic elections which was also the United States’ goal in that country. The coalition government of Iraq is made up of 22 parties with political legitimacy and all of them of a democratic nature. The recent parliamentary elections held in that country put repeated emphasis on the country’s democratic process. It would be against the principles of democracy that if somebody has garnered fewer votes, they should take up arms and fight.

The success of Salafist terrorists of the ISIL will extend the limits of their influence to beyond the region and, therefore, they will be the first organized terrorist group with control over oil resources, which would be able to conduct further operations from within well-defined borders of its own. Such a state of affairs will also pose a serious threat to the interests of the United States and its Western allies. In the meantime, limited air strikes by the United States against the positions of the ISIL terrorists would be more acceptable than the invasion of the entire country like what Washington did in 2003.

Apart from the US Air Force, which is quite capable of blocking further progress of the ISIL, the United States should also put more pressure on its regional allies, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to find an expeditious solution to this crisis. The government and people of Iraq, on the other hand, should accept plurality of ideas and civil rights of all social groups in order to prevent terrorist groups promoting Salafist and Takfiri cause from finding excuses to go on with their terrorist acts. Any dawdling and delay in taking firm action by the United States and other countries will undoubtedly turn Iraq into a new Somalia.

Hossein Ahmadi
Professor of International Relations

Source: Shargh Daily
http://sharghdaily.ir/
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

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By Elise Harris

Following abuse accusations last fall involving the former apostolic nuncio to the Dominican Republic, the Vatican has concluded the first part of his canonical trial with a guilty verdict and laicization.

Accusations of sexual misconduct were reported last year regarding the former nuncio Josef Wesolowski, which led to his Aug. 21 resignation.

Following the publication of the initial accusations, a 13-year-old boy from the country said in a television interview that the Polish former archbishop had solicited him for sexual favors in exchange for money. He was then taken into protective custody by Dominican Republic officials.

In September the Vatican expressed their willingness to hand the former nuncio over to civil authorities, even though they are not required to do so since there is no extradition treaty between the Vatican and the Dominican Republic, and since they possess the legal right to invoke diplomatic immunity in protection of the nuncio.

In a June 27 announcement making known Msgr. Wesolowski’s laicization, the Vatican explained that he now has two months in order to make an appeal, and that his penal trial before Vatican judicial authorities will begin again as soon as the canonical sentence is definite.

The Vatican also specified that as the former nuncio waits for the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith’s verification of the charges made against him, he has been granted a certain flexibility in terms of his freedom of movement.

In wake of the sentence passed by the congregation, the Holy See assured that all the necessary procedures will be taken relating to Msgr. Wesolowski, according to the gravity of the case.

In a September letter signed by Cardinal Nicolás López Rodríguez of Santo Domingo and president of the Dominican bishops’ conference after the nuncio’s accusation, the bishops called for a “purification of the Church and for the removal of those who unworthily exercise this ministry and do not deserve to be called priests.”

This purification, the letter read, should take place with “the collaboration of authentic priests, who are the majority, and of the church community.”

Members of the Church in the Dominican Republic are also recovering from the recent accusations of sexual abuse against Father Juan Manuel Mota de Jesus.

A “root problem” of clergy abuse, Cardinal López said, is “an undetermined number” of candidates preparing for the priesthood who “do not have an authentic vocation” and who “during formation are able to feign something that they are not, and if formation directors are not careful, they sneak into the clergy, and later the bishops pay the consequences for their excesses and turmoil.”

He then asked as president of the Dominican bishops for “forgiveness of the victims of the heartless men who have abused them and their families” as well as forgiveness “of the community of the Catholic Church, which is humiliated by this unspeakable abuse, and also of the entire Dominican nation which is witnessing this unfortunate spectacle.”

The cardinal entreated civil authorities to “act with conviction and clarity” in their investigations, and prayed that “those who have done wrong assume responsibly the consequences of their actions.”

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By Jim Garamone

President Barack Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget request for overseas contingency operations is significantly less than last year, but still provides the resources needed to protect the United States and its interests, Defense Department officials said.

The request calls for $58.6 billion for the Defense Department in the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 2014.

“This is nearly $21 billion less than last year’s OCO request, representing a 26 percent reduction in OCO funding as our nation concludes 13 years of war and our mission in Afghanistan transitions to a training, advisory, and assistance role post-2014,” Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby said in a written statement issued yesterday.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel fully supports the request, saying it protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests.

The request funds temporary and extraordinary expenses associated with military operations in Afghanistan. It also funds counterterrorism efforts.

The request covers funding for DOD, the State Department and other government agencies not covered by the base budgets of these organizations.

The request covers some high-profile and quick-trigger initiatives.

It calls for $5 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. The fund builds on authorities to respond to a range of terrorist threats and crisis response scenarios. It is designed to help build the counterterrorism capacity of partner states from South Asia to the Sahel.

If approved $500 million will be used to train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the moderate Syrian armed opposition. This would allow moderates in the country to defend themselves against attacks by the Assad regime and would weaken extremists groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

In light of Russian actions regarding Ukraine, the budget request calls for $1 billion for the president’s proposed European Reassurance Initiative.

“These funds will help us improve the security of our NATO allies and partner states by increasing exercises, improving European infrastructure and allowing us to enhance the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe,” Kirby said in the statement.

The request does reflect the transition in Afghanistan, according to officials. The costs are dropping, but not precipitously. The department will still incur significant costs to transport personnel, supplies and equipment back to their home stations.

Funding is also needed to sustain Afghan security forces.

Officials said that funding will help the U.S. military re-set from over a decade of fighting to repair and replace equipment and munitions.

Congress must pass the OCO request.

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Forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) kidnapped at least 40 Shia Turkmen, dynamited four Shia places of worship, and ransacked homes and farms in two Shia villages bordering the Iraqi city of Mosul, Human Rights Watch said today. The assaults took place during a violent three-day spree that began on June 23, 2014.

ISIS ordered all 950 Shia Turkmen families to leave the two adjacent farming villages of Guba and Shireekhan, according to nine displaced residents, two local activists, and local journalists. The displaced residents told Human Rights Watch they heard from the few remaining villagers, all Sunni, that ISIS had killed at least some of the kidnapped men, but none had seen bodies or could provide other confirmation. ISIS, an armed extremist Sunni group, remains in control of the two villages.

“This ISIS rampage is part of a long pattern of attacks by armed Sunni extremists on Turkmen and other minorities,” said Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The killing, bombing, and pillaging threatens to displace entire communities, possibly forever.”

Guba and Shireekhan are 5 kilometers north of Mosul, which ISIS captured on June 10. ISIS controls large areas of north-central Iraq and neighboring Syria. In recent days, the group has sought to expand its control beyond Mosul, targeting nearby Shia communities of Turkmen and Shabaks, another religious minority. ISIS has stated that it considers Shia to be heretics and has frequently executed Iraqi and Syrian Shia on that basis, including en masse in Tikrit, a city it captured June 11.

On June 25 and 26, ISIS destroyed seven Shia places of worship in the predominantly Shia Turkmen city of Tal Afar, 50 kilometers west of Mosul, which it captured June 16, four sources from the area told Human Rights Watch. Since then, 90 percent of Tal Afar’s Turkmen have fled, residents and local activists said.

Human Rights Watch spoke to the nine residents who had fled Guba and Shireekhan on June 24 in villages north of Mosul controlled by peshmerga, the armed forces of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region. Many of those interviewed, still fearful of ISIS, asked Human Rights Watch not to divulge their names or new locations.

Four men who fled the night of June 24, two from each village, said they saw about 70 military vehicles filled with armed ISIS members roll into Guba and Shireekhan on the afternoon of June 23. They said the vehicles included Humvees that they thought must have been among the ones ISIS is widely reported to have confiscated from the Iraqi army earlier in June in Tal Afar and Mosul. Most of the fighters were unmasked. Two residents said that they later heard some of the fighters speaking Arabic with accents that were not Iraqi. They said at least seven of the fighters were local and wore black facemasks to disguise their identities.

Haider, a 40-year-old Guba farmer, was watching the fighters from a bluff overlooking his village:

They used loudspeakers to say bad things about Shia and told us, “All of you have to leave.” Then they rounded up the men and boys and checked their identity cards. The young local men who wore masks were helping them. They separated all those who they thought were Sunni and also the younger boys, and told them they could leave. Then they took away all the Shia in their vehicles. Until now we have no idea where they took them. But when ISIS takes people away like that they usually kill them.

The nine villagers told Human Rights Watch that ISIS had taken about 60 Shia men, all Turkmen. A worker with an international organization that operates in the area around Mosul told Human Rights Watch he had received reports that ISIS later released 20 of the captives, after determining that they were Sunni.

ISIS members removed all Iraqi state flags in the two villages and replaced them with black banners that bear the Islamic creed, “There is no god but God, Muhammad is the messenger of God,” the nine villagers said. ISIS also hoisted the banners over the Shia shrine in Guba, al-Imam al-Abbas, and three Shia mosques – al-Ridha in Guba, and al-Zahraa and al-Imam Hussein in Shireekhan, they said. “Every time they hoisted the banner they would shout, ‘Allahu Akbar [God is Great],’ and fire shots in the air,” said Mohsen, 49.

ISIS placed explosives in Imam Abbas’ shrine and the three Shia mosques, and on June 24 blew them up, said one witness from Guba and one from Shireekhan as well as the local activists. All others interviewed said they had heard from Sunni inhabitants of the villages, or relatives who had not yet fled, that ISIS had destroyed the places of worship. At that point any remaining Shia in the villages fled, they said.

On June 25, the armed militants went door-to-door through the Shia Turkmen homes, searching for remaining men and looting, residents told Human Rights Watch, citing Sunni inhabitants of the two villages. A woman who fled said that remaining villagers told her the gunmen took “everything they could find,” including from her home:

If the doors were locked, they broke them open. They took gold and money if there was any, and televisions and any other appliances. They also took cars and cattle and sheep. We are worried sick. We left our homes with nothing but the clothes we were wearing, and now we have nothing to go back to.

ISIS also took over the homes of prominent residents of the two villages, the residents said. They said they were certain that the fighters were ISIS because of their black banners and their destruction of Shia places of worship. Some of the residents said they or their neighbors had initially fled after ISIS took Mosul but subsequently trickled back into Guba and Shireekhan, lured by reports that the villages were calm and fears that if they did not return, ISIS would encourage Sunnis to occupy their homes.

In Tal Afar, ISIS on June 25 destroyed the Shia shrines of Imam Sa’ad and Khider al-Elias, a historic shrine on a site where Christians and Yezidis, a Kurdish minority sect, also worshipped, as well as the mosque of Hashim Antr, two journalists and an activist from the city told Human Rights Watch. The following day, ISIS destroyed four more mosques in Tal Afar – Imam Sadiq, , al-Abbas, Ar Mahmoud, and Ahl al-Beit, they said.

“ISIS should immediately free all captured civilians and stop its marauding,” Tayler said. “Killing civilians or captured combatants amounts to a war crime, and the ISIS fighters and commanders should be aware they will face justice for their crimes.”

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HIV and its transmission has long been associated with injecting drug use, where hypodermic syringes are used to administer illicit drugs. Now, a newly reported study by researchers affiliated with New York University’s Center for Drug Use and HIV Research (CDUHR) in the journal PLOS ONE, shows that HIV infection among heterosexual non-injecting drug users (no hypodermic syringe is used; drugs are taken orally or nasally) in New York City (NYC) has now surpassed HIV infection among persons who inject drugs.

The study, “HSV-2 Co-Infection as a Driver of HIV Transmission among Heterosexual Non-Injecting Drug Users in New York City,” was conducted among drug users entering the Mount Sinai Beth Israel drug treatment programs in NYC. The researchers found that HIV infection among non-injecting drug users doubled over the last two decades, from 7% infected in the late 1990s (n= 785) to 14% (n=1764) currently. During this same time-frame, HIV infection among persons who inject drugs fell to 10%.

The increased efficiency for transmitting HIV occurs even when persons with herpes simplex virus 2 (HSV-2) are between outbreaks, as herpes increases both susceptibility to and transmissibility of HIV. More than half of the non-injecting drug users in the study were infected with HSV-2.

“Heterosexual intercourse is usually not very efficient for transmitting HIV, but the efficiency of heterosexual transmission nearly triples in the presence of herpes simplex virus type 2,” notes the study’s lead author, Don Des Jarlais, PhD, Deputy Director, Research Methods and Infectious Diseases Cores, Center for Drug Use and HIV Research (CDUHR) and Professor of Psychiatry and of Preventive Medicine at Mount Sinai Beth Israel. “In New York City, we have done an excellent job of reducing HIV among persons who inject drugs and we must now put more efforts into reducing sexual transmission associated with non-injecting drug use.”

The study concludes that an increase in HIV infection among these non-injecting drug users is better considered as an increase in HSV- 2/HIV co-infection rather than simply an increase in HIV prevalence. Additional interventions (such as treatment as prevention and pre-exposure prophylaxis) are needed to reduce further HIV transmission from HSV-2/HIV co-infected non-injecting drug users.

The City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has initiated a program “treatment as prevention,” in which HIV infected persons are given anti-viral medications to both protect their own health and to reduce the chances that they will transmit HIV to others. There are also new federal recommendations to provide anti-retroviral medications to HIV uninfected persons at high risk for becoming infected.

“If we can implement these programs on a large scale, we should be able to control sexual transmission of HIV in the city, and achieve the goal of an “End to the AIDS Epidemic,” said Dr. Des Jarlais.

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Without a steady supply of blood, neurons can’t work. That’s why one of the culprits behind Alzheimer’s disease is believed to be the persistent blood clots that often form in the brains of Alzheimer’s patients, contributing to the condition’s hallmark memory loss, confusion and cognitive decline.

New experiments in Sidney Strickland’s Laboratory of Neurobiology and Genetics at Rockefeller University have identified a compound that might halt the progression of Alzheimer’s by interfering with the role amyloid-β, a small protein that forms plaques in Alzheimer’s brains, plays in the formation of blood clots. This work is highlighted in the July issue of Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.

For more than a decade, potential Alzheimer’s drugs have targeted amyloid-β, but, in clinical trials, they have either failed to slow the progression of the disease or caused serious side effects. However, by targeting the protein’s ability to bind to a clotting agent in blood, the work in the Strickland lab offers a promising new strategy, according to the highlight, which will be published in print on July 1.

This latest study builds on previous work in Strickland’s lab showing amyloid-β can interact with fibrinogen, the clotting agent, to form difficult-to-break-down clots that alter blood flow, cause inflammation and choke neurons.

“Our experiments in test tubes and in mouse models of Alzheimer’s showed the compound, known as RU-505, helped restore normal clotting and cerebral blood flow. But the big pay-off came with behavioral tests in which the Alzheimer’s mice treated with RU-505 exhibited better memories than their untreated counterparts,” Strickland says. “These results suggest we have found a new strategy with which to treat Alzheimer’s disease.”

RU-505 emerged from a pack of 93,716 candidates selected from libraries of compounds, the researchers write in the June issue of the Journal of Experimental Medicine. Hyung Jin Ahn, a research associate in the lab, examined these candidates with a specific goal in mind: Find one that interferes with the interaction between fibrinogen and amyloid-β. In a series of tests that began with a massive, automated screening effort at Rockefeller’s High Throughput Resource Center, Ahn and colleagues winnowed the 93,000 contenders to five. Then, test tube experiments whittled the list down to one contender: RU-505, a small, synthetic compound. Because RU-505 binds to amyloid-β and only prevents abnormal blood clot formation, it does not interfere with normal clotting. It is also capable of passing through the blood-brain barrier.

“We tested RU-505 in mouse models of Alzheimer’s disease that over-express amyloid- β and have a relatively early onset of disease. Because Alzheimer’s disease is a long-term, progressive disease, these treatments lasted for three months,” Ahn says. “Afterward, we found evidence of improvement both at the cellular and the behavioral levels.”

The brains of the treated mice had less of the chronic and harmful inflammation associated with the disease, and blood flow in their brains was closer to normal than that of untreated Alzheimer’s mice. The RU-505-treated mice also did better when placed in a maze. Mice naturally want to escape the maze, and are trained to recognize visual cues to find the exit quickly. Even after training, Alzheimer’s mice have difficulty in exiting the maze. After these mice were treated with RU-505, they performed much better.

“While the behavior and the brains of the Alzheimer’s mice did not fully recover, the three-month treatment with RU-505 prevents much of the decline associated with the disease,” Strickland says.

The researchers have begun the next steps toward developing a human treatment. Refinements to the compound are being supported by the Robertson Therapeutic Development Fund and the Tri-Institutional Therapeutic Discovery Institute. As part of a goal to help bridge critical gaps in drug discovery, these initiatives support the early stages of drug development, as is being done with RU-505.

“At very high doses, RU-505 is toxic to mice and even at lower doses it caused some inflammation at the injection site, so we are hoping to find ways to reduce this toxicity, while also increasing RU-505′s efficacy so smaller doses can accomplish similar results,” Ahn says.

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Climate scientists have long tried to explain why ice-age cycles became longer and more intense some 900,000 years ago, switching from 41,000-year cycles to 100,000-year cycles.

In a paper published this week in the journal Science, researchers report that the deep ocean currents that move heat around the globe stalled or may have stopped at that time, possibly due to expanding ice cover in the Northern Hemisphere.

“The research is a breakthrough in understanding a major change in the rhythm of Earth’s climate, and shows that the ocean played a central role,” says Candace Major, program director in the National Science Foundation (NSF)’s Division of Ocean Sciences, which funded the research.

The slowing currents increased carbon dioxide (CO2) storage in the oceans, leaving less CO2 in the atmosphere. That kept temperatures cold and kicked the climate system into a new phase of colder, but less frequent, ice ages, the scientists believe.

“The oceans started storing more carbon dioxide for a longer period of time,” says Leopoldo Pena, the paper’s lead author and a paleoceanographer at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO). “Our evidence shows that the oceans played a major role in slowing the pace of the ice ages and making them more severe.”

The researchers reconstructed the past strength of Earth’s system of ocean currents by sampling deep-sea sediments off the coast of South Africa, where powerful currents originating in the North Atlantic Ocean pass on their way to Antarctica.

How vigorously those currents moved can be inferred by how much North Atlantic water made it that far, as measured by isotope ratios of the element neodymium bearing the signature of North Atlantic seawater.

Like tape recorders, the shells of ancient plankton incorporate these seawater signals through time, allowing scientists to approximate when currents grew stronger and when weaker.

Over the last 1.2 million years, the conveyor-like currents strengthened during warm periods and lessened during ice ages, as previously thought.

But at about 950,000 years ago, ocean circulation slowed significantly and stayed weak for 100,000 years.

During that period the planet skipped an interglacial–the warm interval between ice ages. When the system recovered, it entered a new phase of longer, 100,000-year ice age cycles.

After this turning point, deep ocean currents remained weak during ice ages, and ice ages themselves became colder.

“Our discovery of such a major breakdown in the ocean circulation system was a big surprise,” said paper co-author Steven Goldstein, a geochemist at LDEO. “It allowed the ice sheets to grow when they should have melted, triggering the first 100,000-year cycle.”

Ice ages come and go at predictable intervals based on the changing amount of sunlight that falls on the planet, due to variations in Earth’s orbit around the sun.

Orbital changes alone, however, are not enough to explain the sudden switch to longer ice age intervals.

According to one earlier hypothesis for the transition, advancing glaciers in North America stripped away soils in Canada, causing thicker, longer-lasting ice to build up on the remaining bedrock.

Building on that idea, the researchers believe that the advancing ice might have triggered the slowdown in deep ocean currents, leading the oceans to vent less carbon dioxide, which suppressed the interglacial that should have followed.

“The ice sheets must have reached a critical state that switched the ocean circulation system into a weaker mode,” said Goldstein.

Neodymium, a key component of cellphones, headphones, computers and wind turbines, also offers a good way of measuring the vigor of ancient ocean currents.

Goldstein and colleagues had used neodymium ratios in deep-sea sediment samples to show that ocean circulation slowed during past ice ages.

They used the same method to show that changes in climate preceded changes in ocean circulation.

A trace element in Earth’s crust, neodymium washes into the oceans through erosion from the continents, where natural radioactive decay leaves a signature unique to the land mass from which it originated.

When Goldstein and Lamont colleague Sidney Hemming pioneered this method in the late 1990s, they rarely worried about surrounding neodymium contaminating their samples.

The rise of consumer electronics has changed that.

“I used to say you could do sample processing for neodymium analysis in a parking lot,” said Goldstein. “Not anymore.”

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