The Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (a Boeing 777-2H6ER) from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was “brought down” in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast on 17 July 2014, killing all 298 aboard. The plane was reportedly flying at an altitude of 10 kilometres (roughly 33,000 feet) between Krasni Luch in Luhansk region and Shakhtarsk in the neighbouring region of Donetsk when it went down. Information available indicates the possibility of the aircraft being shot down by a Russian-made medium range (altitude) surface-to-air missile (SAM). The ongoing insurgency in Eastern Ukraine and EU-US-Russia friction in the region has dragged this tragedy into a geo-political slugfest.
Analysts have classified the catastrophe as the fourth deadliest single-plane disaster in aviation history, and the deadliest from a manmade cause. The incident has raised a host of issues from humanitarian to ethical, from procedural to regulatory. This article looks at some of the politics surrounding the incident from a mildly technical perspective.
The Buk
The system suspected of having been involved in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 is the Russian-built Buk missile which is the successor to the SA-6 “Gainful” SAM system. As the exact type of the SAM has not been identified amongst SA-6, SA-11, SA-17 or the S-300s available in Ukraine, we would go by the US assertion based on information from its space-based surveillance system that it was a SAM (and not air-air missile) and possibly the Buk-M1 (SA-11) that was used against MH 17. Adopted into service by Russia in 1978, since then, the Buk-M1 has been continually upgraded and refined. It is a mobile vehicle mounted system and hence capable of changing its location and being concealed.
A Buk-M1 missile launcher can execute missions independently (from the transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicle) or as part of a larger Buk air-defence (AD) unit deployment along with other sub-systems. When it operates as a part of a unit it has the added advantage of receiving target inputs from a long range (85 Km) surveillance and acquisition radar held centrally by a Buk AD unit. However, when the Buk AD system(TELAR) operates singly or in autonomous mode, its operations envelope reduces and it can then track aircrafts flying at a height of 22 Km at a maximum distance of 32 Km using the tracking and illumination radar housed on the TELAR. Guidance to the SAM launched by the Buk TELAR is semi-active radar homing aided in the proximity of the target, by systems on board the missile. Very simply, the missile uses the TELAR radar signals being reflected by the airplane to home on to it. Given the capability of the Buk ( including in the autonomous mode), and the fact that MH17 was an airliner with a large radar signature, low manoeuvrability and no missile counter measures- it was a sitting duck.
A point regarding AD missile systems, particularly those more sophisticated and capable than the man-portable shoulder-fired class (MANPADS), they come with the manufacturers understanding of their lethality and the havoc they can cause if they fall in wrong hands. Hence these AD missile systems (particularly the Russian systems) incorporate what is commonly termed as “interlocks” which serve three broad purposes. First is safety; they ensure simple safety actions such as you cannot switch on the radar till all hatches are closed ect. Secondly, they ensure physical distribution of authority to fire a missile by the use of radar codes, launch keys ect. By placing these “interlocks” in the custody of more than one person, it can be ensured that a missile cannot be fired without sufficient authorisation. Even the missile itself requires some “interlock” actions to be carried out before it can be used for target engagement. Three, these interlocks allow disabling of the system when there is a danger of it falling into enemy hands.
Therefore capture of AD systems like the Buk does not necessarily mean that even trained captors can put them into operation, unlike in the case of tanks, cannons or the MANPADS. To that end, the 29 June report by the ITAR-TASS news agency, that the separatists had captured some Buk AD systems after taking control of a Ukrainian AD base A-1402, must be treated with some caution. The scenario is complicated further by claims of Russia’s Defence Ministry that it had intercepted Ukrainian radar signals indicating that pro-Kiev AD forces were active in the Donetsk region during the critical hours in question. According to WSJ, which quotes the IISS, the Ukrainian AD systems inventory included 60 Buk SA-11 systems as well as approximately 150 SA-13 Gopher systems, 125 vehicle-mounted SA-8 Gecko units, and 100 SA-4 Ganef systems. Ukraine also fields the S-300.
The second issue regarding AD systems is of training. Operation of such AD systems requires a high degree of familiarity and a reasonable level of skill. To fire a missile from these AD systems would require a skill level more than what it would take to fire a MANPADS and yet such an operator may not have the experience to assess the type of target from its radar signature or its flight characteristics. It is also more likely that such an operator may not have the knowledge of complementary systems like the IFF (Identification-Friend or Foe) or the electro-optical tracker (simply, a TV to see the target you are engaging) which may assist you in determining whether the aircraft is a “friendly or an enemy.”
Therefore such AD weapons systems under most circumstances are likely to be operated by trained and skilled military personnel. In case of the armed forces, the AD systems are deployed as part AD complexes and networks which provides awareness of international over flight routes, pre-disseminated flight plans, live radio-contacts and electronic identification ect to varying degrees. Duplicated, fail-safe measures and procedures are in place to minimise the chances of an accidental engagement of non-hostile aircrafts. Independent operation of AD weapon systems by untrained persons would therefore be very prone to accidental engagement of friendly aircrafts.
In case of separatists they would have to be trained by the Russians or be defectors of Ukrainian AD unit. The US in this regard has claimed that Moscow has been supplying Ukrainian separatists with AD weaponry (three Buk TELARs to be precise), and has held training sessions along the eastern Ukrainian border, teaching rebels how to operate these systems. There is yet another possibility being alluded to by the Ukrainians that it was a Russian AD system, operated by the Russians but operating from separatist held Ukrainian territory. The employment of potent AD systems had become crucial for the separatists of late as Ukraine was reportedly using its air force to target the supplies coming across the border from Russia.
While the responsibility for the missile attack is yet to be fixed the politics surrounding the incident have intensified by the Russian double-speak, lack of cooperation and possibly the “irresponsibility” in providing the Buk systems to the separatists. The US reaction on the other hand, has been focussed on pinning the blame on Russia and in consolidating international opinion against it. Sen. John McCain has gone on record to say it does not matter if the shooting was accident or deliberate act, Russia must be held accountable. US possibly feels that classifying the incident as an accident would place the Ukrainian separatists in the same league as US and Ukrainian militaries, both of whom in the past have been guilty of shooting down civilian commercial airliners. Sen. McCain’s suggestion that “Give the Ukrainian government the weapons it’s been asking for,” as a response to this situation created by proliferation of lethal weapons is equally confounding.
It is beyond doubt that the actions of the Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists have been appalling and criminal, but it is imperative that we must first direct our efforts to ensure that dignity is accorded to the victims of MH 17 and a sense of closure provided to their relatives at the earliest. Sovereign nations need to exercise restraint and maturity in their response to such incidents while initiating measures to prevent them from reoccurring.
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