By Monia Ghanmi

Tunisia is taking steps to protect citizens from the security chaos across the border in Libya.

In the latest move, Tunisia recalled diplomats from Libya and urged expats to leave the embattled country.

“We have decided to cut consular services provided by our consular missions in Tripoli and Benghazi, and to provide only necessary and urgent services,” the Tunisian Foreign Ministry said on July 16th.

“A consular office will be opened in the coming few days in Ras Jedir to provide services to our community and facilitate their return to the homeland,” it added.

Tripoli is witnessing clashes in the vicinity of its airport, while Benghazi is seeing fierce fighting between Khalifa Haftar’s Operation Dignity forces and Ansar al-Sharia. Scores of Libyan military personnel and civilians have been killed.

Libya is facing a tough situation after bloody fighting intensified among militias looking for money and power and that are also looking to impose their radical views, according to Ismail Harakat, a 41-year-old educator and resident of a Tripoli suburb.

“Our interests have been damaged and our businesses have been stopped as a result of that,” he said. “We don’t know when all this will end; there is nothing showing that the situation will change for the better in our country.”

Mohamed Abou Bridàa, a self-employed Tripoli resident, said the situation could only be changed through dialogue between the various Libyan factions.

“The solution is to avoid partisanship; Libya is for everyone and with everyone,” he added. “Those who carry arms have to lay down their arms, come back to their senses and listen to the voice of reason and logic. We’re all sons of Libya.”

Meanwhile, TunisAir cancelled its flights to Libya because of the security risks.

Boujemàa Khamari, a 40-year-old day labourer, said the decision was correct given the armed conflict in neighbouring Libya, noting that such conditions make it necessary for all countries to take precautions.

“We appreciate the measure, which has become necessary due to the recent events in Libya in order to avoid kidnappings after diplomatic missions became a target for attacks,” he added. “In addition, the Libyan government is unable to secure itself and can’t be depended on in protecting the interests of other countries on its soil.”

A Tunisian diplomat and embassy staff member kidnapped in Libya last April by gunmen were recently released.

However, Omar Khouini, an activist at a civil society organisation, said the decision to curtail staffing was not enough and was only temporary. “Tunisia must play the role of mediator among the various factions in Libya to reach a solution and spare blood that is daily spilled; those who die there are our brothers,” he said.

Many Tunisian workers have recently returned home from Libya because of the danger.

Kais Chtioua, 39, said he had travelled to Libya four months ago and worked at a shop selling beverages in Tripoli, but decided to return because of the deteriorating security situation there.

“I could no longer stay there although my Libyan friends were prepared to protect me,” he told Magharebia. “I felt I was not safe; the situation is dangerous and made me fear for my life, and therefore, I decided to come back.”

The post Tunisia Cuts Libya Diplomatic Presence Amid Unrest appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen

The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) emerged out of the ashes of two conflicts. It was born as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then used the power vacuum created by the civil war in Syria to create a base out of which it could create the foundations for an emerging state. However, how likely are they to succeed in their goal of establishing a functioning state? In answering this question, it is crucial to understand their strategy: do they only operate based on ideological fervor, or does their strategy contain elements of realism? Machiavelli taught us that a successful prince should learn to be both a fox and a lion, does IS have the ability to act as both?

Machiavelli’s recommendations for Princes

The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves. Machiavelli, The Prince.

What did Machiavelli mean in his masterpiece, which for long has been essential reading on the reading list for all first year political science students? In the animal kingdom, a lion is the symbol of ultimate strength. It is the most powerful mammal on land that is feared by all other animals. However, the lion has a weakness, it is not intelligent enough to recognize the danger of traps.

A fox is also a predator, living off preying on other animals. However, the fox is cunning and calculating. It recognizes dangers when it feels uncomfortable in a new setting. A fox does not necessarily attack if it judges that it could result in it being in danger.

A temporary alliance of convenience

Evidence from the ground in Syria shows that there is a common understanding between the Assad regime and IS that their inaction towards each other is of mutual benefit. There is enough proof for one to state that Assad is not targeting the areas controlled by ISIS, but chooses to hit more moderate opposition held areas instead. The immediate enemy of Assad and IS are the same, as Frederic C. Hof puts it, “Whatever Bashar al-Assad and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may think of one another personally, their top tactical priority in Syria is identical: destroy the Syrian nationalist opposition to the Assad regime.“

In the meantime, the Islamic State is pushing further and further into the areas held by the anti-Assad. IS has shown itself to be a shrewd opportunist. It has developed a strategy of reaping the ripe fruits sown by other militant groups. They largely go into areas already weakened by fighting between the SA and the various groups making up the more moderate opposition. Currently in Aleppo, the Syrian Army is trying to use its most effective strategy: set up a siege around the areas held by the opposition, and starve them both materially and physically. In the meantime, IS is operating closer and closer to the suburbs of the city and the opposition fears that the two forces together might eventually lead to complete control by IS and the Syrian army.

What explains this mutual understanding? Assad’s calculation is that he is likely to win more easily against IS if he emerges as the victor against the more nationalistic opposition within the country. In many ways, he has paved the way for the more radical elements of the opposition to become empowered. In his view, IS would be an easier enemy to defeat, and the further they expand their control, the more likely it becomes that the west supports Assad. (Also read this in the NYTimes, and this in the Guardian.)

Undoubtedly, this unholy alliance is a temporary one. In the long term, if we see the more nationalist elements even further weakened, we are likely to see a permanent war between IS and the Syrian army. This week we saw evidence of this, when IS attacked and beat the Syrian Army in the most significant battle yet, leading to IS taking control of one of the most important gas production facility. This points to IS being able to operate with an understanding of realism. It acts like a fox when needed, and a lion when conditions allow for it. It has formed a quasi alliance with Assad, and this might be one its most important strategical assets, largely overlooked by observers.

IS the Lion

Overwhelmingly, IS has used brute force towards anyone who acts against it. Late last year the brutality, combined with IS’ reluctance to fight Assad, lead to a formidable coalition of anti Assad groups attacking IS, and quickly it was on the retreat in Eastern Syria.

However as the spoils of war came in from the conquests in western Iraq, the IS has reallocated vital supplies, including American made Humvees, to the Syrian front-lines. The augmented moral, combined with the new supplies largely explain IS’ recent advances in Syria.

Its strategy has also developed. As Hassan Hassan noted in a recent article, their forces increasingly use diplomacy to take over villages. As long as the inhabitants lay down their weapons and pledge allegiance to IS, the village is spared attack. This new more benevolent strategy should be seen in light of the vast territory it now controls. IS does not have the manpower to impose its strict rules in all the territory under its possession. Currently, it is therefore utilizing a policy of accommodation with the populace. Over time, and as its military conscripts increase, it is more likely to become more forceful.

This strategy is likely to become very effective. As its geopolitical achievements, coupled with its military arsenal and funds grow day by day, it will be more likely to attract public support from Syrians and Iraqis who make up the vast majority of its fighters. These young men are not necessarily believers in grandiose ideas of creating an Islamic state. But they will be much more comfortable fighting with a force that is well equipped and that wins battles. For a young Syrian, it is undoubtedly more fulfilling to ride on the back of a Humvee conquering gas fields and villages than to be bogged down in never ending skirmishes in largely destroyed buildings in Aleppo.

IS the Fox

On many occasions, the IS has shown military prowess a skillful maneuvering on the terrain. For a long time, it fought skirmishes with the US troops and its Iraqi allies. Rather than confronting their enemy head on, as they did in Fallujah, they employed hit and run operations and sieges. All very familiar to those who have read Mao’s military tactics (for more information about the theoretical links between Maoism and other secular theorists impact on radical Islamic military doctrine, see Michael Ryan: Decoding the Al-Qaeda Strategy).

Contrary to popular belief, Mosul did not fall over night. The take over by IS and its allies, was the culmination of months of strangulation by cutting off the supply routes between Baghdad and the city. The take over was only a culmination of years of insurgent attacks on the city and in fact the city has for long been one of the main sources of revenue as a result of extortion of its business owners.

The geopolitical puzzle

IS is a result of the turmoil in the region. No state actor wants it to succeed in establishing a state. However, states are using it to advance their geopolitical interests. Saudi Arabia sees the benefit of an IS in order to avoid a long feared Shia Crescent forming from Lebanon to Iran. At the same time, they fear them since the group is a real threat to their own stability. If IS is able to navigate between these fears, and gain temporary allies by recognizing its limits, it is more likely to succeed in its short term mission of holding on to some territory. Here we find a paradox and also a weakness. It mobilizes ideologically on the basis of being uncompromising in its reach. However were it to challenge Jordan, Saudi Arabia and countries beyond, it is likely to quickly be confronted from all sides.

The longer the regional crisis continues, the more entrenched the new state will become. If IS develops political callous in the midst of the chaos, and evidence shows that it has, it is likely to become an increasingly formidable foe. One which could possibly become a permanent feature in the region.

Its likelihood to hold on and expand its currently held territory lies in how capable it is in operating on a foreign policy based on realism – acting as Machiavelli’s fox – rather than only utilizing brute force. There is evidence to suggest that its leaders understand this and will use the knowledge to become a significant power. All the same, like so many revolutionary movements before it, IS is propelled by its universal ambitions which will make it difficult to stop its expansion. Its leaders have dazzled their supporters through maximal goals, minimal dithering, and lightning conquests. Reining in the expectations of its fighters will be difficult.

IS has conquered vast amounts of territory, sufficient in terms of resources to create a functioning state. However its permanence rests on its ability to restrain itself and appease its followers who believe and fight for its universal reach to become a reality here and now. If it restrains itself it is likely to lose supporters, including foreign fighters, if it does not, it will be challenged by forces that are likely to put it to an end.

IS feeds on the instability, and as long as the region remains tumultuous, the more likely they are to remain. A grand bargain is often used in foreign policy debates, but that is exactly what is needed in order to avoid the strengthening of IS. The group can not be seen as being an isolated result of the mess in Iraq and Syria. In some states’ views, it operates as a balance to counter Iranian hegemony. But its success impacts negatively on everyone. Only the United States has the power and influence to create the conditions necessary for a grand bargain between Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf States, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

Ultimately, the stability of the region is of primary concern for all states. If Iraq and Syria break apart, it will undoubtedly have effects on the cohesiveness of the main regional actors: Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The US should utilize a three track policy. The first two are aimed at solving localized conflicts, and should be aimed at reassuring disaffected Sunni’s that the US has not realigned its foreign policy to appease Iran:

• Train and equip the more nationalistic rebels in Syria so that they are powerful enough to serve as a military counterweight to Assad. They should not be able to win, but they should be strong enough to be seen as a threat to the current regime in Damascus. If they are not a balance to Assad, no viable dialog can take place between the warring factions. A negotiated settlement should be the aim.

• Reach out to the disaffected Sunni community in Iraq including old enemies such as the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order. They, combined with the Military Council of the Tribes of Iraq, are powerful and secular forces currently allied with ISIS.

• Thirdly, the US should act on a regional level:

• Engage regional states, including Iran, in negotiations about the need for military disengagement from the conflicts. This will be anything but easy, however a redrawing of Middle Eastern borders is in no ones interest. Should IS establish itself borders will be redrawn.

Furthermore, the region is vulnerable to several actors becoming entangled in uncomfortable alliances with IS:

• The Iraqi Kurds: if the central Iraqi government starts to battle the Kurdish regional Authority for control over Kirkuk, there could be a potential of a tacit alliance between them and IS.

• The more nationalist Syrian rebels: if the Syrian army pushes ahead, and that the low level war between the SA and IS increases, they could become temporary allies.

• Jordan: although Jordan fears IS (especially in light of growing support for them in the Ma’an and other parts of the country) it is for now a less of a foe than if Iraq and Syria fall completely under the control of Iranian aligned regimes.

• Saudi Arabia: similar concerns as Jordan.

For any decision maker in Washington, it is of paramount importance that these regional weaknesses and alliances are understood and monitored. If they are not, the IS is likely to use them to their advantage.

Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen worked for the Danish Red Cross in Syria before and during the conflict. He earned his MSc from the University of London and is the producer of www.syrianactivists.org. He is based in Boston.

The post Can Islamic State Survive? What Can US Do? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Lesley Masters

The growing role of emerging countries in the development assistance landscape is bringing about a change in the international politics of development. South Africa, along with other emerging countries such as China and India, is moving beyond a position as an ‘aid’ recipient towards defining its role as a development assistance partner. Within this changing international landscape, developed and developing countries alike are reassessing their relationships in the field of development cooperation. In exploring the impact of these changing relations, this policy brief considers the shape and direction of South Africa-EU engagement in development cooperation, where the two parties are moving from a donor-recipient relationship to the construction of a collaborative partnership in support of development.

By tracing the emergence of South Africa as a development assistance partner, this analysis highlights areas of policy convergence and divergence with the EU and the potential for making of trilateral development cooperation (TDC), a more central element of South Africa and the EU’s strategic partnership.

Drivers of South Africa’s International Developmental Agenda

In the early 2000s South Africa began to pursue an active role in negotiating the future shape and direction of the international development regime through participation in the negotiations around aid effectiveness and later the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (established at the 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan). Pretoria has also moved towards positioning itself as a development assistance partner, particularly within Africa, through the creation of the initial African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) in 2001, and the planned establishment of a South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Underpinning these moves are South Africa’s own historical legacy; its pursuit of domestic development priorities in foreign policy; and its aspirations to play a central role in shaping the future contours and direction of the international development regime.

The country’s history of apartheid has left South Africa as one of the world’s most unequal societies, with approximately 40 per cent of the population (predominantly black) living below the poverty line.

Economic development is seen as a means to address these inherited economic imbalances. Following South Africa’s democratic transition, the government introduced a number of development orientated policies, including the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, and the more recent National Development Plan (NDP), released in 2011. Despite slight differences in emphasis across these initiatives, they are all consistent in envisioning South Africa as a developmental state and in addressing the injustices of the past.

Linked to the idea of a developmental state is the idea of a ‘developmental foreign policy’.1 This prioritises development concerns within South Africa’s international agenda, linking domestic priorities to international engagement. The Zuma administration has consistently maintained that domestic development priorities and a particular focus on the African agenda continue to inform South Africa’s stance towards development cooperation and the post-2015 Development Agenda. Development cooperation is increasingly seen as a ‘vehicle to advance South Africa’s foreign policy to address challenges of poverty, underdevelopment and marginalisation in Africa and the South’.2

The link between domestic and foreign policy in terms of development is further underlined in the 2011 draft White Paper on foreign policy, Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, which notes the importance of ‘foreign policy alignment with South Africa’s domestic and developmental needs, particularly to create a better life for all South Africans’.3 Moreover, international development cooperation is, for the first time, included within the mandate of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).4 The draft White Paper also provides direction for South Africa’s engagement on ‘aid effectiveness, increased global development assistance, and strengthening development partnerships’.5

In addition to pursuing the role of an emerging development cooperation partner, South Africa has sought to play a central role in shaping international development negotiations, assuming the position of Co-Chair of the G-20 Development Working Group, and acting as an elected representative to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECO- SOC) for the period 2004-2006 and then again from 2013-2015. Within these multilateral platforms South Africa has called for the strengthening of the voice of the global South through engagement with the Africa Group (the African Common Position)6, the G77+China, IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). For example, during the 2011 Busan negotiations on aid effectiveness, the inclusion of emerging development cooperation partners such as China, India and South Africa contributed to a change within the negotiations from an emphasis on ‘aid’ to an emphasis on development cooperation and partnership.

The Busan discussions saw a marked distinction between the position of South Africa and other members of the geopolitical South on the one side, and that of the EU and other OECD donors on the other. While the EU was concerned with addressing the proliferation and fragmentation of aid providers, South Africa and other developing countries were more welcoming of an increase in the number of development assistance partners, a trend which provides more options for developing countries to negotiate terms and conditions.7 There has also been a division between South Africa and the EU over what should constitute official development assistance (ODA), with developing countries arguing that this should be broadened to include elements such as trade, technology transfers, and investment.8 This contrasts with the EU’s more traditional interpretation, set out by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which limits ODA to being provided by state agencies, having a primary focus on economic development, and having a grant element of at least 25 percent.9

As negotiations around the post-2015 Development Agenda gather pace, South Africa argues that there should not be an attempt to re-negotiate existing global development commitments, but rather an effort to build upon the frameworks already in place. Key priorities for South Africa within the post-2015 debates include: funding and implementation of the current MDGs; an understanding of the particular development needs of recipient countries; a focus on poverty eradication, income inequality and job creation (particularly for Africa); an emphasis on all dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental sustainability); and continued commitment to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. South Africa also wants to see a genuine partnership emerge between the geopolitical North and South, with the northern countries fulfilling their commitments to contribute 0.7 percent of gross national income to Official Development Assistance.10

South Africa’s Practice Of Development Cooperation

South Africa’s approach to development cooperation has focused on supporting the promotion of democracy and good governance; the prevention and resolution of conflict; socio-economic development and integration; and humanitarian assistance and human resource development.11 South Africa’s development cooperation budget for the ARF saw development assistance grow from an initial R50 million (about €6 million) in 2003/2004 to a peak of just under R700 million (about €60 million) in 2008/2009. This has been reduced to just over R500 million (about €50 million) since 2011.12

There has been consistency in the focus of South Africa’s approach towards development cooperation, from the ARF to discussions concerning the future of SADPA’s engagement. This is in line with South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, which exhibit a central focus on Africa, particularly in terms of peacekeeping, capacity building, regional integration, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. In terms of capacity building, South Africa has already organised programmes for civil servants from countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and South Sudan, while peacekeeping initiatives have seen South African troops operating in Burundi, the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, the Comoros, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire.13 South Africa has also contributed towards elections assistance in the DRC and the Comoros and supported a SADC observer mission to the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe.

In all of these areas South Africa possesses particular expertise and experience – the fruits of the country’s own peaceful transition, its domestic development, and its role in peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives on the continent. The principles guiding South Africa’s approach are linked to the wider context of South-South Cooperation, and include an emphasis on recipient countries’ ownership of development processes, particularly in determining the focus and outcomes of projects and programmes. A further principle is that partnerships should be based on needs assessment, should be demand driven, and should contribute to improving coordination between development assistance partners within the recipient country.14 South Africa has also attached importance to building greater understanding of the political, economic and security contexts within each recipient country, in order to ensure that development cooperation does not undermine peace, stability or democracy. 15

The Creation Of The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) is likely to be a positive step in managing the implementation of development cooperation, although the agency is yet to be operationalised. SADPA will be tasked with policy development (through crafting policy principles that guide decision making), with engagement with relevant departments and partners, and with managing the implementation of projects and programmes.

In terms of implementation SADPA aims to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of development programmes across government, to provide administrative and management accountability, and to provide clear operating principles and guidelines.16 This approach is important, as Pretoria has found itself increasingly stretched in terms of its capacity to manage both its multilateral engagement on development and its bilateral development partnerships.17 In addition, challenges of communication between the relevant departments have been a problem, causing delays in the implementation of projects. There has also been a lack of policies and guidance for implementation of the ARF, as well as capacity constraints in the monitoring and evaluation of projects.18

While these constraints present implementation challenges, they can also provide the impetus for Pretoria to engage in collaborative partnerships with other actors – such as the EU – in order to meet foreign and development policy objectives.

South Africa, The EU And Engagement In International Development Cooperation

Relations on development cooperation between the EU and South Africa are in a state of transition. The EU has traditionally been one of the largest sources of official development assistance (ODA) to South Africa, providing ‘70 percent of all external assistance funds: 25 per cent from the EC, 20 percent from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 25 percent from the EU Member States’.19 In 2013, South Africa received some €100 million for the country’s infrastructure programme and approximately €50 million for job creation initiatives.20 EU ODA to South Africa is aimed at adding value through ‘enabling experimentation and learning, innovation, risk-taking, and capacity building’.21 However, it is important to note that South Africa is not dependent on ODA, which accounts for approximately one per cent of the state budget and 0.3 percent of GDP.22

South Africa-EU engagement on foreign policy and development issues has gathered pace since the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of 1999. Within the TDCA particular attention is paid to development cooperation within the ‘context of policy dialogue and partnership’, yet this is focused on South Africa as a recipient of EU ODA. In 2007 a strategic partnership was established between the EU and South Africa with regular high-level summits taking place. The 2007 South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan identifies a number of areas for cooperation, including development. However, like the TDCA, the focus in this action plan is on South Africa as a recipient country and not on the prospects for EU-South African partnership in promoting development externally.23 Reflecting this interpretation of EU-South Africa relations, the Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 is also primarily concerned with ODA between the EU and South Africa, making only short references to South Africa’s role as a collaborative partner, and only a passing reference to potential regional or continent-wide cooperation (involving bodies such as Southern African Development Community, Southern African Customs Union, and the African Union) and the scope for engagement with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).24

Both the Action Plan and the Joint Country Strategy Paper continue to reflect a vision of South Africa-EU engagement as merely a partnership in which the EU supports South Africa’s development.

However, there are a number of areas of policy convergence that could enable deeper collaboration between the two partners in promoting development more broadly, both at a multilateral level and within third countries.

Policy Convergence And Divergence On Development Cooperation

An important point of convergence between South African and EU approaches to development is the priority given to Africa. This includes South Africa’s foreign policy focus on the African Agenda; its peace-making and peace-keeping commitments on the continent; and its emphasis on supporting the socio-economic development of Africa. Likewise, the EU accords priority to Africa within its development policy framework, Agenda for Change, noting that the ‘EU should continue to recognise the particular importance of supporting development in its own neighbourhood and in Sub-Saharan Africa’.25 Moreover, given EU commitments to increasingly allocate its aid budget to the world’s poorest countries, Africa will become an even greater priority for the EU.

In addition to a focus on the development of Africa, both the EU and South Africa converge around the principles of poverty reduction, human rights, democracy and good governance.26 These broad shared principles were stressed at the 2013 6th South Africa-EU Summit held in Pretoria, where both parties reaffirmed a commitment to ‘shared values and interests including the promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, the Rule of Law and sustainable development’.27

With much convergence in terms of their regional focus and the broad principles informing their approach to development, the main challenge in building a stronger partnership between the EU and South Africa is divergence concerning practice and implementation. For instance, South Africa’s foreign policy focus on South-South Cooperation and its emphasis on ‘solidarity’ with developing countries have encouraged Pretoria to look askance at certain conditionality policies, especially those concerning democracy and good governance.28

Furthermore, South Africa, as well as other developing countries, continues to question the linkages between EU economic interests and the EU’s approach to development cooperation. South Africa and other actors are concerned that EU policies in areas such as trade, agriculture, manufacturing, and non-tariff barriers may undermine development gains made on the ground in recipient states. For example, the EU Raw Minerals Initiative may see developing countries become more dependent on the export of primary commodities, despite attempts by some countries to introduce export restrictions as part of their developmental strategies.29

The challenge for the EU is to balance its interests and values in a transparent way that addresses some of these concerns. As Mackie (et al) point out, ‘Europe is known for its strong discourse on democracy and governance. Yet too often this value-driven EU agenda is perceived as clashing with the way it pursues its security and economic interests, which can undermine the Union’s credibility’.30 However, much like the EU, South Africa too has come under scrutiny regarding the balance between perceived economic interests and its peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and development activities in countries such as the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR).

There is also concern within South Africa over the EU principle of ‘differentiation’ between developing countries, which sets out to distinguish advanced developing countries and those less developed countries which remain significantly dependent on external sources of finance (aid).31 The EU’s argument is that middle income countries (MICs) are able to support some of their own development, although this distinction glosses over the continued challenges of inequality and poverty within MIC countries. The problem with the EU claiming that some states have ‘graduated’ to MIC level is that it creates a perception that the EU is defining new partnership models in which it ‘still sees it as its [the EU’s] responsibility to define the stature of its partners’.32

Despite these sources of tension, the significant areas of policy convergence between the EU and South Africa do provide a platform for deepening relations as collaborative partners on development. In building such a collaborative partnership, trilateral development cooperation (TDC) could help facilitate a better understanding of respective development approaches and enhance cooperation in the field.

South Africa-EU As Collaborative Development Partners: The Future Of Trilateral Development Cooperation

The potential for TDC between the EU and South Africa has been underexplored and requires greater attention. In contrast to the experience of emerging development partners such as China and Brazil, where trilateral cooperation initiatives have received something of a ‘lukewarm’ reception or failed to gather momentum, trilateral cooperation is an area that is gaining attention within development thinking in South Africa. South Africa has already pursued TDC with individual EU member states, including Germany’s TriCo Fund, in the pursuit of shared development objectives.33 Nevertheless, when it comes to EU-South Africa partnerships, thinking on trilateral engagement remains in its infancy. The Joint Country Strategy Paper of 2007-2013 only referred to the ‘potential’ of TDC, while the most recent Progress Report available on the EU and South Africa as development partners (2010) only includes a few lines on the matter, noting that there is potential for the EU to undertake TDC with South Africa, not least given the experience of EU member states, such as Germany, which have already launched joint initiatives on the continent.34

South Africa is currently in the process of developing a framework for TDC, which will guide Pretoria’s approach towards trilateral partnerships aimed at ensuring that they are demand driven, meet the development priorities of the beneficiary country, and promote local ownership and partnership. The potential benefits of TDC include the creation of a platform for improving coordination between development partners in beneficiary countries, boosting resources for projects or programmes (particularly as South Africa’s own ODA budget is relatively small), and the creation of economies of scale. The benefits for South Africa of a partnership with the EU lie in the opportunity to engage with existing expertise on development cooperation and to enhance South Africa’s own development cooperation capacity. For the EU there is the opportunity to learn from South Africa’s own unique experience and its understanding of the region.

Moving towards a more substantial EU-South Africa partnership on development requires further research into the partners’ different approaches to development cooperation, with a view to building a deeper working partnership. This should include identifying existing programmes/projects and unpacking the ‘lessons learned’ to inform future TDC initiatives. The challenge has been that engagement so far has been ad hoc and uncoordinated, with the SADPA yet to be operationalised. Progress should include building shared understanding around basic concepts (development, democracy, human rights) and their policy implications for development, as well as defining approaches (e.g. best practice, monitoring and evaluation) for managing a horizontal partnership between the EU, South Africa and beneficiary countries. The next steps should also include consideration of just what is strategic for the partnership when it comes to development, or where an EU-South African partnership with a beneficiary country could add the most value in a field where there are a burgeoning number of development actors.

What will be critical to EU-South Africa relations going forward is that the strategic partnership dialogue (and future action plans) should reflect the potential for the two to act as equal partners in promoting development in Africa and beyond, moving beyond their previous donor – recipient relationship.

About the author:
Lesley Masters is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue, associated with the University of South Africa.

Source:
This article was published at FRIDE, as ESPO Policy Brief Number 11, July 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF)

The ESPO project on Development and EU Strategic Partnerships is kindly supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

Endnotes:
1 C. Landsberg., ‘Towards a Developmental Foreign Policy? Challenges for South Africa’s Diplomacy in the Second Decade of Liberation’, Social Research, vol 72, no. 3, 2005, p. 726.
2 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), presentation to Parliament, 2011; Establishment of SADPA, ‘Presentation to the NCOP Select Committee on Trade and International Relations’, 3 August 2011.
3 DIRCO, ‘Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’, White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Pretoria, 2011, p. 7.
4 ibid. p. 9.
5 DIRCO, ‘Building a Better World’, 2011, op cit., p. 23.
6 The Africa Group is a regional grouping of African countries which seek to pursue greater African agency in international re- lations. The Group has negotiated among themselves an African Common Position that reflects African priorities, on issues such as Climate Change and Development that it then takes to the international multilateral negotiations. The Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda was negotiated in March 2014.
7 N. A. Besharati,, ‘A Year after Busan: Where is the Global Partnership going?’, Occasional Paper No. 136, Economic Diplo- macy Programme, South African Institute of International Relations, 2013, p. 11-12.
8 E. Sidiropoulos, ‘Rising Powers, South-South Cooperation and Africa’, Policy Brief 47, Global Powers and Africa Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs, March 2012, p. 3.
9 OECD. Glossary of Statistical Terms. http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043 (accessed 14 January 2014).
10 J. Zuma, ‘Statement of the President of the Republic of South Africa, His Excellency Mr Jacob Zuma, to the General Debate of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Headquarters, New York, USA’, 24 September 2013, http://www. thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=16132 (accessed 28 November 2013).
11 DIRCO, ‘African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund: Strategic Plan 2013-2016’, Annual Performance 2013- 2014. Pretoria, 2013, p. 5.
12 Figures in Euros are calculated by applying the average EUR/ZAR exchange rate prevailing in each respective year. For South Africa’s development cooperation budget, see the Annual Reports from the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund, http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/report/index.htm
13 N. A. Besharati, ’South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Af- rica?’, Research Report 12, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs, August 2013, p. 18.
14 ibid., p. 8. Also, Interview with DIRCO Official, January 2014; Interview with Treasury Official, 2014.
15 ibid.
16 S. Casoo, ‘The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)’, paper presented at the ODI Cape Conference, London, 14-15 November 2012, http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-presentations/1380.pdf (ac- cessed 9 June 2014).
17 Besharati, 2013 op cit., p. 35.
18 DIRCO, 2013, op cit., p. 14.
19 European Commission in South Africa. Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/ acp/country-cooperation/south-africa/south-africa_en.htm (accessed 6 February 2014).
20 Council of the European Union, Sixth South Africa-European Union Summit Joint Communique, 19 July 2013, http:// www.esastap.org.za/download/sa_eu_summit_communique.pdf (accessed 1 April 2014).
21 S. Herbert, ‘The future of EU aid in middle-income countries: The case of South Africa’, Working Paper 370, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2013, p. 11.
22 T. Leshoro, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in South Africa: An Empirical Analysis Using Bounds Testing’, Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences, vol. 6, no. 1, 2013, p. 56.
23 The Joint Action Plan is focused on the value of ODA for South Africa in terms of best practice, innovation, risk-taking, pilot programmes, system development, capacity building, and skills and knowledge development. See Council of the Eu- ropean Union, The South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, Brussels, 9650/07., 15 May 2007, p. 4-5.
24 European Union, Cooperation between the European Union and South Africa, Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 3, 25, 33.
25 European Commission. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, 13/10/11, p. 9, http:// ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf (accessed 1 April 2014).
26 For South Africa’s African Agenda, see the draft ‘White Paper of South Africa’s Foreign Policy’, Department of International relations and Cooperation, 2011; and European Commission, op cit., p. 9.
27 Council of the European Union, 2007, op cit.
28 E. Sidiropolous, ‘South Africa: Development, International Cooperation and Soft Power’, in S. Chaturvedi, T. Fues, and E. Sidiropolous (eds.), Development Cooperation and New Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns?, London, Zed Books, p. 232-233.
29 See M. Curtis, ‘The New Resources Grab: How EU Trade Policy on Raw Materials is Undermining Development’, Traid- craft Exchange, Oxfam Germany, WEED, AITEC and Comhlamh, 2010, http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/ downloads/The_new_resource_grab.pdf
30 J. Mackie, S. El Fassi, C. Rocca and S. Grosse-Puppendahl, ‘A Question of Leadership? Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2014’. Policy and Management Insights, no. 5. December 2013, ECDPM, p. 2.
31 European Commission. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, 13 October 2011, p. 9, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf
32 S. Zondi, ‘South Africa-EU Strategic partnership in the context of a changing North-South power dynamic’, GREAT In- sights, vol. 2, Issue 6, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2013.
33 Task Team of South-South Cooperation, Experiences from the Trilateral Cooperation Fund, http://www.southsouthcases. info/casostriangular/caso_16.php (accessed 11 March 2014).
34 National Treasury South Africa and Delegation of the European Union to South Africa, ‘The European Union and South Africa: Development Partners’, Progress Report 2010, p. 32.

The post The EU And South Africa: Towards New Partnership For Development – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran holds some of the world’s largest deposits of proved oil and natural gas reserves, ranking as the world’s fourth-and second-largest reserve holder of oil and natural gas, respectively. Iran also ranks among the world’s top 10 oil producers and top 5 natural gas producers. Iran produced 3.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of petroleum and other liquids in 2013 and more than 5.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of dry natural gas in 2012.

The Strait of Hormuz, on the southeastern coast of Iran, is an important route for oil exports from Iran and other Persian Gulf countries. At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, yet an estimated 17 million bbl/d of crude oil and oil products flowed through it in 2013 (roughly one-third of all seaborne traded oil and almost 20% of total oil produced globally). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes also flow through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 3.9 Tcf of LNG was transported via the Strait of Hormuz in 2013, almost all of which was from Qatar, accounting for about one-third of global LNG trade.

Effects of recent sanctions

Iran’s oil production has declined substantially over the past few years, and natural gas production growth has slowed, despite the country’s abundant reserves. International sanctions have stymied progress across Iran’s energy sector, especially affecting upstream investment in both oil and natural gas projects. The sanctions have prompted a number of cancellations and delays of upstream projects, resulting in declining oil production capacity. The United States and the European Union (EU) enacted measures at the end of 2011 and during the summer of 2012 that have affected the Iranian energy sector more profoundly than any previously enacted sanctions. The sanctions impeded Iran’s ability to sell oil, resulting in a 1.0-million bbl/d drop in crude oil and condensate exports in 2012 compared with the previous year.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran’s oil and natural gas export revenue was $118 billion in the 2011/2012 fiscal year (ending March 20, 2012). In the 2012/2013 fiscal year, oil and natural gas export revenue dropped by 47% to $63 billion. The IMF estimates that Iran’s oil and natural gas export revenue fell again in the 2013/2014 fiscal year by 11% to $56 billion. The revenue loss is attributed to the precipitous decline in the volume of oil exports from 2011 to 2013. Iran’s natural gas exports actually increased slightly over the past few years. However, Iran exports a small volume of natural gas, as most of its production is domestically consumed.

Nonetheless, international sanctions have also affected Iran’s natural gas sector. Iran’s natural gas sector has been expanding, but production growth has been lower than expected as a result of the lack of foreign investment and technology. The South Pars natural gas field is the largest hydrocarbon upstream project currently being developed in Iran and continues to encounter delays. South Pars, located offshore in the Persian Gulf, holds roughly 40% of Iran’s proved natural gas reserves. It is currently being developed mostly by Iranian companies as most international companies have pulled out. The field’s development entails 24 phases, of which phases 1-10 are completed, and phase 12 started production in February 2014.

On November 24, 2013, a Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was established between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany (P5+1). Implementation of the JPOA started in January 2014. Under the JPOA, Iran agreed to scale back or freeze some of its nuclear activities during the six months of negotiations in exchange for some sanctions relief. The period of negotiations was recently extended for another four months to November 24. The JPOA aims to reach a long-term comprehensive plan that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, which may lead to the lifting of international sanctions.

The JPOA does not directly allow for additional Iranian oil sales, although it does suspend sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services. However, Iran and the countries that are continuing to import Iranian oil have increasingly been able to find alternatives to European Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I) coverage from EU companies.

Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports increased in late 2013 and have maintained a level above the 2013 average. From January to May 2014, Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports averaged 1.4 million bbl/d, roughly 300,000 bbl/d higher than the 2013 average, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Exports to China and India account for almost all of the increase.

Total primary energy consumption

Iran consumed 9.6 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) of energy in 2012. Natural gas and oil accounted for almost all (98%) of Iran’s total primary energy consumption in 2012, with marginal contributions from coal, hydropower, nuclear, and non-hydro renewables. Iran’s primary energy consumption has grown by more than 50% over the past 10 years. In order to curtail wasteful energy use and to limit domestic demand growth, Iran has embarked on an energy subsidy reform to raise the prices of domestic petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. The first phase of the reform was enacted in late 2010, and phase two was initiated in early 2014.
Iran’s total primary energy consumption, share by fuel, 2012
Management of oil and natural gas sectors

The state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is responsible for all upstream oil and natural gas projects. The Iranian constitution prohibits foreign or private ownership of natural resources. However, international oil companies (IOC) can participate in the exploration and development phases through buyback contracts.

The energy sector is overseen by the Supreme Energy Council, which was established in July 2001 and is chaired by the president of Iran. The council is composed of the Ministers of Petroleum, Economy, Trade, Agriculture, and Mines and Industry, among others. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Petroleum, state-owned companies dominate the activities in the oil and natural gas upstream and downstream sectors, along with Iran’s petrochemical industry. The three key state-owned enterprises are the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), and the National Petrochemical Company (NPC).

Table 1. Iran’s state-owned energy companies

The state-owned NIOC, under the supervision of the Ministry of Petroleum, is responsible for all upstream oil and natural gas projects, encompassing both production and export infrastructure in the oil sector. The National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC), a subsidiary of NIOC, accounts for 80% of oil production covering the provinces of Khuzestan, Bushehr, Fars, and Kohkiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad. Nominally, NIOC also controls the refining and domestic distribution networks, by way of its subsidiary, the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC).

Table 2. Subsidiaries of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)

Foreign investment

Iran is planning to change the oil contract model to allow IOCs to participate in all phases of an upstream project, including production. However, international sanctions continue to affect foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector, limiting the technology and expertise needed to expand the capacity at oil and natural gas fields and reverse production declines.

The Iranian constitution prohibits foreign or private ownership of natural resources, and all production-sharing agreements (PSAs) are prohibited under Iranian law. The government permits buyback contracts that allow IOCs to enter into exploration and development contracts through an Iranian subsidiary. The buyback contract is similar to a service contract and requires the contractor (or IOC) to invest its own capital and expertise for development of oil and natural gas fields. After the field is developed and production has started, the project’s operatorship reverts back to the NIOC or the relevant subsidiary. The IOC does not get equity rights to the oil and gas fields. The NIOC uses oil and gas sales revenue to pay the IOC back for the capital costs. The annual repayment rates to the IOC are based on a predetermined percentage of the field’s production and rate of return, according to a report by Clyde and Company. According to FACTS Global Energy (FGE), the rate of return on buyback contracts varies between 12% and 17% with a payback period of about five to seven years.

Iran recently announced a new oil contract model called the Iranian (or Integrated) Petroleum Contract (IPC), although it is not yet finalized and is subject to change. The purpose of the new framework is to attract foreign investment with a contract that contains terms similar to a PSA. Some of the main criticisms of the buyback contracts include lack of flexibility of cost recovery and in some cases, the NIOC’s limited expertise to reverse field decline rates in comparison to the IOC that developed the field.

Under the current draft IPC, IOCs can establish a joint venture agreement with the NIOC or a relevant subsidiary to manage oil and natural gas exploration, development, and production projects. IOCs will help manage the projects, but they will not have ownership of the reserves. IOCs will be paid a share of the project’s revenue in installments once production starts. The payment terms can be adjusted as the project progresses, according to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES).

IPCs will cover a longer time period of between 20 to 25 years, which is double the amount of time under the buyback contract. The IPC will encompass the exploration, development, and production phases, along with the possibility to extend into enhanced oil recovery (EOR) phases. This proposed contract model is different from the current buyback contracts, which only cover the exploration and development phases. This modification aims to rectify issues with field decline rates by including the IOC in the production and recovery phases, while optimizing technology and knowledge transfers. To help facilitate knowledge and technology transfers, the IPC will require IOCs to fulfill Iran’s local content requirement, which will be 51% of the contract.

International sanctions have affected Iran’s energy sector by limiting the foreign investment, technology, and expertise needed to expand the capacity at oil and natural gas fields and to reverse declines at mature oil fields. Iran has mainly had to depend on local companies to develop oil fields. Chinese and Russian companies are the only IOCs currently directly or indirectly involved with developing oil fields, according to FGE.

Foreign investment played a role in restoring oil production in the latter part of the 1990s and first part of the 2000s, according to IHS Cera. But in 2007, international sanctions led to the near halt of most international investment as many IOCs stalled investments. From 2009-10, Iran forced out most of the companies from western countries, Malaysia and Japan because of non-delivery of projects, making way for Chinese and Russian companies, according to IHS Cera.

Nonetheless, international sanctions have also led Chinese companies to stall or slow investments. In 2013, Iran cancelled CNPC’s contract to develop Phase 11 of the South Pars natural gas field, and in 2014, Iran cancelled its $2.5 billion contract with CNPC to develop the South Azadegan field, both because of persistent project delays. CNPC is still involved in the development of the North Azadegan field, although Iran has also noted dissatisfaction with the project’s progression.

As a result of the poor investment climate and international political pressure, some IOCs, including Repsol, Shell, and Total, divested from Iran’s natural gas sector. In response, Iran has looked toward eastern firms, such as state-owned Indian Oil Corp., China’s Sinopec, and Russia’s Gazprom, to take a greater role in Iranian natural gas upstream development. Activity from these sources has also been on the decline because of sanctions imposed on technology and financial transactions.

Oil sector

Reserves

Iran’s major oil infrastructure

Iran holds nearly 10% of the world’s crude oil reserves and 13% of OPEC reserves. About 70% of Iran’s crude oil reserves are located onshore, with the remainder mostly located offshore in the Persian Gulf. Iran also holds proved reserves in the Caspian Sea, although exploration has been at a standstill.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal, as of January 2014, Iran has an estimated 157 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves, representing nearly 10% of the world’s crude oil reserves and 13% of reserves held by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Most of Iran’s reserves were discovered decades ago. According to a report by Clyde & Company, roughly 80% of Iran’s reserves were discovered before 1965.

According to FGE, approximately 70% of Iran’s crude oil reserves are located onshore and the remainder offshore, mostly in the Persian Gulf. Roughly 85% of Iran’s onshore reserves are located in the Luristan-Khuzestan basin in the southwest near the Iraqi border, according to the Arab Oil and Gas Journal.

Map of Iran’s major oil infrastructure
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, IHS EDIN

Iran also has proved and probable oil reserves of approximately 500 million barrels mostly offshore in the Caspian Sea, but exploration and development of these reserves have been at a standstill because of territorial disputes with neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Iran also shares a number of both onshore and offshore fields with neighboring countries, including Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Exploration and production

Iran’s crude oil production fell dramatically in 2012, following the implementation of sanctions in late-2011 and mid-2012. Iran dropped from being the second-largest crude oil producer in OPEC to the fourth in 2013, after Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and narrowly behind the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Iran’s production increased in 2014, increasing Iran’s rank to the third-largest crude oil producer in OPEC during the first half of 2014.

Iran is one of the founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was established in 1960. Since the 1970s, Iran’s oil production has varied greatly. Iran averaged production of over 5.5 million bbl/d of oil in 1976 and 1977, with production topping 6.0 million bbl/d for much of the period. Since the 1979 revolution, however, a combination of war, limited investment, sanctions, and a high rate of natural decline of Iran’s mature oil fields has prevented a return to such production levels.

In recent years, a series of sanctions targeting the oil sector have resulted in cancellations of new projects by a number of foreign companies, while also affecting existing projects. Following the implementation of sanctions in late-2011 and mid-2012, Iranian production dropped dramatically. Although Iran had been subject to four earlier rounds of United Nations sanctions, the much tougher measures imposed by the United States and the EU have severely hampered Iran’s ability to export its oil, which affected Iran’s oil production.

The U.S. and EU measures targeted Iran’s petroleum exports and imports, prohibited large-scale investment in the country’s oil and gas sector, and cut off Iran’s access to European and U.S. sources for financial transactions. Further sanctions were implemented against institutions targeting the Central Bank of Iran, while the EU imposed an embargo on Iranian oil and banned European Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) from providing Iranian oil tankers with insurance and reinsurance.

Iran’s largest oil fields

In 2013, Iran produced approximately 3.2 million bbl/d of petroleum and other liquids (total oil), of which roughly 2.7 million bbl/d was crude oil, 0.4 million bbl/d was condensate, and 0.1 million bbl/d was natural gas plant liquids (NGPL). Iran’s total oil production level in 2013 was 1.0 million bbl/d (almost 25%) lower than the production level of 4.2 million bbl/d in 2011. The drop in production is mainly attributed to the sanctions. Iran faces continued depletion of its production capacity, as its fields have relatively high natural decline rates of 8% to 11%, coupled with an already low recovery rate of 20% to 25%, according to FGE and the Arab Oil and Gas Journal. Sanctions and unfavorable contractual terms have impeded the necessary investment to halt this decline. Moreover, sanctions enacted in late 2011 and throughout 2012 have accelerated Iran’s production capacity declines.

For the first half of 2014, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that Iran’s total oil production increased by an average of almost 200,000 bbl/d, compared with the annual average in 2013. Preliminary export data for 2014 show a corresponding increase in Iran’s exports.

Crude streams and oil fields

Iran’s crude oil is generally medium in sulfur content and in the 28° to 36° API gravity range. Two crude streams, Iran Heavy and Iran Light, account for more than 80% of the country’s crude oil production capacity. Other crude streams include Froozan, Soroush/Norouz, Doroud, Sirri, and the Lavan Blend. Iran’s largest producing oil fields are the onshore Ahwaz-Asmari, Marun, and Gachsaran fields, all of which are located in Khuzestan Province. Iran’s largest offshore field is Abuzar field, with a production capacity of 175,000 bbl/d.

The Iran Heavy crude stream accounts for approximately 45% of the country’s total crude oil production, according to FGE. The stream is mainly sourced from a few onshore fields in southern Iran, some of which are multilayered and also feed the Iran Light stream. Gachsaran and Marun are two of the largest fields that contribute to Iran Heavy. Other fields include Rag-e-Safid, Ahwaz, Bangestan, Mansouri, and Bibi Hakimeh.

The Iran Light crude stream is the other key grade and is sourced from several onshore fields in the Khuzestan region. However, two-thirds of this grade comes from three fields: Ahwaz-Asmari, Karani, and Agha Jari. Many of the fields that produce Iran Light have been producing for decades and are declining rapidly. NIOC has been working on offsetting these declines through the use of EOR techniques, mainly by reinjecting associated gas into oil wells to improve oil recovery rates.

Non-crude liquids production

For the first half of 2014, Iran produced about 600,000 bbl/d of non-crude liquids (condensate and natural gas plant liquids). Iran’s non-crude oil production mostly comes from the South Pars natural gas field, with smaller volumes produced at Nar and Kangan, and at other fields.

In mid-2011, Iran started a 1,000-bbl/d pilot gas-to-liquids plant, according to the Arab Oil and Gas Journal. The country planned to build a 10,000-bbl/d commercial plant fueled by the South Pars natural gas field. However, the status of the plant’s development is unclear.

Upstream projects

Iran has not had a new oil field enter into production since 2007. There were a number of new exploration and development blocks announced over the past several years that could provide Iran with an increase in its crude oil production capacity, but sanctions have negatively affected the Iranian oil industry. Virtually all western companies have halted their activities in Iran, although there are some Chinese and Russian companies that are still participating. The sanctions and lack of international involvement have particularly affected upstream projects, as the lack of expertise, technology, and investment has resulted in delays and, in some cases, cancellations of projects. Nonetheless, development of a few projects continues, albeit at a slower pace than planned.

The Azadegan field was Iran’s biggest oil find in 30 years when announced in 1999. It contains 6 to 7 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil reserves, but its geologic complexity makes extraction difficult. The field is divided into two portions: North and South Azadegan. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is developing North Azadegan in a two-phase development, with ultimate total production estimated at 150,000 bbl/d (75,000 bbl/d for each phase). Latest estimates from FGE indicate that the first phase will be onstream by 2015/2016, costing $1.8 billion.

In 2004, a consortium of NIOC (25%) and Japan’s INPEX (75%) signed an agreement to develop the South Azadegan field. However, INPEX has since halted its activities in South Azadegan. In 2009, CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the NIOC to obtain a $2.5 billion contract to develop the South Azadegan field and was awarded the contract in 2011. The project targeted peak output is 260,000 bbl/d in two phases (150,000 bbl/d in the first phase and 110,000 bbl/d in the second phase). However, in 2014, the NIOC announced that it was cancelling its contract with CNPC to develop the South Azadegan field because of persistent project delays. In February 2014, Iran said that CNPC drilled only 7 of the 185 wells it had planned at the field, according to MEES. The South Azadegan field came online in 2007 and produced 50,000 bbl/d in 2013, virtually unchanged from its production level in 2009.

Yadavaran is the other promising upstream development project, with 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves and 2.7 Tcf of recoverable gas reserves. China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) signed a buyback contract at the end of 2007 to invest $2.2 billion to develop Yadavaran. Yadavaran produced 25,000 bbl/d in 2013. Production is expected to increase to 85,000 bbl/d by mid-2015. A second phase in the field’s development is projected to boost production by 50,000 bbl/d to 100,000 bbl/d in 2018. NIOC is also planning a third phase to boost output to 300,000 bbl/d. NIOC originally planned to have Yadavaran’s first phase completed by 2012.

able 3. Status of selected new upstream oil projects in Iran

Crude oil and condensate exports

Iran’s exports of crude oil and condensate dropped from 2.5 million bbl/d in 2011 to 1.1 million bbl/d in 2013 because the United States and the European Union tightened sanctions that targeted Iran’s oil exports. The largest buyers of Iranian crude and condensate are China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey.

According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports averaged 1.1 million bbl/d in 2013, 1.4 million bbl/d less than the volume exported in 2011. Iran’s ability to sell oil was substantially impeded by new sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU, which went into effect in summer 2012.

Iran’s exports increased in the beginning of 2014. From January to May 2014, Iran’s exports averaged 1.4 million bbl/d, 300,000 bbl/d higher than the 2013 annual average, according to the IEA. China and India accounted for nearly all of that increase.

Effects of 2011-12 sanctions

According to the IEA, Iranian crude oil and condensate exports declined by 1 million bbl/d in 2012 compared with the previous year. The decline is attributed to new sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU at the end of 2011 and during the summer of 2012. Iran’s ability to sell crude oil was particularly affected by the EU ban on all Iranian petroleum imports as well as the imposition of insurance and reinsurance bans by European P&I Clubs effective July 1, 2012. European insurers underwrite the majority of insurance policies for the global tanker fleet. The insurance ban particularly affected Iranian oil exports as lack of adequate insurance impeded the sales of Iranian crude to all of its customers, including those in Asia. Iranian exports dropped to less than 1.0 million bbl/d in July 2012 as Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Indian buyers scrambled to find insurance alternatives. Adding to the insurance difficulties was continued pressure imposed by the U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil customers to decrease their purchases.

Iran and the countries that are continuing to import Iranian oil have since been able to find alternatives to P&I coverage from EU companies. By the last quarter of 2012, Iranian exports recovered somewhat as Japan, South Korea, and India began to issue sovereign guarantees for vessels carrying Iranian crude oil and condensate. China and India began to accept Iranian Kish P&I Club guarantee on the vessels that shipped oil to its refineries. Nonetheless, Iranian exports have failed to reach export levels prior to the latest sanctions.

In 2012, sanctions were not the only driver of export decreases. For example, commercial interests contributed to the decrease in China’s imports, as Chinese buyers were engaged in a contractual dispute with Iran in the first quarter of 2012. China is Iran’s largest trading partner and its biggest oil importer, according to the World Bank. Chinese refiners significantly decreased their purchases of Iranian crude and condensate as a result of a dispute over the terms of annual purchase contracts. Although eventually Unipec (the trading arm of China’s largest refiner Sinopec Corporation) signed a supply contract with NIOC for volumes comparable to those imported in 2011, the contract did not allow NIOC to make up for the oil sales that did not get delivered to China in the first quarter of that year.

Petroleum product exports

In addition to crude oil and condensate, Iran also exports petroleum products. According to FGE, Iran exported about 240,000 bbl/d of petroleum products in 2013, most of which was fuel oil and LPG sent to Asian markets. Iran’s petroleum product exports declined by roughly 40% in 2013 compared with the 2011 level. According to FGE, U.S. and EU sanctions affected Iran’s ability to sell petroleum products as well.

Oil terminals

The Kharg, Lavan, and Sirri Islands, located in the Persian Gulf, handle almost all of Iran’s crude oil exports. Iran also has two small crude oil terminals at Cyrus and Bahregansar, one terminal along the Caspian Sea, and other terminals that handle mostly refined product exports and imports. Condensate from the South Pars natural gas field is exported from the Assaluyeh terminal.

Kharg Island is the largest and main export terminal in Iran. Roughly 90% of Iran’s exports are sent via Kharg. Kharg’s loading system has a capacity of 5.0 million bbl/d. The terminal processes all onshore production (the Iranian Heavy and Iranian Light Blends) and offshore production from the Froozan field (the Froozan Blend). The Kharg terminal includes the main T-jetty, the Sea Island that is located on the west side of Kharg, and the Dariush terminal to the south. Kharg Island relies on storage to ensure even operations, and its current storage capacity is expected to increase to 28 million barrels of oil in 2014.

Lavan Island mostly handles exports of the Lavan Blend sourced from offshore fields. Lavan is Iran’s highest-quality export grade and one of Iran’s smallest streams. Lavan’s production averaged less than 100,000 bbl/d in 2013, but the Lavan facilities have the capacity to process 200,000 bbl/d of crude oil. Lavan has a two-berth jetty, which can accommodate vessels up to 250,000 deadweight tons. Lavan’s storage capacity is 5.5 million barrels.

Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the Sirri Blend that is produced in the offshore fields of the same name. The Sirri terminal includes a loading platform equipped with four loading arms that can load tankers from 80,000 to 330,000 deadweight tons. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million barrels.

The small offshore loading terminal at Cyrus can handle tankers up to 70,000 deadweight tons. Crude is stored on a barge moored nearby, according to Arab Oil and Gas Journal. The Bahregansar field in the northern Persian Gulf has its own loading terminal. It features one single buoy mooring that can load tankers up to 250,000 deadweight tons.

Neka is Iran’s Caspian Sea port and was built to receive crude oil imports from Caspian region producers that are delivered under swap agreements. The port was built in 2003 and has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels and can handle up to 100,000 bbl/d of crude oil, according to FGE. Neka has not been operational since 2011. The terminal was previously used to facilitate swap agreements with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran exported the same amount of crude oil through its Persian Gulf ports.

The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini), are near the Abadan refinery and are used to export refined product from the Abadan refinery. Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran’s main fuel oil export terminal.

Consumption and downstream

Iran is the second-largest oil-consuming country in the Middle East, second to Saudi Arabia. Over the past few years, Iran has expanded its domestic refining capacity to meet growing domestic demand, particularly for gasoline. Almost all of Iran’s domestic oil consumption was of locally produced products.

Iran is the second-largest oil-consuming country in the Middle East, second to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil consumption is mainly diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil. Total oil consumption averaged approximately 1.75 million bbl/d in 2013, almost 3% higher than the year before. In the past, Iran had limited domestic oil refining capacity and was heavily dependent on imports of refined products, especially gasoline, to meet domestic demand. In response to international sanctions and the resulting difficulty in purchasing refined products, Iran expanded its domestic refining capacity. As of September 2013, Iran’s total crude oil distillation capacity was nearly 2.0 million bbl/d, about 140,000 bbl/d more than the previous year, according to FGE. Most of that increase came from expansion projects that were recently completed at the Arak and Lavan refineries. Iran also extracts petroleum products at natural gas processing plants (naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas). A small amount of crude oil, approximately 4,000 bbl/d, is directly burned for power generation.

Table 4. Oil refineries in Iran

Almost all of Iran’s product consumption was locally produced. In 2013, FGE estimates that Iran imported almost 17,000 bbl/d of petroleum products, of which roughly 85% was gasoline. Over the past several years, Iran’s gasoline import dependence has decreased significantly as a result of increased domestic refining capacity and subsidy cuts. Iran plans to increase gasoline production capacity at the Isfahan and Bandar Abbas refineries by the end of 2014. Despite refinery expansions, FGE expects Iran’s gasoline imports to increase over the medium and long term because of increased gasoline demand and the government’s plan to reduce gasoline production at petrochemical plants. However, gasoline demand is expected to decrease in the short term because of higher prices as a result of subsidy cuts.

Rationing and subsidies

Iran’s energy prices are heavily subsidized, particularly gasoline prices. At the end of 2010, the government initiated the first phase of the subsidy reform, decreasing the subsidies on energy prices to discourage waste. Phase II of the subsidy reform was initiated in early 2014. According to FGE, gasoline prices have risen by 43% to 75%. As a result, gasoline consumption is expected to decline in the near term, at least in 2014. The subsidy reform also includes phasing out subsidies for natural gas.

Natural gas sector

Reserves

Iran is the second-largest proved natural gas reserve holder in the world, behind Russia. Iran holds 17% of the world’s proved natural gas reserves and more than one-third of OPEC’s reserves. Iran’s largest natural gas field, South Pars, is estimated to hold roughly 40% of Iran’s gas reserves. However, the vast majority of Iran’s gas reserves are undeveloped.

According to Oil & Gas Journal, as of January 2014, Iran’s estimated proved natural gas reserves were 1,193 Tcf, second only to Russia. Iran holds 17% of the world’s proved natural gas reserves and more than one-third of OPEC’s reserves. Iran has a high success rate of natural gas exploration, in terms of wildcat drilling, which is estimated at 79% compared to the world average success rate of 30% to 35%, according to FGE.

Iran’s natural gas infrastructure

Iran’s largest gas field is South Pars, a non-associated gas field located offshore in the middle of the Persian Gulf. South Pars is a portion of a larger gas structure that straddles the territorial water borders of Iran and Qatar. It is called the North field in Qatar. South Pars reserves account for roughly 40% of Iran’s total gas reserves, and the field is also estimated to hold 17 million barrels of condensate in place. Other major gas fields in Iran include: Kish, North Pars, Tabnak, Forouz, and Kangan. These fields and others also hold large amounts of condensate reserves. Iran is also estimated to hold 2 Tcf of proved and probable natural gas reserves onshore and offshore in the Caspian basin.

Although finding new natural gas reserves is not a high priority because much of Iran’s current reserves are undeveloped, there have been significant gas discoveries in recent years.

Iran’s natural gas resources are abundant, and although exploration for new resources is not a priority for the Iranian government, a number of new finds have been announced recently. In 2011, four sizeable new discoveries were announced: Khayyam (onshore), Forouz B (offshore in Persian Gulf), Madar (offshore in the Persian Gulf), and Sardare Jangal fields (offshore in Caspian Sea).

The discovery of the Khayyam field, located near the city of Assaluyeh, was announced in January 2011. According to Arab Oil and Gas Journal, the field contains 9.2 Tcf of natural gas in place, of which at least 7.3 Tcf is believed to be recoverable, along with approximately 220 million barrels of condensate reserves. The Forouz B field was discovered in the Persian Gulf, close to Lavan Island, and holds an estimated 29 Tcf of gas in place. The Madar field, close to Assaluyeh, is thought to hold about 17.5 Tcf of natural gas in place and 653 million barrels of recoverable condensate reserves.

In December 2011, Khazar Oil Company (a NIOC subsidiary) discovered the giant Sardare Jangal field approximately 150 miles offshore in the Caspian Sea. Based on initial assessments, the field is estimated to hold 50 Tcf of natural gas in place. Given the field’s position in the Caspian Sea, it is possible that Iran shares the field with Azerbaijan. However, the lack of a border delineation agreement among littoral states could complicate the development of this field.

Production

Iran is the world’s third-largest dry natural gas producer, after the United States and Russia, and accounted for nearly 5% of the world’s dry natural gas production in 2012. Despite repeated delays in field development and the effects of sanctions, Iran’s natural gas production is expected to increase in the coming years. In 2012, almost 40% of Iran’s gross natural gas production came from the South Pars field.

Gross natural gas production totaled almost 8.2 Tcf in 2012, increasing 3% from the previous year. Of the 8.2 Tcf produced, most of it was marketed (6.54 Tcf), and the remainder was reinjected into oil wells to enhance oil recovery (1 Tcf) and vented and flared (0.62 Tcf). Reinjecting natural gas plays a critical role in oil recovery at Iran’s fields. As a result, natural gas reinjection is expected to increase in the coming years. Some estimates indicate that NIOC will require 7 to 8 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of natural gas for reinjection into its oil fields in the next decade, according to FGE. Iran also flares (burns off) a substantial portion of its gross production. According to Cedigaz, Iran flared the second-largest amount of natural gas in the world in 2012, after Russia. Gas is flared because of the lack of infrastructure to capture and transport gas associated with oil production.

Dry natural gas production is a subset of marketed production. Marketed production includes dry natural gas, liquid hydrocarbons, and natural gas used in field and processing plant operations. In 2012, 69% of the gross natural gas production was marketed as dry gas. Iran’s dry natural gas production has rapidly increased to more than 5.6 Tcf in 2012, almost double the amount produced 10 years ago. Iran is the world’s third-largest dry natural gas producer, after the United States and Russia, and accounted for nearly 5% of the world’s dry natural gas production in 2012. The vast majority of Iran’s production is consumed domestically. Domestic consumption has increased alongside production and totaled 5.5 Tcf in 2012.

The South Pars field accounted for almost 40% of Iran’s gross natural gas production, with sizeable production also coming from the Nar, Kangan and Tabnak fields. Nearly 80% of gross production came from non-associated gas fields, with the remainder of gross natural gas produced being associated with oil. Associated natural gas production originates mainly from the Khuzestan, Ilam, and Kermanshah provinces, along with offshore oil fields.

Much like in the oil sector, the natural gas sector has been hampered by international sanctions. Although sanctions targeting the Iranian natural gas exports were only recently enacted by the EU, lack of foreign investment and sufficient financing has resulted in slow growth in Iran’s natural gas production. According to some analysts, Iran should have become one of world’s leading natural gas producers and exporters given its large resource base. Development of its fields has been hampered by a combination of financing, technical, and contractual issues.

Nonetheless, Iran’s natural gas production has grown, and output is likely to continue to increase in the coming years. FGE projects that Iran’s gross natural gas production will increase to 10.6 Tcf in 2020, but that growth will depend on the pace of development of the South Pars field.

Natural gas production from South Pars is critical to meet increasing domestic consumption and Iran’s current and to meet future export obligations.

The most significant energy development project in Iran, the South Pars field, accounted for nearly 40% of Iran’s gross natural gas production in 2012 and holds 40% of Iran’s total proved natural gas reserves. Discovered in 1990 and located 62 miles offshore in the Persian Gulf, South Pars has a 24-phase development scheme. The total cost is expected to exceed $100 billion, which excludes downstream facilities, according to Arab Oil and Gas Journal.

The entire project is managed by Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC), a subsidiary of NIOC. Each of the 24 phases has a combination of natural gas with condensate and/or NGPL production. Production from phases 1 to 10 was originally designed to be allocated for the domestic market for consumption and reinjection. Production from the remaining phases is planned for export via pipelines and as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and/or used for proposed gas-to-liquids (GTL) projects.

Currently, phases 1 to 10 and phase 12 are producing natural gas. Phase 12 is the most recent to come online in February 2014, although it is not expected to reach its full capacity of 3 Bcf/d of natural gas and 120,000 bbl/d of condensate until 2016-17. Phases 15 and 16 are the next phases planned to come online in 2015, eventually reaching full capacity of 2 Bcf/d of natural gas and 80,000 bbl/d of condensate a year following its start.

Other field developments

The Kish field, which was originally thought to hold approximately 48 Tcf of natural gas reserves, was reassessed in mid-2011 to 70 Tcf. According to FGE, Kish may be one of Iran’s more lucrative natural gas prospects because of its reserves and location. PEDEC put in place a six-phase plan to develop Kish, which could produce more than 4 Bcf per day of natural gas. Because of repeated contractual disagreements among companies involved in the development of this field, as well as the infrastructure required (which includes the construction of a natural gas processing plant, gas pipelines, and a new power plant), the first phase of this field is unlikely to come online before 2020.

The North Pars field has approximately 50 Tcf recoverable reserves of sour gas. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed an agreement with NIOC to develop North Pars. However, Iran cancelled the contract with CNOOC after CNOOC paused its activities as a result of U.S. sanctions. According to FGE, this project is not likely to come online before 2020.

The Lavan field’s estimated recoverable reserves are approximately 6.6 Tcf, with 62 million barrels of condensate reserves. The first phase of the project, expected to be completed by 2015-2016, will produce 750 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) of natural gas and 11,000 bbl/d of condensate.

The Forouz B field’s recoverable reserves are estimated at 25 Tcf. Production from this field is expected to be used for electricity generation for export to Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Oman. The first gas from Forouz B is expected in 2017-18.

The Golshan and Ferdowsi fields hold 39 Tcf and 11 Tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves, respectively. Contracts for the development of these fields were awarded but subsequently cancelled. There are currently no development plans. NIOC plans to award these fields to Iranian firms sometime during 2014. First production is not expected until after 2020.

Consumption

In 2012, Iran consumed an estimated 5.5 Tcf of dry natural gas, an increase of 2% compared with the previous year. The residential and commercial sector accounted for the largest share of dry natural gas consumption (34%), followed by electric power (28%), industrial (25%), transportation (5%), and other sectors (8%), according to FGE. While Iran’s domestic natural gas consumption has been growing in those sectors, domestically-produced natural gas is also central to Iran’s plans to increase crude oil production through EOR techniques. In 2012, Iran reinjected more than 1.0 Tcf of natural gas in its oil fields to help boost oil production. In addition to domestic consumption and reinjection for oil recovery, Iran also must dedicate a portion of its natural gas production to fulfill contractual export commitments.

Iran has experienced seasonal natural gas supply shortages in the winter months mostly because of the delay of the South Pars projects. Also, Iran’s natural gas imports declined by roughly 50% in 2012 over the previous year, reflecting substantially fewer volumes imported from Turkmenistan because U.S. and EU sanctions interfered with financial transactions. As a result of the 2013 natural gas supply shortage, power plants were switched to use fuel oil and diesel. Also, natural gas supply, used to fuel compressed natural gas (CNG) stations for transportation and production at petrochemical plants, was disrupted this past winter. Iran is expected to continue to experience seasonal natural gas supply shortages in the next few years, although this largely depends on whether any new South Pars phases come online. Iran is planning to expand its underground natural gas storage capacity to ensure that enough natural gas is available during peak demand periods in the future.

Imports and exports

Iran trades marginal amounts of natural gas regionally via pipelines. In 2012, more than 90% of Iran’s imports came from Turkmenistan and roughly 90% of Iran’s exports went to Turkey. Iran does not have the infrastructure in place to export or import liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Iran accounted for less than 1% of global natural gas trade in 2012. In 2012, Iran exported 326 Bcf and imported 188 Bcf of dry natural gas, both via pipelines. Iran relies on imports particularly during winter months when residential space-heating demand peaks during colder weather. Iran does not have the infrastructure in place to export or import liquefied natural gas (LNG). The NIOC started construction projects in the past to build an LNG export plant, but most of the work has been halted, mainly because of the lack of technology and foreign investment, stemming from international sanctions.

Iran’s natural gas imports declined by roughly 50% in 2012 compared with the previous year, reflecting substantially fewer volumes imported from Turkmenistan. According to FGE, the U.S. and EU sanctions interfered with financial transactions between Turkmenistan and Iran in 2012 and 2013, resulting in the decline of Turkmen gas imports. In 2011, Iran received almost 30% of Turkmenistan’s gas exports, but the share dropped to under 15% in 2012. Nonetheless, more than 90% of Iran’s natural gas imports still came from Turkmenistan in 2012, and the remainder was from Azerbaijan. Imports of Turkmen natural gas are essential to Iran’s ability to meet both seasonal peak demand and industrial demand in northern Iran.

Iran exports natural gas to Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Almost 90% of Iranian exports went to Turkey in 2012, and the remainder went to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia uses the majority of imported Iranian natural gas to produce electricity at the Hrazden power plant. In return, excess base-load electricity generated from the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) is exported to Iran. Iran’s exports natural gas to the isolated Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan via the Salmas-Nakhchivan pipeline. In exchange, Azerbaijan exports natural gas to Iran’s northern provinces via the Astara-Kazi-Magomed pipeline.

In a report titled Natural Gas Exports from Iran, EIA estimated that the average revenues from Iran’s natural gas exports during the period July 2011 to June 2012 were approximately $10.5 million per day, or about 5% of the estimated $231 million per day in revenues from crude oil and condensates exports over the same period. In 2010, natural gas exports accounted for less than 4% of Iran’s total export earnings, while crude oil and condensates accounted for more than 78%.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG)

Although Iran’s aspirations to build a liquefaction facility date back to the 1970s, the country has yet to build one. Despite ambitious plans, Iran has had to cancel or delay LNG projects because of U.S. and EU sanctions that made it impossible to obtain financing and to purchase necessary technology. Given the political constraints, Iran’s LNG projects are years away.

Proposed regional pipelines

Iran-Iraq Pipeline: Iraq signed an agreement with Iran in June 2013 to receive natural gas to fuel Iraqi power plants in Baghdad and Diyala. The initial contract covered 880 MMcf/d over 5 years, but this was later increased to 1.4 Bcf/d over 10 years. The pipeline is under construction and it has experienced delays, some of which have been security-related issues including an attack on Iranian engineers. According to FGE, Iran’s plans to export 176 MMscf/d of gas to Iraq have been postponed to 2015.

Iran-Oman Pipeline: Iran and Oman signed an MOU for Iran to supply 1 Bcf/d of natural gas via pipeline to Oman over 25 years. According to IHS, the pipeline is expected to be completed in 2018-19. However, the project may be delayed because of pricing disagreements. According to FGE, Iran expects gas prices of $11-14/MMBtu, while Oman is looking to pay $6-7/MMBtu.

Iran-Pakistan Pipeline: Although the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline has experienced considerable financing difficulties, both countries seem committed to complete the project. In 2012, Pakistan completed tenders for engineering, procurement, construction, and commissioning, and Iran agreed to supply Pakistan with $500 million to finance the line on the Pakistani side. The initial agreement called for the delivery of 750 MMcf/d of natural gas over 25 year, but this was later increased to roughly 1 Bcf/d, according to Arab Oil and Gas Journal. Although contractor targets indicate pipeline completion in late 2014, industry sources do not expect the pipeline to be operational before 2018.

Iran-UAE Gas Contract: The Iran-UAE gas contract outlined an agreement to transport natural gas from the Salman field to Sharjah in UAE. Contract negotiations were not concluded because of a pricing and volume dispute, and the contract was referred to international arbitration.

Electricity sector

Iran’s increasing domestic demand for electricity has created supply shortfalls during times of peak energy demand. Iran recently increased electricity prices, which is a component of its energy subsidy reform, in hopes to limit demand growth. Natural gas is the country’s primary fuel source to generate electricity, accounting for almost 70% of total generation in 2012.

In 2012, Iran generated approximately 221 billion kilowatthours (Bkwh) of electricity, of which almost 95% was from fossil-fuel sources, according to Business Monitor International (BMI). Natural gas is the largest source of fuel for electricity generation in Iran, accounting for almost 70% of total generation. Oil, hydropower, coal, and non-hydro renewables made up the remaining fuel sources used to generate electricity in Iran, with marginal generation from a nuclear power plant that came online in 2011 but did not start commercial production until 2013.

Iran has experienced seasonal natural gas supply shortages in the winter months mostly because of the delay of the South Pars projects. Several natural gas-fired power plants were switched to use fuel oil and diesel during the past winter because of the natural gas supply shortage. Iran is planning to expand its underground natural gas storage capacity to ensure that enough natural gas is available during peak demand periods to avoid electricity supply shortfalls in the future.

As a part of Iran’s energy subsidy reform, the Iranian government announced in early 2014 that electricity prices would increase by 25% as subsidies are scaled back. The government hopes that the price increase will ease consumption growth and pressure on its generation system, particularly during peak demand times. Nonetheless, Iran’s electricity consumption is expected to continue to grow, and be met by new generation from natural gas, non-hydro renewable resources, and nuclear power.

Iran’s first nuclear power plant at Bushehr became operational in 2011 after many years of delay. Construction at the power plant originally began in the mid-1970s, but was repeatedly delayed by the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and more recently by problems associated with the Russian consortium that was awarded the construction contract. The Iranian government took control over the management of the plant in late 2013, around the same time the nuclear power plant began commercially producing power at its full capacity of 1,000 megawatts (MW), according to BMI. Two additional units are planned at Bushehr, each with a planned capacity of 1,000 MW, according to the World Nuclear Association.
Electricity generation by fuel in Iran, 2012

Iran’s government plans to construct additional nuclear power plants, the next of which is likely to be a station near Darkhovin with a generation capacity of 360 MW, although initial plans included capacity of more than 1,000 MW. However, sanctions imposed on Iran’s controversial nuclear program may prevent the development of not only this nuclear power plant, but also adversely affect fossil-fueled generation and hydroelectric projects as a result of a lack of financing and necessary technology.

The Iranian government also plans to expand power generation from fossil-fuel sources with a number of new projects being developed as independent power projects, including a station near Assaluyeh (natural gas-fired), one in the East Azerbaijan province (gas-fired combined-cycle), and another at Parehsar on the Caspian Sea coast.

Increasing its generation capacity will help ensure that Iran can meet its increasing domestic power demand and continue to export electric power to neighboring countries. Iran exports electric power to Armenia, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Azerbaijan and Armenia supply electricity to Iran under a swap agreement.
Notes

Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of July 22, 2014.
Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

The post Iran Energy Profile: Fourth In Crude Oil Reserves, Second In Natural Gas – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Jennifer Lazuta

Air Algeria says authorities to continue to look for flight AH5017, which vanished from radar somewhere over northern Mali, on its way from Burkina Faso to Algiers. There has been no contact with the plane carrying 116 passengers and crew since early Thursday morning, on what should have been a four-hour flight.

There were few clear indications either of what might have happened to flight AH5017, or whether there were casualties, but Burkina Faso’s transport minister said the crew asked to adjust their route at 0138 GMT because of a storm in the area. It is not yet known if weather played a role in the plane’s disappearance.

“I can confirm that it has crashed,” the Algerian official told Reuters, declining to be identified or give any details about what had happened to the aircraft on its way north.

The French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said the Air Algerie flight was still missing, but had probably crashed.

“Despite intensive search efforts no trace of the aircraft has yet been found,” Fabius told journalists in Paris. “The plane probably crashed.”

French President Francois Hollande canceled a planned visit to overseas territories and said all military means on the ground would be used to locate the aircraft.

Earlier Thursday, Kara Terki, a spokesman for Air Algeria, confirmed there has been no sign of the plane since around 330 GMT, about one hour before it was scheduled to land in Algiers Thursday morning.

“Since 5 o’clock this morning, we have been searching, and continue to search, to trace the signal from our plane, that was destined for Algeria,” Terki said. “But for the moment, the plane remains missing… We would like to have more definitive information, particularly for the families of those on board, but for now, we continue to search.”

Spanish airline Swiftair, which owns the MD-83 aircraft, constructed in 1996, said in a statement it continues to work with Air Algeria and local authorities to locate the missing plane.

According to Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Transportation, there were 110 passengers and six crew members on board, including 50 French citizens and 24 Burkinabe. They said most of the passengers were in transit to destinations in Europe.

Last seen over northern Mali

Security officials in Mali told VOA that the plane was last seen on radar over northern Mali, between Gao and Tissalit, near the border with Burkina Faso.

Gao was one of the towns in northern Mali seized by al-Qaida-linked Islamist militants in 2012. The Malian government regained control after a French-led military intervention last year, but militants continue to attack French and government troops.

Crisis team

Algerian officials have set up a crisis team at the Algiers airport, while Swiftair said emergency equipment and personnel have been deployed to find out what happened to the plane.

The post French FM Says Missing Algeria Plane ‘Probably Crashed’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Zarin Ahmad

In June 2014, history repeated itself when three Muslims were killed and over 50 injured in Aluthgama, Sri Lanka. Almost 100 years ago, in May 1915, communal violence erupted between Sinhala Buddhists and Muslims in Kandy, Sri Lanka.

The 1915 riot was a spontaneous expression of deep economic hostilities with Muslim traders. This time the island’s Muslim community finds itself at the receiving end of a concerted and well thought-out attack by the jubilant Sinhala-Buddhists in a post-war Sri Lanka. The militant Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), an off-shoot of another hard-line Sinhala organisation the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) is spearheading a movement against Muslims. Over the past two years, the BBS has organised a systematic and structured attack on Muslim places of worship, dress-code, dietary practices, and business establishments. In February 2013, the BBS went on an aggressive campaign against ‘halal’ certification of foods that follow Islamic dietary guidelines. Later, the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama withdrew the ‘halal’ certification in the domestic market ‘in the interest of peace’. Soon after, the Islamic dress-code of the ‘abaya’ became the new bone of contention and drew the ire and disdain of the BBS. Since 2012, the BBS has been distributing pamphlets to discourage people from buying products from Muslim-owned establishments.

Why has there been this aggressive campaign against Muslims, and what has been the Muslim response in the island’s politics? The answer lies in the island’s complex political history. Muslim identity in Sri Lanka grew within and as a result of competing Sinhala and Tamil identity assertions. Muslims are the third largest community in the island-nation. According to the 2011 census, they constitute 9.7 per cent of the country’s population. Despite a sizeable number, they are scattered across the country, particularly in the eastern province, and in Colombo. Ethnically they comprise Sri Lankan Moors, Indian Moors, Malays, Memons and Bohras. The term ‘Moor’ was used by the Portuguese, and later the Dutch, to refer to Muslims of mixed Arab origin living in the coastal cities of Sri Lanka. A majority of the island’s Muslims claim their ancestral connection to Arab maritime traders – that predates the birth of Islam. Except southern Muslims who are bilingual (i.e they speak Tamil and Sinhala), Muslims are predominantly Tamil-speaking. In a country sharply divided along linguistic lines, they formed an identity on the basis of religion.

Due to a history of persecution (under Portuguese and Dutch rules from the 1600s to the beginning of the 1900s), scattered geography, and competing Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms, Muslims have by and large maintained a low-profile in the complex dynamics of the island’s politics. However, in the 1980s, when the fight for a Tamil homeland was happening literally in their backyard, Muslims could not remain out of the fray. They opposed a merger of Northern and Eastern Provinces fearing that they would become a ‘minority within a minority’.

They demanded that the predominantly Muslim areas in the Eastern Province should be linked together as a single political and administrative entity. This was also the period when their political and electoral identity crystallised with the formation of the island’s first effective Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) under the aegis of the late MHM Ashraff. Socially, Muslims expressed an identity based on their religion to distinguish themselves from Tamils. However, despite being geo-politically located in the locus of the war, Muslims did not resort to militancy like their Tamil counterparts.

In the immediate post-war political dynamics, the SLMC initially supported the opposition coalition. However, the lasting impact of the total obliteration of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 and the overwhelming electoral victories of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) hereafter put minorities, particularly Muslims, on the political back foot and an end to a viable opposition. The SLMC joined the ruling coalition in 2010.

This brings us back to our initial question – why is there a systematic attack against Sri Lankan Muslims? First, this could be yet another reflection of rising Islamophobia in the Indian Ocean region as asserted by Justice Minister and SLMC leader, Rauf Hakeem. Second, the demographic number game has been critical in Sri Lankan politics. The 2011 census indicated a positive curve in the Muslim population. This growth is perceived as an upsurge of growing Muslim domination. Third, the military victory over the LTTE in 2009 gave the Sinhala Buddhist hardliners a strong ‘imagined’ sense of preserving the ‘homeland’ for themselves.

In a much delayed response to the riots of June 2014, Hakeem threatened Muslim radicalisation and claimed that Sri Lanka could become a fertile ground for ‘outside’ forces. Going by the history of Sri Lankan Muslims, this may well be another strong statement by the SLMC to assert to its electorate that it is the only party that stands up for Muslim rights. But what is more disturbing is the growing latent hostility in a section of the majority mind-set.

Zarin Ahmad
Visiting Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi

The post Sri Lanka: Understanding Buddhist-Muslim Communal Clashes – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

THE human species reaffirms with frustrating force that it has existed for approximately 230 million years. I do not recall any affirmation that it has achieved any greater age. Other kinds of humans did exist, like the Neanderthals of European origin; or a third, the hominid of Denisova in North Asia but, in no case are there fossils more ancient than those of the homo sapiens of Ethiopia.

On the other hand, similar remains exist of numerous species living then, such as dinosaurs, the fossilized remains of which date back more than 200 million years. Many scientists talk of their existence prior to the meteorite which struck the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, provoking the death of these mammals, some of which measured up to 60 meters in length.

Equally known is the prehistory of the planet which we today inhabit, which broke away from the solar nebula and cooled as a compact, almost flat mass, constituted by a growing number of well defined materials which, little by little, acquired visible traits. It is not as yet known how many remain to be discovered, and the previously unknown uses which modern technology can contribute to human beings.

It is known that the seeds of certain edible plants were discovered and began to be used around 40,000 years ago. There is also confirmation of what was a sowing calendar, engraved in stone approximately 10,000 years ago.

Science must teach all of us to be more modest, given our congenital self-sufficiency. In this way, we would be more prepared to confront and even enjoy the rare privilege of existing.

Countless generous and self-sacrificing people, in particular mothers, whom nature endowed with a special spirit of sacrifice, live in this exploited and plundered world.

The concept of fathers, which does not exist in nature, is on the other hand, fruit of social education in human beings and is observed as a norm in any part of the world, from the Arctic, where the Eskimos are to be found, to the most torrid tropical jungles of Africa, in which women not only look after their families, but also work the land to produce food.

Anyone who reads the news arriving every day on old and new behaviors of nature and discoveries of methods for confronting events of yesterday, today and tomorrow, will understand the exigencies of our time.

Viruses are transforming themselves in unexpected forms, hitting the most productive plants or animals which make possible human alimentation, making the health of our species more insecure and costly, generating and aggravating illnesses, above all among the elderly or infants.

How to honorably confront the growing number of obstacles suffered by the inhabitants of the planet?

Let us think that more than 200 human groups are disputing the Earth’s resources. Patriotism is simply the widest sentiment of solidarity achieved. We should never say that it was only a little thing. It evidently began with family activities of reduced groups of people which historians describe as family clans, to explore ways of cooperation among family groups who cooperated with each other in order to undertake tasks within their reach. There was a struggle among family groups in other stages, until they reached higher levels of organization such as, doubtless, tribes. More than 100,000 years went by. Recollections written on sophisticated parchment, however, date back no more than 4,000 years.

The human capacity to think and develop ideas was already notable, and I sincerely do not believe that the Ancient Greeks were less intelligent than contemporary humans. Their poems, their philosophical texts, their sculptures, their medical knowledge, their Olympic Games; their mirrors, with which they set alight enemy ships by concentrating the sun’s rays; the works of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Archimedes and others, filled the ancient world with light. They were men of exceptional talents.

After a long road, we arrived at the contemporary stage of human history.

Critical days were not long in presenting themselves for our homeland, at 90 miles from the continental territory of the United States, after a profound crisis struck the USSR.

From January 1, 1959, our country took charge of its own destiny after 402 years of Spanish colonialism and 59 as a neo-colony. We no longer existed as indigenous peoples who did not even speak the same language; we were a mix of whites, Blacks and American Indians who formed a new nation with its virtues and defects like all the rest. It goes without saying that the tragedy of unemployment, underdevelopment and an extremely poor level of education ruled on the island. The people were in possession of knowledge inculcated by the press and literature dominant in the United States, which was unaware of, if it did not scorn, the sentiments of a nation which had fought with arms over decades for its independence and, in the end, also against hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the service of the Spanish metropolis. It is essential not to overlook the history of the “Ripe Fruit,” dominant in the colonialist mentality of the powerful neighboring nation, which made its power prevail and not only refused the country the right to be free today, tomorrow and for ever, but attempted to annex our island as part of the territory of that powerful country.

When the U.S. Maine battleship exploded in the port of Havana, the Spanish army, comprising hundreds of thousands of men, was already defeated. Just as one day, on the basis of heroism, the Vietnamese defeated the powerful army endowed with sophisticated equipment, including Agent Orange, which affected so many Vietnamese for life, and Nixon, on more than one occasion, was tempted to use nuclear weapons against that heroic people. It was not by chance that he fought to soften the Soviet position with discussions on food production in that country.

I would not be clear if I do not point to a bitter moment in our relations with the USSR. This was derived from our reaction on learning of Nikita Khrushchev’s decision related to the 1962 October Crisis, the 51st anniversary of which is this October.

When we found out that Khrushchev had agreed with John F. Kennedy to withdraw the nuclear missiles from the country, I published a note of five points which I considered indispensable for an agreement. The Soviet leader knew that initially we warned the Chief Marshal of the Soviet rockets that Cuba was not interested in being seen as an emplacement for USSR missiles, given its aspiration to be an example for other countries in Latin America in the struggle for the independence of our peoples. But despite this the Chief Marshal of those weapons, an excellent person, insisted on the need to have some weaponry which would deter the aggressors. Given his insistence on the issue, I stated that if it seemed to them an essential need for the defense of socialism, that was different, because, above all else, we were revolutionaries. I asked him for two hours so that the leadership of our Revolution could make a decision.

In relation to Cuba, Khrushchev had conducted himself with much dignity. When the United States totally suspended the sugar quota and blocked our trade, he decided to buy what that country had ceased to import, and at the same price; when, a few months later, that country suspended oil quotas, the USSR supplied us with the necessities of that vital product without which our economy would have suffered a major collapse. A fight to the death had been imposed, given that Cuba would never surrender. The battles had been very bloody, as much for the aggressors as for us. We had accumulated more than 300,000 weapons, including the 100,000 we had taken from the Batista dictatorship.

The Soviet leader had accumulated great prestige. As a result of the occupation of the Suez Canal by France and Britain, the two powers which owned the canal and, with the support pf Israeli forces, had attacked and occupied the waterway, Khrushchev warned that he would use his nuclear weapons against the French and British aggressors who had occupied that point. Under Eisenhower’s leadership, the United States was not disposed at that moment to involve itself in a war. I recall a phrase of Khrushchev’s at that time, “Our missiles could hit a fly in the air.”

Not long afterward, the world found itself enveloped in extremely grave danger of war. Unfortunately, it was the most serious as yet known. Khrushchev wasn’t just one more leader, during the Great Patriotic War he was outstanding as Chief Commissar of the defense of Stalingrad, now Volgograd, in the hardest battle waged in the world, with the participation of four million men. The Nazis lost more than half a million soldiers. The October Crisis in Cuba lost him his position. In 1964 he was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev.

It was supposed that, although at a high price, the United States would keep to its commitment not to invade Cuba. Brezhnev developed excellent relations with our country. He visited us on January 28, 1974, developed the military might of the Soviet Union, trained many officers of our forces in the military academy of his great country, continued the free supply of military armaments to our country, promoted the construction of a water cooled electronuclear power station at which maximum security measures were implemented, and gave support to our country’s economic objectives.

Upon his death on November 10, 1982, he was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, director of the KGB, who headed the funeral ceremony for Brezhnev and took possession as president of the USSR. He was a serious man, that is my appreciation of him, and also very frank.

He told us that if we were attacked by the United States we would have to fight alone. We asked him if they could supply weapons free of charge as had been the case. He replied in the affirmative. We then communicated to him, “Don’t worry, send us the weapons which the invaders took from us.”

Only a minimum of compañeros were informed of this matter, given that it would have been highly dangerous if the enemy had this information.

We decided to ask other friends for sufficient weapons in order to organize one million Cuban combatants. Compañero Kim Il Sung, a veteran and impeccable combatant, sent us 100,000 AK rifles and their corresponding park without charging a cent.

What contributed to unleash the crisis? Khrushchev had perceived Kennedy’s clear intention to invade Cuba as soon as the political and diplomatic conditions were prepared, especially after the crushing defeat of the mercenary Bay of Pigs invasion, escorted by assault warships from the Marine Infantry and a yanki aircraft carrier. The mercenaries controlled the airspace with more than 40 aircraft including B-26 bombers, air transport planes and other support aircraft.

A prior surprise attack on the principal airbase did not find our aircraft lined up, but dispersed to various points, those which could be moved and those that lacked parts. It affected just a few. The day of the traitorous invasion our planes were in the air before dawn, headed for Playa Girón. Let us just say that an honest U.S. writer described it as a disaster. Suffice it to say that at the end of that adventure only two or three expeditionaries were able to return to Miami.

The invasion programmed by the U.S. armed forces against the island would have suffered tremendous losses, far higher than the 50,000 soldiers they lost in Vietnam. They did not then have the experience that they acquired later.

It will be recalled that, on October 28, 1962, I stated that I was not in agreement with the decision, not consulted with or known by Cuba, that the USSR would withdraw its strategic missiles, for which launch pads were being constructed, to a total of 42. I explained to the Soviet leader that this step had not been consulted with us, an essential requisite of our agreements. The idea can be put in one sentence, “You can convince me that I am wrong, but you cannot say that I am wrong without convincing me,” and I enumerated five points, to remain sacrosanct. 1. An end to the economic blockade and all measures of commercial economic coercion exercised by the United States in all parts of the world against our country. 2. An end to all subversive activities, the launching of landing of arms and explosives by air and by sea, the organization of mercenary invasions, filtration of spies and saboteurs, all of these actions carried out from U.S. territory and some complicit countries. 3. An end to pirate attacks perpetrated from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico. 4. An end to all violations of our air and maritime space by U.S. warplanes and warships. 5. Withdrawal from the Guantánamo Naval Base and the return of the Cuban territory occupied by the United States.

It is equally very well known that the French journalist Jean Daniel interviewed President Kennedy after the October Crisis; Kennedy recounted the very difficult time he had experienced, and asked him if I was really aware of the danger of that moment. I asked the French reporter to travel to Cuba, to talk with me and clarify that question.

Daniel traveled to Cuba and asked for an interview. I called him that night and conveyed to him that I wanted to see him and converse with him about the issue, and suggested that we talk in Varadero. We arrived there and I invited him to lunch. It was midday. I turned on the radio and at that moment a glacial dispatch announced that the President had been assassinated in Dallas.

There was virtually nothing left to talk about. Of course, I asked him to tell me about his conversation with Kennedy; he was really impressed with his contact with the president. He told me that Kennedy was a thinking machine; he was really traumatized. I didn’t see him again. For my part, I investigated as far as I could, or rather, imagined what happened that day. Lee Harvey Oswald’s conduct was really strange. I knew that he had attempted to visit Cuba not long before the assassination of Kennedy, and that it was supposed that he shot at a moving target with a semi-automatic rifle. I am very well acquainted with the use of that weapon. When one fires, the sight moves and the target is lost in an instant; something which does not happen with other types of firing systems. The telescopic lens, of various degrees of power, is very precise if the weapon is supported, but obstructs when used against a moving object. It is said that two lethal shots were fired consecutively in a fraction of a second. The presence of a lumpen, known for his trade, who killed Oswald in no less than a police precinct, moved by the pain that Kennedy’s wife would be suffering, would seem to be a cynical joke.

Johnson, a good oil magnate, lost no time in taking a plane headed for Washington. I do not wish to make imputations; that is a matter for them, but the plans were to involve Cuba in the assassination of Kennedy. Later, after some years had passed, the son of the assassinated President visited and dined with me. He was a young man full of life, who liked to write. Shortly afterward, traveling in a stormy night to a vacation island in a simple aircraft, it apparently failed to find its goal and exploded. I also met in Caracas with the wife and young children of Robert Kennedy, who was Attorney General, and a negotiator with Khrushchev’s envoy and had been assassinated. Thus the world marched on since then.

Very close now to ending this account, which coincides with the 87th birthday of its author on August 13, I ask you to excuse me for any imprecision. I have not had time to consult documents.

News dispatches talk almost daily about issues of concern accumulating on the world horizon.

According to the Russia Today television channel website, Noam Chomsky stated,”’he U.S. policy is designed to increase terror.”

“According to the eminent philosopher, U.S. policy is designed so as to increase terror among the population. ‘The U.S. is conducting the most impressive international terrorist campaign ever seen [...] that of the drone planes and the special forces campaign…’”

“The drone planes campaign is creating potential terrorists.”

“In his view, it is absolutely amazing that the North American country performs on one hand a massive terror campaign that can generate potential terrorists against oneself, and on the other hand it proclaims that it is absolutely necessary to have mass surveillance to protect against terrorism.”

“According to Chomsky, there are many similar cases. One of the most striking, in his opinion, is that of Luis Posada Carriles, accused in Venezuela of participating in an attack on a plane aboard which 73 people were killed…”

Today, I am especially recalling the best friend I had in my years as a political activist – a very modest and poor man forged in the Bolivarian Army of Venezuela – Hugo Chávez Frías.

Among the many books which I have read, impregnated with his poetic and descriptive language, there is one which distills his rich culture and his capacity for expressing his intelligence and his sympathies in rigorous terms, through the 2,000-plus questions put to him by the likewise French journalist, Ignacio Ramonet.

On July 26th this year, when he visited Santiago de Cuba on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada and Carlos M. de Céspedes garrisons, Ramonet dedicated to me his latest book, Hugo Chávez Mi primera vida. (Hugo Chávez: My First Life).

I experienced the healthy pride of having contributed to the drafting of this work, because Ramonet subjected me to an implacable questionnaire, which, despite everything, served to coach the author on this material.

The worst thing is that I had not completed my task as a leader when I promised him to revise it.

On July 26, 2006, I fell seriously ill. As soon as I understood that it would be definitive, I didn’t hesitate for an instant to announce on the 31st that I was resigning from my posts as President of the Councils of State and Ministers, and proposed that the compañero designated to exercise this task should immediately proceed to occupy it.

I still had to complete the promised revision of One Hundred Hours with Fidel. I was prone, I feared losing consciousness while I was dictating and sometimes I fell asleep. Nevertheless, day by day, I replied to the devilish questions which seemed to me to be interminably long; but persisted until I finished.

I was far from imagining that my life would be prolonged another seven years. Only in this way did I have the privilege of reading and studying many things which I should have learned before. I think that the new discoveries have surprised everyone.

In relation to Hugo Chávez there remained many questions to answer, from the most important moment of his existence, when he assumed his post as President of the Republic of Venezuela. There is not one question to respond to in terms of the most brilliant moments of his life. Those who knew him well know the priority he gave to those ideological challenges. A man of action and ideas, he was surprised by an extremely aggressive illness which caused him great suffering, but he confronted it with great dignity, and with profound pain for his family and close friends who loved him so much. Bolívar was his teacher and the guide who directed his steps through life. Both of them brought together sufficient grandeur to occupy a place of honor in human history.

All of us are now awaiting Hugo Chávez, Mi Segunda Vida (Hugo Chávez: My Second Life). Without him, nobody could write the most authentic of histories better.

The post Fidel Castro: Objective Truths And Dreams – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amanda Ufheil-Somers

President Barack Obama got it right when he declared: “There’s no military solution inside of Iraq, certainly not one that is led by the United States.”

But his Iraq track record doesn’t mark much of an improvement over the mess his predecessor made.

The June takeover of Mosul by the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) — a group born from the devastation wrought by the U.S. invasion — has only escalated the mass displacement of Iraqis that the Bush administration sparked in 2003. Half a million people have left Nineveh province in the last month. They’re only the most recent exodus in a six-month-long wave of displacement from western and northern Iraq as ISIS has fought its way across the country.

As ISIS moves toward Baghdad, aerial bombing and clashes with the Iraqi military and local militias have driven thousands of Iraqis — mostly Shi’a, Kurds, and other ethnic and religious minorities, but also many Sunni Arabs — to safer areas in the south or to the territories controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government and its security forces.

There are now nearly 3 million internally displaced persons in Iraq. Over 700,000 of them remain displaced from the war following the U.S. invasion in 2003. Many thousands of Iraqis who had escaped to Syria have returned to Iraq because of the civil war there, along with over 200,000 Syrians.

Most of these returnees and new refugees arriving from the north have taken shelter in Kurdish towns (some in construction sites), or in camps set up by the Kurdish government and the United Nations.

And strained resources, combined with the temporary visas granted to non-Kurdish Iraqis, have forced many people to return to ISIS-controlled or embattled areas.

Iraq now faces a dire refugee crisis that is both humanitarian and political. Washington has promised $12.8 billion to fund services for refugees and internally displaced people in the current crisis in Iraq.

Money can do much to serve the immediate needs of displaced people for shelter, food, medical care and education. But money can’t buy a political solution to the crisis of legitimacy afflicting Iraq’s post-war institutions, tainted as they are by the sectarianism fostered during the U.S. occupation.

Nor can money relieve Washington of its obligations to help the thousands of Iraqis who have applied for permanent resettlement outside of Iraq. The Bush administration accepted only a few dozen Iraqi refugees a year until 2007 — primarily because it didn’t want to admit that there had been no “mission accomplished” in Iraq.

In the first year of the expanded refugee program, fewer than 2,000 refugees arrived. By this past May, the U.S. government had welcomed a total of 103,000 Iraqis. That may sound like a lot. But compare it to the 72,000 Iraqi refugees that Sweden — a country roughly the size of California, with scarcely a quarter of the population — has admitted.

U.S. refugee policies favor members of persecuted religious and ethnic minorities, and there’s a direct application process for Iraqis whose lives have been threatened due to employment or involvement with the U.S. military, its contractors, and American media outlets. But the approval rate for those whose applications are referred by the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration still hovers around 40 percent.

With the instability in Iraq, many American diplomatic staff have evacuated, including those responsible for refugee applications. The process is stalled precisely when it should be working overtime.

In 2009, Obama said that the United States has “a strategic interest — and a moral responsibility” to help displaced Iraqis.

No matter how fervently Washington tries to wash its hands of Iraq, that moral responsibility remains.

Amanda Ufheil-Somers is the assistant editor of Middle East Report, published by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP.org).

The post America Should Open Its Doors To Iraqis – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — Russia’s central bank has unexpectedly raised its main interest rate in a bid to stem inflation and support the ruble amid tensions over Ukraine.

The Bank of Russia said on July 25 it has increased its main interest rate by a half point to 8.0 percent.

In an apparent reference to uncertainty generated by the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions against Russian companies and officials, it said “heightened geopolitical tensions” were pushing down the ruble, increasing the risk of inflation.

The bank said it will continue raising the key interest rate if high inflation risks persist.

Higher interest rates tend to support the strength of a currency but can hurt economic growth.

The interest rate was 5.5 percent at the beginning of the year.

The post Russia Raises Key Interest Rate Amid Ukraine Tensions appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Saeid Jafari

When the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and his colleagues in the State of Law Coalition were occupying all government posts in an totalitarian manner and at all levels of the government, it was quit predictable that the situation in Iraq will become as critical as it is right now. However, it would be also too simplistic to blame Nouri Al-Maliki for all the problems with which Iraq is currently faced. Perhaps, major factors that have brought Iraq to its current critical state can be summarized as follows.

Nouri Al-Maliki and State of Law Coalition

Since he came to power, the prime minister of Iraq has been following a totalitarian approach and did not believe in consulting other parties or showing respect for the opposition views. As a result of sticking to this attitude by Maliki, the political gaps continued to widen not only between the prime minister and Sunni politicians, but even with Shias as well following the second parliamentary elections in Iraq that were held after the fall of the country’s former dictator, Saddam Hussein. If it were not for consultations by Tehran, two powerful Shia clerics, Muqtada Al-Sadr and Ammar Al-Hakim would not have conceded to a repeated term for Maliki as prime minister and he would have not been able to become the country’s prime minister for a second time. However, Maliki continued with his totalitarian policies and as time went by, he became even lonelier than before. The policies he adopted in Sunni-dominated areas were even worse. Those affiliated with the Baath party, the relatives of Saddam and even other Sunni groups had developed a strong hatred toward Shias, in general, and Nouri Al-Maliki, in particular, after they were set aside from the power structure. The prime minister of Iraq, however, continued his discriminatory policies in those areas dominated by Sunnis and further enraged them by not allowing them to take part in the political game. As a result, it is very natural for a powder keg to be set off with the first spark.

Saudi Arabia

The theory of Salafism and Wahhabism enjoys a high amount of potential for the promotion of violence and radicalism. This ideology, which is specifically fostered by Saudi Arabia, has found a powerful fan base among Sunni groups in the Middle East region, especially in those parts when Sunni people are disgruntled with their governments. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, regional power equations have taken a positive turn in favor of Iran’s national interests. Therefore, it is quite natural for Saudi Arabia to try to turn the table. Acting in a sinusoidal manner, this country has tried all existing options to bring about a major change in the existing conditions in Iraq. Riyadh, as such, has spared no effort from lending its support to violent acts by groups that oppose the central government to making recourse to civil mechanisms and providing spiritual and material support for political groups that oppose Nouri Al-Maliki. Undoubtedly, the government of Saudi Arabia as well as part of the Saudi society has played a crucial role in supplying military equipment to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. In the absence of that support, the ISIS would not have progressed as far as it already has.

The question is what are the viewpoints of Turkey and Iran, which have always followed the developments in Iraq with a lot of sensitivity?

Turkey

Perhaps the most eccentric policy toward the ongoing developments in Iraq has been taken by its northern neighbor, Turkey. Despite the fact that Ankara has been always greatly concerned about the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in the region, it is currently supporting the independence of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. In reality, however, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been taking great risks in Iraq. The fact that the next presidential election in Turkey is forthcoming and due to the considerable effect that the votes cast by Turkish Kurds will have in determining the final result of the election, Erdogan has decided to embark on a very dangerous game in Iraq. By trying to pass himself as a major support base for Massoud Barzani [the president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region] and Iraqi Kurds, Erdogan is trying to attract as many of Turkish Kurds’ votes as possible. On the other hand, Erdogan believes that by supporting the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, he will be able to sway a great degree of influence on that state in the figure. This will be a newly established country with a lot of crude oil for exports. However, almost all analysts know that this is a very dangerous game in which the possibility of Erdogan losing the game is tantamount to his chances for winning it.

Iran

Out of all regional countries, Iran benefitted most from the fall of Saddam. Perhaps, the overthrow of Saddam was more beneficial to Iran than even the United States. Therefore, it is no surprise that Tehran is now very concerned about the ongoing developments in Iraq and is opposed to any form of disruption in stability of Iraq as well as any obstacle that may prevent establishment of a powerful central government in its western neighbor. Iran has good friendly relations with all Shia groups in Iraq. However, the charismatic personality of Maliki and the way he ran the government had caused Iran to prefer Maliki over other Shia groups up to the present time. However, it goes without saying that if the need arises, Iran will be ready to prefer a more moderate person over Maliki in order to guarantee the survival of an integrated Iraq. From the viewpoint of Iran, such ideas as disintegration of Iraq, permanent occupation of part of Iraq by the ISIS as well as the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq are unacceptable ideas.

What will come next?

Following the inauguration of the new Iraqi parliament and appointment of a moderate figure out of Sunni groups as speaker of the new parliament, it seems that Maliki will have to say goodbye to power. Perhaps, this is one of the few chances that Iraq will have to overcome the ongoing crisis for which no short-term solution is perceivable. Kurds will not lose what they have gained so far and any central government coming to power in Iraq will possibly have to accept that the city of Kirkuk will never return under Baghdad’s control. Kurds, on the other hand, are well aware that those parties that are positive to independence of Kurdistan sway less power and influence in the country than those parties that are opposed to this process. In other words, under present circumstances, Turkey and Israel are the main parties supporting independence of Kurds, while two major foreign powers with influence in Iraq; that is, Iran and the United States have already indicated their opposition to any demand that would lead to disintegration of Iraq. Iran and the United States are also in agreement over another issue, which is annihilation of the ISIS. Both countries are wary about further growth of Salafi fundamentalism and a worst-case scenario for both Tehran and Washington is further advances of this terrorist group. Therefore, it seems that all the roads lead to Iran and the United States again, of course, provided that officials in both countries decide to strive toward the same goal and cooperate with each other away from longstanding problems that have marred their relations.

Saeid Jafari
Expert on Middle East Issues

The post The Crisis In Iraq: Root Causes And Future Outlook – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A lie told often enough becomes truth.  So it is said.  Thus over two-thirds of Americans had been convinced of Saddam Hussein’s WMDs, and his al-Qaeda connections despite his secular government headed by a Christian Prime Minister.  Where are the Iraqi Christians now?  Lies that cost thousands of lives, millions displaced and billions wasted.

Then there was the accusation that Assad used chemical weapons — since then proven false.  Why on earth would he do so when conventional weapons and his air force were more effective and without the risk of world opprobrium, or even of the wind changing direction.  That one was a close shave with the Russians arranging a face-saving deal.

Now we have the tragedy of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.  Without offering clear proof the US has accused the Ukrainian rebels of bringing it down, and the Russians of supplying the missiles.  Why?  The Russians point out a US spy satellite was over the area, so why not release the photos.  They ask why the Ukrainian aircraft controller diverted the Malaysian plane 500 km south from its regular flight path into a conflict zone.  They have also released images of an unidentifiable, therefore military jet, appearing close to the airliner.  As the rebels do not have any planes, one can only surmise it belonged to Ukrainian forces.

We have been told of desecrated bodies, inadequate access to the crash site and other charges.  But the crash site is in a war zone and, as reported by Reuters, Peter van Vliet, the Dutchman, whose team received the bodies said the rebel recovery crews had done a superb job of collecting and preserving the remains in very difficult circumstances.  Meanwhile the nightmare continues for the ethnic Russian communities in the east with thousands fleeing the bombing and shelling of their homes, seeking refuge in Russia.  Question:  If the Ukrainian government is so benign, why are these people not fleeing westwards within Ukraine?

The black boxes from MH17 were handed to the Malaysians to pass on to the ICAO but they, for reasons best known to themselves, delivered them to British authorities.  Given the pejorative declarations from Mr. Cameron and the pressures on civil servants to serve the ‘national interest’, will we ever know the truth?  Decoding the instrument recorder can take time, although if the plane was downed by a missile, it is unlikely to reveal much.  Thus if anything is to be learned, it will come from the cockpit voice recorder.  That does not require decoding, so why are they keeping the families waiting?

In the interim, the propaganda barrages continue.  Not just over the plane tragedy but also over an ongoing disaster in the Gaza strip.  Navi Pillay the UN Human Rights Commissioner has publicly likened Netanyahu’s bombing to a war crime.  Children are being killed at the rate of one per hour; most of the wounded ones (as the dead) are under five said a serving volunteer anesthesiologist from “Doctors Without Borders.”  The tunnels Netanyahu is complaining about were made necessary by the illegal blockade of Gaza turning it into a giant prison.  As the bodies pile up including the tangled mass of children in the bombing of a school last Thursday, what is the answer?  The only viable answer is peace.  Not never-ending peace talks while Israel continues de facto annexations through settlements, but actual peace.  Otherwise, Israel will find itself eventually in the same situation as South Africa was — all the inhuman killing a pointless tragedy.

The author is a retired Professor and occasional commentator.

The post Lies, Notorious Lies And Propaganda – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The chaos created by United States interventions is never ending and every act of aggression brings the world closer to mass conflict. As is always the case with its interference, the American effort to destabilize Russia has created unforeseen and dangerous consequences. Just as support for jihadists complicated the imperial project in Syria and Iraq, the United States’ instigated war between Russia and Ukraine has spiraled out of the West’s control.

Last week Russian president Vladimir Putin returned to his country flush with foreign policy success. Corporate media ignored his six-day trip to Latin America, but Russia’s financial aid to Cuba and Nicaragua established a much needed counter weight to pax Americana. The 200 year-old Monroe Doctrine, which states that the western hemisphere is the property of the United States, is still accepted in the American mind and political establishment.

Putin’s foray to Latin America was as audacious as it was shrewd. His presence told Barack Obama that 19^th century policy was nothing he felt bound to respect. Not only did Russia breathe new life into struggling left wing regimes, but he offered assistance to Argentina and Brazil with their nuclear power programs before delivering the most important news of all.

Along with his counterparts from Brazil, India, China and South Africa, Putin announced the creation of a $100 billion BRICS development bank and a currency pool worth an additional $100 billion. Not only did he tell the United States that he wouldn’t take their interference lying down, but he also made it clear that there is another important player in world affairs.

It is a good thing that the United States has competition for influence. American intervention in the past ten years has created ruin in Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Syria and now Ukraine. While this country is unmatched militarily it can’t control what it unleashes and sometimes isn’t even guaranteed victory on the battlefield. American supported Libyan jihadists killed the ambassador at Benghazi and are still fighting against other forces in that country. Syria’s infrastructure is destroyed and thousands of people are dead or homeless refugees, but Bashir al-Assad hangs on and America is stuck in the mud of its own making. ISIS has made a mockery of the Iraq intervention and turned what was called a “cake walk” into a continuing American headache.

The damage done to Ukraine is enormous. The country is in the midst of civil war with all of the casualties that come with it because of American desperation to rule the globe. The depth of that danger was made clear on July 17^th when Malaysian airlines flight MH17 was apparently shot down over Ukraine.

In the midst of combat and conflicting claims it is impossible to determine who is at fault for the loss of 298 lives. But Barack Obama and his scribes in corporate media wasted no time in blaming the so-called rebels in Ukraine who are fighting against the United States backed government.

One thing is clear, the conditions that precipitated this catastrophe are all of Washington’s making. There would be no BUK missiles in Ukraine, no uprooted refugees, and no bloodshed if the United States and other NATO nations had not picked a fight with Russia.Regardless of the identity of the culprit who fired the shot, the blood is still on America’s hands.

The Russian government is to be commended for assuring that there is at least the possibility of an impartial investigation of this incident. While Barack Obama and his putative heir Hillary Clinton called names and the corporate media parroted their every word, Putin arranged for the flight recorders to be turned over to Malaysia, the country with the most important interest in this case. Despite what the talking heads have to say, it was remarkable that it only took four days for victims’ remains to be taken from the war zone and sent to the Netherlands, the country of origin of the flight.

Instead of practicing even handed journalistic skepticism, the press have happily turned themselves into propaganda mouth pieces for the White House. There isn’t even a pretense of good reporting and news gathering which would inform the public. Instead we are treated to the kill list president making statements such as, “This is the kind of behavior that has no place in the community of nations.”

As Putin traveled to the Americas, the Obama administration pressured European nations to increase sanctions against his country. The plane shoot-down is already being used as a pretext to bully other western nations into joining the anti-Russian mob, but eventually it will all be for naught. The world won’t bend to America’s will, but in the meantime, there is plenty of opportunity for this nation to bring more catastrophes to the rest of the planet.

The post Putin In America’s Crosshairs – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Daniella Peled

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses a greater threat to Western security than al-Qaeda did in its day, according to an IWPR briefing this week.

Visiting London from Baghdad, IWPR Iraq chief of party Ammar al-Shahbander told the July 22 gathering that ISIS was an independent entity that operated in diverse ways and with different alliances in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking at the briefing via video link, IWPR Syria programme coordinator, Z.E., gave a snapshot of life in Aleppo and her work supporting citizen activism there. (Her name is not given here for security reasons.)

“Many people think that ISIS is not a threat to the West,” said al-Shahbander. “I completely disagree. ISIS is a much greater threat than al-Qaeda – it is the number one magnet for jihadis internationally.”

Not only has ISIS created its own de facto state, but it has a much more open recruitment policy than al-Qaeda.

“This is a very dangerous mix of people with top fighting capability and no ethics. ISIS is capable of violence beyond anything seen by al-Qaeda,” he continued, adding that the international mix of fighters made it all the more likely that they would bring extremist ideas back to their own countries.

At the same time, Shahbander argues that ISIS’s days are numbered in Iraq, as the range of Sunni groups that have struck up a temporary alliance with it and operate under its flag will ultimately turn on it – and they have significantly more military clout than it has.

The process will begin once the Iraqi establishment completes the tortuous process of appointing a prime minister. Assuming they do not settle on the incumbent, Nuri al-Maliki, the new premier’s first task will be to negotiate a political settlement with the Sunni Arabs, likely to result in a kind of devolved status for the territory the insurgents have captured in recent weeks.

Nor, Shahbander argues, will the other Sunni militias and groups tolerate the ISIS’s imposition of its narrow, hard-line ideology in the longer term.

Chairing the discussion, Nadim Shehadi, associate fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), agreed that the complex nature of the conflict made mapping alliances very difficult.

“If you go to some policy circles in Europe and in the United States, there is confusion,” he said. “You have people saying that to solve this issue we have to collaborate with Assad and Iran, our allies in the fight against ISIS, and you have people saying that ISIS is the creation of Saudi Arabia.

“And on the other side, you have people saying no, this is the classic game of Iran and the Syrian regime playing arsonist and offering to be the firefighter.”

Z.E. agreed with Shahbander’s view that in Syria, ISIS is allied with President Bashar al-Assad’s government and not, as it might appear, his most dangerous foe.

“The ISIS base in Raqqa was not bombed once,” she recalled, adding that activists used to head there when firing began. “It was the only place where the regime wouldn’t shell us.”

In a vivid description of the war-torn city, she said she was living in the only remaining civilian neighbourhood in Aleppo. People had become so used to the “barrel bombs” dropped by the regime that they now simply tried to go into an inner room to avoid shrapnel if they heard helicopters flying above.

But the crude weapons still exact an awful toll. Z.E. said that last month, one scored a direct hit on a building whose basement had been turned into a school, killing 25 people.

Despite the huge dangers, she said, “There are still people surviving here. I am even invited to four weddings. Life goes on, in an awkward way.”

Describing her work to empower women, including running writing workshops and supporting training programmes, Z.E. said, “As a woman it’s easier for me to work with women under ISIS, even if I have to wear black and cover up.… Working with women is still valid whatever the situation.”

Looking into the future, she spoke of the need to document the contribution made by women.

“The history of this war is going to be written by men, and these women are going to be forgotten if we don’t write about them,” she said.

Guests at the briefing event welcomed the opportunity to get unique insights from actors on the ground.

“It was very good to have first-hand witnesses from Baghdad and Aleppo,” veteran Middle East correspondent Patrick Cockburn said afterwards. “Aleppo, in particular, is a city on which it not easy to get up-to-the-minute eyewitness accounts of the situation such as we received.”

Daniella Peled is IWPR Editor in London. This article appeared at IWPR’s ICR Issue 407.

The post ISIS ‘Greater Threat’ To West Than Al-Qaida appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shahin Abbasov

Even in the best of times, the Azerbaijani government is not a talkative bunch. But their stone-wall silence after northern neighbor Georgia triumphantly confiscated roughly $175-million worth of liquid heroin on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border has sparked questions about the reasons for their reserve.

On July 11, Georgian border police found a record 2.79 tons of liquid heroin inside 93 30-kilogram containers of handwash conveyed by a cargo-truck from Azerbaijan to Georgia. A video released by the Georgian interior ministry shows that the containers bore Georgian flags and the inscription “Georgia Clean.” The cargo truck displays a slightly blurred name of “GB” or “G3” and the marking “Internationale Spedition.”

In a July-25 statement to a Georgian parliamentary committee, Georgian Interior Minister Aleksandre Chikaidze claimed that the shipment belonged to Afghanistan’s Taliban, who, he alleged, had financed its dispatch to Europe, the news magazine Tabula reported. Two Georgian citizens have been detained in connection with the shipment.

Chikaidze earlier had claimed that the stash had traveled from Afghanistan via Iran to Azerbaijan, and was headed to Turkey and on into Europe. Citiing an ongoing investigation, he declined to comment further.

Azerbaijan and Georgia’s status as part of a narcotics corridor from Afghanistan and Iran to Europe long has been established. Both countries cooperate with the United Nations and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to crack down on international trafficking rings.

In the first nine months of 2012, the latest year for which information is available, Azerbaijan confiscated a total of over 654 kilograms of narcotics, according to the US State Department, citing Azerbaijani government data.

That past record –which has earned praise from the State Department – prompts some Azerbaijanis to wonder how the heroin managed to make it past the Azerbaijani border control and into Georgia.

But Azerbajani officials aren’t talking.

In comments to EurasiaNet.org, Azerbaijani State Border Control Service spokesperson Elhan Nagiyev said that his agency had “no such information” about the seizure of liquid heroin on the Azerbaijani-Georgian border. “The Georgian law-enforcement bodies did not apply to us” for assistance with this mission, he added.

Spokespeople for the Azerbaijani State Customs Committee, Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Security also declined to comment.

One local drug-trafficking expert, however, believes that the Azerbaijani government must have cooperated with Georgian officials on this drug bust.

“Such operations are being prepared for months and involve a network of secret agents,” said Mazahir Efendiyev, Azerbaijan’s national coordinator for the United Nations’ South Caucasus Anti-Drug Programme.

Citing unnamed government sources, the pro-opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat has alleged that Georgian Interior Minister Chikaidze discussed details about the operation with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, Interior Minister Ramil Usubov and State Border Control Chief Elchin Guliyev during a May 13-16 official visit to Baku.

At the time, Azerbaijani media reported that Chikaidze had discussed “border issues.”

If the Yeni Musavat report is accurate, some observers wonder why Baku does not acknowledge its success publicly, together with Georgia.

The US State Department’s 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report estimates that “up to 11 metric tons” of narcotics, much of it from neighboring Iran, travel through Azerbaijan each year. As Turkey tightens its own border controls, Azerbaijan could become “an increasingly favored transit country for drugs . . .,” the report posited.

News about a liquid-heroin drug bust by Azerbaijan and Georgia would serve to reinforce the message that Baku takes this threat seriously.

But Efendiyev claims that perhaps Baku decided to stay quiet to let Georgia, “a friendly country,” gain the limelight and enhance its own domestic political prestige. Tbilisi’s announcement about the heroin bust occurred two days before run-off local elections in Georgia, a vote which the government’s Georgian Dream coalition won.

Ex-counterintelligence officer Arastun Orujlu, director of the pro-opposition East-West Research Center, sees another possible reason for Baku’s silence, however.

“[E]ither Azerbaijan’s border control or customs do not do their jobs properly or . . . these [drug] syndicates have strong patrons in these bodies,” alleged Orujlu.

The National Council of Democratic Forces, a bloc of Azerbaijan’s largest opposition parties, has echoed that allegation, condemning the government for saying nothing about the heroin operation, but making “very loud” announcements about the arrest of “civil-society activists on false drug-possession charges.”

The government has not responded. Efendiyev dismisses any discussion about ties between drug traffickers and Azerbaijani officials, noting that the country has confiscated “more than 10 tons” of narcotics since 2007.

Yet despite that vigilance, he added, “of course, regional drug syndicates have their presence in the country.”

The US embassy in Baku did not respond to requests for comment about any possible role by the US DEA in the detection of the liquid-heroin shipment.

The State Department wrote in its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report that the DEA, which has trained Azerbaijani state employees in anti-narcotics work, “helped Azerbaijan pursue international drug trafficking organizations in 2013.”

It noted that Baku has provided “tremendous cooperation” in combating drug-trafficking, and said that it expects “that this support will continue.”

Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku.

The post Azerbaijan Keeps Mum About Bust On Georgia Heroin Highway appeared first on Eurasia Review.

According to estimates in the Active Population Survey (Spanish acronym: EPA) drafted by the National Statistics Institute (Spanish acronym: INE), employment rose by 402,400 in the second quarter of the year – an increase of 2.4%. This is the largest employment growth in the second quarter of a year since 2005.

192,400 jobs were created in the last year – up 1.1% and the first increase in new jobs since the second quarter of 2008, when the economy entered recession. Unemployment fell by 310,400 in the second quarter, a new record for any quarter in adjusted terms. The total number of people out of work stands at 5,622,900, the lowest figure since the fourth quarter of 2011, and the unemployment rate fell by 1.5 points to 24.5%. The Active Population Survey on trends recorded a positive result between the number of unemployed who found work and the number of those in work who lost their job (+335,700). This trend reflects an increased confidence in employment.

From a sectoral point of view, employment has increased in all sectors – except farming – with 378,600 more jobs in the service sector, 56,700 more jobs in industry and 36,900 more jobs in construction. In contrast, 69,800 jobs were shed in the farming sector. The only sector posting a year-on-year increase in jobs was the service sector, with 263,800 more jobs. Meanwhile, the construction sector shed 55,200 jobs, the farming sector 13,800 and industry 2,400. However, the pace of decline in industry slowed by 3.5 percentage points to -0.1% and in the construction sector by 6.3 points to -5.3%. Farming shrank by 1.8% when compared with a year ago, whereas it grew by 12.9% in the previous quarter.

As regards the professional status of those in work, the quarterly increase affected 388,000 salaried employees and 14,400 non-salaried professionals. The employment growth was mainly concentrated in the private sector – with 393,400 more jobs, while the public sector grew by 8,900. When compared with a year ago, the private sector grew by 208,000 and the public sector shrank by 15,500, with year-on-year rates of 1.5% and -0.5%, respectively.

In terms of employment stability, the quarterly increase in salaried workers affected both temporary contracts and permanent contracts. The latter increased by 180,200 while the former increased by 207.800. When compared with a year ago, the number of workers with a permanent contract rose by 0.3% (from -1.9% in the previous quarter) and the number of workers on a temporary contract rose by 6.5% (1.5 points more than in the first quarter of the year). With this result, the temporary employment rate rose by 0.8 points on the first quarter to 24%.

As regards the working timetable, the number of those working full-time rose by 304,400 in the second quarter and the number of those working part-time rose by 98,000. When compared with the same period in 2013, the number of people in full-time employment rose by 0.8% while the number of people in part-time employment rose by 2.6%. These figures represent an upturn of 1.7 points for the former and of 0.5 points for the latter. Following these figures, the weighting of part-time workers out of the total increased by 0.2 points in the quarter, with the part-time employment rate standing at 16.4%.

The labour force increased by 92,000 in the quarter (0.4%), following six consecutive quarters of decline. The labour force shrank by 232,000 (-1%) on one year ago, compared with a rate of -1.8% in the previous quarter. The quarter-on-quarter increase in the labour force is mainly the result of an increase in the rate of activity and, to a lesser extent, an increase in the population over 16. The rate of activity rose by 0.2 points to 59.6% due an increase of 0.4 points in the rate of activity among men, while the rate of activity among women fell by 0.04 points to 53.7%.
Unemployment fell by 310,400 in the second quarter, compared with a drop of 230,900 in the same quarter of the previous year. This produced a quarterly reduction of 5.2%. It should be noted that the fall in unemployment in the second quarter is the largest in adjusted terms since INE records began.

Following this result, total unemployment now stands at 5,622,900 and the unemployment rate fell by 1.5 points to 24.5% of the labour force; this quarterly drop in the unemployment rate is also a new record. When looking at the INE-seasonally-adjusted figures, the quarter-on-quarter change stands at -3.1%, compared with -2.5% in the first quarter. Unemployment fell by 424,500 (7%) on a year ago, which is an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the annual rate of decline.

The quarterly drop in unemployment has affected both men and women. The former group shrank by 184,400, meaning that the unemployment rate among men fell by 1.7 points to 23.7%. Unemployment among women fell by 126,100, with the unemployment rate for this group falling by 1.2 points to 25.4%. The number of households in which all members are unemployed fell by 145,000 on the first quarter.

In summary, the Labour Force Survey (EPA) for the second quarter of the year is positive, shows evidence of significant improvements in the labour market and reveals that the economic recovery is already having an impact on job creation. Not only were record figures posted in terms of employment this quarter, but net job creation was also achieved over the last 12 months – something that has not been seen since six years ago. This response from the labour market would not have been possible without the structural reforms undertaken by the government and without the wage and price restraint that continues to be applied. Nonetheless, the level of unemployment remains unacceptable and that means perseverance is required with the structural reforms, as well as with the price and wage restraint, as this will enable a boost to the recovery in terms of both production and employment.

The post Spanish Economy Produces Net Job Creation For First Time Since 2008 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

International NGOs have rebuffed a recent offer by the UN Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to use drones for humanitarian information gathering, saying this could represent a dangerous “blurring of the lines” between military and humanitarian actors in the conflict.

Drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are seen by some within the DRC humanitarian community as potentially providing a “useful technology” for relief operations, Frances Charles, World Vision’s advocacy officer in eastern DRC, told IRIN. But to accept MONUSCO’s offer would be akin “to handing out food aid from the back of a tank”.

Charles said MONUSCO, which “is party to the conflict”, had proposed to the humanitarian community that drone platforms could be shared with the military for information gathering, but that such an arrangement would compromise the core principles of relief organizations: neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.

The drones have become closely associated with military operations and have been dubbed “loud mosquitoes” by local people, said Charles. MONUSCO has not made efforts to raise local awareness about the purpose or activities of its drones “so people don’t know if they are armed or not,” she said.

The proposed use of drones by MONUSCO for both military and humanitarian purposes would “muddy the waters” as local communities and armed groups would be unable to tell whether a drone mission was military or humanitarian, she said. She urged UN humanitarian agencies to shun any offer to use drone information.

In a 14 July 2014 statement the international NGOs, including Concern, Care, Handicap International and Finn Church Aid, said: “If data gathered during a flight with a humanitarian objective informs combat operations or is used for military intelligence, there is a clear compromise of neutrality.”

The stance taken by the North Kivu Chef de Mission forum, which represents international NGOs in eastern DRC, was seen by them as particularly pertinent as “MONUSCO is setting a significant precedent as the first DPKO [Department for Peacekeeping Operations] mission in the world to use UAVs formally integrated into the mission’s civilian structure…

“Whilst it is anticipated that debate concerning the use of UAVs in DPKO missions will be on-going and evolve, caution and rigor must be applied at this early stage to ensure the correct precedent is set,” the statement said.

Eye in the sky

Two drones were first deployed by MONUSCO in December 2013 and April 2014; three more were added as part of a UN private military contract with the Italian company Selex-ES, a subsidiary of Finmeccanica corporation.

Fitted with high definition infrared cameras and with no capacity to carry weaponry, they have quickly become an essential piece of equipment for MONUSCO and provide invaluable military intelligence in an operational theatre characterized by myriad armed groups roaming across vast swathes of eastern DRC.

Poor roads and inhospitable terrain favour local militias over the heavily mechanized MONUSCO force which is carrying out its robust Security Council mandate to “eliminate” groups which do not demobilize.

Drone technology was being used for a variety of purposes beyond the military campaign, a serving British army officer coordinating MONUSCO’s drone deployment, who declined to be identified, told IRIN.

He said daily flights monitor Goma’s nearby volcano, which has been “bubbling a bit” in recent months, using infrared cameras to detect new fissures; the information is shared with local volcanologists. The drones can also map evolving camps for internally displaced persons, as well as illegal cross-border movements (people not using established border crossings), illegal checkpoints and charcoal operations.

During a 5 May 2014 training exercise involving drones and a patrol vessel to develop strategies to thwart the trafficking of goods to and from neighbouring Rwanda on Lake Kivu, drones identified a capsized ferry with about 20 people in the water. Helicopters and the patrol boat were alerted and 14 people were rescued. Without “the coincidence”, all those in the water would probably have drowned, the British officer said.

MONUSCO drones have a maximum range of about 250km and can spend 12 hours in the air, though operations are generally restricted to eight hours. They can be airborne within 30 minutes of being tasked, and on average fly two missions a day.

Detecting threats

During recent border clashes between Rwandan troops and the DRC national army, drones were “retasked” in the air to monitor the situation, though there is an operational policy for the aircraft to keep at least five nautical miles from the border to prevent any disputes with the neighbouring state, the officer said.

Able to operate both night and day, usually at about 5,000 metres, drones can simultaneously stream real-time imaging to three sources: the pilot flying the drone from Goma airport, MONUSCO’s headquarters and, if need be, a laptop on the ground.

The officer said the drones can provide MONUSCO forces and the DRC national army (FARDC) with real time tactical information during engagements with armed groups, potentially a huge advantage, but did not elaborate.

“Information is just information, it depends what you do with it,” he said. There are tell-tale signs that can indicate imminent attacks on villages. When people congregate together at night – drones’ thermal imaging capacity can easily detect this – it is usually an indication that a community is about to be attacked and MONUSCO can then employ preventative measures.

Information guidelines

New “National Guidelines for the Coordination between Humanitarian Actors and MONUSCO” are about to be adopted.

Developed in cooperation with the broad humanitarian community and MONUSCO, they are a revised version of guidelines first adopted in 2006.

A final draft document seen by IRIN does not directly address the use of information gleaned through drones.

The draft guidelines recognize “there are situations where either humanitarian actors or MONUSCO possess information that is confidential and cannot be shared with others without compromising the identity of the source or exposing individuals to potential risk. In such cases, it is understood that such information will not be shared between humanitarian actors and MONUSCO.”

The document also acknowledges that there are regular briefings between MONUSCO and humanitarians with “information on relief and humanitarian activities with relevance for both actors, and information on threats to the safety and security of humanitarian actors”.

‘The problem is,” Charles said, “that we [humanitarian actors at the briefings] don’t know what information comes from drones and what doesn’t. What are we meant to do? Block our ears? That has not been resolved yet.”

MONUSCO, the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation, has over 21,000 uniformed personnel. Its Force Intervention Brigade is comprised of Malawian, South African and Tanzanian troops.

The post NGOs Against MONUSCO Drones For Humanitarian Work appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The shrine of Jonah – revered by Christians and Muslims alike – has been turned “to dust” near Iraq’s Mosul. Footage of the event was posted online, and witnesses said it took ISIS militants just an hour to stuff the mosque with explosives.

“ISIS militants have destroyed the Prophet Younis (Jonah) shrine east of Mosul city after they seized control of the mosque completely,” an anonymous security source told the Iraq-based al-Sumaria News.

The extremist group ISIS changed its name from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL) to just the Islamic State (IS), after formally declaring a new caliphate in Syria and Iraq at the end of June.

Muslims know the tomb as the shrine of Younis, whereas Christians refer to it as the tomb of Jonas.

Jonah is renowned for having been swallowed by a fish or a whale in the Bible’s Old Testament, with a similar story being present in the Koran. The site upon which the mosque had been built dated back to the eighth century BC.

“[The] Islamic State completely destroyed the shrine of Nabi Yunus after telling local families to stay away and closing the roads to a distance of 500 meters from the shrine,” an anonymous official from the Sunni Endowment, which manages Sunni religious affairs in Iraq, told AFP.

The post ISIS Extremists Destroy Shrine Of Jonah – Video appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel has agreed to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire in fighting with militants in the Gaza Strip to start at 8 a.m. (1 a.m. EDT) on Saturday, a military spokeswoman said, Reuters reported.

The spokeswoman said that during the brief truce, troops would keep searching for tunnels used by militants and that the military will “respond if terrorists choose to exploit this time to attack Israel Defense Forces personnel or fire at Israeli civilians.”

“Gaza civilians who have been requested to vacate from their residents are to refrain from returning,” the spokeswoman said.

The post Israel Agrees To 12-Hour Gaza Ceasefire appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

Over the past three years, there has been an evident surge of Buddhist radicalism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with the clergy being increasingly involved in violence against minorities, especially Muslims. Both countries have sizeable Muslim populations, and while the situation in Myanmar is the worse of the two, Sri Lanka is not too far behind.

The general deduction is that the current state-of-affairs is a consequence of paranoia over losing one’s culture, Islamophobia, and a typical assertion of the majority over the minority. However, there must also be a closer examination. How did the practitioners of Buddhism – widely perceived as the most peaceful religion in the world – come to resort to violence? Given how a majority of victims in both countries have been Muslims, how much of a role has Islamophobia played? Is there a non-theological reason for the proliferation of religious violence?

The Situation Today

In Myanmar, a large section of the society comprises monks, given the large-scale enlisting to monasteries that took place during the Junta years. The clergy holds a moral high ground in Myanmarese society, and has a strong social standing. Throughout the decades of military dictatorship, Myanmar’s clergy fought another issue – the high global attrition rate among schools of Theravada Buddhism. Therefore, protecting the culture became the mainstay, and, knowingly and/or unknowingly, aided the cultivation of non-violent radicalisation among the monks. When this met Islamophobia, it resulted in a violent campaign against 400,000 Rohingya Muslims. Naypyidaw could have easily intervened but it has its own agenda: to wash its hands off the economic costs of providing for thousands of people when its resource basket is already heavily strained. There is a strong ethnic bias element too. Rohingyas do not find favour with the Rakhine Buddhists for their ethnic origins, and given their Muslim faith, Islamophobia has been a side-effect.This, combined with the high social position occupied by the clergy, has resulted in a plausible tacit deal.

In Sri Lanka, action and literature against religious minorities began 40 years ago, soon after the government decided to stop funding the Sangha. Although the victims were not Muslims alone at the start, since the early 2000s, the focus of violent Buddhist radical actions has been Sri Lanka’s Muslim population.

In Sri Lanka, three key ethnicities are identified: Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims. This makes it evident that despite being a religious and not an ethnic construct, Muslims (who have ancestral links to Arab traders, Tamils, and Malays) are considered to be of another ethnicity – one that is identified by the their religious faith. However, the Sri Lankan Buddhist radical clergy does not target Muslims alone. They began by targeting minorities, and with increasing Islamophobia, they have concentrated their attacks primarily on Muslims. In Sri Lanka, almost all political parties have monks in their membership. The monks’ entry into the political arena they otherwise shunned began just before World War II, and has today become a part of Sri Lankan politics.

Myanmar and Sri Lanka: Situational Differences

The basic difference in the nature of nexus between the Buddhist clergy and the political class in Myanmar and Sri Lanka is that in Myanmar, the clergy has strong socio-political standing and cannot be ignored, and is therefore co-opted; and in Sri Lanka, the clergy – fairly strong but one that is also influenced by modern Sinhala nationalist ideology – is used by the political class as pawns during election campaigns and/or employed to legitimise various government decisions.

However, the split that the Sri Lankan Sangha went through, over three decades ago, resulted in the fragmentation of the clergy. With no direct material support from the government, each group tries to outdo the other to ensure funding that is provided only by wealthy benefactors – who fund only the most radical groups.

In Myanmar, the Buddhist clergy is united and has an upper hand to an extent – or at least an even hand – and the government is in a quid pro quo arrangement with them to secure their individual interests. In Sri Lanka, the Buddhist clergy is becoming increasingly radicalised due to competition for sources of funds – a problem that arose primarily due to ideological differences in the Sangha itself and its implications on political preferences – and the government’s use of the monks for political benefit. Furthermore, in Myanmar, violence against Rohingya Muslims has a lot to do with their ethnic and historical Bengali origins than their faith alone while that is not the case in Sri Lanka.

There are indeed several other factors at play in Sri Lanka, such as the 2004 Anti-Conversion Bill, and the politics and politicisation of the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, among others, and in Myanmar, its citizenship laws. Understanding the core differences between what is unfolding in Myanmar and Sri Lanka is crucial therefore to develop custom-made solutions for each. Evidently, the central factor sustaining these crises is money and/or the lack of it. Financial factors being the bulwark for the sustenance of violence only means it will be easier to resolve than if it were purely ideological.

Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
Research Officer, IReS, IPCS
Email: rajeshwari@ipcs.org

The post Sri Lanka And Myanmar: Understanding Rise Of Buddhist Radicalism – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The media emphasizes the emotional aspect of tragedy, and the public responds with tears and regrets, rarely giving attention to the illogic that caused the tragedy. When illogic is a governing factor in the violence against people, it elevates the calamity to a criminal action. Feeling sorrow for the victim is warranted but insufficient; thought must complement emotion and enforce justice against the perpetrator.

In the war on Gaza, commentary has evaded logical analysis and presented causes and actions as gut reactions to unforeseen events. Logic, the opposite of emotion, may seem cold and indifferent, but syllogism, “a formal argument in logic that is formed by two statements and a conclusion which must be true if the two statements are true,” tells us an inarguable story. Explaining the attack on Gaza by logic, reveals a syllogism of death.

The syllogism goes like this: If “A” yields “B” and “B” yields “C,” then “A” must yield “C.”
Israeli attacks on Palestinians lead to Palestinian attacks on Israelis
Palestinian attacks on Israelis lead to increased Israeli attacks on Palestinians.

Conclusion: Israeli attacks on Palestinians leads to mounting deaths on Palestinians.

The syllogism does not work the other way, with the Palestinians starting the attacks. The Palestinians have a limited offense, and Israel’s military offenses are unlimited in the punishment they can cause the Palestinians, Fatality statistics in past and present Gazabattles demonstrate that story.

Three Israeli teenagers were abducted and killed by unknown assailants.

Compose the syllogism:

Israeli military, without evidence of involvement, arrests several hundred Palestinians, including many of Hamas’ West Bank leaders, and kills five Palestinians during the military operation (A), which leads to Hamas and Islamic Jihad firing rockets into Israel (B).

Palestinian rocket attacks on Israelis (B) (somewhat terrifying, but resulting in only few fatalities, including one which was not from rocket fire, but from a mortar shell fragment. It killed an Israeli man, who had come as a civilian volunteer to distribute food to soldiers at the Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip.) lead to Israeli attacks (horrifying and several hundred Palestinians killed) on all Gazans (C).

Israel’s attacks on Hamas instigated attacks by Hamas.

Attacks by Hamas provoked Israel to continue its deadly attacks.

Conclusion: Israel’s attacks (A) led to Israel’s attacks (C), and therefore only Israel can halt the cycle of violence. One means was to revoke the illegal detentions of Hamas personnel, which probably would have halted the rocket barrage. Instead Israel signaled that no matter how the Palestinians react, Israeli attacks (A) or (C) will always occur.

Place the syllogism of death in another perspective:

If Israel was aware that its unlawful reaction to the deaths of the teenagers (A) would provoke revenge by Hamas (B) and force retaliation (C), then it placed its own citizens in eventual harm, and despite its claims to be cautious and humane, was prepared to cause many Palestinian casualties?

The conclusion from this syllogism is that Israel did not expect many, if any civilian casualties from Hamas’ revenge, and did not care that the cycle of violence would cause many Palestinian civilian casualties.

Statistics, not ones from the present conflagration, but previous attacks demonstrate the conclusion of the syllogism. Note the number of children killed in 2012 in the West Bankand Gaza.

Amnesty International
Annual Report 2013 (http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2013) The Israeli military continued to use excessive force against protesters in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT); in addition to 100 civilians killed during the November conflict in Gaza, Israeli forces killed at least 35 civilians in the OPT during the year.

Annual Report 2012 (http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2012) Israeli military forces killed 55 civilians in the OPT, including 11 children. Settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank increased, and three Palestinians were killed by Israeli settlers. Israeli settlers and soldiers accused of committing abuses against Palestinians generally escaped accountability.

Operation “Pillar of Defense” (in the 2012 annual report)
Israeli forces launched a major military operation on Gaza on 14 November (2012), beginning with an airstrike that killed the leader of the military wing of Hamas. In the following eight days, before a ceasefire on 21 November was reached with Egyptian mediation, more than 160 Palestinians, including more than 30 children and some 70 other civilians, and six Israelis, including four civilians, were killed.

These are numbered casualties. Add the violent Israeli actions – arrests, detentions, house demolitions, destruction of crops, usurpation of water supplies, seizure of lands, construction of settlements, barriers to fishing, barriers to daily interchange, harassment, and terror.

And behind the faceless call to oppress, a grotesque mentality that exceeds all moral limits.

The Jerusalem Post has attributed the expression “mow the grass” to Israeli sources. What does “mow the grass” mean? Every once in a while, just as a home owner must mow the lawn to rid the garden of weeds, “Israel will act to mow the grass as frequently as necessary to degrade enemy military capabilities and keep Israel’s rivals off-balance.”

Here are some more expressions attributed to Israeli leaders:

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman: “Israel needs to conquer and thoroughly cleanse the Gaza Strip.”

Israeli Interior Minister Eli Yishai: “The goal of the operation is to send Gaza back to the Middle Ages, only then will Israel be calm for the next 40 years.”

Michael Ben-Ari: “There are no innocents in Gaza, don’t let any diplomats who want to look good in the world endanger your lives – mow them down!”

Gilad Sharon (son of the former Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon): “We need to flatten entire neighborhoods in Gaza, Flatten all of Gaza. The Americans didn’t stop withHiroshima - the Japanese weren’t surrendering fast enough, so they hit Nagasaki, too. There should be no electricity in Gaza, no gasoline or moving vehicles, nothing.”

These are the people who compose their own syllogism:

If we control all movement into, out of and within Gaza (A), then the Palestinians will have no means to contest us (B).

If the Palestinians have no means to contest us (B), then we will not suffer any violence (C).

This is obviously an incorrect syllogism – the embargo and oppression of the people inGaza have not prevented them from contesting and Israelis have suffered from violence.

Another syllogism goes like this:

If Israel stops its oppression of the Palestinian people and its embargo on Gaza (A), then the Palestinians will have no need to retaliate (B).

If the Palestinians will have no need to retaliate (B), then Israel will not suffer any violence (C).

The latter may also not be a true syllogism. However, it is worth the test of proof. In any event, if both are not syllogisms, the latter still has more merit than the former.

There are more “ifs.”

If Israel did not have suitable shelters and an Iron Dome Missile defense, would its government have been ultra aggressive?
if Israelis discomfort with going to emergency shelters (contrary to the IDF spokesperson exaggerations, probably a minor number for a minor period of time) prompted its government to unleash a devastating attack on Gaza, what would the government contemplate doing if its citizens were imprisoned in a giant ghetto for decades and generations, unable to move far or engage in free commerce, cut off from most amenities, constantly under surveillance and perpetually fearful of attack?

If Netanyahu locates living survivors of the 1943 Warsaw ghetto, for certain they will give him clues to how the people of Gaza think, feel, hope, and dream.

Dan Lieberman is editor of Alternative Insight, a commentary on foreign policy and politics. He is author of the book A Third Party Can Succeed in America and a Kindle: The Artistry of a Dog.
Dan can be reached at alternativeinsight@earthlink.net

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