It is a sometimes overly rich recipe, starched with violence and populism, but Latin American politics is something to behold. In the Americas, experiments have been run and tried with brutal consequences. Revolutions and counter-revolutions have been plotted and enacted. The good have tended to be a short time in office, while the coup d’état has had something of a long history.

Evo Morales’ victory in the Bolivian elections for a third term with just over 60 per cent of the vote is no minor achievement. Cement magnate Samuel Doria Medina received a paltry 25 per cent, something he blamed on the late entry of ex-president Jorge Quiroga, a move that potentially split the anti-Morales vote. Morales’ Movement Towards Socialism romped in, winning eight of the nine regions, including the affluent area of Santa Cruz. A remarkable achievement, given Morales’ own background as the son of peasant Altiplano farmers.

Victory for Morales in Santa Cruz also proved particularly sweet given its base for opposition to the MAS in 2008. Then, it was the aspiring Rubén Costas, co-founder of the right leaning Unidad Demócrata (UD), who attempted to fan the flames of secession.1 This, it was said, was also being facilitated by US money, be it through USAID or the National Endowment for Democracy. The latest victory has prompted Morales to quash claims that the country was one of half-moons “but a full moon”.

This victory is much more than a polling matter. The conflict between wealthy settlers and the indigenous populations has been the scar that never leaves, and a Morales victory did much to stare it down. (He, himself, is a native Aymara Indian.) In 2009, he introduced a new constitution with a focus on indigenous rights and grants of greater autonomy. Then came the fiscal redistributions – income gathered from natural gas has been used in targeted programs. While the corruption stain lingers in its accusing tone, the country has not become the victim of dedicated kleptocrats. As long as the natural resource boom continues, Morales is on a purple patch. He knows, however, that such patches do turn colour in time. (This might be a literal statement, given the environmental costs of the Morales program.)

In the main, Morales has provided a copy book on the redistribution of natural wealth via the state pocket. Infrastructure projects connected with gymnasiums, schools and medical clinics have received funding through the Bolivia Cambia Evo Cumple program. Growth rates of 5.5 per cent this year, and 5 per cent for next, have been predicted by the IMF.

Measures of inequality have fallen even as inflation is being kept in check, and while Bolivia remains impoverished, it is barely recognisable as the once noted basket case run by a small ruling class hungry for coups. Half a million people have been pulled out of poverty. As if to prove a point, the country made a return to global credit markets in 2012, making its first bond issue since the 1920s, while issuing another in 2013.2

Pragmatic socialism, as it has been termed, has not assumed that all sectors of the economy require nationalisation. The hydrocarbon reserves in May 2006 came in for special treatment, and the government coffers were promptly filled by increased state revenues of 285 per cent. But the banking sector is being left to its own devices – in the main. “We have never thought of nationalising the banking sector. As they are earning well, let them pay taxes.”

Such pragmatism would have surprised the late conservative William F. Buckley, Jr. of the National Review, who found the very notion, “in A.D. 2006, of aiming at reform by movement towards socialism” as “at best quaint.”3 Buckley did, however, provide Morales with something of a backhanded compliment. Even if the then newly elected leader was keen on socialising industries, he was also, when required, going to mount the soap box for free trade. This was particularly so over US policies to stamp out coca production. “Whose problem is it that many Americans use cocaine?”

Buckley’s own question – and he was at least good enough to suggest so – was whether the United States government did, in fact, have a right “to convert its own concern for weak-minded Americans into a veto power on Bolivian agriculture”. The only way was to “straighten up our disorderly theoretical house” and do business with Morales on the subject of protecting Americans.

In September 2006, Morales made a point before the United Nations General Assembly to hector Washington over its policies to criminalise coca production. With colourful defiance, Morales brandished the otherwise banned coca leaf during his speech.

The Morales victory cannot be seen in splendid isolation. As the Bolivian leader has himself conceded, such a polling result is not one that can be confined. It is, truly, a continental one that was already gathering pace when he was elected in December 2005. “There is a deep feeling, not just in Bolivia, but in the Americas, of freedom, of a triumph of the anti-imperialists.” Through the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, Morales has proven a busy presence.

The argument on indigenous rights is very much a broader argument of Latin American sovereignty in the face of meddling policies hatched in and implemented by Washington’s overly curious representatives. To those who see Latin America as both backwater and backyard, Morales had only one response: “Homeland yes, colonialism no.”

Morales did wish to dedicate the election victory to a few luminaries – those of “Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez.” And the defiant rejection of Washington’s veto over Latin American regimes, be it through stealth or standard confrontation, continues.

Notes:
1. http://newint.org/blog/2014/10/13/evo-morales-election-victory/
2. http://www.oann.com/bolivia-has-no-further-plans-for-nationalizations-president-morales/
3. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216587/president-morales-aboard/william-f-buckley-jr

The post Bolivia’s Transformation: The Victory Of Evo Morales – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China could ask to join TPP, but would prefer finalizing the Doha Round with the WTO.

By Shuaihua Cheng

The fact that the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, does not include China raises questions: Is the TPP meant to be an “anyone but China” club to contain the central kingdom? Will China react with competing trading blocks to escalate economic hostility against the US? What does this mean for the future of the global trade order?

While TPP could eventually help China, Beijing has deep reservations about the rules being drafted. From China’s point of view, deepening of the World Trade Organization with passage of the Doha Round is a greater priority than creating a new trade grouping.

The TPP is a mega free trade agreement, or FTA, currently under negotiation that encompasses 12 Asia Pacific countries. In 2006, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore initiated a four-way FTA, termed Pacific-4. Later, five additional countries, namely the United States, Australia, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam, joined the agreement and this led to the creation of TPP, which held its first round negotiations in Australia, March 2010. Since then, Mexico, Canada, Japan and South Korea have requested to join the TPP. Members approved participation of the first three candidates, but did not accept South Korea’s application.

The goal of TPP is to “craft a high-standard, 21st-century agreement,” as stated by the Office of United States Trade Representative, or USTR. It is reported that TPP aims to achieve duty-free access for trade in industrial products and comprehensive liberalization in services, and entails deeper regulatory convergence among members in the areas of investment, government procurement, competition policies, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights enforcement, state-owned enterprises, e-commerce, labor and environment.

The allegation that the United States is building an ‘’anyone but China” club is hard to substantiate, suggested David Pilling or the Financial Times. In theory, the TPP does not prevent China from membership. As the USTR explained, if an economy is interested in joining TPP, it must send a formal request, and existing members then decide on admission by consensus.

China last expressed interest in TPP was May 2013. A spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce said that China “will analyze the pros and cons as well as the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and according to principles of equality and mutual benefit.”

It makes economic sense for China to participate. Excluded from the TPP, Chinese firms would face discriminatory treatment in TPP markets. For example, TPP uses cumulation of origin to encourage member countries’ firms to source from within the TPP, instead of from non-members such as China, the world’s biggest producer of components.

From a systemic perspective, China would be better off taking part in setting the rules now than to accepting rules passively in the future. Some of the new trade and trade-related norms stemming from TPP will likely supersede those already existing in WTO rules stamped in 1995.

Nevertheless, China has not applied to participate yet and has two kinds of concerns:

First is its domestic stability concern. China could benefit from further liberalization in manufacturing and services, a high-standard protection and promotion of investment, even from tougher anti-corruption rules, as these issues are in line with the reform agenda of Chinese leaders.  China, though, worries about the possible economic hardship resulting from quick, nationwide application of new TPP rules, which may trigger social or even political turmoil.

The second concern is that some high standards of TPP may not be necessarily good standards for China. TPP chapter on intellectual property rights is such an example. As certain public interest groups pointed out, the IP chapter is “heavily weighted toward big industry interests” of developed countries and has “negative impact on development.”

Many commentators argue that, in responding to TPP, China has proactively built its own rival trading blocs such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, FTAAP.

Such observations – and perceptions – have factual errors. RCEP is not China’s initiative. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, that launched regional group during the 2012 summit in Cambodia, encompassing 10 ASEAN member countries plus the six countries with which ASEAN has existing FTAs – Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). Members agreed that ASEAN, not China or any other non-ASEAN member, is in the driver’s seat of these negotiations.

FTAAP is neither a Chinese initiative nor new. As the host of the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, China does actively push for the realization of FTAAP.  But APEC leaders agreed to examine the prospect of an FTAAP as early as in 2006. In the recent ministerial meeting in May 2014, all 21 APEC members, including the US and China, agreed to establish a working group to discuss possible way forward for FTAAP.

China does not react by setting up competing FTAs against the US, mainly because China sees not only challenges but also opportunities that TPP may bring, such as a chance for China to study the high standards of developed countries. China aims to become a medium-level developed country until the mid-21st century. In this regard, China has responded by establishing the Shanghai Free Trade Zone in 2013 with the backing of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. This zone aims to follow emerging international standards and regulations such as those in TPP, and to carry out unilateral liberalization and autonomous reforms. On the one hand, by limiting the deeper liberalization and higher standards to a fixed region, such an experiment can control impacts and avoid big scaled economic and social disruptions. On the other hand, it will prepare the nation to join the TPP in the future.

Countries have a right to negotiate mega FTAs, driven by various geopolitical, economic or commercial considerations.

But these mega FTA negotiations have two serious problems. Firstly, they take up political and financial resources could otherwise be used in concluding the Doha Round. Secondly, they do not address sensitive but critical issues for the sustainability of the global economy, such as agricultural domestic support and export subsidies, fisheries subsidies, and anti-dumping rules.

Therefore, China, the United States and other major economies can and should do more to reengage in the WTO. A multilateral deal is the most cost-effective legal framework available to ensure non-discriminatory trading terms for all, in particular for the smallest and poorest groups. It is fundamentally essential to foster inclusive globalization, without which abject poverty gives rise to terrorism and crime.

The Bali Package that all WTO members agreed on in December 2013 offers a silver lining for the multilateral negotiations. At Bali, members also promised to make a post-Bali work program by the end of 2014 with a view to concluding the Doha Round.

The clock is ticking. When Chinese President Xi and US President Obama meet at the APEC Summit in Beijing this November, or even before, they should focus on neither TPP nor FTAAP. Instead, they should manifest their joint leadership, engagement and commitment to conclude the Doha Round, which the Asia Pacific and the rest of the world badly need.

Shuaihua Cheng is managing director of ICTSD China, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of his organization.  

The post TPP, China And The Future Of Global Trade Order – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Andrea Gagliarducci

After a media frenzy and lively internal debate were both raised by the publication of the midterm relatio of the Synod of Bishops, its secretariat issued a statement clarifying its merely provisional nature.

“The General Secretariat of the Synod … reiterates that it is a working document, which summarizes the interventions and debate of the first week,” said an Oct. 14 declaration of the Holy See press office on behalf of the secretariat of the Synod of Bishops.

The statement was made “in response to reactions and discussions following the publication of the Relatio post disceptationem, and the fact that often a value has been attributed to the document that does not correspond to its nature.”

The relatio’s publication was hailed in the secular media with such headlines as “Synod signals Catholic shift on gays” and “Vatican’s New Views On Gays, Divorced”.

The Holy See press office also noted that the relatio “is now being offered for discussion by the members of the Synod gathered in the Small Groups, in accordance with the Regulations of the Synod.”

Among the synod fathers who received the relatio less than warmly was Cardinal Wilfrid Napier, O.F.M., of Durban, South Africa’s largest port on the Indian Ocean.

Cardinal Napier, a moderator of one of the small circles at the synod, openly dismissed the relatio during an Oct. 14 briefing with journalists, saying, “that’s Cardinal Erdo’s text, not the synod text.”

The cardinal questioned whether “some expectations of the synod are unrealistic,” and underscored that “the synod is not called to discuss contraception, abortion, same-sex marriages. It was convoked to speak about the family.”

“How it is written, the relatio conveys that there is an agreement on issues, on which there is not in fact an agreement” the Archbishop of Durban underscored.

And he concluded: “I hope the line of the synod, not that of some group, prevails.”

Cardinal Fernando Filoni, prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples and moderator of an Italian small group, recounted to journalists that synod fathers “were surprised by the first reactions published in the media, as if the Pope has declared, as if the synod has decided … it is not true! The relatio is a working document, and every group will relate its points of view and proposals, which will be voted on by the synod fathers.”

Notwithstanding the Holy See press office’s statement, the discussions in small circles has been called “lively” by many of the participants.

The press office also released an unofficial summary of the discussion that followed the issuance of the relatio.

According to this summary, the synod fathers raised many points of concern.

The synod fathers stressed that the relatio should have spoken more widely of families faithful to the Gospel, in order to encourage their testimony; they also asked that the synod shed light with clarity on the beautiful and merciful indissolubility of marriage – which is often lived out and is indeed possible in our society – rather than focusing on failed family situations.

Other synod fathers desired to stress more the importance of women in transmitting life and faith; suggested to at least mention the importance of grandparents; asked for a more specific mention to the family as ‘domestic Church”, to the parish as “family of families,” and to the Holy Family.

The Holy See press office also reported that synod fathers asked that the issue of graduality be clarified, since it can lead to some confusion.

“For instance, regarding admission to the sacraments for the divorced and remarried, it was said that it is difficult to welcome exceptions without exceptions becoming a common rule,” the Holy See press office recounted.

For what concern homosexuals, synod fathers have highlighted that welcoming them is needed, but this must be done prudently, in order not to give the impression that the Church is positively evaluating homosexual acts.

Part of this discussion was also revealed during the Oct. 13 press conference. Cardinal Peter Erdo of Esztergom-Budapest and general rapporteur of the synod, said the relatio may not be completely attributed to him.

When asked about legislation regarding homosexual couples, Cardinal Erdo did not respond and instead gave the floor to Archbishop Bruno Forte of Chieti-Vasto, saying “who has written the paragraph must respond.”

However, after Archbishop Forte’s response, Cardinal Erdo wanted to point out that the relatio lacks a mention of “the disorder” of some behavior, even though synod fathers had stressed it.

Likewise, some synod fathers – the Holy See press office said – complained that the word “sin” is almost not present in the relatio, and reminded that Christ asked that his followers not conform to the mentality of the contemporary world.

In an Oct. 13 interview, Cardinal Raymond Burke, prefect of the Apostolic Signatura, told CNA the relatio “is simply riven with very serious difficulties, and I’m deeply, deeply concerned and I’m not alone.”

And Archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki of Poznan, on behalf of the Polish bishops’ conference, told Vatican Radio that “we also need to present the truth,” according to a translation by Rorate Caeli.

It is general opinion that the relatio post disceptationem may be overturned in the final document, the ‘relatio synodi’ (synod’s report).

The latter will be a comprehensive document which will contain all the inputs of the two-week synod of bishops.

It will be the first time the synod issues a final report. Usually, synods made a list of proposals and suggestions coming from the discussions of the small groups, and the Pope himself was entrusted with summarizing all the concerns and suggestions in a post-synodal apostolic exhortation.

According to the new methodology of the synod, the proposals will be summarized by the General Secretary of the Synod, the General Rapporteur, the Special Secretary, and a group of six prelates called to assist in drafting the document.

The group includes: president and deputy of the Commission for the message, Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, president of the Pontifical Council for Culture; Archbishop Victor Fernandez, rector of the Catholic University of Argentina; the General Superior of the Society of Jesus, Fr. Adolfo Nicolas; Archbishop Carlos Aguiar Retes of Tlalnepantla; Cardinal Donald Wuerl of Washington; and Peter Kang U-il, Bishop of Cheju.

“The appointment of six people to help in drafting the final report was normal. Before, there were proposals, and there was no need of help to draft a comprehensive text. This kind of summary is a hard amount of work for the only General Rapporteur and General Secretary,” said Fr. Federico Lombardi, director of the Holy See Press Office.

The Pope will decide whether or not to make public the synod’s report. Its conclusions will be the basis for the working document of the 2015 synod of bishops.

The post Controversy Prompts Vatican To Clarify Synod Midterm – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Joanna Paraszczuk

(RFE/RL) — Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge has been the spotlight of Russian, Georgian, and Western media attention in recent days, following several reports of regional connections to the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

One report, which claimed that IS commander and Pankisi native Umar Shishani had threatened Russia in a phone call to his father, was repeated in a broadcast by the private Georgian news outlet Imedi on October 10. The broadcast said that Umar Shishani had threatened revenge because of “Russian occupation” (presumably a reference to Chechnya).

Western media outlets also expressed concern about the radicalization of ethnic Chechens in Pankisi by IS in the wake of reports that a teenage boy from the region, Beso Kushtanashvili, has died fighting in Syria.

In the light of these reports, it is worth asking two questions: first, is Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge supplying a particularly high number of jihadis to Syria; and second, are militants from Pankisi joining IS or other groups?

It is not known how many of Pankisi’s ethnic Chechens are fighting in Syria, but Georgian media outlets have suggested that around 50 residents of the Pankisi Gorge may be participating in the conflict.

While a number of the most prominent militants from the former Soviet Union in Syria are from Pankisi, most Russian-speaking fighters in Syria are from elsewhere in the region, particularly the North Caucasus (including Chechnya and particularly Daghestan) and other countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.

Among the prominent Chechens from Pankisi are militants previously active in the Caucasus Emirate, a North Caucasus-based Islamic terror group.

Many of these militants, as well as ethnic Chechens from Chechnya itself who were previously active in the Caucasus Emirate, do not fight with IS in Syria and many have actively spoken out against the group.

Of the Chechens from Pankisi known to be fighting in Syria, the most notorious — in the sense of having received the most media attention — is IS military commander Umar Shishani (real name Tarkhan Batirashvili). Umar Shishani arrived in Syria in late 2012 and set up residence in the town of Haritan in Aleppo Province, where he quickly gathered around himself a group of Russian-speaking fighters from various parts of the former Soviet Union, mostly from the North Caucasus. He became the emir (leader) of a mostly North Caucasian faction, Jaish Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Helpers), before taking a core group of loyal fighters (including some from Pankisi) to join IS in December 2013.

After Umar Shishani moved to IS, Jaish Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar’s leadership was purportedly taken over by another Chechen militant, Salahuddin Shishani. While Salahuddin Shishani’s real name is not known, sources say that he is also from Pankisi.

Abu Musa Shishani, who at least until recently led the Latakia-based Syrian Islamist faction Ansar ash-Sham, is also reported to be from Pankisi.

Pankisi’s most experienced militant in Syria, and the fighter likely best known to the Georgian security services is Murad Margoshvili, known by his nom de guerre of Muslim Abu Walid Shishani. The leader of a Latakia-based faction, Junud ash-Sham, Margoshvili has recently been blacklisted by the United States.

The ethnic Chechen fought alongside Arab foreign fighters in Chechnya until his imprisonment in Russia in 2003 for gun-running and membership of a terrorist organization; upon his release in 2006, he returned to the Pankisi Gorge and found himself unable to return to Chechnya. After reportedly narrowly averting the shootout between Georgian special forces and armed militants in Georgia’s Lopota Gorge, and after finding himself at odds with some in the Caucasus Emirate, Margoshvili is said to have gone to Syria and established an independent faction.

Meanwhile, the Russian media has played up Georgia’s concerns about terrorism, particularly in recent weeks.

In an article entitled “Georgia: Welcome, International Terrorism,” Russia’s RIA Novosti discusses the reports (condemned by Moscow and later denied by Tbilisi) that Georgia was to host a training center for anti-IS fighters.

“Georgia already has experience of using Islamists to destabilize neighboring territories,” RIA writes. “For almost two decades, Tbilisi has actively taken care of and trained Caucasus Emirate personnel.”

RIA also notes that Georgia was the birthplace of IS commander Umar Shishani.

While some Russian outlets are keen to emphasize the Pankisi Gorge as a source of IS militants, some in Georgia have tried to play down the concerns. The chairman of Georgia’s parliamentary committee on defense and security, Irakli Sesiashvili, admitted that it was impossible to stop the outflow of Georgians from Pankisi to Syria. However, Sesiashvili said this was a “global problem” and not specifically confined to Georgia.

The answer, he said, was for Tbilisi to look to the West, and adhere to antiterror measures adopted by EU countries.

On social media, some Georgian nationalists offered a different (and more cynical) view of reports that Pankisi Gorge native Umar Shishani had threatened Russia.

A pro-Georgia account on Russian social network VKontakte published a photograph of armed militants with the caption: “ISIS [Islamic State] will defend Georgia in the event of another aggression from Russia.”

The post Should Georgia Fear IS Threat To Its Pankisi Gorge? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Ebola outbreak is “winning the race” against attempts to contain it, the head of the United Nations mission working to stop the deadly virus warned the Security Council today as he urged the international community to help expand on-the-ground efforts across the affected nations in West Africa.

In his briefing, Anthony Banbury, head of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), told the 15-nation Council that he is “deeply worried” that the steps implemented by the international community are “not nearly enough” to halt the advance of the fatal disease.

“Ebola got a head start on us,” he said. “It is far ahead of us, it is running faster than us, and it is winning the race. If Ebola wins, we the peoples of the United Nations lose so very much…,” he said.

“We either stop Ebola now or we face an entirely unprecedented situation for which we do not have a plan,” Mr. Banbury told the Council via video link from the operation’s headquarters in Ghana.

In its most recent situation report on the disease, the UN World Health Organization (WHO), which is leading the wider UN response, reported 8,376 cases and 4,024 deaths from Ebola based on information provided by the Ministries of Health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, whose UN delegations were represented at today’s Security Council briefing.

The agency notes that the upward epidemic trend continues in Sierra Leone and most probably also in Liberia. By contrast, the situation in Guinea appears to be more stable, though, in the context of an Ebola outbreak, a stable pattern of transmission is still of a very grave concern, and could change quickly.

“With every day that passes, the number of sick people increases,” continued Mr. Banbury. “Time is our biggest enemy. We must use every minute of every day to our advantage and that is what UNMEER is doing.”

Mr. Banbury recalled WHO’s recommendation that, within 60 days of 1 October, 70 per cent of all those infected must be in the hospital and 70 per cent of the victims safely buried, if the outbreak were to be successfully arrested. Otherwise, he warned, the Ebola numbers risked rising “dramatically” and overwhelming the overall response.

“This is what we are fighting for now: we are fighting to prevent unavoidable deaths. We are fighting for people who are alive and healthy today, but will become infected…and die if we do not put in place the necessary emergency response,” he declared.

In particular, he called for an increase in the number of diagnostic laboratories, transport support, and funding to help with operation logistics which, he said, would help aid the UN response to a crisis so vast in scope and magnitude.

Moreover, with the number of infected growing exponentially each day, Mr. Banbury cautioned that UNMEER could expect new caseloads of approximately 10,000 people per week by 1 December, meaning that 7,000 beds for treatment were needed. He noted that his Mission expected to have 4,300 beds in treatment centres by that date but lamented that there was no staff to operate many of them under current plans.

“UNMEER is playing the critical role of crisis manager,” he added, “but responding to a complex crisis, especially one that cuts across multiple national boundaries, requires an overall perspective and a comprehensive plan.”

The UNMEER head pointed out that his mission plan would ultimately ensure that no gaps were left unfilled and that resources were allocated appropriately, all the while permitting Governments to own the Ebola responses in their respective countries.

“There’s much bad news about Ebola but the good news is we know how to stop it,” said Mr. Banbury, while emphasizing that failure was “inconceivable” and “unacceptable.”

“We must defeat Ebola and we must do it fast,” he concluded.

Meanwhile, earlier in the day, a UN children’s rights official briefed reporters on the broader UN response to the Ebola outbreak.

Speaking at a press conference in Geneva, the UN Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) spokesperson, Christophe Boulierac, reported that an upcoming conference to be held on 16 and 17 October in Kenema, Sierra Leone, would confront the issues facing Ebola survivors as well as the caring of children infected or affected by the disease.

Alongside the devastating physiological effects of the virus, the outbreak has ignited panic and fear across affected areas with some survivors, victims, and their children, being spurned by their local communities.

Mr. Boulierac noted that one “creative” method to help treat and care for children in a more compassionate manner involved the use of Ebola survivors who could provide those children with the attention they need at no risk to themselves or others. Ebola survivors, as medical professionals have frequently reiterated, are no longer capable of contracting the virus. In addition, he pointed out that the conference would address the stigma and discrimination facing Ebola survivors as such challenges undermined their recovery.

In other news, Karin Landgren, head of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), announced the death today of the United Nations Volunteer who worked in the Mission’s medical team and was evacuated to Germany last week to receive treatment for Ebola. This is the second death at UNMIL due to Ebola, after an earlier probable case that resulted in the death of a national staff member on 25 September.

“UNMIL colleagues are saddened by the tragic news as they continue to serve at this very difficult time. Our thoughts now are with the family and friends of the departed,” a UN spokesperson said today in New York.

As for international support against Ebola, the spokesperson noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has announced that it will provide specialized diagnostic equipment to help Sierra Leone in its efforts to combat the outbreak. That support will later be extended to Liberia and Guinea.

It will consist of supplementing the country’s ability to diagnose Ebola quickly, using a technology known as Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR). Early diagnosis, if combined with appropriate medical care, increases the victims’ chance of survival and helps curtail the spread of the disease by making it possible to isolate and treat the patients earlier, the spokesperson explained.

The post Ebola Outbreak ‘Winning The Race’ Against Attempts To Contain It – UN Official appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The UN refugee agency reported on Tuesday that an estimated 180,000 people have fled from the central Iraq town of Hit following its capture by ISIS and affiliated armed groups at the weekend.

The town’s mostly Sunni residents, as well as other Iraqis who had found refuge there in the past, fled to Ramadi, Khaldiya, Hadithat, Rawa, Ana, Amiryah Rahaliya and other places in Anbar province, as well as further afield in Kerbala and Baghdad, some 180 kilometres to the east. Many are sheltering with relatives and friends, as well as in schools, mosques and public shelters.

Hit had, until recently, been a safe haven for those who had fled earlier waves of violence in Ramadi, Fallujah and other parts of Anbar, providing shelter for some 100,000 displaced people.

“The exodus from Hit represents the fourth major wave of displacement in less than a year in Iraq, and for many of those caught up in it, it is the second, third or even fourth time that they have had to flee since January,” UNHCR’s chief spokesperson Melissa Fleming told journalists in Geneva. “Tens of thousands of desperate Iraqis are now caught in a rolling wave of multiple displacement amidst the conflict’s shifting frontlines,” she added.

UNHCR field staff met with some of the displaced while conducting a needs assessment in western Baghdad on Monday. Among them was a 30-year-old woman, originally from Ramadi, who had just fled from Hit with her elderly mother and disabled brother. The family has been displaced three times since January, fleeing the advance of ISIS throughout Anbar. They first fled to Khaldiya, where they stayed eight months, then to Hit for a month, before running for their lives once more in the past few days.

Another 27-year-old woman with two young children fled Hit after her husband was killed by shellfire. Though afraid to leave the house, she was even more afraid of ISIS rule if she stayed. After a 14-hour journey to Baghdad, she is now staying with relatives.

These families join Baghdad’s 75,000 internally displaced people whose key concerns include shelter, health care and finding a source of income. An estimated 1.8 million citizens have been internally displaced this year throughout the country.

UNHCR is sending mattresses, jerry cans, blankets and other relief items to the displaced in Ramadi, Kerbala, Abu Ghraib and the west of Baghdad. However, humanitarian access to large parts of Anbar province is extremely limited by the conflict.

Meanwhile in northern Iraq, an increasing number of Syrian Kurds from the besieged border town of Kobane are seeking shelter in Dohuk province having crossed the border from Turkey. Last Friday, the Iraqi Kurdish authorities opened the Ibrahim Khalil border, near Zakho, easing the journey for the steady stream of people who last week had to pay smugglers US$250 each to cross.

Some 5,400 Syrians from Kobane have now entered Iraq via Turkey, including 3,600 people in the last three days. Another 10,000 to 15,000 people are expected to cross in the coming days. The Syrians cite various reasons for moving on from Turkey. These include civil unrest; the high cost of living; difficulties with aid – especially with the looming winter; and family links to people living in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

Upon arrival in Iraq, the asylum-seekers are screened by border authorities and transferred by the International Organization for Migration to Gawilan camp, set up a year ago for previous waves of Syrian refugees. But the camp reached its capacity this week and new arrivals from today onwards will be taken to the Arbat refugee camp in Suleymaniyah province, which can host an additional 7,000 people.

Talks are under way with the authorities to expand the Darashakran camp in Erbil province, if more people come. UNHCR is also setting up a reception centre at the Ibrahim Khalil border to protect the new arrivals from the elements while they are screened by border officials. UNHCR and its partners are at the border to identify particularly vulnerable people.

Iraq already hosts some 214,000 Syrian refugees with the vast majority residing in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The more than 1.8 million internally displaced people in 2014 add to almost a million internally displaced people who had fled violence in previous years.

The post Iraq: 180,000 Flee Town Of Hit Following ISIS Capture appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fouad Farhaoui

In memory of the victims, this month we express our deep sorrow for the Srebrenica massacre, which resulted in the death of 8 thousand people in 1995. This year on July 11, thousands of people from Sarajevo came together to commemorate and lay to rest the bodies of 175 victims who have been recently identified by the authorities. This is not the first time that the people of Sarajevo have bid farewell to their loved ones. Such is a familiar scene for the Bosnian people. For many years in Bosnia, children, mothers and grandparents buried their relatives who were the victims of violent murder. This scene however, does not only remind international society of their responsibilities to combat crimes perpetrated against innocent civilians, it also generates a social conscience so that massacres like those in Srebrenica never happen again whether in Bosnia, the Balkans or anywhere else in the world.

The international conscience is not only formed by politicians, governments, international society and the United Nations, it also involves the intellectual community, academics and the media, the manufacturers of public opinion. We remember the dark clouds of the 90s which were precipitated by Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama in their theses “The Clash of Civilizations”, “The End of History and the Last Man” and “After Humanity”. These theses caused many atrocities after being accepted as ‘sacred texts’ by war-mongers and arms traders, guiding them in their criminal acts.. In conjunction with these theses, “Islamophobia” developed in many European societies and after the collapse of the Soviet Union such thinking formed the basis of a “new identity” for many politicians, just as did the failure of Adam Smith’s market theory and his “let them do as they will” principle to create uniformity and social cohesion in European societies. Therefore, with the expectations of creating a hypothetical united conscience they looked to God to find a new political departure that ultimately manifested itself in the form of Islamophobia. This approach will be maintained until another political opportunity comes along.

Unfortunately, the same logic, which caused the Bosnian tragedy, still exists in today’s world, discouraging cooperation, diversity and pluralism among different societies, cultures and nations. Therefore, when you look at an international issue, you see tragedy, the same as in Srebrenica, and this keeps happening all over the world. Looking at Asia, we see some of the most unforgettable hostile crimes of history in the Maluku Islands of Indonesia and in East Timor (1999). Over one million seven thousand people were killed by “Khmer Rouge – Red Khmers” in Cambodia. In the age of globalization, where policies are based on mutual understanding, in Myanmar thousands of people have been slain and forcefully expelled from their homes. Christians and other minorities living in the Middle East and Arab world have become increasingly concerned about the wave of racist and sectarian violence. Especially with the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the West’s expostulation of terrorism in the area, a new state of mind called “Sunni Islamophobia” is coming into formation. Recently, just like in 90s-Bosnia, “ethnic and religious cleansing” is now taking place in Africa.

Adversities in Angola but…

In November 2013, Angolan Minister of Culture Rosa Cruz decided to ban Islam and demolish all mosques and Islamic associations including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other human rights agencies. Some reporters have confirmed the Angolan government’s initiative to demolish the mosques located there. Although the Angolan government denies such an anti-Islamic approach while declaring the legitimate rights of Muslims, Christians and others, various observers have pointed out that for 10 years, the Angolan government has continuously failed to appoint a representative to take part in negotiations. As a result, Muslims have yet to be legally recognized or be afforded protection under the law in the country.

This issue captured the headlines, but, in order to avoid an amplification of the backwashes, the truth was hidden from the media shortly after. Besides, the timing of the incidents was of great significance. Just two months earlier in Nairobi, Kenya, the Westgate shopping mall became the site of a terrorist attack in which many were injured and killed by the “Movement of Striving Youth”. Among the victims of the attack were French citizens and other foreign nationals, and the UN Security Council was prompted to condemn the occurrence as an act of terrorism. Due to the terrorist attack, the British government increased its security to counter potential reprisals within its own territory. In the same context, the government of Uganda warned its citizens of a general threat of attacks. Again in 2013, many incidents of terrorism took place in Kenya, thus, increased safety measures were exercised throughout East Africa. These attacks brought back painful memories of 9/11, which resulted in the deaths of close to three thousand innocent Americans. As a matter of fact, in Africa, the terrorist attacks aggravated the African version of Islamophobia just as it had done in the Western world after 9/11.

Central African Republic and the Symphony of Genocide

Not long after the attack in Nairobi and the controversies in Angola, another disaster occurred, albeit this time in the Central African Republic, due to the outbreak of violence. This situation, referred to as “Holocaust” by many politicians and in the media, exemplifies the dire security issues in the area. Undoubtedly, the inhumanity witnessed in the brutal acts of slaughtering perpetrated against innocent Muslims might even overreach the definition of the word “Holocaust”. Certainly, the definition of “The Holocaust” goes beyond religion, expressing the same validity for all innocent people killed by Muslims, regardless if the are Christians or others who follow indigenous African religions. Sadly, the main reason for the ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic, namely the struggle for power and wealth, is skimmed over due to the media’s attention to word “The Holocaust”. In fact, many African countries are actually facing similar atrocities to those that are being committed in this country.

Again, the 2012 dispute in the Republic of Mali has the same root causes as the conflict in the Central African Republic. The primary difference between these two countries, however, is seen in the rebellious attitudes of the Muslims in the Republic of Mali. Furthermore, the starting point of the recent conflict between the government and opponent forces in the Republic of South Sudan once again has the same origin; power, money and ascendance. Here, however, Muslims did not take part in the conflict based solely on religion. Nonetheless, although most of the leaders in conflict have been Christians, it is still impossible to describe this dispute as Christian versus Christian.

Boko Haram is creating Islamophobia in Africa

Again, when the debate around “Holocaust” began to wane in the Central African Republic, in the middle of last April more than 200 female students were kidnapped and held hostage by the militant group Boko Haram. This shocking, hostile incident was strongly criticized by Nigerians and other nations and sanctions against Boko Haram were approved by the United Nations. Soon, radical Muslim groups began to play their anti-Christian “symphony” stating that Nigeria is being ruled by Christians who intend to divide the country and declare an independent nation under its full sovereignty. The northeast of the country, where the female students were kidnapped, known as “Burno”, is a Muslim dominated area. Due to the criminal acts of Boko Haram, some Christians expressed their concerns about an “Islamic threat”. Furthermore, some of those affected attended the U.S. Congress hearing entitled “The Ongoing Struggle Against Boko Haram” on June 11, 2014, but were unfortunately unable to articulate any meaningful words on the incidents in the country.

Looking at Nigerian history, we see that General Ojukwu, who proclaimed the Republic of Biafra and started the Biafran War that would last from 1967 until 1970, was not Muslim but a Christian. His opponent, Head of the Nigerian State and former military officer Yakubu Gown, was also a Christian. The two did not have the same ethnicity however. Here, the ensuing conflict that culminated and endured in the form of a bloody coup before 1975, saw Christian pitted against Christian. This is just the same as in 1985 when the Muslim military commander Ibrahim Babangida organized a military coup to oust the Muslim military leader Muhammedu Bahari. Once again, the two did not share the same ethnic origins.

Amidst the Suffering Rwanda offers Recommendations

Due to terrorist activities, Islamophobia has seen a dangerous upward trend in Africa. This is a significant threat when considering the rival security issues between the diverse ethnic and religious groups. As a matter of fact, basing their fears on the idea that different religions cannot coexist, people are concerned about the declaration and birth of new states in Africa. Keeping this in mind, it is important to find solutions to African countries’ real problems without blaming and manipulating the role of religion. We should remember that the continent has experienced massacres that were far more atrocious than those seen in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in the 90s. In 1994, more than eight hundred thousand people were killed in acts of ethnic cleansing pursued by the Hutu tribes against the Tutsi minority group in Rwanda. In the middle of this horrifying tragedy, Muslim members of the Hutu groups refused to take part in mass killings, and what is more, they actually helped Christian Tutsis. On the other hand, despite the fact that some Muslims did join in the killings, Christians did not blame the Muslims for the attacks on Tutsi churches. Much appreciated by the Muslims, this approach of the Christians helped the two religious groups’ collaborative efforts to live together in peace. It also significantly contributed to the economic recovery and development of Rwanda.

The post Srebrenica Massacre And Islamophobia In Africa: Conscience, Apprehension And Massacre – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Öznur Akcalı

The Catalan government has announced that it will revise the independence referendum which is set to be held on November 9. It is said that the Catalan government will seek alternative ways to reach a solution by deeming the referendum part of a “participative process”. However, the President of the Generalitat de Catalunya Artur Mas stated in a press conference that the referendum will proceed, “The vote on 9 November can be considered the preparatory vote before the definitive one.”

He went on to add that the Catalan government has jurisdiction to consult popular opinion and that the real adversary is the Spanish state, which has done everything in its power to stop the vote. Mr. Mas insists that his regional government will not relinquish the possibility of its independence.

El Pais newspaper claims that the referendum on independence was initially withdrawn because of its lack of legal grounds. In response to the decision of the judiciary, Artur Mas said Spain is a democratic country and everyone should obey the law. Now, however, the Catalan government will rely on another law that affords the Catalan government the right to public consultation.

Nonetheless, the announcement by the Catalan government has been met with criticism by supporters of independence in Catalonia. The political party Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), which props up Mas’s conservative CiU coalition in the regional assembly, published a statement saying “There is only one path: for the Catalan parliament to make an immediate declaration of independence and to open up a constituent process.”

With this attitude among those supporting independence, the ERC is expected to make big gains if Mas were to call early elections.

In the run up to the current state of affairs, the regional government of Catalonia called for independence and set into motion plans to execute a referendum on 9 November. The Spanish government rejected the plan but the Catalan authorities stated that they would hold the referendum on independence nonetheless. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has called the plans unconstitutional because the Spanish Constitutional Court decided any such referendum should first be approved by the Spanish government.

Support for independence increased after the euro crisis, which hit Spain particularly hard. In addition, the Scottish referendum also had an impact on the Catalans who also sought independence despite the fact that the Scots decided to remain within the United Kingdom in the end. After the Scottish referendum decision in March, Artur Mas further wrote an article in the Guardian discussing the central government’s rejection of the Catalan plans for a referendum on independence, stating “What happened in Madrid was exactly the opposite of what occurred in London when the UK government granted Scotland’s request for a referendum without questioning the Scottish people’s right to decide, despite its strong desire to keep Scotland within the UK. That is how democracies work.”

Unlike the Scots, Catalans appear to be more enthusiastic for independence. A poll issued by the Center of Opinion Studies shows that 45.2 percent of Catalans want independence and that 20 percent of Catalans think that Catalonia should be a state within Spain. The current status of Catalonia was accepted by only 23.3 percent of respondents.

Catalans one of the largest autonomous communities which has its own regional administration in With a population of around 7.5 million, Catalonia constitutes 16.1 percent of the total Spanish population. A wealthy region, Catalonia provides 19 percent of Spain’s GDP according to data of the OECD and enjoys better economic conditions than most other parts of the country.

The post Catalonia’s Future: Independence Or Another Solution? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The parents of Reeva Steenkamp said they were “quite surprised” that confidential payments from South African runner Oscar Pistorius were disclosed during his sentencing hearing.

A statement released by their lawyer Wednesday said Pistorius had requested the $550 monthly payments not be revealed.

The athlete offered the payments last year after hearing Steenkamp’s parents were having financial difficulties.

The statement said they intended to repay the funds, likely deducting them from any possible civil settlement, and will now be returning the money because they have decided not to pursue a civil case against Pistorius.

Prosecutor Gerrie Nel revealed Tuesday that Steenkamp’s family had rejected another offer of $34,000. He said the family turned down the payment because they did not want “blood money.”

The sentencing hearing continued Wednesday with Nel questioning social worker Annette Vergeer, who has recommended Pistorius be placed under house arrest rather than being sent to prison. Nel called her suggestion a “shockingly inappropriate” sentence.

Judge Thokozile Masipa could sentence Pistorius to up to 15 years in prison. The hearing is expected to last for several days.

The post Pistorius Payment Revelation Surprises Steenkamp Family appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Already battling airstrikes conducted by the US and its allies, the Islamic State now has another threat to look out for: a motorcycle gang from the Netherlands.

Three members of the infamous Dutch biker gang “No Surrender” reportedly journeyed to Iraq and Syria last week in order to fight alongside Kurdish troops and against Islamic State (IS) militants.

Now, commenting on the legality of that move, the Dutch public prosecutor said Tuesday they are allowed to do so.

“Joining a foreign armed force was previously punishable, now it’s no longer forbidden,” the prosecutor’s spokesman, Wim de Bruin, told AFP.

As long as the individuals do not enlist in a battle against the Netherlands, they are not committing a crime, he added. If the members of the biker gang are found to be engaging in torture or rape, however, De Bruin said they could be indicted on criminal charges.

“The big difference with IS is that it’s listed as a terrorist group,” De Bruin said. “That means that even preparing to join IS is punishable.”

The comments come after it was revealed that at least three No Surrender members had joined Kurdish fighters in the Middle East. The gang’s leader, Klaas Otto, confirmed that the members were from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Breda. One of them can be seen in a photograph holding a Kalashnikov assault rifle.

Dutch bikers are far from being the only individuals traveling to fight the Islamic State. Last week, a Reuters report noted that some US citizens have already done the same. A man named Brian Wilson, who claimed to be a former soldier, said multiple Americans are now fighting with Kurdish troops.

“There are a few Americans who wanted to come here and help the YPG in any way we can,” he said to Reuters, referring to the main Kurdish group battling Syrian militants. “Everything has been fine. They’re very nice, very accommodating, hospitable. Very good people,” he added about his Kurdish hosts.

Fighting on the other side of the battle, though, are even more foreigners. American officials believe there are more than 15,000 people from 80 different countries fighting alongside IS, including more than 2,000 Europeans and 100 Americans.

Last week, unnamed US officials said that some of the militants are entering Western Europe while disguised as refugees.

The post Dutch Motorcycle Gang Gets Green Light To Fight Islamic State appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By P K Ghosh

The news on India’s Naval underwater capability is grim. Requiring at least 30 submarines to fulfill its commitments, the Navy currently has only 13 subs – that too fairly old diesel electric conventional submarines . Shockingly, only half of the strength is operational at any given time. Along with these, there is Chakra, an Akula II class nuclear powered attack submarine, currently on lease from Russia which has no long range weaponry. The current lot of boats are all around 20-27 years old even though the normal prescribed life for such boats is only around 25 years.

While the ten Kilo-class (Sindhughosh class) Russian submarines in the Indian inventory were purchased between 1985 and 2000, the German Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) Type 209 boats were purchased between 1986-94 and served the nation well despite the initial controversy of corruption.

In July 1999, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the Navy’s 30-year submarine building plan which was the only way to overcome the growing obsolescence and depletion of inventory. The plan envisaged constructing 12 new boats with foreign collaboration by 2012 while another 12 were to built using indigenous design parameters. However, in the 15 years since approval, no new submarine has been inducted. The plan went awry and was dogged by delays which started with the approval for the Scorpene submarine deal. This was partly due to the dilution of infrastructure built for the HDW submarine construction which was to be used for the Scorpene as well other material constraints. As a result, the construction of the Scorpene class (known as Project 75) at the Mazagon Docks (MDL), which was being undertaken in collaboration with the French DCNS, got seriously delayed. Now, it is presumed that the first boat would be due in 2016 with the remaining five following at 10-month intervals thereafter, by which time about 65 per cent of the current fleet would be decommissioned or require urgent replacement. The last two of these boats are expected to be fitted with the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) which would allow a conventional submarine like the Scorpene to operate without the need to surface or use a snorkel for long periods.

Recently, when Defence Minister Arun Jaitly reviewed the ongoing Scorpene project at the MDL, he certainly wasn’t happy. He was informed that the first would be delivered in September 2016 after a delay of more than four years. The balance five of the submarines are expected to follow after every 10-11 months. Unsurprisingly the Project 75 (Scorpene) cost has, in the meantime, escalated to Rs 23,562 crores.

While the delay would have shocked any concerned person, what has proved even more surprising is that the second project for more advanced stealth submarines armed with both tube-launched missiles for land-attack capabilities as well as AIP and termed P 75 India ( Project P 75I) is yet to be floated despite numerous attempts to do so. Ostensibly the file till recently was shuttling between the Finance and the Defence Ministries, now both under Mr Jaitly. The project was granted “Acceptance of Necessity” way back in November 2007 when the estimated cost was around Rs 50,000 crores . However, a fresh debate arouse on the necessity of importing two boats outright (to save time) and construct the other three at MDL and one at Hindustan Shipyard (HSL). Given the current stress to “make Indian” by the Prime Minister, it has now been decided to make the initial two boats in India which may add to the time factor, though would be suitable in the longer run in giving the public and private defence sectors the necessary technological expertise and confidence in manufacture.

India’s naval thinking derives its inspiration from maritime strategist Mahan. The idea of projecting power across the Indian Ocean for securing Indian strategic interests is the dominant discourse in this thinking. As a corollary, India considers itself a net security provider in the entire Indian Ocean region. Many of the associated issues that Indian naval planners are presently grappling with include how to cope with Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean, expanding Indian presence in the region , controlling SLOCs (Sea lines of Communication) i.e. trade routes, de facto forward basing and generating capacity for sustained operations in and around the entire ocean. This is a difficult task to perform with the limited number of warship platforms and mere 13 conventional submarines.

The Indian Navy has a long way to go before catching up with the Chinese Navy that has been operating in the Indian Ocean rather than making the “incidental forays”. China possesses one of the largest submarine fleets comprising anything between 68 to 85 boats spread across nine different classes, a far cry from the Indian inventory. Even Pakistan which has a much smaller navy has five conventional submarines with an order of six more from China.

Despite a relatively unblemished record of submarine operation since December 1967 (when the first submarine — a Foxtrot class — arrived from Soviet Union), the Indian Navy has in recent times been bogged by accidents and perceived lack of professionalism due to these incidents. It is imperative that the institutional and professional inadequacies are addressed to overcome security gaps. A refocused attempt to rectify the growing lack of underwater platforms and warship inventory is the dire need of the hour, as we can ill afford at the cost of our national security.

(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

Dr P K Ghosh is a Senior Fellow at the Delhi based Observer Research Foundation. He specializes in Maritime Security. He can be reached at pkghosh@orfonline.org

The post Aging And Insufficient Submarines Plague Indian Navy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By John Dyck

The roots of North Caucasian militancy run deep, as the people of this region have been struggling against Russian control of their territory for centuries. Early resistance involved a broad mix of ethnic groups, sometimes coalescing, and in other instances, fighting independently. Russia eventually consolidated control however, and for quite some time was able to supress unrest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, militant resistance re-emerged in the form of nationalist-secessionist movements, with Chechnya as the epicenter. Over time, the insurgency evolved into an Islamic insurgency with a fundamentally different goal: the creation of a pan-Caucasian Islamic polity. This transformation was accompanied by a concurrent shift in insurgent demographics, as an increasing number of foreign fighters joined their ranks. While not unrecognizable, the North Caucasian insurgency has changed significantly over time. What follows is a brief examination of its history and evolution.

Earliest Russian Control

As of 1725, Russia claimed control of the North Caucasus as far south as the line of the Terek River, which runs through northern Dagestan, Chechnya, North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Bearing in mind the territoriality within many North Caucasian cultures, there was likely an ongoing low-level conflict occurring during this period. In the early 1800s, the Romanov Tsars attempted to expand in the North Caucasus. In doing so, they encountered fierce resistance, led by an ethnic Avar religious leader, Imam Shamil. His force, consisting of a mix of North Caucasian tribes, caused considerable difficulties for the Russians, who were unable to bring the area under their control until approximately 1858. Thus, from early on, resistance to Russian domination was truly a pan-Caucasian effort, though this did not necessarily entail inter-ethnic cooperation.

Russian control of the area lapsed at the downfall of the Romanovs during the First World War. A brief independence was enjoyed in the region until the Bolshevik communists, having consolidated control in the Russian core, re-established control of the North Caucasus through the liberal application of military force. Such methods continued under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. Towards the end of the Second World War, Stalin ordered the deportation of the entire Chechen population in the winter of 1943-44. This was carried out for the Chechens’ alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Thousands perished on their way to exile in central and eastern Russia. The Chechens were allowed to return to their homes by Nikita Khrushchev a short time after the conclusion of the war. The heavy hand with which the Russians ruled the North Caucasus effectively repressed militancy in the region for a time. When Caucasian militancy re-emerged, it was, at least initially, a largely Chechen affair.

Post-Soviet Collapse

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw several long-simmering independence movements surface in the North Caucasus republics. These nascent movements were largely motivated by ethnic nationalism that had reached its peak as the Soviet state disintegrated. The most significant movement was that of the Chechens. In late 1991, Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared independence after winning the presidential election. Chechnya soon adopted a constitution defining it as an independent secular state. The Chechens, and many of the other North Caucasian secessionists, hoped this would be their seminal moment; the culmination of a centuries-long struggle for the right to political and military control of the North Caucasus.

But Russia would not, and indeed could not, give up so easily.

Having witnessed the rapid disintegration of their geopolitical buffer zone between 1989 and 1991, the Russians were desperate not to allow the North Caucasus, an area Russia considers to be part of its core, to break from their political control. The Caucasus mountain range represents a defensible line against any potential foreign aggression from the south. The area immediately to the north of these mountains, including Chechnya, is a major transit corridor for Caspian Sea oil exports to Europe via the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The collapse of its extended buffer zone had already demonstrated Russian weakness on the international stage. Corralling Chechnya was not just a way to reassert its power and prestige, but a strategic imperative. Initial Russian attempts to put down the rebellion by proxy involved the arming of the pro-Russian opposition in Chechnya. When this failed, the Russian army was deployed to Chechnya on 11 December 1994.

The First Chechen War

Thus began the predominantly Chechen phase of the insurgency in the North Caucasus (the Chechen insurgents were more than likely joined by like-minded fighters from the neighboring North Caucasian republics). At the outset, the insurgency was a nationalist-secessionist one (though it would not always remain so). On a strategic level, the insurgents were very astute. They understood that a major factor in their ultimate success had to be popular support, and they undertook a multifaceted campaign that effectively targeted this support. The insurgents provoked indiscriminate Russian reprisal attacks against civilian targets by operating close to hospitals and schools, as well as beheading captured Russian soldiers (techniques all too familiar to observers of several conflicts today). They also conducted an effective Information Operations (IO) campaign, using mobile jammers and broadcasting equipment, to counter the Russian narrative of the conflict. Conversely, the Russians prosecuted an essentially coercive strategy that was ineffective at garnering popular support.

Operationally, the Chechen defense was centered on large urban centers such as Grozny. In these areas, the Chechens engaged in a hybrid style of guerrilla warfare, proving to the Russians (and the world) their methodological flexibility. The Chechens fought pitched battles against massed Russian formations in urban areas, often lasting months.

On a tactical level, they created almost no strong points, instead seeking to maximize their mobility and make creative use of the urban terrain as a force equalizer. Examples of this include the insurgent’s use of urban verticality to launch attacks from above and below the angles at which Russian armour could effectively return fire. They also made use of the canalizing effects of the dense urban core to effectively trap whole columns of Russian armour by disabling the lead and rear vehicles. The Chechens were also able to conduct certain deception operations based on the communications difficulties created by urban verticality and electromagnetic ‘noise’ present in the urban environment, such as inserting false messages into Russian tactical communications, thereby creating tactical advantages for the insurgents. Chechen tactics were characterized by swarming attacks that were largely ad hoc affairs, wherein multiple groups of insurgents opportunistically coalesced from several different directions to attack a Russian formation. These groups would then break contact and disperse in multiple directions, often leaving the Russians at a loss as to where they came from and who to pursue.

Despite the Chechen approach to the conflict, the Russians pursued a conventional strategy that was essentially based on Second World War doctrine. It involved the massing of forces, moving in a linear fashion, with an emphasis on the occupation of urban centers such as Grozny. Initially, this was inadequate to deal with the insurgents. Preceded by a three week bombardment by air and military forces, the 131st “Maikop” Brigade, composed of 1000 soldiers, 26 tanks, and 120 armored vehicles was tasked to penetrate to Grozny’s city center. This unit entered the downtown core of Grozny in column formation, and was reduced to approximately a fifth of its size in three days. Despite staggering losses such as this, the Russians continued to prosecute their conventional strategy.

For a variety of reasons, not the least of which was a serious lack of munitions, the Chechens were gradually pushed out of the urban centers in the northern lowlands, and forced to fall back into the southern mountains. At this time, the insurgents changed tactics and carried out several high-profile terrorist attacks, including those on 14 June 1995 at Budennovsk (Stavropol Krai) and January 1996 at Kizlyar-Pervomaiskoye (Dagestan). Both incidents resulted in a significant loss of Russian lives (mainly civilians) and further loss of face for the Russian government. The Budennovsk incident alone resulted in approximately 150 deaths and 400 casualties, when Russian troops attempted to rescue the hostages taken by the insurgents. This delivered a severe psychological blow to the Russian public, who began to question the necessity of the conflict. Ironically, it was the Chechen leader Shamil Basayev who planned and conducted many of these high profile attacks. Basayev was part of a large group of North Caucasian militants who had been trained and equipped by the Russian government, and sent to assist Abkhaz insurgents fend off the Georgians in that conflict during the early 1990s.

Over the course of the next year, fighting continued between the two sides, largely limited to ambushes and small skirmishes, centered in villages in the southern mountain passes. In August 1996, the insurgents launched a successful counterattack against Russian forces in Grozny, retaking the city. This led to the Khasavyurt Accord, a cease-fire between the two sides. A formal peace agreement was signed in May 1997, which saw Chechnya remain a part of the Russian Federation. While the agreement brought an end to hostilities, it did not resolve the question of Chechen independence, which both sides agreed to determine in five years. Somehow, small groups of decentralized North Caucasian insurgents had fought the much vaunted Russian military to a standstill. For the Russian government, who had previously appeared determined to crush the “criminals” and “bandits”, this was a stunning reversal.

The Interwar Years: A Swing towards Fundamentalism

The interim peace was transformative for both parties to the conflict, but particularly so for the insurgents. For the Russians, defeat was an unacceptable end, and so the Khasavyurt Accord was never more than an opportunity to reorganize and rearm. For the insurgents, a new faction of Islamic fundamentalists emerged at this time, which began to challenge the nationalist faction for control of the broader insurgent agenda. Their primary goal was to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Chechnya, and subsequently, the rest of the Caucasus. Their first major move occurred in early 1999, when they pressured Aslan Mashkadov, the leader of the Chechen republic at the time, to declare that Shari’ah law was to be phased in over the next three years.

In a regional context, Islamic fundamentalists, or to be more specific, Salafists, had been present in the North Caucasus for some time. Neighboring Dagestan had experienced clashes between Sufi and Salafist Muslims as early as 1994-1995, and in 1998 Salafists had attempted a coup in the capital Makhachkala. That same year, Dagestani Salafists declared the creation of a “Special Islamic Territory” in Botlikh, Andi, and Gagatli, three villages in the south-west of the Republic.

These events help to highlight an important pre-existing split within Islam in the North Caucasus. When Islam first penetrated the Caucasus, it was of the Sufi variety. Sufism has a long history in the region and has, during the course of this history, incorporated regional traditions and is essentially entrenched in the region. Salafism has also been present in the region; however, it arrived much later, and was not as widely embraced by the many peoples of the Caucasus. Salafists have tried to invoke a “pure” version of Islam, free from local traditions. Salafism appealed to some, especially the younger generation that sought an answer to the moral and social crisis that emerged after the disintegration of the Communist state. Prior to the conflict, to be a Salafist did not mean to be a radical. Indeed, this holds true today. It was only in the lead up the conflict that a radical interpretation of Salafism emerged, making it a recent phenomenon in the North Caucasus. When it did, the Sufi led establishment in Dagestan and Chechnya resisted its spread, with both parties requesting Russian help in subduing their Salafist opponents in 1998 and 1999 respectively. This demonstrates the deep divide between Sufis and Salafists, not just between insurgent factions, but in the broader societal context.

Prior to this shift, the fortunes of the insurgency were in the ascendant. The emergence of this split in insurgent ranks had vital practical implications for Russian counterinsurgency efforts and marked the beginning of an important shift in insurgent demographics, and concurrently, the decline of the insurgency. It was at this point that the insurgency became an increasingly international affair. It also saw the dominance of the fundamentalist faction increase.

The Second Chechen War

Accounts vary over who made the first move but in August of 1999, a force of approximately 5,000 Chechens, under the command of Shamil Basayev, crossed the border into Dagestan’s newly declared “Special Islamic Territory,” in response to the deployment of Russian forces who had been sent in at the request of the government in Makhachkala. Although the insurgents were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempt to hold ground in the face of the Russian assault, this was a sizable deployment of combat power, demonstrating the growing significance of the Salafist group within the insurgency. Over time, Mashkadov’s submission over Shari’ah law, as well as the nationalist’s inability to prevent the fundamentalist faction from carrying out cross-border incursions into Dagestan, emboldened the fundamentalists, who increasingly demonstrated independence from the nationalist leadership’s command and control.

After driving the insurgents from Dagestan, the Russian military advanced into Chechnya in October of 1999. Encountering sporadic, light resistance, Russian forces quickly advanced on Grozny. In the previous conflict, the insurgents had begun their defense in Grozny, and as they fell back towards the south, defended successive cities along the way. This time however, as the Russians approached the outskirts of Grozny, all hell broke loose. The insurgents mounted an inspired defence of the Chechen capital and at the same time, throughout Chechnya, towns the Russians had passed through without incident, sprang up in rebellion as soon as the main Russian force was engaged in the capital. This revised operational strategy may be termed ‘concurrent cities.’ Tactically, the Chechens proved as astute as ever, making excellent use of urban verticality. This time, they went one step further however, by creating and making use of an extensive network of underground tunnels. Chechen tactics were again of the guerilla variety in that they conducted highly mobile, hit and run attacks. They rarely attempted to hold ground in the classic sense. Instead, they would blend back into the civilian population to wait for their next opportunity to attack. This left the Russians often unable to distinguish between subdued territory, and territory teeming with insurgents. The Russians, again, were using conventional tactics against an unconventional opponent. As with the first conflict, this was largely counterproductive in that it alienated the local population, thereby increasing both active and passive support for the insurgents. Despite significant difficulties however, the Russians were eventually able to achieve control of Chechnya.

When this happened, the insurgents dispersed to neighboring republics, as well as to the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, a long time sanctuary for Chechen militants due to ethno-religious ties with the people of that area. Also at this time, observers noticed that the stated goals of the fundamentalists were changing. In 2002, the two sides argued over the potential declaration of Shari’ah law throughout the entire North Caucasus. This alteration of priorities by one faction highlighted the importance of the shift that was occurring, as well as their growing dominance in the insurgency. It is likely that prior to this, they had either hidden or downplayed their ultimate goals in the interest of cohesion with the nationalist faction.

The Ascent of Terrorism

This shift was accompanied by the increased acceptance and incorporation of terrorism as a tactical tool. Despite being greatly diminished in numbers due to their initial combat losses and the success of the Russian’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, the insurgents proved themselves to be quite resilient by carrying out a variety of high-profile attacks including (but certainly not limited to) the “Nord-Ost” siege (Moscow, 2002), and the attack on the School #1 in Beslan (North Ossetia, 2004). The insurgents also successfully assassinated Akhmad Kadyrov, an ambitious Sufi ex-mufti (and ex-insurgent) who was the head of the Russian-backed administration in Chechnya. This occurred in a very public way during a Victory Day parade in Grozny’s Dynamo Stadium on 9 May 2004.

The ultimate aim of the fundamentalists’ ambitions became clear as then president of the Chechen shadow-government (most of who lived in exile), Doku Umarov, declared the creation of a Caucasian Emirate on 7 October 2007, with himself as Emir. The fundamentalist faction’s goals had evolved into something very similar to the trans-national strategy of Al-Qaida. The latter’s goal is to establish a global political system (Caliphate) based on a fundamentalist version of Islamic law, while the former’s was to create a regional Islamic polity (Emirate). This clashed directly with the goal of the nationalists and marked the final separation of the increasingly divergent factions. Lack of coordination between the two insurgent factions rendered the nationalists largely irrelevant, as they had little to no control over a significant portion of the military wing of the insurgency. This irrelevance had been growing for quite some time, as since 2004, all of the main anti-Russian statements have been made under the flag of radical Islam and not under the banner of Chechen nationalism. Without this control, there was little incentive for the Russians to engage with the nationalists. It did however, come at a cost to the fundamentalists, as it reduced their domestic recruitment base due to the increasing alienation of the nationalist Sufis. The division also terminated the fundamentalist’s connection to a political entity (the nationalist shadow government) that the international community might have viewed as legitimate. At this point, the insurgency had officially been transformed into one of the fundamentalist Islamic variety.

As mentioned previously, the early 2000s saw the increasing internationalization of the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The relative lack of internal and external support for the fundamentalists had caused this faction to look for outside help as it rose to dominance. Its declaration of an Islamic polity in the North Caucasus helped in this respect. Past claims as to the number of foreign fighters vary greatly. While some have put the number at 300, the Russian government claimed that at one point, there were approximately 700 foreign fighters in the North Caucasus. Documents reported to have been found in Grozny list nationals from Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan as present in the ranks of the insurgents. Somewhat surprisingly, two insurgents from China were reportedly captured in the battle for Komsomolskoye, demonstrating the far reach of insurgent recruitment efforts. In terms of finances, the US State Department has estimated that, at minimum, approximately $100 million has been channelled to Chechen fundamentalists from various sources in the Middle East. The Chechens have also received training in the West Bank, support from Islamists in East and Central Asia, and have gained experience fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. This external support did little in the near-term to resurrect the fortunes of an insurgency that had been in decline for years. It did however, help to sustain it.

The Islamic State Connection

Currently, the North Caucasian insurgents are well connected to trans-national jihadi groups. The civil war in Syria has provided the insurgents with new opportunities for recruitment, training, and the chance to ally themselves with significant transnational jihadi groups such as the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State (IS). It has been reported that they have made significant contributions in terms of fighters and financing to these groups. This is particularly true in the case of IS, in which Umar Shishani, a Chechen, is reported to be one of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s closest associates. Shishani’s group, predominantly of North Caucasian descent, are reported to be quickly becoming one of the largest factions in IS. There has been a reduction in insurgent activity (though not a cessation) in the North Caucasus which is likely the result of this outflow of insurgent fighters and capital. It has also been noted that this has caused an internal debate amongst the North Caucasian insurgents, over whether they should be participating in the Syrian/Iraqi conflict, or fighting for the creation of the Caucasian Emirate at home. Many have left to fight in the Middle East however, as their strategic agenda is aligned with the jihadi rebels there. Furthermore, the environment in Syria (and now Iraq) is much more accommodating. In the North Caucasus, the Russians and their proxies are firmly in control at the moment, making any sort of major operation or training difficult. Whereas in Syria and Iraq, the North Caucasians have had a chance to hone their combat skills, as well as acquire sophisticated new political and economic skillsets, notably from Islamic State. In several recent press releases, members of IS, some of which are thought to be North Caucasian, have promised to return home and put these to use. If and when they do, they will do so as more capable and battle-hardened than ever before.

This article was published originally at Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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By Ömer Faruk Topal

Saudi Arabia is held accountable for spreading radical religious ideas which have been creating violent extremist groups. Salafi-Wahhabism, the official religious school of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is the religious and ideological base for many radical groups in the Muslim world, from Mali to Indonesia. Critics of the Kingdom claim that Saudi Arabia does not only impose a strict Wahhabi code in the country that eliminates all kinds of freedoms, but also spreads this ideology by funding Salafi-Wahhabi madrassas and scholars in different countries, by broadcasting and publishing media materials, and by supporting radical militant groups.

Despite the fact that Saudi nationals constitute a very high percentage of those recruited for global terrorism and that the religious understandings of Saudi Arabia and radical groups exhibit a high degree of similarity, Saudi Arabia is not exempt from these groups’ attacks and threats. The government in Riyadh is concerned about attacks which may target its oil fields and petrochemical complexes, and the Two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Madinah. The former carry crucial importance for both the international and Saudi economy and the latter is connected with the prestige of the Saudi regime, which proclaims itself the custodian of these Holy Sites. These concerns are not superfluous. The seizure of The Grand Mosque in 1979 by religious zealots led by Juhayman al-Otaybi is still fresh in the memories of the Muslim world and Saudi Arabia alike.” Additionally, in 2006, Saudi security forces prevented a bombing by al-Qaeda at Abqaiq, the world’s largest oil processing complex.

ISIS has also seen the Saudi regime as a puppet of the US, its biggest enemy. Every ISIS militant takes a nom de guerre after they join the group with the last part of their new pseudonym indicating their nationality, for example Abu Omar al-Kuwaiti and Abu Qatada al-Britani. However, fighters from Saudi Arabia generally choose al-Jazrawi instead of al-Su’udi. Jazrawi comes from Shiba Jazeera (peninsula). In this context Jazrawi means people from the Arabian Peninsula and refers to Saudi Arabia, yet by choosing this name, Saudi ISIS fighters show that they do not recognize the Saudi regime.

In May and November 2003, more than 40 people were killed by al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. On 1 May 2004, the group killed five Western workers at a petrochemical complex in Yanbu, and on 29 May, 20 Saudi and foreign nationals in Khobar faced the same fate. In December 2004, militants attacked the US Consulate in Jeddah and killed nine people. There have also been scores of raids on police stations and attacks on foreigners in the country.

De-radicalization after 9/11

After the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia launched rehabilitation programs as part of its counter-terrorism policy. In 2009, Abu Qatada (Omar M. U. Abu Omar), one of the leading jihadist ideologues in Europe, commented on the transformations by saying in an interview that “the impact of these retreats on us [jihadists] is worse than 100,000 American soldiers”. The Saudi government has implemented programs to counter radicalization by providing the general public with information about Islam and the threat of extremism. In particular, the program emphasizes that the extremists do not actually care about Muslims, but callously use them to achieve their own objectives. Psychologists, Islamic scholars, social workers and academics are all involved in the Munasaha rehabilitation program that aims to analyze and rehabilitate terrorist ideology as part of the ideological war in which the Saudi security apparatus has been battling al-Qaeda over the past few years. Approximately 100 religious figures, psychologists, social workers, and teachers help to operate the Munasaha rehabilitation program which aims to rehabilitate those who have been involved in terrorist activity. The Al-Munasaha Committee propagates schemes to raise awareness all across the country. Its activities include lectures and courses that are held at schools, mosques and summer camps, and are aimed at combating deviant thought and misunderstandings.

In 2001, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center was founded with Saudi backing. The Kingdom also donated $100 million to the Center. Additionally, in 2003, King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue was established. One of the aims of the initiative is “contributing toward the presentation of the true image of Islam inside and outside the country based on moderation through constructive dialogue.”

New threat, new measures

The emergence of ISIS poses an existential threat to regional security. The group now exceeds al-Qaeda in terms of its number of fighters and scope of their origins, its fighting capabilities, and its potential regional effects. Therefore, the Kingdom commenced an action plan against ISIS. One of the most interesting statements in this regard came from Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Al al-Sheikh. On August 19, the Mufti labeled ISIS and al-Qaeda as the number one enemies of Islam and stated that Muslims are the main victims of these extremist groups. He also claimed that they are the “Kharijites of the time.” The term “Kharijites”, referring to the sect which emerged from the first civil war in the Muslim world in the 7th century, is increasingly used by Saudis to describe ISIS so as to keep Salafism-Wahhabism’s distance from the extremist organization. The King himself, Abdullah bin Abdelaziz, also harshly criticized the radical groups for using the name of Islam to justify their actions, asserting that Islam is different from what these groups represent. State officials and religious leaders, state-backed newspapers, and state-sponsored television channels all denounce ISIS and like-minded groups.

Measures taken against ISIS are not only limited to discourse however. In March, al-Nusra and ISIS were classified as terrorist organizations by the Saudi regime and participation in the war in Syria was criminalized, punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment. In September 2014, Saudi Arabia also hosted a regional terrorism conference that outlined the battle against ISIS. The Arab League, in which Saudi Arabia wields great influence, issued a statement rejecting Islamic radicalism. The Kingdom also joined the US-led coalition aimed at targeting militants in Syria, along with other Arab allies including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. The Son of Crown Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz is even one of the pilots involved in air strikes. Saudi Arabia flew British-supplied Tornadoes and US-supplied F-15 Eagles in addition to F-22 fighters armed with Tomahawk missiles. Saudi Arabia has also agreed to host the training of Syrian opposition fighters by the U.S.

Despite these efforts, Saudi Arabia still faces criticism for its support of ISIS and like-minded groups. The main reason for this support is the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which manifests itself in both countries’ use of proxies in different countries. In order to balance growing Iranian influence in the region, which has been enhanced by scores of non-state actors, Saudi Arabia has also supported various groups that promote its own interests. However, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl-al Haq are not only funded, equipped, and trained by Iran, but are also virtually led by Iran. There are strong ideological ties between these groups and Iran and they exhibit a high degree of synchronization. On the other hand, aid coming from Riyadh is mainly financial in nature and the country has a limited influence on the groups it supports. This is why, although Saudi Arabia disapproves of the atrocities perpetrated by ISIS and other groups, once they are supported for various political reasons, they are hard to stop.

Stability is everything for the House of Saud. Therefore, every revisionist movement, no matter Islamist or jihadist, represents a threat for the ruling elite. However, sympathy or support for ISIS in the public is generally beyond the government’s control. The conservative religious establishment, with its strong influence on the educational and judiciary systems, as well as on the media, boosts radical thought in the country and creates sympathy for these groups. Private donors have funneled millions of dollars to ISIS despite the fact that Riyadh formally outlawed such donations. While ISIS’s presence at its northern border poses an external threat to the Kingdom, the struggle against ISIS also has a domestic dimension. The ruling elite, possessing good relations with the West, desire stability in the country and increasingly see Israel as a regional ally that can balance Iran. The anti-Western, anti-Israel, and pro-ISIS stances held by the religious establishment and some powerful private groups may cause conflict between various factions in the country which would in turn shake the foundations of the Kingdom.

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(EurActiv) — Spain’s Prime Minister said on Wednesday that a new “chapter of dialogue” was being opened with Catalonia, after the northeastern region dropped plans to hold a referendum on independence next month.

But Rajoy also threatened to block a non-binding “consultation” ballot which Catalonia says it will hold instead, if it were found to be illegal.

Nor was it clear if the Catalan authorities wanted to start discussions with the central government. Regional president Artur Mas said on Tuesday the Spanish state was “the enemy”.

Mas said that a referendum on independence – strongly opposed by the Madrid government – would not now go ahead as planned on Nov.9 but instead a non-binding “consultation” ballot would take place.

Rajoy, who had welcomed the decision, told reporters at parliament on Wednesday: “A chapter of dialogue is now being opened.”

But he also said he would seek to block the consultation vote if there was any indication it was against the law.

“Nobody can break the law because that would mean liquidating democracy. If we see that there is anything (in the consultation) that is against the law then we’ll have to appeal against it,” he said.

Catalonia’s long-standing drive for independence has gathered steam in the past decade, fueled by Spain’s economic crisis.

Mas presented Rajoy a set of economic measures in July, including an increase in central government spending in the region, Spain’s economic powerhouse, while the government has opened the door to reforms next year on the way Spanish regions are financed, a long-standing demand from Catalonia.

Many political analysts and business figures in Catalonia and Madrid believe the measure could be the basis for an agreement between the two sides. But Rajoy and Mas have not met since July.

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Macedonia has signed agreement to export lamb meat in China and to expand the marketing of dairy products, the Food and Veterinary Agency (FVA) announced Tuesday.

The agreement followed a visit by a senior Chinese delegation that was introduced to the animal food security system in the country, which included official controls performed by FVA, animal health, the implementation of legal regulations concerning food safety, monitoring plans, laboratory facilities and food operators.

The Chinese delegation led by Deputy Director General of the Department for registration at the Institute for Certification and Accreditation, visited several facilities and food operators in the past four days – the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine laboratories, a facility for production, processing and handling of milk products, two slaughterhouses approved for lambs’ slaughtering, a facility for the production, processing and handling of meat products, a facility for production of animal feed, a sheep farm and a facility for wine production.

The delegation included the Deputy Director of the Department of Food Supervision at the Border Inspection and Quarantine Bureau as well as the CEO of the Inspection and Quarantine Institute.

“After the inspection and the field activities it was established that the food security control system in Macedonia is on very high level in terms of administrative procedures and in terms of construction, technical and technological readiness or placement of the food operators in general. High standards have been achieved in terms of food safety that provide adequate assurance for safe and quality products, “informs the FVA.

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A group of national and international human rights organizations called on President Salva Kiir to veto what they defined as an “abusive” bill, passed last week by parliament.

The rights groups include Human Rights Watch and South Sudan’s Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO).

The bill gives the National Security Service (NSS) sweeping powers, allow them unfettered authority to arrest and detain suspects without a warrant. The only obligation would be to ensure the suspect appears in court within 24 hours. An armed conflict is underway in South Sudan since December between loyalist forces of President Salva Kiir and rebels headed by his former deputy Riek Machar.

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The mayor of Dallas, Texas, said the situation “may get worse before it gets better,” after a second health care worker tested positive for the Ebola virus.

The health worker was identified as Amber Vinson, a nurse at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital.

Dallas Mayor Mike Rawlings told reporters on Wednesday that Dallas authorities are at work notifying her neighbors.

Vinson was put into quarantine on Tuesday after a fever was detected.

“Health officials have interviewed the latest patient to quickly identify any contacts or potential exposures, and those people will be monitored,” the Texas Department of State Health Services said on Wednesday.

Vinson contracted the virus while treating Thomas Eric Duncan, the Liberian national who became the first person in the United States to die of the virus last week.

Rawlings said Vinson, who lived alone with no pets, is being decontaminated.

The Associated Press reported on Wednesday that Vinson had flown before she realized she was ill. The AP reported that officials were alerting her fellow passengers.

Nurse infected

The news comes just days after another nurse, 26-year-old Nina Pham, became the first person infected by Ebola in the United States while caring for Duncan during much of his 11 days in the hospital. Duncan died on Oct. 8.

Pham released a statement Tuesday saying she is “doing well” and wants “to thank everyone for their kind wishes and prayers.”

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said in a statement that it was performing confirmation testing of Texas’ preliminary tests on the new patient.

“An additional health care worker testing positive for Ebola is a serious concern, and the CDC has already taken active steps to minimize the risk to health care workers and the patient,” the CDC said.

The head of the CDC said Tuesday any U.S. hospital with a confirmed case of Ebola now will get a CDC response team on the ground “within hours.”

CDC response

Dr. Tom Frieden said he has been hearing “loud and clear” from health care workers that they are worried about Ebola and do not feel prepared to take care of a patient with the disease.

Frieden said the CDC team currently on the ground in Dallas is making sure those caring for Pham do so “safely and effectively.”

He said putting “a more robust” infection control team in place when the first patient was diagnosed in Dallas might have prevented her from getting infected.

At least 75 other health care workers who might have come into contact with Duncan are being monitored for fever or other symptoms.

Another 48 people exposed to Duncan before he was hospitalized have passed the period of greatest risk, and Frieden said they are now unlikely to develop Ebola.

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The essential fact of the sectarian conflicts (internal and external) that have characterized the MidEast for decades has been the artificial boundaries left behind by empire and the colonial powers. The basic question facing any political approach to restoring peace would be whether to seek to preserve those boundaries or draw new ones that would somehow recognize the ethnic and religious realities on the ground.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

It seems increasingly clear that there is no purely military solution to the chaotic conflict engulfing Syria and Iraq.  Given the extreme sectarian nature of the over-lapping confrontations, and the various outside forces involved on the several sides, an air war alone is unlikely to achieve anything beyond metastasizing the violence and may not be able to prevent further gains by the Islamic State (IS).  It is hard to see how even a ground war – i.e., the introduction of US, NATO or other combat forces – could gain a stable outcome.  America’s generals have freely admitted that the war may be a long one.  The situation seems to cry out for a political approach.

President Obama had been long reluctant to get involved in another foreign intervention.  But perhaps led by the political pressures upon him to be seen doing something – and apparently ill-advised by his current national security team – Obama first undertook a half-hearted effort to aid Syrian “moderate” rebels.  Then after the IS beheadings, he decided to launch the current air war against the IS in both Syria and Iraq.  The aim of the air war is to prevent further IS gains and “degrade” its capabilities.  In Iraq, the US now has a Shia government perhaps more able to keep further Sunni from going over to the IS.  In Syria, it is “vetting” rebels to find some it can entrust with its weapons.  Some have criticized the US focus on IS rather than on overthrowing Assad in Syria.  Turkey has been especially critical.  Ankara seems understandably reluctant to take on fellow Sunnis who are fighting Assad, himself supported by Shia powers Iran and Hezbollah.  (Turkey also may not object to IS delivering setbacks to Kurds.)  In Iraq, it is not the Iraqi army confronting IS but Shia militia.  US special forces are on the ground in Iraq and probably Syria as well.  In all, the US has stepped into a conflict in which everyone seems to be fighting everyone else and the Arab powers and other outsiders all have their favorites.

If there is no military solution to the conflicts then what is to be done?  The answer seems, in principle, obvious:  engaging the many parties in some political process, some form of negotiation.  But about what, including who and how to go about it?

The essential fact of the sectarian conflicts (internal and external) that have characterized the MidEast for decades has been the artificial boundaries left behind by empire and the colonial powers.  The basic question facing any political approach to restoring peace would be whether to seek to preserve those boundaries or draw new ones that would somehow recognize the ethnic and religious realities on the ground.  The US and West Europeans customarily reject, as a matter of general policy, reopening the question of borders with Washington especially looking to preserve multi-ethnic states through democracy and minority participation.  But exceptions have been made.  Yugoslavia was allowed to fragment along ethnic lines.  Despite US and EU efforts to construct a multi-ethnic Kosovo out of part of Serbia, the effort has run aground on the lack of enthusiasm of Serbs in the north for living under “Albanian rule.”  Keeping Syria and Iraq within the current boundaries would, at the least, require a massive and prolonged outside invention focused not only on keeping the peace but on nation building.

Related to the question of “what” is of course the question of “who” would be included in any negotiations.  All the parties – including the outsiders – would have their own views, especially on the issue of who to leave out.  But it would seem that the only way to achieve an outcome that would stand a chance of being sustainable would be to somehow include everyone.  The list would certainly have to include the Iraqi government.  But that would be the only “easy” one.  What about the various Sunni, Shia and Kurd communities and factions?  And Assad?  How about the Iranians, the Gulf States, Turkey and Washington, Brussels and Moscow?  They would have to be part of any process that would have a chance of success.

In some cases, perhaps the outsiders might represent the interests of the conflicting parties.  Iran might speak for the Shia, Saudi Arabia for the Sunni.  Turkey – which must have some way of talking to the IS since it won the release of the 49 hostages – might be able to bring it into the mix.  Perhaps Russia might speak to the future of Assad?  While everyone would find the participation of some “distasteful,” it’s hard to see how anyone could be excluded if they have not been able to be eliminated militarily.

This bring us to the “how” question.  It may be necessary to work toward convening an international conference of those foreign powers with interests and potential roles, perhaps under a mandate from the UN Security Council.  The US might work toward such a process by reaching out to the major outside powers including Russia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.  Such a conference might first work out a common approach to the conflicting parties to engage them – with appropriately provided encouragements and constraints – in considering what sort of settlement they would accept.

Does all this seem unlikely?  For sure.  It is not clear that IS, for example, would settle for anything other than everything.  So perhaps there remains a role for military actions to degrade it to the point that other Sunni abandon it or its leaders accept a political outcome.  But this might also have to be in the context of accepting that some form of Sunni state be made from parts of Syria and Iraq.  But then what about the Kurds and Turkey?  This is all very complicated.  And it doesn’t by itself touch on the other big questions in the region, Israel/Palestine and Iranian nuclear.  It is hard to see how these might all be kept separate.

Since Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld broke Iraq, the Pandora’s box has been open.  War alone – from the air or on the ground – won’t close it.  Only a political approach can find a way to survive the forces that have been released.  What else is there?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. He was Diplomat-in-Residence at Drake University for the 2013-14 school year and now works as an independent consultant.

The post Iraq, Syria And The MidEast: What Is To Be Done? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi for Syria Comment

Following on from my previous post for Syria Comment on the National Ideological Resistance in Syria (a ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ militia brand primarily based in Tartous and Hama governorates but also operating militarily at least in Aleppo province as well), below is an interview I recently conducted with the group’s leader: Sayyid Hashim Muhammad Ali.

Some things to note in particular about this interview:

1. ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ brands at the grassroots level- whether or not actually set up by Hezbollah- with propagation of Iranian-aligned Shi’ism among Syrian Alawites predate the onset of the civil war in Syria, if the Sayyid’s testimony is true.

2. As ever, a contrast exists between what is stated here in this interview and what is propagated as open source social media advertisement. For example, in the case of extent of military operations, little from open source advertisement points to operations in Quneitra or Deraa.

Muqawama Suriya: Masyaf Branch. Photo Credit: Syria Comment.

3. It is interesting that the Sayyid says there is no connection with the Muqawama Suriya, even as the latter claims a media office branch in Masyaf (Hama province), for instance. This may indicate tension between the two despite the public advert ‘brotherology’ here (cf. his reference to Ali Kayali as ‘brother’).

Q: When was the National Ideological Resistance in Syria [NIR] established?

A: In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. The NIR was established in the beginning in mid-2009 before the events in Syria, as a resistance movement from within the components of the Syrian people against the Zionist enemy: nationalist, of the people (ideological), and [established] without intervention or support from any state or any other faction. We began with a small, limited number [of members] and we undertook special training sessions to undertake martyrdom missions against the Zionist soldiers. But [because of] our very weak capabilities…we undertook a number of simple missions…and we continued lying in wait for any opportunity to be offered to us to undertake a mission against the Zionist soldiers, in any case. And before the beginning of the crisis in Syria we perceived the danger and visited some of the oppositionists in a number of provinces and our weapons were the freedom of speech we possessed and we always expressed our opinions even if they were against the government, and we did not fear the truth…

Thus we were before the events and thus we still are, and thanks to God, we managed to connect with some of those who thought that what is happening in Syria is a revolution and a number of them joined our ranks, either transmitting information to us or participating in battle. The resistance was established in the mosque of Sayyida Zahara’ (peace be upon her) in the village of Namriya in the Sheikh Badr region of  Tartous.

Q: How many ‘martyrs’ does NIR have?

A: We have 27 great martyrs of righteousness and men of our Lord the Companion of Time [Imam al-Mahdi] (peace be upon him). We also have, thanks to God, around 70 wounded…and the wounds among them are serious and light, thanks to God.

Q: Does NIR support Ayatollah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih*?

A: With regards to your question about wilayat al-faqih, allow me to respond to your question with a question: are we able to be in the presence of one knowledgeable in religion to guide us? And why should we become confused in our matter so long as the sayyid and knowledgeable one is present? And we are the ones working for our Lord- the Companion of Time- to accept us in his army,** so as long as our work is pure to the face of God- Exalted is He- so it is obligatory for us to be bound by the program of the Commander of the Faithful and our impeccable imams. And we must embrace the original Islamic religion of Muhammad.

Q: What are your relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon?

A: On the question of our relations with the heroes and mujahideen of Hezbollah, we say with total pride that they are our model, whose manners, commitment, faith and power- which are from trust in God and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah (may God protect him)- we imitate. Their cooperation with us gives us power, constancy, and faith in the divine victory.

Q: What are your relations with the Muqawama Suriya led by Ali Kayali?

A: On our relations with the brother Ali Kayali, sadly we are not connected by any relation because we work on internal fronts in Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, Deraa and Quneitra, but not in Latakia. So we don’t meet with them but in any case we respect all the honourable ones in this crisis and we are completely ready to cooperate with them within the ethical framework and direction of the Ahl al-Bayt [Muhammad's family revered by Shi'a in particular] (peace be upon them).

Notes

*- Iran’s ideological system of governance.
**- Whence NIR’s ‘armed wing’: Jaysh al-Imam al-Mahdi

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Technology for the rapid diagnosis of Ebola will soon be delivered to Sierra Leone by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will also later be supplied to Liberia and Guinea.

In response to a UN Security Council appeal and a request from Sierra Leone, the IAEA said it will deliver “in the coming weeks” diagnostic technology known as Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR). The IAEA will provide the west African country with an RT-PCR machine, cooling systems, biosecurity equipment, diagnostic kits and other materials. This technology allows Ebola to be detected within hours, unlike other diagnostic techniques which take several days.

Early diagnosis of Ebola, if combined with appropriate medical care, increases the victims’ chance and survival and helps cut the spread of the disease by making it possible to isolate and treat patients earlier.

RT-PCR – instrumental in the global eradication of rinderpest in livestock – initially used radioactive isotopes as markers in the process that determines whether the virus is present in a sample. However, subsequent refining of the method has led to the possibility to use fluorescent, instead of radioactive, markers for screening purposes.

The IAEA said that its support “initiates broader IAEA support to African Member States to strengthen their technological abilities to detect diseases transmitted from animals to humans.”

The IAEA plans to extend such support to Liberia and Guinea, which have also been hit by the Ebola outbreak.

IAEA director general Yukiya Amano said: “Transfer of nuclear-related technologies is a key part of the Agency’s work, and we have cooperated with Member States for years to develop and strengthen their capacity to use this nuclear-derived technology.”

He added, “With this additional support, the Agency makes a small but effective contribution to global efforts to fight the ongoing Ebola outbreak.”

According to the World Health Organization, as of 14 October a total of 8914 cases had been reported in the latest outbreak of Ebola. The number of reported deaths is 4447.

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