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Blaise Compaoré: Here’s Your Hat, What’s Your Hurry? – OpEd

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The lack of progress in the rural standard of living and the lack of jobs for youth led to growing discontent. Blaise Compaoré’s proposal to change the term limits set in the Constitution was the issue which set fire to the discontent.

By Rene Wadlow

Blaise Compaoré, whose 27 years of rule over Burkina Faso came to an end on 31 October, 2014, is now living in Cote d’Ivoire, home of his wife Chantal Terrasson. She has long been considered as the “Lady Macbeth” of West African politics pushing her husband to take larger roles on an ever-wider West African stage. At the time, she was suspected as having pushed Blaise Compaoré to kill his predecessor as president of Upper Volta, Thomas Sankara, in October 1987. Sankara and Compaoré were both young military officers who had plotted together to stage a military coup in August 1983 and were considered to be close friends.

Thomas Sankara, the more outgoing and ideological of the two, was named president. He began campaigns of rural development and reform based on the mobilization of village workers. Sankara encouraged community or collective forms of agriculture in a country where 95 per cent of the population lived in the rural area. Sankara also became an anti-colonial voice on the world scene such as his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1984. Sankara, influenced by the writings of Frantz Fanon, was highly critical of what he considered to be the neo-colonial economic policies of the European States, especially France, the former colonial ruler. France had kept close economic ties to Upper Volta and considered it as part of the French zone of influence in West Africa.

Blaise Compaoré eliminated from the Administration those considered “too close” to Sankara and built a strong Presidential Guard, the only part of the Army that was heavily armed and well trained. Although Compaoré had at first participated in Sankara’s rural development efforts, he quickly tried to find a wider West African focus for his activities. As has come out in the trial of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian leader, Compaoré played a role in the uprising in Liberia and Sierra Leone; no doubt making personal money on the way.

He then developed a reputation as a “mediator” facilitating discussions among parties in conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinée, Togo and Mali. He was helped by the French diplomatic service and was considered by some as the chief agent for maintaining “stability” in French-speaking West Africa. Compaoré was adept in his mediation role, able to balance interests − his own as a priority. While Compaoré was involved in foreign policy, his younger brother and his mother-in-law were busy developing their financial interests in the country. During the two days of massive protests which led to Compaoré leaving the country, the homes of his brother, mother-in-law and others who had profited economically from their political positions were burned.

The lack of progress in the rural standard of living and the lack of jobs for youth led to growing discontent. Blaise Compaoré’s proposal to change the term limits set in the Constitution was the issue which set fire to the discontent.

As the Presidential Guard was the only well organized body − the political parties existed in name only − the Guard rushed in to fill the political “void”. Lt Colonel Zida has been named Prime Minister of what is said to be a “transitional” government − elections to be held in November 2015. Michel Kafando, long the Ambassador to the UN in New York, has been named President of the transition. As he spent 2000-2011 out of the country, he had links to no specific faction of the society, but no personal base of power either.

Thus, the elite section of the Army is in power. Many of its officers or their families already had links to business, so we must not expect radical changes. However, the failure of Compaoré to develop the rural sector may serve as a warning. The situation is well worth watching.

René Wadlow is president and a U.N. representative (Geneva) of the Association of World Citizens and editor of Transnational Perspectives.

The post Blaise Compaoré: Here’s Your Hat, What’s Your Hurry? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Ron Paul: House Chooses New Cold War With Russia – OpEd

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Last week the US House voted overwhelmingly in favor of an anti-Russia resolution so full of war propaganda that it rivals the rhetoric from chilliest era of the Cold War. Ironically, much of the bill condemns Russia for doing exactly what the US government has been doing for years in Syria and Ukraine!

For example, one of the reasons to condemn Russia in the resolution is the claim that Russia is imposing economic sanctions on Ukraine. But how many rounds of sanctions has US government imposed on Russia for much of the past year? I guess sanctions are only bad when used by countries Washington doesn’t like.

The resolution condemns Russia for selling weapons to the Assad government in Syria. But the US has been providing weapons to the rebels in Syria for several years, with many going to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS that the US is currently bombing!

The resolution condemns what it claims is a Russian invasion of Ukraine (for which it offers no proof) and Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. But it was the US, by backing a coup against the democratically elected Yanukovich government in February, that first violated that country’s sovereignty. And as far as a military presence in Ukraine, it is the US that has openly sent in special forces and other military advisors to assist the government there. How many times have top US military and CIA officials visited Kiev to offer advice and probably a lot more?

The resolution condemns Russia for what it claims are attempts to “illicitly acquire information” about the US government. But we learned from the Snowden revelations that the NSA is spying on most rest of the world, including our allies! How can the US claim the moral authority to condemn such actions in others?

The resolution attacks Russian state-funded media, claiming that they “distort public opinion.” At the same time the bill demands that the thousands of US state-funded media outlets step up their programming to that part of the world! It also seeks “appropriate responses” to Russian media influence in the rest of the world. That should be understood to mean that US diplomats would exert pressure on foreign countries to shut down television networks like RT.

The resolution condemns what it claims is Russia’s provision of weapons to the Russian-speaking eastern part of Ukraine, which seeks closer ties with Russia, while demanding that the US government start providing weapons to its proxies on the other side.

As I have said, this is one of the worst pieces of legislation I can remember. And trust me, I have seen some pretty bad bills. It is nothing but war propaganda and it will likely lead to all sorts of unintended consequences.

Only ten Members – five from each party – opposed this reckless resolution. Probably most of those who voted in favor did not bother to read the bill. Others who read it and still voted in favor may have calculated that the bill would not come up in the Senate. So they could vote yes and please the hawks in their districts – and more importantly remain in good graces of the hawks who run foreign policy in Washington – without having to worry about the consequences if the bill became law.

Whatever the case, we must keep an eye on those Members of Congress who vote to take us closer to war with Russia. We should thank those ten Members who were able to resist the war propaganda. The hawks in Washington believe that last month’s election gave them free rein to start more wars. Now more than ever they must be challenged!

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: House Chooses New Cold War With Russia – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

UN Says Force-Feeding At Guantánamo Constitutes Ill-Treatment In Violation Of Convention Against Torture – OpEd

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I’ve been so busy lately with the launch of We Stand With Shaker, the new campaign to secure the release from Guantánamo of Shaker Aamer, the last British resident in the prison, that I haven’t had time to write anything — until now — about the United States’ recent appearance before the United Nations Committee Against Torture to explain its position on the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners in its custody.

The session — which took place on November 12 and 13, and was the first US report to the Committee Against Torture since 2006, when George W. Bush was president — led to numerous criticisms in the Committee’s response, adopted on November 20; in the Guardian‘s words, of “indefinite detention without trial; force-feeding of Guantánamo prisoners; the holding of asylum seekers in prison-like facilities; widespread use of solitary confinement; excessive use of force and brutality by police; shootings of unarmed black individuals; and cruel and inhumane executions.”

The Committee was also concerned about the US record on torture, expressing “its grave concern over the extraordinary rendition, secret detention and interrogation programme operated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between 2001 and 2008, which involved numerous human rights violations, including torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism-related crimes” — concerns expressed in a 2010 UN report about secret detention on which I was the lead author (and also see here, here and here) — and reminded the US about “the absolute prohibition of torture reflected in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention [Against Torture], stating that ‘no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.’” The Committee also called for the long-delayed Senate Intelligence Committee torture report — or, more accurately, its executive summary — to be issued without further delay.

The Committee also focused on a loophole allowing torture in Appendix M of the Army Field Manual — as assiduously covered by my colleague Jeff Kaye for many years (and I’ll shortly be cross-posting his analysis of the Committee’s findings) — and also expressed concerns that the US has still not adequately ratified every aspect of the Convention Against Torture — which came into force in 1987. The Committee was specifically disappointed that “a specific offence of torture has not been introduced yet at the federal level,” adding that they were “of the view that the introduction of such offence, in full conformity with article 1 of the Convention, would strengthen the human rights protection framework” in the US. The Committee was also disappointed that the US “maintains a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the Convention and does not intend to withdraw any of its interpretative understandings lodged at the time of ratification,” adding, “In particular, the concept of ‘prolonged mental harm’ introduces a subjective non-measurable element which undermines the application of the treaty.”

The question of police brutality — in which the Committee expressed “deep concern” about the “frequent and recurrent police shootings or fatal pursuits of unarmed black individuals,” and also noted the “difficulties to hold police officers and their employers accountable for abuses” — has, of course, come to the fore in recent weeks, through the lack of prosecutions for the killing of black men — firstly in Ferguson, with the shooting of Michael Brown, and most recently in New York, with the choking to death of Eric Garner — and it is no surprise that the streets of the US have erupted with demands for change in huge numbers.

I also concur with the Committee’s concerns about the death penalty, the shockingly widespread use of solitary confinement, the poor treatment of asylum seekers, and deaths as a result of poor prison conditions — the Committee was “particularly concerned about reports of inmate deaths [that] occurred as a result of extreme heat exposure while imprisoned in unbearably hot and poor ventilated prison facilities in Arizona, California, Florida, New York, Michigan and Texas.” However, as my particular area of expertise is Guantánamo, here’s my detailed analysis of what the Committee had to say about Guantánamo.

On Guantánamo, the Committee began with some positive comments, welcoming the fact that, since 2006, the Supreme Court had recognized “the extraterritorial application of constitutional habeas corpus rights to aliens detained by the military as enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay,” in Boumediene v. Bush in June 2008; and that, on January 22, 2009, President Obama had issued “Presidential Executive Orders 13491 — Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 13492 — Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, and 13493 — Review of Detention Policy Options,” and, on March 7, 2011, “Presidential Executive Order 13567 establishing a periodic review of detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility who have not been charged, convicted or designated for transfer.”

So much for the good news — although, in the end, that involved a Supreme Court ruling gutted by the D.C. Circuit Court after a couple of golden years of judges ordering prisoners released through a lack of evidence of any wrongdoing whatsoever; an unfulfilled promise to close Guantánamo; a periodic review process that is horribly slow; and some dubious posturing about “lawful interrogations,” specifically through the Appendix M loophole mentioned above.

Following on, the Committee expressed its “deep concern” about the fact that the US “continues to hold a number of individuals without charge at Guantánamo Bay detention facilities,” adding, “Notwithstanding the State party’s position that these individuals have been captured and detained as ‘enemy belligerents’ and that under the law of war is permitted ‘to hold them until the end of the hostilities’, the Committee reiterates that indefinite detention constitutes per se a violation of the Convention [Against Torture].”

The Committee also expressed concern that, of the men still held — 148 at the time; 142 now — “only 33 have been designated for potential prosecution, either in federal court or by military commissions – a system that fails to meet international fair trial standards,” and that “36 others have been designated for ‘continued law of war detention.’” The Committee added, “While noting that detainees held in Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Committee is concerned at reports that indicate that federal courts have rejected a significant number of habeas corpus petitions” —  echoing the dismay felt by advocates for the prison’s closure when the D.C. Circuit Court cynically shut down habeas corpus for the Guantánamo prisoners in a number of rulings from 2009 to 2011, which the Supreme Court refused to challenge.

The Committee also noted that, although the US government had provided “explanations … concerning the conditions of detention at Guantánamo,” they remained “concerned about the secrecy surrounding conditions of confinement, especially in Camp 7 where high-value detainees are housed.”

The Committee also noted “studies received on the cumulative effect that the conditions of detention and treatment in Guantánamo have had on the psychological health of detainees” — echoing what Christophe Girod of the International Committee of the Red Cross had pointed out in October 2003, when he said, ”The open-endedness of the situation and its impact on the mental health of the population has become a major problem.”

The Committee also mentioned the “nine deaths in Guantánamo during the period under review, including seven suicides,” adding, “In this respect, another cause of concern is the repeated suicide attempts and recurrent mass hunger strike protests by detainees over indefinite detention and conditions of detention.”

Crucially, it was added, “In this connection, the Committee considers that force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike constitutes ill-treatment in violation of the Convention [emphasis added]. Furthermore, it notes that detainees’ lawyers have argued in court that force feedings are allegedly administered in an unnecessarily brutal and painful manner (arts. 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16).”

The reference to “force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike” as “ill-treatment in violation of the Convention” is particularly damaging, as, last year, a prison-wide hunger strike attracted global concern, and, this year, the Obama administration has been resisting efforts by a number of prisoners (in particular a Syrian man, Abu Wa’el Dhiab) to get a judge to order an end to his force-feeding.

In conclusion, the Committee called on the US to “take immediate and effective measures” to:

(a) Cease the use of indefinite detention without charge or trial for individuals suspected of terrorism-related activities;

(b) Ensure that detainees held at Guantánamo who are designated for potential prosecution be charged and tried in ordinary federal civilian courts. Any other detainees who are not to be charged or tried should be immediately released. Detainees and their counsels must have access to all evidence used to justify the detention;

(c) Investigate allegations of detainee abuse, including torture and ill- treatment, appropriately prosecute those responsible, and ensure effective redress for victims;

(d) Improve the detainees’ situation so as to persuade them to cease the hunger strike;

(e) Put an end to force-feeding of detainees in hunger strike as long as they are able to take informed decisions;

(f) Invite the UN Special Rapporteur on torture to visit Guantánamo Bay detention facilities, with full access to the detainees, including private meetings with them, in conformity with the terms of reference for fact-finding missions by Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.

The Committee added that it “reiterates its earlier recommendation (CAT/C/USA/CO/2, para 22) that the State party should close the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay, as instructed in section 3 of Executive Order 13492 of 22 January 2009.”

I’m glad to see such robust criticism from the UN, although I expected no less, and I await, in particular, to see if the Committee’s criticism of force-feeding will have any impact as the Obama administration, cynically, seeks to prevent the judge-ordered release of videotapes showing the force-feeding and “forcible cell extractions” of Abu Wa’el Dhiab, mentioned above.

The post UN Says Force-Feeding At Guantánamo Constitutes Ill-Treatment In Violation Of Convention Against Torture – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Senior US Leaders Condemn Murder Of Luke Somers By Al Qaeda In Yemen

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President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel condemned yesterday’s murder of U.S. photojournalist Luke Somers in Yemen by al Qaeda terrorists as U.S. and Yemeni commandos attempted a rescue.

Somers, 33, was taken hostage in Yemen in September 2013 by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an al Qaeda splinter group.

Somers, who reportedly held U.S. and British citizenship, was shot by the terrorists as Special Operations forces moved in. Another hostage, South African teacher Pierre Korkie, was also fatally shot during the rescue attempt.

A Nov. 25 raid by U.S. special operations forces to rescue Somers freed some other al Qaeda-held hostages, but Somers wasn’t present.

President Obama’s Statement

“The United States strongly condemns the barbaric murder of Luke Somers at the hands of al Qaeda terrorists during a rescue operation conducted by U.S. forces in Yemen in partnership with the Yemeni government,” Obama said in a statement issued today. “On behalf of the American people, I offer my deepest condolences to Luke’s family and to his loved ones. I also offer my thoughts and prayers to the family of a non-U.S. citizen hostage who was also murdered by these terrorists during the rescue operation. Their despair and sorrow at this time are beyond words.”

The president added, “It is my highest responsibility to do everything possible to protect American citizens. As this and previous hostage rescue operations demonstrate, the United States will spare no effort to use all of its military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities to bring Americans home safely, wherever they are located. And terrorists who seek to harm our citizens will feel the long arm of American justice.”

After Somers was captured in Yemen, Obama said, “the United States has been using every tool at our disposal to secure his release. Earlier this week, a video released by his terrorist captors announced that Luke would be killed within 72 hours. Other information also indicated that Luke’s life was in imminent danger. Based on this assessment, and as soon as there was reliable intelligence and an operational plan, I authorized a rescue attempt yesterday. I also authorized the rescue of any other hostages held in the same location as Luke.”

Obama described Somers as “a photojournalist who sought through his images to convey the lives of Yemenis to the outside world. He came to Yemen in peace and was held against his will and threatened by a despicable terrorist organization. The callous disregard for Luke’s life is more proof of the depths of AQAP’s depravity, and further reason why the world must never cease in seeking to defeat their evil ideology.”

The president expressed his gratitude “to the U.S. forces who carried out this mission as well as the previous attempt to rescue Luke, and to the dedicated intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic professionals who supported their efforts. I also deeply appreciate the support and assistance provided by President Hadi and the Yemeni government, and reiterate our strong commitment to combating the shared threat posed by AQAP.

“We remember Luke and his family, as well as the families of those Americans who are still being held captive overseas and those who have lost loved ones to the brutality of these and other terrorists,” Obama added. “We remain determined to do our utmost to bring them home, and to hold those who have done them harm accountable.”

Secretary of State’s Statement

Somers’ murder “is a reminder of the brutality of the terrorists of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. They have again demonstrated their cruelty and their disdain for human life, freedom, and the Yemeni people whom they terrorize daily,” Secretary of State Kerry said in a statement issued today.

There was reason to believe that Somers’ life was in immediate danger, Kerry said, “and so we recommended that the president authorize an attempt to rescue Luke. Tragically, Luke and a foreign national hostage were killed by their captors during the course of that operation.”

Kerry said he’s “proud of the brave men and women of the U.S. military who twice risked their lives in operations to try and bring Luke home safely. We also appreciate the efforts of the dedicated intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic professionals who supported these operations, and we are particularly grateful to the Yemeni government, under the leadership of President Hadi, for their critical and supportive role in trying to liberate this young American from unfathomable captivity, and for their enduring partnership in combating the scourge of AQAP.”

The AWAP terrorists know “how to hate, they know how to murder, and now they have robbed a family of an idealistic young photojournalist who went to Yemen to practice his calling and document the lives of ordinary Yemenis,” Kerry said.

“As a parent, I know there are no words that can assuage the loss that Luke’s family has suffered, or the anguish of the family of the second hostage who was killed,” the secretary of state said. “There’s no way to wipe away their pain. But Teresa and I both pray that they can find some small solace in knowing that the United States government and all of our people grieve with them, and that there were brave Americans in uniform willing to lay down their own lives so that they had a chance to live.

“We also pray for the families of all the innocents who are held against their will, whose safe return we work towards every day,” Kerry said.

Secretary of Defense’s Statement

There were “compelling reasons to believe Mr. Somers’ life was in imminent danger,” Defense Secretary Hagel said in a statement issued today. Somers and a second non-U.S. citizen hostage, he said, “were murdered by the AQAP terrorists during the course of the operation. On behalf of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces, I extend our condolences, thoughts, and prayers to their families and loved ones.”

Several of the AQAP terrorists holding the hostages captive were killed in the mission, Hagel said, who noted yesterday’s rescue attempt took place in central Yemen and was conducted in partnership with the government of Yemen.

“I thank President Hadi, the Yemeni government, and Yemen security forces for their assistance and cooperation,” the defense secretary said. “Yesterday’s mission is a reminder of America’s unrelenting commitment to the safety of our fellow citizens — wherever they might be around the world.

“I commend the troops who undertook this dangerous mission,” Hagel said. “Their service and valor are an inspiration to all of us.”

The post Senior US Leaders Condemn Murder Of Luke Somers By Al Qaeda In Yemen appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Militant Soccer Fans Reassert Their Key Role In Protest With Storming Of Cairo Stadium – Analysis

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Militant, street battle-hardened soccer fans stormed a Cairo stadium in advance of the second leg of crowned Cairo Al Ahli SC’s African Confederation Cup final against Ivory Coast’s Sewe Sport in a reassertion of the fans’ key role in protest against the regime of toppled president Hosni Mubarak and subsequent Egyptian governments.

The storming constituted a rejection by the fans of an appeal by the interior ministry, which has banned spectators from attending matches for much of the last four years, to cooperate in ensuring an Egyptian triumph on the pitch. The appeal further was an effort by the ministry, the target of deep-seated soccer fan hostility because of its control of Egypt’s despised police and security forces, to pave the way for a reopening of stadia to spectators.

The appeal was also an attempt to rekindle differences among various groups of militant soccer fans or ultras whose rivalry is rooted in their intense loyalty to competing clubs at a time that an Islamist group, Ultras Nahdawy, plays a key role in mass student protests against general-turned president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, and Ultras White Knights (UWK), the support group of Al Ahli arch rival Al Zamalek SC that like the Ahli fans played a key role in Mr. Mubarak’s overthrow, is fighting an attempt in the courts to outlaw it as a terrorist organization.

The ministry had said it would temporarily lift the ban on spectators and allow 25,000 fans to attend Ahli’s match against Sewe Sport. “We ask Al Ahli fans to help us to play our role in securing the match, as we and they are working for the sake of Egypt, our motherland. We are not their enemies, this match will be broadcast in most African countries and we want good image of Egyptian football,” the ministry said in a statement before the storming.

Ultras Ahlawy – UA07, the militant support group of Al Ahli many of whose members believed they would be barred from entry to the stadium, responded on its Facebook page that has more than 1.1 million followers with a text entitled “Try entering the stadium.” The text reflected the ultras’ hostility towards the security forces as well as a failure to implement an earlier agreement to replace security forces in the stadia with private security company personnel. Ultras said privately that the group would respond to the ministry appeal in good time.

A ministry statement said 2,000 fans had stormed the Cairo International Stadium by using a truck to break down one of its gates. “All the legal procedures are being applied to handle the situation and also to avoid the existence of provocateurs among those who stormed the stadium,” the statement said.

The ministry said the storming of the stadium was resolved with the fans’ agreement to leave and be searched before re-entering to watch the match. The agreement came after the ministry had reportedly threatened to cancel the game in a move that could have severely damaged the fan’s image but also made the ministry vulnerable to claims that it had weakened Al Ahli’s chances of winning the title.

For much of the past months, militant soccer fans have made their mark on university campuses that had become a focal point of protest against Mr. Al Sisi’s regime rather than in stadia that had been closed. The influence of Ultras Nahdawy, a group was formed by militant pro-Brotherhood supporters of Zamalek and Al Ahli that has since distanced itself from the Islamist group, is visible in video clips of the student protests in which protesters much like militant fans in stadia jump up and down while chanting and fire off coloured flares and smoke bombs.

The battle of the students and the fans is one for public space and against efforts by Mr. Al Sisi to depoliticize youth emboldened by its success in overthrowing a dictator after 30 years in office and angered by their being side-lined in the wake of their successful revolt and the rolling back of heavily fought achievements.

Lack of public space under Mr. Mubarak who tolerated no uncontrolled public space propelled highly politicized, well-organized, street battle-hardened soccer fans to the forefront of anti-government protest. History threatens to repeat itself under Mr. Al Sisi despite the fact that the president acknowledges that he and his predecessors have failed to reach out to youth under the age of 25 who account for half of the Egyptian population.

That gap was fuelled by the side lining of the youth almost from the day that Mr. Mubarak was forced to resign. It was further evident with relatively few youth participating in a referendum under military-backed rule following the coup against Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, and in Mr. Al Sisi’s election. The low youth participation stood in stark contrast to the large numbers that participated in parliamentary elections in 2012 and the polls that brought Mr. Morsi to power.

Mr. Al Sisi has promised to correct the situation by creating a National Youth Council, increasing opportunities for youth participation in politics, and enhancing scholarship openings for study overseas. At the same time, the president warned students and youth from engaging in activity “with questionable political goals that serve the interests of unpatriotic groups in their endeavour to destroy the nation.”

Mr. Al Sisi’s warning appears to have so far fallen on deaf ears with a large number of students, fans and youths evidently putting little faith in his promises. The storming of the stadium was the last indication of the president’s failure to convince his detractors of his sincerity.

The storming highlighted soccer facilities as but one of a number of flashpoints of opposition to Mr. Al Sisi’s regime. Other potential soccer-related flashpoints include the pending court case that could lead to the banning of the UWK initiated with regime backing by maverick Zamalek chairman Mortada Mansour and the appeal against the sentencing to death of 21 people and lengthy prison sentence for others on charges that they were responsible for a 2012 politically loaded brawl in Port Said in which 74 Al Ahli SC fans died. Al Ahli fans blame the military and security forces for the deaths.

The post Militant Soccer Fans Reassert Their Key Role In Protest With Storming Of Cairo Stadium – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Long Road To The Ocean: Afghanistan’s Quest For A Seaport – OpEd

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By Tamim Asey*

For years Afghan statesmen and policy makers have tried to come up with policy options and arrangements to have an exclusive access to a seaport and breakaway from the country’s landlocked nature.

For the first time it was President Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978) who pursued this ambitious agenda with the newly formed Government of Pakistan, which failed in spite of the willingness of the Pakistani side to give exclusive access to Afghanistan in the Gwadar and Karachi ports in exchange for Afghanistan’s recognition of the controversial Durand line. The former Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), who was a good friend of the Afghan King, Zahir Shah (1933-1973), also offered an exclusive port access in Chabahar for Afghanistan in exchange for a long-term water sharing agreement for Helmand river valley water, but due to political, administrative and economic reasons this arrangement was also never implemented.

More recently, President Ghani has outlined an ambitious agenda of turning Afghanistan into the land bridge of Central and South Asia. He deliberated in a recent London conference that his priority after the conference would be to work on key infrastructure projects to promote regional connectivity such as the Afghan ring road, Afghanistan railroad and above all invest in small to medium scale infrastructure projects that would turn Afghanistan into a modern silk road and a center of connectivity.

According to the World Bank, Afghanistan has one of the worst world systems in the world and no rail system. It is a landlocked country and has the longest distance from the nearby seaport estimated to be 2,000 km over some of the harshest terrain the world. The existing road system is poorly maintained and only people in the urban areas are connected through a ringroad which was completed through heavy donor aid in the past one and half decade. Its air transport is poorly maintained, under-invested and lacks a clear institutional framework. Furthermore, major parts of the country remains cut off especially the rural areas from the rest of the country on average four months a year due to harsh climate and heavy snowfall. All of this serves as a great barrier for investors and international air carriers to invest in Afghanistan’s infrastructure.

In addition, the ambitious program of Dr. Ghani is hampered by geopolitical, security and most important of all financial capital bottlenecks. Afghanistan does not have the required political leverage to force its neighbors or the regional powers to agree to its terms in building the road infrastructure it requires and the financial capital i.e. upfront costs for such an ambitious agenda. This political and financial capital could only come from India, China and or international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank both of whom are engaged in other regional infrastructure projects in Central Asia.

Furthermore, Afghanistan still suffers from regional terrorism which primarily emanates from Pakistan to pursue geopolitical interests and counter the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is on the verge of a proxy war between India and Pakistan; Russia and the United States and above all Saudi and Iran. All of which pursue a variety of interests through their proxy groups. China is also increasingly asserting itself due to increased insurgency in Xinjiang province – though the extent of its interests in Afghanistan is not yet clear. All these regional security and political dynamics – makes life of President Ghani difficult and his dreams almost unreachable in the near future.

China has already outlined the Silk Road initiative and allocated US $45 billion dollars, which in reality is a project to increase China’s influence in Central Asia and through it build a vibrant economy in its volatile Xinjiang province. In addition – the Japanese and Koreans have also been trying to kickstart a host of infrastructure projects in Central Asia through Central Asia plus Japan and Korean New Silk Road Initiative platforms including the recent Euro-Asian Transport Links (EATL) project all of which have had relative or little success in transforming the infrastructure and trade dynamics of Central Asia. This is primarily due to lack of political will, financial and investment capital, harsh terrain and incompetent bureaucracies.

On the other hand, Afghanistan has been rigorously pushing for Lapis Lazuli corridor. It is a corridor which connects Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey via road and rail that is most appropriate transit trade route in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Europe and also connects effectively South Asia to European countries. The importance of this route to Afghanistan is, an alternative and shortest, cheapest and safest way to the aforementioned areas.

The Lapis Lazuli begins from Aqina in northern Faryab province and Turqundi in western Herat province of Afghanistan and continues to Turkmenbashi of Turkmenistan and after passing Caspian Sea, arrives Baku, the Azerbaijan’s capital and then it connects Baku to Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital and also to the ports of Polti and Batumi of Georgia. And then get cities of Kars and Istanbul of Turkey and finally ends Europe. But this is a long term projects which is far more complicated and could in the best case scenario take a decade to become fully operational. In the meantime – Afghanistan needs to find ways to reduce transit and trade reliance on its neighbors and realize the grand visions of Dr. Ghani who is elected for a five year term.

Failed attempts – TAPI and APTA

A good case study of whether turning Afghanistan’s geographic location from a liability to an asset is the infamous TAPI pipeline which has not taken off for years and has been consistently delayed for a variety of reasons chief among them geopolitics, lack of a consensus on various fees and taxes, security, upstream and down development by the IOCs, lack of financing for the project among others.

Another good example is the controversial Afghanistan – Pakistan Transit Agreement (APTA) which was built over the 1965 transit agreement agreed between the two countries in 2011 but has been consistently undermined since then and renegotiated in 2013 due to bureaucratic hurdles, paper works and lack of a political commitment for its implementation by the Pakistani side.

These two examples only signifie the challenges of the geopolitics surrounding harnessing Afghanistan’s geographic location and turning it into a connecting point of Asia.

The Regional Setting – Geopolitics takes precedence over Trade

Today security and geopolitics supersedes any economic and trade interests in the region. Dr. Ghani and his economic will have a hard time changing the existing security and geopolitics narrative to that of trade and economic integration among Afghanistan and its neighboring countries. The current mindset among the policy makers and the political stakeholders in the region is that of terrorism, extremism, proxy wars and other negative phenomenon. The first step to change this narrative and mindset in the region is to change the environment of distrust among the neighboring countries taking a set of confidence building measures. This could start from small steps and could eventually lead to bigger breakthroughs to facilitate the ownership of a shared trade and transition vision for the region.

Financial Capital and Investment – Who Pays for it?

The cross country multinational highway road and railway network building in Europe, Asia and Africa shows that such undertakings requires on average 100 to 150 million dollars i.e. The Dori –Tera road of Burkina Faso/Niger, The Kankan – Kouremal-e-Bamako Road between Guinea and Mali, The Trans African Highway network among others. Afghanistan and its neighbors except India and China will not be able to afford to underwrite such a bill. The sums of financial capital and technical expertise which Afghanistan lacks but countries like China and India could furnish but this requires a strong political and economic commitment from these two countries disregarding their geopolitical interests.

Furthermore,  the good news is that upcoming BRIC Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank which were recently agreed among BRIC and Shanghai Cooperation Organizatoin (SCO) countries could foot the bill for some of these mega infrastructure development projects.

The Institutional Challenge – Does Afghanistan have the complex bureaucracy to turn Dr. Ghani’s ideas into realities?

Dr. Ghani is known for his grand seasonal ideas. He is a dynamic, clean and hardworking individual but he inherits a bureaucracy from the 1960s with little or no capacity even to perform its own basic function let alone undertake complex multinational infrastructure development projects. He needs a competent bureaucracy and vibrant private sector both in Afghanistan and the region to turn his vision of an regionally integrated Afghan economy to thrive.
Afghanistan is ranked in the bottom list of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the presence and wrath of the central government barely extends beyond major urban centers and to undertake ambitious multinational infrastructure development projects

The Dream of a Land Bridge and Seaport – Is it doable?

Afghanistan has a long way to go to realize its vision of becoming the connecting point and roundabout of Central and South Asia. It requires political will, billions of dollar in financial capital, a sophisticated human capital, requires a complex bureaucracy, bidding farewell to the politics of the past in the region above all a share long term vision among the party countries who truly realize their economic and trade interests in realizing such a vision.
Afghanistan’s access to a seaport and turning into the landbridge of the region is certainly doable but requires a new vision at the regional and international level combined with a region consensus over a shared future economic and trade integration. But the journey to realizing such a vision will be hard and long.

*Tamim Asey is a fellow at Asia Society and a Fulbright scholar at Columbia University pursuing a degree in Economic Policy management. He was also a former Government of Afghanistan official and taught at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF).

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Debating The School Of The Americas – Analysis

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By Ronn Pineo

Should the School of the Americas be closed? To its critics, the school, renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001, is an institution smeared in blood, a place of torture training and coup plotting. How much of this perception of the School of the Americas (SOA) is fair?

The School of Americas began in 1946 as a military training site at Fort Amador and then Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The facility, called at the time the Escuela Latino Americana Terrestre (Latin American Ground School), centralized the various World War II cooperative military training activities that had taken place in Panamá since just before the war. In 1963 it took the name the School of the Americas, and in 1984, in the wake of the Panama Canal Treaties, it was moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, the new location was selected due to the oversized influence of Georgia Senator Sam Nunn and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Most of the over 61,034 officers and cadets who attended the SOA came on scholarships, often under the U.S. International Military Education and Training program.1 The classes they took, at least in the first decade and a half of the SOA’s existence, were unremarkable. Classes dealt with matters like jeep repair or the preparation nutritious but filling field meals.2

However, the mission of the SOA changed dramatically after Fidel Castro came to power. President John F. Kennedy came to be deeply alarmed, even fixated, by what he saw as a mounting communist treat in the hemisphere. In response he created the Alliance for Progress, an initiative which offered considerable financial aid to promote social reform, but was joined with a powerful determination to fund, train for, and launch counter-insurgency combat operations to neutralize communist influence in Latin America. Kennedy was particularly keen on expanding the size and mission of the military’s Special Forces–the Green Berets–to attack the threats he perceived. Accordingly, between 1962 and 1967 the United States deployed over six hundred Special Forces Mobile Training Teams, each with two officers and ten soldiers, on training missions across the Americas.3

At the same time, the SOA revamped its curriculum, adding instruction in anti-communism, training in counter-insurgency methods, and primers in prisoner interrogation techniques. Some course content became so sensitive that even the course descriptions were classified.4

Under President Jimmy Carter, as researcher Gregory Weeks has noted, the situation actually improved, with “all courses on irregular warfare, psychological operations, interrogation, etc. … eliminated.”5 But when Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 the old curriculum was largely restored and new classes added, including class offerings just for the Salvadoran military. President Reagan had taken a sharp personal interesting in helping the government of El Salvador, then in the midst of brutal campaign against leftist guerrillas, their supporters, and those suspected of being supporters.

On the morning of the November 16, 1989 Salvadoran soldiers burst into the religious sanctuary at the campus of the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” in San Salvador and gunned down six Jesuit fathers, housekeeper Elba Ramos, and her young daughter Celina. World mourning and outrage followed. Given the heavy U.S. role in supporting the Salvadoran military, U.S. Representative Joseph Moakley of Massachusetts launched an inquiry into the slayings, looking into the possible role the U.S. might have played in this outrage. The resulting investigation found that nineteen of the twenty-six Salvadoran soldiers who carried out the murders had trained at the SOA.6 The revelation was stunning; even today we yet witness the implications.

Immediate, intense, and widespread pressure built for full disclosure about what was going on at the School of the Americas. The U.S. Army stonewalled, but in 1996 was finally forced into what became another significant revelation: torture training manuals. From 1989 to 1991 the SOA had employed seven U.S. Army Spanish language counter-insurgency training manuals, and over a thousand copies had been distributed to military personnel in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Perú from 1987 and 1989. The manual detailed brutal interrogation methods, including forced drug injections, and recommended “the arrest or detention of the … relatives” of anyone being questioned, or if that did not work, to “give him a beating.”7 U.S. Representative Joseph Kennedy, summing up the common reaction, said that the government documents “revealed what … [those] opposed to the … [S]chool [of the Americas] had been alleging for years—that foreign military officers were taught to torture and murder.”8

Forced under the Freedom of Information Act to disclose details of SOA training and the names of those who attended classes, researchers have compiled some rather damning facts. Of those Salvadoran military personnel specifically named as the authors of serious human rights crimes in the 1993 United Nations Truth Commission report, two-thirds had attended the SOA.9 Indeed, the list of those attending the SOA, we now know, includes some of the most savage violators of human rights that the world has ever seen: Roberto D’Aubuisson, death squad organizer and author of the murder of Archbishop Óscar Romero, of El Salvador; Efraín Ríos Montt, key architect of the Guatemalan genocide; the military leadership of Argentina, including Leopoldo Galtieri, during the time of the “dirty war”; the leadership of the barbaric Honduran Battalion 3-16; the Salvadoran Atlacatl Battalion, which carried out the 1981 El Mozote Massacre of hundreds of innocent peasants, children, women, and men; Panamanian henchman Manuel Noriega Moreno; and Chilean dictator and human rights criminal Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.10 All these men studied at the School of the Americas.

The Role of the School of the Americas

A quantitative study by researcher by Katherine E. McCoy found that only 1.3 percent of those who attended the SOA were ever connected to any known human rights crime.11 Attending the SOA was a common experience for most military men in Latin America in this era, and it follows therefore that nearly all SOA attendees had nothing to do with human rights violations. Moreover, some of those who trained at the school did not end up serving right-wing military governments, but instead left-wing progressive ones like that of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Perú (1968-1975).

Most of the training that the participants received at the SOA was brief; nearly all courses lasted just one to four weeks.12 SOA classes were usually innocuous. Infamously cruel Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer, for example, attended the School of the Americas, but his class records from 1956 show that he took a short course in how to best serve as a military driver.13 Whatever Banzer understood about the use of torture and terror–and Bolivians understand only too well that this was a lot–he learned somewhere other than at his brief stint at the School of the Americas.

Defenders of the SOA argue that a core mission of the school is training in military professionalism and democratic values. They point out that while it is true that many SOA participants came from countries where the military had often the worst records of abuse, that it was precisely these officers and cadets who would most profit from SOA guidance in developing a deeper sense of professionalization.

These views are sincerely held by nearly all who were associated with SOA. Yet if this was the real mission of the SOA, then it is fair to conclude that it failed at this task. Instead, the school functioned to reinforce extreme anti-communism, legitimating a dark paranoia too often granted full expression when the students returned home from their studies at the SOA. In the end it was the SOA culture that was most important, signaling that one had to tough enough to do what was necessary to match the perceived communist threat.

The SOA was only one element in U.S.-counter insurgency efforts. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency actively recruited at the SOA, handpicking those who would then be provided more advanced training. CIA training, to the extent that we can learn about it, appears to have been bone-chillingly evil, with hands-on instruction in the black arts, including torture.

Worse still was the systemic role of the Argentine military during its “dirty war” from 1976-1983. The Argentine military, not content with raping, torturing, and murdering their own fellow citizens, decided it should help train others to be just like them. It was Argentina that did the most to coach the Central American militaries and irregular forces, like the Nicaraguan contras, in the craft of torture, murder of civilians, and wholesale human rights violations.14

Closing the School of the Americas

In the wake of the explosive public exposure of SOA training manuals and the establishment of SOA links to perpetrators of many of the human rights crimes in the region, the School of the Americas had to close. It was a public relations disaster, and the SOA shut its doors in 2000.

In 2001 the Fort Benning announced the opening of WHINSEC, located in exactly the same place as the old SOA, and teaching nearly all of the same courses. Still, there are some changes. WHINSEC now spotlights courses in Peace Operations and Democratic Sustainment. Even more, WHINSEC mainstreams human rights awareness and training in democratic values, adding this curriculum content to nearly every class.15 They are much more careful now about all these matters at WHINSEC.

Conclusions

In Panamá today the old School of the Americas building is a five star eco-tourism hotel. Up in Georgia WHINSEC keeps chugging along, even holding human rights conferences which academics refuse to attend, “even when the school offered to pay their expenses.”16 And every November protesters assemble outside the Fort Benning gate, demanding the closing of WHINSEC and reciting the names of those who were murdered. Some demonstrators climb the fence to get arrested; those being detained for a second time at the site will get half a year in jail.

There is honor in these actions. They may not be able to close WHINSEC, but they bear witness to the evil that was done, and they express our shared desire to assure that it cannot happen again. Above all, they honor the memory of those who were lost.

Ronn Pineo, Senior Analyst at the Council On Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History, Towson University.

References

1. Russell W. Ramsey and Antonio Raimondo, “Human Rights Instruction at the U.S. Army School of the Americas,” Human Rights Review 2:3 (April-June 2001), 95.
2. Gregory Weeks, “Fighting the Enemy Within: Terrorism, the School of the Americas, and the Military in Latin America,” Human Rights Review 5:1 (October-December 2003), 16.
3. Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 75.
4. Weeks, “Fighting the Enemy,” 16-17.
5. Ibid, 18.
6. Bill Quigley, “The Case for Closing the School of the America,” BYU Journal of Public Law 20 (2005), 1.
7. Manual de estudio: manejo de fuente (Study Manual: Managing of Sources), document in, Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolova, Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 327-329.
8. Representative Joseph Kennedy, quoted in, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of the Assassins: Guns, Greed, and Globalization (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 5.
9. Thomas L. Pearcy, The History of Central America (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 95.
10. Gill, School of the Americas, 75.
11. Katherine E. McCoy, “Trained to Torture? The Human Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of the Americas,“ Latin American Perspectives 32:6 (November 2005), 57.
12. Gill, School of the Americas, 26.
13. Ibid, 78.
14. Ibid, 86.
15. Ibid, 45.
16. Ramsey and Raimondo, “Human Rights Instruction,” 108.

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Saudia Arabia Says Won’t Give Up Supporting Yemen

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Saudi Arabia will not give up supporting Yemen, especially at this current critical juncture, said Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal on Sunday, according to Yemen’s state news agency SABA.

According to SABA, Al-Faisal made the statement during his meeting with Foreign Minister Abdullah al-Saidi, who is on an official visit to Riyadh.

Al-Saidi expressed hope that Kingdom and the GCC States continue their support for Yemen to implement the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and the dialogue outcomes in order to achieve the transitional phase successfully, SABA reported.

As reported by Al Bawaba news agency, the US on Sunday defended a failed rescue raid in Yemen that ended with the deaths of two hostages, saying that it had no choice to launch the operation.

American photojournalist Luke Somers, 33, and South African teacher Pierre Korkie, 57, were killed by their Al Qaeda captors on Saturday when the location they were being held in was stormed in a joint US and Yemeni iniative.

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Yemen: Tragedy As Up To 70 African Migrants Drown Off Coast

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Up to 70 illegal migrants coming from the Horn of Africa drowned while trying to reach the Red Sea’s Moca coast i Taiz governorate, said security forces at Moca District, according to Yemen state news agency SABA.

According SABA, citing the Interior Ministry’s Information Center, the migrants, who carried Ethiopian identities, were all on board a small boat, reported Interior Ministry’s Information Center. The tragedy was attributed to strong winds and high sea waves.

The Interior Ministry’s Information Center said the boat came from the Horn of Africa and was owned  by a known human trafficker, SABA reported.

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Saudi Arabia: 135 Arrested For Terror Links

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By MD Al-Sulami

Security forces have arrested 135 people accused of belonging to terrorist organizations in different regions, the Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry has announced.

The majority of the offenders, 109, are Saudis, while the remaining detainees are from different countries including Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Ethiopia Bahrain, and Iraq.

The security spokesman of the ministry, Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki, disclosed to Arab News that in light of repeated attempts by hate groups to undermine the country’s stability, security officials have managed to identify suspicious groups engaged in various forms of terrorism.

Al-Turki said 40 of the detainees had been participating in conflicts abroad, and were directly involved with extremist organizations. These people, the official claimed, also had in their possession a significant amount of weapons, and were receiving training to perform terrorist acts in the country.

Over 50 other offenders were arrested for association with radical groups, funding and recruiting members, disseminating propaganda and harboring wanted individuals and possessing explosives.
Other 17 people were held in connection with riots as well as for shooting at security forces in the town of Awamiya.

Among other charges, they are accused of arms smuggling and plotting to carry out terrorist acts in the Kingdom, said Al-Turki.

The ministry has urged all citizens and residents to remain cautious of attempts by some individuals to breach security and harm the country, and to promptly inform security authorities of any suspicious activity, said Al-Turki.

Reiterating the Kingdom’s determination to crush terror, he said security forces would not tolerate any individual or group who attempts to jeopardize the security of the homeland and its citizens and residents.

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Ethnic Cleansing Manifesto – OpEd

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By Jamal Kanj

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and head of Yisrael Beitenu party published on November 28 a new manifesto outlining the party’s outlook for Israel.

The updated platform entitled “Swimming Against the Stream” posted on Lieberman’s Facebook page demanded Israeli Arabs who identify themselves as Palestinians “… to forfeit their Israeli citizenship and move and become citizens of the future Palestinian state.”

It is worth noting that the impassive “Israeli Arabs” or “Arabs” nomenclatures were invented by Zionists to avoid identifying those who remained in their homes – when Israel was forced upon them – as Palestinians. To their chagrin however, Palestinians keep reminding Zionists that “it was Israel that came to us; we did not go to Israel.”

The Israeli foreign minister further suggested that Israel should create “a system of economic incentives” to entice Palestinians to leave their homes and towns that existed before Israel itself.

Unlike this transplanted Moldavian, even South African born white leaders never dared to suggest that Black South Africans be given money to move to black South African countries.

Nevertheless, let’s for argument sake, agree with Zionism that one’s “Jewishness” trumps all other. That Jews were uniquely persecuted and gassed in Europe. Hence, the original people of historical Palestine should make way for the only Jewish nation in the world, and relocate to what Lieberman describes as “the future Palestinian state”.

Where is this “future Palestinian state”? Is it in the remaining 22 per cent of historical Palestine, otherwise known as the land occupied in 1967?

Lieberman won’t tell us.

Simply because he lives in one of the many illegal Jewish only colonies built over the same area ostensibly slated for “the future Palestinian state”. The transplanted ŽmigrŽ, like his fellow illegal settlers, has already seized 40pc of the 1967 occupied land while more than 60pc of the West Bank water is reserved exclusively for Jews.

Lieberman is an embodiment of Israel’s land grab policies that left no place for a viable Palestinian state. For this, the ex-Moldavian qualifies for inclusion on the EU list of illegal settlement’s products.

Moreover, I have no doubt that the nightclub boxer-turned Israeli foreign minister expects American taxpayers to finance his platform. The same bottomless taxpayers who paid for Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai under the Camp David accord and who advanced money for the so-called “redeployment” of Israeli army under the Oslo Accord and later the Wye River agreement.

Lieberman’s manifesto wants the indigenous Palestinians moved out but he won’t pay for it. He wants them moved to a place where 40pc of the land has been earmarked for Jewish only colonies.

Sadly, Zionists’ bigoted views are not limited to Israelis, but shared with those who enjoy Western democracies. Take for instance Rabbi Steven Pruzansky of Teaneck, New Jersey and former vice-president of the Rabbinical Council of America.

Lieberman could have plagiarised Pruzansky’s personal blog from a November 21 post calling for measures to “encourage Arab emigration – the payment of stipends, compensation for property, etc”, and asserting that the “…Arabs who dwell in the land of Israel are the enemy … and must be vanquished.”

The man of the “Jewish” God, Pruzansky, suggested that “They (Palestinians) must be made to feel that they have no future in Israel – no national future and no individual future.”

That is what the new Basic Law bill, Jewish state, intends to do.

The Zionist obsession with the presence of non-Jews in historical Palestine is as old as Israel itself. First Israeli Prime Minister, the Polish David Ben Gurion, lamented in 1948 on their failure to “clear the entire central Galilee region” of the Palestinians.

Today, the 2014 Moldavian’s manifesto calls to complete the ethnic cleansing that was started by his fellow Polish in 1948.

- Jamal Kanj (www.jamalkanj.com) writes regular newspaper column and publishes on several websites on Arab world issues. He is the author of “Children of Catastrophe,” Journey from a Palestinian Refugee Camp to America. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. (A version of this article was first published by the Gulf Daily News newspaper.)

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US Intelligence Concerned Release Of CIA Torture Report Could Cause Violence Abroad

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The US intelligence agencies predict that the publication of a Senate report on the use of torture on terror suspects by the CIA will cause “violence and deaths” abroad, with security beefed up at US foreign installations.

The 480-page report on Central Intelligence Agency’s interrogation techniques after 9/11 is to be to be released next week. The document is a summary of a larger 6,000-page study, which still remains classified.

The US intelligence agencies as well as foreign governments have said privately that the publication of the paper will be used by the extremists to promote deadly violence, Rep. Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican, told CNN’s State of the Union program.

Rogers questioned the very need for the report to be released as the investigation of CIA torture by the Justice Department saw no criminal charges filed.

An unnamed US intelligence official told AP, that US Congress has been warned “of the heightened potential that the release could stimulate a violent response.”

On Friday, US Secretary of State John Kerry urged the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dianne Feinstein, to consider the timing of the release report.

In a later interview with Los Angeles Times, Feinstein provided no comment on Kerry’s plea, only stating that “we have to get this report out.”

The brutal interrogations by the CIA undermined “societal and constitutional values that we are very proud of. Anybody who reads this is going to never let this happen again,” the California Democrat stressed.

AP also cited an unnamed congressional aide, who said that Washington has boosted security at American installations around the globe in view of the publication.

According to the aide, the US administration has been in talks to declassify the report since April, with both president Obama and his director of national intelligence endorsing its release.

The report will make first public account of CIA’s use of torture on al-Qaida detainees held in secret facilities in Europe and Asia a decade ago.

US officials familiar with the report said that it includes new – disturbing – details about the CIA’s use of sleep deprivation, confinement in small spaces, humiliation and waterboarding.

The report also states that the torture failed to produce life-saving intelligence, despite opposite claims by current and former intelligence officials, including CIA director, John Brennan.

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Canada Closes Cairo Embassy Over Security Concerns

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Canada’s embassy in Cairo was closed on Monday until further notice because of security concerns, an official answering its emergency telephone line said, the second diplomatic mission to shut its doors this week.

A message on the embassy’s website read: “The ability to provide consular services may occasionally be limited for short periods due to unsettled security conditions.” It gave no more details.

The British Embassy in Cairo closed to the public on Sunday, also citing security concerns. A notice on its website on Monday said its services remained suspended.

Egypt is battling an Islamist insurgency largely centered around the Sinai Peninsula, a strategic area near the border with Gaza and the Suez Canal.

Insurgent attacks have mostly targeted Egyptian police and soldiers, killing hundreds in the past year.

Smaller bombs also regularly explode in Cairo and the Nile Delta, usually causing limited injuries.

One security source told Reuters on Sunday it was not yet clear what threats had prompted the British embassy to close its doors. But another source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said a suspected militant who was recently detained by Egyptian authorities had confessed to plans to target foreign embassies.

Australia also updated its travel advice to Egypt on Dec. 6, because of reports early in the month indicating that “terrorists may be planning attacks against tourist sites, government ministries and embassies in Cairo.”

“We continue to advise against all travel to the governorate of North Sinai. We continue to advise Australians to reconsider their need to travel elsewhere in Egypt due to ongoing political tension and the threat of terrorist attack,” it said.

Original article

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Maritime Combat Power In The Indo-Pacific – Analysis

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By Vijay Shankar

Both Julian Corbett and Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Goroshkov had an astute perspective of the importance of a theory for the application of Combat Power. Theory, as Julian Corbett put it, “…be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, but as a means to fertlise both”.

India’s armed forces have traditionally evolved to cope with operational scenarios. Whether this orientation was by instinct or a deep-seated misplaced trepidation of the power of the military is really not germane to our study. However, its impact was to stunt the development of Combat Power to the operational canvas. So it is that the inspiration of the instantaneous intimidation was and continues to be the pretender that fills strategic space.

Strategic Approach

The strategic approach derives from two characteristics of the international system. First, the endemic instability of protagonists involved in the system; whether it is their politics, national interests, alliances or historical antagonisms. Second is the function of a state as a sovereign entity charged with guardianship of a unique set of values often contrary to the larger system.

It is interesting to examine the Chinese case. Two events of the 1990s shaped their military strategy. The assembly of coalition forces in preparation for the Gulf War of 1991, they believed, constituted first firing and justified strategic pre-emption. Second, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 was a humiliating experience of Chinese sovereignty being violated when two American carrier groups deployed in the Straits with impunity. These two events caused them to develop the ‘Anti Access and Area Denial’ strategy and structure Combat Power to enable it.

Combat Power

Combat Power in a given operational situation is defined as the ability to achieve a decisive outcome, mindful of the principles of war, through the application of leadership that coalesces the various elements of military capability. It harnesses the total impact of destructive and disruptive forces that can be applied. This fundamental process provides the conceptual framework for execution of operational tasks.

Leyte Gulf: Flawed Application of Combat Power

The Battle of Leyte Gulf (22-26 October 1944) was the largest naval battle that was ever fought. It proved decisive to the war and yet provides a study of the failure to apply full Combat Power.

By October 1944 Japan had long passed Clausewitz’s ‘culminating point of the offensive’; it was strategically distended and materially exhausted. In contrast US Navy air power dominated the skies; its ships controlled the Pacific, severing energy lines and isolating millions of Japanese soldiers in China; its armies were rampaging northward towards the Philippines. Under these circumstances the Japanese Navy decided to launch a last ditch naval offensive.

The plan hailed back to a pre-First World War concept of operations; it envisaged a complex multi-pronged gun attack on the US Seventh Fleet covering the Leyte landings while a diversionary was to lure the US Third Fleet with its heavy carrier groups away from the Leyte. The Third Fleet took the bait and abandoned its primary task. Just as Japan was on the point of success, a lightly armed defending force attained their limited armament range by radar and dealt a crippling blow on the Japanese attackers.

Japanese losses at Leyte completed the extinction of their maritime combat power, underwrote the fall of the Philippines and opened the home islands to the final phase of the Pacific Campaign. The battle had been won and lost through a combination of poor intelligence, presence of superior technology and blunders of leadership on both sides inhibiting application of full Combat Power.

Strategic Maritime Space

What bearing the current shift in global power, to Asia in general and China and India in particular, will have on the larger security environment in the region must now be recognised. It begins by defining the geography within which the power shift will be most felt and maritime strategy operate. This characterisation factors area of origin of trade, energy lines, sea lines of communication, narrows contained which could be dominated or denied and location of potential allies. The Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (IOSCS) dominated by ten choke points provides the strategic context in general to trade passing through and in particular to maritime forces that would seek to surveil, deny or control.

Policy, Power and Oceanic Vision

Declarations such as the ‘Look East Policy’, the ‘India Africa Forum Summit’ or indeed Prime Ministers Modi and Abbot’s more recent Strategic Security Framework (SSF) in the Indo-Pacific provide the necessary stimulus for developing a strategic orientation.

The expansion of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are suggestive of the littoral’s aspirations to counter-balance the looming presence of China. Indeed, the India Africa Forum Summit is yet to articulate a security perspective, but clearly this is on the cards. As far as the more recent SSF in the Indo-Pacific is concerned; the players involved and their shared interest would have to be identified, objectives defined and collective control and decision-making would need to be fleshed out and made to harmonise with the American “re-balancing” act in the region. Notwithstanding, contemporary challenges in the IOSCS are dominated by three currents:

• The Challenge of a rising China that seeks to rewrite the rule book.

• Whether existing dispensations will tolerate distress to the ‘status-quo’.

• The mixed blessings of globalisation that endows disproportionate destructive power to lesser states.

Force Planning and Missions

Force planning must be driven by three considerations: first, understanding of what the articulated national policy is; second, what challenges may arise in the short and long-term to this policy; lastly, an estimate of potential harm that may occur to our interests if Combat Power were not developed to address the first two.

The Mahanian logic of being able to provide “unity of objectives directed upon the sea” must drive major infrastructural centres in the Andaman Sea, support facilities in Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam; and to the west in the Indian Ocean littorals of South Africa, Malagasy, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles. Military maritime missions that the Navy may be tasked with in the IOSCS include:

• War fighting which includes Sea Control, Access Denial and littoral warfare.

• Surveillance in all dimensions.

• Strategic deterrence.

• Coercive maritime deployments including marking.

• Co-operative missions.

• Diplomatic missions, policing and benign role.

Forces that would be required at all times to fulfill these missions would comprise of one carrier group for control tasks with an amphibious brigade group attached. Suitable airborne anti-submarine and sea-bed surveillance assets and units for marking high value opposition forces. Nuclear attack submarines for denial operations and the nuclear deterrent would be on patrol at all times.

Conclusion

Contemporary challenges are marked by a China that has lost the power-bashfulness of the Deng era and replaced it with a cockiness that aims at revising the status-quo. There is an invitation to a contest that India cannot refuse; to take the next step to establish a strategic security framework with the US, Japan, Australia and the littorals is logical. The security construct will necessarily have to be centred on deployed Combat Power, all of which will serve to ‘contend, control and deny’.

Vijay Shankar
Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India

The post Maritime Combat Power In The Indo-Pacific – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

India-Pakistan: Frantic Thrust In J&K – Analysis

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By Ajit Kumar Singh

With major terrorist attacks intended to disrupt the electoral process in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), India accused Pakistan of “mainstreaming terrorism”, even as the first two of five phases of the State Assembly Elections conducted on November 25 and November 30, 2014, registered record turn-outs of 71.28 and 72.1 per cents, respectively. Evidently, the anxiety within the establishment at Islamabad has been pushed to a new level, and terrorist groups operating in J&K, directly under the aegis of Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), unleashed a series of attacks just two days after the first round of polls.

In the most recent of these attacks, on December 5, 2014, at least 21 persons, including 11 Security Forces (SF) personnel, eight terrorists and two civilians, were killed in four coordinated attacks carried out by terrorists who had been infiltrated from across the border. This was the highest fatality figure for a single day since May 23, 2004, when at least 30 persons, including 19 Border Security Force (BSF) personnel, six women and five children, were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device blast at Lower Munda, near Qazigund, on the Srinagar-Jammu highway.

In the first attack on December 5, a group of heavily armed terrorists carried out a suicide attack targeting the Army’s 31 Field Regiment Ordnance Camp located at Mohra, near the Line Control (LoC), in the Uri sector of Baramulla District. In the ensuing gunfight, which lasted over six hours, 11 SF personnel, including Lieutenant Colonel Sankalp Kumar, and six terrorists, were killed. Six AK rifles with 55 Magazines, two shotguns, two Night Vision Binoculars, four Radio Sets, 32 unused Grenades, one Medical Kit and a large quantity of miscellaneous warlike stores were recovered from the dead terrorists.

Later the same day, terrorists opened fire on a Police patrol in the Awanta Bhawan area under Soura Police Station on the outskirts of Srinagar city. The Policemen returned fire, killing one of the terrorists on the spot while another, who took shelter in a shed, was neutralized subsequently. One of the dead was identified as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) ‘district commander’ Qari Asrar. Arms and ammunition, including two AK rifles and seven magazines and hand grenades were recovered from the encounter site.

In another incident, two civilians were killed and another 11 were injured in the Tral area of Pulwama District, when terrorists lobbed a grenade near a bus stand. Terrorists also hurled a grenade at a Police Station in Shopian District, though it failed to hit the intended target, and there were no casualties.

Earlier, on November 27, 2014, terrorists who had reportedly been infiltrated across the border under covering fire by Pakistani Rangers, in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, carried out a suicide attack targeting an Army Base Camp in the Arnia sector of Jammu District, killing five civilians and three SF personnel. The four attackers were also killed.

Since November 25, 2014, a total of 41 persons, including 15 SF personnel, eight civilians and 18 terrorists, have been killed, and another 15 persons injured, in eleven terrorism-related incidents across the State. More worryingly, two of these incidents were suicide attacks, which had become rare in J&K.

Referring to the suicide attack at the Army Camp in Uri, General Officer Commanding of the Army’s 15 Corps, Lieutenant General Subrata Saha observed, “(Either side of) the road between Baramulla and Uri is densely populated now. The aim must have been to come and strike at civilian targets to cause fear and disrupt the peaceful conditions ahead of the polls.” Uri is going to polls in the third phase of elections on December 9.

Significantly, according to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), at least 130 infiltration attempts had been made from the Pakistani side till October 2014, and of these 45 have occurred in the preceding three months alone. Similarly, a total of 545 incidents of CFA violation along the LoC and International Border were reported till November 25. Of these, 424 incidents of CFA were reported between August and November 2014 (till November 17). According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), while at least six infiltration attempts have been reported since November 1, 2014, at least two CFA violations have been recorded since November 26, 2014, (data till December 7, 2014).

Meanwhile, in another manifestation of Islamabad’s direct involvement in promoting terrorism, the founder of banned LeT and chief of Jamma’t-ud-Dawa (JuD) Hafeez Mohammad Seed, a United Nations-designated terrorist, and the prime accused in the November 26, 2008, Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11) was provided state facilities to organize a two day (December 4-5, 2014) “National Conference” on the theme, “Pakistan’s liberty lies in the ideology of Pakistan”, in Lahore. Interestingly, Pakistan Railways operated trains from Hyderabad and Karachi to bring people to Lahore and the Railways spokesperson argued that “there had been a uniform policy to run special trains on the request of political and religious parties”. Reaffirming strong support for Islamist extremists across the Pakistani political spectrum, both the Government and Opposition parties extended their ‘full support’ for the success of the “conference”. Unsurprisingly, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tahreek-i-Insaf (PTI) postponed its call to blockade Lahore on December 4 on the “request” of the JuD leadership.

And this is what the head of “religious and political” party, JuD, Saeed stated during the “conference”:

Acting on the Quran, it is obligatory on all of us to help Kashmiris in their struggle to get freedom from India. Those who had performed jihad against Russia should go to Kashmir and help the Kashmiris. Gone are the days when Mujahideen were declared terrorists and sanctions were imposed. Now jihad has entered the second phase (in Kashmir). To deal with the Indian atrocities we will have to adopt the course of Ghaznavi and Ghauri… Narendra Modi should be straightforward and resolve the Kashmir dispute, and if you are not ready to resolve it, then God willing, Kashmir will be the gateway and we will Jihad against India…

He later tweeted, “Ghazwae Hind is inevitable, Kashmir will be freed, 1971 will be avenged and Ahmedabad Gujarat victims will get justice, Insha Allah.”

India reacted strongly, but characteristically ineffectively, against the episode. Indian government spokesperson Syed Akbaruddin declared, “This was an event at a national monument in Pakistan, with Police deployed for security, and advertised all across Pakistan. The rally was held by an organization that has been banned not only by India, but also the U.S., U.K, Australia and under the U.N. resolution 1267. Extending these sort of facilities to a designated terror entity including providing train services, is nothing short of mainstreaming terrorism.”

Such ‘strong reactions’ are an established ritual in New Delhi. Nevertheless, the Government has also announced its intentions to strengthen the security grid across the LoC and International Border, as well as within the State, to counter the current and frantic thrust from across the border. It will be a test of the Centre’s will and ability to see whether these measures can be implemented within the immediate context of the remaining phases of Assembly Elections, or whether they will have to wait for a longer term for effective implementation.

Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India-Pakistan: Frantic Thrust In J&K – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


India: The Same Trap, Again In Chhattisgarh – Analysis

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By Fakir Mohan Pradhan

In a guerrilla ambush, showing sufficient elements of mobile warfare, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed 14 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel including two officers, Deputy Commandant B.S. Verma and Assistant Commandant Rajesh Kapuria, and injured another 14 on the outskirts of Kasalpar village, near Chintagufa and Chintalnar, close to the Dornapal-Jagargunda Road in Sukma District, on December 1, 2014. CRPF Deputy Inspector General (DIG) D. Upadhyay disclosed that the Maoists looted 10 AK-47s, including three UBGL (Under Barrel Grenade Launcher) attachments, 900 rounds, 30 UBGL grenades, an INSAS LMG with 300 rounds, an INSAS rifle with one magazine, four bullet proof jackets, a GPS and two binoculars, after the encounter.

A day earlier, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh had boasted, “the Maoists would be finished from Chhattisgarh soon”.

Prime Mister Narendra Modi condemned the attack as ‘brutal’ and ‘inhuman’, while Union Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh termed it ‘cowardly’. Facing the first such major blow to the SFs in anti-Maoist operations under the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government at the Centre, UHM Singh issued a suo moto statement regarding the incident in both houses of the Parliament on December 3, declaring, “It is our firm commitment to provide every possible assistance to the Security Forces and we will continue the operations till this problem is fully eradicated.” The UHM’s statement gave details of the operation under which the present debacle occurred:

The State Police and the Central Armed Police Forces have been conducting operations in the LWE affected States to effectively tackle the problem of Left Wing Extremism. On the basis of intelligence inputs about the movement of CPI(Maoist) cadres, CRPF launched a multi phased massive operation on 16.11.2014 in the Chintagufa area of Sukma District, Chhattisgarh.

2. In this operation, 2253 CRPF personnel and 224 State police personnel (a total of 2477 security forces personnel) participated. During the first and second phase of this operation on 17.11.2014 and 21.11.2014, there had been several encounters between security forces and Maoists. On the basis of information received from various sources which include intelligence and media sources, there have been reports of killings of 12 Maoists on 21.11.2014. However, this is yet to be confirmed. During this multi phase operation, a few security forces personnel were injured who had been treated.

3. The third phase of this operation was started on 27.11.2014. After combing operations in this densely forested area, when the troops of 223 Bn and 206 CoBRA Bn were returning to their camps, they were ambushed by Maoists near village Kasalpar. This incident occurred at 10.30 AM on 01.12.2014. The troops retaliated and responded to the Maoists’ attack bravely. This encounter lasted for around 3 hours. In this encounter, 14 CRPF personnel of 223 Bn. have been martyred and 14 others were injured. As soon as this encounter started, other parties of CRPF which were present nearby rushed for reinforcement.

4. The injured security forces personnel were brought to the base camp at Chintagufa and they were then sent to Jagdalpur and Raipur for further treatment. In this incident, the Maoists managed to take away the weapons and ammunitions of the deceased jawans.

UHM Singh had referred to the encounter that took place during the second phase of the combing operation on November 21, where the unconfirmed killing of 12 Maoists (the CRPF IG in Bastar claimed the number to be 15) occurred. The incident had also resulted in confirmed injuries to five CRPF personnel initially, while another two troopers, including an IAF gunner, were injured when the Maoists fired on the helicopter that was sent to evacuate the injured. The chopper was damaged, but managed to evacuate the injured troopers.

The December 1 ambush came as surprise to many, as it occurred at a time when the frequency of Maoist attacks was gradually diminishing and Maoist surrenders, especially in the heartland Bastar Division, were mounting rapidly. The Maoists had issued more than one communication admitting losses suffered, both in terms of cadres and weapons, as well as increasing desertions among cadres and sympathisers. Nevertheless, there have long been apprehensions that the Maoists were planning ‘something big’, to restore the sagging morale of cadres.

It was the SFs who served up a golden opportunity to the Maoists, repeating past mistakes in pursuit of a misconceived ‘strategy’ of ‘area domination’. The plot was somewhat similar to the devastating incident suffered by CRPF troops at Chintalnad in Dantewada District on April 6, 2010. A unit had moved out on an area ‘domination exercise’, and was ambushed on their way back to camp. 75 CRPF troopers and one Policeman of the Chhattisgarh Police were slaughtered by the Maoists.

As the dust settles, reports indicate several things that went wrong on December 1. Firstly, the group that was ambushed had been isolated from the main contingent. Secondly, the troopers were tired after the protracted operation. Thirdly, the team had ‘deviated’ from its planned route. According to CRPF sources, the “deviation from the planned route” took place because seven CRPF men were suffering from malaria: “The jawans were showing signs of cerebral malaria. We had asked for a chopper to evacuate them on November 30, but the chopper refused to land citing lack of space, leaving us with no option but to carry the sick personnel, which slowed down our movement.” Fourthly, the IAF choppers refused to evacuate the injured immediate aftermath of the ambush as “…. there was no clarity on whether the landing area at the encounter site in the jungle had been sanitized.” CRPF claims timely evacuation could have saved at least three lives. Fifthly, there were allegations that surveillance drones withdrew midway through the operation, disregarding SF requests. Further, some reports also suggest that a Maoist ‘mole’ led the SFs into the trap. As usual, there are also reports claiming that the SFs violated standard operating procedures (SOPs) by following the same route over 10 days.

There have also been claims by the CRPF that the Maoists used villagers as human shields, as a result of which SFs could not retaliate properly. This remains to be confirmed by investigators, but certainly appears strange, in view of the claim that the Maoists ambushed the CRPF unit. There is no precedent of an ambush carried out by the Maoists with human shields in tow.

An enquiry has been ordered into what went wrong leading to the huge loss.

Incidentally, newspapers on December 1 reported an outbreak of malaria across Bastar. Besides SF personnel, a huge number of villagers had also been hit. The lack of medical facilities in the area was exposed, with over 50 personnel of the State Police and CRPF lying on the floor for treatment at the Maharani Hospital at Jagdalpur. Bastar Inspector General of Police (IG) S.R.P. Kalluri noted, “Our operations have been affected. We have asked the State Government to immediately take note of the situation and ensure medicare for Policemen.”

Disgracefully, the uniforms of the troopers who had been killed found their way into a garbage dump outside the Ambedkar Hospital in Raipur, where the post-mortem was conducted, displaying extraordinary negligence and a collapse, both of the CRPF and Police leadership, as well as minimal norms of hospital administration. Once again, an enquiry has been ordered to fix responsibility for the lapses leading to the dumping of the personal effects of the dead troopers.

The attack establishes that, despite the continuous desertions and surrenders, the core of Maoist strike capabilities remain intact in the Bastar Division. The surrender of Chamballa Ravinder aka Arjun, who rose through the ranks and became the commander of the first company raised by Maoists in Abujhmaad, and was later elevated to the rank of commander of the ‘Abujhmaad battalion’, the second Maoist Battalion in Bastar, suggested, of course, that all was not well with the Maoists. Nevertheless, as in the past, the rebels have demonstrated a residual strength sufficient to exploit SF blunders.

There are no visible gains from the ‘multi phased massive operation’ initiated by the SFs on November 16, 2014, in the Chintagufa area, but the Maoists have achieved some definite advantages, beyond the demonstrative impact of the damage inflicted on the CRPF troops. By firing at helicopters on several occasions, including the latest incident on November 21, they generated sufficient doubt in the minds of the IAF to fly evacuation operations. Further, they successfully slowed down ‘enemy forces’ (SFs) by planting IEDs, and, eventually, inflicted heavy casualties on the SFs. The CRPF had already issued a ban on the use of Mine Proof Vehicles (MPVs), describing them as ‘coffins on wheels’.

Crucially, the December 1 incident is evidence of persistent failures of strategy on the part of the SFs and their planners. Despite claims, the ‘multi-phased operation’ was based, at best, on ‘general intelligence’ regarding the presence of Maoists in the targeted area, and not on any specific intelligence. The Force was, consequently, wandering about a vast forest area for two weeks, simply hoping to smoke out the Maoists in an ‘area domination’ approach that has demonstratively and repeatedly failed in the past, particularly given the inadequacy of Forces available to effectively dominate the thousands of kilometres of dense jungle in the Bastar Division. Unsurprisingly, though belatedly, UHM Rajnath Singh has now announced, that the CPMFs should “desist from expansive area-domination exercises” in Maoist areas, and to focus on specific intelligence based targeted operations.

The strategic vulnerabilities of the SFs are also a direct consequence of the perversity of States’ approach to the Maoist problem. In a candid interview, the outgoing Director General of the CRPF, Dilip Trivedi, observed, on November 27, 2014, “For some States, continuing Naxal violence is beneficial. It helps them get central funds. And then it’s not their men who die but those from outside the State (central force personnel).” It remains the case that, despite the training of over 22,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College at Kanker, the overwhelming proportion of the anti-Maoist fighting continues to be done by Central Forces, whose total deployment in Chhattisgarh amounts to some 31 Battalions, with each battalion yielding approximately 400 personnel on the ground – that is, roughly 12,400 Central Paramilitary Force (CPMF) personnel. Sources said the DG was hinting at Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha revealed media reports. Trivedi observed, further, “The easier way of fighting IEDs (improvised explosive devices) is to ensure Maoists do not get explosives easily. But the Government is not serious about regulation of explosives’ sale. State Governments have to stop explosives from reaching Maoists.” In essence, Trivedi was underling the lack of a genuine effort to solve a problem on the part of the State Governments. Under the preceding United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in Delhi, the Centre’s role in tackling the Maoists had been over-emphasised on the grounds that this was a ‘national problem’, transcending State boundaries, and could, consequently, be resolved only at a ‘national’ level. The affected States had eagerly seized upon this logic, stridently demanding greater financial benefits to tackle ‘developmental deficits’ and more and more CPMF deployment, and abdicating all responsibility for the management of ‘law and order’ or ‘security’ in the State. It is significant that, of the 2,477 personnel involved in the ‘multi phased massive operation’ of initiated on November 16, 2014, just 224 belonged to the State Police. The cumulative consequences of this approach had already been demonstrated in the massacre at Chintalnad in April 2010, but no lessons appeared to have been learned.

Since it assumed power at the Centre with a strong majority, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government has made some appropriate noises regarding Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ (UMHA’s) draft policy states:

The LWE (Left Wing Extremism) affected States will take the lead in the counter-insurgency campaign with support from the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). The CAPFs have the responsibility of holding the counter-insurgency grid together, operating seamlessly across state borders in coordination with the State police forces… The CAPF personnel deployed in LWE affected areas would be given incentives on par with the maximum prevailing levels — those available in Jammu and Kashmir… In the worst left-wing extremism affected areas, security interventions will be followed by development interventions; in moderately affected areas, both the interventions will go hand in hand and in less affected areas, development interventions will take precedence.

In the wake of the December 1 debacle, UHM Rajnath Singh has now declared that the States must take the lead in anti-Maoist operations. A senior UMHA official reportedly stated: “The State (Chhattisgarh) was told that the experience of previous counter-insurgency campaigns in India in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Tripura shows that State Police should take the lead in the campaign with support from Central Forces… This also forms the main part of the new national policy against Maoists that has been framed by the Home Ministry. The Policy is now set to be laid before the Cabinet Committee on Security for approval.”

The counter-insurgency experience of Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh has long been before the nation, and cannot have escaped the attention of the Governments of Chhattisgarh and other Maoist afflicted States, or of regimes at the Centre. If the lessons of this experience have been consistently ignored, the reasons can only lie in the perverse politics that former CRPF DG Trivedi hinted at. It remains to be seen whether the new dispensation at Delhi can overcome this pattern of politics, to capitalize effectively on the visible weakening of the Maoist organisation and cadres, or will the persistence of political and strategic folly once again create the spaces for another Maoist revival.

Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India: The Same Trap, Again In Chhattisgarh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Nepal: Deepening Polarization – Analysis

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By S. Binodkumar Singh

In a clear indication of deepening polarization in the constitution drafting process in Nepal, 20 out of 31 parties represented in the Constituent Assembly (CA), on November 20, 2014, rejected the seven-province proposal of the ruling alliance – the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). The dissident parties alleged that the joint proposal was against the spirit of the Interim Constitution of 2007 and earlier peace agreements, including the 11-Point Agreement, 7-Point Agreement and 23-Point Agreement. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala, who is also President of the ruling NC, and CPN-UML Chairman K.P. Sharma Oli, had jointly presented the seven-province proposal at a meeting of the Constitutional Political Dialogue and Consensus Committee (CPDCC) on November 3, 2014.

The seven-province proposal primarily focused a federal system, the system of governance, the judicial system and the electoral model. Koshi, Janakpur, Bagmati, Gandaki, Lumbini, Karnali and the Far-West were to be the seven Provinces in the Federal structure, with Kathmandu as the Federal Capital. The proposal also stated that there will be a multiparty parliamentary system of governance; the Supreme Court will be the final authority to interpret the constitution; and all 165 members of the House of Representatives will be elected directly.

On November 17, 2014, the task of resolving disputes in the constitution-making process had already suffered a serious setback, as the meeting of the CPDCC of the CA was deferred until further notice, even as the January 22, 2015, deadline for promulgating a new Constitution was drawing close. CPDCC Chairman Baburam Bhattarai, who is also a Vice-Chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (UCPN-M), adjourned the meeting for an indefinite period after NC leader Ram Chandra Paudel submitted signatures of 43 of the 71 members of the CPDCC demanding that Bhattarai should forward the NC – CPN-UML seven-province proposal to the CA’s full House.

The deadline given to the CPDCC to submit its report to the CA, after four extensions, expired on November 16, 2014. Finally, on December 5, CPDCC, Chairman Baburam Bhattarai, submitted the CPDCC’s report to CA Chairman Subas Chandra Nembang, incorporating the joint proposals put forth by NC and CPN-UML, along with opinions of other parties. The CA meeting is now scheduled for December 9, to discuss on the report. The CPDCC was formed on March 27, 2014, and mandated to hold discussions with political parties to settle disputed issues in the constitution-drafting process.

Terming the seven-province proposal against the spirit of consensus and unacceptable, the 22-party alliance led by the main opposition UCPN-M, at a meeting on November 17, 2014, denounced the joint proposal presented by ruling NC and CPN-UML to the CPDCC. Talking to media after the meeting, Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP) Co-Chair Hridayesh Tripathi argued that the proposal failed to incorporate the spirit of federalism. Similarly, two indigenous people’s organizations, including the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) and Indigenous Nationalities Movement of Nepal (INMN), announced joint protest programs to guarantee the indigenous people’s rights to identity in the new Constitution. Issuing a joint statement, the two organizations declared they had decided to join forces to fight for issues related to inclusion of ethnic identity in the Federal Constitution while the constitution promulgation process was ongoing.

A day later, UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda, argued, “We are the opposition in the Parliament, however, NC and CPN-UML treat us as the opposition even in the CA where, in fact, nothing but constitution-making must be focused on.” Likewise, Vice-chairman of the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum-Democratic (MJF-D) Jitendra Narayan Dev, a key strategist in the 22-party alliance, observed, on November 20, 2014, that the ruling parties secretly prepared their joint proposal and submitted it to the CPDCC without even uttering a word about it in the trilateral meeting held a day before, thus creating deep suspicion in the opposition camp.

Meanwhile, on November 18, CA members representing the Tharu-community from all the parties, including NC and CPN-UML, initiated a signature campaign, opposing the proposal. These lawmakers argued that the seven-province model was a gambit to link Tarai-Madhes to the Hills, and violated the rights of the Tharu community. Earlier, on November 9, 2014, Madhes based lawmakers from NC also submitted their signatures to Prime Minister Koirala, denouncing the seven-province federal model. Further, the United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF) comprising six Madhesi parties — MJF-D, TMDP, Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum-Nepal (MJF-N), Sadbhavana Party (SP), Tarai Madhes Sadbhavana Party-Nepal (TMSP-N) and National Madhes Socialist Party (NMSP) – formed a six-member committee on December 4. After a committee meeting on the same day, the front prepared to publicize the State-Restructuring Commission’s 10-province federal model as its official proposal.

Federalism is one of the most contentious issues to plague the constitution drafting process. The shifting position of all concerned parties on the subject had complicated it further. Earlier, in a meeting of the alliance of five main Maoist parties of Nepal, at Kathmandu on June 30, 2014, during an extensive interaction on the subject of federalism, the constituent parties expressed their readiness to hit the streets to press the Government to incorporate their agenda in the constitution. Compounding the issue further, on July 11, 2014, the UCPN-M and six Madhesi parties formed the Federal Republican Front (FRF), to push for their demand of identity-based federalism.

On the other hand, the High Level Political Committee (HLPC), another body engaged in drafting of the constitution, met on November 30, 2014, in the presence of CA Chairman Subash Nembang. The meeting of the HLPC ended without making any headway. The HLPC was constituted on March 16, 2013, to ‘assist the Government’ in resolving possible problems in the political sector. The other contentious issues left to be resolved, apart from federalism, include the restructuring of the state, the electoral system and the judiciary.

Amidst the uncertainty brought about by the differences among major political parties, various groups have launched signature campaigns, rallies, and Short Message Service (SMS) campaigns, to pressure CA members. Significantly, locals in Dhangadhi city of Kailali District, on December 3, 2014, staged a rally to exert pressure on the political parties to promulgate the new statute by January 22, 2015. The rally, in which various civil society organizations took part, was held under a banner that read: “We do not want to be failed again.”

Meanwhile, the Mohan Baidya aka Kiran led faction of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Baidya), which abandoned the UCPN-M on June 19, 2012, split further on November 24, 2014, after a splinter-group led by party secretary Netra Bikram Chand submitted a letter to the CPN-Maoist-Baidya Central Committee, announcing its intentions to separate. Organizing a press conference in Kathmandu on December 1, 2014, the newly formed Chand-led CPN-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand) urged the ruling coalition parties to implement in full the 12-point understanding, the interim constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Frustrated with the delays in the Constitution writing process, CA Chairman Subas Chandra Nembang stated, on December 5, 2014, “The new Constitution would be possible by January 22 only by shortening, scrapping and suspending several provisions of the CA Rules. If all procedures are to be followed, the new Constitution is possible only by April 15. The fast-track is the only option before us.”

Evidently, political parties are sharply divided over both the procedure and the contents of the new Constitution. Growing mistrust has diminished the prospect of the country getting its new charter by January 22, 2015. Sticking to their respective positions, both ruling and opposition fronts have adopted a wait-and-see approach, and a deadlock continues to cripple the process of drafting the new Constitution.

S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The post Nepal: Deepening Polarization – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Elusive India-Japan Nuclear Deal: Time To Bridge The Differences To Clinch Deal – Analysis

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By Dr. Shamshad A. Khan*

(ICWA) — India-Japan nuclear cooperation has been one of the much talked about issues between the two governments, strategic circles and the media. Despite achieving new breakthroughs in their cooperation in the fields of trade, infrastructure, security and defence, the civilian nuclear cooperation issue remains an unfinished agenda. The inconclusive agreement, vital for India’s energy security, has been passed over to the new government as a result of the regime change in India. This is one of the issues over which both the countries have had four rounds of negotiations, but they have been unable to clinch the nuclear agreement.

Prospective India-Japan Civil Nuclear Agreement: Differing Perceptions

There is a basic disagreement on the approaches of the two countries that has become a stumbling block in realizing this objective. Japan looks at the nuclear cooperation purely from strategic angle, while India sees it from an economic perspective and considers Japan’s approval of a nuclear deal important for going ahead with the installation of new nuclear power plants. This is primarily because Japanese companies enjoy a monopoly over certain key components including “reactor vessels” required for nuclear reactors. India has signed agreements with General Electric, Areva SA and Westinghouse to set up nuclear power plants. Japanese companies have major stakes in these companies. If Japan does not sign an agreement with India, these companies cannot proceed with their installation plans.

There had been some headway, however, in this regard. The then Foreign Minister, Katsuya Okada, during his New Delhi visit, has agreed to launch negotiations on nuclear agreement. Okada, during his official visit in 2011, stated, “The decision to launch the negotiation for the nuclear cooperation agreement was probably one of the toughest decisions that I had to make as Foreign Minister.” It may be noted that Japan took almost five years to move from commitment to negotiation stage. It had made a commitment to India to enhance civil nuclear energy cooperation “through constructive approaches under appropriate IAEA safeguards” in a Joint Statement signed by the then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh and the then Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe in 2006. Interestingly, Shinzo Abe is back at the helm of affairs in Japan and has been actively promoting the sale of Japanese technologies, including nuclear technologies abroad, as part of his agenda of economic revival of Japan, commonly known as “Abenomics.”

Though the Japanese government has swiftly concluded nuclear deals with Turkey, Vietnam and has been negotiating the sale of nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but even after the return of Abe, it has been unable to conclude the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India. Japan’s slow approach in this regard suggests that Japan is finding it difficult to generate a consensus at home and convince its anti-nuclear lobby, which is against extending nuclear cooperation to non-NPT signatory countries including India.

India-Japan Civil nuclear Cooperation: Push and Pull factors

On the other hand, there has been sustained pressure on Tokyo from certain business lobbies to go for the deal as Japanese nuclear enterprises are eyeing the nuclear energy potentials in India. It is being estimated that the Indian nuclear energy market alone offers USD 150 billion. If Japan bags a substantial number of contracts to install the nuclear reactors in India, it would be a big boost for Abenomics.

Despite the push from the business lobby, there is a pull factor also. The opposition to a prospective Indo-Japanese nuclear deal comes from the anti-nuclear lobbies and the Japanese media, which has openly expressed concerns about the deal. In 2011, opposition to nuclear deal with India also appeared in Nagasaki Peace declaration issued in the wake of commemoration ceremony of nuclear bombing on Nagasaki. In the face of pressure on the Japanese government from the domestic constituencies, Tokyo has been treading very cautiously. The Japanese sources also suggest that a section of Japanese nuclear reactor exporting companies have lost interest in Indian nuclear market following India’s adoption of nuclear liability bill. They have expressed unease over the bill and expect India to revisit the liability bill. India should not accede to these demands as the liability bill is the best insurance for the communities hosting nuclear power plants in case of an accident. India should also take cognizance of some internal developments in Japan including Tokyo’s willingness to join the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for nuclear damages. CSC calls for setting international rules whereby compensation can be made smoothly in the event of a nuclear accident.

The CSC also stipulates that liability for damages should be shouldered by the companies concerned. Recently, Japan has called for ratification of the CSC and has submitted a draft bill to the Diet. If Japanese Diet ratifies the bill and Japan becomes signatory of this international convention, all the companies operating under nuclear plants domestically will fall in the ambit of the CSC. Indian can ask these companies to follow the similar safety, security and liability norms for Indian markets as well.

Why Japan wants a specific nullification clause in the nuclear agreement?

To assuage Japanese nuclear allergic public, majority of whom remain unaware of India’s “unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing”, Japan has been asking to include a specific clause in the pact. The Japanese side wants that the nullification clause in the prospective nuclear agreement should stipulate that “Tokyo would halt nuclear energy cooperation if New Delhi conducts a nuclear test.” They continued with this demand during the four rounds of negotiations held so far. It was expected that during the visit of Prime Minister Narender Modi’s Japan visit Prime Minister Abe who considers selling of technology, including nuclear technology abroad as one of the main pillars of Japan’s economic revival will clinch the pending civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. But the joint statement signed during the two leaders merely noted that the two prime ministers “directed their officials to further accelerate the negotiations with a view to concluding the Agreement at an early date.” Similar observations have been made about the nuclear cooperation in the joint statement signed between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterparts during the last few years. The persisting stalemate between the two countries over the nuclear cooperation agreement suggests that they need to do more to bridge their perceptions.

A close look at Japanese thinking on nuclear cooperation with India suggests that Japan faces a dilemma. It is not able to decide which one to choose between economic gains and the ideal principle of not selling nuclear technology to a non-NPT member. The Fukushima incident has also acted as an impediment in the deal. Post Fukushima incident that led to the displacement of inhabitants closer to the Fukushima nuclear power generation site, a section of Japanese people believes that exporting nuclear reactors is likely to bring similar disasters abroad; thus, they oppose the government’s move of using the nuclear reactor as a tool of trade.

How to bridge the differing perception over the nuclear accord?

The conclusion of an Indo-Japan civilian nuclear accord would depend on how both the countries reconcile on an agreed position. Both need to moderate their positions to clinch the deal. Japan’s demand for inclusion of a nullification clause in the prospective India-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement is not aimed at denying this technology to India, rather it is aimed at assuaging public concerns prevalent in a nuclear allergic and deeply pacifist society. It does not seem that Japan is using the specific clause as a tactics to delay the nuclear deal. However, the Japanese political elites should also understand that the Indian government also faces a similar dilemma. If they agree for the inclusion of the kind of phrase that Japan demands, a large section of the people would blame the present political dispensation for “compromising” India’s long held interest and strategic autonomy.

India’s repeated statements that India has a moratorium on nuclear testing adopted in 2008 and the inclusion of a nullification clause is not required, has not helped assuage the concern of Japanese nuclear allergic people. The common Japanese are not aware of the text of India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Since both Indian and Japanese governments have shown commitment for civil nuclear cooperation, they should jointly strive to make the text popular among the Japanese people. For example, the translated text of the oft-referred moratorium can be advertised in Japanese papers. It is a common practice in international diplomacy to use media space to convey its stance to a local populace. Various governments have utilized these spaces to clear their position.

Hopefully, a section of the statement made by the then External Affairs Minister, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee in Indian Parliament in 2008 would likely have a profound impact on Japanese thinking, which is as follows:

“We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We do not subscribe to any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm our policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.”

If Japan and India fail to find a common ground to clinch the deal and Japan still insists on the specific abrogation clause in the proposed nuclear deal, both the parties, as a last resort, should consider a special clause in the pact, conveying the essence of the above mentioned statement.

As various reports have suggested that India’s economic progress would depend upon the availability of sustainable energy, it becomes important to increase the share of nuclear energy in India’s total energy mix, which, at present, remains less than two per cent. And to increase the share of nuclear energy in India’s energy mix, Japan’s cooperation is necessary. Therefore, both the governments should accommodate each other’s concerns and pave the way for signing the long pending nuclear deal.

*Dr. Shamshad A. Khan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Views expressed by the contributor are his personal views.

This article was published by The Indian Council of World Affairs (PDF).

The post The Elusive India-Japan Nuclear Deal: Time To Bridge The Differences To Clinch Deal – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

SAARC Energy Agreement: What Should Be Next Steps? – Analysis

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By Mirza Sadaqat Huda

The viability of the South Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was once again put to the test at the 18th SAARC Summit on November 26, when the three agreements on connectivity and energy cooperation that were due to be signed in Kathmandu failed to garner consensus among all eight countries. Pakistan stated that it was unwilling to sign the agreements as its ‘internal processes’ were incomplete. Despite the low expectations that have been generally associated with SAARC Summits, the three agreements had generated some kindle of hope, particularly as they were aimed to be a collective declaration of the need for interdependence via transport and energy infrastructure. However, in the concluding ceremony of the Summit, Nawaz Sharif agreed to sign the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation, with the other two agreements also expected to be signed in the near future. Whether this is meant to be a last minute face-saver for SAARC or a genuine appreciation of the need for cooperation in energy remains to be seen. Given that this is the only substantial outcome of the SAARC Summit, what implications it can have for energy cooperation in the region needs to be examined.

Firstly, the conceptualisation of energy security under the agreement has still not been revealed. This is extremely important as this underlying theme determines the repercussions that this agreement will have on future initiatives on the regional grid. One would hope that the outdated supply-centric and economic growth-focused understanding of energy has been discarded for a more comprehensive view. Agreements on energy and energy projects at the SAARC level must aim to increase accessibility and affordability among the under-privileged and have an impact on reducing inter-state tensions in the South Asian region, in addition to fueling economic growth.

Secondly, the agreement is solely on the issue of electricity. This raises the question whether pipeline projects such as the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India), TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), and MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India) have been excluded to divert resources for the realisation of the SAARC Energy Grid, or if pipelines are no longer considered to be feasible in the current geopolitical context.

Thirdly, although the agreement is meant to be an overarching cooperative scheme that aims to address broad issues such as the enabling of cross border trade in electricity, the development of a common regulatory mechanism and the waiving of customs fees, energy projects are inherently sub-regional. This is owing to India assuming a central position as the fulcrum of energy demand in South Asia, which creates two energy markets: the eastern market comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the western market comprising of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The countries in these two markets are expected to trade in electricity with India as well as provide transit facilities for transmission lines. The vast difference in the geopolitics of these two markets, notwithstanding the common regional denominators such as the need for energy infrastructure development, may require a breakdown of the agreement into two loosely connected action plans:

Eastern market: The eastern market would comprise of Nepal and Bhutan, each with hydroelectric potentials of 83,000 and 30,000MW respectively providing electricity to India and Bangladesh. India will also aim to export electricity from its North East region to its eastern states through Bangladesh.

However, the realisation of crucial multilateral projects in this region has been held down by India’s refusal to provide Bangladesh access to Nepal and Bhutan through India. Bangladesh has formally requested a ‘power corridor’ to access the Bhutanese and Nepalese markets several times, each of which has been turned down. This is despite the fact that very recently Bangladesh agreed to allow India to transfer hydroelectricity from Assam to Bihar through Bangladeshi territory. For the SAARC energy agreement to have any impact, allowing Bangladesh to access the hydroelectric markets in Nepal and Bhutan is crucial and this issue should be looked at with pragmatism and in light of the need to strengthen the relationship between the two friendly but often disputative neighbours. In addition, if India seeks to exploit the more than 5,8971MW of hydroelectric potential in its North East region, Bangladesh would be a natural partner in transmission and trade, owing to its geographic position. Bi-lateral negotiations in this regard would be a lot smoother if reciprocity is shown by India regarding the provision of a power corridor for Bangladesh to access electricity from Nepal and Bhutan.

Western market: Some analysts may argue that the western market is much more problematic due to the continued conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan and India, which to some extent overshadowed many SAARC summits, including the recently concluded one in Kathmandu. However, the gateway to the Central Asian region provided by Pakistan and Afghanistan and the opportunity for India to tap into some projects that are already underway in that region makes the western market very important in terms of energy cooperation. In addition to the potential trade in electricity between India and Pakistan, two other projects that are underway will be greatly enhanced if they can be linked to the South Asian region via India: The CASA 1000 project and the TUTAP. The CASA 1000 envisions the transfer of excess hydroelectricity from Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan in the summer months when there are huge shortages of power in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The TUTAP project consists of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan trading in power with Afghanistan and Pakistan. These two projects are conceptualized under the Central Asia-South Asia Power Transmission initiative and therefore, long-term objectives of such projects should be link them to India, which would increase the number of stakeholders in the project and provide greater opportunities for peace building between India and Pakistan. It may even provide a platform for perceiving common interests in Afghanistan by the two South Asian rivals. The countries involved in the CASA 1000 and TUTAP projects should thus collectively approach India to join the project, keeping in mind that in the very long-term the SAARC Energy Grid may well be connected to the Central Asian electricity grid.

Energy for prosperity and peace

The SAARC energy agreement signed on November 28 may have given some hope for the realisation of energy cooperation in South Asia. However, it needs to be understood that an overarching agreement has little impact on project-based cooperation, owing to the centrality of India in the South Asian geography. The follow up of the agreement should thus be two separate action plans: one for the western market and another for the eastern market. Within such action plans, arguably one of the most important aspects would be the issue of financing infrastructure development, for which South Asian countries must come up with innovative means of attracting international donors. In addition, the action plans must conceptualize energy both in the economic, geopolitical and social realms. In addition to the overt purpose of fueling economic growth, the plans should thus include issues such as affordability and accessibility, owing to the 584 million people in the region who do not have access to electricity. Most importantly, the peace building capabilities of energy projects must be recognized and duly exploited. The countries of SAARC must come together to envision energy as the means of reducing low-level political conflicts in the eastern market by binding countries together via mutual benefits, and as a deterrent to high-level military conflicts in the western market by incentivizing peaceful means of dealing with intractable disputes.

(The writer is a Visiting Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a PhD candidate at the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, the University of Queensland)

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For Catholics And Muslims, Interreligious Dialogue A Path To Peace

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By Andrea Gagliarducci

Pursuing interreligious dialogue and opening hearts and minds to others are the way to face troubled times, stressed participants in the Third Catholic-Muslim Summit held this week in Rome.

“Our meeting here, I would think, is a sign of hope for our troubled world. It is a message to all humanity, especially to us, the members of the great family of Abraham – the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims,” said Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, following the conclusion of the Dec. 2-4 meeting, which was themed “Christians and Muslims: Believers living in Society.”

In addition to Cardinal Tauran, the principal leaders of the summit included Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan; Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad, an ayatollah and director of Islamic Studies at Iran’s Academy of Sciences; and John Bryson Chane, an Episcopalian bishop.

Chane stressed that “Christianity and Islam have at this moment in time a great opportunity to work together effectively with governments and civil societies currently in turmoil.”

“They can begin to re-shape a culture of peace in a world too much torn apart by sectarian violence and political pilfering. Christianity and Islam can and must be the bridge builders of the 21st century,” he concluded.

Prince Hassan bin Talal said “the schisms in the world today have become so numerous, the inequities and inequalities so stark, that a universal respect for human dignity must once again be brought back to the consciousness of the international community. Now, more than at any other time, an ethic of human solidarity and a new international order are required.”

All of the participants agree that now it is the time for a renewed Christian and Muslim dialogue, starting from mutual acceptance and in order to find a common path.

Cardinal Tauran underscored that “one of the important bases for the acceptance of the other and therefore for social peace is to be aware of the unity of the human family. It is one in its origin: God; one in its end: God; one in its fundamental needs: air, water, food, dress, shelter, etc. The human aspects of our life are one: joy, sorrow, hope, despair, fear, etc.”

“Having all this in common, the legitimate differences – ethnicity, religion, culture, political choices – should not be a reason for refusing the other, ignoring him or her, marginalizing, persecuting, or even eliminating him or her, as is unfortunately the case in our days, especially in Iraq and in Syria, and in particular towards the Christians and Yazidis,” Cardinal Tauran maintained.

Abraham Skorka, a rabbi and a friend of Pope Francis, took part in the summit, saying that “in the 20th century were consummated horrible crimes in the name of new anthropomorphic religions. Nazism and Stalinism killed millions of human beings on the altar of their fanatic and insane beliefs.”

From the 1970s on, he then stressed, “many went back to the old religions,” but “their returning was not to the pureness and spiritual depth, but to their extreme and aggressive aspects.”

“As tolerance and acceptance of the other was not in the vocabulary of the anthropocentric religions, some new expressions of the renewed traditional religions do not know about the other, in his right to be different,” he concluded.

The Christian-Muslim Summit is a gathering of Christian and Muslim leaders from around the world and experts from both religious traditions who come together for purposes of interreligious and intercultural relationship building and to address issues of conflict that exist between religions and nations.

Pope Francis met the summit participants Dec. 3, reminding them that dialogue is “the path to peace.

Pope Francis also thanked the summit for their work on the path to dialogue, since “this helps us to strengthen our fraternity.”

The fourth summit is expected to be held in Iran.

The post For Catholics And Muslims, Interreligious Dialogue A Path To Peace appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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