Despite having recently initiated negotiations to join the EU, Serbia has declared itself neutral concerning EU sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine crisis. This paper looks at Serbia’s somewhat ambiguous position between the EU and Russia.

By Raquel Montes Torralba*

The conflict in the Ukraine has revived the logic of the Cold War. Since the EU’s new borders have strengthened its eastern flank, limiting Russia’s room for manoeuvre, the Balkan countries have come back into the limelight. Serbia is a particularly interesting case in point. Despite having recently initiated negotiations to join the EU it has declared itself neutral concerning the EU’s sanctions against Russia. This paper focuses on the three main areas that determine the ambiguity of Serbia’s position: (1) the Kosovo issue; (2) the country’s relations with NATO; and (3) its economic-energy relations with Russia and the EU. Serbia’s behaviour seems to be driven by the logic of maximising its gains and using Russia as a way of maintaining the EU’s interest in enlargement. However, the problem is the sustainability of this policy in the near future, especially if the conflict in the Ukraine intensifies. Bearing in mind Serbia’s interest in joining the EU, its politicians should seize the opportunity to open a national debate about the three areas mentioned above and discuss the realistic options open to the country. At the same time, the EU should support Serbia’s efforts by making integration in the EU a real –and attainable– goal for it.

Analysis

Introduction

President Obama’s statements guaranteeing the protection of the Eastern European countries that feel threatened by Russia appears to be leading Europe back to the re-establishment of the old bloc system. If EU enlargement to the east has served to safeguard Europe’s eastern flank, the focus should now be on the countries stuck in the middle. At a time when geopolitics are back on the agenda, the situation of the Balkans should return to the limelight. Despite being at some distance from the hotspot, their poor economic situation and their remaining unresolved conflicts make them the weakest part of Europe. As the cold war experience has shown, in a world of blocs every country counts and the logic of attracting allies is again being developed by both sides.

In this context, Serbia is in particularly interesting situation: it has declared itself neutral in the conflict over the Ukraine alleging that its national interests are at stake and it has refused to join the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia. Such a position is perceived by the EU as paradoxical for a country that has recently opened up negotiations to join it. Nevertheless, national interests, mainly determined by energy dependency, explain not only the country’s behaviour but also that of many others in Europe (with Germany at the top of the list). Thus, the main question concerning Serbia is not its right to legitimately defend its national interests but the ambiguity of its willingness to integrate into what is still perceived in some sectors as the ‘West’. Despite the open manifestation of Serbia’s desire to be the next country to join the EU, its ties to Russia seem to be becoming even stronger. This is not merely a theoretical dilemma since it translates into governmental decisions and policies that have practical repercussions.

Had the crisis in the Ukraine not occurred, the ambiguity could have remained ‘unresolved’ while negotiations with the EU proceeded. However, the Ukraine crisis has changed the paradigm in Europe, reviving the old ‘friend-enemy’ scenario. This geopolitical outcome explains the increased attention (and high level official visits) that Serbia is receiving from both sides. It also presages a growing pressure on the country, particularly since it will hold the OSCE chairmanship next year. In this context, maintaining a neutral policy could be extremely delicate and any false step could ruin Serbia’s efforts on its path to EU integration.

This paper focuses on the three main areas that determine Serbia’s position concerning Russia and the triangle it forms with the EU: (1) Kosovo and its impact on Serbian foreign policy; (2) the country’s policy towards NATO; and (3) its economic relations, particularly in the field of energy. Serbia has made remarkable progress on its path to joining the EU, but it seems to be exploiting uncertainties in order to maximise its gains in its negotiations with both sides. The question that remains is the sustainability of this policy in the near future, as the country is highly dependent on the development of events in the Ukraine. Under these circumstances, Serbia could use the Ukraine crisis to trigger a nation-wide debate to reach a consensus on strategic issues, such as Kosovo, NATO and the extent of its relations with Russia and the EU, which will determine its future. At the same time, it is the moment for the EU to be more pro-active and to adopt a more strategic policy towards Serbia, showing that it can understand the latter’s difficult position. In this respect, EU enlargement should be a genuinely open door.

Belgrade on the chessboard

This year several important meetings have taken place in Belgrade. The most recent was Vladimir Putin’s visit to commemorate the city’s liberation in 1944. At the beginning of May Belgrade also received the simultaneous visit of the President of the Russian Parliament, Sergey Naryshkin (one of the Russian officials sanctioned by the US), and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stephan Füle. The following are extremely helpful to understanding the factors inherent in the triangle formed by Serbia, Russia and the EU.

1. The political elite is divided as regards Serbia’s orientation towards Russia or the EU. Füle was received by Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić –known for representing the government’s pro-European faction– while Naryshkin was received by the President Tomislav Nikolić –known for his pro-Russian slant–. The pro-Western and pro-Russian divide is entrenched in the political class despite all political parties currently in Parliament being in favour of EU integration. It is also present in the population: according to the latest poll, 50% are in favour of joining the EU and 70% of closer relations with Russia. However, when asked to whom Serbia should give priority, 27.8% answered Russia, 14.1% the EU and 51% were in favour of having good relations with both.

2. Russia is using history to inflame anti-Western and pro-Russian feelings. The commemorations of WWI and WWII this year are particularly meaningful for both countries since the most important symbols of solidarity between them are drawn from those wars. They are interpreted by Russia as a sign of the expansionist and bellicose policy that characterise the Western powers, with the Ukraine crisis just being a further episode. From the Serbian side, Russia’s support concerning the interpretation of the WWI is extremely valuable since there are revisionist opinions that point to Serbia as the main culprit of the Great War.[1] Narishkin’s agenda included a visit to the monument to those killed by the NATO bombings of 1999. This sensitive issue is the cause of anti-western feeling and is repeatedly used by Russia to express its commitment to Serbia. ‘NATO aggression angered Russian society’[2] as Naryshkin pointed out during the visit. Putin also seized the opportunity to stress Russia’s unchanged position on Kosovo.

3. Serbia is committed to joining the EU. While Putin and Naryshkin were dealing with history, European officials were praising Serbia for its efforts on Kosovo and its ambition to join the EU before 2020. Although the EU’s representatives have publicly declared that Serbia is not obliged to adhere to its sanctions against Russia (European laws only contemplate such an alignment at later stages of the negotiation process) it seems very likely that the message to the Serbian government is quite different. In fact, there is a real concern in pro-European circles about the impact this could have for Serbia: for the first time Chapter 31, devoted to foreign policy, could become an obstacle to integration.

Secondly, the natural catastrophe that affected Serbia in mid-May, which caused human casualties and extremely severe material damage,[3] was a further occasion for displaying power and influence. The Russians responded effectively and rapidly, despatching rescue teams and humanitarian aid. For its part, the EU –although less quickly off the mark– raised €995 million at an international donors’ conference in addition to providing €60 million from its solidarity fund. Nevertheless, the image of Russian soldiers rescuing victims was used by the media to exemplify the close relations between the two countries.

Finally, the increasing attention that Serbia is receiving from both the West and Russia is the best indicator of the changes that Europe is experiencing. By the end of this year Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić will have met representatives of Germany, France, Russia and China. Moreover, the First Conference on the Western Balkans,[4] which took place in Berlin on 28 August, shows the interest of the EU, and especially Germany, in securing the region’s South-East. This interest can translate into opportunities for business and investments, as needed by the region.

Increasing attention and the opportunities arising from it might have changed Serbia’s perception and strategy. More confidently, Serbia has started to develop a policy of ‘blowing hot and cold’ that is a result not only of cultural-historical factors but also of a pragmatic strategy to maximise gains. The following section analyses the interaction of the various factors behind Serbia’s options.

The Kosovo question and Serbian foreign policy

The status of Kosovo and its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 have been the main factors determining Serbia’s foreign policy over the past decade, with two main effects:

1. An obstacle to its entry to the EU. Serbia’s foreign relations after the war, as defined by its Minister of Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanović (2001), were based on four pillars: its return to the international community, EU membership as its main objective,[5] the balance of power between the US, Russia and China, and the restoration of relations with the non-aligned countries. However, in 2008 the independence of Kosovo caused a political earthquake that led to a ‘degradation’ of the goal of EU membership. While EU membership was maintained at a declaratory level as one of Serbia’s priorities, other questions, such as territorial integrity and military neutrality, emerged to put the EU integration process on hold.

2. Its rapprochement with Russia. Russia’s rejection of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and its veto at the UN Security Council, along with its request of an advisory opinion on the legality of this action by the International Court of Justice, were the two main actions that facilitated Serbia’s rapprochement with Russia. Hence, from 2008 on, the two countries have increasingly cooperated by coordinating their positions on international issues and by signing a series of agreements covering economic, strategic and foreign affairs issues,[6] which will be analysed below. Serbia’s neutrality on events in Georgia and Abkhazia (2008) and the Ukraine are an instance of its new alignment.

This situation stagnated until a new government came into power in May 2012. Surprisingly, the new government, led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and drawn from the ranks of the nationalist Radical Party, marked a turning point in the country’s policy towards Kosovo and EU integration. In May 2013 Belgrade and Prishtina initiated a process to normalise their relations and in January 2014 Serbia officially opened negotiations in order to join the EU. This highly risky political move was put to the test at the snap elections in 2014 that gave an absolute majority to the SNS, with voters not only showing their willingness to join the EU but also their readiness to turn the page on Kosovo by ignoring the parties that more strongly refused to talk to the EU outside Parliament.

It is generally assumed that Serbia’s progress towards EU integration is determined by its parallel progress towards a solution for Kosovo. This explains the government’s behaviour in two different ways, which could be construed to be contradictory: first, in its determination to integrate Kosovo’s Serbs into its political structure and, secondly, in its adamant refusal to accept Kosovo’s independence. However, the logic seems to be that keeping Kosovo’s status on hold is the best way of maintaining the EU’s interest in Serbia’s integration, so that it will only consider the ratification of Kosovo’s independence at the end of the membership negotiation process. This interpretation is particularly consistent in a context in which the enlargement process is highly unpopular and is only justified before the EU for geopolitical reasons. In current circumstances, Russian support is necessary for the development of this strategy, since its withdrawal could jeopardise Serbian efforts to maintain a comfortable leeway to negotiate on Kosovo.

Serbia’s position on NATO

Serbia is the only country in the Balkans that is neither a NATO member nor a candidate to join. Its position is based on the ‘Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia’ whereby it has declared military neutrality. In more specific terms, the declaration of military neutrality must be understood as the official rejection to entering NATO although not ruling out participation in several of its programmes. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) signed in 2006 has led Serbia to carry on a process of reforms and modernisation in its defence sector and to update it in accordance with NATO standards[7] with the aim of participating in international crisis management actions.[8] The Alliance’s increasingly important role was confirmed in 2010 by the approval of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which included not only technical issues but political dialogue as well.

Nevertheless, Serbia’s rapprochement with NATO was parallel to its engagement with Russia in the field of Security and Strategic affairs. In fact, 2013 was a key year for the enhancement of Serbian-Russian cooperation: the two countries signed a Strategic Partnership in May and a Bilateral Agreement on Military Cooperation (which took 15 years to be reached) in November. Additionally, Serbia became a Permanent Observer of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). According to analysts, the content and scope of these agreements[9] in no way challenge Serbia’s cooperation with NATO and even less constitute an alternative to it. However, they are seen as deliberate acts that show Serbia’s willingness to maintain the best relations it can with Russia (regardless of its EU integration process) and Russia’s interest in blocking any attempt to join NATO, in line with its ‘red line’ policy.

In this context, Serbia’s position is determined by several factors:

1. NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999. The memory of the 78-day bombing operation that caused the death of 2.000 people and displaced thousands is still very much alive in Serbia. In 2013 only 13% of the population supported NATO membership (compared with 53% supporting EU membership). This explains the lack of interest among politicians to push the issue and the scant publicity that Serbia’s participation in NATO programmes has received. Nevertheless, it is also clear for Serbia that NATO plays an important role as the only international force (KFOR) entrusted with ensuring the security of Kosovo’s Serb population. During an interview last February with Bruce Naples, head of the NATO Joint Force Command, the Serbian Minister of Defence, Nebojša Rodić, said that KFOR is the most trusted international actor in Kosovo and underlined the importance of not downsizing troop numbers.

2. Russia’s position concerning NATO. In accordance with the ‘red-line’ policy, in December 2013 the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, met the then-Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, to ask him openly about the country’s position on NATO. After being assured of Serbia’s military neutrality and its intention never to become a member of the Alliance, the two countries finally signed the defence cooperation agreement mentioned above.

Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that Russian opposition has not prevented other Balkan countries from showing their interest in becoming members of NATO. The most remarkable instance is Montenegro: despite a similar aversion to NATO,[10] it received a Membership Action Plan in 2009 as its Prime Minister, Milo Đukanović, had integration as one of the country’s main foreign policy objectives. Moreover, although its has very strong economic ties with Russia, last year Montenegro refused to allow the establishment of a Russian military base at Bar (Tivar), planned to be an alternative emplacement for the only military base Russia has in the Mediterranean, at the Syrian port of Tartous.

Since South-Eastern Europe is far from its ‘natural area of interest’, Russia did not consider the steady move of these countries towards the EU and NATO as a major threat. However, the current situation in the Ukraine could make Russia strongly re-consider its position. In this respect, the example of Montenegro is again particularly pertinent since its candidacy to join the Alliance has been put off until 2015. This answer to Montenegro’s request has been interpreted by analysts as an indication by NATO that it does not wish to fuel a confrontation with Russia, but at the same time has left Montenegro in the lurch and open to possible reprisals. At any event, the West’s lack of a long-term geostrategic vision could have a very negative effect on countries like Serbia since it can discourage a more defiant policy towards Russia.

3. The legacy of Yugoslavia. Following the logic of Yugoslavia’s geostrategic position in the Cold War, whereby its status as a non-aligned country was an opportunity to be courted by both sides, being the only non-NATO member in the Balkan Peninsula can be interpreted by Serbia as a threat but also as an opportunity. Serbia is an excellent candidate to be Russia’s regional ally[11] because the latter’s position in the Mediterranean is threatened by the conflict in Syria while the conflict in the Ukraine has polarised Eastern Europe and its traditional allies –Bulgaria and Montenegro– are no longer available due to their commitment to NATO. Thus, the joint construction of an emergency centre at Niš in south-eastern Serbia in 2010, aimed at assisting Serbia and other countries in the Balkans in the event of natural disasters and emergency situations, has allowed Russia to gain a base on the ground, which is commonly held to be an excuse for it to be present in the region. In fact, the centre’s diplomatic status was one of the conditions to be negotiated during Putin’s visit to Belgrade last October, although it was finally removed from the agenda following strong pressure from the West. At the same time, having good relations with both NATO and the EU –in line with the principle of military neutrality– means that it cannot be accused of being anti-western.

On the other hand, Serbia’s neutrality can be very useful in the context of reaching an agreement on the Ukraine crisis. Since Serbia will hold the chairmanship of the OSCE from January of next year, its neutrality and the trust it inspires in Russia could serve to facilitate an agreement.

Serbian trade relations and energy cooperation

Despite the image of Russia as Serbia’s closest partner, in terms of trade relations, the EU and regional structures (such as CEFTA)[12] are by far its most important partners. In Europe, Italy and Germany are in the lead while the EU is also Serbia’s main source of Foreign Direct Investment, at 78.4%.[13]

Table 1. Serbia’s main economic partners, exports and imports (€ million)

Source: EU Delegation in Serbia.

As for Russia, in 2013 bilateral trade reached US$3,034 million (see Table 2). In terms of exports, Russia stands in fifth position, at 7.6%; in imports it is Serbia’s third-largest partner, at 9%.[14] Energy remains the main import from Russia (60%), whereas exports are dominated by agricultural products.

Table 2. Serbia-Russia bilateral trade (US$ million)

Source: J. Simic (2014), “Economic aspects of Strategic Partnership between Serbia and Russia”, The New Century, nr 6, Belgrade, February, p. 22-32.

Economic relations between Russia and Serbia are governed by a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in 2000, which covers 99% of bilateral trade. The agreement is important for Serbia not so much for the actual volume of trade between the two countries (given the different size of their markets, Serbia cannot fully develop the possibilities) as for the attractiveness that it offers foreign investors and companies –it is the only FTA that Russia has signed with a south-eastern European country and, moreover, the only one outside the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, Russia and Serbia have developed a wide range of cooperation agreements in different areas (tourism, health, banking and joint activities related to medium and small enterprises) and several loans have been granted (totalling US$800 million) to renew the country’s railway system.

During Putin’s visit to Belgrade he said that Russia was prepared to increase agricultural imports from Serbia up to €500 million (from the current €200-300 million). Nevertheless, this is a poisoned gift as the increase would occur in the context of EU sanctions against Russia. Last summer Belgrade was already warned by the European Commission against using sanctions to increase exports to Russia. So such a move would be perceived as disloyal, leaving Serbia in a difficult situation with its EU partners.

Serbian-Russian energy cooperation

If Russia’s relevance in terms of economic exchanges is relatively moderate, the bulk of its relations with Serbia is based on energy, since Russia is its main provider of natural gas. In this area the two countries have signed several agreements and conducted some important joint projects:

• In 2008 they signed a cooperation agreement for the oil and gas industry whereby Gazprom bought 51% of Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), Serbia’s state-owned oil company.[15] Talks on the South Stream project began in the same year.
• In 2011 the construction the Banatski Dvor underground gas storage facility, a joint venture between Gazprom and Srbijagas, was completed.
• In 2013 Serbia and Russia agreed to undertake the reconstruction of the Novi Sad oil refinery and established a programme to increase the processing of oil derivatives at the Pančevo refinery, involving an investment of € 1.5 billion over the following two years.

Nonetheless, the most important deal concerning both countries is the South Stream pipeline. This project, extremely influenced by the political environment in Europe,[16] has been one of the Serbian government’s priorities. It involves €2 billion in Foreign Direct Investment for the country and the creation of 2,500 jobs during the construction period. Moreover, it will turn Serbia into a gas transit and storage centre for Europe.[17]

Map 1. The South Stream pipeline: Serbian section
Source: South Stream Serbia.

The confrontation between the European Commission and the Russian government over its non-compliance with European Law[18] has halted the project several times. In this respect, Serbia is in a special position since it is the only transit country which is not an EU member but is nevertheless a member of the European Energy Chapter Treaty on the adoption of EU energy legislation. The EU Commission has warned Serbia that it could also be penalised in the event of an infringement of EU Law.

In this context, several high-level meetings between Russian and Serbian delegations have taken place this year. The most important was held on 7 and 8 July in Moscow when the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, met his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medmedev and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Before the meeting, the Serbian media had echoed several requests[19] that were to be presented to the Russians, among them a reduction in the price of gas (currently established at €400/1,000m3).

Despite all the rumours concerning the visit, especially about a hypothetic ultimatum to Serbia in order to gain its support in the Ukrainian crisis, the meetings were mainly focused on economic issues [20] and more particularly on South Stream. In fact, at the same time that the meetings were taking place in Moscow, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, was in Bulgaria and Slovenia (7-8 July) to solve the impasse concerning the South Stream negotiations. During a previous visit to Belgrade last June, Lavrov had already asked Serbia not to give up[21] on the South Stream project, particularly after the announcement of the suspension of work on the project in Bulgaria.[22]

The agreements on the South Stream project with Serbia seem useful for Russia in at least two ways. First, politically, to show that it is not alone at a time when the West is trying to ostracise it. Secondly, to promote South Stream at all costs now that the conflict in the Ukraine presages a future full of obstacles. As long as the project remains at risk and Serbia can help Russia reach its objectives, it is very likely for the latter not to put too much pressure on the former to take sides in the Ukraine conflict.

Nevertheless, it is important to underline here that some days after Putin’s visit to Belgrade, Russia cut its gas deliveries by 30%. The official reason was an unpaid debt owed by Serbia to Russia totalling US$200 million. An unofficial explanation suggests that the cause was the investigation launched to evaluate the legality of the process under which Serbia sold NIS to Gazprom in 2008. It has also been said that it was a way of punishing Serbia for leaving out of the agenda of Putin’s visit the agreement on the humanitarian centre at Niš and any official act to launch the South Stream works. In any case, it was a strange move in a country in which Putin enjoys wide popularity. However, it does suggest that, should the time come, Russia would not hesitate to use all means to put pressure on Serbia.

On the other hand, should the South Stream problems finally be resolved, the EU should be very conscious of the fact that Serbia would be the pipeline’s only non-EU transit country. Taking into account the current situation in the Ukraine, energy security in Europe should be one of the factors to be considered at the next EU enlargement round.

Conclusions:

Serbia seems determined to join the EU, with its strong economic relations with the Union and the dialogue process with Prishtina being the best examples of its interest and commitment. At the same time, Belgrade continues to foster its privileged dialogue with Moscow. Three factors determine its position towards Russia. First, its cultural proximity. Any alienation from Russia would be incomprehensible to the population since –unlike for other countries in Eastern Europe– Russia has always been considered an ally by the Serbians rather than as a threat. Secondly, Serbia needs Russian support to complete its policy shift towards Kosovo. If Belgrade were to lose Russian support its negotiating position would be substantially weakened. This would hamper not only one of the main incentives for integrating Serbia in the EU but also harm its image as a key actor to end the conflict –which is important for internal political reasons–. Finally, in the current context of crisis in the Ukraine, Serbia exploits its double allegiance to maximise its gains by maintaining the EU’s interest in the integration process while receiving favours from parties in terms of military cooperation, energy, investment and trade.

Bearing in mind Serbia’s interest in joining the EU, even if Belgrade maintains its neutrality towards Russia it could seize the opportunity to initiate a national debate in which politicians should be clear about realistic alternatives on the various issues at stake: Kosovo, military neutrality, EU integration and its interests concerning Russia. This would help society re-organise its national project and would also be an important political sign for Serbia’s European allies. On the other hand, the EU –and the West in general– should provide Serbia with more support without giving the impression of blackmailing it with EU integration. In this respect, it is critical to show that EU enlargement is a real possibility, not just an empty promise.

About the author:
* Raquel Montes Torralba
Specialist in political science

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute and may be accessed here.

Notes:
[1] ‘World War I History divides Balkan Schoolchildren’, Balkan Insight, 6/V/2014.

[2] ‘State Duma speaker Sergei Naryshkin: “we are increasingly confronted with attempts to shift the blame on the victims with the aggressors”’, RU Facts, 5/V/2014.

[3] The damage assessment so far is: 60 casualties, 32,000 evacuees and thousands of millions of euros in material damage.

[4] ‘Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans’, Berlin, 28/VIII/2014.

[5] This objective was pushed forward at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 between the EU and the Western Balkans in, at which they were declared ‘potential candidates’ to the EU.

[6] Z. Petrovic (2010), ‘Russian-Serbian Strategic Partnership: Scope and Content’, in Z. Petrovic (Ed.), Russia-Serbia relations at the beginning of the 21st century, Isac Fund, Belgrade, p. 25-40.

[7] M. Nic & J. Cingel (2014), ‘Serbia’s relations with NATO: the other (quieter) game in town’, CEPI, January.

[8] In January 2014 Serbia had 213 peacekeepers on six UN missions, its largest contingents being posted in Lebanon and Cyprus. Serbia also participates in EU missions in Somalia/Uganda and in the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean.

[9] Z. Petrovic (2010), ‘Russian-Serbian Strategic Partnership: Scope and Content’, in Z. Petrovic (Ed.) (2010), op. cit., p. 25-40.

[10] K. Rekawek (2013), ‘The western Balkans and the Alliance: All is not well on NATO’s Southern Flank?’, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, nr 14 (62), June, p. 5-6.

[11] A. Fatic, A., ‘Serbia’s Strategic Dilemma- Between NATO and Russia’, in M. Kosic & M. Karagaca (Eds.), New Serbia, new NATO: Future vision for the 21st century, TransConflict Serbia, Forum For Ethnic Relations, Klub 21, Belgrade, p. 223-226.

[12] Central European Free Trade Agreement. Members: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on Behalf of Kosovo.

[13] EU Delegation in Serbia.

[14] J. Simic (2014), ‘Economic aspects of Strategic Partnership between Serbia and Russia’, The New Century, nr 6, Belgrade, February, p. 22-32.

[15] It is frequently stressed that these agreements were reached in parallel to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (February 2008) and with Russia’s contrary vote at the UN Security Council.

[16] C. Oliver & J. Farchy (2014), ‘Russia’s South Stream gas pipeline to Eutope divides EU’, Financial Times, 4/V/2014.

[17] ‘South Stream comes to Serbia’, Gazprom, 24/XI/2013.

[18] ‘South Stream bilateral deals breach EU Law’, Euractiv, 4/XII/2013.

[19] According to the media, Serbia had three requests: to increase oil and gas income; to reduce the price of gas; and the authorisation to export 10,000 Fiat 500L (through the extension of the free trade agreement). Source: ‘Vicica u Moskvicekaultimátum’, Informer, 3/VII/2014.

[20] The Serbian delegation comprised the Minister of Energy, Aleksandar Antić, the Minister of Economy, Dušan Vujović, and the Mayor of Belgrade, Siniša Mali.

[21] ‘Lavrov reassures Serbia on South Stream’, EurActiv, 18/VI/2014.

[22] B. Lewis (2014), ‘EU asks Bulgaria to stop work on Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline’, Reuters, 3/VI/2014.

The post Belgrade At Crossroads: Serbian-Russian Relations In Light Of Ukraine Crisis – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Pakistan’s government should immediately halt the apparent pending execution of an alleged child offender and commute his sentence, Human Rights Watch urged Tuesday.

News reports suggest that Shafqat Hussain, who was 14 or 15 when sentenced in 2004 for kidnapping and killing a 7-year-old boy, is among the several hundred prisoners facing imminent execution in Pakistan. The United Kingdom-based human rights organization Reprieve issued a statement alleging that security forces in Pakistan’s Sindh province had tortured Hussain into confessing to the crime.

“Sending child offenders to the gallows is a monstrous government response to the vicious Peshawar school attack,” said Phelim Kine, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government’s apparent aim to execute someone for crimes allegedly committed as a child is an affront to basic decency, as well as a violation of children’s rights.”

Hussain’s looming execution follows the government’s decision on December 16, 2014 to rescind a four year unofficial death penalty moratorium for non-military personnel “in terrorism related cases.” That decision was an explicit government reaction to the December 16 attack by the Pakistani Taliban splinter group Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) on a school in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan that left at least 148 dead—almost all children. The Pakistan government has already executed six convicted militants in Punjab province on December 19 and 21, 2014 as part of its announced policy to speed execution of death row inmates.

Pakistan has ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which specifically prohibit capital punishment of anyone who was under 18 at the time of the offense. The prohibition is absolute. In July 2000 Pakistan issued a Juvenile Justice System Ordinance banning the death penalty for crimes by people under 18. However, the ordinance requires the existence of dedicated juvenile courts and other mechanisms not provided for by law in all parts of Pakistan, leaving juvenile offenders at risk of trial as adults in capital cases.

Human Rights Watch could last confirm Pakistan’s execution of an alleged child offender on June 13, 2006, when Peshawar authorities hanged Mutabar Khan. A trial court in Swabi had sentenced Khan to death on October 6, 1998 for the alleged murder of five people in April 1996. During his appeal, Khan provided the court with a school-leaving certificate to support his claim that he was 16 at the time of the killings, and contended that authorities knew he was a child because they held him in the juvenile wing of the Peshawar Central Prison for two years. Since Khan’s execution, only four other countries are known to have executed people for crimes committed as children: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.

Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as an inherently irreversible, inhumane punishment. Human rights law requires adherence to the right to a fair trial and limits the death penalty to “the most serious crimes,” typically crimes resulting in death or grievous bodily harm. Pakistan should join with the many countries already committed to the UN General Assembly’s December 18, 2007 resolution calling for a moratorium on executions and a move by UN member countries toward abolition of the death penalty.

A joint report issued in December by Justice Project Pakistan and Reprieve concluded that the high number of people on death row for terrorism-related convictions reflects an “overuse” of anti-terrorism laws by Pakistan’s security forces and judiciary. The report states that “instead of being reserved for the most serious cases of recognisable acts of terror, the anti-terror legislation is in fact being used to try ordinary criminal cases, either in a deliberate attempt to evade the procedural safeguards guaranteed by ordinary courts or due to the vague and overly broad definitions of ‘terrorism’ in the legislation.”

Pakistan’s interior minister, Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, announced on December 21 that the government intends to execute about 500 prisoners on death row in the next two to three weeks. Nasir sought to justify the mass executions as a recognition that Pakistan is in “a state of war” and necessary to “avenge to avenge the victims of the Peshawar attack.”

As part of that effort, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif instructed the attorney general to seek to overturn judicial stay orders on executions of prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Sharif described that move as part of a policy of “no mercy for those who have killed our children, citizens and soldiers.” That same day, Sharif said that he would extend ongoing military offensives in remote North Waziristan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to alleged militants “hiding in our cities and villages.”

“Pakistan’s president should immediately use his power to suspend and commute Shafqat Hussein’s execution,” Kine said. “Pakistan’s government does a disservice to the child victims of the Peshawar attack by rejoining the odious short-list of countries that permit the barbarous practice of executing child offenders.”

The post Pakistan: Halt Execution Of Alleged Child Offender, Urges HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amita Batra*

The year 2014 is likely to close with the Indian rupee among the best performing major emerging market currencies against the US dollar. The fall in rupee value over the year has been marginal even while some of the other emerging market currencies have seen a free fall. Improved macro fundamentals including the current account deficit, domestic inflation along with prospects of positive and stable growth have helped contain capital outflows from India even as expectations of higher interest rates in the US draw money back from other emerging markets. It may be time therefore to consider using the rupee as the regional currency, a move that can contribute to enhancement of intra regional trade in South Asia. In neighbouring East Asia, China initiated the process in 2009 and is well on its way to internationalising the renminbi. India formed a task force for the purpose in 2013 with little progress thereafter.

Currency internationalisation involves the use of a currency instead of national currencies, by residents and non-residents, for all international transactions whether they be purchases in goods, services or financial assets and requires full capital account convertibility and a flexible monetary management framework. As seen appropriate for South Asia, a limited version of the concept that involves the currency usage, in this case, of the rupee, in trade invoicing and settlement within the region, could be useful. Rupee regionalisation in this manner will help enhance regional and bilateral trade through reduced transaction costs and exchange rate risk, the latter having been significantly brought forth vis-à-vis advanced market currencies during the global financial crisis. Countries with a trade surplus can maintain rupee receipts as rupee bank deposits which can subsequently be invested in rupee denominated financial assets through offshore/onshore markets. In case of a trade deficit, bilateral rupee-local currency swap lines between the Reserve Bank of India and the central bank of a regional economy can be negotiated to enhance their liquidity position. Additionally, South Asian economies can maintain smaller dollar reserves or allow for greater currency diversification in reserve accumulation. This will imply lower risk exposure and hence costs given that ‘store of value’ properties of advanced economies’ currencies are increasingly being questioned.

Some facilitating factors in this regard such as India’s centrality to regional trade, its economic size, macroeconomic stability and use of rupee in cross-border trade with Nepal and Bhutan already exist. Further, India has already assumed the role of liquidity provider with its regional swap arrangements. India and Bhutan have a currency swap agreement signed between the Reserve Bank of India and the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMAB) for US$100 million. It enables RMAB to make withdrawals of US dollar, euro or Indian rupee in multiple tranches up to a maximum of US$100 million or its equivalent. In May 2012, RBI had announced it would offer swap facilities aggregating US$2 billion, both in foreign currency and Indian rupee, to SAARC member countries. The arrangement would be for a three-year period and would help bring financial stability in the region. However, these swaps are denominated in dollars and earmarked only as a line of reserve for partner countries during a balance-of-payment crisis; it is not for enabling trade payment.

India is also in the process of developing local currency offshore bond markets. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), an arm of the World Bank Group, in 2013 launched a US$1 billion off shore rupee linked bond programme. The bonds to be bought and sold in dollars are denominated in rupees and offer returns linked to rupee interest and exchange rates. They have a triple-A rating guaranteed by the IFC. A series of these bonds are to be issued by the IFC and proceeds will be invested in government and corporate bonds. The bilateral swap arrangements and the offshore market activity are both indicators of the strength and credibility of the Indian rupee.

China has a far more ambitious programme and aims at internationalisation of its currency with regionalisation as only a step in the process. The centrality of China in the regional trade and production networks has been at the base of the expanding ease and use of its currency in trade settlements throughout East Asia. China initiated a pilot program for renminbi internationalisation in 2009 with renminbi (RMB) settlement of cross-border trade in a limited number of cities and regions that was later expanded in geographical coverage and scope of eligible transactions. Linkages between offshore market and onshore market have been set up. Onshore financial markets have been steadily opened to foreign investors. Banks outside mainland China participating in cross-border trade settlement transactions can invest their RMB funds in the interbank bond market in mainland China. China has also signed bilateral RMB-local currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities of 23 countries. Even while negotiating FTAs with regional partners, China has been vigorous in elevating the status of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to a regional unit of accounting and exchange.

While internationalisation of Chinese currency would need to be supported by large scale domestic financial sector reforms and call for some serious pondering on its implications for international currency and reserve mechanisms, India can move ahead with regionalisation of the rupee with the available financial infrastructure in its limited task of trade enhancement in a region specific context.

*Amita Batra
Professor of Economics, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi

The post South Asia: Rupee Regionalisation And Intra-Regional Trade Enhancement – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Saumitra Mohan*

With the longstanding land boundary agreement (LBA) between India and Bangladesh on the verge of being clinched, the exchange or transfer of population residing in the enclaves (‘chhintmahals’) to be exchanged between the two countries is yet another problem they need to resolve. The question of giving options to the inhabitants residing in these enclaves needs to be addressed sooner than later to have a holistic resolution of this long-pending issue. Incidentally, both India and Bangladesh conducted a joint census between 14-17 July 2011 to determine the total population in these enclaves and found their number to be around 51,549. Of them, 37,334 persons were in Indian enclaves within Bangladesh while 14,215 people were residing in Bangladesh enclaves within India.

Historically speaking, the international boundary between India and Bangladesh was drawn hurriedly when the British left India. As a result thereof, thousands of people were left stranded in a number of unsettled enclaves as citizens of one country but living in territories surrounded by that of the other. The people in 111 Indian enclaves (17,160.63 acres) in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi people (7,110.02 acres) in India have been living in these pockets without any rights as lawful citizens of either country.

It is learnt that India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs (SCEA) has proposed in its report to the Lok Sabha that the inhabitants living in Bangladeshi enclaves in India should be granted Indian citizenship under Section 7 of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 (as applicable to populations residing in territories incorporated into India), as these enclaves are to be transferred to India as part of the proposed land swap deal. As a result of the proposed LBA, not only would some Indian citizens return to the mainland from the previously held enclaves, but a number of currently Bangladeshi nationals would be given Indian citizenship after the area is ceded to India. After all, it is only logical that the Indian citizens living in Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh are given a choice to retain their Indian citizenship after these territories are legally handed over to Bangladesh.

Similarly, it is also advisable that the Bangladeshi citizens living in enclaves to be handed over by Bangladesh to India are also given an option to opt for Indian citizenship. If the same does not happen, the life of these people shall continue to be as troubled as it was earlier. It would also constitute a gross anomaly as being Bangladeshi citizens, they cannot continue to live in territories owned by India unless they are resettled in legally-owned Bangladeshi territories to be identified for the purpose or are given a choice to switch their citizenship without any need to change their place of residence i.e. current Bangladeshi enclaves encircled by Indian territories.

As the proposed territorial and population exchanges shall have serious implications for the country’s security and integrity, the government should exercise all options available to put in place a suitable mechanism and modality to check for the bonafides and credentials of the Bangladeshi nationals who shall be conferred Indian citizenship after legal incorporation of the enclaves where they have so far been residing as citizens of Bangladesh.

The SCEA, therefore, rightly observed that the cognate security aspects should be thoroughly examined before the proposed population exchange is effected. It also recommended suitable augmentation and upgradation of the law and order machinery in the affected areas in consultation with India’s eastern provincial government of West Bengal.

It may be noted that because of the fact that these Bangladeshi enclaves are deep within Indian territory without any fencing or means to physically demarcate them, the Bangladeshi citizens in these enclaves have been practically free to mix with the rest of the Indian populace. In fact, there is no choice available to these people as they are physically encircled on all sides by Indian territories. Such a scenario makes it very difficult for the Indian law enforcement authorities to effectively carry out their duties in these enclaves as technically they are not Indian territories, notwithstanding the fact that many of these enclaves have become hot-beds for criminal activity. It is this anomalous situation that the proposed LBA and its attendant Protocol seek to address as and when they are ratified and implemented by the two countries.

The Indo-Bangladesh LBA is a low-hanging fruit waiting to be plucked at the asking of the two countries. It is hoped that resolution of this issue would pave the way for the further strengthening and consolidation of a very functional bilateral relationship between the two countries. It is also hoped that such an agreement would encourage resolution of various other intractable issues between and India’s other neighbours.

*Saumitra Mohan
District Magistrate and Collector, Burdwan, West Bengal, India

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of India.

The post India-Bangladesh: Land Boundary Agreement And Enclave Populations – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Subhash Kapila*

Pakistan and particularly the Pakistan Army is stunned and stung by the horrific TTP terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16 2014 in which over 140 innocent lives were lost. Global sympathy flowed-in but the question that Pakistan needs now to answer as a consequence is that whether it will discard use of terrorism as instrument of state-policy?

Not much analysis is required to come to the conclusion straightaway that Pakistan is unlikely to discard terrorism as instrument of state-policy as it robs the Pakistan Army and its rogue intelligence agency –the ISI of its most well-crafted and well-tested instruments used against India and Afghanistan and Iran also to some extent. In Pakistan Army’s asymmetric military equations with India, it is terrorism as an instrument of state-policy that provides Pakistan to bleed India with a thousand cuts.

Pakistan following the Peshawar 12/16 terrorist attacks is now at a tipping point in its history where the Pakistan Army needs to recognise the simple home-truth that Pakistan’s use of terror as an instrument of state policy has failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives vis-s-vis India or even in Afghanistan despite Pakistan Army’s collusiveness with the United States. On the contrary and ironically too Pakistan itself is being consumed by terrorism targeted from within with no outside sponsorship. In this process Pakistan runs the strong risk of further fragmentation from the persecuted tribals of its Frontier Areas and Baluchistan.

The Pakistan Army is stung and its responses gone rabid and berserk because the TTP attack on the Army Public School took place in the highly fortified Peshawar Cantonment area and thereby were exposed many shortcomings and chinks in the Pakistan Army armour and strategies. Pakistan Army failed earlier during General Musharraf’s time in South Waziristan and seems to have failed presently in Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif’s much vaunted OP ZARB-E-AZB in general area of North Waziristan and Frontier Areas of Peshawar. These operations were aimed at neutralising militant organisations targeting Pakistani cities and Pakistan Army military bases. The TTP and others tomorrow may follow in throwing stronger and defiant challenges to the Pakistan Army to do its worst against them.

Rather strangely, what one witnessed was the Pakistan Army Chief signing the death warrants of terrorists in Pakistani jails. This should rest with the judiciary and the political executive in any democratic country. Does it signify that the Pakistan Army Chief has effectively carried out a ‘silent coup’ in Pakistan? Does it not tie up with my observations in an earlier SAAG Paper that the Pakistan Army Chief seemed to be behind the political disturbances in Islamabad orchestrated through PTI and the imported Canadian Qadri? Does the rabid responses of Pakistan Army Chief not indicate that General Raheel Sharif’s outbursts in wake of Peshawar TTP attacks is indulging in a cover-up of Pakistan Army’s own collusion with motley Islamic Jihadi terrorist outfits? Does it not indicate that the Pakistan Army Chief at this critical juncture is trying to shift the blame for his Army’s inadequacies and failure on to the other Sharif who happens to be the Prime Minister?

After flagging the salient issues in terms of issues that come to the fore, we can now turn to another crucial issue that Pakistan Army’s patrons like the United States, Saudi Arabia and China need to answer the global community as to why all of them have not exercised their considerable leverages with Pakistan in not reining-in Pakistan Army from its dubious and self-destructive path of state –sponsored terrorism? Particularly, when all these three nations have been affected by Pakistan Army facilitated terrorism in one way or another and more singularly that this Pakistan-Centric obsessive permissiveness has fouled up their relationships with the emerging Asian power, namely, India.

The salient consideration determining such an ostrich-like attitude of the United States, Saudi Arabia and China is that all three of them find it politically expedient to make use of the collusive Pakistan Army Generals as a proxy for their own strategic ends.

In relation to restraining Pakistan Army’s use of state-sponsored terrorism the glaring reluctance of the United States stands out in bold relief in view of the predominant hold that it has on the Pakistan Army. It was the United States that goaded the US-Collusive Pakistan Army to use Islamic Jihad against the Former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Thereafter Pakistan Army felt encouraged that it had the United States endorsement of use of state-sponsored terrorism elsewhere as an instrument of State-policy.

With no lessons learnt, the United States following its 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan in which Pakistan Army was complicit in making its Taliban-protégés even fight the United States, it was a sorry plight that the world’s mightiest power enlisting the same discredited Pakistan Army in Afghanistan and even 9/11 Pakistan Army- facilitated attacks on Homeland USA were overlooked to the extent that the United States designated Pakistan as a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’.

Since Pakistan and the Pakistan Army are unlikely to discard use of State-sponsored terrorism as an instrument of State-policy against its neighbours and the reluctance of the United States to do anything about it, what options are available to its neighbours to dissuade Pakistan and Pakistan Army from the reckless and selective use of terrorism as an instrument of State-policy. This challenge particularly applies to India as the predominant power in South Asia held back by United States pressures not to take strong actions against Pakistan sponsored terrorism.

India’s options in this direction are multiple and diverse in application ranging from covert operations to overt limited actions by the Indian military. India also has strong diplomatic bargaining power with Pakistan’s three patrons mentioned above in view of the changed global strategic environment. India needs to hone up its military capabilities so that India’s military capabilities-in being could act as a strong dissuasive factor which the Pakistan Army can ill-ignore.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that with Pakistan Army unwilling to discard terrorism as an instrument of State-policy, an attitude fostered by decades of Indian political leadership’s timidity and succumbing to US pressures, the time has come for India to adopt strong and determined postures and actions against Pakistan Army, singularly. Indian public opinion has so far been long ignored in willing to support any Indian Governments strong ripostes in response to Pakistani terrorism.

* Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

The post Pakistan Unlikely To Discard Terrorism As Instrument Of State Policy Post-Peshawar Attack? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Salma Malik*

The year is about to end, and keeping true to tradition, it is time for reflection and recollection. However bad the situation may become, the end of year holds an optimism that the coming year would prove better than the previous. 2014 began on a positive note despite the cross-border firings, as India headed for elections.

Although Narendra Modi’s election as the Indian prime minister did not come as a surprise, his garnering of the massive mandate was beyond expectation. Ironically, the election was highly reminiscent of the 2013 Pakistan general elections that brought former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif back into power through a massive mandate. In both cases, the heavy mandates had a lot to do with absence of a strong alternative and the anti-incumbency sentinment more than anything else. Both elections also brought a daring third option, where in India’s case, the Aam Aadmi Party couldn’t defeat the established political vote base, and in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf has been on a justice-seeking mission for the past several months, with sit-ins and marches across the country. However, in Pakistan, Modi’s campaigning and election to office was closely watched, and has been interpreted differently by different stakeholders.

On one hand, he has been alleged to be the architect of the 2002 Gujarat riots and as a result of his personal beliefs, views, ideological and party affiliations, is not viewed as someone who can deliver peace. This viewpoint gains further credence with his election manifesto that was heavily anti-Pakistan; spoke of the revision of Article 370 of the Indian constitution pertaining to Kashmir’s special status; reviewing of India’s nuclear doctrine with the possibility of the adoption of no NFU clause.

The second school of thought, though cautious, was more amiable to the idea of Modi being voted in specifically due to his economic vision and development agenda – and thus interpreted that he would not disturb the economic cart by engaging in conflict; rather he may actually be able to offer trade and commercial cooperation.

A possible third group was the nonchalant, indifferent category that seems to have given up on the re-engagement option. They believe Modi is for India alone and his coming to power will have no effect on the India-Pakistan situation. Finally, there is the ‘silver lining’ category, comprising compulsive optimists. To them, if anyone can deliver peace, it’s Narendra Modi, and this is the strategic window of opportunity available to both sides to make or break.

All four are partially correct. Without doubt, this definitely is the right time, and even if New Delhi finds this clichéd, in contrast to Islamabad, the former holds the potential to call the shots – both for the better or worse. A peace offering which is substantive enough to alter the conflict spectrum will not come cheap, and will definitely extract a price. However in comparison to Pakistan, India is relatively better-positioned both domestically and otherwise to be in the driving seat. The window of opportunity is strategic, given how both Sharif and Modi have a common economic vision.

There is also a strong constituency that believes in economic engagement and increased connectivity and doing away with unnecessary red tapes vis-à-vis cross-border interaction. Modi enjoys a strong mandate and is not only opening to all countries (except Pakistan) but wants to create a legacy of his own. Can an amicable settlement of relatively minor disputes such as Siachen and Sir Creek help create that space?

Afghanistan too is, for the moment, enjoying a smooth transitional path, especially in terms of security, even if it is externally backed. How long does the “unity government” stay united depends on how prudently both Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah decide their nominees and team. Afghanistan may not be the best proxy field for its eastern neighbors to settle scores. Perhaps it is simplistic to state, but the resumption of cross LoC firing and its geographical scope expanding to the working boundary should be seen as a substitute and viable alternative to open conventional hostilities.

Many argue that these violations are routine and nothing extraordinary. While it’s a true estimation, if contextualised under current circumstances, they represent an aggressive, dismissive and proactive India, which at the sub-conventional level, is sending appropriate signals to Islamabad. Will Islamabad adopt an alarmist approach to any and all anti-Pakistan statements issued by Modi and his team? Should the 44 plus formula and the revision of Article 370 not be dismissed as a paranoia, as the US insists? If there is a constitutional change in the status of Kashmir, can we afford to ignore the trigger-happy gun-toting non-state actors who are always on a look out for a new conflict?

Does this imply the proactive doctrine initiating in response to the proverbial Mumbai 2.0? If this be the case, then the pessimists have won. However, one thing is certain, that for the moment, Modi has not developed a policy to engage with Pakistan. One can only hope that that happens sooner than later, as the optimists feel that only the current set-up, given its strengths and capacity to implement change enjoys that strategic window of opportunity. Otherwise, not only will the peace process remain stalemated, but with passage of time, erode peace constituencies.

The recently-concluded SAARC summit demonstrated broad smiles, strong handshakes and applauses from the interested audience. If taken seriously, through the looking glass of 2015, in the alternate universe, SAARC performs in real terms; South Asia is a prosperous region, with high development and growth rankings instead of dismal governance indicators. From Afghanistan to Bangladesh there is increased interconnectivity, and together, the leaders seek a vision of prosperity.

*Salma Malik
Assistant professor, Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University

The post India-Pakistan Relations In 2015: Through A Looking Glass – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ana Quintana*

On Tuesday, December 16, President Obama announced that the U.S. would begin to normalize relations with Cuba. This dramatic policy shift follows the release of American aid worker Alan Gross, who was held hostage for over five years by Castro’s regime, in exchange for three Cuban spies.

Choosing to normalize relations with a regime whose chief export has been an aggressive anti-American foreign policy will not advance U.S. interests, let alone facilitate a democratic transition on the island. With the pending economic collapse of Venezuela—Cuba’s primary benefactor—the regime would have lost its main revenue source and, ultimately, its ability to govern under communism. Furthermore, by deciding to normalize relations, the President has justified the regime’s aggression during the Cold War, mass murder, brutal torture, and fomenting of Leftist insurgencies throughout Latin America and Africa.

The Forces Behind a Drastic Policy Shift

Following almost two years of behind-the-scenes negotiations, the Obama Administration traded three Cuban spies for the release of American aid worker Alan Gross; Cuban Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, a U.S. intelligence asset; and the regime’s promise to release 53 political prisoners. Alan Gross was arrested and given a 15-year sentence for bringing telecoms to the disenfranchised Jewish community in Cuba. For over five years, the Castro regime held Gross hostage, using him as leverage against the U.S.

The three Cuban spies who were released were part of a five-man spy network sent to the U.S. to infiltrate U.S. military installations and spy on the exile community. Part of their work contributed to the shooting down of U.S. rescue planes over international waters and deaths of American citizens in 1996.

In the past few years, the regional governments in Latin America have protested Cuba’s exclusion from multilateral organizations and the U.S. embargo. Criticism has increased in recent months, mainly because of the strong insistence that Cuba attend the upcoming 2015 Summit of the Americas. Cuba’s two-decade-long exclusion from the summits has been based upon the country’s clear violation of the summit’s principle tenants: democracy and free trade.[1] Indeed, as recently as September, the State Department insisted it would not support Cuba’s attendance because it does not meet the Summit of the America’s qualifications.[2]

Concessions to Castro

Through executive action, the President will soon be providing Castro’s regime with much needed revenue. Numerous aspects of America’s relationship with Cuba are set to change, but the most consequential for the U.S. are:

1. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, including the establishment of an embassy and the appointment of an ambassador;
2. The adjustment of Department of Treasury and Commerce regulations governing trade and travel, including a change in remittance levels, which have been raised from $500 to $2,000 per quarter;
3. The loosening of existing regulations that previously limited travel to only 12 specific categories;
4. The allowance of commercial transactions and increased access to technology between U.S. businesses and private entrepreneurs on the island; and
5. A review of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

It is important to note that the President has not lifted the economic embargo and cannot do so without congressional authorization.

Implications for the United States

The U.S. will gain nothing from these policy changes and stands to be adversely affected. Unlike the President has led many to believe, normalizing relations, allowing for more tourism, increasing “commercial transactions,” and allowing “access to technology” will not lead to a transition away from Castroism. In fact, over 100 countries have normalized relations with the island, as well as free-flowing trade—none of which has benefited the Cuban people or the U.S. Furthermore, the average Cuban will still not be able to interact with Americans visiting the island, as no Cuban national is allowed to visit the tourist areas. According to the Cuban Law of Protection of National Independence and the Cuban Economy, contact between tourists and a foreigner remains criminalized.[3] Entrepreneurs are virtually nonexistent and owning a private business is a privilege determined by the regime. Access to technology is limited because Cuba is a police state, where online and phone communications are heavily censored.

Congress should note that in the President’s plan remittances can, and will, end up in the hands of government officials and members of the Communist party. Not only does the regime tax remittances at 20 percent, but the new regulations state that restrictions on remittances are against only “certain officials of the government or the Communist party.”[4]

In allowing for commercial transactions, the President has put Americans in danger. He has offered no plan for how to protect American businesses on the island. Canada, which has long shared warm relations with Cuba, has been unable to release a Canadian businessman incarcerated on the island. Nor have they been able to recover the over $100 million in assets seized from him by the Cuban government.[5]

What Should Congress Do?

Congress cannot sit by and allow these reforms to be implemented. Considering the Iranian nuclear negotiations in play, the Obama Administration is setting a dangerous precedent through unilateral concessions. Congress must:

• Uphold the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. Following the Cuban military’s downing of American rescue planes, the LIBERTAD Act strengthened international sanctions. Only with congressional authority—and only when the Cuban government demonstrates a genuine commitment toward democracy—should it be lifted.
• Deny funding for an embassy in Cuba and withhold confirmation of ambassadors. No money should be appropriated to either establish a new embassy or convert the existing Interests Section in Havana into one.
• Actively support human rights and a democratic transition through democracy promotion assistance. The U.S. should not end its long tradition of supporting Cuba’s democrats, human rights activists, dissidents, and nongovernmental organizations. As proven by the democratic movements in Eastern Europe and South Africa, the most successful such organizations follow this model of transition.

Getting Back on the Right Path

Normalized relations with Cuba should not be the result of unilateral concessions by the United States. Rather, conditions should be placed on the Cuban government to demonstrate a real commitment to a democratic transition.

The U.S.’s economic embargo was the result of the Castros’ aggressive actions. The island’s self-imposed isolation should continue regardless of pressure from Latin American governments. For the Castro regime, normalization is the ultimate coup. For the rest of America’s enemies, it is confirmation that, under President Obama, anything is possible.

About the author:
* Ana Quintana is a Research Associate for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published here by The Heritage Foundation.

Reference:
[1] “Declaration of Principles,” First Summit of the Americas, December 1994, http://www.summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm (accessed December 19, 2014).

[2] Jen Psaki, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, September 2, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/09/231216.htm#ISIL (accessed December 19, 2014).

[3] Stephen Johnson, “Time for Consensus on Cuba,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1579, August 30, 2002, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/08/time-for-consensus-on-cuba.

[4] The White House, “Fact Sheet: Charting a New Course on Cuba,” December 17, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/fact-sheet-charting-new-course-cuba (accessed December 22, 2014).

[5] “Canadian Businessman Gets 15-Year Prison Sentence in Cuba,” Capitol Hill Cubans, September 28, 2014, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2014/09/canadian-businessman-gets-15-year.html (accessed December 19, 2014).

The post How Congress Should Respond To Obama’s Radical Change In Cuba Policy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China is in the midst of its second ‘cultural revolution’ in a half century. While the first (under Chairman Mao Tse Tung) was intended to ‘revitalize socialism’; the current is directed to ‘moralizing’ capitalism.

The first CR was a frontal attack on the hierarchy of power and privilege inside and outside of the Communist Party, launched from above by Mao Tse Tung, but taken up from below by Red Guards in order to bring about a more egalitarian society.

The current ‘cultural revolution’, launched by President Xi Jinping, is directed at ending widespread corruption, theft and pillage of the Chinese economy and society by high and low officials in government and the capitalist sector.

The two cultural revolutions are linked by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who officially put closure on the first and set in motion the policies and slogans (“Getting Rich is Good!”), necessitating a second cultural revolution three decades later.

The Socio-Economic Roots of the Cultural Revolution Today

Deng’s call to ‘get rich’ was directed at the Communist Party elite, their family, friends and overseas backers; it was an open invitation to the multi-nationals of the world to freely exploit China’s resources, infrastructure and labor – educated, nurtured and organized through the collective efforts of the preceding Communist regime. Deng ‘liberated’- or privatized – the means of production and rapidly turned public control and appropriation of earnings over to emerging private capitalists. The corollary was the elimination of all social rights, benefits and protections of labor. The dual incentives were designed to maximize private profits in order to attract long-term, large-scale investments and to achieve high growth in the shortest time possible. Deng telescoped a century of growth and exploitation into a few decades.

His strategy succeeded.

Profits soared. By the late 1980’s and early 1990’s millionaires multiplied like mushrooms after a downpour. Then came the billionaires. Aided and abetted by the wholesale privatization of lucrative industries and public lands, a new class of real estate speculators and so-called ‘developers’ emerged , closely linked to corrupt local municipal, regional and national state officials. Millions of peasants were dispossessed and barely (if ever) compensated; hundreds of millions of workers were employed at starvation wages without the free housing, medical care, education, recreational benefits and lifetime employment of the past, socialist system.

China’s GNP exploded at a double-digit rate for three decades – an unprecedented performance. Most of the profits circulated among a narrow elite of party – state officials and capitalists, while a smaller share ‘trickled down’ to middle and low level functionaries. The seizure of public wealth, followed by three decades of intense exploitation of labor and the private land grabbing of farmland and homesteads, spurred the boom in real estate profits and laid the basis for all pervasive and large-scale corruption .The pillage of the public treasury led to large-scale conspicuous consumption – of imported luxury goods, multi-tiered mansions in gated communities, multiple purchases of luxury condos for offspring, mistresses and bribe-takers and givers.

By the mid 2000’s the concentration of wealth, property and privilege had reached astronomical heights: hundreds of billions accrued to the top 2%, millions to the top 10%, and hundreds of thousands to the top 15% – the self-styled ‘middle class’ who thrived on lesser but equally pervasive corruption and theft and who aped the elite and imitated their life style of luxury consumerism.

Beginning in the mid-2000s, hundreds of strikes by exploited factory workers demanded and secured higher wages; millions of households, farmers and peasants fought against municipal party officials, linked to real estate capitalists, who were attempting to ‘grab’ their land, homes and neighborhoods. Hundreds of millions of Chinese in the countryside protested exorbitant medical and educational costs, induced by the privatized health and educational system, which had bankrupted millions of households. They quickly became aware of the luxurious private medical facilities and specialized clinics for the rich -capitalists and corrupt officials. The internal migrant workers, who built the hyper-luxury condos and mansions, lived in paper shacks, far from the twelve-course banquets celebrating the ‘grand openings’ by business swindlers and ‘bought officials’. As wealth grew among the elite, so did the people’s hostility and rejection of the Party and the State, which they personified.

The ever-cautious klepto-capitalists and public pillagers, fearing for their illicit fortunes, smuggled out enormous wealth. Big swindlers, with big fortunes engaged in massive money laundering while publicly demanding the ‘de-regulation” of the financial sector (i.e. to make it easier to launder and hide their fortunes in overseas accounts). Between 2005-2011 China hemorrhaged over $2.83 trillion in illegal overseas financial outflows.

Part II: The Consequences of Corruption, Pillage and Exploitation

The illicit flow of Chinese wealth overseas resulted from the elite’s savage and illegal exploitation of labor (failure to meet minimum official standards concerning pay, work safety, child labor, excessive hours) .Wealth from bribes, kickbacks on government contracts, speculation on illicit seizures of land, and making false invoices overpricing imports and underpricing exports, flowed upward and outward. While China was profiting from double-digit growth the regime could ‘tolerate’ corruption and illicit outflows. However, by the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, when China’s economy de-accelerated to about 7 – 7.5%, the regime became less tolerant of wholesale corruption accompanied by capital flight.

Moreover, the new billionaires, millionaires and affluent middle class indulged in what Thorsten Veblen described as “conspicuous consumption”, the purchase and ostentatious display of superfluous luxury products as status symbols of “success”. According to a Special Report on “Luxury” in the Economist (12/13/14, p.8 -10) “nearly one-third of all personal luxury goods sold worldwide are bought by Chinese consumers.” Since the global crises of 2009, 70 – 80% of global growth in the (luxury) sector has come from China.

China’s emerging private-public ruling class has advanced from concentrating wealth, to consolidating political power to seeking prestige and social status – recognition from their domestic and foreign peers. Ideologically, they are decidedly neo-liberal and pro-Western – as evidenced by the billions they spend in the top-end real estate markets of North America, Europe and Australia as well as the millions they spend on their pampered offspring for ‘elite’ private education. Theirchildren live in half-million dollar condos in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Oxford and Cambridge (England), Toronto and Vancouver (Canada), Sydney and Melbourne Australia. The Chinese oligarchs “make the market” for six-figure Swiss watches, five figure handbags and four digit French cognac.

Corruption, conspicuous consumption and class polarization has delegitimized the ruling Communist Party elite in the eyes of the great mass of the Chinese working class, as well as the professionals and salaried employees who make-up the lower middle class.

The ‘political rot’- the privileged social networks derived from kinship ties-is leading to a relative closed ruling class – excluding the mass of urban workers and rural peasants, with potentially explosive social consequences.

Already thousands of local protests, strikes and other forms of direct action occur every year, even as they are repressed or resolved.

In addition to the social and political dangers resulting from the massive illegal, ‘squandering and theft of wealth’, the illicit outflow of wealth is undermining domestic investment and productive overseas investments, and corruption is preparing the way for stagnation and financial crisis.

The stars are lining up for a ‘perfect political storm’ – which has unfolded in the form of President Xi Jingping’s launch of China’s second cultural revolution (CR).

Xi Jingping’s Cultural Revolution

From the start of the 2nd CR in 2012 to mid-2014, the Chinese Communist Party’s internal corruption body has prosecuted and punished 270,000 cadres. That figure includes both the “tigers” (high officials) and the “flies” (low level functionaries). “Over three dozen officials with ranks of ministers or above, including former security Tsar and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang”, have been arrested and jailed (Financial Times 12/4/14, p. 4). Earlier, the former Railways Minister was arrested and sentenced to death for rigging contracts worth about $26 billion dollars over his seven-year tenure. Hundreds of thousands of private business people, paying bribes, have been arrested and sentenced.

President Xi’s campaign has attacked bribes, ‘gift giving’, frequent ostentatious banquets serving expensive delicacies, and high Party officials’ lodging in five star hotels for weeks on end, ostensibly “tending to business”, but more frequently ‘cavorting with their mistresses’.

To be precise, President Xi is attacking the triple evils of corruption, conspicuous consumption, and pillage of public wealth. The new austerity agenda and the public revelations of ill-gained wealth are focused on exposing public officials and private business people in order to regain public legitimacy. And it is succeeding,…. as far as it goes. Public indignation at the revelations is matched by high approval for the Xi leadership’s anti –corruption campaign.

What makes this far more than just a “power struggle among privileged elites” as the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times have routinely claimed, are: 1. the duration of the campaign of over 2 years, 2. the scope of the campaign, covering top officials and Chinese business equivalents of Wall Street moguls, 3. The nature of the punishment including long prison terms and even death sentences (rather than the mere ‘slap on the wrists and paltry fines’ that US regulators have given to Wall Street’s billion-dollar swindlers), and 4. the ongoing nature of the process. The sweep and magnitude of Xi’s campaign has all the makings of a ‘cultural revolution’ – not the episodic ‘blowing off steam’ or ‘scapegoating of rivals’ described in the Western press.

The Nature of Xi’s Cultural Revolution

Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is directed and driven from above – established legal authorities are in charge – the masses are excluded, and preemptory justice is eschewed: regular court proceedings decide guilt and sentencing.

Secondly, Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ does not, in any way or place, call into question capitalist property relations, foreign investors, or large-scale inflows and outflows of investment or legally registered speculative capital. Nor has Xi called into question existing capital-labor relations.

Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is an attempt to sanitize existing capitalist relations, and to infuse a new capitalist ethic. He wants to ‘revise’ Deng’s famous precept “Getting Rich is Good” to read “Get Rich Lawfully . . . or Face Jail”. China is rated number 100 out of 175, on a corruption scale published by Transparency in 2014 (Financial Times 12/4/14, p. 4). Xi’s war on corruption is based on the premise that corruption undermines China’s status as a global power – it ranks with Algeria and Surinam. Secondly, Xi hopes that he can ‘reform’ the public sector in order to privatize it and he wants the sale to go to the highest bidder, not the biggest bribe giver.

His campaign attacks privileged elites, who accumulate and dispose of wealth illegally but he has never sought to diminish the class system, the hierarchy and inequalities which concentrate political power and forms the basis of corrupt bribe giving and taking.

Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is continuing and corruption may lessen. Ostentatious public spending is declining. But this layer of ‘new morality’ is spread thinly over a system of power that can easily revert to the ‘old system’ once the ‘revolution’ ends.

Xi’s noteworthy ‘cultural revolution’, the moralization of public administration and private capitalism, can only succeed if it is accompanied by a social transformation: ethics at the service of social justice and equality and by a democratization of the economic decision-making process. The problem is that Xi, by family, social ties and political allegiances is deeply embedded in a milieu which absolutely rejects any such ‘deepening’ of Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’.

His cultural revolution is strictly guided by a singular objective: to force ‘morality’ on the ‘captains of capital’ in order to facilitate the smooth transition to fully liberalizing China’s economy. President Xi, along with his anti-corruption campaign, is steadily loosening state control over foreign financial investments in Chinese stocks and financial sector; he is moving strongly to expand China’s overseas investments; he is accelerating the privatization of public enterprises and increasingly opening financial services to Wall Street and the City of London. He is also internationalizing the use of the yuan-the Chinese currency- in global transactions, displacing the dollar.

In other words, his cultural revolution is a bridge to a new stage of Chinese capitalist expansion; it will lessen the crude open plunder of the public treasury, but it will not lessen the exploitation of labor nor slow the increasing concentration of wealth and privilege. That will require a different kind of ‘cultural’ revolution- one led from below by workers, peasants and salaried employees. A real ‘cultural revolution’ that realizes the ethical ideals of ‘good government’ through a transformation of class relations.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign confirms what many workers already knew – but it also unmasks the systemic decay and forges an elementary class consciousness: counter-posing honest, hardworking workers to corrupt privileged oligarchs. Xi is aware of the danger that his campaign could ignite a popular fire: That is why he has kept a tight hold on the process. He is trying to navigate the liberal capitalist transition around the shoals of existing capitalist rot without arousing mass unrest.

The post China’s Second ‘Cultural Revolution’ – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Three months since the disappearance of 43 students in Ayotzinapa, Mexico, the parents of the missing students have called on Pope Francis to address the issue during the December 24 Mass to demand an increase in the efforts of the Mexican government to finding their children, reports MISNA.

The Apostolic Nuncio to Mexico, Christophe Pierre, celebrated mass today at the “Isdro Burgos” Rural Normal teaching College, expressing the support of the Catholic church for the families of the students.

In a private meeting, the parents consigned to Monsignor Pierre a letter for the Pope, reports MISNA, adding that the representative of the parents of the missing students, Felipe de la Cruz, said, “We asked to convey our message of grief to the Pope and an intervention of his Holiness on Christmas night”.

The students disappeared on September 26 after being impeded from participating in a protest over workers rights. The theory of investigators, confirmed by multiple witnesses, is that the students were attacked by police and then assassinated by members of a criminal gang.

The post Mexico: Parents Of Missing Students Call For Intervention Of Pope appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US stock market hit a historic milestone on Tuesday, following an announcement that the country’s economy grew five percent between the months of July and October ‒ its fastest pace in over a decade.

On Tuesday, the Commerce Department revised its third quarter gross domestic product (GDP) estimate upwards, citing stronger consumer and business spending than previously assumed. It was the fastest pace since the third quarter of 2003.

“Our economy is firing on most cylinders, whereas the global economy is essentially in dire need of a spark,” Ryan Sweet, a senior economist at Moody’s Analytics, told Reuters.

Previously, the economy was reported to have expanded at a 3.9 percent annual rate. The growth has now been revised up by a total of 1.5 percentage points since an initial estimate in October.

The government’s latest third-quarter GDP estimate rose “for all the right reasons, notably stronger domestic demand,” Diane Swonk, chief economist at Mesirow Financial, wrote in a blog post. “Indeed, depending on the outcome for the fourth quarter, growth for the year could now surpass 2.5 percent, which is much better than anyone expected just a month ago.”

The economy has been benefiting from sinking energy prices. Gas prices have fallen for 88 straight days, according to AAA, the longest consecutive decline on record. This has freed up money for Americans to spend on other items – including cars, clothes, and appliances, the Associated Press reported.

Much of the third quarter growth came from consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of US economic activity. Consumer spending grew at an annual pace of 3.2 percent heading into the holiday season – the fastest rate since the fourth quarter of 2013.

“After four years of rocky recovery the US economy is now hitting its stride, with a notable acceleration in growth in recent quarters,” said Gus Faucher, senior economist at PNC Financial Services Group. “And growth should remain good next year, with lower gasoline prices a big plus for consumers.”

The government report on the state of the US economy sent stocks soaring to record levels. It came after last week’s announcement that the Federal Reserve would be “patient” in deciding when to raise rates, because the economy wasn’t yet fully healthy. On Tuesday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average topped 18,000 at the opening bell for the first time in history.

“The market was roaring yesterday, and going into the end of the year it keeps pushing higher,” Stephen Carl, principal and head equity trader at New York-based Williams Capital Group LP, said in a phone interview with Bloomberg on Tuesday. “The Fed is part of the fueling of everything, and you have to couple that with the year-end push.”

The unexpected growth rate could escalate pressure on the central bank to raise interest rates, which have remained near zero since 2008. Inflation remains well below the Fed’s two percent target ‒ the inflation gauge it most closely monitors has risen just 1.2 percent over the past 12 months ‒ so the central bank has been trying to “raise inflation from excessively low levels,” AP reported.

The Commerce Department also released a report on ‘Non-defense Capital Goods Excluding Aircraft,’ which is a closely watched proxy for business spending plans. Those orders were unchanged in November after a decline of 1.9 percent in October.

But economists – who had expected a strong rebound – largely shrugged off the data, which was at odds with sturdy readings on industrial production and fairly upbeat factory surveys, Reuters reported.

“We think this report paints an unrealistically bad picture of the current orders environment and payback is likely,” said Tim Quinlan, an economist at Wells Fargo Securities.

The only major sector where the economy hasn’t been hot is real estate. The Commerce Department reported that sales of new single-family homes fell 1.6 percent from October – well below estimates of a small increase.

The post US Stock Market Rises On Strong Economic Growth appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Globally active Gauselmann Group, one of the “world’s leading gaming companies”, has expressed regret and announced the removal of its Hindu god Shiva themed slot gambling game titled “Shiva”, after upset Hindus protested calling it highly inappropriate.

Paul Gauselmann, Chairman of Espelkamp (Germany) headquartered Gauselmann AG, in a signed letter to Hindu statesman Rajan Zed (who spearheaded the protest) received in Nevada (USA) on December 23, wrote: “We understand the confusion and irritation concerning this…Therefore, we will immediately remove this game from our games portfolio and no longer offer this. At no point in time did we have the intention to insult the religious or ideological feelings of Hindus. We truly regret the confusion this has caused and you may rest assured that we will be even more diligent concerning the design and the designation of our games in the future.”

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, in a statement in Nevada today, thanked Gauselmann AG and its Chairman Paul Gauselmann for understanding the concerns of worldwide Hindu community, which thought usage of Lord Shiva on slot gambling game was highly inappropriate.

Rajan Zed suggested multinational corporations to send their senior executives for training in religious and cultural sensitivity so that they had an understanding of the feelings of customers and communities when creating new products or launching advertising campaigns. If asked, he or other Hindu scholars would gladly assist, Zed added.

Zed, in an earlier statement, had indicated that Lord Shiva, who was highly revered in Hinduism, was meant to be worshipped in temples or home shrines and not for promoting gambling on slots for mercantile greed of an international company. Inappropriate usage of Hindu deities or concepts for commercial or other agenda was not okay as it hurt the devotees, Zed pointed out.

Christian (United Church of Christ pastor Reverend Richard L. Smith), Buddhist (Jikai’ Phil Bryan) and Jewish (Rabbi ElizaBeth W. Beyer) leaders had also come out to the support of protesting Hindus on this issue.

Symbols of any faith, larger or smaller, should not be mishandled, Rajan Zed had noted.

Developed by Merkur Division of Gauselmann Group, “Shiva” slot gambling machine showed a blue four-armed Lord Shiva with dark red lips carrying damru in one hand. This five-reels and 50 win-lines gambling machine, besides Lord Shiva symbol (which substituted all symbols) also showed symbols of cobra, Taj Mahal, monkey, etc. “Step into the realm of the god Shiva and experience an exciting adventure!” website announcement said. It could be played live on various online casinos.

In Hinduism, Lord Shiva, along with Lord Brahma and Lord Vishnu, forms the great triad of Hindu deities. Moksh (liberation) is the ultimate goal of Hinduism.

The post Germany’s Gauselmann Removes ‘Shiva’ Slot Gambling Game After Hindus Protest appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The following is a joint statement by Dr. William A. Donohue, President, Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights and Rabbi Aryeh Spero, President, Caucus For America

We extend our heartfelt condolences to the grieving families of Officer Wenjian Liu and Officer Rafael Ramos, and express our continued support for the NYPD, America’s finest police force, a fair one, upon whose independence and physical security our safety depends.

We are distressed by the incendiary remarks made over the last few weeks by Al Sharpton, and the threats and chants coming from protesters against police, which have resulted in a hate-filled atmosphere that people of foresight understood could result in violence against police officers and other forms of destruction.

We equally are disappointed by some elected officials within the highest echelons of government who have made statements over the past several weeks that have sown resentment, discontent, and feelings of revenge against the police and our jury system. Such remarks were subtly, but intentionally, expressed to convey that minorities are victims of an unfair system stacked against them, that minorities have no recourse, and that America’s police forces are often guided by racism and hostile attitudes. The rhetoric of these officials has been irresponsible and provocative.

The American people, a fundamentally good and fair people, do not need Mr. Sharpton and others pontificating to us, continually chastising us and telling us who we are and what our values should be.

We urge the White House to stop using Al Sharpton as a spokesman and partner. His past agitations have hurt many good and innocent people.

The post We Support Our NYPD And Condemn The Agitators – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Defying a consensus that it is a priority by the world community comprising international rivals like the United States, Europe, Russia and China and regional rivals like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Israel, like Turkey, does not eye the U.S. – led war on the IS as its regional priority. Nor fighting Israel is an IS priority.

The Israeli top priority is to dictate its terms to Syria to sign a peace treaty with Israel before withdrawing its forces from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, Palestinian territories and Lebanese southern lands.

For this purpose, Israel is determined to break down the Syria – Iran alliance, which has been the main obstacle preventing Israel from realising its goals. Changing the ruling regime in either Damascus or Tehran would be a step forward. Towards this Israeli strategic goal the IS could not be but an Israeli asset.

“To defeat ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria as the IS was previously known) and leave Iran as a threshold nuclear power is to win the battle and lose the war,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the UN General Assembly last September.

Therefore, “it should not come as a surprise that the (Benjamin) Netanyahu government has not yet taken any immediate steps against IS,” according to Amos Harel, writing in Foreign Policy on September 15.

However, information is already surfacing that Israel is “taking steps” in the opposite direction, to empower the IS and other terrorist groups fighting and infighting in Syria.

Israeli daily Haaretz on last October 31 quoted a “senior Northern Command officer” as saying that the U.S. – led coalition “is making a big mistake in fighting against ISIS … the United States, Canada and France are on the same side as Hezbollah, Iran and [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad. That does not make sense.”

Regardless, on September 8 Israeli daily The Jerusalem Post reported that Israel has provided “satellite imagery and other information” to the coalition. Three days later Netanyahu said at a conference in Herzliya: “Israel fully supports President [Barack] Obama’s call for united actions against ISIS … We are playing our part in this continued effort. Some of the things are known; some of the things are less known.”

Obama’s call was the green light for Israel to support Syrian and non- Syrian rebels. Syrian official statements claim that Israel has been closely coordinating with the rebels.

Israeli statements claim theirs is confined to “humanitarian” support to “moderate” Syrian opposition, which the U.S. has already pledged to train and arm in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. A significant portion of the $64 billion earmarked for conflicts abroad in the budget legislation signed by Obama on December 19 will go to these “moderates.”

Both Israel and the U.S. have no headaches about whether the “moderates” would remain as such after being armed with lethal weapons or whether it remains appropriate to call them “opposition.”

But the Israeli “humanitarian” claim is challenged by the fact that Israel is the only neighbouring country which still closes its doors to Syrian civilian refugees while keeping its doors wide open to the wounded rebels who are treated in Israeli hospitals and allowed to return to the battle front after recovery.

IS close to Israeli borders

The Israeli foreign ministry on last September 3 confirmed that the U.S. journalist Steven Sotloff whom the IS had beheaded was an Israeli citizen as well. In a speech addressed to Sotloff’s family, Netanyahu condemned the IS as a “branch” of a “poisonous tree” and a “tentacle” of a “violent Islamist terrorism.”

On the same day Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon officially outlawed the IS and anyone associating with it.

On September 10, Netanyahu convened an urgent security meeting to prepare for the possible danger of the IS advancing closer to the Israeli border, a prospect confirmed by the latest battles for power between the IS and the al – Nusra Front on the southern Syrian – Lebanese borders and in southern Syria, within the artillery range of Israeli forces.

On November 9, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM), which has been operating against the Egyptian army, released an audio clip pledging allegiance to the IS to declare later the first IS Wilayah (province) in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, south of Israel.

On last November 14 The Israeli Daily quoted Netanyahu as saying in a private defense meeting that the IS is “currently operating out of Lebanon … close to Israel’s northern border. We must take this as a serious threat.”

However, “in truth, as most of Israel’s intelligence community has been quick to point out, there are no signs that anything of the sort is actually happening,” according to Amos Harel, writing in Foreign Policy five days later.

Moshe Ya’alon told journalists in September that “the organization operates far from Israel” and thus presents no imminent threat. Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery, on November 14, wrote: “The present and former generals who shape Israel’s policy can only smile when this ‘danger’ is mentioned.”

Israel “certainly does not see the group as an external threat” and the “Islamic State also does not yet pose an internal threat to Israel,” according to Israeli journalist and Associate Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Dimi Reider, writing in a Reuters blog on last October 21.

What Netanyahu described as a “serious threat” in the north does not yet dictate any Israeli action against it because “we must assume that Hizballah,” which is allied to Syria and Iran, “does not have its house in order,” according to the Israeli premier.

The presence of the IS Wilayah on its southern border with Egypt is preoccupying the country with an internal bloody anti-terror conflict that would prevent any concrete Egyptian contribution to the stabilization of the Arab Levant or support to the Palestinians in their struggle to end the Israeli occupation of their land, let alone the fact that this presence is already pitting Egypt against Israel’s archenemy, Hamas, in the Palestinian Gaza Strip and creating a hostile environment that dictates closer Egyptian – Israeli security coordination.

Therefore, Israel is not going to “interfere” because “these are internal issues of the countries where it is happening.” Israel is “informally … ready to render assistance, but not in a military way and not by joining the (U.S. – led) coalition” against the IS, according to the deputy head of the Israeli embassy in Moscow, Olga Slov, as quoted by Russian media on November 14.

Jordan is another story

However, Israel’s eastern neighbours in Jordan and Syria seem another story.

“Jordan feels threatened by IS. We will cooperate with them one way or another,” ambassador Slov said. Jordanian media has been reporting that more than 2000 Jordanians had already joined al-Qaeda splinter the IS, al-Qaeda’s branch al-Nusra Front or other rebels who are fighting for an “Islamic” state in Syria. Hundreds of them were killed by the Syrian Arab Army.

The Daily Beast on last June 27 quoted Thomas Sanderson, the co-director for transnational threats at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as saying that Israel considers the survival of Jordan as “a paramount national security objective.”

If Jordan requested Israeli assistance in protecting its borders, Israel would have “little choice” but to help, the Beast quoted the director of the Israeli National Security Council, Yaakov Amidror, as saying.

As a precaution measure, Israel is building now a 500-kilometre “security fence” on its border with Jordan.

While Israel is willing and getting ready to “interfere” in Jordan, it is already deeply interfering in Syria, where the real battle has been raging for less than four years now against terrorists led by the IS.

A few weeks ago The Associated Press reported that the IS and the al-Nusra had concluded an agreement to stop fighting each other and cooperate on destroying the U.S. – trained and supported rebels (The Syrian Revolutionaries Front and the Hazm movement) as well as the Syrian government forces in northern Syria.

But in southern Syria all these and other terrorist organizations are coordinating among themselves and have what Lt. Col. Peter Lerner, a spokesman for the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) called “a gentleman’s agreement” with Israel across the border, according to Colum Lynch in Foreign Policy on June 11.

Last October, Al-Qaeda branch in Syria, al-Nusra, was among the rebel groups which overtook the only border crossing of Quneitra between Syria and the Israeli – occupied Golan Heights. Israel has yet to demonstrate its objection.

“Many Sunnis in Iraq and the Gulf consider ISIS a bullet in their rifles aimed at Shiite extremism, in their bid to restore their lost standing,” Raghida Dergham, a columnist and a senior diplomatic correspondent for the London – based Arabic Al-Hayat daily, wrote in the Huffington Post on September 19.

A political public agreement between Israel and the Gulf Arabs has developed on a mutual understanding that the dismantling of the Syria – Iran alliance as a prelude to a “regime change” in both countries is the regional priority, without loosing sight of the endgame, which is to dictate peace with Israel as the regional power under the U.S. hegemony. The IS is “the bullet in their rifles.” From their perspective, the U.S. war on the IS is irrelevant, for now at least.

The post Fighting ‘Islamic State’ Is Not The Israeli Priority – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The South Asian security architecture became complex and less predictable after India carried out its first nuclear weapons test in 1974 – in a so-called Peaceful nuclear test. Since India only received a slap on the wrist, this partly emboldened New Delhi to test again in 1998 and its abstention from recent voting on the resolution that seeks a ban on future testing makes their intentions doubtful. It remains to be seen, how the international community will react if India resumes testing.

The conflict prone Indo-Pak subcontinent has witnessed an arms buildup by India that Pakistan is trying to match, and nuclear weapons have bridged that conventional military asymmetry to some extent. However, the Indian acquisition of a ballistic missile defense system, massive expenditures on satellites and Russian leased nuclear powered submarines that India is reverse engineering, are dangerous trends. The nature of strategic stability between these arch rivals could then tilt from that of deterrence to compellence, as India could have assumed a sense of enhanced power that may motivate it to coerce by taking ‘pre-emptory action’ rather than deterring Pakistan. The Western powers and other minions, who have economic or geo-strategic interests with India, unfortunately encourage this imbalance in power. This dangerous trend could push the region towards perpetual instability.

This shift in Indian policy of credible minimum deterrence is motivated by global power ambitions and has become possible because of three reasons: India’s economic rise, its narrative to project itself as a prospective counter-weight China and willingness of Beijing’s competitors to let New Delhi bid to such position. The facts are, however, a bit different. It is not necessary that India could do American and Western bidding to actually contain China. Like them, New Delhi also has huge trade interests with Beijing and there is visible economic interdependence. In this sense, China does not react to Indian provocations to consider it is a competitor.

Since, the BJP came into power, security artists in New Delhi have drafted policies for more bombs and better ways to deliver them. The shift in the Indian nuclear posture from credible minimum deterrence to that of effective deterrence is clear from the recent developments that have taken place since Modi came to power. Developments, such as flight testing of the subsonic cruise missile, Nirbhay, ICBM Agni V, super-sonic cruise missile Brahmos, Dhanush missiles, and the most controversial Indo-Australian uranium deal and recent refusal to the UN Draft resolution on NPT depicts Modi’s over–consciousness in national security. Recently, the BJP government has opted to buy $525m worth of Spike anti-tank guided missiles from Israel. Indian echoes arms imports have increased by 111% within 3 to 4 years and its weapons purchases account for about 14% of the global arms trade.

Indian domestic politics also plays a role in this policy shift. The Indian nuclear establishment creates the conditions that favor weapons acquisitions by encouraging extreme foreign threats and actively lobbying for increased defense spending. The roots of Modi’s security driven initiatives can be found in BJP’s maiden budget that overwhelmingly boosted its defense budget to 12% and foreign direct investment in domestic weapons industry has also increased to 49%.  The nuclear establishment in India has the lion’s share in the country’s defense budget and more importantly a nod from Modi in making more sophisticated missile systems – a shift to reliance on hard power.

From the developments of last three months, it can be seen that the  word minimum has lost its meaning in Indian nuclear policy of deterrence. Minimum is just a hangover of a bygone era that was only associated with an economically weak India. With newfound money and political support, India is pushing towards a more aggressive nuclear posture to deter regional adversaries. In pursuit of regional hegemony, its nuclear posture is even more aggressive than other nuclear powers. India sees its unchecked nuclear spending as a policy tool in achieving national interests. It is quite clear that, in the near future Modi’s hawkish policies and aggressive doctrinal shift will further deteriorate regional peace and stability — and Western myopia has let this happen.

The post India-Pakistan Relations: Shift From Credible Minimum Deterrence To ‘Compellence’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Forgetfulness, it turns out, is all in the head. Scientists have shown fading memory and clouding judgment, the type that comes with advancing age, show up as lost and altered connections between neurons in the brain. But new experiments suggest an existing drug, known as riluzole and already on the market as a treatment for ALS, may help prevent these changes.

Researchers at The Rockefeller University and The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai found they could stop normal, age-related memory loss in rats by treating them with riluzole. This treatment, they found, prompted changes known to improve connections, and as a result, communication, between certain neurons within the brain’s hippocampus.

“By examining the neurological changes that occurred after riluzole treatment, we discovered one way in which the brain’s ability to reorganize itself — its neuroplasticity — can be marshaled to protect it against some of the deterioration that can accompany old age, at least in rodents,” said co-senior study author Alfred E. Mirsky Professor Bruce McEwen, head of the Harold and Margaret Milliken Hatch Laboratory of Neuroendocrinology. The research was published online December 15 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Neurons connect to one another to form circuits connecting certain parts of the brain, and they communicate using a chemical signal known as glutamate. But too much glutamate can cause damage; excess can spill out and excite connecting neurons in the wrong spot. In the case of age-related cognitive decline, this process damages neurons at the points where they connect — their synapses. In neurodegenerative disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease, this contributes to the death of neurons.

Used to slow the progress of another neurodegenerative condition, ALS (also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), riluzole was an obvious choice as a potential treatment, because it works by helping to control glutamate release and uptake, preventing harmful spillover. The researchers began giving riluzole to rats once they reached 10 months old, the rat equivalent of middle age, when their cognitive decline typically begins.

After 17 weeks of treatment, the researchers tested the rats’ spatial memory — the type of memory most readily studied in animals — and found they performed better than their untreated peers, and almost as well as young rats. For instance, when placed in a maze they had already explored, the treated rats recognized an unfamiliar arm as such and spent more time investigating it.

When the researchers looked inside the brains of riluzole-treated rats, they found telling changes to the vulnerable glutamate sensing circuitry within the hippocampus, a brain region implicated in memory and emotion.

“We have found that in many cases, aging involves synaptic changes that decrease synaptic strength, the plasticity of synapses, or both,” said John Morrison, professor of neuroscience and the Friedman Brain Institute and dean of basic sciences and the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences at Mount Sinai. “The fact that riluzole increased the clustering of only the thin, most plastic spines, suggests that its enhancement of memory results from both an increase in synaptic strength and synaptic plasticity, which might explain its therapeutic effectiveness.”

In this case, the clusters involved thin spines, a rapidly adaptable type of spine. The riluzole-treated animals had more clustering than the young animals and their untreated peers, who had the least. This discovery led the researchers to speculate that, in general, the aged brain may compensate by increasing clustering. Riluzole appears to enhance this mechanism.

“In our study, this phenomenon of clustering proved to be the core underlying mechanism that prevented age-related cognitive decline. By compensating the deleterious changes in glutamate levels with aging and Alzheimer’s disease and promoting important neuroplastic changes in the brain, such as clustering of spines, riluzole may prevent cognitive decline,” said first author Ana Pereira, an instructor in clinical investigation in McEwen’s laboratory.

Taking advantage of the overlap of neural circuits vulnerable to age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease, Pereira is currently conducting a clinical trial to test the effectiveness of riluzole for patients with mild Alzheimer’s.

The post Existing Drug, Riluzole, May Prevent Foggy ‘Old Age’ Brain appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Scientists have discovered the oldest recorded stone tool ever to be found in Turkey, revealing that humans passed through the gateway from Asia to Europe much earlier than previously thought, approximately 1.2 million years ago.

According to research published in the journal Quaternary Science Reviews, the chance find of a humanly-worked quartzite flake, in ancient deposits of the river Gediz, in western Turkey, provides a major new insight into when and how early humans dispersed out of Africa and Asia.

Researchers from Royal Holloway, University of London, together with an international team from the UK, Turkey and the Netherlands, used high-precision equipment to date the deposits of the ancient river meander, giving the first accurate timeframe for when humans occupied the area.

Professor Danielle Schreve, from the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway, said, “This discovery is critical for establishing the timing and route of early human dispersal into Europe. Our research suggests that the flake is the earliest securely-dated artifact from Turkey ever recorded and was dropped on the floodplain by an early hominin well over a million years ago.”

The researchers used high-precision radioisotopic dating and palaeomagnetic measurements from lava flows, which both pre-date and post-date the meander, to establish that early humans were present in the area between approximately 1.24 million and 1.17 million years ago. Previously, the oldest hominin fossils in western Turkey were recovered in 2007 at Koçabas, but the dating of these and other stone tool finds were uncertain.

“The flake was an incredibly exciting find”, Professor Schreve said. “I had been studying the sediments in the meander bend and my eye was drawn to a pinkish stone on the surface. When I turned it over for a better look, the features of a humanly-struck artifact were immediately apparent.

“By working together with geologists and dating specialists, we have been able to put a secure chronology to this find and shed new light on the behavior of our most distant ancestors.”

The post Oldest Stone Tool Ever Found Discovered In Turkey appeared first on Eurasia Review.

When people spend time interacting with their smartphones via touchscreen, it actually changes the way their thumbs and brains work together.

At least those are the findings of a recent report in the Cell Press journal Current Biology, which notes that more touchscreen use in the recent past translates directly into greater brain activity when the thumbs and other fingertips are touched, the study shows.

“I was really surprised by the scale of the changes introduced by the use of smartphones,” said Arko Ghosh of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich in Switzerland. “I was also struck by how much of the inter-individual variations in the fingertip-associated brain signals could be simply explained by evaluating the smartphone logs.”

It all started when Ghosh and his colleagues realized that our newfound obsession with smartphones could be a grand opportunity to explore the everyday plasticity of the human brain. Not only are people suddenly using their fingertips, and especially their thumbs, in a new way, but many of them are also doing it an awful lot, day after day.

Not only that, but smartphones are also keeping track of user digital histories to provide a ready-made source of data on those behaviors.

Ghosh explains it this way: “I think first we must appreciate how common personal digital devices are and how densely people use them. What this means for us neuroscientists is that the digital history we carry in our pockets has an enormous amount of information on how we use our fingertips (and more).”

While neuroscientists have long studied brain plasticity in expert groups–musicians or video gamers, for instance–smartphones present an opportunity to understand how regular life shapes the brains of regular people.

To link digital footprints to brain activity in the new study, Ghosh and his team used electroencephalography (EEG) to record the brain response to mechanical touch on the thumb, index, and middle fingertips of touchscreen phone users in comparison to people who still haven’t given up their old-school mobile phones.

The researchers found that the electrical activity in the brains of smartphone users was enhanced when all three fingertips were touched. In fact, the amount of activity in the cortex of the brain associated with the thumb and index fingertips was directly proportional to the intensity of phone use, as quantified by built-in battery logs. The thumb tip was even sensitive to day-to-day fluctuations: the shorter the time elapsed from an episode of intense phone use, the researchers report, the larger was the cortical potential associated with it.

The results suggest to the researchers that repetitive movements over the smooth touchscreen surface reshape sensory processing from the hand, with daily updates in the brain’s representation of the fingertips. And that leads to a pretty remarkable idea: “We propose that cortical sensory processing in the contemporary brain is continuously shaped by personal digital technology,” Ghosh and his colleagues write.

What exactly this influence of digital technology means for us in other areas of our lives is a question for another day.

And there is a potential downside: Ghosh and colleagues note evidence linking excessive phone use with motor dysfunctions and pain.

The post Smartphones Are Giving Thumbs Superpowers appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Clinical trials are about to begin on a new Parkinson’s disease vaccine that could offer patients significant improvements over current treatments. The vaccine, developed through the FP7-funded SYMPATH project, may actually be able to modify disease progression, rather than simply providing symptomatic improvement.

The breakthrough could improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Parkinson’s disease is the second most common neurodegenerative disorder among the elderly; it has been estimated that there are around 1.2 million patients in Europe alone. There is currently no cure and existing therapeutic measures are only able to treat symptoms. The disease typically starts with non-motor symptoms, and progresses slowly but steadily to a debilitating state.

What is more, the provision of healthcare for the elderly has become a pressing social and economic concern. By 2025, more than 20 % of Europeans will be 65 or over, with a particularly rapid increase in the number of over 80s. An ageing population means increased incidences of physical, sensory and mental diseases. If Europe is to maintain manageable healthcare costs and ensure a decent quality of life for millions of its citizens, then diseases like Parkinson’s must be tackled.

This has been the objective of the SYMPATH project. Although therapeutic vaccines have been the subject of intensive research for neurodegenerative disorders, no concept has as yet entered into clinical practice.

The new vaccine works by targeting a specific protein called alpha-Synuclein, which plays a key role in the onset and progression of Parkinson’s as well as ‘Multiple system atrophy’ (MSA). MSA is a rare neurodegenerative disorder that progresses rapidly, usually leading to death within nine years. It is associated with the degeneration of nerve cells in specific areas of the brain, causing problems with movement and balance.

These randomised, placebo-controlled trials will be conducted in Vienna and Innsbruck, Austria. The trials aim to demonstrate the safety and tolerability of the vaccine, and researchers will also assess the vaccine’s immunological and clinical activity in vaccinated patients.

SYMPATH builds on the fact that vaccines have a particularly attractive cost-effectiveness ratio. Their protection rate is usually high, side effects are minimal, and vaccines only need to be administered a limited number of times. The cost-medical benefits ratio of a therapeutic vaccine is therefore unlikely to be met by any other form of treatment currently under development. In this way, the SYMPATH project will help to meet public health needs and contribute to the sustainability of European healthcare systems.

The start of the clinical trial comes only a year after the SYMPATH consortium was launched, reflecting the high level of cooperation achieved between the expert partners. Scheduled to run until September 2017, the project has received nearly EUR 6 million in EU funding from the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). AFFiRiS, located in Vienna, Austria, is the coordinator for the project’s ambitious research programme. Project partners include five universities and three SMEs from across Europe.

Source: CORDIS

The post Tackling Parkinson’s With Targeted Therapeutic Vaccines appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Victoria Arnold

Disputes over religious property remain unresolved in many parts of the Russian Federation, Forum 18 News Service notes, often leaving religious communities with no dedicated place of worship and having to rent unsuitable or expensive premises if they can find any.

In the capital Moscow the Society of Krishna Consciousness, for example, has lost two arbitration court cases over a unilaterally terminated land lease and the denial of building permission for a temple. The community is now appealing further and is prepared if necessary to take its case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg.

In Russia’s Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad, the Muslim community has exhausted all domestic legal avenues in its efforts to complete their nearly-built mosque, and have already appealed to the ECtHR. Kaliningrad’s Jewish community, ordered in June to halt the reconstruction of their synagogue destroyed in 1938 by the Nazis, is challenging the city administration’s denial of a building permit in the Regional Arbitration Court. In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has had its work on a Kaliningrad church legalised after the work was complete.

The acquisition and retention of places of worship has long been difficult for many religious communities. For example, a Moscow Patriarchate parish was forced out of a pre-1917 hospital church in the Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk. A recent trend is localized public opposition to the state-financed construction of new Moscow Patriarchate churches.

If communities, including Orthodox churches of different jurisdictions, seek to reclaim historical religious property, the process is rarely simple and has long been controversial. The 2010 Law on the Transfer of Religious Property to Religious Organisations has proved to be no guarantee that the restitution process will be easy or unchallenged, or indeed that religious property confiscated during the Soviet period will be returned at all.

Kaliningrad mosque

The Muslims of Kaliningrad have appealed to the ECtHR against the court decision which ruled their unfinished mosque illegal and deprived them of ownership rights, according to their lawyer Dagir Khasavov. “In Russia no hope remains of correcting this illegal judicial act”, he told Forum 18 from Moscow on 21 November.

The Muslim community has made repeated efforts since 1993 to acquire land to build a mosque. The mosque lies within a recreational area and a heritage preservation zone and construction began in 2009. The mosque was declared illegal after suits brought by a nearby museum (the Friedland Gate) and by district prosecutors “on behalf of an unspecified group of people”. Building restrictions on the land were not enacted until 2013, and did not apply when the city gave the land to the community. The authorities made no attempt to halt construction until the mosque, which has been visited by Forum 18, was about 80 per ent completed.

Kaliningrad’s Muslims continue to worship in rented premises across the city, and to gather in large numbers in the park and the streets surrounding the unfinished mosque on major festivals.

The community attempted to lodge a cassational appeal at Kaliningrad Regional Court, but Judge Sergey Kostikov deemed this inadmissible on 29 August, “without any reasoned explanation”, according to Khasavov. Russia’s Supreme Court similarly refused on 28 November to consider the case.

“Thus, the Muslims have lost in the conditions of Russia any possibility for the effective protection of their rights, but more precisely they had no such opportunity from the start of the illegally instigated process against them,” Khasavov concluded.

The ruling which declared the mosque illegal and removed it from the community’s ownership came into force on 4 June, but nothing has yet happened to the building, Khasavov told Forum 18. “The Muslims have expressed their readiness to protect the house of the Most High,” he added, “even by physical force, if the authorities try to tear down the building.”

In Moscow city officials have with no warning demolished a completed place of worship, Holy Trinity Pentecostal Church, which was destroyed with mechanical diggers soon after midnight on 6 September 2012. Officials were helped by police and men in plain clothes, who called themselves druzhinniki (civil volunteers). Insecurity over property has also left many other Russian religious communities – including Pentecostals and Muslims – vulnerable to arbitrary actions by state officials.

The telephone at the City Property Administration’s Land Department went unanswered each time Forum 18 called between 10 and 15 December.

The application to the ECtHR was lodged on 29 November and has been registered as application number 75301/14, a court spokesperson confirmed to Forum 18 from Strasbourg on 12 December. It is not yet known when the court will decide on the admissibility of the case.

Kaliningrad synagogue

Kaliningrad’s Jewish Community has taken both the city administration and its Architecture and Building Committee to Kaliningrad Regional Arbitration Court over the suspension of construction of the city’s first post-war synagogue. This is intended as the “rebirth”, according to Sergey Sterlin, editor of the local Jewish newspaper Simha, of a synagogue destroyed by the Nazis in 1938 in the so-called Kristallnacht. At that time the city was known as Koenigsberg and was part of the German province of East Prussia.

Echoing earlier comments of Jewish community members, Sterlin told Forum 18 on 15 December that the project represented “historical justice..with respect to the victims of the Holocaust and the anti-fascist movement”.

Sterlin described Kaliningrad’s Jewish organizations as being “scattered across various addresses” in the city. The premises on Cherepichnaya Street, just east of the center, which houses a prayer hall and the Simha offices, are “insufficient”, with no space for a kindergarten or a school.

A Central District court order halted construction in March 2014 on the grounds that it was illegal as no permission had yet been granted. Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld this ruling in June. Forum 18 notes that an Orthodox church in the city and an Orthodox building outside the city have both apparently been legalized after being constructed without city permission.

After an information request by the New Kaliningrad news agency in July, the city administration at last revealed that the permit had not been granted because of a minor discrepancy between two sets of plans regarding the number of storeys. The number initially agreed upon was 4-5, while the contractor’s project documentation showed 5-6 storeys, it claimed. Forum 18 has been unable to establish whether this would affect the height of the building or whether its impact on the surrounding urban environment was a concern to the city administration.

Forum 18 notes that the synagogue site is very close to the city’s large 32 meter (105 feet) high former Lutheran cathedral, now used as a concert hall and museum of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. The former cathedral now has both Russian Orthodox and Lutheran chapels.

The city administration also claimed that the building lay partly within the preservation zone of the old Jewish orphanage (1904-1905), which now contains flats but is an object of cultural heritage of regional significance. Larisa Koptseva, head of the Regional Monument Preservation Service, nevertheless told journalists that the former orphanage’s preservation zone did not overlap the construction site.

The arbitration court combined the two separate suits into one case in early December 2014 and the next hearing is planned for 22 December. The community is, firstly, challenging the Architecture and Building Committee’s refusal to issue a building permit, and secondly, attempting to gain legal ownership of the unfinished structure on the site.

The city administration had leased the site to the Jewish Community (an orthodox organisation affiliated to the largely Hasidic Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, headed by Russia’s Chief Rabbi, Berel Lazar) for five years from March 2011, so that the nineteenth-century Koenigsberg New Synagogue could be rebuilt. The administration failed, however, to provide a building permit or to offer any explanation as to why one was not forthcoming.

The community hired a contractor and began building anyway in January 2013. One storey was completed before the Architecture and Building Committee inspected the site on 13 February 2014 and initiated court proceedings to stop construction.

An official of the Architecture and Building Committee directed Forum 18 on 12 December to the city administration’s Information and Analytical Department. A spokeswoman there maintained that the synagogue would indeed be built, but insisted that all further questions be submitted in writing. Forum 18 sent a written request for information that day. No reply had been received by the end of Kaliningrad’s working day on 16 December.

Moscow Hare Krishna temple

The Society of Krishna Consciousness has lost two cases at Moscow’s 9th Arbitration Court over the city authorities’ refusal to allow its temple to be built. The Society is continuing to appeal. “We will pursue both cases through every level of the courts, to be able to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights”, the Society’s lawyer Mikhail Frolov told Forum 18 on 11 December.

Hare Krishna devotees are still worshipping in the cramped premises it has rented since March, the rent for which is 1 million Roubles (about 110,940 Norwegian Kroner, 11,920 Euros or 14,840 US Dollars) per month. “Believers barely fit inside on Sundays and holidays”, Frolov told Forum 18 on 15 December. “The altar room itself is in a basement..[with] one narrow entrance”.

Frolov lamented the loss of the Society’s previous place of worship near the Dinamo metro station in northern Moscow, which it had to vacate early in 2014 and which has since been demolished: “We had a large pandal [structure in which to venerate a god] which accommodated 1,000-1,500 people – so many came to big celebrations and Sunday programmes”. Hare Krishna devotees had to leave those premises after a court ordered eviction instigated by the authorities (see F18News 11 September 2013 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1874).

Annulment of contract “motivated by nothing at all”

Moscow City Property Department annulled a contract granting the Krishna devotees free use of a plot of land for building in the summer of 2013. It did not explain its reasons for doing so in court, but admitted that the objections of local residents had been “taken into account”. Sergei Andreyev, Director of the temple building project, pointed out to Forum 18 in June 2014 that there were no houses near the temple site. The written complaint did not come from Molzhaninovo residents but from a group in the neighboring district of Khimki, who described the community as “a dangerous totalitarian sect”.

“Even when it became clear that the views of residents could not have been the reason for the termination of the contract, the Moscow government took the position that the city authorities had the right to end the contract without explanation,” Frolov insisted to Forum 18 on 8 December. He maintained that the termination “was motivated by nothing at all”.

Tatyana Kolesnik of the Moscow City Property Department told Forum 18 on 9 December that the “Moscow Architectural Committee has been instructed to investigate the location of the [temple] on an alternative plot of land”, but would give no further information.

Long struggle

The latest site in Molzhaninovo District beyond the capital’s ring-road, was allocated to the community in April 2007 after a long struggle with the city authorities. Protestants, Molokans and Muslims face similar obstacles.

Among the obstacles faced by the Hare Krishna community was permission for a new temple being withdrawn in October 2005 after strong criticism from the Russian Orthodox Church. International public opinion, particularly in India, appears to have assisted the Krishna devotees’ case. However, Rinchenling, a 200-strong community following the Dzogchen tradition within Tibetan Buddhism, was unsuccessful in overcoming similar obstacles.

After various planning requirements had been fulfilled, a consecration ceremony for the Hare Krishna temple was held in June 2012. But when the contract was annulled, the Moscow Committee for State Oversight in Construction (Mosgosstroinadzor) refused to grant a building permit.

Other disfavored communities

Long-standing official obstructions continue to this day for disfavored communities in the capital, such as Muslims, Pentecostals and Hare Krishna devotees.

Muslim communities in Moscow have a growing need to open mosques, as the Islamic population is growing fast. There are only four official mosques in the Russian capital, yet in August 2012 police estimated there were 170,000 Muslim worshipers for the end-of-Ramadan festival Eid-ul-Fitr – about the same number as attended Russian Orthodox churches at Easter. But in stark contrast to the Russian Orthodox, the Muslim community has faced persistent official obstruction to its attempts to open more mosques.

Protestants and Muslims in other parts of Russia – such as in the 2014 Winter Olympic city Sochi – also face official obstructions, while the Moscow Patriarchate enjoys state funding for its church building projects.

Protests

Alleged objections from local residents – some clearly genuine, others seemingly questionable – often appear among official reasons to deny building permission or suspend or halt construction of a place of worship. People living near a proposed site can and do demonstrate or sign petitions against construction, citing a variety of reasons from objection to the religious community in question to a legitimate desire to protect green space from development (frequently invoked in Moscow). How the authorities respond to such protest varies, however, both between religious groups and across regions.

In Moscow, which is home to a large Muslim population but has only four mosques, no new mosque sites have been allocated since 2012, when the city authorities withdrew two plots they had previously assigned in the north-west and south-east of the capital, citing objections from residents.

At a Public Chamber meeting entitled “The construction of new temples in Moscow: challenges, myths, problems”, on 16 July 2014, Mufti Rushan Abbyasov (deputy chair of the Council of Muftis) described the organisation of protest rallies against proposed mosques as “unfair”, saying that construction was only planned in areas well away from houses, such as industrial zones, and suggesting that “more than 90 percent” of the protesters had no links to the areas anyway.

In contrast, the projects of the Moscow Patriarchate’s “Moscow 200″ church-building program have also provoked protests from citizens, but none of these has to Forum 18’s knowledge resulted in a site being withdrawn. Indeed, Moscow’s City Administration enthusiastically supports all forms of construction by the Moscow Patriarchate.

In Yekaterinburg in the Urals, however, the city authorities appear to have genuinely tried to balance the competing interests in a dispute over plans to build a Lutheran church in a city center park. Over 1,000 people signed a petition submitted to the city administration in July 2014, and another online petition has gained nearly 900 signatories since August. Protesters have also held public demonstrations. On 13 October, however, the administration nevertheless formally allocated the land to the Lutheran Church.

The Yekaterinburg Lutheran community had claimed the site, which had previously been a Lutheran cemetery, under the Law on the Transfer of Religious Property to Religious Organisations. Such claims for restitution have often been challenged, and are not sure of success. Yekaterinburg’s Old Believer community, despite a verbal promise from the regional governor, fear that they may never get restitution of their church confiscated in the Soviet period.

The post Russia: Difficulties For Places Of Worship In Kaliningrad And Moscow appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Russia is enduring its harshest winter in over 70 years, with temperatures plunging as low as -50 degrees Celsius. Dozens of people have already died, and almost 150 have been hospitalized.

­The country has not witnessed such a long cold spell since 1938, meteorologists said, with temperatures 10 to 15 degrees lower than the seasonal norm all over Russia.

Across the country, 45 people have died due to the cold, and 266 have been taken to hospitals. In total, 542 people were injured due to the freezing temperatures, RIA Novosti reported.

The Moscow region saw temperatures of -17 to -18 degrees Celsius on Wednesday, and the record cold temperatures are expected to linger for at least three more days. Thermometers in Siberia touched -50 degrees Celsius, which is also abnormal for December.

The Emergency Ministry has issued warnings in 15 regions, which have been put on high alert over possible disruptions of communication and power.

Across the country, heat pipelines have broken down due to the cold. In southeastern Russia’s Samara, the cold has broken down many heat pipelines, leaving hundreds of homes without heating, including an orphanage and a rest house. Many schools and kindergartens have been closed for almost a week.

The cold spell, along with snowfalls, has disrupted flights all over the country, and led to huge traffic jams. In the southern city of Rostov-on-Don some highways were closed due to snowfalls over the past two days, triggering a traffic collapse.

The post Russia Suffering Coldest Winter In 70 Years appeared first on Eurasia Review.