There was much hope in the international community that the Hague war-crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia, allied to domestic proceedings, could point the region to a reconciled future. It was not to be.

By Katarina Ristic*

After 12 years in prison, one of the most notorious radical nationalists in Serbia, Vojislav Šešelj, returned from Scheveningen in November under somewhat mysterious circumstances. Neither acquitted nor sentenced, he was released due to his medical condition, pending the judgment of the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Straight from the prison, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party went to its premises in Belgrade and addressed his supporters: “Brother Serbs and sister Serbs! They threw me out of Scheveningen prison. I didn’t ask for it—they just wanted to get rid of me. I promised you that I will destroy the Hague tribunal. The battle took a little bit longer than I expected, but I won!”

His words were cheered, as if the troubled history of the ICTY had come to a close with the accused celebrating victory over the discredited institution. Not everyone would agree but for most Serbs Šešelj’s release confirmed an already persistent belief that the ICTY was a mockery of justice, a political court determined on putting Serbs on trial with hardly any evidence.

Serial disappointments

From the very beginning, the ICTY was accompanied by failure: only two years after it was established in May 1993, hopes of a deterrent effect were dashed when the most gruesome crimes in Bosnia were committed. Serial disappointments followed: inability to capture accused figures, to conclude proceedings in a timely manner and to counter nationalist attacks sustained negative perceptions of the tribunal.

It failed to conclude effectively some of the most prominent cases—from Slobodan Milošević (former president of Serbia), to Jovica Stanišić (former head of the state security service) to Vojislav Šešelj. Additionally, dramatic reversals in the Appeals Chamber, as in the cases of Ante Gotovina (a former lieutenant general in Croatia) and Momčilo Perišić (former chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav army), pummelled the institution’s already low standing.

Serbia has been the site of strongest anti-Hague sentiment, bitterly resisting political co-operation and justice from that quarter. The tribunal is presented in Serbia as the judicial arm of NATO, delegitimised as a victor’s court and demonised as offering ‘justice’ only for military enemies of Serbia.

With hardly any political support and strong resistance from various social actors—from legal professionals and academics to politicians and media—this consensus against the institution, its ‘unreasonable’ indictments and its ‘unjust’ trials has grown year by year, from the extradition of Milošević to the arrests of the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, Radovan Karadžic and Ratko Mladić respectively. The ICTY was presented as a “court of inquisition”,[1] its sole goal to judge Serbian ‘patriots’—accusing Serbs, as one journalist put it, “only because they are Serbs”.[2] The long-time ICTY chief prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, counted for years as one of the most hated persons in Serbia.

Neither the trials of other nationals nor indeed their victims were presented in the media. Instead, press articles were filled with denials of atrocities and the minimisation of crimes, refusing any responsibility on the part of Serb forces and constantly evoking Serbian victimhood.

Domestic trials

Hopes that domestic legal procedures could overcome these obstacles and provide less controversial justice did not long survive. Legal proceedings in front of the specialised War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court and a war crime prosecutor’s office, established in 2003, quickly showed that diffident political support and moderate acceptance were not enough to change attitudes towards war-crime trials.

The first cases provided initial encouragement, enabling formulation of a different ‘patriotic’ discourse about war-crime trials in Serbia, articulated by those involved in the legal process and their few political allies. If reticently, they introduced to public speech individual victims of other nations, the tragic story of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia and the moral foundations of dealing with past crimes.

This moderate patriotism was limited by some of the topoi it shared with nationalist discourse: representation of the ‘Serbian people’ as the ultimate victims, the presentation of Bosnia as a ‘civil war’ and the suggestion that ‘all sides’ bore equal responsibility. And so prosecution was never extended beyond direct perpetrators towards higher ranking officers, whose arraignment remained unimaginable.

Nevertheless, these domestic vehicles did have slightly more political support than the Hague trials: besides human-rights NGOs, they were supported by the Democratic Party and generally in 2008-12 radical-nationalist rhetoric was replaced by moderate, accommodating language. This was a time when the public could hear from the highest institutions about crimes committed by Serbian forces, when victims were individually named and even some moral responsibility was acknowledged.

The media, like the institutions, responded to this change in their public presentation of crimes but didn’t dare cross boundaries set by the political elite. For example, the mainstream media did not bother following the story which led from the uncovering of mass graves of ethnic Albanians in Batajnica, near Belgrade, to its judicial conclusion years later in convictions of Serbian police officers in the Suva Reka trial. Neither did they search out survivors or victims’ relatives to describe the 1999 crime, in which grenades were thrown into a locked pizzeria in the southern Kosovo town, leaving 50 dead. And they failed to connect this trial with proceedings in the ICTY, which might have shed more light on the command chain in the Kosovo case.

A combination of media uninterest, lack of investigative journalism and the notion that Serbia had already undergone a catharsis additionally obscured war-crime trials from the public. Only in some media (notably the daily Danas,Vreme and several online portals, like E-novine and Pescanik) have journalists tried to provide trials with context, give voice to the victims and query the wider responsibility of broader social milieux. Otherwise, war-crime trials are covered only marginally, with short, impersonal and unemotional language, which allows complete dissociation from the victims.

The media continue to divide trials according to ‘us’ and ‘them’. If Serbs are on trial, they are careful to frame the whole case from the accused perspective, providing the public with rationalisations, blatant lies or conspiracy theories to mitigate charges. In the few legal cases where Serbs are victims, by contrast, the media are quick to provide emotional depictions of crimes, to investigate and to demand justice. Such cases are presented through the victims’ eyes, dominated by their needs, stimulating strong identification and moral condemnation.

Croatia and Bosnia

Serbia is however not alone in this regard. Other Yugoslav successor states have seen a similar incorporation of trials into the nationalist narratives which emerged during the wars, so that a reassuringly stable national identity, rather than troubling self-reflection, dominates the post-conflict societies.

Mainstream Croatian media have engaged in the glorification of battles, with stories of Croatian heroes and brave defenders, rejecting claims of crimes by Croatian forces as impossible and offensive. Questioning of the ICTY prosecution for not charging Milošević for the war of aggression and genocide was matched by strong condemnation of those who addressed the responsibilities of Croatian officers.

The acquittal of Gotovina by the Appeals Chamber, after he had been sentenced to 24 years, reassured anyone who might have doubts about crimes committed in Operation Storm—when Serbs were driven out of the Krajina in Croatia—by confirming the nationalist narrative of a defensive war. As in Serbia, despite the years of rejection and anger over the ICTY trials, journalists now tend to believe they have faced any crimes committed by Croat forces, not only in the recent war but also in the second world war.[3]

Building strongly on victims’ stories, mainly supported by ICTY charges and judgments, Bosnia transformed war-crime trials directly into the nationalist narrative—departing only when the ICTY accused ‘Bosniaks’ (Bosnian Muslims) themselves. In the latter cases, the frequency of acquittals confirmed the general impression that Bosniaks were not guilty of war crimes, while the number of genocide verdicts against Republika Srpska officers confirmed Bosniak victimisation, particularly vis-à-vis the brutal executions of civilians in eastern Bosnia.

The ICTY also created a hierarchy among victims by privileging those at Srebrenica, adding to competing victimhood narratives within Bosnia and inspiring other groups to request recognition of genocide elsewhere from 1992. In the media, war-crime trials are presented through the victims’ frame: articles are often written by the survivors and denials by the accused are directly confronted with survivors’ memories. Trial testimonies are included at length in the articles, with individual, emotional and detailed depictions.

Divided histories

With such strong discrepancies in interpretation, the region presents a picture of divided histories, with ICTY trials instrumentalised for self-victimisation and to confirm prior nationalist narratives against ICTY claims. In none of the three new states have the charges or verdicts been used for critical evaluation of responsibility towards victims.

One of the eminent researchers of Holocaust memory in Germany recently observed how rare, globally, self-reflective memory can be—and how national memory easily slips back into self-congratulatory narratives, even vis-à-vis the Holocaust.[4] War-crime trials in former Yugoslavia have hardly had a chance to provoke debate. Instead they have produced revolt, bitterness and new grievances—adding further to the nationalist repertoire to be used in peacetime.

Public hatred and threats to life have been visited on those who have dared support war-crime trials and confront dominant nationalisms. Victims of other ethnicities rarely enter the public sphere: as Serbian victims were wiped out from the victorious memory in Croatia, so is that of Bosniak or Croat victims absent from public discourse in Serbia. Even the dominant victims’ narrative in Bosnia has not succeeded in creating more space for the victims of other groups.

Self-reflective memory is elusive, not easily achieved even in stable democracies with effective rule of law. That war-crime trials failed to trigger reflective memory in post-conflict societies might surprise only those unaware of the ease with which even model democracies manage to avoid it.

Katarina Ristic is a researcher at the Centre for Area Studies and lecturer in the Global and European Studies Institute of the University of Leipzig. Her Imaginary Trials: War Crime Trials and Memory in former Yugoslavia was published in 2014 by Leipziger Universitätsverlag.

This article was originally published by OpenDemocracy and is available by clicking here.

Footnotes

1) ‘Amfilohije Radović’, Vreme, 29 March 2001.

2) ‘Srbi krivi što su Srbi’, Večernji novosti, 7 April 2008.

3) Ines Sabalic, ‘Smrt Haškog suda’, Globus, 18 November 2014.

4) W. Kansteiner, presentation at the fourth annual conference of the Dialogues on Historical Justice and Memory Network, Lund, 6 December 2014.

The post Ethnicised Justice And Dealing With The Past In Ex-Yugoslavia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Luke Coffey, Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D. and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.*

The United States faces mounting challenges in Europe in 2015. Russia is on the march in Ukraine, many of America’s oldest allies question its commitment to transatlantic security, and the economies of Europe have still not fully recovered from the Euro crisis. In addition, the specter of Islamist terrorism has raised its ugly head again in Europe, with the brutal slaying of 17 people in France, including eight journalists at the offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris. It is time for the U.S. to renew its commitment to European security, to make NATO relevant again, and to promote economic freedom across the continent. Here are the top five foreign policy priorities in the European region for the Administration and Congress in 2015.

1. Bring NATO back to the basics of collective security. NATO is, first and foremost, a collective security alliance; everything else the alliance does is secondary to that main mission. NATO does not have to be everywhere in the world doing everything all the time, but it does have to be capable of defending its members’ territorial integrity. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty is clear that NATO’s area of responsibility is “in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” In order to stay relevant, NATO needs to prepare to defend against 21st-century threats in the North Atlantic region.Since its creation in 1949, NATO has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other multilateral organization, including the European Union. 2015 will be a pivotal year for the alliance. It is essential that the U.S. continue to be an active participant in the alliance’s future and chart a course back to basics. The U.S. should use 2015 as an opportunity to get NATO refocused on collective security and territorial defense and to pressure European allies to invest properly in their military capabilities.
2. Improve key bilateral and multilateral relationships in Europe. This is the time for Washington to focus on strengthening ties with major allies in both Eastern and Western Europe. The threat posed by an increasingly aggressive Russia, as well as an array of Islamist terrorist groups, from ISIS to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has made the need for transatlantic military, security, and intelligence cooperation an urgent priority. An estimated 3,000 Islamists based in Europe have traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight with the Islamist State. Many have returned to Europe to plot terrorist attacks on European soil.The Obama Administration has paid little attention to Europe since President Obama came to office in 2009, with many U.S. partners in Europe marginalized and sidelined by the White House. The Anglo–American Special Relationship, the NATO alliance, and U.S. collaboration with allies in Eastern and Central Europe have all been weakened through Washington’s approach of “leading from behind.” There is concern across Europe that the United States is becoming less engaged in the world and is attaching less importance to the defense of the West. The U.S. must recommit to leadership in Europe, sending a clear message to America’s allies that it stands with them, while warning America’s enemies that it will firmly oppose them.
3. Promote improved governance in the South Caucasus and Turkey. The South Caucasus and Turkey sit at a crucial geographical and cultural crossroads that for military and economic reasons has been strategically important for centuries. The region, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, has played a major role in NATO’s Northern Distribution Network for resupplying troops in Afghanistan. Important pipelines transit the region carrying oil and gas to European markets. As Europeans try to become less dependent on Russian energy sources these pipelines will become increasingly important.Turkey is a member of NATO, a state with a long but threatened tradition of secularism that bridges the European and the Islamic world, a developing economy, and a major player in the energy market. In spite of President Recep Erdogan’s iron-fisted leadership, Turkey is still a parliamentary democracy, and as the president, Erdogan derives his extensive powers because his Justice and Development Party (AKP) controls parliament.Without that AKP majority, the center of power in Turkish politics would shift back to the Prime Minister’s office. In June, Turkey will hold parliamentary elections—and if the elections are like Turkey’s 2014 presidential elections, the race will be close. If the AKP does not get a majority, or if it has to form a coalition, Erdogan’s power will be significantly curtailed.

   Moscow continues to take advantage of ethnic divisions and tensions in the South Caucasus to advance pro-Russian policies that are often at odds with, or even worse threaten, American and NATO interests in the region. The U.S. should publicly oppose Russian efforts to foment conflict and subvert democratic nations in the region, and should work with all friendly states in the region to improve their governance, security, and trade links.

4. Promote genuine free trade with Europe. Free trade, and economic freedom more broadly, is essential to economic growth and prosperity. The purpose of freer trade is to reduce the cost of goods, thereby making them more affordable, just as the purpose of economic freedom is to remove barriers to competition, thereby preventing vested interests from rigging the system to their benefit.The U.S. and the EU are currently negotiating a trade deal, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Because trade between the U.S. and EU is already quite free, even a perfect TTIP would produce only modest benefits. Unfortunately, the TTIP will likely be based on the harmonization of transatlantic rules, which would make the U.S. and the EU less competitive, reduce their economic freedom, and benefit vested interests by given them an outsized voice in the creation of the harmonized rules.The U.S. should instead seek to negotiate free trade agreements based on mutual recognition of rules with willing and democratic partners, including both nations not in the EU (such as Norway and Switzerland) and nations that may leave it (most importantly, the United Kingdom).
5. Develop a new strategy to deal with Russia. Recent events have confirmed that the “Russian reset” is dead. Far from being a partner on the path to reform, Russia under Vladimir Putin has proven itself a strategic competitor that has destabilized Eastern and Central Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, which has shown no interest in liberal, representative democracy or any desire to respect the rights of its citizens. The U.S. must craft and implement a strategy to deal over the long term with Putin’s Russia, taking into account all facets of Russian foreign policy.Until Russia’s leadership stops its aggression against neighboring states, ends its campaign of provocation and propaganda against the United States, and acts as a responsible power, Washington should approach U.S.–Russian relations as they are, not as the naïve reset policy fantasized they would be.

Europe Needs U.S. Leadership

Europe is critically important to American interests. It is the home of many of America’s closest allies and vital for America’s trade and investment. Developments in Europe have a major impact on U.S. security and prosperity, yet the current U.S. Administration is disengaged from what is happening across the Atlantic.

This is a moment for robust U.S. leadership: America’s friends and allies are facing a renewed threat from an increasingly emboldened Moscow, as well as homegrown Islamist militants, intent on carrying out acts of carnage on European soil and also seeking to threaten the United States itself. Restoring trust in American leadership should be a top foreign policy priority for the White House in 2015, demonstrating that the United States will stand with its allies at a time of mounting challenges in Europe.

* About the authors:
—Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Ted R. Bromund, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in Anglo–American Relations in the Thatcher Center. Nile Gardiner, PhD, is Director of the Thatcher Center.

The post Top Five Policy Priorities For Europe In 2015 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Is America in the throes of a class war?

Look at the chart and decide for yourself. It’s all there in black and white, and you don’t need to be an economist to figure it out.

But, please, take some time to study the chart, because there’s more here than meets the eye. This isn’t just about productivity and compensation. It’s a history lesson too. It pinpoints the precise moment in time when the country lost its way and began its agonizing descent into Police State USA. That’s what it really means.

It all began in the 1970s, that’s when everything started going down the plughole. Once wages detached from productivity, the rich progressively got richer. They used their wealth to reduce taxes on capital, role back critical regulations, break up the unions, install their own lapdog politicians, push through trade agreements that pitted US workers against low-paid labor in the developing world, and induce their shady Central Bank buddies to keep interest rates locked below the rate of inflation so they could cream hefty profits off gigantic asset bubbles. Now, 40 years later, they own the whole f*cking shooting match, lock, stock and barrel. And it’s all because management decided to take the lion’s share of productivity gains which threw the whole system off-kilter undermining the basic pillars of democratic government. Here’s how FDR summed it up:

“The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is Fascism—ownership of Government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling private power.” (Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Message to Congress on Curbing Monopolies.,” April 29, 1938. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.

Are we there yet?

Pretty close, I’d say. The only way to preserve democracy is by keeping one hand firmly clasped around the windpipe of every rich bastard in the country. If you can’t keep your tycoons in check, you’d might as well throw in the towel and accept a life of indentured servitude now, because that’s where you’re headed anyway. Here’s a short rundown of the changes that took place in the ’70s by economist Lawrence Mishel:

“Productivity in the economy grew by 80.4 percent between 1973 and 2011 but the growth of real hourly compensation of the median worker grew by far less, just 10.7 percent…. The pattern was very different from 1948 to 1973, when the hourly compensation of a typical worker grew in tandem with productivity. Reestablishing the link between productivity and pay of the typical worker is an essential component of any effort to provide shared prosperity and, in fact, may be necessary for obtaining robust growth without relying on asset bubbles and increased household debt.

It is hard to see how reestablishing a link between productivity and pay can occur without restoring decent and improved labor standards, restoring the minimum wage to a level corresponding to half the average wage (as it was in the late 1960s), and making real the ability of workers to obtain and practice collective bargaining.” (The wedges between productivity and median compensation growth, Lawrence Mishel, EPI)

When was the last time you heard Obama talk about “improving labor standards” or “collective bargaining”?

Don’t make me laugh. It’s not even on his radar. Did you know that inequality has actually gotten worse under Obama? Much worse.

It’s true. He might proclaim his determination to “tax millionaires” in one of his blustery orations, but it’s all just rhetorical fakery. The fact is, the 1 percenters have done better under Obama than they did under Bush. Check this out from Naked Capitalism:

Yup, under Bush, the 1% captured a disproportionate share of the income gains from the Bush boom of 2002-2007. They got 65 cents of every dollar created in that boom, up 20 cents from when Clinton was President. Under Obama, the 1% got 93 cents of every dollar created in that boom. That’s not only more than under Bush, up 28 cents. In the transition from Bush to Obama, inequality got worse, faster, than under the transition from Clinton to Bush. Obama accelerated the growth of inequality.” (Growth of Income Inequality Is Worse Under Obama than Bush, Matt Stoller, Naked Capitalism)

93 cents of every buck has gone to the 1 percenters under Obama. And you wonder why Wall Street loves this guy? It’s because he’s bent over backwards to make them richer, that’s why. Just look:

Graph (4) above: the blue line across the bottom of the graph represents the wealth of the bottom 90% of U.S. households. The red line represents the wealth of the richest 0.1%. Source: Emmanuel Saez (The Climate Crisis is Capitalism, Rob Urie, CounterPunch)

The rich are making money hand over fist, and it’s all due to President Twoface and his dodgy friends at the Federal Reserve. Of course, Obama would like everyone to think that he’s really rooting for the little guy, doing his best to boost wages, create more jobs and raise living standards for ordinary working people.

Right. Check out this speech he gave in 2013:

“The combined trends of increased inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American Dream, our way of life, and what we stand for around the globe. And it is not simply a moral claim that I’m making here. There are practical consequences to rising inequality and reduced mobility.”

Got that? Obama is all about closing the gap between the rich and the poor. Just don’t look at his record or you might notice a slight discrepancy between what he says and what he does.

The fact is, stocks have surged under Obama as have corporate profits which “have doubled since he took office in 2009″. At the same time, he’s overseen the slowest recovery in the postwar era, stood idle while middle class incomes were shaved by nearly $5,000 annually, and refused to intervene when over 700,000 public sector jobs were slashed in the early days of his administration. And we won’t even mention the health care debacle, the endless spying, the perennial warmongering, targeted assassinations or Gitmo.

But as bad as Obama may be, the problem didn’t start with him. It goes back decades as the first chart indicates. The steady erosion of workers bargaining power, changes in the tax code favoring capital, anti-worker trade agreements, deregulation, loosey-goosy monetary policy and, of course, the “biggie”, financialization, have all contributed to the evisceration of the middle class which now appears to be hanging by a thread. Check out this clip from authors John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff who researched the roots of financialization and wrote about it in an article in The Monthly Review titled “Financial Implosion and Stagnation”:

“It was the reality of economic stagnation beginning in the 1970s, as heterodox economists Riccardo Bellofiore and Joseph Halevi have recently emphasized, that led to the emergence of “the new financialized capitalist regime,” a kind of “paradoxical financial Keynesianism” whereby demand in the economy was stimulated primarily “thanks to asset-bubbles.” Moreover, it was the leading role of the United States in generating such bubbles—despite (and also because of) the weakening of capital accumulation proper—together with the dollar’s reserve currency status, that made U.S. monopoly-finance capital the “catalyst of world effective demand,” beginning in the 1980s. But such a financialized growth pattern was unable to produce rapid economic advance for any length of time, and was unsustainable, leading to bigger bubbles that periodically burst, bringing stagnation more and more to the surface.

A key element in explaining this whole dynamic is to be found in the falling ratio of wages and salaries as a percentage of national income in the United States. Stagnation in the 1970s led capital to launch an accelerated class war against workers to raise profits by pushing labor costs down. The result was decades of increasing inequality.” (Financial Implosion and Stagnation, John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, Monthly Review)

Let me get this straight: Persistent stagnation paved the way for financial engineering and asset bubbles where investors could make beaucoup dough regardless of the (abysmal) condition of the underlying economy? Is that it?

Sounds a lot like today, doesn’t it; where corporations are minimizing their capital expenditures, laying off workers, and reducing revenues, but still making record profits by goosing stock prices with buybacks which add absolutely nothing to productivity. But, then again, why expand your business if you can make piles of moolah by just loading up on your own shares?

It’s madness, and it’s all the result of 6 years of zero rates and QE which has lured investors further and further out on the risk curve. The system is so deluged with liquidity that people are taking chances they never would have otherwise.

But where do we see “the falling ratio of wages and salaries as a percentage of national income in the United States” that the authors mention in their article? Is there any real proof of a class war or is it just more leftist folderol?

Graph: Compensation of Employees, Received: Wage and Salary Disbursements/Gross Domestic Product

It sure looks like class war to me.

Foster and Magdoff make a pretty convincing case that the system has been rejiggered to overcome stagnation. Financial assets provide a place where the big wigs can grow their money during the periods when the economy is flatlining due to crappy wages, weak demand and slow growth. And that’s the name of the game, isn’t it; creating outlets for profitable investment even in the down-times?

You bet it is. That’s what QE is really all about, Bernanke even admitted as much in an op-ed in the Washington Post in 2010. He said:

“…higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending. Increased spending will lead to higher incomes and profits that, in a virtuous circle, will further support economic expansion.”

There it is from the horse’s mouth. Bernanke wanted higher stock prices, and that’s what he got. But when does all that wealth start trickling down to the worker-bees like he promised? (At present, the economy is still growing just a touch above 2 percent, not at all what one would expect after $4 trillion in asset purchases.)

More important, who are the lucky ducks who own all those stocks and bonds that the Fed just inflated with 3 rounds of QE? It certainly isn’t Joe Sixpack who can barley scrape up enough dough to make the monthly payment on his ’99 Chevy Caprice.

Of course not. The only people who own stocks are the rich and the very, very rich Take a look:

(The Great Economic Misdirection, Rob Urie, CounterPunch)

Just think about that for a minute: Bernanke admits that the purpose of QE is to inflate asset prices but, on closer examination, we see that those very assets are owned almost exclusively by a small group of very rich investors. Does that seem like an evenhanded policy to you, dear reader, or does it seem like the former Fed chair simply used QE to transfer trillions of dollars to his shifty constituents?

QE was never intended to boost inflation, (it doesn’t), spur more lending (it hasn’t) or lower long-term rates. (Long-term rates dropped after all 3 rounds of QE, and are currently lower than during the Great Depression!) The program’s real objective which was to funnel more money to Bernanke’s moocher friends via asset inflation. In that regard, it has succeeded beyond anyone’s wildest imagination. Just look:

Average income growth in US recoveries: top 10% versus the bottom 90%. (Graph: Pavlina Tcherneva)

(Smart Charts: An Economic Recovery for the 1%, Bill Moyers)

You can see from the chart above that the bottom 90 percent have gone from treading water to sinking like a stone. And, as we all know, a growing number of these same people are rapidly slipping through the cracks, loosing their spot in the middle class, and entering a terrifying new world of economic hardship and uncertainly.

This is no accident nor is it the result of free market operations that unavoidably create winners and losers. The upward distribution of wealth is the natural corollary of decades of aggressive lobbying, government infiltration, and political arm-twisting. Ruling elites are a like-minded bunch who know what they want and will stop nothing until they get it. The system has been effectively restructured to serve their needs and those of their constituents. They alone control the levers of state power as well as the marionette politicians who do their bidding.

So, is America in the throes of a class war or not?

Indeed, it is. But only one side is fighting.

The post 40 Years Of Economic Policy In One Chart – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Tens of millions of people made New Year’s resolutions, but few were as creative as the one pushed through Congress last week. Apparently, the new Congress decided that its first order of business should be to go after workers who are no longer able to hold jobs due to injury or illness.

It did this in a technical move that is likely to escape the attention of most of the public. The Republican Congress voted to ban any reallocation of Social Security tax revenue between the retirement fund, designated for retirees and survivors, and the disability fund for disabled workers. This matters because the disability fund is projected to face a shortfall some time in 2016. If no steps are taken by that point, workers suffering from cancer, heart disease, or other disabling conditions will see their benefits cut by almost 20 percent.

The easiest way to have addressed this problem would be to simply reallocate money between the funds, as has been done eleven times in the past. But the Republican Congress apparently felt that it would be better to hold disabled workers hostage in order to extract concessions on this or other programs.

Just for a bit orientation, the disability program is an insurance program that workers pay into. There are currently just under 9 million people getting disability benefits. The average benefit is $1,150 a month. It is financed by a tax of 1.8 percentage points of earnings, up to $118,500.

The projections had shown the program facing a long-term shortfall for some time, but its problems were moved forward by the Great Recession. As happens in every downturn, the number of workers collecting disability increased when the economy collapsed.

There are many workers who have various ailments that make it difficult for them to do their jobs. In good times their bosses may keep them on the payroll. But when economy turns down, a 60-year-old with a bad back or trouble walking is likely to be the first to lose their job.

By not paying workers the full disability benefits to which they are entitled, the government will not only be imposing a serious hardship on millions of workers and their families, it will effectively be defaulting on its obligations. It did after all collect payments from these workers, in most cases for several decades.

In recent years there has been a PR campaign to convince the public that the Social Security disability program is riddled with fraud. The facts say otherwise. Three quarters of applicants are turned down on their initial application, and even after appeals, 60 percent of applicants are denied benefits.

A recent study published by the University of Michigan examined a group of marginal disability applicants. These were people who could be approved or denied depending on the examiner to which they were assigned. This group comprised 23 percent of all applicants. The study found that two years after the decision on eligibility, an additional 28 percentage points of the people denied benefits were working compared to those who got benefits. After three years, this gap fell to just over 20.0 percentage points. Furthermore, the average wage of the people who worked was less than half of their wage before applying to disability.

These results indicate that even from this marginal group of applicants, the overwhelming majority would not be working even if denied benefits, indicating that they are suffering from serious health problems. If that is the case with marginal applicants, it is reasonable to assume that few among the 77 percent of non-marginal beneficiaries would be able to work.

This doesn’t mean there is no fraud. Any program with 9 million beneficiaries will have some fraud. However the costs of the disability program are not being driven by fraud; they are being driven by workers who are no longer able to work.

While the easiest path to maintain full benefits would have been to reallocate some of the surplus from the Social Security retirement program, it would not be a huge lift to make up the shortfall with additional revenue. The cap on taxable wages could be raised above $118,500, which would make up some of the shortfall. Alternatively, an increase in the payroll tax of 0.2 percentage points on both workers and employers would fully close the gap.

While no one will want to pay higher taxes, a tax increase of this magnitude is not likely to pose a serious hardship. For a worker earning $40,000 a year it would mean an increase in taxes of $1.60 a week on both the worker and the employer. This tax increase is one-fifth the size of the increase that took effect in January of 2013.

It would have been best to have this discussion when the economy had more fully recovered and ideally wage growth had resumed. If wages were growing 1.0-1.5 percent a year, workers could still see higher pay even with a slight increase in taxes.

But even in the current economic context it is likely that many workers would be willing to face a 0.2 percentage point increase in the payroll tax in order to keep the disability insurance program intact.  After all, they would be paying these taxes to ensure their own protection from disability. Also, unlike our representatives in Congress, most workers probably do not think it is funny to threaten terminal cancer patients with a 20 percent cut in benefits.

This article originally appeared on Al Jazeera, and is reprinted with permission.

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Paris has recently witnessed the targeted assassination of eight Parisian journalists. Many see their execution as terrorism. Some see it as a justifiable act of avenge or retaliation for insulting Islam and its revered Prophet (S). And then there are many others who are not sure how to categorize the violence – while they are disgusted by the shootings in Paris they may nonetheless have reasons for not embracing the slogan “I am Charlie”.

The French government has epitomized hypocrisy and taken it to a level that is rarely seen in our time. It claims to respect religious rights, but such rights are routinely denied to more than six million French Muslims. A third generation French Muslim of North African heritage is still treated as an outsider in France. Mosques get routinely attacked by Islamophobic French hoodlums, but such information, thanks to the French-fried, biased and hostile media, never makes the news.

The French authorities owe the public answers to the following set of questions: if freedom of expression is a sacred cow that has to be kept alive and protected at any cost, why do they routinely punish dissenting voices that see things clearly and smell the gutter rat within the French system of equality, liberty and fraternity? Why is any expression that is critical of the deranged, sick secular fundamentalists there and their divisive and farcical policies, let alone an honest, nonthreatening criticism of Zionism and the rogue Israeli government is always portrayed as hostile and thus, punishable by the state laws? So, when demonic insulting of the most revered men in history (Prophets Muhammad, Jesus and Moses) is not just tolerated but cheered at under the guise of freedom of expression why all these double-standards to stop dissenting views on other matters, which are often conveniently lumped as promoting terrorism? Whom are they trying to fool?

In the past, I have written a few times against the savage, ultra-secular Talibanism promoted within the French society by the deranged and often delusional Talibans running the republic. Obsessed and delusional as they are, they fail to understand that their hypocritical and unjust policies are at the heart of the civilizational crisis we witness today. Like other more genuinely civilized nations around the globe, the French secular Talibans ought to learn the simple fact that while each of us have the freedom to extend our arms, such extension of arms has limits. When our stretched out arms or fists hit someone, it is no longer freedom but abuse or violence against the one who is hit.

The French people and many in the western secular societies have not learned that basic wisdom and continue to do the stupid, moronic thing of violating the rights of others. They abuse and then try to hide under the selective umbrella of freedom. It is an evil ploy that they play, hoping to hoodwink the neophyte elements within their society. In their unfathomed obsessions and Pharaonic arrogance they forget that such violent and provocative acts are bound to get some reactions from their targeted victims. Such reactions may not, of course, happen every time, but to be oblivious of the mere fact that the victims of their abuse and violence has similar rights to hit back – sometimes violently or disproportionately – is mere stupidity. And that is how most of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America do see the current problem, which is at odds with the popular views in the west – i.e., Europe, Australia and North America – all former colonizers.

So, while the Parisians gathered last Sunday to show their solidarity with the murdered serially abusive cartoonists of the French weekly – Charlie Hebdo – where some 40 world leaders – many of whom are cold-blooded murderers – marched in unison at the Place de la Republique with the bemused – and some confused – crowd, chanting like a parrot ‘I am Charlie’, no rational and conscientious human being can excuse those rogue journalists for provoking violence. Nor can they be in solidarity with those arrogant hypocrites who fail to distinguish insults from freedom of expression. While they deplore the loss of innocent lives, they know that not everyone will filter messages in ways that are not threatening. To some the acts of those slain cartoonists were utterly sacrilegious and highly provocative – thus setting the rationale for avenging the honor of their beloved personality – the best of humanity created by God.

Freedom of press is a bedrock principle of democracy, but when journalists take that freedom as a license to incite violence, promote intolerance and inflame a society for few cheap laughs, claptraps and giggles, they degrade, denigrate and embarrass their noble profession, and need to be shunned by all. As I have noted elsewhere, they are no better than the other terrorists of our time, and can often be worse, more damaging and dangerous.

There is a well-known Persian couplet:

Ba Khuda deewana basho
Ba Muhammad hoshyaar
(Meaning: Play madly with God if you wish, but be careful with Muhammad.)

Sadly, the management and cartoonists in Charlie Hebdo continue to display insanity. One can only take pity on such arrogant fools.

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Even in the midst of the global economic crisis, Barcelona has proven itself to be a magnet for foreign direct investment (FDI). During the period from 2007 to 2013, FDI fell in Europe by 72 percent and in Spain by 47 percent, yet it grew in Barcelona and its region, Catalonia, by a total of 50 percent.

A report on foreign direct investment in Barcelona by IESE’s Public-Private Sector Research Center and the Barcelona City Council’s economic development initiative, Barcelona Activa, highlights the many things that Barcelona is doing right to attract foreign investment and how it might encourage the trend to continue.

A Star in Multiple Sectors

According to available data, the region of Catalonia receives 20 percent of Spain’s total FDI, up from just 7 percent before the crisis. The city of Barcelona is home to 7,000 foreign offices and accounts for 91 percent of foreign companies settled in Catalonia. Some 46 percent of foreign companies operating in Spain have at least one office in Barcelona.

Barcelona is the top destination for FDI in continental Europe and first among European cities without a native English-speaking population. Ahead of Barcelona, only Dublin and London received more FDI, both in terms of capital invested and jobs created when construction jobs are excluded, due to their temporary nature.

Information and communications technology (ICT), logistics and the automotive industry are three key sectors attracting FDI in Barcelona. Investments in Barcelona’s ICT sector have recovered and even exceeded pre-crisis levels. The Barcelona ICT-mobile industry is benefitting from its reputation as the world’s mobile technology capital and related service activities.

The Barcelona region stands out as the leader in Europe’s logistics and design sectors. Furthermore, it ranks within Europe’s top five in 12 out the 15 sectors considered by the study. Those twelve sectors are: construction, ICT, logistics, mobility, retail and consumer goods, biotechnology and life sciences, tourism, food and agriculture, creative industries/ media, design, energy, and higher education and research.

What Barcelona Does Right

But what accounts for Barcelona’s popularity as an investment destination? According to the experts consulted via focus groups, questionnaires, interviews and surveys for this study, the Catalan capital has a number of factors that influence investor decisions:

• Intangible assets: The image and brand of Barcelona is shaped by its associated quality of life — taking into account its public and private schools and universities, local transportation services, security, climate, seaside location and even its architecture. If choosing a European base, why not choose a pleasant one?
• Well-qualified, low-cost work force: The labor available in Barcelona is highly educated, but wages are low compared with other cities in Western Europe. There’s also a large international pool, also attracted by Barcelona’s high quality of life.
• Developing business ecosystems: Business ecosystems encompass links with suppliers, customers, business partners, research centers and knowledge networks. Barcelona has worked to create business ecosystems in various sectors (e.g., ICT and biotechnology) and the resulting opportunities to collaborate and network are viewed positively by investors.
• Improving perceptions: Foreign investors located in Spain were more likely than outsiders to invest and reinvest in Barcelona and be satisfied with their investments. As perceptions improve, more foreign investors are coming in to invest and reinvest.
• Appeal in emerging markets: Already a preferred destination for firms from Europe and Japan, Barcelona is starting to attract firms from emerging markets — including firms from South America. For Asia-based firms, the port of Barcelona provides a convenient entry point for shipping goods intended for Western Europe.

Source: adapted from IESE survey

In sum, Barcelona is viewed positively around the world, despite Spain’s struggles during the economic crisis. Its quality of life attracts people from all over. Its transportation and logistics infrastructure, educated workforce and networking opportunities are also boons to those setting up shop.

According to those surveyed, institutional and administrative obstacles along with the economic and political uncertainty are the strongest barriers to investment. Consequently, (1) establishing a clear reform agenda and (2) assuring that legislative and political action will not have retroactive or unpredicted effects are two ways to help safeguard future FDI flows in the region, according to the report.

How Barcelona Can Harness Its Potential

The report lays out various recommendations for how Barcelona can continue to improve its profile to receive further FDI, including:

1. Improve intercontinental connectivity to position itself as “the best city in the best time zone.”
2. Emphasize that Barcelona is well placed to be a base for sales within Southern Europe or even the whole continent. It also boasts access to Latin American markets.
3. Open up to Asia. The report notes that Barcelona and its port represent the first great entry point in Europe coming from Asia. While Japanese companies are already investing in Barcelona, Chinese and South Korean companies could follow suit. Given that Asia’s FDI multiplied by 10 over the past 10 years, Barcelona would be wise to try to compete with other European cities for Asia’s investments.
4. Become a “one-click city.” Hosting the Mobile World Congress and promoting a Smart City project have already helped Barcelona earn a tech-friendly image. Barcelona could further foster tech innovation to make life easier for its inhabitants. Using the emergence of the smartphone and other technologies, it could become a true “one-click city.”
5. Encourage an entrepreneurial mindset. “Fresh start” legislation to help reduce the burden of business failure could help locals take on a more entrepreneurial mindset. Spain is one of the few European countries without such legislation on its books.
6. Develop the city’s brand on a global level. This includes getting the word out about Barcelona’s strengths, continuing to cut red tape, developing connections with the rest of Europe and promoting its diverse university and industrial base.

“The future of FDI is about cities, not countries,” the report concludes. Investment experts today are more likely to compare London, Birmingham, Madrid and Barcelona than they are to simply compare the United Kingdom with Spain. Promoting itself as world-class city with quality-of-life advantages, an attractive labor force and beneficial geographic location and infrastructure, the Catalan capital may continue to be an FDI magnet. Barcelona’s offerings should be tailored for the different investor profiles, the authors note.

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By J C Suresh

A decline in oil prices, a stronger U.S. economy, and continued low global interest rates will help fuel the growth of the world economy in 2015, says a new study issued by the World Bank Group on January 13.

The Global Economic Prospects report, published every two years, predicts a global economic expansion of 3 per cent for 2015, 3.3 per cent for 2016, and 3.2 per cent in 2017 – a boost following last year’s disappointing 2.6 per cent growth.

At the same time, the report adds, developing countries are expected to surge from last year’s 4.4 per cent growth to 4.8 per cent in 2015 and then strengthen to a more robust 5.4 per cent by 2017.

The developing world and large middle-income countries are, in fact, expected to benefit from lower oil prices. In Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey, the fall in oil prices will help lower inflation and reduce current account deficits. Meanwhile, exporting countries, such as Russia, can expect their economies to contract as a result, prompting opportunities for wide-scale structural reforms.

“Lower oil prices will lead to sizeable real income shifts from oil-exporting to oil-importing developing countries,” said Ayhan Kose, Director of Development Prospects at the World Bank.

“For both exporters and importers, low oil prices present an opportunity to undertake reforms that can increase fiscal resources and help broader environmental objectives.”

But the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim cautioned in a news release marking the report’s launch: “In this uncertain economic environment, developing countries need to judiciously deploy their resources to support social programs with a laser-like focus on the poor and undertake structural reforms that invest in people.”

“It’s also critical for countries to remove any unnecessary roadblocks for private sector investment,” Kim continued. “The private sector is by far the greatest source of jobs and that can lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.”

Despite the positive developments, the report paints a largely mixed picture depicting both the growing momentum of economic activity in the U.S. and Britain amid healing labour markets and a stuttering recovery in the Eurozone and Japan.

In addition, a number of risks continue to overshadow the potential of full global recovery, particularly weak global trade, possible financial market volatility, the strain low oil prices will place on oil-producing countries, and the risk of prolonged stagnation or deflation in the Eurozone or Japan.

“Worryingly, the stalled recovery in some high-income economies and even some middle-income countries may be a symptom of deeper structural malaise,” cautioned Kaushik Basu, World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice President. “As population growth has slowed in many countries, the pool of younger workers is smaller, putting strains on productivity.”

Nevertheless, Basu added, there are “some silver linings behind the clouds.”

“The lower oil price, which is expected to persist through 2015, is lowering inflation worldwide and is likely to delay interest rate hikes in rich countries. This creates a window of opportunity for oil-importing countries, such as China and India,” he said, noting the World Bank’s expectations for India’s growth to rise to 7 per cent by 2016.

Moderate pick up in Asia-Pacific growth

Another UN report forecasts that developing countries in Asia and the Pacific will grow at an average of 5.8 per cent this year, up from 5.6 per cent in 2014, spurred by decreased inflation and a steep decline in oil prices, according to a new United Nations report that indicates that structural reforms and lower oil prices can boost grown for sustainable development.

Growth in the region is being driven by improved economies in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea and Thailand, reports the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in its Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2014: Year-end Update. The report also found that growth in the region still remains below pre-crisis levels.

“Despite improved prospects, many developing economies in the region face structural constraints which have kept them from realizing their growth potential,” ESCAP Executive Secretary Dr. Shamshad Akhtar said in Bangkok as she unveiled the report on January 13.

“Infrastructure shortages remain acute and growth has not translated into enough decent jobs,” she added. Structural reforms in India and Indonesia are projected to help increase growth to 6.4 and 5.6 per cent, respectively, from 5.5 and 5.2 per cent, respectively, in 2014. Growth in China is forecast to hover around 7 per cent in 2015.

The Year-end Update also estimates that for energy-importing countries, a $10 per barrel drop in the price of oil in 2015 would translate into an increase in GDP growth of up to 0.5 percentage points. However, reduced growth in Russia could deprive neighbouring Central Asian countries of $1.7 billion in remittances.

Among the growth drivers in the region, Thailand’s economy, after the sharp slowdown to 0.8 per cent in 2014, is forecast to grow by 3.9 per cent due to increased short-term consumer and investor confidence following the end of the protracted political instability.

However, likely capital volatility in 2015, triggered by developed world monetary policies could slash Asia-Pacific GDP growth by up to 0.7 percentage points, ESCAP estimates, advocating sound macroeconomic management and macroprudential policies to address this.

On the domestic front, developing countries in the region need to bridge physical and social infrastructure gaps that need an annual investment of $815 billion, according to the Year-end Update. It outlines ways to increase infrastructure financing and recommends labour market reforms to increase decent job opportunities.

Meanwhile, declining global oil prices could reduce fuel subsidies that account for a large share of national budgets in many countries in the region. ESCAP estimates that savings from those subsidies could, for example, finance the provision of income security to the elderly and persons with disabilities as well as universal access to health and education.

“This is a particularly critical and opportune time to decrease subsidies,” the ESCAP Executive Secretary said, noting that this would not only reduce budgetary strains but also prepare governments for the near future when global financing may be even more challenging to secure.

“Reducing subsidies can raise significant public financial resources for productive investment in the region and could make needed funds available for financing sustainable development,” Dr. Akhtar concluded.

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NASA’s New Horizons spacecraft recently began its long-awaited, historic encounter with Pluto. The spacecraft is entering the first of several approach phases that culminate July 14 with the first close-up flyby of the dwarf planet, 4.67 billion miles (7.5 billion kilometers) from Earth.

“NASA first mission to distant Pluto will also be humankind’s first close up view of this cold, unexplored world in our solar system,” said Jim Green, director of NASA’s Planetary Science Division at the agency’s Headquarters in Washington. “The New Horizons team worked very hard to prepare for this first phase, and they did it flawlessly.”

The fastest spacecraft when it was launched, New Horizons lifted off in January 2006. It awoke from its final hibernation period last month after a voyage of more than 3 billion miles, and will soon pass close to Pluto, inside the orbits of its five known moons. In preparation for the close encounter, the mission’s science, engineering and spacecraft operations teams configured the piano-sized probe for distant observations of the Pluto system that start Sunday, Jan. 25 with a long-range photo shoot.

The images captured by New Horizons’ telescopic Long-Range Reconnaissance Imager (LORRI) will give mission scientists a continually improving look at the dynamics of Pluto’s moons. The images also will play a critical role in navigating the spacecraft as it covers the remaining 135 million miles (220 million kilometers) to Pluto.

“We’ve completed the longest journey any spacecraft has flown from Earth to reach its primary target, and we are ready to begin exploring,” said Alan Stern, New Horizons principal investigator from Southwest Research Institute in Boulder, Colorado.

LORRI will take hundreds of pictures of Pluto over the next few months to refine current estimates of the distance between the spacecraft and the dwarf planet. Though the Pluto system will resemble little more than bright dots in the camera’s view until May, mission navigators will use the data to design course-correction maneuvers to aim the spacecraft toward its target point this summer. The first such maneuver could occur as early as March.

“We need to refine our knowledge of where Pluto will be when New Horizons flies past it,” said Mark Holdridge, New Horizons encounter mission manager at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Maryland. “The flyby timing also has to be exact, because the computer commands that will orient the spacecraft and point the science instruments are based on precisely knowing the time we pass Pluto – which these images will help us determine.”

The “optical navigation” campaign that begins this month marks the first time pictures from New Horizons will be used to help pinpoint Pluto’s location.

Throughout the first approach phase, which runs until spring, New Horizons will conduct a significant amount of additional science. Spacecraft instruments will gather continuous data on the interplanetary environment where the planetary system orbits, including measurements of the high-energy particles streaming from the sun and dust-particle concentrations in the inner reaches of the Kuiper Belt. In addition to Pluto, this area, the unexplored outer region of the solar system, potentially includes thousands of similar icy, rocky small planets.

More intensive studies of Pluto begin in the spring, when the cameras and spectrometers aboard New Horizons will be able to provide image resolutions higher than the most powerful telescopes on Earth. Eventually, the spacecraft will obtain images good enough to map Pluto and its moons more accurately than achieved by previous planetary reconnaissance missions.

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By Justin Scott Finkelstein*

After the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks last spring, the Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas had a short list of options: (1) start a new, violent intifada, (2) resume negotiations on Israel’s terms (without any preconditions), or (3) move the Palestinian cause forward at the United Nations and other international bodies.

For a host of reasons, Abbas has chosen the third option. At the end of December, the Palestinian President submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council that set a Dec. 31, 2017 deadline for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The resolution was one vote shy of being approved, but Abbas has vowed to go back to the Security Council until it receives the required nine of fifteen votes (which could happen, as many countries rotate as non-permanent members of the body). Shortly after the resolution’s defeat, Abbas signed the Rome Statute, making the Palestinians eligible to charge Israelis with war crimes in the International Criminal Court (ICC).

What brought Abbas to this point? One can begin answering this question by taking a look at the first two options, which are simply unfeasible for the Ramallah-based leader. Regarding the first, it is fairly clear that Abbas opposes an all-out violent intifada against Israel, as he believes taking this route would only bring about a massive Israeli retaliation that would wreak havoc on the lives of millions of Palestinians. It simply would not achieve an end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state.

The second option – to negotiate with Israel with no preconditions – would be political suicide for Abbas. Public opinion polls of Palestinians have shown wide disapproval of the Palestinian Authority negotiating with Israel without any preconditions, such as a settlements freeze or the release of Palestinian prisoners. Abbas would seriously risk losing any remaining relevance and legitimacy he has among the Palestinian people: he is in the tenth year of a four-year term and in the eyes of most Palestinians, he has not brought his people any closer to ending the Israeli occupation and achieving statehood.

Conversely, opinion polls have found widespread support among the Palestinian public for going to international bodies. This is a very important context through which to view the Palestinian moves at the U.N. and the ICC: of all the options on the table for the Palestinian Authority, this is-–domestically-–the only tenable one. To do nothing would only further erode Abbas’ legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public.

Beyond that, there are also some strategic considerations for Abbas. In addition to being swayed by the Palestinian street, Abbas and the Palestinian Authority have lost considerable faith in the traditional model of American-led bilateral negotiations with the Israelis. In the Palestinian view, they have been negotiating for twenty years and the prospect of an independent Palestinian state has only grown more distant. Therefore, Abbas has decided to try to “internationalize” the conflict by bringing the Palestinian case to international bodies and institutions. However, a complete pivot away from America will likely only hurt his people-–and Abbas knows this. Hence he faces the tricky balancing act of not pushing the Americans too far away while at the same time giving Palestinians confidence in his leadership by doing just that.

Yet the greater irony here is that the moves in both the U.N. and the ICC will likely not change anything on the ground in the foreseeable future. Despite the United States initially showing some rare ambiguity on whether or not it would veto the Palestinian proposal at the Security Council (America usually makes clear its opposition to resolutions regarded by Israel as being against the Jewish state’s interests), it has become apparent that the U.S. will veto any resolution that sets a deadline for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Since the original intent of the Palestinian resolution was to set an internationally-agreed upon end date for the occupation, a resolution with no timetable would essentially be meaningless.

In addition, going to the ICC carries more risks. On the one hand, the Palestinians could gain some leverage against Israel if the ICC indicts Israeli politicians and military figures on charges of war crimes. This could make it impossible for Israeli leaders to travel to many countries that accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and would arrest any convicted Israelis on their soil. This would be a major diplomatic blow to Israel. On the other hand, Abbas and the Palestinian Authority know that Israel could counter their move by bringing its own charges against high-ranking Palestinian officials (and terrorist groups like Hamas) to the ICC.

Finally, it must be remembered that investigations conducted by the ICC have historically either dragged on for years before issuing a verdict, and oftentimes investigations never go beyond an initial phase of “preliminary examinations.” If the Palestinians have indeed taken this into consideration and their goal is to simply pressure Israel into making concessions (perhaps at the negotiating table at some point in the future), the risk becomes greater: it is anybody’s guess as to how Israel will respond to mounting international pressure at the U.N. and ICC.

It may be asked why the three options above are Abbas’s only choices. A fourth option, floated by some, would be for President Abbas to spearhead a non-violent uprising consisting of massive protests and demonstrations at flashpoint locations in the West Bank. Such areas may include land near parts of Israel’s security barrier that is seen by Palestinians as encroaching on private Palestinian property or village territories (smaller demonstrations already occur regularly at some of these locales), on land Israel has announced it will be using for settlements and at the sites of particularly contentious Israeli checkpoints.

Reasons why Abbas has not done this remain largely speculative, but a good guess might be that Abbas is concerned that the protests would turn violent and spiral into a new intifada, much like the Second Intifada of 2000 to 2005. Abbas knows that could lead to the massive Israeli retaliation that he worries would only make daily life for Palestinians worse.

Furthermore, Abbas is aware that he would be held responsible by Israel for any violent escalation. It was only some twelve years ago that Abbas, as a senior figure in the Palestinian Authority, saw Israeli forces destroy much of then-Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s compound in Ramallah-–leaving Arafat with very limited space in which to take refuge-–in retaliation for the violent intifada Israel believed Arafat was instrumental in fomenting. Abbas certainly does not want this to happen again.

A diplomatic spree at the U.N.-–and even a bid at the ICC-–simply carries much less risk of backfiring in such dramatic proportions. Therefore, with all these factors considered, the U.N. and ICC route is the only option left for Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.

Two developments to look out for, however, are Secretary of State John Kerry’s continued efforts to revive peace talks and the outcome of the upcoming Israeli elections on March 17. Kerry has not given up on getting the Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. This seems rather unlikely with the present Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which refuses to release more prisoners or freeze settlements as a precondition and does not seem to be in any rush to negotiate. Yet if a new government headed by Labor party leader Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni is elected, we may see some crafty maneuvering by Israel in order to get back to the table with the Palestinians.

Both Herzog and Livni believe it is in Israel’s vital interest to negotiate a two-state solution with the Palestinians and may be willing to freeze settlements, release prisoners or make other significant gestures to get the Palestinian Authority to negotiate. Abbas, for his part, has historically been willing to negotiate if the right incentives are offered. Furthermore, Abbas is not officially eligible to submit a case to the ICC until April 1, 2015 (when Palestine officially becomes an ICC member)-–coincidentally just two weeks after the Israeli elections. If a more conciliatory Israeli government emerges from those elections that makes concrete gestures to Abbas, it is not completely unfathomable that Abbas would postpone bringing a case to the court.

Regarding America’s Secretary of State, one must not underestimate the tenacity of John Kerry. Bent on finding a peaceful solution to the conflict as he is, it would not be out of character for Kerry to try multiple techniques in order to get the parties back to the table. He may yet pull something new out of his sleeve in order to bring this about. What exactly this would be likely depends on how the ICC bid unfolds and the outcome of the Israeli elections–multiplying the already numerous factors to take into consideration.

About the author:
* Justin Scott Finkelstein is a Research Associate in FPRI’s Program on the Middle East, where his research focuses on issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli and Palestinian public opinion on the two-state solution, and Israeli domestic politics. Finkelstein previously worked as a Program Associate for the Study of the U.S. Institute on Religious Pluralism and Democracy – a State Department-funded program that brings undergraduate students from the Middle East to America for education about religious diversity, democracy and dialogue. He also works as an editorial consultant.

Source:
This article was published here by FPRI.

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The United States and United Kingdom will conduct joint cyber “war games” against each country’s banks, financial institutions, and other critical infrastructure in order to improve defenses against cyber attacks.

Additionally, the two allies will create a joint “cyber cell” featuring agents from both countries that will conduct the war games and share information on threats, as well as the best ways to combat hackers. The US division has already been staffed with members of the FBI, National Security Agency, GCHQ, and MI5, the Guardian reported.

The first war game will occur later this year with the help of the Bank of England, and will target institutions in London and on Wall Street. Later exercises will test other infrastructure such as power suppliers and transportation systems.

The news comes as British Prime Minister David Cameron arrived in the United States Thursday to meet with President Barack Obama for two days of talks. The two are slated to discuss boosting the global economy and terrorism, as well as cyber security.

Prior to meeting with Obama, Cameron commented on the joint cyber initiative.

“Just as we have worked with our closest ally, the US, to protect our people and our countries from traditional threats, so we must work together to defend ourselves from new threats like cyber attacks,” he said.

“This is an evolving threat which poses a real risk to our businesses, and that’s why we’re taking our cooperation with the US to an unprecedented level. This is about pooling our effort so we stay one step ahead of those who seek to attack us.”

Part of the cyber security deal also includes setting money aside to train the next wave of cyber agents.

“The joint exercises and training of our next generation of cyber-experts will help to ensure that we have the capability we need to protect critical sectors like our energy, transport and financial infrastructure from emerging threats,” said Cameron.

Cameron is also expected to ask Obama to pressure social media giants like Facebook and Twitter to share information with UK intelligence agencies so that the government can more effectively monitor threats made online. Facebook and Twitter offer encrypt communication services for users that government agents cannot access, and hardware companies like Apple and Google are also offering encryption to those who use their devices.

These developments have sparked criticism from both US and UK officials, who have argued that law enforcement and national security agencies need easier access to data in order to prevent criminal and terrorist acts.

Civil liberties group Privacy International (PI) warned that Cameron and his Conservative party are guilty of “cynical opportunism” in the aftermath of the French terror attacks.

“Government officials…rally in the name of freedom and human rights claiming that the terrorists will never win and hate us for our freedoms. Then moments later…they attempt to curtail our rights they boldly proclaim in public as unassailable,” a spokesman for the group said.

Earlier this week, Obama highlighted the danger of cyber attacks in the wake of the Sony hack and proposed new measures to enhance security. Obama called on Congress to pass legislation that would improve information sharing between the private sector and the government. He also said that the law should compel companies to quickly notify customers when their data has been breached.

“This extraordinary interconnection” made possible by the internet “creates enormous opportunities,” Obama said Monday, “but also creates enormously vulnerabilities for us as a nation and for our economy and for individuals.”

However, his data-sharing plan also came under fire from privacy advocates who are wary of surveillance concerns following revelations about the NSA’s wide-ranging domestic surveillance programs.

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By Nick Simeone

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in what was expected to be his last major address to the troops before leaving office, told an Army audience today the world is at a defining moment, with events charging ahead with a new immediacy, creating less margin for error for U.S. leaders and he urged the military to “prepare this institution in ways that we’ve never had to.”

In an address at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy on Fort Bliss, Texas, Hagel described the cascade of events that have occurred on his watch — from threats associated with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the emergence of the Islamic State of the Iraq and the Levant in the Middle East, Ebola’s spread in West Africa and other challenges to national security — as being unprecedented in modern times, a trend that he said will continue to place demands on military leaders.

“We are living at a very defining time in the world,” Hagel said. “We have not seen disruptions in the world order like we are seeing today since World War II.”

While only the people of the affected countries can ultimately solve such problems, Hagel said, the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria along with sectarian violence in the Middle East in general will require solid judgment on the part of U.S. leaders, who will have “very little margin of error.”

Key Requirements for Leadership

“The world will be presented more and more with those kinds of issues where responsible leadership will always end up having to rely on responsible judgment,” said Hagel, who added that not every problem will come with immediate answers.

“These next few years will define a world order,” full of ups and downs and inconsistencies, he said.

“That means we have to prepare this institution in ways we’ve never had to prepare it and much of that will fall on you in your command positions,” Hagel said. He emphasized that he believes qualities such as responsibility and good judgment will continue to be the key requirements for leadership in the Defense Department of the future.

“You can’t teach that. It’s an accumulation of experiences of knowledge, of commitment,” the secretary said.

Budget Uncertainty

Despite the threats, Hagel, in response to a question from the audience, called budget uncertainty the biggest challenge the military faces over the next decade, given the looming return of spending cuts ordered by the budget sequester that are set to take effect next year requiring the department to find billions in additional cuts.

“I don’t think the demands on the Department of Defense will be less over the next few years,” Hagel said. “I think they’ll be more.”

Hagel, the first enlisted combat veteran to lead the Defense Department, fondly recalled his days training in the Army at Fort Bliss nearly 50 years ago.

“I might say enlightening, when you are referenced not by your name, but by other superlatives in those days,” said Hagel, recalling the time he spent enduring the wrath of drill sergeants before he deployed to Vietnam in 1968.

As he looked back on his nearly two years as defense secretary, Hagel described his biggest challenge in leading “the largest enterprise in the world” as deciding how to manage the demands placed on his time and making sure that “every minute of that time counts” in a job that he called all-consuming.

“You’ve got one bottom line – responsibility,” he said. “That’s the security of this country, and you live with that every day.”

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By Samir Saran*

What is a security actor and how is it different from being a great or major power? In many ways, this question is central to understanding the lack of appreciation of the European Union (EU) as an actor in the security arena in India and certainly in some other parts of Asia. The use of the word ‘security actor’ by EU agencies and research institutes is itself perhaps a neutralisation of the phrase ‘major power’. This reveals the ambivalence of the EU to power in contemporary times, despite having given the world several great powers in the past. This ambivalence, and the hesitant Asian comprehension of the EU’s role in the security domain shape the current debate.

However, to move beyond this general understanding and to try and understand the Indian perspective on this issue, three key enquiries are essential. First, does the EU have the agency to be a security actor? Second, does it have the capability and capacity to follow through in this role? And, finally, does the EU, or a significant part thereof, see itself as a Security Actor?

Agency: Who do I call?

The EU is a great economic power and is central to the construction of any polycentric order. In spite of this, it is not viewed as a security actor. Perhaps this can in part be explained by what Henry Kissinger once famously said, in an interview with Der Spiegel, ‘Who do I call if I want to call Europe?’. While the EU now has a number of structures that deal with security its security policy has not evolved to the point where it can shape emerging international security scenarios.

The principal issue is that of integration. Collectively, it appears that the EU thinks of itself more as a civil and economic power, viewing military instruments as an option of last resort. Within the EU, France and the United Kingdom have a different approach in which use of force, or the threat of the use of force is a prominent instrument in their toolbox. Some others like Germany tend to take the opposite view and are generally more reluctant to sanction the use of force.

This can have consequences like France declaring that its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council will remain a French seat and will not be ceded to the EU. France has also rejected the validity of a UN veto when humanitarian crises loom (as was the case in Syria)[1]. These two French positions have led to both disappointment and alarm in other members of the EU. Damagingly for the EU, the latest crisis in Europe, i.e. the occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, has only confirmed this apprehension. The lack of a coordinated EU response is disconcerting, as what we have is a set of nations individually condemning Russian actions and others staying silent.

Trade and commerce across the EU is now so integrated that it allows for similar perceptions and ideas on most macro and several micro economic policies. This allows the EU far greater cohesion and therefore, weight in trade talks. On the other hand, political approaches and realities in each member country vary dramatically. This dissonance between a cohesive economic union and a relatively divided political union has a significant impact on the perception of the EU in a continent like Asia where the realist paradigm dominates. The EU is likely to be seen as a ‘hyper-successful’ regional trading and economic arrangement, but not a unified security actor or a ‘great power’. It is also seen to be creating a large political and security bureaucracy, which churns out some strategic and security objectives, without seeking to possess the hard power elements to realise these set of goals.

Capacity: Acute Deficit

Capacity is the key element that will define the EU’s ability in the Asian theatre. In 2012, as per the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ (IISS, London) estimates, Asian defence expenditure exceeded Europe’s. Indeed within the EU, member states are increasingly hesitant to commit towards defence expenditure. Additionally, the focus of current expenditure is on capabilities that are not decisive in the Asia-Pacific theatre or suitable for hard power projection in the classic sense. There is little political and public support for defence expenditure when social spending is deemed a higher priority.

As a result, the EU’s ability to play a role in the international system is going to be far more constrained than ever before. This is perhaps evidenced by the fact that not a single European or EU action has been carried out without US support even when taking on vastly inferior militaries like those of Serbia or Libya.

This acute capacity deficit means that if the EU chooses to act by itself, it comes up against the various perceptions among the EU member states on its role as security actor. On the other hand, if it chooses to act through the agency of NATO to bypass this internal dissonance, it is fundamentally dependant on the US for capacity.

Self-View: “Empire of Norms”

The recent description of the EU being an ‘empire of norms’ is another important facet of the view of the EU as a security actor.[2] It connotes a renunciation of the modes and methods of traditional empires in favour of one that leads by example and rules, largely renouncing the use of force and prioritising economic integration. In this, the EU has something to teach the world; the postmodern construction of international relations. But beyond the EU, the post 1989 sense of euphoria, has not translated into political evolution that suggest support for any such new approach to sovereign relations.

The EU firmly believes it has entered a post modern world, whereas in reality much collective action today is directed towards pre-modern situations like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. To use an Americanism, ‘when you don’t have dirty work to do you can be dressed in white clothes’. As a result, when the EU piggybacks on US hard power, it can well afford to play the ‘empire of norms’ role. This harks back to India in the 1950s and 1960s when India was ‘preachy'[3], telling Europe to peacefully coexist with the USSR, substituting rhetoric, largely to compensate for acute structural weaknesses. Today, India and Europe have traded places and the projection of EU rhetoric is seen as a sign of weakness, borne out by the structural factors discussed earlier.

View from Asia 1: Largely favourable

Immediately after World War II, the main goal was peace and stability and hence there was the need for a specific role for the set of actors who could provide this. But in the 21st century, the narrative has changed. Economic growth and prosperity, in an age of stagnant industrial growth, is the overarching political priority of these times. Even though the world may have moved beyond the post-war quest for peace, to the singular objective of greater economic vibrancy, the EU’s role in securing this objective cannot be denied given its economic agency. However, political stability is a necessary condition for sustainable growth and economic well-being. This stability is to be created and preserved collectively by the old and new powers. Therefore in Asia, in countries such as India, there exists a largely favourable view of the EU’s role in the world. India sees a decisive security role for the EU, albeit as an agent of ‘The Asian Century’.

Following from this, if the EU is a decisive player in the contemporary context, European hard power is not necessarily viewed unfavourably and is a situation that India can negotiate well. A strong EU is good for the balance of power and stability in Eurasia and therefore favourable to India. In fact, a not so uncommon view in India is that if there is a decline in the EU’s hard power, it might contribute to flux in the balance of power in Eurasia, leading to instability. Thus, the EU is still seen as a decisive actor in the security dynamics of Asia. And a real example is the EU’s arms embargo on China, which could be said to contribute to stability in Asia.

However, in India, the EU is also seen as hypocritical in its application and espousal of rules and norms. This is sometimes inimical to the larger objective of stability and prosperity because the EU is perceived to be trying to impose normative frameworks on societies, which are not yet ready to accept them. This is not necessarily an EU-specific flaw. Every country has displayed this hypocrisy where its core interests are at stake. India itself follows a very different set of rules in its own neighbourhood than in the rest of the world. For example, India intervened decisively in 1971 in Bangladesh and for much of the 1980s and 1990s in Sri Lanka. But where its core interests are not at stake, it adopts a very different stance.

While largely hypothetical, India’s main concerns, should the EU decide to play the role of a security actor would be: where and how does the EU want to operate? Does it merely look at its periphery? Or does it seek to project out? If it operates for longer periods of time in Asia, will it be in a continental or a maritime role? Given that the naval dimension and the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean have largely driven much of India’s strategic realignment post 1990, India would almost certainly welcome EU as an offshore balancer. This is evident from the fact that India welcomed the EU-led operation Atalanta aimed at controlling piracy off the coast of East Africa. Similarly, India voiced no concerns at the build up of a formidable projection force off the proximate Myanmar coast following cyclone Nargis, and actively cooperated with US and European navies in the wake of the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004.

View from Asia 2: Geography and sovereignty matter

Multiple path dependencies, along with the overarching economic prosperity objective mean that the EU’s cost-benefit analysis of engaging in Asia, for example, is very different from India’s. The EU would have more to lose economically in any prolonged military engagement in Asia and therefore prefers economic tools such as sanctions. Of course geography matters not just to the EU. This is evident in how India perceived Bangladesh in 1971 and how it perceives the situation in Syria today. In the case of the former, the instability in India’s neighbourhood had a direct impact on India’s demography and security and the cost-benefit analysis of action was very different to the likely costs of EU’s action in the region. Syria, on the other hand, was more of a normative issue for India on how it balanced humanitarian intervention against a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); whereas Syria had a more proximate impact on Europe and subsequently on its cost-benefit analysis of action.

Lastly, in a continent like Asia that has a history of being colonised, sovereignty is an important consideration. From this perspective, the EU’s rather relaxed interpretation of sovereignty, partly used in its explanations for humanitarian interventions, can be seen as unsettling. Moreover, the selective use of sovereignty can erode the credibility of the EU as a whole. For example, defence sales such as those of the Rafale, Gripen or Eurofighter are carried out under sovereign flags and these in turn guarantee certain sovereignties to recipient countries. However, when uncomfortable decisions are taken such as the arms embargo on China, the EU is used as the shield, effectively a policy of safety in numbers.[4] This means bilateral brownie points accrue to individual sovereign constituents of the EU, without translating into advantages to the EU as a whole. However, disadvantages and the resultant negative perceptions are spread across the board and impact on the image of the collective.

Going forward

Going forward, there are four central cleavages between the Indian and European worldviews.

The first has to necessarily be language and the principle source of information that shapes Indian understanding of Europe and EU. Not having a core of experts trained in European languages, a disproportionately small foreign service and a structural incapability to collect primary data[5], much analysis of Europe and the EU rests on secondary source analysis of a euro-sceptic English language press. Consequently, the nature of the EU’s decision making remains even more of a mystery to Indian audiences.

The second is that the EU (for reasons already discussed) is not viewed in India as a credible security actor. In fact, Europe’s recent humanitarian interventions are seen as creating dangerous precedents in Asia, changing the security dynamics in the region and creating fresh security challenges which the EU does not have the capability to deal with. This is where India and the EU are on a collision course. India wants Europe to be more cognisant of its hard security role. In addition, India wants the EU to be responsive to emerging security issues, which will be shaped by new specificities and geographies of conflict. Local understanding and localised responses would be in order and Europe must begin to engage from within and not from outside.

The third is with regard to global governance. European institutes tend to securitise the global commons and global public goods discourse.[6] Every economic and social service provision is being subsumed under a security discourse. This approach may be useful to galvanise public opinion in the Euro-Atlantic community; but in Asia, where societies are still evolving and discovering a balance of narratives between the political and military discourse, it could be dangerous and counterproductive. In countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, if water, environment and trade become security narratives, discussions within and among these regional countries would essentially become zero sum games. Additionally, the preponderance of the military architecture and defence bureaucracy diminishes the role of democratic institutions and the role of civilian governments. This is counterproductive to the liberal democratic value system that EU espouses. It may appear that in order to compensate for its lack of military heft, the EU seeks to overbalance through the securitisation narratives.

Finally, the central division between the EU and India is the tyranny of grammar. Europe and the EU pursue their interests under the grammar of values, which is sought to be achieved through ideological underpinnings. India has sometimes also couched many of its strategic interests in its own grammar of ethics. Till a new language is discovered where the two can negotiate their individual interests (doing away with ideological sermonising), common ground (based on core interests of prosperity, growth and liberal market framework) will be lost to a rather unnecessary battle of perceived virtues.

*Samir Saran is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: http://www.bpb.de/internationales/asien/indien/190264/the-european-union-as-a-security-actor

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As ASEAN Chairman this year Malaysia has to tackle the South China Seas disputes. Malaysia’s supposed “hedging” stance should be viewed more comprehensively.

By Oh Ei Sun*

2015 sees Malaysia stepping up to the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN, just as the ten member states are poised to embrace the much anticipated ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Amidst the continued global economic slowdown, it is perhaps understandable that much attention has been focused on AEC as yet another impetus to spur regional economic growth, and by extension on Malaysia’s hopefully adroit skill in ASEAN’s driver’s seat.

Nevertheless, the disputes over the territorial and maritime sovereignty of a large part of the South China Sea, although apparently quietened down late last year, continued to be a latent challenge for all regional parties concerned. How skillfully Malaysia, both as a claimant party as well as ASEAN chair, handles the South China Sea disputes in relation to its three ASEAN co-claimants as well as China is crucial to regional peace and security.

Priority for economic cooperation

Recently, some researchers characterised Malaysia’s management of its South China Sea dispute with China as a “hedging” one, balancing its national interest of maintaining close economic relations with Beijing with the “regional” interest of ASEAN solidarity vis-a-vis China. While this “hedging” label on Malaysia may be partially accurate, it begs a more comprehensive and nuanced view of Malaysia’s international role as well as a more realistic regional outlook.

Firstly, for hundreds of years, Malaysia (and its preceding constituent states) has been a vibrant regional trading hub. This is especially so when the country undertook rapid industrialisation in the last half century, albeit with the vital assistance of foreign investments. The prevalent Malaysian national psyche, including and especially that of the ruling elite, thus exhibits a strong natural predilection toward economic concerns such as improved trade and investment, as opposed to overly ideological and nationalistic concerns.

Malaysia’s trade volume with China is indeed tremendous, surpassing US$100 billion annually over the last few years, making China its largest overall trading partner, and Malaysia China’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. These fruitful and escalating bilateral economic ties thus understandably overshadow the intermittent South China Sea disputes, which do not show any immediate or even medium-term resolution.

Malaysia’s non-adoption of the more confrontational approaches of Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea disputes is therefore not surprising. Vietnam unfortunately experienced protracted and traumatic armed conflicts in its road towards nation-building, and its arguably more nationalistic attitude can thus be somewhat understood. The Philippines for obvious domestic reasons was not endowed with the massive economic development (and the resulting preference for trade) seen in the case of Malaysia.

Regional solidarity

But even if the term “hedging” were to describe Malaysia’s handling of the South China Sea disputes, it should at least be construed in a wider context. It is widely known that in addition to maintaining fertile trading relations with China, Malaysia, not unlike its many Southeast Asian neighbours, also welcomes the United States to continue playing a constructive role in regional security matters. Joint exercises (including maritime ones in or near the disputed waters), port calls and anti-terror efforts, to name but a few, continue to be cornerstones of US-Malaysia security cooperation.

Malaysia’s US-friendly stance, at least in security-related aspects, thus does not differ substantially from that exhibited by either Vietnam or the Philippines. It is perhaps also interesting to note that Malaysia and China will reportedly hold their first-ever joint military field exercise later this year.

Indeed, Malaysia certainly did not abandon regional solidarity with its neighbours when it comes to the South China Sea disputes. Malaysia remains committed and is proactively pushing for eventual region-wide solutions to the disputes. Malaysia is also equally comfortable with China’s preference for bilateral dealings over the South China Sea issue.

But whether bilaterally or multilaterally, Malaysia is flexible in terms of the ways and means – direct negotiation, mediation, joint development, arbitration, adjudication or otherwise – for resolving the disputes. Most of these have been successfully employed to conclusively settle its territorial disputes with neighbours such as Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.

Malaysia, in this respect, looks favourably toward the region-wide (including both China and Southeast Asian claimant states) adoption of the Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea. Although the COC supposedly does not touch on sovereignty issues, it should provide a pragmatic framework for potentially managing, if not resolving, the South China Sea disputes. As ASEAN chairman Malaysia is likely to accord high priority to the adoption of the COC.

Confrontational benefits elusive

More fundamentally, it could also be argued that the more aggressive approaches preferred by the Philippines and Vietnam in dealing with China on the South China Sea disputes did not quite produce the results that they would have desired. For example, in the aftermath of the Philippines’ 2012 run-in with China over the Scarborough Shoal (which China calls Huangyan Island), Beijing assumes de facto control over access to the territory.

Similarly, despite Vietnam’s repeated skirmishes with China over the Paracel Islands/Xisha, these remain firmly under Chinese administration. As such, other Southeast Asian claimants, Malaysia included, could not elicit positive lessons from such confrontational styles.

Even the Philippines and Vietnam did not always confront China resolutely over the South China Sea disputes. In the midst of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the Philippines inaugurated a China-funded dam project. Vietnam, which shares similar ideological outlook with China, often sees its South China Sea conflicts with China tone down after high-level party-to-party visits between the two countries.

For all these reasons, and with the benefit of a more comprehensive grasp of regional and international power-play realities, Malaysia may be said to more than just “hedge” its way out of the South China Sea disputes. It hews to a more comprehensive approach towards the eventual peaceful resolution of these disputes.

*Oh Ei Sun is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. A version of this commentary also appeared in Global Times.

The post More Nuanced Than Just ‘Hedging': Malaysia And South China Sea Disputes – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Lebanese army foiled more terror plots Thursday, announcing the arrest of a cell planning a series of suicide attacks in the country and dismantling a car packed with explosives in northeastern Lebanon. Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, for his part, warned that terrorism from Syria and Iraq has actually reached Lebanon, while guaranteeing that Lebanese security services were fully capable of thwarting terrorist schemes.

The military said in a statement that it dismantled a Mercedes rigged with 120 kilograms of explosives after an army Intelligence patrol spotted it in the area of Ain al-Shaab, on the outskirts of the northeastern town of Arsal.

An earlier army statement announced that the military thwarted a series of suicide attacks which were planned to take place after a twin suicide bombing which hit Tripoli Saturday.

The army said it arrested Bassam Houssam al-Naboush, Elie Tony al-Warraq and Mohannad Ali Abdel-Kader who were plotting a series of terrorist attacks against “army locations and residential areas.”

An army source said that although his name indicated he was a Christian, Elie Tony al-Warraq was actually a Sunni from Tripoli.

The three suspects, who had been using fake Syrian and Palestinian IDs, were linked to Shadi Mawlawi and Osama Mansour, two of the most-wanted Islamist fugitives in Lebanon.

The men had pledged allegiance to “terrorist organizations and participated in the fighting in Syria as well as in attacks on the army,” the statement said. The source identified the terrorist organizations as the Nusra Front and ISIS.

The statement added that Naboush, Warraq and Abdel-Kader had also participated in the series of deadly clashes over the last four years between the Tripoli neighborhoods of Jabal Mohsen, which is sympathetic to Syrian President Bashar Assad, and Bab al-Tabbaneh, which supports the uprising in Syria.

The statement said the detainees were being interrogated by the judiciary and that the remaining members of the terrorist group were being pursued.

The arrests came a few days after twin suicide bombings – the first in the past six months – rocked the majority Alawite neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen, killing nine people and wounding more than 30.

Meanwhile, Machnouk assured the Lebanese that security services were able to counter terrorist threats which he said the country was being exposed to.

“Terrorism from Syria and Iraq has now reached Lebanese territories – what happened in Arsal and lately in Jabal Mohsen stand as proof,” Machnouk said during an interview with LBCI television.

“Every area in Lebanon is targeted. But there is a high level of alertness, seriousness and a high capability to prevent the success of any [terrorist] operation on all Lebanese territories,” he added.

Militants from ISIS and the Nusra Front briefly took over Arsal last August and kidnapped over 30 army soldiers and policemen. They are still holding at least 25 in the outskirts of Arsal.

Machnouk explained that Roumieh Prison’s Block B, which was cleared of its Islamist inmates Monday, was actually “an operations room contacting terrorists in Raqqa, Mosul, Arsal and Ain al-Hilweh.”

The Internal Security Forces moved inmates of Block B to Block D after intercepting calls between the Islamists and members of the cell behind Jabal Mohsen’s attacks.

Machnouk said the government would not accept any messing with the stability of the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, located on the outskirts of the city of Sidon.

He said authorities would discuss the issue with Palestinian officials, but highlighted that no military operations would target the camp.

Machnouk said that a security plan in the northern Bekaa Valley would be launched soon.

“We will continue the security plan in the Bekaa Valley soon in coordination with the Lebanese army and the Internal Security Forces,” he said, adding that the security plan enjoyed a full political cover.

Original article

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By Subir Bhaumik*

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led opposition alliance is back on the streets in Bangladesh to enforce a nationwide transport blockade.

Their leader Khaleda Zia, who alleges confinement in her Dhaka office for several days by police, has called for the blockade after her party was not given police permission to hold a rally in Dhaka on Jan 5. That was the day the Awami League returned to power in a national parliament election that was boycotted by the BNP and its allies. The BNP wanted to observe Jan 5 as “Murder of Democracy Day” while the ruling Awami League wanted to celebrate it as “Democracy Day”. The rival narratives, born out of the confrontation that marked last year’s general election in Bangladesh, goes a long way to highlight the apparent irreconcilability that is haunting the country’s fledgling democracy.

What is complicating it further is the ‘Great Game East’, what with China quite happy to see Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina rule the roost as that is a sure way of limiting US influence, and the Americans keen to see Khaleda Zia in power to ensure a greater presence for themselves. India is keen to ensure its security and connectivity concerns addressed – and so long as they are done by the Hasina regime Delhi is unlikely to see any great reason to advocate a change of guard in Dhaka. But when it comes to China and the US, India appears to let neither gain too much influence in what Delhi sees as its own backyard.

But it is now apparent that both the ruling Awami League and the opposition BNP are reaching out to India. Many may feel happy about the pinnacle of Indian influence in a crucial neighbouring country but that also brings forth challenges that are not easy to handle.

Prime Minister Hasina has made quite an effort to connect to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, highlighting all that she has done to fight terror and insurgency directed against India. Modi appears to be convinced that the outstanding Indian commitments on the Land Boundary Agreement and the Teesta water-sharing deals need to be concluded at the earliest. He has made both surface and submarine efforts to make West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee change her line. Banerjee’s turnaround may help Modi conclude both agreements, and once that happens it will be a feather in Hasina’s cap. It will also boost India’s image in the neighbouring country.

Now BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia, realising the limits of US influence in her country, has also turned to India to help “protect democracy” in Bangladesh. The line her colleagues have taken is interesting and worth a very close look. They say Hasina has brushed aside all offers to negotiate a new arrangement to facilitate a fresh inclusive election because she has strong Indian backing – so India will stand blamed for the “murder of democracy” in Bangladesh and that will not help Indian interests in the long run. On the quiet, Zia has tried assuring India – some say, on American advice – that her security and connectivity concerns will be as sympathetically addressed as they are by the Hasina regime.

India has so far maintained stoic neutrality on the issue of fresh election in Bangladesh, knowing as it possibly does the outcome if polls were held now. Despite much progress in development projects from road building to power generation, the Hasina government is facing much anti-incumbency due to rising corruption and factional feuds in Awami League ranks. Delhi has so far dismissed the issue as “completely internal” to Bangladesh.

After the Jan 5 polls last year, Delhi maintained the elections were a “constitutional necessity”, not venturing as far as the Chinese who promised Sino-Bangladesh relations will attain new heights under the Hasina government. India has earlier turned the other way in Myanmar on the democracy issue and engaged the military junta which was in power. Or else, it would lose out to China in the battle for influence, reasoned many in Delhi. Now India faces a similar dilemma. If it tries pushing Hasina on an early poll, it may force India’s best friend in the region to turn to China. Hasina’s recent preference for the “Chinese path of economic development”, articulated during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Dhaka visit, would not be lost on South Block. If Hasina starts considering what is good for economics as also good for politics, Bangladesh’s democracy will be in trouble.

If Delhi continues to look the other way on the plea of non-interference and allows a Hosni Mubarak-type regime emerge in Bangladesh, it may encourage Islamist radicals to gain ground and compromise Indian security in the long run. India has not one good reason to respond to Khaleda Zia’s overtures – but it can only ignore the risk of being identified with an increasingly unpopular ruling regime at its own peril.

To begin with, India needs to do some hard talking to its friends in the present government, apart from clearing the Land Boundary and Teesta deals, to get their house in order. That can happen at personal if not official levels and Modi has a friend in the Rashtrapati Bhavan who is best suited to help. Given the innate hostility of the rival parties and the severe ideological divide in the country, it will never be easy to handle a democratic transition in Bangladesh. But for India, the reality is it cannot afford to look the other way when the transition becomes imminent.

* Subir Bhaumik, a former BBC correspondent, is author of ‘Insurgent Crossfire’ and ‘Troubled Periphery’. He can be contacted at contributions@spsindia.in

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By C. Uday Bhaskar*

The terrorist attack in Paris on Wednesday (Jan 7) that saw the ruthless and cold-blooded killing of 12 people, that included the senior editorial staff of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, is an assault on the principle of free speech and the relevance of satirical journalism in the 21st century.

The three Kalashnikov-wielding masked attackers were reported to have shouted: “Allahu Akbar – we have avenged the Prophet”, and made their escape in a waiting car, in what has been described by eye-witnesses as a “calm and professional manner”. One stark difference from earlier Islamist terrorist attacks is that these perpetrators were not the suicide bomber type – they had come to kill for their cause and not die as martyrs.

While France has witnessed similar acts of violence and terror in past decades, this attack has been the most dastardly and sent shock waves across Europe and the world. France is understandably in a state of national mourning and this act has been condemned globally.

At the time of writing this comment, the French authorities have indicated that even as a massive manhunt is in progress to nab the perpetrators – one suspect has surrendered and seven more suspects have been taken into custody. The prime suspects have been identified as two brothers – Cherif and Said Kouachi, who the police warned are still at large and deemed to be “armed and dangerous”. Local sources also stated that Cherif Kouachi was convicted in 2008 to three years in prison for belonging to a Paris-based group that was engaged in recruiting jihadist fighters for the ‘cause’ in Iraq.

The satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo is no stranger to such attacks and it may be recalled that in September 2012 the same magazine had published cartoons relating to Prophet Muhammad, and at the time the protests across the Muslim world were intense and widespread. As many as 20 countries reported widespread violence and more than 30 people were killed. In the South Asian region, Pakistan witnessed the most strident protests, and even at that time the debate about free speech being intimidated raged across the world.

In the present incident – there are indicators that the perpetrators may have been radicalized by the ideology of the Islamic State (IS) and that this act was revenge for what the perpetrators believe to be a series of mounting insults against the Islamic faith. Allusion has also been made to the leader of the IS being caricatured by the magazine and the net result is a bloodbath that has seen the murder of the editor of the magazine and senior staff members, including highly respected political cartoonists of France.

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the US-led war against Islamic terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been considerable alienation in many parts of the Muslim world and this has taken the most intense form among the immigrant population of Western Europe.

France, UK and Germany are among the three nations with a sizable Muslim population. France has the largest, both in numbers and as a percentage of overall population, with five million which is 7.5 percent. Over the last five decades, many of the first generation Muslim immigrants have lived uneasily against the French dictum of assimilation, wherein they have been expected to shed their distinctive religious, linguistic and ethnic identity and become part of the mainstream.

The second and third generation children immigrants born in France now see themselves as being both French citizens yet outsiders given the inherent racism, cultural and socio-economic asymmetries that often come into play. There are success stories and the French football World Cup winning team of 1998 had the celebrated Zinedine Zidane, of Algerian descent as its talismanic captain. But these are few and far between.

The last decade has been particularly polarizing and there have been a number of instances of growing Islamophobia in many parts of Europe, and France is no exception. Right-wing political parties have exploited deteriorating economic and employment conditions to whip up European nationalist fervor and the Muslim constituency has resented this trend.

Many in Europe conjecture that the disillusioned and cynical youth from this cross-section have been attracted by the ideology of radical Islam as represented most recently by the Islamic State and have chosen to take recourse to terror and violence to further the ‘cause’.

The current Paris massacre is a gruesome manifestation of the increasing intolerance that now permeates many societies, and the easy availability of automatic weapons and related ordnance makes terrorism an easy option. The target of attack this time is the journalist – as represented by Charlie Hebdo and the grievance is an insult to the Islamic faith. This is clearly an untenable position and the global response has been to stand by France and the liberal principles it upholds. Dissent is at the heart of the liberal democratic order, and while libel and slander is to be censured, no oral or textual transgression – however obnoxious – can justify wanton murder and mayhem.

It also warrants notice that this kind of intolerance is raising its head in India as well, and both the controversy over the film “PK”, and the most recent protest and burning of effigies of certain journalists for their reporting in relation to the interception of a suspicious vessel by the Indian Coast Guard is a case in point. The larger concern in India is the inflexible assertiveness by the Hindu right-wing on many domestic issues and what may be described as a creeping Islamophobia that casts aspersions on the Muslim citizen of the country.

The Paris massacre has multiple relevance and the challenge for the global community and India in particular will be to nurture the spirit of tolerance and mutual accommodation of what may be divergent views and opinions – even if on occasion they seem to be beyond the limits of propriety and moderation.

* Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar (Retd), is Director of the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at cudaybhaskar@spsindia.in

The post Paris Massacre: Terrorism Threatens Free Speech – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By R Swaminathan*

The recent rape of a young woman in an Uber taxi in Delhi has triggered off a slew of institutional responses. These range from usual suspects like increased patrolling by the police to the unusual ones like the use of drones to keep an eye on activities. It’s interesting that the Delhi police are actively looking at deploying drones to augment and, in several cases, take over standard policing operations. At one level, it’s almost an explicit admission that their existing system of patrolling and response mechanisms – the basic framework of law and order – are fraying at the edges, often getting overwhelmed comprehensively by the ugly underbelly of the city. At another, it indicates a desperate and naïve assumption that just throwing high end technology at a deep rooted and multidimensional problem, one that’s as social and economic and it is gendered and political, will end up resolving it. By itself technology cannot be the sole solution to social issues. However, a robust ecosystem of technology-based solutions combined with the right administrative structure and a proactive policy environment can actually contribute to a better quality of life and a safer and more secure cityscape. A good example is the staggered manner in which New York mayor Michael Bloomberg set the stage for introducing drones for internal surveillance and law and order functions. Of course, it wasn’t without its share of controversies, especially on issues of privacy, but the public debate it generated contributed a great deal in clarifying the operating profile and the policy framework for the use of drones on a daily basis. Seen in this context, the decision of the Delhi police to use drones seems like an ad-hoc and knee-jerk reaction with no clear-cut thought process on how it will integrate with the existing systems of investigation, evidence gathering and recording and standard operating procedures. In order for drones to effectively augment existing police functions and create new ways of responsive intervention and action, instead of becoming yet another fancy and underutilised toy, there is a clear cut need for an enabling system. There are three fundamental pillars for creating this facilitating framework.

The first is to clearly reorient and redefine notions of airspace and air-corridors. A drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle first and an integrated digital system next. Indian policy makers tend to treat airspace as somewhat of a physical commodity, almost like a piece of land. It’s necessary to look at airspace beyond its literal definition and as a ‘collection of procedures, regulations, infrastructure, aircraft and personnel that compose the national air transportation system’. Airspace, by default, has also come to mean at least 10,000 feet. Except for the landing and take-off phase, for airlines, air traffic controllers, aviation authorities and policymakers airspace only refers to 25,000 to 35,000 feet (the standard cruising altitude for most civilian aircraft). Micro drones and small unmanned aerial vehicles, like the ones being sought to be used by Delhi police, redefine airspace with some cruising at less than 100 feet and others going up to almost 3000 feet. Though not many details are available, the drones expected to be used by the Delhi police will have the capability to transmit real time pictures to Quick Response Teams (QRTs), integrate with the existing network of CCTV cameras and fly at approximately 200 feet. The prevailing Air Traffic Control (ATC) system operates on the basis of ground level radars (a command centre) monitoring the movement of planes, and communicating directly with the pilots and co-pilots on direction, altitude, navigation, vehicle and traffic control and collision avoidance. Apart from the constant guidance and inputs from the ATC, pilots either visually try and spot aerial vehicle or use the Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) to avoid untoward incidents. Unmanned aerial vehicles have to integrate with the current system, especially with the TCAS. This requires the current ATC system to introduce new generation radars that can track small and microdrones flying at extremely low altitudes. Additionally a system to physically and electronically identify drones has to be evolved. Since drones will increasingly become part of a networked environment, it’s critical to give each drone a unique electronic code, something like an Internet protocol address, for quick, easy and clear identification. In this regard, the European Union’s policy and approach document towards the regulation and management of unmanned aerial vehicles is an excellent starting point.

The second is to reconceptualise connectivity and infrastructure. Drones are, for all practical purposes, the first autonomous peer-to-peer connective infrastructure that does not need a hub. Though each drone is an independent hub and a spoke at a same time, nonetheless they require adequate docking and charging stations. If the Delhi police is serious about integrating drones as part of its law and order maintenance and surveillance system then it has to first establish specifically earmarked docking and recharging stations. Most of these drones are either electrically and battery operated or work on alternative energy means like solar energy. The docking and maintenance stations will require their own power sources, an entire band of unmanned aerial vehicle engineers, maintenance crew and a complete supply chain system for parts, electronics and networking solutions. There is also a need to support and evolve a domestic drone industry that understands specific Indian challenges. Today, most of the drones are imported and then customised. These two aspects, of a evolving a docking and maintenance infrastructure and a robust domestic industry, cannot be achieved till all aspects of civilian drone management and regulation is integrated into one single department. The issues of integration of unmanned aerial vehicle with existing systems of law and order transcend boundaries of civil aviation, internal security, privacy and safety and external security. A crucial component of resolving this challenge to satisfaction is to reorient the role of DGCA from an agency focusing exclusively on providing various forms of certifications for flight operations, air worthiness and the final Certificate of Authorisation (COA), and to become a true regulator on the lines of a Securities Exchange and Board of India (SEBI) and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). In this respect it would be a good idea to look at the policy measures being taken in the United States of America to expand the regulatory mandate of the FAA to slowly integrate drones with the existing manned aviation network. Today, FAA has a separate division that’s exclusively mandated to look and manage the integration of drones into various daily aspects of social, political and economic life.

The third issue is one of privacy. Taken together with CCTVs, web monitoring programmes and real time satellite imagery, drones complete the picture of 360 degree surveillance. Drones require an absolutely new human thinking: one that has to acknowledge and understand that the set of interconnected technologies of today constitute an artificial intelligence of tomorrow that will no longer be completely in our control. It is in this context that there are two fundamental challenges that are worth considering and debating. The first challenge confronting Indian policy makers is to substantially rework the Information Technology Act of 2000, which was amended in 2008, to be ready for a future that’s going to be increasingly based on an Internet of things. Drones are at the cutting edge of this phenomenon. Attention has to be paid to Section 66A of the IT Act, especially its wordings ‘computer resource’ and ‘communication device’, which embeds the possibility of any land or air vehicle, whether manned, semi-autonomous and completely autonomous, using any form of digital technology, which for all practical purposes is a computer resource, to come within the purview of the Information Technology Act. The second challenge is to redefine existing legal framework with reference to what constitutes the correct way of collecting evidence, especially its admissibility in a court of law in the context of Indian attempts to define a comprehensive and proactive policy and regulatory framework for privacy. The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 has two sections — 43A and 72A — providing for civil and criminal liabilities relating to Privacy. Section 43A focuses on the nuts and bolts of ‘reasonable security practices’ for sensitive personal data and information, while Section 72A provides for a jail term and a fine to anyone, a person, a body corporate or an institution, who causes ‘wrongful loss or wrongful gain’ by divulging the personal information of another person. These two sections specifically defined personal data as any information that is capable of singularly identifying the person. Everything from birth registry details, hospital records, financial and census information, mobile number, social networking details, educational records to death certificate and even a person’s sexual orientation can possibly be interpreted to mean personal data and information. The introduction of drones for law and order introduces a completely new dimension to the debate and it’s within this context that the draft Privacy Bill 2011 needs to be located. In this context, it would also not be a bad idea examine the case history relevant to drone surveillance and the American Fourth Amendment, especially how the Katz vs United States (1967) case, which established a legal and juridical standard for the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, has been used in recent times to redraw and reorient ‘constitutional protections’ of the United States of America.

* The author is a Senior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, a Fellow of the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI) and Contributing Editor of Governance Now

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Pope Francis took the opportunity during an address to families in the Philippines to praise Blessed Pope Paul VI’s encyclical opposing contraception and affirming Church teaching on sexuality and human life.

The Pope spoke Friday to families gathered at the Mall of Asia Arena in Manila during his Jan. 15-19 visit to the Philippines.

After discussing various threats to the family, including “a lack of openness to life,” he deviated briefly from his prepared remarks, transitioning from English to his native Spanish in order to speak from the heart about the subject.

“I think of Blessed Paul VI,” he said. “In a moment of that challenge of the growth of populations, he had the strength to defend openness to life.”

In 1968, Pope Paul VI released the encyclical Humanae Vitae, which upheld Catholic teaching on sexuality and the immorality of artificial contraception, predicting the negative consequences that would result from a cultural acceptance of birth control.

“He knew the difficulties that families experience, and that’s why in his encyclical, he expressed compassion for particular cases. And he taught professors to be particularly compassionate with particular cases,” Pope Francis said.

“But he went further. He looked to the peoples beyond. He saw the lack and the problem that it could cause families in the future. Paul VI was courageous. He was a good pastor, and he warned his sheep about the wolves that were approaching, and from the heavens he blesses us today.”

Pope Francis’ comments come in the wake of Philippines president Benigno Aquino’s signing a highly controversial reproductive health bill in 2013 that drew strong protest from local bishops and members of the faith.

The legislation requires government-sanctioned sex education for adults, middle school and high school students, as well as a population control program that includes fully subsidized contraceptives under government health insurance. The nation’s bishops spoke out strongly against the measure.

Elsewhere in Pope Francis’ address, he spoke about the threats to family posed by natural disasters, poverty, migration, and a redefinition of marriage.

He called for “good and strong families to overcome these threats.”

“Be sanctuaries of respect for life, proclaiming the sacredness of every human life from conception to natural death,” he urged.

The Pope encouraged regular family prayer to hear and understand the will of God, as well as action to be prophetic witnesses in the world.

He deviated from the text of his remarks on several other occasions as well, speaking about his love for St. Joseph and the importance of dreaming within a family.

“When you lose this capacity to dream, you lose the capacity to love, and this energy to love is lost,” he said.

In addition, Pope Francis warned against an “ideological colonization” that does not originate with God, but that tries to destroy the family.

The Pope asked Christians to pray to St. Joseph for the wisdom to identify and reject ideas and initiatives that are driven by these false ideologies and threaten the family.

The post Paul VI Was Right To Warn Against Contraception, Pope Francis Says appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bahrain’s allies including the United Kingdom, Germany, France and other European countries should publicly call on Manama to drop charges against the human rights advocate Nabeel Rajab, Human Rights Watch and the Gulf Center for Human Rights said Friday. Rajab could face up to six years in prison if convicted over a Twitter posting that allegedly “insulted state institutions.” A court ruling is expected on January 20, 2015.

The two groups were among 16 international rights organizations that sent a letter to British and European foreign ministry officials calling on them to urge Bahraini authorities to drop the prosecution of Rajab on these charges. British, German, and other European officials have confined their public statements to calling for a fair trial and due process. A US State Department spokesperson on October 16, 2014 called on Bahrain to drop the charges, and on October 20 urged Bahraini authorities to free Rajab. He was freed on bail on November 2.

“This is an open-and-shut freedom of expression case,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “Due process is not the issue here – Nabeel Rajab should never have been charged in the first place.”

Rajab is the president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, a founder of the Gulf Center for Human Rights, and a member of the Human Rights Watch Middle East division’s advisory committee.

Authorities arrested Rajab on October 1 following a message on his Twitter account that said, “Many #Bahrain men who joined #terrorism & #ISIS came from security institutions and those institutions were the first ideological incubator.” Authorities claimed this “insulted” the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Article 216 of the country’s penal code authorizes imprisonment for anyone who “offends by any method of expression the National Assembly or other constitutional institutions, the army, law courts, authorities or government agencies.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts that monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Bahrain has ratified, issued an authoritative interpretation on the scope of the right to freedom of expression and opinion. In its General Comment 34, the committee stated that, “In circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high.” It also stated that “states parties should not prohibit criticism of institutions, such as the army or the administration.”

“It’s true that due process is a serious concern whenever one is speaking of Bahrain’s justice system, but Nabeel Rajab faces jail solely for exercising his right to free speech,” said Khalid Ibrahim, director of programs at the Gulf Center for Human Rights. “All those governments that are proclaiming their dedication to free expression should be making clear to Bahrain that Nabeel should not be jailed.”

The post Bahrain: Drop Twitter Charges Against Rights Advocate, Urges HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Clemént Doleac

After a number of interventions and interferences in the political life of Haiti, the U.S. government is trying once again to avoid bearing the responsibility for the catastrophic situation that is currently building up there, as a result of backing sometimes abusive executive branches at the voting booth. On Tuesday, January 13, 2015, the legislative branch officially ceased to fulfill its duties because it has become, not for the first time, nonfunctional. This is possible because after its six year term, its mandate has legally ended and no new elections have been scheduled. The situation is now largely the responsibility of incumbent President Michel Martelly, who wants to rule the country by decree, thus abusing his executive authority. But the Haitians alone cannot be blamed: the U.S., French and Canadian governments –backed by the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of American States (OAS)– should be blamed for removing former elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide twice, and later supported a flawed ballot leading to the current situation. Without multi-party negotiations, including the supporters of former President Aristide, no long-term solution will be found and the country will revert to a one-man rule.

Constant Interventionism in Haiti Led to the Current Crisis

Since the end of the dynastic dictatorship of the Duvaliers (father and son) and the installation of democracy, Haiti has suffered constant interferences from the U.S., French, and Canadian governments, often backed by the UN and the OAS.1 The French and the U.S. governments have supported extreme right-wing groups, militias, and death squads in Haiti, and in 1990 threatened the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide –the first democratically elected authorities in decades. Aristide was overthrown by the military one year later in 1991.2 As Haiti expert Paul Farmer once stated, “Aristide was seen as a threat in the U.S.”3 Jean Bertrand Aristide came back into office in 1994 –after three years of terror– to finish his term as elected president. Aristide abolished the Haitian army, and in 1996, became the first elected civilian to see another elected civilian, René Préval, succeed him as president. Préval himself became Haiti’s first president ever to serve out his term.4 In November 2000, Aristide was reelected again for a four-year term.5 The democracy in Haiti, at that time, was still fragile and without stability, but still very well alive and dynamic.

However, this was not the point of view of the U.S. and French governments, who years before chose to overthrow elected President Aristide. Again, they financed and trained right-wing militias made up largely of former soldiers, leading to a destructive civil war from 2002-2004.6 This extreme situation on February 21, 2004, the U.S. and French governments to “invite” Aristide to leave the country in order to bring “peace and security […] to the country.”7 The Dissident Voice reports that since then, “a quasi UN trusteeship had begun. Since that time the Haitian National Police has been heavily militarized and steps have been taken towards recreating the military.”8 With the end of Aristide’s second presidential term in 2004, human rights violations began to rise again, sometimes at a meteoric pace.

A Terrible Human Rights Situation

These multiple interferences in the democratic life of Haiti have led to a lack of democratic legitimacy in the country, and therefore to a dramatic human rights decline. Access to justice is brief, high crime rates go off the chart, and public lynching has become a deplorable commonplace.9 Moreover, the situation of Haitians living abroad is also of concern, representing a high-level risk of dangerous statelessness.10 At no time did these interferences lead to an improvement in human rights in the country in addition to being anti-democratic. Furthermore, the Haitian people have been deprived of many of their basic political rights. The local and legislative elections, initially scheduled for 2012, have yet to occur, and there is still no date for these elections to be staged.11 The long-overdue elections for the Chamber of Deputies and a third of the Senate, along with local and municipal elections, were supposed to take place in 2014. These elections, initially scheduled for 2012, then 2013, and finally October 26, 2014, were finally delayed once again, but this time indefinitely.12 The Haitian president has sought to appear as the one fulfilling his duty by proposing a newly drafted electoral law, which members of the Senate refused to ratify citing the unconstitutionality of the process leading to this draft. This has led to a situation where the legislative branch is now unconstitutional, with an ambitious president who wishes to legislate by decree in an aspiration to a one-man rule style. Nonetheless, local actors cannot be seen as the only culprits in this difficult situation.

The U.S. Government Threatens to Back a New Turn to One-Man Rule

Those being held responsible for one-person rule on the island, with no small amount of hypocrisy laying the blame on local actors. As stated by The Miami Herald, “the United States is calling on Haiti’s politicians to make the necessary compromises to avoid one-man rule by President Michel Martelly on Monday, and the country slipping deeper into political chaos.”13 The State Department’s Haiti Special Coordinator, Thomas Adams, has also stated that “we want to see elections happen, agreement on elections, and we also want to avoid rule by decree […] We think its better if all three branches of government are existing and functioning.”14 The U.S. government prefers to favor flawed elections again rather than building a positive, democratic future.15 In a statement, the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince declared the same thing: “Only through the participation of a broad spectrum of political parties can the choice of the Haitian people be accurately reflected on election day […] To that end, the USG already has in place a robust program to support the conduct of elections and the participation of the Haitian electorate, and pending approval from U.S. Congress, the U.S. government is prepared to support additional measures for democratic political parties to play their part and participate fully in the electoral process.”16

As COHA reported in December 2014, Haiti needs to hold elections, but not the type of flawed ones seen in 2010, with massive fraud and less than a quarter of potential voter participation.17 Haiti, since these poor elections, has demonstrated that a country can have elections without the resemblance to true democracy.18 Why, in this case, does the U.S. State Department still push in this direction?

On January 8, 2015, opposition groups demanded the elected President’s resignation as a result of his constant actions to delay elections.19 As The Miami Herald pointed out, “several large political parties in Haiti are also opposed to the agreement and were not part of the negotiations (the so-called El Rancho Accord). In addition to raising constitutional issues, Martelly’s opponents have also raised questions about the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Électoral Provisoire, CEP) tasked with organizing the vote.20 Many feel that it is currently being controlled by the President.”21

In an official statement issued on January 11, 2015, the U.S. Embassy said it “strongly supported efforts by Martelly to end the impasse”, noting his “wide-ranging concessions,” including the “recent removal of his prime minister.”22

Through the same statement, the U.S. government made it very clear that it would back a one-man-rule regime if necessary, stating that if “a solution cannot be reached by January 12, the U.S. will continue to work with President Martelly and whatever legitimate Haitian government institutions remain to safeguard the significant gains we have achieved together since the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The Haitian people have the right to elect their leaders, and in these circumstances the United States would expect the President to use his executive powers responsibly to organize inclusive, credible, and transparent elections, in an expeditious manner.”23

In this way, the U.S. government continues to consent to follow a non-democratic path, backing an example of strong one-man rule in Haiti, a solution, which has historically led to problematic situations such as the one currently seen today.

An Agreement Among the Majority That Solves Nothing

After meeting with senators and opposition parties on January 7, 2015, President Martelly resumed meetings, Thursday, January 8, with the same actors. Former Senator Edmonde Supplice Beauzile, head of the opposition party Fusion Social Democrats, declared that “an agreement had been reached about which sectors the nine members of a new CEP would be drawn.”24 These negotiations have continued over the weekend. As reported by Al Jazeera on Monday January 12, 2015, “late on Sunday, just hours before the country marked the fifth anniversary of the earthquake that left some 300,000 people dead […] the president and some of the opposition politicians reached a long-term agreement [which] states to have elections organized before the end of 2015 for two-thirds of the senate and deputies, as well as for president.”25 This agreement also tried to “improve faith in the system, a new nine-member electoral council will be created including representatives of the Catholic church and Protestant churches, as well as the local voodoo belief system, farmers’ associations, women’s and business groups, unions, the media and higher education.”26

However, this deal will probably not change the situation on the ground. The main opposition party in Haiti, Fanmi Lavalas, was not even able to run in the latest elections for very questionable reasons, and it “was not part of Sunday’s last-minute agreement, which came shortly before the mandate of the sitting legislature […] was to expire on Monday.”27

This new agreement, following that of December 30, 2014, and the agreement of El Rancho reached in early 2014, which is still the same deal: a weak and cheap compromise, which will let the executive branch choose the rules and the date of the next elections, despite this being the provence of the legislature.28 This new agreement, which contains nothing groundbreaking, is merely part of an already long list of agreements, which is bound to lead again to a blockage for several weeks or even many months.

The Parliament tried to reach a quorum of votes on January 11, 2015, in order to legislate and subsequently legalize these agreements. However, no deal could be reached and the Haitian Parliament is now little better than a dysfunctional body, without enough parliamentarians legally elected as members. Only 10 senators are currently legally elected, and the Senate only seats one third of its legal composition.29 The Parliament therefore has been dissolved and a de facto Prime Minister, Paul Evans, took office, even though he was not ratified by the remaining legislators.30 The future of the agreement is now more than uncertain.

The Coordinator of the Organization of the Struggling People (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte), Sauveur Pierre Etienne, accused President Martelly of being responsible for this failure, saying that Martelly wanted to rule the country by decree. The agreement of January 11, 2015 was signed by 24 political parties, of which 21 had no elected representatives in the Parliament, illustrating its inadequate mandate.31

For Pierre Etienne, the head of Haitian state is “only a puppet in the hands of the international community, specifically the United States, which are disposed to support him even without Parliament”.32 Since January 12, 2015, Haiti is left with only 11 elected representatives: President Martelly, and 10 senators. Now, President Martelly is free to rule alone by decree within Haiti reverting it to a one-person regime. He is strongly supported by the “Core Group” which include the governments of Brazil, Canada, France, the USA, Spain, representatives of the European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States.33 This new one-man-rule will probably not lead to an improvement of human and civil rights in Haiti, but to its deterioration with the active support of the so-called Core Group, as it has happened since 2004.34

The only long-term solution is to speak with the real opposition –Fanmi Lavalas– to reach a deeper and sharper agreement that is inclusive and fair to everyone. Haiti’s price for democracy may seem high, but that of an authoritarian rule will be even more costly. Now the country is returning to a one-person rule format, which most likely will lead to political repression, censored media, and a worsening of the human rights situation resulting in enhanced migration to the Dominican Republic and to the United States. Is the United States willing to pay this high price? The U.S. Department of State and the members of the Core Group may not have all the answers.

* Clemént Doleac, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Notes:
1DOLEAC Clément “Human Rights in Haiti” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on November 17, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/human-rights-in-haiti/ on January 12, 2015; Also see “François Duvalier, 1957–1971″, The Library of Congress, Country Studies, December 1989. ; FARMER Paul “Who removed Aristide” in the London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 8 · 15 April 2004 pages 28-31, on the following link: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide

2Ibid. ; GALLON Gustavo, Independent UN expert report on the situation of Human Rights in Haiti, A/HRC/25/71, February 2014, Human Rights Council.

3FARMER Paul “Who removed Aristide” in the London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 8 · 15 April 2004 pages 28-31, on the following link: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide

4FRENCH Howard W. “Front-Running Priest a Shock to Haiti” in The New York Times, December 13, 1990. Consulted on http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/13/world/front-running-priest-a-shock-to-haiti.html

5DOLEAC Clément “Human Rights in Haiti” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on November 17, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/human-rights-in-haiti/ on January 12, 2015.

6Ibid ; FARMER Paul “Who removed Aristide” in the London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 8 · 15 April 2004 pages 28-31, on the following link: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide The details of the meeting were reported by Michel Vastel in “Haiti put into trusteeship by the United Nations?” L’Actualité, 15 March, 2003 or in ENGLER Yves, “Media Cover-up of Canada’s Role in the Overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide”, Part 1 of a 4 Part Series, Dissident Voice, January 30th, 2014 consulted on http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/01/media-cover-up-of-canadas-role-in-the-overthrow-of-jean-bertrand-aristide/ ; SDA-ATS News Service, 29 février 2004 “La Maison blanche appelle Jean-Bertrand Aristide à quitter le pouvoir” in Interet General, on February 29, 2004, Consulted on : http://www.interet-general.info/article.php3?id_article=543 on November 17, 2014.

7DOLEAC Clément “Human Rights in Haiti” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on November 17, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/human-rights-in-haiti/ on January 12, 2015.

8ENGLER Yves, “Media Cover-up of Canada’s Role in the Overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Part 1 of a 4 Part Series”, Dissident Voice, January 30th, 2014 consulted on http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/01/media-cover-up-of-canadas-role-in-the-overthrow-of-jean-bertrand-aristide/ ; DOLEAC Clément “Human Rights in Haiti” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on November 17, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/human-rights-in-haiti/ on January 12, 2015.

9GALLON Gustavo, Independent UN expert report on the situation of Human Rights in Haiti, A/HRC/25/71, February 2014, Human Rights Council.

10GALLON Gustavo, Independent UN expert report on the situation of Human Rights in Haiti, A/HRC/25/71, February 2014, Human Rights Council. ; According to his data, the number of Haitians living abroad would be about 4.5 million people. In 2007, the International Crisis Group estimated that a population of more than 3.71 million Haitians and descendants of Haitians residing abroad. The reference is International Crisis Group, “Construire la paix en Haïti: inclure les Haïtiens de l’extérieur”, Rapport Amérique latine/Caraïbes no°24, Port-au-Prince/Bruxelles, December 14 2007.

11DOLEAC Clément “Elections On Hold In Haiti: Stability Versus Democracy” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on December 08, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/elections-on-hold-in-haiti-stability-versus-democracy/ on January 12, 2015.

12Ibid.

13JACQUELINE CHARLES , « U.S. wants to avoid one-man rule in Haiti », Miami Herald. January 8, 2015. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article5650584.html on December 09, 2015.

14Ibid.

15DOLEAC Clément “Elections On Hold In Haiti: Stability Versus Democracy” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on December 08, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/elections-on-hold-in-haiti-stability-versus-democracy/ on January 12, 2015.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

20Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), “U.N. and U.S. Blame Haiti’s Opposition for Delayed Elections, Ignore History”, in CEPR, on September 16, 2014. Consulted on http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/un-and-us-blame-haitis-opposition-for-delayed-elections-ignore-history on November 24, 2014. ; DOLEAC Clément “Elections On Hold In Haiti: Stability Versus Democracy” in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on December 08, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/elections-on-hold-in-haiti-stability-versus-democracy/ on January 12, 2015.

21Ibid.

22McFADDEN David, Associated Press, “Riots in Haiti, president agrees to hold election” in WPRI.news on January 12, 2015. Consulted on http://wpri.com/2015/01/12/riots-in-haiti-president-agrees-to-hold-election/ on January 12, 2015.

23“Haiti – FLASH : The United States alongside Martelly, even in case of failure of the agreement” in Haiti Libre, on January 11, 2015. Consulted on http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-12920-haiti-flash-the-united-states-alongside-martelly-even-in-case-of-failure-of-the-agreement.html on January 12, 2015.

24 CHARLES Jacqueline, “U.S. wants to avoid one-man rule in Haiti” in Miami Herald, on January 8, 2015. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article5650584.html on January 12, 2015.

25 AL JAZEERA, “Haiti political crisis persists despite deal » in Al-Jazeera, on January 12, 2015. Consulted on http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2015/01/haiti-rival-leaders-seek-last-minute-deal-201511203231758694.html on January 12, 2015

26Ibid.

27Ibid.

28Haiti – Politic : « The El Rancho agreement, a crisis within the crisis… » on Haiti Libre, on March 31, 2014. Consulted on http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-10832-haiti-politic-the-el-rancho-agreement-a-crisis-within-the-crisis.htmlon January 12, 2015. ; « Haiti Reaches Political Agreement For ‘Consensus’ Government » in TeleSur, on December 30, 2014. Consulted on http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Haiti-Reaches-Political-Agreement-For-Consensus-Government-20141230-0009.html on January 12, 2015. ; JOHNSTON Jake, WEISBROT Mark, “Haiti’s Fatally Flawed Election” in Center for Economy and Policy Research (CEPR), January 2011. Consulted on http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/haitis-fatally-flawed-election, on December 04, 2014.

29Haïti – Politique : « C’est fini, le rideau est tombé sur le Parlement… », Haiti Libre, on January 13, 2015. Consulted on January 13, 2015, on http://www.haitilibre.com/article-12934-haiti-politique-c-est-fini-le-rideau-est-tombe-sur-le-parlement.html

30Reuters, “Haiti’s parliament dissolved after last-ditch negotiations to avert crisis fail” in The Guardian., on January 13, 2015. Consulted on http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/13/haiti-parliament-dissolved-michel-martelly-crisis on January 14, 2015.

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33 Le Nouveliste “Avec la communauté internationale à ses côtés, Martelly seul au pouvoir” in Le Nouvelliste, on January 13, 2015. Consulted on http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/140311/Avec-la-communaute-internationale-a-ses-cotes-Martelly-seul-au-pouvoir on January 14, 2015.

34GALLON Gustavo, Independent UN expert report on the situation of Human Rights in Haiti, A/HRC/25/71, February 2014, Human Rights Council.

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