By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

The Security Forces (SFs) recovered three bullet-riddled bodies from Mand area of Turbat District of Balochistan on December 30, 2014. The victims had been shot multiple times in the head, chest and face at close range.

Earlier, on December 21, 2014, at least eight bullet-riddled bodies were found dumped at three separate places across the Province. At Kalzai in Pishin District, three bodies of Afghan nationals were found. Two Baloch bodies were found at Khanozai in the same District. Another three bodies of Afghan nationals, were found dumped near a river in the Baghao area of Ziarat District. Ziarat Assistant Commissioner Abdul Salam Achakzai disclosed. “The bodies bore multiple torture marks which suggest they were tortured before being shot in the head.”

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), based on open media sources, at least 153 bullet-riddled bodies were recovered in Balochistan through 2014, as against 39 such recoveries in 2013. 124 of the bodies found in 2014 where recovered from the Baloch separatist areas of South Balochistan, and 29 from Pashtun-dominated North Balochistan.

The staggering rise in recoveries of such bodies in 2014 was primarily accounted for by the discovery of three mass graves in the Totak area of Khuzdar District. Between January 25, 2014, and April 2, 2014, a total of 103 bodies were recovered from these graves. The bodies were too decomposed for identification. The local people claimed that 169 bodies were found in these graves.

The recovery of these mass graves in Khuzdar has now further confirmed what SAIR has been highlighting over years, that there is a relentless campaign by the state’s covert agencies to target Baloch nationalists and their sympathisers in campaigns of ‘disappearances’, and a ‘kill and dump’ policy, both directly and through sectarian/extremist proxies in Balochistan, particularly in the south regions of the Province.

According to SATP’s partial database, the Province has recorded at least 3,295 civilian fatalities since 2004. Of these, 305 civilian killings (182 in the South and 123 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations. Islamist and sectarian extremist groups, primarily Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India), claimed responsibility for another 512 civilian killings, 506 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and six in the South. The remaining 2,478 civilian fatalities – 1,498 in the South and 980 in the North – remain ‘unattributed’. A large proportion of the unattributed fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). In 2014, the Province recorded at least 301 civilian fatalities of which 26 civilian killings (All in North) were claimed by Baloch separatist formations. Islamist and sectarian extremist groups claimed responsibility for the killing of another 37 civilians (31 civilians in the North, mostly in and around Quetta; and six in south). The remaining 238 civilian killings remain ‘unattributed’.

Significantly, prior to 2014, Islamist and sectarian extremist formations were not overtly operating in South Balochistan and none of these outfits had claimed responsibility for any civilian killing in the region. This, however, is now a thing of the past. On May 21, 2014, at least six people, including a Government school teacher identified as Master Hameed, were shot dead when terrorists entered his residence and opened fire, killing him and five of his relatives in the Dasht area of Turbat District. The attack came in the wake of threatening letters sent to private schools by a newly surfaced Islamist terrorist group, Tanzeem-ul-Islam-al-Furqan (TIF, Oragnisation of Islam and the Holy Standard) in Panjgur District, warning the people to completely shut down girls’ education or to prepare themselves for “the worst consequences as prescribed in the Quran”.

Earlier, on May 13, 2014, four armed TIF terrorists, wearing headbands with Allah-o-Akbar (Allah is Great) imprinted on them, set ablaze the vehicle of Major (Retired) Hussain Ali, owner of The Oasis School, in the same District, while he was driving girls to school. The masked terrorists asked him and the girls to de-board the vehicle, before setting it ablaze. These attacks in Panjgur and Turbat Districts indicate the penetration of the Taliban ideology of intolerance and religious bigotry into the Southern regions of Balochistan, which had, thus far, escaped the influence of TTP and its likes.

South Balochistan has long been affected by the Baloch nationalist insurgency, while the North came under the influence of Islamist terrorist formations, including TTP and LeJ. While ethnic Baloch people were targeted by the state machinery, persons from minority communities were persecuted by state-sponsored extremist groups. Zohra Yusuf, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) claimed, on October 12, 2014, that Balochistan had been made a fertile place for armed religious extremists under a plan and, as a result, about 300,000 Shias, Zikris, and Hindus had been forced to migrate to other areas of the country. She expressed concern over this distress migration of minorities due to lack of security in Balochistan.

The ‘disappearances’ issue has come to dominate the political discourse in Balochistan. However, while the search for missing persons continues, their cases have been complicated by gross discrepancies in the record. For instance, according to a July 23, 2014, report the Home Department stated that only 71 people were missing in the Province, while human rights organisations estimate that the figure is closer to 8,000. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VFBMP), an advocacy group, insists that more than 19,000 Baloch political activists and sympathisers have been subjected to enforced disappearances over the last 13 years. VFBMP vice-president Mama Qadir told The Express Tribune on July 23, 2014, “There are more than 19,000 people who were subjected to enforced disappearance in Balochistan and none of them have been recovered yet. The Government has done nothing, except to release those who were detained for a brief period.” He added that his organisation had submitted a detailed report to the United Nations with evidence regarding missing persons. Significantly, on January 12, 2015, the Pakistan Supreme Court directed the Federal Government through Attorney General Salman Aslam Butt to submit comprehensive data within 10 days, regarding the number of missing persons in the country.

Terrorism related incidents and fatalities have, however, registered a decline through 2014 as compared to the preceding year. According to SATP data, the province recorded 607 fatalities, including 301 civilians, 223 militants and 83 SF personnel in 2014, in comparison to 960 such fatalities, including 718 civilians, 137 SF personnel and 105 militants in 2013. Similarly, the number and lethality of suicide attacks in the Province has also decreased considerably, with four such incidents resulting in 12 fatalities and 64 injuries in 2014; as against nine such attacks resulting in 233 deaths and 407 injuries in 2013. The Province also witnessed a decrease in bomb blasts and resultant fatality, from 138 incidents and 440 deaths in 2013, to 84 incidents and 132 deaths in 2014. Further, as against 63 major incidents of killing (each involving three or more fatalities) resulting in 433 fatalities in 2013, year 2014 recorded 56 such incidents resulting 415 fatalities. The provincial capital Quetta recorded a considerable decrease in terrorism related incidents, from 190 in 2013 to 100 in 2014. There were nine attacks on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) convoys through 2014, with three killed and six injured, as against 18 such attacks in 2013, with six killed and seven injured. Attacks on gas pipelines, however, increased from 10 in 2013 to 17 in 2014.

Disappearances and the state’s ‘kill and dump policy’ continue to cause great distress in Balochistan, feeding the crisis of mistrust between the Baloch people and Islamabad and prolonging the insurgency. Islamabad’s strategy of creating and supporting Islamist extremist groups to manage domestic political challenges has enormously aggravated the problem in both North and South Balochistan, though these groups are most active in the North. The limited gains in terms of a marginal reduction in most indices of violence, consequently, offer little hope of a sustainable improvement in the Province.

*Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The post Pakistan: Persistent Crisis In Balochistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Harold A. Gould*

It has been widely publicized that Barack Obama is the first American president who will be guest of honour at the Jan 26 Republic Day festivities since this dazzling celebration commenced in 1950.

I personally witnessed this grand event in 1960 when Queen Elizabeth II was the honored guest. As Al Jazeera reported (Jan 7), “Modi has been courted by the United States as a key partner in the attempt to rebalance US diplomatic weight towards Asia.” In the words of White House press secretary Josh Earnest, this visit will enable the president “to meet with the prime minister and Indian officials to strengthen and expand the US-India strategic partnership.”

To paraphrase the contemporary phraseology for such impending high level encounters: ‘Much will be needed to be done.’ For it cannot be denied that US-Indian relations have markedly languished since their high point in the late 90s when president Bill Clinton instilled a new vitality into the relationship, and both former prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and P.V. Narasimha Rao responded in kind.

Part of the reason for this cooling down process of course pertains to the dramatic changes that have occurred on the India side. The Nehru era has given way to a new political synthesis that is still in the process of becoming. New values, new expectations, new personalities have emerged which promise to impart a fresh identity both to domestic India and her international image. India is clearly in the throes of regaining her political bearings!

What then are some of the issues that President Obama and Prime Minister Modi must place on the agenda?

Certainly the preceding visit to India by Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear that India’s relationship with the US will no more result in an either-or proposition between the two rival powers than it did during the Cold War. During that arcane era America’s determination to incorporate Pakistan into its cordon sanitaire around the Communist bloc had left Nehru no alternative than to acquire from the Soviet Union the military and diplomatic means to shield India from the Pakistanis’ real reason for joining the Grand Alliance – viz, acquiring the wherewithal to eventually make war on India.

By now too much water has flowed under the dam and the US knows that a constructive relationship between India and the US will require that both parties must adopt policies which yield flexible, pragmatic outcomes that shy away from the doctrinal stridencies of the past.

Clearly this means that Obama and Modi must stress policies that take maximal advantage of the one dominant demographic reality that now pervades the Indo-American relationship: That over the past 70 years South Asian Indians have become one of the largest and socially significant ethnic communities in the United States whose impact on relations between the two countries has become decisive.

There is both a challenge and opportunity here to be sure because far more than in the past, South Asian Indians cannot be taken for granted or ignored both in American domestic and international political and economic processes; nor can either side fail to find ways to utilize the abundant across-the-board technical and intellectual talent that inheres in this new resource. This fact of life will have to be on the agenda when Obama and Modi sit down at the table in New Delhi.

But perhaps more than anything else, the two leaders will be compelled to address the reality of Pakistan: The threat this failed state represents to South Asian peace and security, and indeed, thanks to its nuclear weapons capability, the rest of the world as well.

Perhaps therefore, the greatest challenge of all to the future of US-Indian relations must be whether discussions in New Delhi can in any way lay the foundation for a major revision in America’s ages-old misbegotten policy of appeasing and reinforcing the Pakistani military establishment’s capacity to undermine the US’ policy orientation toward the region. Billions of dollars have been squandered over the decades sustaining a Pakistani military culture, which through its ‘deep state’ pseudo-governmental apparatus, enabled in large part by American strategic naivete, has persistently stood in the way of domestic social reform and secularism, has nourished Islamic extremism in the name of a perverted form of self-serving ‘realpolitik’, and has done its utmost to subvert whatever socio-political progress the US coalition has endeavoured to achieve in Afghanistan.

If there is one matter that President Obama’s Indian Yatra must address and achieve significant progress on, it is a decisive new approach to the Pakistan challenge. Unless the two leaders can find a way to diminish the capacity of the Pakistani military establishment to call the political tune in South Asia, all other efforts to further develop and capitalize on the positive resources inherent in the US-Indian relationship will ultimately come to naught.

If on the other hand Obama successfully grasps this ineluctable political reality and determines to seize the moment, his journey to imbibe the spectacle of the Indian nation majestically passing before his eyes along Rajpath will not have been in vain.

*Harold A. Gould is a Visiting Professor of South Asian Studies in the Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. He can be contacted at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Obama Prepares For Delhi: Time US Revisits Misbegotten Appeasement Of Pak Military – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The combined wealth of the richest 1 percent will overtake that of the other 99 percent of people next year unless the current trend of rising inequality is checked, Oxfam warned today ahead of the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos.

The international agency, whose executive director Winnie Byanyima will co-chair the Davos event, warned that the explosion in inequality is holding back the fight against global poverty at a time when 1 in 9 people do not have enough to eat and more than a billion people still live on less than $1.25-a-day.

Byanyima will use her position at Davos to call for urgent action to stem this rising tide of inequality, starting with a crackdown on tax dodging by corporations, and to push for progress towards a global deal on climate change.

Wealth: Having It All and Wanting More, a research paper published today by Oxfam, shows that the richest 1 percent have seen their share of global wealth increase from 44 percent in 2009 to 48 percent in 2014 and at this rate will be more than 50 percent in 2016. Members of this global elite had an average wealth of $2.7 million per adult in 2014, according to Oxfam.

According to Oxfam, of the remaining 52 percent of global wealth, almost all (46 percent) is owned by the rest of the richest fifth of the world’s population. The other 80 percent share just 5.5 percent and had an average wealth of $3,851 per adult – that’s 1/700th of the average wealth of the 1 percent, Oxfam said.

The post Richest 1% Will Own More Than All The Rest By 2016 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — Catalonian leaders are hoping that a regional election in September will keep alive a fading independence drive and force the hand of Spain’s central government – but the move could also backfire.

Catalonian leaders are hoping that a regional election in September will keep alive a fading independence drive and force the hand of Spain’s central government – but the move could also backfire.

The long push for independence from Spain, which gathered strength during the economic crisis of recent years, is a big headache for Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, who has taken a hard line on such ambitions.

Catalonia defied Madrid and went ahead with a symbolic vote on independence last November. The outcome, however, was mixed — about 80 percent of the 2.2 million people who voted backed secession but the turnout was little more than 40 percent.

With a general election due in Spain by the end of the year, the Catalan parliamentary vote, called this week by regional President Artur Mas for 27 September, should force the issue to the fore of the national campaigns.

“Early regional elections will increase pressure on Madrid to offer concessions to the Catalans,” said Antonio Roldan, an analyst at Eurasia Group.

Rajoy’s team says he is unlikely to offer much to Catalonia, which is still highly dependent on Madrid for financing support, – in the run-up to the September poll or the general election, because it would alienate his People’s Party’s (PP) own voters.

The premier said on Thursday the election called by Mas made no sense.

“It is simply a clear show of the failure of a policy that has only generated instability and uncertainty,” he said.

But the Socialist Party has called for constitutional reform in Spain and the debate on creating a more federal state or revamping the model for financing regions could start gathering steam.

A big show of support for pro-secession parties, including the one led by Mas, could at the very least give Catalan leaders more leverage to discuss some demands, including for more autonomy, as politicians try to woo voters from Spain’s wealthiest and second most populous region.

High stakes

The September elections are, however, a high-stakes gamble for Mas and some of his allies as it risks exposing divisions in the pro-independence camp. It could also find it hard to keep up the momentum over the next eight months.

Like Rajoy’s centre-right PP and the opposition Socialists, Catalan parties face tough competition from upstart anti-establishment party Podemos (“We Can”), which is gaining strong support across Spain and opposes Catalan independence.

Recent polls also showed Mas’ Convergencia i Unio (CiU) alliance and the second party in the region, the pro-secession Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (The Republican Left of Catalonia) falling well short of getting 50 percent of votes between them.

Though the two forces will run with a common “roadmap”, they will not campaign with a joint list of candidates as Mas had pressed for, and they remain rivals.

He said on Friday that he hoped Catalans would back independence in the polls, although he was also ready to form a government in case they lacked a majority to move forward with secession from Spain.

“If the process is not ratified but I win the elections, I will try to govern,” he told Catalan radio.

That could hamper attempts to portray the elections as a proxy for a referendum on independence, while even strong support for parties favouring a breakaway from Spain may not necessarily bring secession closer.

“In Scotland, the prospect of independence was certain – they were out if they voted “yes”,” said Antonio Barroso, analyst at think tank Teneo Intelligence.

Scots voted to remain in Britain in a historic vote on independence held last September. The British government had agreed that if it would respect the referendum result either way. But Spain’s central takes a firm stand that a vote on independence would be against the constitution.

“It’s not so clear in Spain,” Barroso said.

The post Catalonia Takes Election Gamble To Keep Independence Drive Alive appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sourajit Aiyar*

Apart from Bhutan, India hardly had sustained, progressive relations with any other regional country in recent years. While it made inroads with Sri Lanka, there were tenuous twists even in this relation.

Sri Lankans voted for a new president this month. This vote does matter to India, as it holds the promise of a more inclusive relationship – in geopolitics, trade and investments.

As former president Mahinda Rajapaksa reeled under human rights challenges post the 2009 war, there was a gradual shift in his stance towards China. This geopolitical shift saw China funding several infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka. A more worrisome finding was that Sri Lankan soil was being used for Chinese military activity. Under the new administration, India hopes the motivation for this geopolitical shift towards China might reduce.

The new President Maithripala Sirisena announced in his manifesto that he aimed to maintain equal relations with India and China, and was concerned about excessive indebtedness to any specific foreign power. Sirisena’s Prime Minister Ranil Wickramesinghe also announced that they might relook at the Chinese-funded port project due to environmental concerns. All in all, India hopes that China’s free-run in the country may reduce and this might help balance the geopolitical equation.

The new administration might bode well for another threat which India was facing. The capture of a Sri Lankan, Zakir Hussain, in May 2014 brought to light that Pakistani intelligence elements were allegedly setting up training camps in Sri Lanka and using the country’s Muslim minority to target India’s south. The new president is expected to put stress on the minorities’ interests, both Tamils and Muslims, a reason believed why Sri Lanka’s North tilted towards him in the elections.

Enhancement of economic opportunities and education for Muslim youth might help address this challenge, especially if joining such extremist camps was the only source of income for the unemployed and uneducated Muslim youth in the rural hinterlands.

Apart from geopolitics, the other impact is related to economic ties – trade and investments. The expectation is that the new president might bring back focus on economic development, a reason believed why Sri Lanka’s South voted for him.

Since 2000, the India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has worked to liberalize trade, including transforming Sri Lanka’s exports from low value primary products to value added processed products. Sri Lanka has moved from exporting only pepper, nuts, fruit, cloves etc to value added products like insulated wires, cables, pneumatic tyres, garments, ceramics, tableware, vegetable oils, copper products, furniture, freezers, etc. Imports from India largely include petroleum products, vehicles, sugar, cotton, pharmaceuticals etc.

However, the challenge is that many items seeing high volumes fall in the FTA’s negative list of products, and hence, is hardly influenced by it. While both sides have been working on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), progress has been slow. The change in government is expected to usher in much-needed momentum in this.

As the new administration is expected to work towards diversifying its exports, possible opportunities can emerge for India. Exports have to be a thrust area for Sri Lanka, since the size of its domestic market is limited – its population is only about 21 million, and the economy cannot achieve scale without global integration. Sri Lanka’s export basket is currently highly concentrated to specific regions (USA, EU) and products (tea, garments). This impacted Lankan exports when the West saw a prolonged slowdown.

Export diversification needs to be a priority to make the country less vulnerable to shocks in specific areas. This thrust towards diversification should bode well for India, in terms of broadening the overall scope of trade between India and Sri Lanka by enhancing the list of competitive products.

The FTA also placed quotas on tea and garments, which comprised bulk of Sri Lanka’s export basket. The attempt now should be to maximize Sri Lanka’s exports in its areas of core competencies, as well as reduce any non-tariff barriers. This would help India eke out maximum quotas for its own exports, in return.

Investments (FDI) from India to Sri Lanka started with bus manufacturing in the 1980s (Ashok Leyland) to sectors like steel, cement, vanaspati, copper, etc in the 1990s to services like telecom, banking, oil, tourism in the 2000s (ICICI, Airtel, IOC, Tata). India is now amongst the largest investors in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan companies have also invested in India, including sectors like apparel, logistics, hospitality, etc (MAS, Brandix, John Keells, Aitken Spence). Going forward, Sri Lanka would need investments to develop the new export sectors, to set up the production facilities and supply chains.

Also, Sri Lanka does not possess the supply capacity to cater to the sizable Indian market. Renewed focus on the economy should spell opportunities to invest into production in those specific sectors. An option might be to promote Joint-Ventures between Indian and Sri Lankan companies with buy-back arrangements. CEAT Kelani is a JV involving India’s CEAT, which exports tyres made in Sri Lanka back to India.

Another challenge for low trade volumes has been that intra-industry integration between the two countries has not grown much. Sri Lankan manufacturers have not been successful in creating vertical integration with Indian industries. India’s new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government has been making efforts to use its embassies abroad for trade promotion/facilitation. Such facilitation offices on both sides could be useful access windows to connect potential partners and develop regional value chains in specific industries.

Infrastructure is another area of potential, especially in re-building projects. India’s IRCON participated in rebuilding the Jaffna-Colombo railway line, and is involved in four rail projects financed by India’s EXIM Bank. Apart from rail, power generation and transmission, housing and construction, cement and water supply infrastructure also hold promise in Sri Lanka. NTPC, Tata Housing, L&T, UltraTech and VA Tech Wabag are already present. In water infrastructure alone, projects worth Rs.21,000 crore are expected to come up, as per Sri Lanka National Water Supply and Drainage Board.

The challenge here for Indian companies is access to cheap funding. This is where China has an edge. Apart from huge cash piles, China also has a better sovereign rating than India. This means its cost of funding is more favourable than India. To help Indian companies, India has extended a credit line of $1 billion to Sri Lanka through EXIM Bank for infra-projects. India also needs to play its geographical proximity to its advantage, which can help reduce the cost of transporting key raw materials and heavy equipment from India for projects there.

Export of equipment extends to the defence sector. India recently won a contract to supply two offshore patrol ships to Sri Lanka. These are indigenously built at Goa Shipyard, and used for anti-piracy operations, search-rescue operations, transportation of troop and cargo, etc. Thus, Sri Lanka can emerge as a key export area for Indian defence manufacturers.

Services included peoples’ movement for education, healthcare and tourism. More Lankan students and patients are travelling to India each year, as they face supply constraints domestically. While affluent Lankans generally travelled to the West, Australia or Singapore for education or healthcare, India is emerging as a viable option for the middle class Lankans. India could do well to promote its medical tourism and higher education facilities further in Sri Lanka, including easing the access to such facilities.

Tourism has also picked speed, following visa liberalization and better connectivity. Sri Lankan Airlines already derives a significant chunk of its income from India, as does a Lankan budget airline. India is also the largest source of foreign tourists to Sri Lanka. Opportunities exist in hospitality segments like restaurants, hotels and related supply chain. A stable Sri Lanka should see further tourist inflows from other countries, which Indian hospitality supply-chain/logistics companies might capitalize on.

There is also potential in information technology. Lankan IT companies are already servicing Indian firms. Sri Lanka is emerging as a feasible base for analytical work. Copal AMBA has invested in a centre in Colombo. Wage arbitrage can play a role in moving of IT services from India to Sri Lanka, just like it is moving IT services from China to Vietnam (as Microsoft did). Wages in India are expected to increase higher relative to Sri Lanka, and this might make Lankan IT services much more competitive. This includes investments from IT companies looking to service the Indian market through lower cost centres in Sri Lanka.

*Sourajit Aiyer is a finance professional in India. He can be contacted at contributions@sps.in

The post Why The Sri Lankan Vote Matters To India? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“We need a strong alliance between Europe with its technology and Russia with its resources. This is our duty of historic proportions.”
Jean-Marie Le Pen, Komsomolskaia Pravda, Jan 15, 2015. ¹

The conspiracy theorist functions as both magnet and vessel. Conspiracy theorists, in the absence of appropriate evidence, substitute and improve upon. But the conspiracy theory is also a product of passion, anger and irrational temper. Unwanted feelings, concerns, and suspicions, tend to be channelled through the workings of sinister forces, problematic alliances and seeming compromises.

Then come political figures who are impossible to wrap and summarise along plain conspiratorial lines. They are unpleasantly problematic, precisely because they use the pragmatism of politics, with the intoxication of anxious polemics. Occasionally, they can even be lucid, identifying themes of the troubling Zeitgeist.

The hard-hitting, seemingly inflated being of France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder and president-for-life of the Front National Party, is such a figure. He is not easy to categorise, and dismissive slurs about his reactionary behaviour simply won’t do. He fears Islam in France, something he has deemed a virus in need of policing and eventual eradication. He thinks, as he acted before, as a soldier, having himself done his bit for Francophile imperialism with stints in Algeria and Indochina.

He fears those, in fact, who would be anything other than French in that rigidly cut fashion he deems appropriate. It seems antiquated, but the fact that he, and the party his daughter currently leads, is proving to be a serious electoral chance in France, suggests anything but. He nurses the long held suspicion about other powers and forces he fears are undermining French sovereignty. He does not trust the American program, which he accuses of belligerence and global mischief making.

The recent, and rippling interview with Komsomolskaia Pravda, featured a colourful assortment of opinions.² There is the usual anti-immigration sentiment, a slur against France’s millions of Muslims. “They [Charlie Hebdo] can organise a show with a powerful media attack and the slogan ‘I am Charlie,’ temporarily mobilizing the nation but they are incapable of protecting the country from the influx of immigrants from the south.”

These immigrants refuse to work, though there is a sense that Le Pen would rather they did not. They are, for Le Pen, secondary agents of conquest. His preference, rather than for the “clowns” of Charlie Hebdo’s project, is to be the historically lionised, and Moor-stopping Charles Martel. “Martel, this brilliant French warrior, stopped the Arab invasion at Poitiers in 732.”

Combing through the rough and ready patches of Le Pen’s reasoning, and a few strands of logic are detectable. He doesn’t like Muslims nor cares much for Islam, but he was against the French meddling in Libya that resulted in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. “Getting involved in a war with Libya was true insanity.” Gaddafi’s forces, readying to attack the fundamentalist Salafists in Benghazi, were strafed by French planes. The fall of the regime led to a proliferation of weapons through North Africa, an outcome he lays squarely at the feat of the previous President Nicola Sarkozy.

Then came the Ukrainian crisis, another excuse for meddling in a bid to expand NATO, and US, power up towards Russia’s borders. “Our party’s position is as follows: the conflict between the Russians and the Ukrainians is a family feud. After all, Russia was born in Kiev. Neither Europeans, nor Americans should get involved in this family drama.”

The acute sense that France, and the rest of Europe, is in an existential struggle with Washington is made clear. There is a demographic problem – following a long historical trajectory, Russia’s population numbers are in decline with its eastern territories in a spot of bother, and Germany “is a gold-plated coffin stuffed with dead bodies.”

Dying nations, dying states, among the supposed roses of civilization, are losing out to the breeders and the movers, the immigrants of colour Le Pen hopes will disappear under the pressures of pandemics. (“Monsieur Ebola,” he claimed in May 2014, “can solve the problem in three months.”³)

Then there is the economic weapon, furnished via the incapacitating Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement. If the EU signs it with the United States, “We will turn into America’s economic colony.” His sharp solution? “We need a united Europe – from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but this must be a Europe of sovereign nations”.

The statement about US imperial power nosing about in the European provinces is a bit out of date – for decades various European states have offered bases, soldiers and material for the US project, a form of “empire by invitation,” as the less critical scholars on the subject claim. But Le Pen, and here, the lucidity breaks through, is right to fear the encroachments on sovereignty through such corporation-friendly instruments as the TTIPA.

The record of officialdom is also something to be doubted. Trusting a dyed-in-the-wool official of the tie and suit establishment is akin to believing a paid-up astrologer versed in reading entrails. Forget the fools in Brussels. Forget the new born moralists of the Hollande government who suddenly woke up to threats.

For that reason, Le Pen would rather not believe what exactly took place behind the Paris murders, though he stops short of the suggestions made by the site McLatchy and Thierry Meyssan that French and American operators were behind the attacks (The Independent, Jan 17). At least the official version, in which he smells something rank. “The Charlie Hebdo shooting has the modus operandi of the special ops, but we have no proof.” When in doubt, official versions prove dismissive of terrorists, seeing them as incompetent, and nitwits. Sadly, the nitwit tendencies are not exclusive.

Notes:
1. http://www.radixjournal.com/journal/2015/1/17/jean-marie-le-pen-from-paris-to-vladivostok
2. http://m.kp.ru/daily/26329.4/3212604/
3. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10847344/Jean-Marie-Le-Pen-Ebola-epidemic-would-solve-immigration-problems.html

The post Je Suis Charles: Jean-Marie Le Pen And The West’s Predicament – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — Iran has confirmed a general of its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) died in an Israeli air strike in Syria that also killed several members of the Lebanese Shi’ite militant group Hizballah on January 18.

The IRGC said in a statement on January 19 that General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi had been on assignment giving “crucial advice” to Syrians fighting terrorists — a reference to Sunni rebels and Islamic extremists.

The strike also killed a son of a top Hizballah operative assassinated in 2008 in Damascus.

Hizballah said the strike targeted two Hizballah vehicles as fighters were inspecting positions in an area close to the Israeli-controlled frontier.

Israeli Channel 10 television said an official Israeli source had confirmed that Israel had mounted an attack inside Syria on January 18.

Hizballah fighters have been battling alongside forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Predominantly Shi’ite Iran backs Hizballah and the regime in Damascus.

The post Iran Confirms General Killed In Israeli Air Strike In Syria appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amit Dasgupta*

Psephologists got it completely wrong. But then, so did everyone else, including Mahinda Rajapaksa himself.

Indeed, he was so convinced of a third term that he called for elections two years in advance. The results stunned everyone, including Rajapaksa’s astrologer, who had assured him of victory.

For Beijing, Rajapaksa’s defeat is a serious strategic setback. They could read the signs early enough with regard to what they could expect, because in the election manifesto itself Maithripala Sirisena had voiced his disapproval of the heightened Chinese presence. He drew attention to the growing ‘foreign’ presence, which he lamented would once again reduce Sri Lanka into ‘a colony’.

During Rajapaksa’s tenure, much to India’s discomfiture, Sri Lanka brazenly taunted India by assiduously playing the China card. India had watched with growing anxiety and was clearly rattled when a Chinese submarine was provided berthing facilities within sniffing distance of its shores.

The dramatic defeat of Rajapaksa could result in President Sirisena diluting Beijing’s embrace considerably. Beijing would be watching as to how Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi plays his cards. While Sirisena has agreed to an early India visit, a lot would depend on the sensitivity with which New Delhi responds.

First, New Delhi needs to assure Sirisena of full support without being perceived as interfering in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs. Domestic constituencies in India will, understandably, lobby for greater rights and autonomy for the Tamil population. But for now, India needs to strongly and openly endorse Sirisena’s commitment for the ‘truth-seeking mechanism’ and ‘reconciliation’, which in itself is a huge step from the Rajapaksa era.

Second, there is genuine worry among many Sri Lankans that the Sirisena government might not demonstrate the same commitment to growth as Rajapaksa. An economically resilient Sri Lanka would be in India’s interest. With the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as good as dead, India needs to actively pursue sub-regional cooperation that could see the Maldives, Sri Lanka and the southern states of India integrated on a range of social and economic issues.

Third, India needs to candidly share its security concerns, especially on Pakistan-supported terrorism, with the new government. All indications suggest that Sirisena will be receptive to this. It would be useful to craft a mechanism through which intelligence sharing and cooperation is enhanced.

Fourth, India’s Development Partnership Administration (DPA) programme for providing development assistance needs to be streamlined if it is to be an effective foreign policy instrument. Presently, there are delays in fund disbursement and consequently, slippages in time schedules. A clear directive from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can correct this. Simultaneously, focus needs to be directed on areas identified by the new government in Colombo, whether they are in infrastructure or the social sector, rather than on what New Delhi might consider as priorities.

Finally, India needs to be pragmatic. It needs to recognize that Beijing would continue to encourage the neighbourhood to invoke the China card. Further, some of our neighbours have demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate their inclination to succumb to such inducement. This is part of Beijing’s belligerent desire for assertiveness in the region, and is based on their policy of containing India through encirclement. The push for a greater role for Beijing at the recent SAARC summit clearly reflected this.

Furthermore, Sirisena will opt for policies that enhance Sri Lanka’s interests. This is as it should be. If India is to take advantage of Rajapaksa’s defeat, it can do so only if it is sensitive to Colombo’s concerns and supportive of Colombo’s interests. For the moment, New Delhi needs to take heart that Sirisena wishes to pursue a more balanced foreign policy than his predecessor.

At the same time, it is important for India to be cognizant that a long and hard road lies ahead for Sirisena. Rajapaksa’s United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) enjoys a majority in parliament. Sirisena vowed, within a self-administered deadline of 100 days, to abolish the executive presidency. It has been in place since 1978 and provides the president with almost authoritarian powers. This is not going to be easy but if Sirisena can pull it off, it will win hearts and minds of those who had been severely undermined during the Rajapaksa tenure.

Granting greater autonomy to the provinces is not likely to happen overnight nor indeed is it likely to be an immediate priority. But, as Sirisena gains in popularity and strength, it needs to be an area that New Delhi can gently nudge him towards. A soft-spoken, almost shy person, Sirisena lacks the flamboyance and arrogance of Rajapaksa. It is unlikely that he would be opposed to provincial autonomy, as it would only strengthen his hand.

The time is ripe for New Delhi to do some urgent and out-of-the-box thinking on its neighbourhood policy. Opportunities, such as Rajapaksa’s stunning defeat, do not come every day.

*Amit Dasgupta is a former diplomat. He can be reached at amit.dasgupta2013@yahoo.com

The post Opportunities For India In Rajapaksa’s Defeat – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kaveh L. Afrasiabi*

2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a sharp reminder of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the imminent danger to humanity posed by some 17300 bombs in the world today, irrespective of the legally binding obligation of the five (officially-recognized) nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, China, France, and England) to take practical steps toward a total elimination of nuclear weapons, i.e., disarmament.

The failure of disarmament and the problem of spread of nuclear weapons, i.e., proliferation, will once again top the agenda of the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May, 2015, and it remains to be seen if any tangible progress on the pressing NPT issues will be achieved at this conference? Judging by the outcome of the three preparatory meetings since the last review conference in 2010, it is wishful thinking to expect a major breakthrough on the key issues such as disarmament, universal adherence to NPT, non-discriminatory peaceful use of nuclear energy, security assurance of nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states, non-transfer of nuclear material to states not party to NPT, and a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

Concerning the latter, Iran and many other Middle East nations are eager to push forward the 1995 resolution that was also adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 review conference that “calls upon all states in the Middle East that have not yet do so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.” This resolution is essential to the denuclearization status of the Middle East as a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ), in light of Israel’s clandestine nuclear arsenal and its stubborn refusal to join the NPT and allow the slightest nuclear transparency. A nuclear weapon-free zone strengthens the NPT and is generally regarded as a major contributor to the disarmament cause, as clearly stated by Iran’s report to the 2010 review conference (NPT/CONF2010/33).

Unfortunately, there is no indication that Israel, enjoying its nuclear monopoly in the region, will heed the call by the international community to adhere to the NPT and its safeguard IAEA requirements, which in turn raises the question of how the 2015 Review Conference can compensate for the recent derailment of the 2012 UN-sponsored Helsinki conference on a Middle East NWFZ? Lest we forget, that conference was cancelled under US pressure, with the lame excuse, given by the US official, Victoria Nuland, citing “a deep conceptual gap that persists in the region on approaches towards regional security and arms control arrangements,” and because “states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions” for the meeting. Clearly, a more constructive and flexible US approach at the coming review conference is called for, otherwise the expectation of convening the Helsinki conference any time soon will not materialize.

One way to pressure Israel to join the NPT, as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, is to follow the Non-Aligned Movement’s call on all NPT states to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Another way is to intensify the efforts to prohibit the transfer of nuclear knowledge and material to Israel as long as it remains a non-party to the NPT.

In steering the 2015 NPT Review Conference toward an iron-clad commitment to hold an international conference on a Middle East NWFZ, the Non-Aligned Movement currently chaired by Iran has a crucial role to play. In addition to its NAM position, Iran’s contribution to the conference and its outcome is underscored by the nuclear talks that have yielded an interim agreement within the framework of NPT and regulations of IAEA. In turn, this has disarmed the supporters of Israel who seek to deflect the pressures on Israel, which has been manifested at the NPT review conferences for the past 20 years. As a result, the US and other Western powers will be hard pressed to find a justification for their reluctance to back the cancelled conference on a Middle Eat NWFZ; should these powers persist in their approach by refusing to set a definite date for the conference, then a major split at the Review Conference will be inevitable.

Of course, Iran’s purpose at the upcoming NPT review conference is not to sow divisions, but rather to exert leadership and play a constructive role in building bridges, while simultaneously highlighting its own contributions to the strengthening of NPT and the importance of non-discriminatory use and access to nuclear technology. Managing the agenda of such important international conferences is an important benchmark of “global governance” that should not be “the preserve of a small group of countries,” to paraphrase the Final Declaration of the NAM Summit in Tehran in 2012. With the world divided between the nuclear haves and nuclear have-not, there is a fundamental disparity of interest and orientation that needs to be bridged if the NPT is going to have a robust prospect in the long run.

Unfortunately, since it came into existence 45 years ago, NPT has witnessed a near doubling of nuclear-armed states, even though all the current documents of NPT and its review conferences continue to limit themselves to the five original states when referring to the “nuclear-weapon states.” This malady is even apparent in the NAM statements and ‘working papers’ at the review conferences, e.g., calling on the five nuclear states to refrain from attacks or threats of attacks on the peaceful nuclear facilities of other countries, deemed contrary to international law, UN Charter, and NPT principles. This call must now be realistically extended as well to all the other four nuclear-armed states of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, which are not NPT member states. These states should not be exempted from the demands leveled against the other five members of the ‘nuclear club’ simply by virtue of standing above the NPT’s purview. Israel in particular, given its history of war with its neighbors and threats against Iran, should be brought within the NPT’s radar and forced to comply with its legally-binding pledges and commitments.

In addition to the above-said, Iran with its example of the recent Geneva “Joint Plan of Action” which recognizes Iran’s right to a nuclear fuel cycle, has an important role in terms of pushing the NAM-led idea that concerns related to proliferation should not be used as an excuse to impose undue restrictions on the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology and the related rights enjoyed by the states under Article 4 of the NPT. Thus, the 2015 NPT Review Conference can be an important forum to highlight the importance of the Iran nuclear agreement for the broader community of developing nations, whose representatives at the review conferences are often heard lamenting such restrictions under the excuse of “sensitive technology.”

The only way to ensure the proper (peaceful) use of “dual-track” nuclear technology is by strengthening the IAEA, as the sole legitimate authority for verifying compliance of member states with their NPT obligations. As is well-known however, IAEA is not immune from ‘politicization’ and one of its problems has been selective attention to cases of “non-compliance” and also failure to protect the confidentiality of all information given to the agency by the member states about their nuclear activities. The 2015 NPT Review Conference is another occasion to re-affirm the importance of IAEA’s objectivity and confidentiality of its access to sensitive country information.

Finally, at a time when the US Congress is plotting further unilateral sanctions against Iran, both Iran and other NAM countries should seize the moment at the 2015 NPT Review Conference to campaign against unilateral sanctions, particularly those that are invoked in the name of strengthening the NPT yet in fact undercut the NPT-based approaches to counter-proliferation, e.g., by adding to the vulnerabilities of a target state that may resort to a ‘nuclear shield’ to defend itself. There is a fundamental incompatibility between unilateral sanctions and the NPT that has so far remained hidden and needs to be fleshed out at the coming conference.

*Kaveh Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of several books on Iran’s foreign policy. His writings have appeared on several online and print publications, including UN Chronicle, New York Times, Der Tagesspiegel, Middle East Journal, Harvard International Review, and Brown’s Journal of World Affairs, Guardian, Russia Today, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, Boston Globe, Mediterranean Affairs, Nation, Telos, Der Tageszeit, Hamdard Islamicus, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Global Dialogue.

The post Iran And The 2015 NPT Review Conference – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

United States and India are poised at strategic crossroads in January 2015 on the eve of President Obama’s unprecedented second visit to India. India-at-large expects deliverable game-changers in the politico-strategic arena.

The US-India Strategic Partnership in the last fifteen years could not evolve into a vibrant strategic partnership as Indian denouement followed United States, despite the Strategic Partnership, showed reluctance to change its policy perceptions and formulations on Pakistan and China in relation to South Asian politico-strategic dynamics.

In January 2015 American attitudinal policy inclinations persist in this direction. And, that brings United States-India relations to strategic crossroads on the eve of President Obama’s second State visit to India, which itself is unprecedented.

President Obama’s decision, in which his personal input may be more than that of the US policy establishment, signifies that India in 2015 counts in the United States global strategic calculus and review of Asian security.

If that be so, then what is required to add to the vibrancy and glow to the US-India Strategic Partnership is visible, it becomes inevitable for course corrections in United States policies on Pakistan and China in the politico-strategic arena. Small change like renewal of ‘Framework for US-India Defence Cooperation’ for ten years or increased US FDI in India does not count much in Indian public perceptions.

United States strategic permissiveness on China’s build-up of the Pakistan nuclear weapons and missiles arsenal has resulted in Pakistan being a “rogue nuclear weapons state” akin to North Korea. Successive United States Presidents looked the other way to pre-empt China’s build-up of Pakistan’s missiles and nuclear weapons arsenal on the pretext that “actionable intelligence” was not available, which was not the case.

This has resulted in the materialisation of a “Joint Nuclear and Military Threat” to India’s security and an unsettling wider threat to Indo Pacific stability and peace.

Similarly, the United States in the 1970s to1990s unmindful of the effects on Asian security and balance-of-power relentlessly built up China’s comprehensive power capabilities so that it emerges as a proxy counterweight to the Former Soviet Union and thereby serve US strategic interests. This US policy inclination still continues in the vain hope that China could be drawn out of its strategic nexus with Russia.

On both counts of misconceived United States politico-strategic policy formulations, the United States has willy-nilly facilitated the emergence of “Strategic and military monsters” threatening Indian security, Indo Pacific security and even United States security.

In January 2015, the picture is that the United States has major strategic concerns on Pakistan and China and desires that other Asian nations join an American-led posse’ to impose restraint on China and Pakistan ,if not outrightly contain them.

On the above count it has belatedly dawned on the United States that India would count heavily in any such politico-strategic endeavour. But then the crucial question that arises is as to what politico-strategic gains accrue to be prompted towards this end?

For such a development to materialise, the United States has to inject a number of significant game-changers in the US-India strategic equations to convince India that United States is willing to cut across the rhetoric of democracies, human rights and US and India being “natural allies” which now sound pedestrian and hackneyed. EX MALABAR naval exercises or India acquiring military aircraft from USA do not add up to a Strategic Partnership

Even the US carrots of increased US FDI in India, greater defence cooperation, transfer of defence technology and joining India in PM Modi’s ‘Make in India” campaign are not adequate and amount to ‘small change’.

India’s expectations from the United States are much higher and lie in the politico-strategic domain which would call for the United States to be respectful and honour India’s strategic concerns on China and Pakistan. It is there that the future course and possible success of the presently so-called US-India Strategic Partnership lies. It is there that US-India “Strategic Trust” can be built up as bedrock of a substantial Strategic Partnership.

On China, the United States needs to endow ‘strategic equivalence’ on India in terms of Indo Pacific security and if in US policy perceptions it appears that India has differentials to qualify for the same, the United States must embark on a fast-track trajectory to assist the build-up India’s comprehensive power. The United States should also disabuse from its mind the concept of a G-2 condominium of United States and China managing Asian security.

On Pakistan, the United States has a less challenging task as India requires no material assistance from the United States to tackle Pakistan’ ‘strategic delinquencies’. All that India expects is a change of United States strategic priorities in South Asia and United States withdrawing its protective umbrella over Pakistan.

The United States policy establishment needs to dispense with its outdated formulations of maintaining the balance-of-power in South Asia by artificially building up Pakistan as a ‘strategic equivalent ‘of India. United States must immediately and definitely stop all military aid to Pakistan Army which facilitated the 9/11 attacks in New York and double-timed the US in Afghanistan all along.

The United States in consultation with the international community should consider options to “de-fang Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal”

By doing so, Pakistan is neutralised of its strategic waywardness and robs China of a military proxy in South Asia and an instrument to destabilise US strategic interests in Greater South West Asia.

It beats Asian thinking as to what strategic ends does China serve in the cause of Asian security? Similarly, it beats Indian thinking as to what the United States can strategically gain in South West Asia by bolstering-up a ‘nuclear rogue state’ and a ‘terrorist state’ like Pakistan?

Only by endeavours outlined above can substantial strategic convergences germinate in United States-India relations paving the way for a vibrant and meaningful strategic Partnership.

United States policy establishment’s differing perceptions with India on China and Pakistan and its consequent effects on Asian security has led United States and India to stand at strategic crossroads in January 2015.

India expects that President Obama during his second visit to India next week would be able to announce visionary major policy course corrections outlined above so that US-India relations could thereafter lead to a substantial and vibrant US-India Strategic Partnership. The United States must recognise that in the overall context of Asian security, the United States needs India as a Strategic Partner; China as a ‘revisionist state’ challenging US predominance in East Asia does not foot the bill and US priorities on China are patently misconceived.

The post United States And India At Strategic Crossroads – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Giriraj Bhattacharjee*

The relative peace achieved in Nagaland was further consolidated through 2014, as insurgency-related fatalities continued to decline. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) the State recorded a total of 15 fatalities, including 11 civilians and four militants in 2014; as compared to 32 fatalities in 2013, including 11 civilians and 21 militants; a decline of 53.12 per cent.

As in 2013, there was no fatality among Security Forces (SFs) in 2014. In fact the last fatality in this category was recorded in 2008, when the Police on May 11, 2008, recovered the body of an Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB) trooper between the Keyive and Heningkunglwa areas under Peren District. Earlier, Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) cadres had killed an IRB trooper at Diphupar village in Dimapur town on April 25, 2008.

Fatalities were reported from five Districts in 2014 – Mon, Phek, Dimapur, Kiphire and Mokokchung – as against seven Districts in 2013. In 2013, these included Mon, Dimapur, Kiphire, in common with 2014, as well as Kohima, Tuensung, Zunheboto and Wokha.

Of the 11 civilians killed in 2014, nine died in a single incident. On January 3, 2014, the highly decomposed bodies of nine Karbi tribesmen, who were blindfolded with their hands tied and shot from close range, were found in a gorge in Dimapur District. The Rengma Naga Hills Protection Force (RNHPF), a group supported by the NSCN-IM, claimed responsibility for the killings. The incident was linked to Karbi People’s Liberation Tiger (KPLT) militants’ killing of a Rengma Naga tribesman in the Karbi Anglong District of Assam on December 27, 2013.

Two other civilians were killed in two separate incidents – at Mukalimi village in Zunheboto District on January 23 and at Phek Town in Phek District on June 3.

By comparison, the 11 civilian fatalities in 2013 were recorded in nine separate incidents.

Fatalities among militants witnessed a steep decline, with just four killed in 2014. Of these, two were killed in two separate fratricidal clashes among Naga militant formations – a cadre each of NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK) and Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN). On November 5, 2014, SFs killed a United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) cadre, identified as Ananta Dutta alias Prakash Baruah, in an encounter at Charing Basti in Mokokchung District. Another ULFA-I cadre, identified as ‘assistant finance secretary and operational commander’ Partha Asom alias Partha Pratim Gogoi, was reportedly killed on January 15, 2014, by cadres of his own group under the order of ULFA-I chief Paresh Baruah, who feared that Gogoi was about to surrender to the SFs on January 26, 2014.

The number of militants killed in 2013 stood at 21. More importantly, 12 of these militants were killed and another 11 were injured in 18 fratricidal clashes. The worst of these took place on December 2, 2014, when three NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) cadres were killed while one was injured in a factional clash with NSCN-KK cadres at Sikiu under Shamator sub-division in Tuensang District. Another two were killed by SFs in two separate incidents – one each of NSCN-IM and NSCN-K.

Clearly, a marked improvement has been witnessed through 2014 in terms of fratricidal clashes as well, which had undermined the State’s security environment for several years. According to SATP data, a total of 426 militants have been killed in such clashes since 2001, the highest number in 2008, when a total of 101 militants were killed in internecine fighting. The worst of recorded incident took place on June 4, 2008, when at least 15 cadres of the NSCN-IM and the Unification faction of NSCN (NSCN-U) were killed in separate factional clashes in and around Dimapur.

Fratricidal clashes among Naga groups outside Nagaland, and resultant casualties, also registered a decline in 2014 as compared to the preceding year. Five such incidents, resulting in three deaths and two injuries, were reported in 2014; as against seven such incidents in 2013, resulting in nine deaths and two injuries.

The improvement is primarily due to the signing of the ‘Lenten Agreement’ on March 28, 2014, during a two-day reconciliation meeting of three Naga militant groups – NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK and Naga National Council/ Federal Government of Nagaland (NNC/FGN) – at Dimapur, under the banner of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). The agreement, signed by six top leaders of the three groups, stated that, in accordance with the Naga Concordant signed on August 26, 2011, they agreed “in principle to form the NNG [Naga National Government]”. This development led to a sharp decline in fratricidal clashes. The joint statement, following the agreement, stated, “While this task is being carried out, we call for maintenance of the status quo, by vigilantly refraining from any unwarranted activities by the Nagas”.

Since an overwhelming proportion of violence in the State had been the result of turf wars between the Naga factions, various other parameters of violence, including explosions and abductions also declined. However, six incidents of explosion, resulting in injuries to five persons, were reported in 2014; as against eight such incidents, resulting in two civilian deaths, recorded in 2013.

The SATP database recorded six incidents of abduction [in which eight people were abducted] in 2014, whereas 12 persons were abducted in 10 such incidents in 2013. 10 incidents of extortion were also recorded in 2014, as against nine incidents reported in 2013. The numbers relating to both abduction and extortion are gross underestimates as most such incidents go unreported, as victims comply without reporting to the Police.

165 militants were arrested in 95 incidents during 2014. These included 56 militants of NSCN-IM, 35 NSCN-K, 33 of NSCN-KK, 24 belonging to different Naga National Council (NNC) factions, nine belonging to the Assam-based United People’s Liberation Army (UPLA), and five belonging to the Assam-based IK Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS). 146 militants were arrested in 69 incidents in 2013.

Despite these positive developments, areas of concern persist. Border clashes along State boundaries remain a challenge. Indeed, in one of the worst clashes along the Nagaland-Assam border, which erupted on August 12, 2014, at least 20 people were killed in the Golaghat District of Assam. Clashes along the interstate borders of these two States, over the years, have claimed many lives. The worst of such clashes took place in 1979 when at least 54 people were killed. Signficantly, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (SC) headed by Justice T.S. Thakur, on January 14, 2015, observed that the boundary dispute between Assam and Nagaland could be resolved either by deciding the 1988 law suit filed by Assam or by referring the matter for arbitration. On the issue as to which State will have control over the disputed area for maintaining law and order and administrative purposes, the bench observed, “it is for the political executive to decide and it cannot be managed by the judiciary.”

It is the prevailing and frequent diktats of the Naga militant formations that remain the primary public and security concern. For instance, the ‘civilian arm’ of NSCN-IM, the ‘Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim’ (GPRN), through its ‘ministry of mines and minerals’ on July 9, 2014, wrote to Metropolitan Oil and Gas Pvt. Ltd. (MOGPL), rejecting the firm’s prospecting licence, leading to cessation of work. MOGPL, however, launched the pre-production phase of its operation at Old Jalukie village in Peren District in September. Kireshwar Bora, Chief Operating Officer stated, on September 23, 2014, that drilling operations had started in Changpang field (Wokha District). The permit was issued by the State Government of Nagaland in February 2014 to develop the Wokha and Peren oil zones.

In another development highlighting this crisis, the Angami Youth Organization (AYO) and Chakhesang Youth Front (CYF), on April 29, 2014, banned NSCN-K cadres from entering Angami tribal areas, and cautioned all Government establishments, institutions, contractors, corporate, public and private individual business owners against contributing any form of “tax and percentages” to the group. This came after a member of the Action Committee against Unabated Taxation (ACAUT), Abe Mero, was attacked by a suspected NSCN-K militant on April 9, 2014 in Kohima.

Significantly, according to a May 27, 2014, report, Joel Nillo Kath, the ‘co-chairman ‘ of ACAUT, noted that multiple ‘taxation’ and illegal collection started right from the entry gates to the State, where different militants and ‘government agencies’ charge exorbitant rates in the form of yearly tax on vehicle, transport, and goods entry on every item, including essential commodities. He added that militant groups started the system of ‘dealership’ for almost all commodities, as a result of which only a small coterie of businessmen were allowed to deal in those commodities.

ACAUT was formed by several organizations under the aegis of the Naga Council in May 2013, in an effort to check the rampant imposition of ‘illegal tax‘ on the people, especially the business community, by various organizations, particularly including Naga militant outfits.

It is, consequently, useful to assess the losses and gains as a result of the cease-fire agreements signed between the Naga groups and the Central Government, and the several rounds of talks that have followed. R. N. Ravi, the current chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who was appointed by Central Government as the interlocutor for talks with Naga groups on August 9, 2014, in a news article published on January 23, 2014, observed:

The reckless ‘ceasefire’ between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM)… for the last 17 years is pushing the Nagas into a state of civil war. While the protagonists of the ‘ceasefire,’ New Delhi and the NSCN (I-M), are in mutual comfort capering about the mulberry bush without a stopwatch, the process has landed the Nagas in an orbit of self-destruction. They are far more fragmented and fractious than before… Over 1,800 Nagas have been killed in some 3,000 fratricidal clashes since the beginning of the ‘ceasefire’ (1997-2013). Contrast it with the violence during the 17 years preceding the ‘ceasefire’ (1980-96) that took a toll of some 940 Naga lives in 1,125 clashes mostly with the security forces… The crucial stakeholders — the popularly elected State government, the traditional Naga bodies that wield wide and deep influence on their respective tribes and other active militias in the fray — were excluded from the process. … NSCN (I-M), notwithstanding its pan-Naga pretensions, is essentially a militia of the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur with little resonance with the broad Naga family. A deal cut with it would not be acceptable to the Naga society… The ‘ceasefire’ with the NSCN-IM has resulted in the retreat of the state from the crucial areas of governance and subversion of democratic politics. The absence of a credible state has created a power vacuum that is being filled in by chaotic sub-nationalist forces often at war with one another.

More than 70 rounds of talks have taken place between NSCN-IM and the Central Government since 1997, without any concrete gains, other than the fact that the outfit has reportedly given up its demand for ‘sovereignty’. Likewise, the cease-fire agreements signed with other prominent Naga insurgent groups – NSCN-K [signed in 2001] and NSCN-KK [signed in 2012] – have also failed to construct any substantive solution to the lingering conflict.

For long, a policy of drift appeared to dominate the approach to militancy in Nagaland and its overflow into neighbouring States. The new dispensation in New Delhi has, however, articulated a time bound strategy of negotiations with Naga groups. On October 18, 2014, while commenting on peace talks with NSCN-IM, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval noted, “There should never be any feeling that it (talks) is protracted… The (peace) process is the means to an end and if there is an end, which is a desired end, it must be found in real time. There should be rule of law in the Naga insurgency-affected areas for which peace process must be completed as early as possible.” It remains to be seen how these declarations are translated into policy and process.

*Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India: Evasive Reconciliation In Nagaland – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A bit of encouraging news came in from Afghanistan after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani nominated ministers for his unity cabinet more than three months after he was sworn in.

Ghani’s chief of staff announced the 25 cabinet nominees during an event at the presidential palace in Kabul on Jan 12 attended by Ghani and government chief executive Abdullah Abdullah. The list will now go before the parliament for approval. During the last three months besides juggling various factional, ethnic and tribal interests Ghani has been attempting to establish a working government to tackle the country’s myriad problems. This article looks at some of the significant developments of the past few months which have influenced the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.

The Cabinet

Salahuddin Rabbani, the former head of the country’s high peace council, has been nominated as foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Karimi, the military chief of staff, earmarked for defence minister while former general Noor-ur-Haq Ulomi has been nominated as interior minister. The cabinet contains three women, for the portfolios of women’s affairs, culture and higher education. The composition of the cabinet appears to reflect the two rival camps and contains “prominent ethnic and regional power-brokers”. The cabinet has new faces some of whom are hardly known to the public.

Afghanistan watchers and international observers have hailed the nominations as an important step, viewing the cabinet as a significant step forward rather than who has been nominated to the cabinet and why.

The Taliban Twist

It has been reported that Ghani had offered the Taliban posts in the new Afghan government, which they rejected. Ghani is supposed to have offered the Taliban three cabinet positions, specifically for Mullah Zaeef, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Wakil Muttawakil, the former Taliban foreign minister, and Ghairat Baheer, a close relative of warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The posts earmarked for them included the Ministry of Rural Affairs, the borders, and the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs. Ghani also considered appointing Taliban governors to three southern provinces: Nimruz, Kandahar, and Helmand.

The Taliban leadership declined the offer citing security deals signed by the new government allowing some international troops to remain in Afghanistan post 2014 as the main stumbling block. The Taliban also want changes to the constitution and immunity from prosecution before they would enter negotiations on joining the government.

An evaluation of Ghani’s offer would indicate that it was in tune with ground realities. It sought to hand over to the Taliban the charge of issues they would have liked to steer at the national level and the control of provinces they are either fighting for or have de facto control over. It also came with the hope that the Taliban would relinquish their hold over the areas in the north and north east of the country.

Interestingly, Ghani nominated a close supporter from eastern Afghanistan, Qamaruddin Shinwari, to the ministry of border and tribal affairs, a crucial post that includes counter-narcotics measures. Shinwari had served as an official in the Taliban government before the US-led invasion in 2001.

Post-Peshawar

After the Dec 16, 2014 terrorist attack on the army-run school in Peshawar, the Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif the next day visited Kabul with classified intelligence details to establish that terrorists are using Afghan soil to carry out attacks in Pakistan. He had also briefed the Afghan leadership that the mastermind behind the Peshawar attack had been giving directives to the perpetrators of the attack from Afghanistan. General Sharif also met International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General Joseph Dunford.

General Sharif had sought Afghanistan’s help in eliminating the Pakistani Taliban, which was being targeted by the Pakistan army in its stronghold of North Waziristan. It fascinates analysts as to how General Sharif would have negotiated with Ghani after providing safe havens to the Afghan Taliban in its 13-year-old war against the US-backed government in Kabul. Besides the more obvious offer to cooperate in cross-border counter-terrorism operations, it is expected that Pakistan would have committed to use its influence to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiation table to end the conflict. This was likely to be in the form of outside the country talks or even better, a Taliban commitment to join the government in Kabul. This may have been another reason for delay in announcement of the unity cabinet.

Ghani had since taking over as president had called on China and Saudi Arabia to use their influence over Pakistan to improve relations. The US too had been using its leverage with the Pakistan army, including committing to not conduct operations against the Afghan Taliban on one hand and carrying out drone strikes against the Pakistani Taliban operating in Afghanistan. The post–Peshawar tension appeared to provide that tipping point where Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) would use all their influence to get the Taliban to start negotiating with the government in Kabul.

It was also felt that the growing distrust of Pakistan among the Afghan Taliban and Chinese efforts at brokering talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government might also contribute in softening the Taliban stand on negotiations. Yet it did not happen for possibly two reasons – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and India.

ISIS

The situation in Afghanistan is being further complicated by the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, which has reportedly started operating in southern Helmand. The group is led by a local commander and is operating in Zamin Dawar area of Sangin and also parts of Kajaki district. The bigger worry is the belief that ISIS militants are waiting to position themselves as the anti-peace talk group as soon as the mainstream Taliban factions commence peace talks with the government in Kabul. This could emerge as a new hurdle to Afghan reconciliation and peace.

India Factor

The latest narrative coming out of Pakistan is that India is using Afghan soil to carry out attacks on Pakistan. The aim is to limit any role India might want to play in Afghanistan and provide a counter argument to Pakistan-supported cross-border activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan is under severe pressure, as is evident by the recent statements by US Secretary of State John Kerry in Islamabad and UN Secretary General in Delhi, to not differentiate between its counter terrorism actions on its eastern and western borders. Pakistan will push for Afghan reconciliation only when it feels secure on all counts.

Ongoing Process

However the strategic jockeying is in play. On Jan 11, prior to the announcement of the Afghan cabinet, General Razwan Akhtar, Pakistan’s chief of the Inter Services Intelligence met Ghani in Kabul, in his third trip to Afghanistan in recent months. Afghanistan and Pakistan appear to be increasing coordination to jointly undertake military operations against the militants, despite the failure to break the Taliban impasse on talks. The Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah is expected to visit Islamabad in this regard. Pakistani media reported recently that the Pakistan government has deported hundreds of Afghan students who had come to Pakistan for religious studies.

The situation in AfPak continues to be complex and uncertain. It is imperative that Afghanistan achieves a degree of stability earliest for itself and the region.

(Monish Gulati is Associate Director with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at mgulati@spsindia.in)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

The post The AfPak Situation: Strategic Jockeying And Continued Uncertainty – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A breached oil pipeline in Montana has spilled as many as 50,000 gallons of crude oil in and around the Yellowstone River, according to the state. Bridger Pipeline LLC has yet to determine the cause, but has claimed the public is in no immediate danger.

Cleanup crews were at work on Monday to address the mess, which emanated from a break in the Poplar Pipeline system about 9 miles upstream from Glendive in eastern Montana.

Bridger Pipeline said the rupture in the 12-inch steel pipe occurred early Saturday and lasted for one hour, dispensing no more than 1,200 barrels, or about 50,000 gallons, of crude oil.

Oil has been reported as far as 25 miles downstream from Glendive, according to company spokesman Bill Salvin. Some of the crude is trapped under ice.

“Oil has made it into the river,” Salvin said, according to AP. “We do not know how much at this point.”

While Bridger has claimed no immediate danger to the public, others are not so sure.

“I am not saying the water is unsafe. I am not saying it is safe. We are waiting for officials to arrive who can make that decision,” said Mary Jo Gehnert, coordinator of the Dawson County Disaster and Emergency Services, according to KRTV.

The Montana Standard, meanwhile, reported that some local Glendive residents said there water could smell and taste oil in their drinking water.

Bridger initially estimated on Sunday that 300 to 1,200 barrels of oil spilled before the company shut down the pipeline.

“Our primary concern is to minimize the environmental impact of the release and keep our responders safe as we clean up from this unfortunate incident,” said Tad True, vice president of Bridger.

State officials said the impact of oil in the Yellowstone River may be reduced given much of the water in the spill area is frozen over.

“We think it was caught pretty quick, and it was shut down,” said Dave Parker, a spokesman for Gov. Steve Bullock. “The governor is committed to making sure the river is cleaned up.”

The US Environmental Protection Agency and state Department of Environmental Quality have responded to the area, Parker said.

Bridger Pipeline, a subsidiary of True Cos., based in Casper, Wyoming, said it was testing the water for contamination, according to AP.

The Poplar Pipeline runs from Canada to Baker, Montana, carrying crude from the Bakken oil region in Montana and North Dakota. The pipeline was last inspected in 2012, according to Salvin, and rests at least eight feet below the Yellowstone River at Glendive.

Bridger Pipeline also owns the Four Bears Pipeline System in North Dakota as well as the Parshall Gathering System and the Powder River System in Wyoming.

In July 2011, a pipeline operated by ExxonMobil Corp. released 63,000 gallons of oil along the Yellowstone River. The company is now facing state and federal fines of up to $3.4 million based on damages from the spill.

The company has said it has already spent $135 million on cleanup and related work, and it expects to pay out more money based on damages to natural resources in the area.

The spill comes amid the high-profile fight over the Keystone XL pipeline, a 1,179-mile project that would transport tar sands oil from Alberta, Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.

The controversial pipeline, owned by energy giant TransCanada Corp., is expected to receive a vote soon in the US Senate, while the US State Department announced Friday that it is giving eight pertinent federal agencies two weeks “to provide their views on the national interest with regard to the Keystone XL Pipeline permit application,” a department official told CNN over the weekend.

The State Department is ultimately responsible for reviewing the pipeline’s permit application.

President Barack Obama has stated his opinion several times about the project, saying it would “not even have a nominal benefit” to American consumers.

“We’re going to let the process play itself out,” he told reporters at a December conference. “And the determination will be made in the first instance by the Secretary of State. But I won’t hide my opinion about this, which is that one major determinant of whether we should approve a pipeline shipping Canadian oil to world markets, not to the United States, is: does it contribute to the greenhouse gases that are causing climate change?”

His concerns echo those of other opponents, who say the pipeline would not result in much long-term job growth or energy security within the US while putting communities at risk for oil spills and other hazards to human and environmental health.

Supporters, including Republicans in Congress, claim the Keystone XL would provide an economic boost while adding to America’s energy independence.

Pending action in Washington follows a Nebraska Supreme Court decision earlier this month that overturned an earlier ruling that had held up construction of the Keystone XL.

The state’s highest court reversed a lower court’s 2012 ruling that had previously determined that Gov. Dave Heineman’s decision to approve a path for the pipeline had violated Nebraska’s constitution. The latest decision in Nebraska means official approval has been granted in all states included in the pipeline’s path.

The post Pipeline Breach Spills 50,000 Gallons Of Oil Into Yellowstone River appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Alan Holdren

Pope Francis has revealed that he hopes to make extensive voyages to Africa and Latin America in the next two years.

“The plan is to go to Central African Republic and Uganda. These two, this year,” Pope Francis said during a press conference Jan. 19 on his return flight to Rome from the Philippines.

The Pope’s revelation comes in response to a French journalist aboard the flight.

Pope Francis said the trip to Africa is “a bit overdue.” He said he would have traveled to Africa sooner, if not for the Ebola epidemic.

“It is a big responsibility to hold big gatherings, (because of the possibility of) contagion, no? But, in these countries there is no problem,” he said.

The latest World Health Organization estimates suggest the Ebola outbreak has killed more than 8,500 people in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The incurable disease has a high mortality rate.

Pope Francis said Central African Republic and Uganda are still “hypothetical” destinations, but he confirmed that a trip to Africa “will be this year.”

He clarified that he will go later in the year to avoid the rainy season.

During the in-flight press conference, Pope Francis also confirmed plans to make two separate visits to South America over the next two years.

A trip to South America this year could include stops in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. While, a possible visit in 2016 or 2017 could include stops in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru.

The trip would be Pope Francis’ first visit to his home country of Argentina since his election to the papacy in March of 2013.

Vatican spokesperson Fr. Federico Lombardi was quick to clarify that the travel plans are still in the beginning stages.

“Everything is provisional, nothing is decided yet,” Fr. Lombardi said.

The post Pope Francis Hopes To Travel To Africa, South America In Next Two Years appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel’s decision to begin drilling on the Golan Heights will not only help quench its thirst for oil and water, whilst establishing greater control over the disputed territory. Syria’s reaction will be key to determining whether the move adds further tension to an already volatile region.

By Ashay Abbhi

Moses led the Israelites to the one place on earth that had no oil. This joke, however, may soon become redundant. After sitting on speculated oil in Golan Heights for twenty years, Israel has finally decided to start drilling. Leftovers of one-time Syrian occupation still haunt the hills, which will soon be echoing with the sounds of large rigs, drilling deep into the core of the earth to search for oil. Ahead of the ripples to come when drilling starts, the international community is already feeling the reverberations. The friction between Israel and Syria, two countries that share joint-custody of Golan Heights, is set to increase considerably.

Golan Heights, arguably the Kashmir of the Middle East, was occupied by Israel in 1967 during the Six-Day war. It wasn’t until 1981 that civil law and administration were extended to it. With 21,000 citizens at present, Israel has slowly increased its presence in the region.

Syria, who owns whatever piece of land that it could retain in the war, still has settlements in the region. Considering the turmoil in Syria, those living in Golan are increasingly accepting Israeli citizenship. According to the latest count, there were around 20,000 Syrians in Golan Heights loyal to the flag and ostracizing the ones defecting to Israel.

Just how and why did Israel decide to pursue the Golan Heights now?

Back in 1996, the National Oil Company of Israel estimated Golan to be holding around two million barrels of oil. Netanyahu had then rejected the company’s requests to drill on the site, but Silvan Shalom, Israel’s Minister of Energy and Water Resources, has now strangely opened it up for oil exploration. This will help Israel achieve multiple goals – to quench its increasing thirst for oil, to perhaps export some of it to Europe and even the US; to establish greater control over the disputed Golan Heights.

Let’s look at these two points one by one.

First, Israel imports nearly 97% of its oil needs, has considerable natural gas production but still needs to import a fraction of it. Given the country’s development drive and sustenance of the protracted occupation of Palestinian territories, its energy requirements have been increasing. Even though oil and natural gas prices are currently low, this golden period is bound to last only for a little while longer, by which time, Israel could possibly be looking at an even higher import bill. Developing the Golan Heights for oil production would not only somewhat ease its oil burden, but could also make it an exporter to Europe or even to the US through pipelines.

Second, the Golan Heights has long been a point of contention between Israel and Syria. While both have tried hard to establish themselves as sovereign authority over the territory, Israel’s move to allow a company to drill in the region carries the risk of political confrontation. The Knesset is well aware of Syria’s injured fiscal and political situation, and could not find a better opportunity to give the world another example of kicking the enemy when they are down.

Another angle to this clever manoeuvre by Israel could be prompted by the United States of America. Afek Oil is the Israeli subsidiary of a New Jersey-based company called Genie Energy Limited, which has Dick Cheney, former Vice President of the US, as an advisor. This could well be enough to make it clear why Afek Oil has been allowed to explore in the politically-sensitive region. This will also provide the US with an opportunity to increase its leverage, either through Israel or directly, over Syria. The US could be looking at eventually arm-twisting Assad through the Golan Heights, which, even though small, gives it significant presence in the region. When seen from this perspective, the role played by the US in accessing the resources in the Golan Heights can’t be ignored.

The Golan Heights holds significance for Israel not only in terms of oil but also water, which it has a lengthy history of exploiting. Israel may therefore be looking to satiate its two major thirsts; one literal and the other metaphorical.

There have been environmental protests against Afek Oil’s drilling in the region, which is expected to commence in February. The company’s website provides a stage-by-stage process that it will carry out over a period of three years; the time for which it has been granted an exploration license. Afek Oil declared that it will not be indulging in environmentally-detrimental operations during this phase, but the issue here includes much more than the environment, which ironically, Syria has not yet raised.

Israel’s move into the Golan Heights is controversial, and open for speculation by the rest of the world. What Syria may make of it and how it will react in the wake of its fractured economy and military is something that remains to be seen. Israel’s increasing hunger for land and resources, and the haughtiness that stems from unconditional US support, could well be a giant in the making. Assad may have to cover his south-western end to prevent another major outbreak, as the probability of the rebels being fed on Israeli-American resources looms large with their increased presence in the region. Could the noise of oil rigs in Golan silence the guns or will it lead to a bloodier quest for the troubled territory?

Ashay Abbhi is based out of India. An analyst in the field of contemporary energy issues, Ashay’s interests also lie in nuanced issues of war and conflict. With his specialisation in tow, Ashay has explored different angles of energy sector, one of which includes the comprehension of the geopolitics of energy.

The post Israel’s Exploration Of Golan Heights: Is It Just About Oil? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

There was a time when getting a taxi in Copenhagen on the eve of Christmas, the traditional date of celebration, was impossible. A booking had to made weeks in advance, in some cases, months. To risk getting to a venue on December 24th and not have a ride home through the biting cold, even as the public transport system slept, was something residents took.

Then came a rivalling solvent, a solution to the dilemma: Uber. The evening of this December 24th, several Uber drivers were on hand in the Danish capital, drawn up on that multi-connected smorgasbord of an item known as the smartphone. In the world of hyper surveillance and monitoring, drivers and locations would be displayed, with your choice of driver duly selected.

They even come with a personalised dimension, the necessary touch for prospective customers. This particular driver boasted a name strikingly similar to the al-Nusra front in Syria, but this was not an occasion to joke. People just wanted to get home, and drivers not associated with the regular taxi market wanted to make earnings.

This is a company that became so large it is brushing past and pushing the competition out of regulated taxi markets. Venture capitalists continue salivating at its growth. Indeed, Uber seemed to be the ideal competitive model. But all models will at some point reach levels of stress, facing the specifics of local problems. The bigger the system, the greater the propensity to unfold.

Uber provides the classic example. Multinational experiments face local problems. A universal template has to yield to the specifics of locality. Precisely the seemingly loose nature of the Uber model, regulatory gurus are wondering how to rein in the driving company.

As are the anti-Uber groups which have sprung up, comprising such leading voices as Steve Wright who has argued that the company is a sinister entity, “backed by corporate titans like Goldman Sachs, and incur no tax liabilities in the UK” (The Independent, Jun 11, 2014). Besides, argues Wright, there is a safe system in operation as it is, competitive in nature and cost, comprising private hire vehicles and taxis.

Those sympathetic to Wright’s case cite safety examples, with a case of alleged rape of a passenger in New Delhi by an Uber driver last December. (The accused is currently standing trial over charges.) For all of that, James Cook, writing in Business Insider (Dec 8, 2014), argues that, “Uber remains one of the safest, if not the safest, ways to order a car.” The company monitors the cars used, the routes taken, and duly informs passenger of the route taken.

Then come the tax problems with the singular structure of the company, claiming that it is a tech entity which just takes fees for linking drivers and passengers. There are issues with those who work for Uber, thinking that there is an agency relationship between the company and the driver.

Uber has also made it into the publicity bad books with a spectacular demonstration of the profit motive in action. Just to show that the desire to make some ruddy cash does not diminish with a hostage siege, Uber made it to the front pages as it charged surging prices for individuals seeking to leave the Sydney central business district during the Lindt Café hold up. “One way to guarantee outrageously expensive Uber surge pricing? A hostage situation, apparently” (New York Magazine, Dec 15). An algorithm was deployed, raising prices to four times the standard rate as residents made a dash for it. The company went into placating overdrive: refunds were offered, and even free rides.

The problems posed by Uber’s push into various markets has been telling. In several European countries, Uber has faced operations clipping their influence. Bans against the use of the UberPOP service have been issued in Spain by judges, though these have been openly defied and challenged in court (The Straits Times, Dec 27, 2014). The regulators are pushing back, in some cases with a good degree of fury. In Portland, Oregon, Uber braved the local market by launching its operations without the approval of local officials. The response came in the form of threatened fines for both the company and its drivers.

The most recent instance of this is a cease and desist order from local government authorities in South Carolina, concerned that an Uber subsidiary, Raisier LLC, runs drivers without the appropriate credentials to be picking customers up and taking them to their destinations for money (The Verge, Jan 15). Since operating its UberX service in the state, regulators have been chewing over a classification regime for the company’s services, and those similar to it.

For all of these problems, the market for hired drivers, accessible at the touch of a booking app, is only getting larger. Uber’s not-so-saintly approach to making profits is bound to change as the regulators creep into the purses and incorporate this model of driver hire.

Those working in regulated, and in some cases closed taxi markets have already seen the threat manifest itself in an all too effective way. The rearguard actions are being mounted, though a mellowing is bound to take place. For all of that, one could still get a ride back in the cold Copenhagen night of Christmas Eve.

The post The Rise And Hiccups Of Uber – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Stephen Westcott*

Following a particularly productive year in Indo-Australian relations that saw great strides most notably in defence cooperation, it is timely to reflect upon the events and ask two key questions: what is the status of the bilateral defence relationship entering 2015?; and what, if any, developments are likely to be seen in the coming year?

India-Australia Defence Relations: Looking Back

Since their nadir in 2008-2009, Australian-Indian relations and defence ties have markedly improved. Indeed, defence and security engagement between the two countries have steadily increased to culminate in the signing of the New Framework for Security Cooperation (NFSC) on 18 November 2014 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s bilateral visit to Australia. The NFSC combined and expanded several previous agreements and commits both countries to hold annual high-level summits, cooperate closely on counter-terrorism and international crime, hold regular bilateral maritime exercises and focus on the early operationalisation the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement (CNECA) to assist India’s quest for energy security. Most of the statements in the lead up to and after the signing of the NFSC have shown that both sides intend to make maritime security the key pillar in the defence cooperation.

There have been plenty of false starts in the Australian-Indian defence cooperation efforts in the past. In 1998, Australia immediately suspended its defence cooperation with India after the nuclear weapons test. When the fledgling Quadrilateral Initiative in 2007 that saw Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and the US participate in a maritime exercise drew a strong hostile Chinese reaction, the newly elected centre-left Labor government publically withdrew in 2008 in a move that annoyed many Indian officials who saw it as Australia bowing to Chinese pressure.

The New Rapprochement: New Governments and Convergences

Defence ties were restored in 2009 but only moved tentatively forward until June 2013 when the Defence Ministers met in Perth, Australia, and agreed to establish bilateral maritime exercises. This rapprochement however appears to have stronger foundations than the preceding efforts and will likely endure for two key reasons.

Firstly, over the past five years governments on both sides of the political spectrum in Australia and India have been working hard to remove the key issues of contention between them, removing the likelihood of change of government producing another change of heart. Indeed, in 2009 the Labor government sought to undo the damage caused by its withdrawal in 2008 by establishing a strategic partnership with India and signing the Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2009 as well as formally dropping its opposition to uranium sales in 2012. The last major obstacle between the two countries’ relations was removed when Prime Minister Abbot signed the CNECA in September 2014 during his bilateral visit to India, thus finally clearing the way for the sale of Australian uranium to India.

Secondly, both Australian and Indian interests have been increasingly converging. Modi’s government has been keen to revamp India’s ‘Look East’ policy into an ‘Act East’ in a search for greater economic ties and also more substantial political connections. As Australia has a similar political system, is a reliable regional provider of raw resources and services needed by the Indian economy, and has a highly skilled and professional defence force, it has moved from the periphery to being comfortably within the scope of this policy. Australia for its part has been showing growing interest in the Indian Ocean, formally identifying the Indo-Pacific (as opposed to the Asia-Pacific) as the key security focus in its 2013 Defence White Paper.

Is there a China Factor?

Providing an additional, if publically unspoken, adhesive are both countries’ serious concerns about China’s incursions into the Indian Ocean, which have been growing more numerous and bolder over the years. Of particular concern has been the emergence of Chinese submarines evidently practising long-range deployments in the Indian Ocean, with the latest incident of note occurring when a Chinese nuclear submarine surfaced just off Sri Lanka in September 2014. While China has legitimate interests in safeguarding its commercial routes that pass through the Indian Ocean, India is inherently concerned about the Chinese military potentially surrounding it by land and by sea as well as eroding its’ dominance in what it has long considered its backyard. Australia likewise has been concerned by China’s aggressive posturing in the South China Sea and is particularly interested in ensuring that no nation is able to establish a maritime advantage in its’ own neighbouring waters.

Defence Ties: Looking Ahead

Heading into 2015, Australian-Indian defence ties are likely to deepen significantly, especially in the field of maritime security. The first formal bilateral maritime exercise between the two countries is scheduled to be conducted in 2015, although the exact date has yet to be published. While piracy in the Indian Ocean may be on the decline, there is also plenty of room for bilateral cooperation over other illegal maritime activities such as the prolific smuggling of people and narcotics in the region. Australia also has several state-of-the-art defence training facilities such as the Submarine Escape Facility in Western Australia that would be of definite interest to the Indian defence forces, and 2015 could see arrangements for joint training courses to be run in the near future.

Nonetheless, one should not get too ecstatic about these developments and possibilities. As the former Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith noted, “Australian Indian relations are like a Twenty-Twenty cricket match-short bursts of activity followed by lengthy periods of inactivity.” Only time will tell whether this period of engagement will peter out like those before it or finally move beyond brief flirtations and develop into a self-sustaining relationship. That being said, there is every reason to be optimistic that this time they are built on firmer foundations.

* Stephen Westcott
Research Intern, IPCS

The post Australia And India: A New Era In Defence Cooperation? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By D Suba Chandran*

Last January in 2014, none would have predicted the fall of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa. At that time, he was gathering momentum politically every passing day; political opposition within Sri Lanka – both inside and outside the Parliament was perhaps the weakest; and he had earlier vanquished the LTTE, the biggest threat to Sri Lankan polity until then.

There was no opposition to him; none of the leaders from the opposition party, including Ranil Wikramasinghe was confident of fighting against Rajapaksa at that time. There were no threats from any of the sub-regions in Sri Lanka – either from the east or the north politically or otherwise. There was no non-State actor that could even remotely pose a challenge to Rajapaksa. His family had by then taken absolute control over the entire State. From the Parliament to media, not many dared to question Rajapaksa and his family. In fact, he felt so strong, that he even preponed the election schedule.

And what an election it turned out to be, strengthening the very core of democratic ideals in South Asia! In retrospect, he is not the only leader in South Asia, who got elected to power democratically by the people, and further got elevated almost into a demi-god or a messiah, only to be dethroned subsequently by the same people who elected them. The list in India alone is long enough; it includes Sheikh Abdullah, Laloo Prasad Yadav, Mamta Banerjee, NT Ramarao, Jayalalitha and many others. While some like Jayalalitha have bounced back electorally, others like Laloo are still trying to float. What causes the rise and fall of these strong men and women? What makes the democracies to elect them strongly, and also make them fall?

Revenge of Minorities?

For the fall of Rajapaksa, the simplest explanation provided so far is too simple to agree with. It talks about the revenge of minorities in Sri Lanka, meaning, the Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims voted completely against Rajapaksa. Perhaps, the minorities did not vote for Rajapaksa; but the minorities in Sri Lanka put together do not constitute an electoral majority! This means, a substantial section of the Sinhala community have also voted against Rajapaksa.

Ethnically, the Sri Lankan Tamils (a section of them being Muslims) constitute less than 12 percent and the Sinhalese constitute close to 75 percent. In religious terms, the Buddhists constitute 70 percent, while the Hindus, Muslims and Christians form the rest. Revenge of minorities’ theory may not do justice to the larger aspirations and anger within Sri Lanka against Rajapaksa, his family and their naked pursuit and abuse of power.

Over Confidence and Arrogance of Rajapaksa Family?

Second, perhaps Rajapaksa’s arrogance and over confidence brought his downfall. From the Airport to the rural areas, one could see huge banners of Rajapaksa, a problem afflicted with political leaders starting from South of India. The banner culture reflects a particular attitude of the political leadership, bordering megalomania. In Tamil Nadu for example, one of the previous losses that Jayalalitha suffered was attributed to this attitude.

Democratically elected leaders, in certain cases get themselves alienated from the very people who have voted them to power. When sycophants’ takeover and build a wall between the leader and people, and when the former get carried away and start listening to a self serving cabal, it is an invitation to disaster.

Added to the above problem is allowing one’s family to abuse the system. This has become a South Asian trait and a bane to democracy in the region. The “Rajapaksa brothers” have become a governance issue and even dynastic; the general perception in Sri Lanka about Rajapaksa, his brothers and wards has been highly negative – not only amongst the minority communities, but also the majority.

In fact the recent Sri Lankan Presidential election concluded was not about electing a new leader. It was all about dethroning Rajapaksa and his family members. The new President Maithripala Sirisena was an unknown name, even within Sri Lanka; by no stretch of imagination, even his own family members would vouch that his popularity carried the day for him. Not many Tamils and Muslims who had voted for him in the elections had actually heard his name before or seen his photograph. Nor the UNP, the main opposition in Sri Lanka was so strong, that it factored substantially in the electoral result. It was Rajapaksa’s unpopularity that elected Sirisena.

Rajapaksa’s decision to prepone the election presumably based on the advice of an astrologer – Sumanadasa Abeygunawardena and invite a Bollywood Star – Salman Khan to campaign for him defeats all political logic. What went wrong with a towering political leader, who was shrewd enough to defeat the LTTE? At the end, it is neither star power of one’s own, or imported from Bollywood that secures the win. It is people and democracy.

Development vs Devolution vs Decentralization: It’s the Combination Stupid

Third, the most important issue that the democrats in South Asia should understand is relating to good governance, efficient administration and decentralized power. What makes men and women as “strong leaders” is not their charisma, but their ability to make positive use of the same to deliver goods to people. True, Rajapaksa had vanquished an enemy and won the War. True, Rajapaksa restored the road and rail networks. But development has to go along with democratic governance and political decentralization. Rajapaksa’s fall should be a big lesson to all the strong men and women in South Asia.

Despite their individual popularity and even an emphasis on developmental projects, what people need is a clean government, good governance and corruption free administration. Rajapaksa may have restored the Yal Devi, the famous and historic train service linking Jaffna with Colombo; and reopened the A-9 Highway after the Civil War and necessary demining, linking the Northern Province with the rest of Sri Lanka. But, this has not cut much ice amongst the Tamils in northern Sri Lanka. In South, Rajapaksa may have built a huge international airport in Mattala and a deep sea port in Hambantota. And a super expressway connecting the Kattunayake international airport with Colombo city. But that has not resulted in Sinhalese voting for Rajapaksa. People in north and south, cutting across ethnic divides, were expecting not just developmental projects, but good governance, devolution of powers and corruption free administration.

Unlike the predominant perception outside Sri Lanka, not all Tamils in the island are pro-LTTE. In fact, the mainstream Tamil leadership was equally targeted by the LTTE during 1980s and 1990s. There were/are genuine political grievances, which Rajapaksa ignored completely; overwhelmed with the military victory over the LTTE, he ignored the mainstream. Perhaps his advisors questioned the need to devolve political powers, after the LTTE had been militarily defeated. The 13th amendment could have been a starting point, totally sidelined unfortunately.

A substantial lesson that the big leaders have to learn in South Asian context is the need for empowerment of the regions and providing adequate space for political voices from different spectrums. Beating one’s own chest about winning the war or vanquishing an enemy will yield fewer dividends in the long run. As a political turning point becomes history, people start living in their present. Democratically elected leaders will have to understand that the people want a better future and a comfortable present and hardly have time to bask in the glory of a past, how much ever glamorous it was.

The new President today has more challenges to address. But there is enough for him to start with. The fact that the election was violence-free and there was a smooth transition underlines the fact that the democratic institutions are still intact. Perhaps, one should also credit Rajapaksa for accepting the defeat and ensuring the smooth transfer of power. Well done and congratulations Rajapaksa. Whatever may have been your flaws while in power, you have accepted its loss with so much grace. You may have missed a huge opportunity to build the nation, after the military defeat of the LTTE; but by peacefully handing over power to the next President, you have earned some credit. Perhaps, the Begums of Bangladesh have something to learn from Sri Lanka on this issue. Perhaps, the other strong men and women who have been elected by the system, should also learn from Rajapaksa’s defeat. Democracies in South Asia may elect strong leaders, but will also not hesitate to throw them out, using the same ballots.

All the best Sri Lanka. 2015 should be a new beginning.

*D Suba Chandran
Director, IPCS

Originally published in Rising Kashmir on 14 January 2014

The post The Fall Of Rajapaksa: Why Democracies Fail Strongmen – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

From January 4 – 12, 2015, Witness Against Torture (WAT) activists assembled in Washington D.C. for an annual time of fasting and public witness to end the United States’ use of torture and indefinite detention and to demand the closure, with immediate freedom for those long cleared for release, of the illegal U.S. prison at Guantanamo.

Participants in our eight day fast started each day with a time of reflection. This year, asked to briefly describe who or what we had left behind and yet might still carry in our thoughts that morning, I said that I’d left behind an imagined WWI soldier, Leonce Boudreau.
I was thinking of Nicole de’Entremont’s story of World War I, A Generation of Leaves, which I had just finished reading.  Initial chapters focus on a Canadian family of Acadian descent. Their beloved oldest son, Leonce, enlists with Canada’s military because he wants to experience life beyond the confines of a small town and he feels stirred by a call to defend innocent European people from advancing “Hun” warriors. He soon finds himself mired in the horrid slaughter of trench warfare near Ypres, Belgium.

I often thought of Leonce during the week of fasting with WAT campaign members.  We focused, each day, on the experiences and writing of a Yemeni prisoner in Guantanamo, Fahed Ghazi who, like Leonce, left his family and village to train as a fighter for what he believed to be a noble cause.  He wanted to defend his family, faith and culture from hostile forces.  Pakistani forces captured Fahed and turned him over to U.S. forces after he had spent two weeks in a military training camp in Afghanistan.  At the time he was 17, a juvenile.  He was cleared for release from Guantanamo in 2007.

Leonce’s family never saw him again.  Fahed’s family has been told, twice, that he is cleared for release and could soon reunite with his wife, daughter, brothers and parents.  Being cleared for release means that U.S. authorities have decided that Fahed poses no threat to the security of people in the U.S. Still he languishes in Guantanamo where he has been held for 13 years.

Fahed writes that there is no guilt or innocence at Guantanamo.  But he asserts that everyone, even the guards, knows the difference between right and wrong. It is illegal to hold him and 54 other prisoners, without charge, after they have been cleared for release.
Fahed is one of 122 prisoners held in Guantanamo.

Bitter cold had gripped Washington D.C. during most days of our fast and public witness.  Clad in multiple layers of clothing, we clambered into orange jumpsuits, pulled black hoods over our heads, our “uniforms,” and walked in single file lines, hands held behind our backs.

Inside Union Station’s enormous Main Hall, we lined up on either side of a rolled up banner.  As readers shouted out excerpts from one of Fahed’s letters that tell how he longs for reunion with his family, we unfurled a beautiful portrait of his face. “Now that you know,” Fahed writes, “you cannot turn away.”

U.S. people have a lot of help in turning away.  Politicians and much of the U.S. mainstream media manufacture and peddle distorted views of security to the U.S. public, encouraging people to eradicate threats to their security and to exalt and glorify uniformed soldiers or police officers who have been trained to kill or imprison anyone perceived to threaten the well-being of U.S. people.

Often, people who’ve enlisted to wear U.S. military or police uniforms bear much in common with Leonce and Fahed.  They are young, hard pressed to earn an income, and eager for adventure.

There’s no reason to automatically exalt uniformed fighters as heroes.

But a humane society will surely seek understanding and care for any person who survives the killing fields of a war zone.  Likewise, people in the U.S. should be encouraged to see every detainee in Guantanamo as a human person, someone to be called by name and not by a prison number.

The cartoonized versions of foreign policy handed to U.S. people, designating heroes and villains, create a dangerously under-educated public unable to engage in democratic decision-making.

Nicole d’Entremont writes of battered soldiers, soldiers who know they’ve been discarded in an endless, pointless war, longing to be rid of their uniforms.  The overcoats were heavy, sodden, and often too bulky for struggling through areas entangled with barbed wire.  Boots leaked and the soldiers’ feet were always wet, muddy, and sore. Miserably clothed, miserably fed, and horribly trapped in a murderous, insane war, soldiers longed to escape.

When putting on Fahed’s uniform, each day of our fast, I could imagine how intensely he longs to be rid of his prison garb.Thinking of his writings, and recalling d’Entremont’s stories drawn from “the war to end all wars,” I can imagine that there are many thousands of people trapped in the uniforms issued by war makers who deeply understand Dr. Martin Luther King’s call for revolution:

“A true revolution of values will lay hands on the world order and say of war, ‘This way of settling differences is not just.’ This business of burning human beings with napalm, of filling our nation’s homes with orphans and widows, of injecting poisonous drugs of hate into the veins of peoples normally humane, of sending men home from dark and bloody battlefields physically handicapped and psychologically deranged, cannot be reconciled with wisdom, justice, and love.”

This article first appeared on Telesur.  

The post Inside The Uniform, Under The Hood, Longing For Change – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In the rush to sensationalize the Paris terrorist attacks and minimize all other news (for example, even more horrendous terrorist attacks in Nigeria), the American media has conveniently overlooked one major ill effect of the public hysteria it is helping to foment.

In a mini-redux of what happened subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, the American public, by confusing what‘s on TV with reality, is demonstrating what experts call “probability neglect.” This phenomenon entails people excessively worrying about a rare event—for example, a terrorist attack—but being much less perturbed about much more common ways of dying by eating unhealthy foods, not exercising, smoking, failing to wear a seat belt, etc.

This excessive public fear allows the U.S. government to run wild outside the Constitution and erode the civil liberties that make the United States unique, in the name of saving the populace from “terror”—for example, unconstitutional indefinite jailing without charge or trial, the creation of kangaroo military tribunals as a substitute for civilian courts, illegally suspending people‘s right to challenge their detention, torture that violated U.S. and international law, and warrantless surveillance under the Patriot Act and even by violating existing law. In the latter case, the Bush administration blatantly violated the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, ignored the required approval of the FISA court for surveillance, and thus had the National Security Agency (NSA) illegally spy on Americans. Also, in the name of national security, that same administration stretched the PATRIOT Act to collect—unconstitutionally without a warrant based on probable cause that a crime has been committed—telephone records of potentially every person in the United States.

Now on the back pages of the newspapers (because the Paris terrorist attacks, long over, are still hogging the headlines), we learn that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also collected, in a data base, Americans‘ international phone records in bulk from American phone service providers and retained the records even when no criminality was discovered. This episode is another example of the government developing an unconstitutional practice for “national security” purposes and then using it to fight ordinary crime. The illegal practice was exposed only when court documents were filed in the case of a man accused of selling goods illegally to Iran without the proper governmental licenses.

Federal law enforcement agents could access the unconstitutional DEA data base to query a phone number if they had “reasonable actionable suspicion” that the number related to an active federal criminal investigation. This practice, as the NSA bulk collection program did, violates the U.S. Constitution in two ways. The Constitution says that any search warrant granted the executive branch by the courts must be specific about what is to be searched and be based on “probable cause” that a crime has been committed. Collecting bulk data is a general warrant, prohibited in the Constitution because the British abused such authority in colonial times to go on fishing expeditions for behavior unacceptable to the crown. No believable scenario exists in which everyone is a suspected criminal. In addition, using the lesser standard of “reasonable actionable suspicion” to query the data base does not meet the constitutional standard of “probable cause.”

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the then-chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, after discovering the DEA program, wrote to Attorney General Eric H. Holder of the Obama administration, expressing concern about DEA‘s “suspicionless intrusion into Americans‘ privacy” without judicial warrants and “indiscriminately” collecting “an enormous amount of information about many Americans for use in routine criminal investigations—rather than national security efforts.”

Furthermore, of all the routine criminal matters that could be investigated using this unconstitutional data base, drug investigations are probably the most trivial of all, because consuming drugs is a victimless crime that probably should not be illegal (at least for adults). Taking drugs is stupid, but people should have control over their own bodies. Many other more severe crimes associated with drugs—murders, theft, illegal trafficking, etc. would also be reduced if drugs were legalized.

A spokesman for the Justice Department claimed that the DEA‘s data collection program was suspended in September 2013, has been terminated, and the data deleted. If true, that is rare good news in the field of civil liberties preservation; however, citizens should still be alert for other unconstitutional or illegal government behavior originating from bureaucratic incentives to exploit people‘s excessive fear of being killed by the rare terrorist attack.

This article was published at Huffington Post and reprinted with permission.

The post A Second Even More Unjustifiable Episode Of Government Collection Of Phone Records – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.