The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Union (EU) have committed to helping the Sri Lankan government repatriate Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu and resettle them in the Island nation, Sri Lanka’s ministry of Resettlement said.

The EU has already built 23,000 houses in the Tamil-majority northern and eastern provinces, and an additional 3,000 houses are due to be built. The EU has allocated 14 million Euro for this project. There are still 26,056 internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.

According to ministry sources, the repatriation of the refugees from India and resettlement of the existing internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka will both be taken up “on a priority basis”, as part of the 100-day program of the new President Maithripala Sirisena’s government. The programme to repatriate the Tamil refugees from Tamil Nadu was discussed in a meeting between Sri Lankan Foreign minister Mangala Samaraweera and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on January 19. Sri Lanka’s cabinet issued a statement last week, saying the issue will be discussed during Modi’s talks with his counterpart Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe when he visits Colombo in mid-March. Both governments have assured that repatriation will be voluntary.

“The refugees have to go back to reclaim their lost rights in Sri Lanka. Repatriation is essentially a Mannai Meetpom (Recover our Land) movement”, explained to reporters S C Chandrahasan of the Chennai-based Organization for Elangai Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OFERR).

The post Sri Lanka: UN And EU Approve Funds For Tamil Refugee Repatriation appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Elvira M. Jukic

Experts, journalists associations and opposition parties have slated plans by Bosnia’s Republika Srpska entity to extend law and order legislation to include the Internet.

The government of Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity, Republika Srpska, has come under fire for trying to censor the Internet after proposing that the entity parliament discuss changes to the Law on Public Peace and Order in Republika Srpska.

The draft law, up for discussion in the entity Assembly next week, expands the definition of the public space to the Internet and envisages penalties for those who break law and order on it.

In a press release on January 27, the government said it was possible to violate public peace and law and order by either instigating fights on the net, or by making threats, and the law needed to regulate this situation.

The announcement drew a hostile reaction from experts, media professionals and opposition parties alike who accused the government of planning to censor the net.

“Expanding the definition of a ‘public place’ from the real to the virtual world represents the worst form of legal violence over freedom of expression and imposes censorship over the Internet, which directly violates the European Convention of Human Rights, and international agreements on civic and political freedom,” the Association of Journalists of Bosnia and Herzegovina said on Tuesday.

Political analyst, psychologist and avid Twitter user Srdjan Puhalo said the government was trying to establish control over social networks.

“They don’t understand the concept of social networks. It is not a pub where they can go in, arrest and force everyone out,” he told Balkan Insight.

Puhalo said that what was also worrying was that the legislation proposes increased penalties for those breaking public peace and order, including prison terms.

The authorities were not worried by protests on the Internet itself but “are more afraid of real demonstrations and protests, and that’s why the fines are being increased,” he said.

A deputy in the entity Assembly from the opposition Party of Democratic Progress, Branislav Borenovic, on Tuesday said the law was “unimplementable” from the perspective of European legislation.

He said he expected the draft to be rejected by the Assembly’s Commission for European integration and regional cooperation, in which case it will not come up for discussion at the Assembly itself.

It was the second time in less than a month that the Bosnian Serb authorities have come under fire over freedom of speech in the entity.

At the end of last year, entity and Sarajevo cantonal police jointly raided the offices of the Sarajevo-based Klix.ba web news portal, searching for original audio recordings of a meeting at which the Republika Srpksa premier, Zeljka Cvijanovic, allegedly discussed bribing two opposition deputies in the assembly into joining the ruling coalition.

The raid was condemned by many local and international experts as well as by journalists’ associations from Republika Srpska.

The post Bosnia Serb Government ‘Trying To Censor Social Networks’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Attorney General-Designate Loretta E. Lynch released the following statement today at the opening of the U.S. Senate confirmation hearing:

“Thank you, Chairman Grassley, Senator Leahy, and distinguished members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you in this historic chamber, among so many dedicated public servants. I want to thank you for your time this morning – and President Obama for the trust he has placed in me by nominating me to serve as Attorney General of the United States.

“It is a particular privilege to be joined today by members of my family – including my husband, Stephen Hargrove, my father, Rev. Lorenzo Lynch, my brother, Rev. Leonzo Lynch and his wife NiCole, as well as several other family members who are here today.

“Mr. Chairman, one of the privileges of my position as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York is welcoming new attorneys into the office and administering to them the oath of office. It is a transformative moment in the life of a young prosecutor. As they stand before me, prepared to pledge their honor and their integrity, I remind them that they are making their oath not to me, not to my office, or even to our Attorney General, but to our Constitution, the fundamental foundation for all that we do. It is that document and the ideals embodied therein to which I have devoted my professional life. Senators, if confirmed as Attorney General I pledge to you and to the American people that the Constitution, the bedrock of our system of justice, will be my lodestar as I exercise the power and responsibility of that position.

“I owe much to those who have worked to make its promise real for all Americans, beginning with my own family. All of them – and so many others – have supported me on the path that has brought me to this moment, not only through their unwavering love and support, but through their shining examples, and the values that shaped my upbringing.

“My mother, Lorine, who was unable to travel here today, is a retired English teacher and librarian for whom education was the key to a better life. She recalls people in her rural community pressing a dime or a quarter into her hands to support her college education. As a young woman she refused to use segregated restrooms because they did not represent the America in which she believed. She instilled in me an abiding love of literature and learning, and taught me the value of hard work and sacrifice. My father, Lorenzo, is a fourth-generation Baptist preacher who in the early 1960’s opened his Greensboro church to those planning sit-ins and marches, standing with them while carrying me on his shoulders. He has always matched his principles with action – encouraging me to think for myself, but reminding me that we all gain the most when we act in service to others.

“It was the values my parents instilled in me that led me to the Eastern District of New York, and from my parents I gained the tenacity and resolve to take on violent criminals, to confront political corruption and to disrupt organized crime. They also gave me the insight and compassion to sit with the victims of crime and share their loss. Their values have sustained me as I have twice had the privilege of serving as United States Attorney, leading an exceptional office staffed by outstanding public servants, and these values guide and motivate me even today.

“Should I be confirmed as Attorney General, my highest priorities will continue to be to ensure the safety of our citizens, to protect the most vulnerable among us from crime and abuse, and to strengthen the vital relationships between America’s brave law enforcement officers and the communities they are entrusted to serve.

“In a world of complex and evolving threats, protecting the American people from terrorism must remain the primary mission of today’s Department of Justice. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the executive branch to use every available tool to continue disrupting catastrophic attacks against our homeland and bringing terrorists to justice. I will draw upon my extensive experience in the Eastern District of New York, which has tried more terrorism cases since 9/11 than any other office. We have investigated and prosecuted terrorist individuals and groups that threaten our nation and its people – including those who have plotted to attack New York City’s subway system, JFK airport, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and U.S. troops stationed abroad, as well as those who have provided material support to foreign terrorist organizations. And I pledge to discharge my duties always mindful of the need to protect not just American citizens but also American values.

“If confirmed, I intend to expand and enhance our capabilities in order to effectively prevent ever-evolving attacks in cyberspace, expose wrongdoers, and bring perpetrators to justice. In my current position, I am proud to lead an office that has significant experience prosecuting complex, international cybercrime, including high-tech intrusions at key financial and public sector institutions. If I am confirmed, I will continue to use the combined skills and experience of our law enforcement partners, the department’s Criminal and National Security Divisions, and the United States Attorney community to defeat and to hold accountable those who would imperil the safety and security of our citizens through cybercrime.

“I will also do everything I can to ensure that we are safeguarding the most vulnerable among us. During my tenure as U.S. Attorney, the Eastern District of New York has led the prosecution of financial fraudsters who have callously targeted hard working Americans, including the deaf and the elderly, and stolen their trust and their hard-earned savings. We have taken action against abusers in over one hundred child exploitation and child pornography cases, and have prosecuted brutal international human trafficking rings that sold victims as young as 14 and 15 years old into sexual slavery. If confirmed as Attorney General, I will continue to build upon the department’s record of vigorously prosecuting those who prey on those most in need of our protection and I will continue to provide strong and effective assistance to survivors who we must both support and empower.

“Throughout my career as a prosecutor, it has been my honor to work hand in hand with dedicated law enforcement officers and agents who risk their lives every day in the protection of the communities we all serve. I have served with them. I have learned from them. I am a better prosecutor because of them. Few things have pained me more than the recent reports of tension and division between law enforcement and the communities we serve. If confirmed as Attorney General, one of my key priorities would be to work to strengthen the vital relationships between our courageous law enforcement personnel and all the communities we serve. In my career, I have seen this relationship flourish – I have seen law enforcement forge unbreakable bonds with community residents and have seen violence-ravaged communities come together to honor officers who risked all to protect them. As Attorney General, I will draw all voices into this important discussion.

“In that same spirit, I look forward to fostering a new and improved relationship with this committee, the United States Senate, and the entire United States Congress – a relationship based on mutual respect and constitutional balance. Ultimately, I know we all share the same goal and commitment: to protect and serve the American people.

“Now, I recognize that we face many challenges in the years ahead. But I have seen – in my own life and in my own family – how dedicated men and women can answer the call to achieve great things for themselves, for their country, and for generations to come.

“My father – that young minister who carried me on his shoulders – has answered that call. As has my mother, that courageous young teacher who refused to let Jim Crow define her. Standing with them are my uncles and cousins who served in Vietnam – one of whom is with me here today – and my older brother, a Navy SEAL, who answered that call with their service to our country.

“As I come before you today in this historic chamber, I still stand on my father’s shoulders, as well as on the shoulders of all those who have gone before me and who dreamed of making the promise of America a reality for all and worked to achieve that goal.

“I believe in the promise of America because I have lived the promise of America.

“If confirmed to be Attorney General of the United States, I pledge to all of you and to the American people that I will fulfill my responsibilities with integrity and independence. I will never forget that I serve the American people, from all walks of life, who continue to make our nation great – as well as the legacy of all those whose sacrifices have made us free. And I will always strive to uphold the trust that has been placed in me to protect and defend our Constitution, to safeguard our people, and to stand as the leader and public servant that they deserve.

“Thank you all, once again, for your time and your consideration. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to your questions – and to all that we may accomplish in the days ahead, together, in the spirit of cooperation, shared responsibility, and justice.”

The post Statement Of Attorney General-Designate Lynch At US Senate Confirmation Hearing appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Felix Corley

The two and a half month moratorium on prosecutions for religious and other literature the Russian authorities regard as “extremist” – declared by Sergei Aksyonov, head of Crimea’s Russian-backed government – expired at the end of 2014. “Sergei Aksyonov gave people the opportunity to hand in such literature,” his spokesperson Yekaterina Polonchuk told Forum 18 News Service from the Crimean capital Simferopol on 21 January. “Those who didn’t will be subject to action by the law-enforcement agencies.” But, she added, “people don’t need to fear if they abide by the law”.

Forum 18 asked Polonchuk in writing the same day whether Aksyonov had issued any instructions to the Prosecutor’s Office, FSB security service or the police following the end of the moratorium, and whether the widespread resumption of raids, religious literature seizures and fines should be expected. No response had arrived by the end of the working day in Simferopol on 26 January.

After numerous complaints, particularly from Crimean Tatars, Aksyonov announced the moratorium in mid-October 2014.

“The question is now closed”?

Although raids, literature seizures and administrative fines for religious books the Russian authorities regard as “extremist” seem to have reduced during the moratorium, they did not stop (see below). However, now the moratorium is ended, it remains unclear if such raids, fines and confiscations will resume.

No one at Crimea’s Prosecutor’s Office in Simferopol was willing to discuss raids to seize such religious literature and administrative fines. Colleagues of spokesperson Natalya Boyarkina told Forum 18 on 19 January that she was out of the office attending official celebrations of Crimea’s flag. Subsequent calls between then and 26 January went unanswered.

Aleksandr Selevko, head of the Religious Affairs Department at Crimea’s Culture Ministry in Simferopol, declined to say if raids and fines will resume more widely now government head Aksyonov’s moratorium is over. He also declined to comment on earlier raids or fines. “The authorities must have had a reason to conduct the raids,” he told Forum 18 on 20 January. “I also can’t comment on court decisions.”

A Muslim Board spokesperson was keen to stress that the period of raids and searches on Muslim Board mosques and religious schools was over. “Such searches haven’t taken place on our institutions since September 2014, nor have there been fines on our officials since then either,” a Muslim Board spokesperson told Forum 18 on 20 January. “The question is now closed – thank Allah!”

Moratorium – fines reduced but didn’t stop

Much of 2014 saw police, Russian FSB security service and Prosecutor’s Office raids and searches across Crimea – including for religious literature banned under Russian law – in libraries, schools, political organisations, Muslim homes, mosques and madrassahs (Islamic schools), and Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls.

Individuals – especially Muslims and librarians – were subjected to fines under Russia’s Administrative Code Article 20.29. This punishes “Production or distribution of extremist materials” from the Russian Justice Ministry’s Federal List of Extremist Materials. If convicted, individuals receive up to 15 days’ detention or a fine of 1,000 to 3,000 Roubles (240 to 720 Ukrainian Hryvnas, 120 to 350 Norwegian Kroner, 15 to 40 Euros or 15 to 45 US Dollars). Fines for people in an official capacity (such as individual entrepreneurs) range from 2,000 to 5,000 Roubles. The banned literature is also confiscated.

Punishment to follow search and confiscation?

On 18 December 2014, searches took place in a mosque and the home of a Crimean Tatar family, the Yagyaevs, in the village of Turgenevka (Teberti in Crimean Tatar) in Bakhchisaray District. Two minibuses full of armed men and four cars arrived mid-morning to conduct the searches. Police and prosecutors claim to have been looking for weapons, drugs and religious literature, Mustafa Yagyaev told Voice of Crimea radio station the same day. After a five-hour search, police officers took religious books among other items. Turgenevka’s mosque was also again searched, but no “banned” books, weapons or drugs were found there. No new case against Yagyaev appears to have reached court.

During an earlier search on the mosque, seven Muslim books deemed “extremist” in Russia were seized. Yagyaev, as head of the mosque community, was found guilty under Russian Administrative Code Article 20.29 at Bakhchisaray District Court on 29 September 2014 and fined 1,500 Russian Roubles.

“Extremism” punishments

Another librarian was punished because a library under her jurisdiction contained a religious book deemed “extremist” in Russia and placed on Russia’s Federal List of Extremist Materials. During an inspection for “extremist” literature in all the libraries in Kerch, prosecutors inspecting a branch library in Kapkany on the eastern side of the town discovered one copy of the book “Fundamentals of Islam” by Abua Ala Maududi, banned in Russia in 2007. They then brought an administrative case on 2 October 2014 against the head of the town’s Belinsky Library and other local libraries, Lyudmila Popova, under Administrative Code Article 20.29.

Popova’s written rejection of the accusation against her insisted that her work was still governed by the provisions of Ukrainian law and that the fact that the book had been on the shelf of one library had not constituted “mass distribution”. However, prosecutors insisted on charging her, pointing out that the book had been borrowed six times. On 30 October 2014, Judge Inessa Grigorevskaya of Kerch Town Court found her guilty. The Judge fined Popova 2,000 Russian Roubles, according to the decision seen by Forum 18. The book was ordered confiscated.

On 18 November 2014, Judge Aleksei Nanarov of Yevpatoriya Town Court found Edem Raimov guilty under Administrative Code Article 20.29, according to court records. The Judge’s assistant told Forum 18 on 19 January 2015 that Raimov had been fined 1,000 Russian Roubles for possession of one Muslim book on Russia’s Federal List. He did not appeal against the fine.

Several other individuals were punished by courts in Crimea in November and December 2014 under Administrative Code 20.29. However, Forum 18 has been unable to establish whether these individuals were brought to court for possessing religious literature or for possessing racist or violent material.

Case dismissed

By contrast, Natalya Chigrina, a lecturer in the Philosophy Faculty of the Simferopol-based Tavrida Vernadsky National University and director of the university library, escaped punishment for two Muslim books on Russia’s Federal List. The two books – “Life of the Prophet Muhammad” by Ibn Hisham, an early 9th century Muslim writer, and “Gardens of the Righteous” – were found during a raid on the library.

An administrative case against Chigrina under Article 20.29 was handed to Simferopol’s Kiev District Court on 15 October 2014. However, she protested her innocence of any intention to store and distribute these two books. She and several colleagues summoned as witnesses insisted that in the ten years that the books (received as gifts) had been in the closed section of the library they had not once been handed to a reader or displayed. On 27 November 2014, at the end of the fourth hearing in the case, Judge Viktor Kozlenko dismissed the case against her, according to the decision seen by Forum 18. The decision did not say what would happen to the two confiscated books.

Fine overturned

Imam Savri Seidametov, who leads prayers at the mosque in the village of Bogatyr in Bakhchisaray District, succeeded in overturning a fine for possessing one Muslim book deemed by Russia “extremist”. On 20 November 2014, Judge Yuri Dedeyev cancelled the fine, deeming the presence of “just one single book” to be an “insignificant offence”. He chose instead to issue Seidametov with a “verbal admonition”, according to the decision seen by Forum 18.

On 16 October 2014, Bakhchisaray District Court had fined imam Seidametov 1,000 Russian Roubles under Article 20.29, according to court records. Seidametov was fined for having two religious books in his mosque when it was raided on 24 September. However, only one is on Russia’s Federal List: “A Word on Unity”, which had been declared “extremist” in 2007. The book was ordered confiscated.

Vitaly Ponomarev of the Moscow-based Memorial human rights organisation – who attended the October 2014 hearing – said the deficiencies over legality and the substantiation of accusations as the case proceeded left him with a “very vivid impression”.

Ponomarev noted to the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission that “no-one tried to establish who the building where the forbidden literature was found belonged to. No proof was presented that the book belonged to the person who was fined.” He stressed that only one of the two books seized had been banned in Russia, and even then, the court did not establish that the book was the same as the one on Russia’s Federal List, merely that it had the same title. “The court decision said that the imam of the mosque had been involved not only in storing but also in the mass distribution of extremist literature, even though no proof was established that anyone had read this book.”

Ponomarev also pointed out that Imam Seidametov had told the court that he only leads prayers and is not responsible for maintaining the mosque and is not constantly present at the mosque. “The court ignored all these arguments,” Ponomarev lamented.

New case being prepared against Jehovah’s Witnesses?

Meanwhile, on 27 October 2014, an administrative case against Jehovah’s Witnesses in Simferopol reached the city’s Central District Court. A record of an offence had been drawn up against the community under Administrative Code Article 20.29. However, on 20 November 2014, Judge Olga Andreyeva sent back the case as the record of an offence had been drawn up incorrectly, according to court records. The case does not appear to have returned to court.

Crimea’s new Religion Law

Crimea’s Russian rulers have promised over several months to adopt a Crimean law to control religious activity. On 15 October 2014, head of government Aksyonov presented to the Supreme Council a draft law “on freedom of conscience, religious associations and the prevention of religious extremism”. In his explanatory note to the draft – both of which were made public on 16 October 2014 on the Supreme Council website – he claimed that the law would “secure the equality of all traditional religious confessions, the constitutional right of citizens to freedom of conscience and religion, as well as public security”.

Aksyonov did not explain why preventing religious “extremism” was included in the same draft law as ensuring freedom of conscience. Nor did he explain what constitutes a “traditional religious confession” and whether what he regards as “non-traditional” religious communities should therefore have fewer or no rights.

The proposed law would particularly have imposed restrictions on “missionary activity”, allowing only “missionaries” approved by registered religious organisations and using literature published by named registered religious organisations. Indeed, the proposed law would have made it impossible for anyone apart from registered religious organisations to produce literature and items for use in religious services. It remains unclear if this would have banned anyone else from producing other sorts of religious literature or items.

However, Supreme Council deputies rejected the draft law on its first reading on 5 December 2014 and sent it back, krymedia.ru noted the same day. Deputies argued that regulating religious organisations and preventing extremism should be handled in separate laws.

That day the Supreme Council’s Culture Committee formed a Working Group with nine members – including one of Crimea’s Deputy Muftis, Ayder Ismailov, and Fr Ioann Pristinsky, Head of the Orthodox Simferopol and Crimea Diocese’s Legal Department. A deadline of 15 April 2015 was set for the Working Group to present a completed draft to the Committee, the Supreme Council website noted on 5 December 2014.

Asked why Crimea needs its own Religion Law, Selevko of the Culture Ministry’s Religious Affairs Department claimed to Forum 18 that such a Law would “make life easier for religious communities here”. He said the draft now being prepared will be completely new, and will include provisions to make it similar to the provisions of the Ukrainian law. Asked whether the restrictions on religious publishing and “missionary” activity in rejected government draft are likely to remain, he insisted they would not.

The post Crimea: ‘Subject To Action By Law-Enforcement Agencies’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Byung-se Yun

The 2015 is a year with anniversaries that resonate for many countries. Europe and Asia will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. For Koreans, it means the 70th year of the liberation, as well as division, of the Korean peninsula.

During these decades, the world has undergone dramatic transformations. Europe rose from the ashes of war and then tore down the wall of division to become a more integrated and prosperous region. Korea has achieved political democracy and economic growth, with a trade volume topping one trillion US dollars.

Despite these remarkable advances, currently our world is beset with multifarious problems, such as the Ebola outbreak, Ukraine, foreign terrorist fighters and ISIL. This year, longstanding challenges, particularly sustainable development and climate change, will also take the spotlight, as the world rallies to shape up a post-2015 and post-2020 framework.

These are issues that touch all of us – including Korea – in this interconnected world, and we cannot stay above the fray. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently pointed out, none of us are insulated from events happening even at the other end of the globe.

This year, longstanding challenges, particularly sustainable development and climate change, will also take the spotlight

On top of this, Korea remains the only nation divided in the aftermath of the Second World War and is located in a region – Northeast Asia – with rising tensions. These form what I would term the “triple waves” of concurrent challenges facing Korea.

Korea’s response, among others, has been to work closely with key partners of the international community. In this process, Korea has rediscovered Europe – as a natural partner sharing common values and principles, as well as a source of inspiration.

From this perspective, let me spell out the “triple waves” and how we are collaborating.

The first wave comes from the Korean peninsula. The most pressing and urgent issue is, of course, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. It recently amended its constitution to declare itself a “nuclear weapon state” and officially adopted the policy of developing both nuclear weapons and the economy. Even at this moment, Pyeongyang is advancing its nuclear weapons capability through miniaturization and diversification, and upgrading its delivery systems. North Korea’s horrendous human rights violations, justly condemned by the UN General Assembly as well as the Human Rights Council last year, are also part of the Korean peninsula’s hard reality.

Yet, a more fundamental question is how to deal with North Korea in toto and bring about a sustainable peace on the peninsula. This underscores the necessity of cooperation between Korea and the international community.

In this regard, the European Union’s policy of “Critical Engagement” is in concord with my government’s policy toward North Korea. Both share a firm, principled position on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and human rights violations, while maintaining the balance on humanitarian assistance for vulnerable North Koreans. Both of us are open to constructive dialogue with Pyeongyang, but seek to induce, or if necessary, press North Korea to make a right strategic decision and return to the fold as a responsible member of the international community.

The second wave comes from Northeast Asia. The region’s turbulent currents are evident in the geopolitical flashpoints in the East China Sea and off the Korean peninsula. This region also has longstanding problems, such as territorial, historical tensions and nationalism, and is witnessing the rise of newer ones, like maritime, space and cyberspace security. Many bilateral relationships between regional countries are also under strain.

Against this backdrop, Korea is trying to develop stable bilateral ties with neighbors and leading various formats of mini-lateral cooperation.

Another focus is on regional multilateral cooperation. Northeast Asia has been missing such a mechanism until now. The Korean government’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative seeks to transform Northeast Asia from a region suffering from mistrust and confrontation into one of trust and collaboration.

Amid such a regional context, the European experience has been invaluable in conceiving, formulating and implementing the Initiative. Indeed, last year the Korean government held joint seminars with the EU and NATO, attended by senior officials, to discuss multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, Europe’s experiences highlight the importance of resolving historical issues in order to move forward.

The third wave is the set of challenges to Korea posed by multiple global problems. In this context, the Korean government is committed to globalism, and is more and more active in a wide array of global issues.

For example, in the field of climate change, Korea is trying to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries in the run-up to this year’s COP21 in Paris, through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Green Growth Institute, both headquartered in Korea.

In global health, in addition to dispatching a medical team to Sierra Leone to fight the Ebola outbreak last December, Korea will host the high level meeting of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) this year.

In these fields and beyond, Korea and Europe have joined forces. Major European nations have pledged considerable donations for the GCF. In Sierra Leone, Korea is partnering with the United Kingdom. In the Horn of Africa, Korea and EU naval vessels have worked together to combat piracy. All these are good instances of Korea and Europe joining hands.

Indeed, Korea is the only country in Asia that has concluded three major agreements with the EU: the Framework Agreement, the Free Trade Agreement, and the Framework Participation Agreement for Crisis Management Operations. This has been possible because our strategic partnership is based on common values – democracy, human rights, and the market economy.

As the challenges facing us rise, so does the scope for our cooperation. In the new year, let us – Korea and Europe – commit ourselves to working even closer together, as we jointly pursue a common agenda for peace and prosperity, in our regions and around the world.

The post Korea And Europe: Natural Partners Rediscover Each Other – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Stephanie Dorman*

Today, about 80 percent of school age (ages 6-17 years) Syrians are attending school in camps run by the Turkish government agency AFAD, while only 27 percent of their peers in host communities are attending. This extremely low attendance rate is alarming. Education for children and youth in emergencies is crucial. Syrian children are being deprived of the psychological healing that comes from the safe space, routine, and purpose for the day that school can provide. It is causing an additional psychological toll on parents who worry they are not able to provide a better life for their children. As a result, much more information is needed to understand the educational opportunities available to Syrians outside of camps in Turkey, as well as the barriers to participation.

Because of the importance of access to education in emergencies, the large percentage of the Syrian population living outside of camps in Turkey, and the low school attendance rate among the non-camp school-age population, this assessment focuses on the educational and psychosocial support needs of Syrian children and adults. I conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with government authorities, Turkish and international organization staff, and researchers working with Syrians in Turkey. In addition, the city of Kirikhan was used as a case study to better understand educational needs for Syrians living in this area near the Syrian border. In Kirikhan, 50 randomly selected Turkish and 50 randomly selected Syrian households participated in the household survey. 108 children (those younger than 15 years) and youth (those ages 15 to 24 years) were profiled among the participating Turkish households, and 155 children and youth were profiled among Syrian households. Additionally, I conducted seven focus groups and ten interviews with Syrians and Turks.

Findings

Not surprisingly, few school age Syrians attend school in urban areas. The quality of schooling remains a concern, due to the potentially limited capacity of teachers and low or nonexistent salaries, as well as the Ministry of Education’s limited ability to monitor and support Syrian schools. For those Syrians attending Turkish schools, language barriers limit their quality of learning. In Kirikhan, 52 percent of school age Syrians attend school. With the exception of secondary schools, attendance rates are actually slightly higher for girls than boys. Those Syrians who are attending school are all attending Syrian schools. Syrians in Kirikhan also expressed dissatisfaction with the poor quality of the Syrian school in the community.

Further, lack of school facilities, economic vulnerability and financial needs, distance from schools, limited teacher capacity, and lack of funding for teacher salaries remain huge barriers to education participation for Syrians in Turkey. Some staff members of international organizations and Turkish NGOs also argue that lack of residence permits needed to enroll in Turkish public schools and limited Turkish language abilities also create serious challenges for Turkish school enrollment. In Kirikhan, barriers to school participation were similar for girls and boys. Lack of schools, long distances to schools, and overcrowding were the most common reasons among the Syrian households surveyed in Kirikhan for not sending their children to Syrian schools. The need to work is also a significant barrier to education across all age groups and among both girls and boys. For Turkish schools specifically, Turkish language barriers are the main reasons Syrians in Kirikhan do not attend Turkish schools.

Those interviewed from international organizations and Turkish NGOs also said more Syrian schools are needed for Syrians. Some representatives from these organizations also argued for better access to Turkish schools. Almost all of those interviewed said that Syrians need to learn Turkish, and would benefit from vocational courses with clear links to employment. Like those interviewed from international and non-governmental organizations, Syrian parents who participated in the survey want more Syrian schools for their children and youth. However, while there is clearly a strong preference for Syrian school facilities, 80 percent of adult respondents said they would send their children to Turkish schools if attendance were possible.

Additionally, language activities were in high-demand for Syrian children and adults (both women and men) in Kirikhan, especially Turkish and English language courses. The majority of Syrian adult participants also said they want to participate in vocational courses. Syrian respondents said that food assistance and transportation would most help them to participate in educational activities.

Moreover, most, if not all, Syrians in Turkey are in need of psychological support, but access to this support is limited. All Syrian respondents in Kirikhan said they are not receiving psychological counseling, suggesting there may be a lack of these services or information about these services available, despite a clear need for support expressed by those interviewed.

Child, or early, marriage (marriage that occurs under the age of 18 years) is also a concern amongst those who are working with Syrians in Turkey and Syrians themselves. The Syrian girls and women interviewed in Kirikhan agreed that early marriage is much more common for Syrian girls in Turkey than it was in Syria. The most common reason identified for girls to get married young was because of families’ financial difficulties. Some also said that girls were getting married because there was nothing to do and they had no way to complete their education. To help prevent child marriage, those interviewed in Kirikhan suggested raising awareness among families, especially for fathers, and also providing financial support.

In Kirikhan, the majority of Syrian respondents said they plan to return to Syria within the next one to two years, which has important implications for educational planning. If respondents do stay in Turkey, the majority said they would learn Turkish and work.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the needs assessment findings. First, to help reduce barriers to education, more funding is needed for Syrian schools, especially in the southern provinces near the border with Syria. There is a particular need for secondary and high schools. Additionally, transportation should be provided to make it easier for students to travel to and from school. To help improve teacher retention and stability, as well as potentially attract more qualified professionals, funding is needed to provide monetary incentives for educators teaching in Syrian schools. Advocacy for accreditation of Syrian schools is needed so students can receive proof of completion and diplomas. Capacity development at the Ministry of Education is also needed to help develop accreditation and monitoring procedures for Syrian schools.

However, while Syrian schools provide a short-term solution, and also may be more appropriate for older Syrian students, access to Turkish public schools should be expanded for Syrian children. To achieve better access to Turkish schools for Syrians, organizations should advocate for alternative IDs that would provide legal status similar to a Foreigner’s ID and allow Syrian school age children to formally enroll in Turkish schools, even without formal documents from Syria. If Syrian students are able to attend Turkish schools in larger numbers, the Ministry of Education Turkish schools will likely need support in developing the capacity to conduct placement tests for Syrian students and to support those students as they adjust to a new curriculum, in a new environment, in Turkish. To help Syrian children transition to Turkish schools—including universities—and to help them thrive in Turkish society, organizations need to expand certified Turkish language training for Syrians. Organizations should work with Public Education Centers to provide certified Turkish language courses for Syrian children and adults.

Third, to help reduce child labor and reduce the chances of early marriage, financial support should be provided to families. Outreach efforts should also be coordinated to raise awareness among Syrian families, specifically targeting fathers.

Fourth, vocational courses should be provided for Syrians and Turks in partnership with Public Education Centers based on a market analysis. Partnerships with potential employers could also help link these programs to employment.

Lastly, organizations should also prioritize hiring more psychologists and training community workers to help provide support and identify targeted psychological support needs. They also need to develop systems for identifying and referring those who need psychological support.

*Duke University Felsman Fellow

**This article was first published in Analist Monthly Journal’s January issue, 2015

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By Yavuz Yener

Arbor Networks, a prominent cyber security company, recently published a report which is based on analysis of a collection of ten years’ worth of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The report suggests both the number and scale of DDoS attacks has tremendously increased.

DDoS attacks aim at disabling access to a website basically by increasing the number of entries through BOTNETs, also known as zombie computers. The hacker or hackers first employ various means to hack vulnerable computers, create a BOTNET, then strive to cut its connection to a targeted website by overloading its servers.

The initial DDoS attacks had specific targets such as betting and gambling websites, which could not afford to be put offline during a game. Thus, it was a very useful tool for cybercriminals, who had been using cyber means for committing crimes. But as Darren Anstee, a senior analyst at Arbor says, new actors have begun conducting DDoS attacks for various purposes.

The report reveals, for instance, that in 2011 the highest scale of a single DDoS attack inundated the targeted website with about 100 gigabits per second (Gbps). But in 2014, this number mounted to 400 Gbps, four times greater than the attack of 2011. This was the highest detected DDoS attack that took place in a single attempt.

Also, the report indicates that there were four times as many attacks which surpassed the 100 Gbps threshold than in 2013. As stated by Mr. Anstee, “There’s been a massive jump in the number of very large attacks going on out there.”

He added, “In 2014 we saw more volumetric attacks, with attackers trying to knock people offline by saturating their access to the Internet.” According to the figures in the report, companies today are more apt at detecting the early stages of a cyber attack, and act accordingly to recover damaged data.

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By Dr Subhash Kapila*

US President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to have put United States and India on an epochal strategic journey going by both the symbolism and their substantive declarations this January 26 2015 weekend.

United States and India presently have relatively young, bold and visionary leaders who have expansive visions on the future course of United States-India relations. They have spelt out their respective visions and the strategic, political and economic blueprint that they have in mind and India would now expectantly await the unfolding of their joint vision of the US-India strategic trajectory.

Sitting through a number of TV panel discussions this week-end the point repeatedly emphasised by me and that was not picked up by both the Indian print and electronic media was the more realistic connotation given by President Obama to describe US-India relations. Unlike Prime Minister Vajpayee who termed US-India relations during former President Clinton’s visit as one of “natural allies”, President Obama throughout his recently concluded India-visit described US-India relations as a “natural partners”

In my opinion the terms “allies” connotes a military alliance relationship in which is implicit also that there could be a hierarchical order and high strategic expectations. On the other hand “Natural Partners” somehow connotes a more equal relationship of shared endeavours and without overly high strategic expectations.

Strategic, military, political and economic aspects of the envisioned US-India relationship stood substantially covered by both the leaders in their pronouncements as well as the official statements.

Strategically, it is obvious that the United States with the contextual international and regional security environment has visualised that India has a pivotal role in the maintenance of security and stability especially in the Asia Pacific. The US President voiced his sentiments as such on this aspect.

The emphasis by President Obama on the South China Sea and Indian Ocean security and equally voiced by the Indian Prime Minister demonstrated that sizeable strategic convergence exists between the two nations. It can now be expected that greater cooperation between the United States and India would now ensue with more vigour.

On the military side with the ten-year extension of the Defence Cooperation Agreement which so far was rather inert during the last Indian regime one could see a spurt of defence cooperation including more meaningful intelligence cooperation in the counter-terrorism field.

The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative promises that the United States would now partner in a more substantive measure in the joint development of defence technologies and co-production of defence equipment. Some pilot projects stand spelt out as pathfinder projects.

This could assist India in military-capacity building of its operational profiles to reduce the asymmetric differential in respect some of the military threats that India faces.

Politically, President Obama vocally and strongly recommended India’s candidature as Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and this seconding by the solitary global superpower itself is an indicator of the new stature of India in US strategic perceptions.

Economically, what President Obama announced at the CII-FICCI US-India business Summit in terms of US involvement, commitments and contributions to India in economic growth would have been music to PM Modi’s ears as it would give concrete shape to his ‘India First’ and economic development priorities.

Some policy analysts would like to maintain that the United States has in the past reneged on its promises in terms of the US-India Strategic Partnership implicit commitments.True to a large extent but then it must be remembered that there is always a new beginning. The present personal chemistry between President Obama and PM Modi suggests that a new journey has begun in this direction.

To a great extent the new rise in the image perceptions of India as a nation to be counted has to be credited to the person of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his appearing on the Indian stage as a bold and decisive leader with a strategic vision to restore India on its great power trajectory.

Concluding, I would like to add as a policy analyst, that what US President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have achieved in the January 2015 visit of the US President is the “restoration of strategic trust” between the United States and India which could now mark the commencement of an epochal “Natural Partnership”.

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

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By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The signs are getting stronger- Maldives appears to be moving towards despotism. The latest in the series is the sudden and hurried sacking of the Defence Minister after a raid of his premises by the Police.

What should be worrying is not of President Yameen consolidating his position but the sinister way by which he is going about it by disregarding all constitutional norms.

Transparency Maldives in one of the reports (3rd August of last year) referred to the “stagnation in democratic consolidation and a reversal in democratic gains.” It also pointed out the lack of outcry in the instances where the powers of key democratic institutions have been undermined.

Since then, Maldives has been going further downhill in the democratic process. But the lack of outcry may not continue indefinitely and at some stage or other there could be a backlash that would have an adverse impact on the law and order situation in the whole country!

The case of the Defence Minister:

On the night of January 18, Police officials on a warrant received from the court raided the residence of the Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim. Nazim was not present in the house and the Police used force to break open the doors of the two apartments of the minister. A spokesman of the Commissioner of Police Ahmed Shifan said that they found dangerous weapons in his house.

On 22nd January, President Yameen dismissed Nazim, of a result of a Police Investigation into illegal weapons being kept in the minister’s house. There has been no announcement on the type or number of weapons retrieved from the Minister’s house. It is heard that only one revolver was found which people say could also have been planted by the Police. Initial reports said that only some documents were seized. Nazim was never given a chance to explain his position.

Nazim was one of the leading protestors involved in the overthrowing of former President Nasheed. He was appointed to that position by Dr. Waheed, Nasheed’s successor in February 2012

The new Minister of defence is none other than Maj. Gen (retd) Moosa Ali who was formerly Chief of Defence Forces in Nasheed’s time. In January 2013 in his deposition, he is said to have admitted that former President Nasheed had indeed resigned under duress. Criminal charges for illegally detaining Criminal Court Chief Judge Abdulla are still pending against him.

These cases are connected to the case against Nasheed also where there is an attempt from Government sources to go slow on the cases. The hope is that with the cases hanging over his head, the Defence Minister will “behave.” But this is not working and will not work with Nasheed who has called for speedy disposal of the cases against him.

JSC Appointment:

President Yameen has appointed Justice Ali Hameed to the Judicial Commission in place of the JSC President Justice Adam Mohamed who resigned for personal reasons.

Justice Hameed was involved in the famous sex tapes that went viral in the media. The Police dropped the investigation on two grounds- one that the picture in the video could not be definitely identified as that of the judge. But the second reason given bordered on the ridiculous. It was that the video was not captured by an “authorised person.” It means that the tape could be true but it should be done by a state authorised photographer! How does one expect an authorised photographer to be invited for filming a sex escapade in a bed room and that too in Colombo?

There were corruption charges also against Judge Ali Hameed. The case had to be closed as the documents were supposed to have been destroyed by a “coffee spill.” Hameed is said to be close to President Yameen and that nothing will happen to him.

More surprising was that the appointment pf Justice Hameed to the JSC had the consent of other Supreme Court Judges! Aishath Velizinee, a former JSC member pointed out how low the courts have fallen!

This appointment comes at a time when two “inconvenient judges” were summarily removed recently by President Yameen from the Supreme Court Bench without giving any reason for the dismissal.( See our paper No. 5847)

Target Gasim:

With the Army, Judiciary and the Majlis behind him, Yameen has only two “inconvenient political leaders”- Gasim of Jumhooree party and Nasheed of the MDP against him.

As a first step he is seen to be targeting Gasim who is perhaps the richest businessman of Maldives. In September last year, President Yameen in order to “muzzle” Gasim in one stroke tried to destroy Gasim’s business by taking away the private airport of Maamigili of Villa Air. After some interval, the airport was not only returned to the Villa Air but was also upgraded and recognised as an international airport! Gasim had since been making only ‘friendly’ noises!

It looks that Gasim’s property is still being targeted. Nasheed in a public rally on the 19th of December, pledged to defend Gasim. He said “Gasim’s property cannot be looted. Gasim’s character and body cannot be harmed. We shall rally in his defence.”

On 21st January, the MDP conducted a street rally in front of Gasim’s residence to show solidarity with the Jumhooree party leader in defending the constitution. The rally was addressed by all the top leaders of the MDP.

It sounds strange that Yameen who could not have become President without the valuable support of Gasim Ibrahim should turn against the latter. And now the person who was defeated and who should hold some grudge against Gasim is coming to his support.

I dread to think of the consequences if Yameen is to try the same tactics to destroy Nasheed of the MDP who by all accounts is still the most popular political leader in Maldives. If something happens to him, the whole of Maldives could be in flames.

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By Prof. B. R. Deepak*

US President, Barack Obama became the first American President to be a chief guest at the annual Republic Day parade of India, the only US president having visited India twice during his presidency and perhaps the only lame duck president to meet Indian Prime Minister 4th time in a gap of one year.

Historically, India-US diplomatic relations have been devoid of mutual trust, the reasons being India’s 1971 treaty of friendship with the erstwhile Soviet Union, and US’s warmth to India’s arch rival China and Pakistan. In the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests and abortive economic sanctions against India, Bill Clinton’s 1999 visit attempted to push the reset button for better relations, however, it was under George Bush’s Presidency that India-US relations were catapulted to a new high with the conclusion of India-US civil nuclear deal that could not take off owing to domestic policies from both the governments, but could be a major take away from Obama’s current visit.

India and the US has done enough as far as symbolism is concerned, however, what is important at this juncture is the substance in this relationship. If the former Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee demonstrated his commitment to turn the ‘estranged democracies’ into ‘natural allies’ then Prime Minister Modi has openly revealed India’s enthusiasm for building strong strategic ties with the US and its allies such as Japan and Australia much to the suspicion of China that India is playing a pawn in the containment of China.

If the US is clear what it wants from India, I believe India has to be clear what it wants from the US too. Modi seems to move away from the diplomatic niceties and move on to the deliverables in terms of operationalization of the civil nuclear deal, revival of the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) that may enable joint development and production of advanced weapon systems, extension of the 10-year India-US defence framework, technology transfer for renewable energy, food processing industry so on and so forth.

In a decade, India has already procured $10 billion worth defence equipments from the US, and there are talks to jointly manufacture Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in India. Bilateral trade has catapulted to near $100 billion trouncing China as India’s largest trade partner. Both plan to take this figure to $500 billion mark in a decade. The symbolism and nature of bilateral engagement indicates that both want the closest possible strategic and trade partnership. However, in order to realise this excellent and cautious excitement over defence and trade, India needs to initiate a series of structural and infrastructural related reforms so as to create conducive environment for the investment inflows and technology transfers. Even if India is successful in doing so, the US companies may not necessarily find the 49% equity cap offered by the government attractive enough.

The US has time and again articulated that it would like to see India as a major global power. One should not be mistaken that it is the rise of China that has enable the ‘estranged democracies’ to forge strategic partnership! However, there are problems too, for the US does not see any role for India in Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its companion agreement Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) which are yet to be signed. Neither has India warmed up to the Chinese proposal of ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Route’. There are other differential issues relating to climate change and WTO where India does not have the kind of understanding or the playing field China has with the US.

In such a scenario, India is faced with uncertainties as well as opportunities to capitalise on the invaluable geopolitical strategic space it has in the Indo-Pacific. If the US is attempting to offset China’s geopolitical pull by way of India confronting China or in tandem with the US and its allies in the seas and land it would be disastrous for all the stakeholders. From an Indian point of view, if the US is looking for a strong economic partnership with India, so is the case of India’s economic engagement with China and the US alike. It would be naïve to say that the US will dump its interests in China for India. Imagine the $521 billion trade volume between China and the US and compare it with our trade with China and the US combine!

It is in this background that if at all India would like to be a so called ‘swing power’ between China and the US, we need to be a swing power as far as cooperation and healthy competition is concerned not the confrontation and conflict, which is neither in India’s interest nor in the interest of China and the US.

*Prof. B R Deepak is Professor of China Studies at the Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own. He could be reached at bdeepak@mail.jnu.ac.in

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By Alireza Noori*

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu recently paid a visit to Iran, which was the first of its kind in the past 15 years, during which he and his Iranian counterpart signed an agreement to stress their countries’ determination to boost high-level security and military cooperation both at bilateral and regional levels. Of course, they agreed that the details of the agreement should be hashed out during a possible visit to Iran by the Russian President Vladimir Putin. This development can, therefore be a prelude to expansion of military cooperation between the two countries. Naturally, like all other military agreements, most parts of Iran-Russia agreement will be confidential and, therefore, various aspects of that agreement as well as its practical outcomes cannot be freely discussed now.

However, there is almost no doubt that the implementation of this agreement will “relatively” change regional equations. In the meantime, special emphasis has been put on the delivery of Russia’s S-300 missile system to Iran. However, beyond that issue, the visit by Russian defense minister and signing of the agreement should be viewed within a vaster framework in which large-scale viewpoints of Iran and Russia about the necessity of bolstering security and military cooperation to meet common interests and counteract common threats to both countries will be of more significance. Undoubtedly, there are many factors that may cast doubt on the implementation of this agreement. However, there are also incentives and necessities that can prompt Tehran and Moscow to boost their cooperation in the field of military technology.

Incentives

Differences with the West: On top of the list of incentives for the expansion of military relations between Iran and Russia one should point to both countries’ continued differences with the Western countries, which do not seem to be overcome in the short term. This issue, in addition to the possibility of the US Republicans sweeping to a presidential vote win in forthcoming elections, has prompted officials in Tehran and Moscow to try to bolster their positions and find new partners and tools in order to boost their bargaining power in the face of the West. In the meantime, although Iran and Russia do not have strategic relations, and the prospect for the establishment of such relations in medium term is dim, due to hostile approach of the West to both countries, they have been, and still are, trying to make the most of their various capacities to reduce the burden of the West’s pressures.

During the past year, the West has been insisting on its geopolitical advancement toward the east within its anti-missile defense scheme. In the meantime, NATO has been trying to expand its realm at a time that Western countries have been pursuing controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East and indirect action strategy in Ukraine. In the meantime, officials in Tehran and Moscow have not remained idle and have been taking steps to further strengthen their military stamina in parallel to bolstering military cooperation as an effective tactic to counteract the West’s pressure. Following the developments in Libya, Syria and then Ukraine, Russia came to realize the depth of its differences with the West and the threat that was posed to it by becoming dependent on the West in all aspects of its relations. Therefore, Moscow decided to make a U-turn by mending fences with countries in its east and south, including Iran.

On the other hand, due to increasing pressures by the US Republicans to escalate sanctions against Iran, a move which Iranian diplomats have described as the end of diplomacy with the West, Tehran has been considering all available scenarios, even military confrontation with the West. Naturally, receiving advanced defense systems from Russia will make it difficult for Iran’s adversaries to think about a military option on the country.

Fighting common regional threats: Maintaining regional stability and security is a common benefit for Iran and Russia. Therefore, both countries have been especially concerned about any jeopardy to regional stability and security from Afghanistan to Central Asia, Caspian basin, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria. Tehran and Moscow have been also feeling concerned about the US plan to expand its anti-missile defense umbrella, eastward expansion of the NATO, and the spreading threat of terrorism. Although increased military cooperation between Iran and Russia will not be possibly adequate to address all these threats, it can be effective in reducing threats. In this regard, good understanding on the part of Iran about the ongoing developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and the activities of the Islamic State terrorist group, on the one hand, combined with Russia’s intelligence and military capabilities, on the other hand, can serve to effectively rein in such escalating threats. Both countries have already had irregular military cooperation, but the recent military agreement can provide a good ground for more regular military collaboration between Tehran and Moscow.

Bolstering political and geopolitical influence: It cannot be denied that Russia is worried about possible achievement of a comprehensive nuclear agreement by Iran and the West, as a consequence of which Moscow will lose a lot of the political influence and geopolitical advantages arising from Iran’s hostility with the West. This issue, has been certainly one of the reasons behind recent steps taken by Russia to bolster military cooperation with Iran in order to fend off possible future losses. This is true as one of the major advantages of military agreements is increased political and geopolitical influence that follows conclusion of such agreements. Therefore, some Russia experts believe that geopolitical aspects of Mr. Shoigu’s Tehran visit are much more important than its technical aspects. They have emphasized that due to aggressive geopolitical approach that the West has taken to Russia, strengthening Russia’s relations with countries that share ideas with Moscow will be instrumental in preventing further advances by the West.

On the other hand, one of the points covered by the new agreement has been facilitation of berthing for military vessels of the two countries in each other’s ports. Therefore, Russia hopes that by receiving permits from Iran, it would be able to revive its presence in the Persian Gulf, which had been effectively ended since 1946. This issue will certainly play an important part in increasing international prestige of Russia.

Economic benefits: Increased sale of weapons for the strengthening of Russian military industries and earning more money at a time that global oil prices are at historical lows, should be considered as one of the most important goals of the recent military agreement signed between Tehran and Moscow. Russia has already signed similar contracts with Egypt, India and a number of Latin American countries. Russian media have been putting emphasis on Iran’s need to renovate its military industries, stipulating that Russia should take the best advantage of this opportunity and export even modern jet fighters to Iran, thus, consolidating its control over the Iranian weapons market. The visit by Mr. Shoigu to India after his trip to Iran and the efforts he made to pave the way for selling more armaments to New Delhi put the rubberstamp on the fact that economic reasons underlie Russia’s military agreements with other countries. However, since Iran has already mastered certain areas of military technology and is capable of building missiles similar to S-300 system, the country is now looking for more modern weaponry. As a result, Tehran has proposed to join hands with Russia to produce modern weapons and pave the way for the transfer of Russia’s advanced military technology to Iran. In doing so, Iran is clearly indicating that it has no plan to turn into a mere customer of Russian weapons.

Impediments

Avoiding further worsening of relations with the West: Both Iran and Russia are at a sensitive juncture of their relations with the West. Tehran is moving toward improvement of relations with the West, while Moscow is heading for more tension. The future outlook for both countries, however, is ambiguous. Under these conditions, both countries are avoiding any measure that may escalate tensions with the West. This is why the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has noted that Russia is now willing and will not allow another Cold War to begin. Moscow is well aware of institutionalized differences between Iran and the West while Tehran, on the other hand, is well informed about the ongoing tensions between Russia and the West.

Both countries also know that any form of practical development of their relations will provide the West with more excuses to mount pressures on Tehran and Moscow. This is why both countries have been cautious about further development of their relations, especially when it comes to military matters. Of course, although both Tehran and Moscow avoid further tension with the West and do not want to give excuses to the Western countries, this does not mean that they will coordinate all their measures with the West. On the opposite, both countries are taking their own pragmatic approach to this issue and believe that a multi-vectoral policy is more suitable at this juncture. They are also aware that the more they retreat in the face of the West, the Western countries will be emboldened to make new advances.

Lack of mutual trust: Moscow is well aware that the “need” for having an ally in the face of the West has inclined Iran toward Russia. Therefore, if Iran’s differences with the West are resolved, including through possible signing of a comprehensive nuclear agreement, interactions with Russia would be of less importance to the Islamic Republic. On the opposite, Iran is also aware that Moscow has become willing to work with Iran due to mere “coercion” resulting from the challenges that it has in its relations with the West. Therefore, it is quite possible that when that “coercion” no more exists, Russia would not have any more reasons to expand its relations with Iran, especially in the sensitive field of military technology. Iran has also relevant experiences in this regard. Russia has always pursued its ties with Iran as a function of its relations with the West. Therefore, as evidenced by the abrogation of the contract for delivery of S-300 missile systems to Iran, the West will be a major factor determining whether Moscow will abide by its commitments to Iran.

Iran is also well informed about the common interests that Russia and the West have in the field of international security and knows that Moscow prefers to work with the West in this regard. Tehran also remembers the proposal offered by Mr. Putin to the United States for common use of Gabala Radar Station in the Republic of Azerbaijan when the United States was trying to expand its anti-missile shield against Iran. Therefore, Tehran has no doubt that Russia will never prefer cooperation with Iran to long-term security and military cooperation with the West. In addition, Tehran knows that it should avoid overdependence on Russia in military fields, which will be also followed by increased political clout of Russia over Iran. This is why Tehran does not seem to have an extended view to expansion of military relations with Russia and is just trying to meet its own defense needs by taking advantage of military and intelligence capacities of Russia in order to deal with regional threats in a better way.

Israel: Although Israel is not the main partner of Moscow in the Middle East, officials in Kremlin have time and again emphasized importance of their country’s ties with Tel Aviv. Without a doubt, Tel Aviv’s lobby was one of the main reasons why Russia repealed its contract with Iran for the delivery of S-300 missile system and can also explain why Moscow changed its mind about equipping Tehran with advanced weaponry. Therefore, Israel’s opposition to further development of military relations between Tehran and Moscow should be also taken into account as a factor with relative influence.

Conclusion

As the existing trends show, the number of agreement that have been signed between Iran and Russia, but their implementation has been hampered due to a host of bilateral, regional and international reasons is not small. The contract for the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant, the contract for the delivery of S-300 missile system, and a recent memorandum of understanding to swap oil for goods are but a few examples to the point. Military cooperation between Iran and Russia has a long and bumpy road to go. Under present circumstances, both countries are more willing for cooperation. Of course, if Mr. Putin put the last confirming seal on the recent agreement in his forthcoming visit to Tehran, then the issue of its implementation and its possible outcomes could be discussed more seriously.

The important point with regard to the implementing of this military agreement and possible delivery of S-300 missiles or their lookalikes to Iran is that Moscow should first repeal an executive order issued on September 22, 2010, by the then Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, which effectively banned export of “certain” military equipment to Iran in relation to international sanctions imposed on Tehran by the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1929. Abrogation of that order will, on the one hand, be admittance of a mistake by Russia, while on the other hand, it would point to the possibility of the cancellation of other restrictions that Moscow has considered in its ties with Tehran in relation to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, including Iran’s possible membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

*Alireza Noori
PhD Candidate, Saint Petersburg State University & Expert on Russia Affairs

The post Incentives And Impediments To Iran-Russia Military Cooperation – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C Raja Mohan*

There have been many false dawns before in the uncertain evolution of the relationship between India and the United States. If India and America were estranged democracies during the Cold War, they certainly became more engaged republics since the 1990s. Yet, repeated attempts at elevating it into a genuine strategic partnership seemed to end up nowhere.

But India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Barack Obama ended their second summit meeting in less than four months by proclaiming that a new chapter has begun in bilateral relations. This time around there is good reason to be a lot less sceptical about the ambitions of the two leaders to change the nature and direction of India-US relations.

The principal reason for optimism has been the change of Indian attitude towards America under Modi. While both Obama and his predecessor George W Bush were eager to transform the partnership with India, the United Progressive Alliance government in Delhi (2004-14) was ambivalent.

While Modi’s predecessor Manmohan Singh presided over some path-breaking initiatives in the nuclear and defence domains with the US during 2005, the leadership of his party, Congress, appeared reluctant to embrace America.

Modi, despite his personal problem with America’s decade-long denial of a visa when he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat, put the United States at the centre of his domestic and foreign policy strategies. Obama, too, was quick to see the opportunity to advance the partnership, and invited Modi to the White House immediately after India’s general election last year. When Modi surprised him with an invitation to be the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations this year, Obama readily agreed.

If the first summit between the two leaders last September arrested the drift in the bilateral relationship, the second one has set the stage for building a more expansive partnership in the coming years.
The new personal rapport with Obama has helped Modi to find a decisive resolution to some of the outstanding issues with America. Modi also set new strategic goals, including more effective cooperation with America in securing the balance of power in Asia and defeating terrorism in the South Asian subcontinent and beyond.

If wrapping up the unfinished business of civil nuclear cooperation showcased Modi as the problem-solver, his quest for common ground with Obama on climate change suggested Delhi was no longer shackled by sterile slogans of the past.

The outlines of a mutual understanding on implementing the civil nuclear initiative emerged in the last few weeks, as Delhi opened purposeful negotiations with the US on resolving three issues at hand—American concerns about India’s Nuclear Liability Act, India’s demand for a quick closure on the terms of international safeguards, and Washington’s support for India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Although a nuclear deal that satisfied both sides was on the cards, few observers in Delhi were prepared for the developments on climate change, which has long been a site of confrontation between India and the United States. If the virtuousness of India’s international policies has been measured in the past by their political distance from the United States, Modi promised to “cooperate closely” with America to conclude an ambitious global climate agreement at the end of this year in Paris.

With Obama standing next to him at the joint press appearance, Modi said India’s problem was not about resisting pressure from America on climate change. Sovereign India was confident enough to handle it, Modi suggested. India’s real pressures today, Modi said, were about protecting the environment for future generations of Indians from the threats of climate change and global warming. His new approach to climate change is centred on deepening bilateral cooperation with the US on renewable energy and developing cooperation with Washington in multilateral forums. Under Modi, Delhi’s entrenched ‘Third World-ism’ is yielding place to the idea of India as a responsible power.

Besides choosing to upturn India’s extended posturing on climate change, Modi outlined his plans for a potentially significant partnership with America in shaping the future of the vast Indo-Pacific region that stretches from East Africa to East Asia. To be sure, promoting Asian balance of power was at the heart of the transformation of the India-US relations in the first term of the UPA government. In the second term, though, the UPA government deliberately began to distance itself from Washington in the name of ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘nonalignment’. In its second incarnation, the UPA government was also reluctant to deepen maritime security cooperation with the United States in the Indian Ocean.

In his statement with Obama on the joint vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, Modi decisively repudiated that ambivalence towards the United States. The two leaders also agreed to “develop a roadmap that leverages our respective efforts to increase ties among Asian powers, enabling both our nations to better respond” to the emerging diplomatic, economic and security challenges in the region.

Unlike the UPA that was reluctant to embark on trilateral and quadrilateral partnerships with the United States, Modi and and Obama have put the idea of building Asian coalitions at the centre of their regional strategy.

The UPA government justified its ambivalence towards America by citing Chinese concerns. Modi, instead, appears a lot more self-assured in navigating the great power rivalries in Asia and unafraid of building India’s comprehensive national power in collaboration with America.

Modi’s bet on a more intensive strategic partnership with America has been reinforced by a revised and more ambitious framework for defence cooperation that the two leaders approved. They also identified a number of weapons projects for co-development and co- production.

Equally important is the determination of the two leaders to expand bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism and homeland security. Of particular interest was their emphasis on “joint and concerted efforts to disrupt entities such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, D Company and the Haqqani Network”. Modi’s India is no longer whining about Pakistan to America; instead it is seeking to strengthen its internal capacities to counter terrorism in partnership with the United States.

About the author:
*Dr Chilamkuri Raja Mohan is Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi (India), and a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. He can be contacted at isascrm@nus.edu.sg and crmohan53@gmail.com. Opinions expressed in this paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief No. 360 – 29 January 2015 (PDF).

The post India-US Relations: Modi And Obama Begin New Chapter – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Jos Boonstra and Laure Delcour*

The Caucasus is a broken region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have chosen different paths for political and economic development, while Turkey and Russia – which can also be considered part of the Caucasus – have very different ties with these three states. In addition, the Caucasus is divided between its southern part of three independent republics and a northern Caucasus, which is part of Russia. Caucasian borders have (to various degrees) emerged as
obstacles to cooperation, movement of people, and trade.

For the European Union (EU), this fragmented landscape is challenging. The Union likes to think in terms of well-defined regions with regional cooperation leading to integration. In the Balkans (which was another broken region), all countries have been seeking eventual EU membership (at different speeds and with mixed results) and the EU has been able to help foster regional cooperation as part of the terms for accession. This is unlikely to happen in the South Caucasus, where the EU is not the only game in town and Russia aggressively seeks to maintain its influence.

Over the past few years, the simultaneous deployment of two mutually exclusive projects – the Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas (DCFTAs) offered by the EU as part of its Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) – has only exacerbated differences in the South Caucasus. Since the Vilnius EaP summit in November 2013, Georgia (like Moldova and Ukraine) has come significantly closer to the EU by signing an Association Agreement (AA) alongside a DCFTA. Neither of the other two South Caucasus countries is likely to conclude similar agreements in the near future, albeit for different reasons. Armenia has become a member of the EEU, which entered into effect in January 2015, while Azerbaijan has so far not engaged into any legally-binding economic integration project.

What does all this mean for the EU’s approach – foremost through the EaP – in the South Caucasus? And how can the EU factor in these differences into coherent bilateral and multilateral policies? Can the EU play a positive role in helping to ‘fix’ this broken region?

BEHIND A BROKEN REGION: DIVERGING NATIONAL PATHS AND INTERESTS

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have diverse foreign policy priorities and domestic reform processes. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that they have different expectations vis-à-vis the EU. In addition, their engagement in regional projects driven by either the EU or Russia is not clear-cut or irreversible, but fraught with multiple tensions.

Over the past few years, Georgian attitudes towards the EU have shifted as a result of both regional and domestic developments. During the early years of the Saakashvili presidency (he was in power from 2004-2013), despite a rhetorical emphasis on the country’s European identity, integration with the EU was not a key priority; instead, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was. The 2008 conflict with Russia – which resulted in the de facto loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while also putting an end to the hopes of NATO accession in the short run – marked a turning point. Despite lingering resistance to some EU regulations (caused by the then authorities’ liberal economic agenda), the conflict put closer links with the EU at the top of
the Georgian agenda. Building on the progress made under Saakashvili, the current government seems to be speeding up its regulatory alignment with EU acquis (rules and practices). Furthermore, alongside some attempts at normalising relations with Russia, the incumbent government has remained firm in its pro-EU choice, and domestic political developments have so far not jeopardised the country’s course.

For Georgia, the EU’s EaP has two major flaws. First, it falls short of offering any prospect of membership and the recognition of Georgia as an ‘Eastern European country’ in the 2014 Association Agreement is of little consolation. Second, the EaP offers nothing to address Georgia’s immediate security concerns. For example, the November 2014 ‘Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ between Russia and Abkhazia triggered suspicion and concern in Tbilisi, but the EU could do nothing more than reiterate its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. The newly tabled treaty with South Ossetia goes a step further in granting Russia full control over that Georgian territory. Georgia, therefore, views modernisation à la EU as a model of development, and thus a means to buttress its independence in the long term. In the short run, Tbilisi is only too aware of the EU’s inability to counter Moscow’s stronghold over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and any further attempts by Russia to encroach upon Georgian territory.

Whereas Armenia recently chose to join the Russian-led EEU, Yerevan had earlier also welcomed the EU’s enhanced offer under the EaP. The 2008 conflict in Georgia and a failed rapprochement with Turkey made the country more vulnerable, while lingering tensions following the divisive 2008 presidential elections triggered a sense of urgency for greater economic modernisation. Armenia’s interest in the EaP has translated into adoption of EU trade-related standards and even completion of negotiations for a DCFTA.

Location and extent of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (lighter color)

However, Armenia’s engagement with the EU is complicated by the simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, since Yerevan depends on Russian support to deter Turkish-backed Baku. During 2013, Russia started increasing its pressure on Armenia to join the Eurasian Customs Union (forerunner of the EEU) – an option initially ruled out by Yerevan. As a result, Armenia accommodated Russian requirements at the expense of EU-inspired reforms.

However, Armenia’s relationship with Russia is complex, as illustrated by both the large number of exemptions sought by Yerevan during EEU negotiations and the recent anti-Russian demonstrations following the tragic killing of an Armenian family by a Russian soldier in Gyumri.

Despite EEU accession, the Armenian authorities have sought to preserve links with the EU to the greatest extent possible. While EEU membership and a DCFTA are mutually exclusive, Armenia is keen to conclude an agreement that would reflect improved relations with the EU – ideally, an AA without a trade component.

However, this is unlikely to be easily accepted by the EU, since Yerevan’s 2013 U-turn generated disappointment and mistrust in Brussels, and tailor-made bilateral arrange- ments would take time to develop within the current rather stringent EaP format.

Thus far, Azerbaijan can afford the luxury of not aligning with the EU – including prescriptions on human rights and democracy – or submitting to Moscow’s will through the EEU (and other Russia-driven organisations). The country’s vast wealth of oil and gas has resulted in the firm establishment of an authoritarian regime that maintains an iron rule at home and advertises its economic progress abroad.

Initially, Baku seemed open to some reforms inspired by Brussels and competed with Yerevan on receiving better marks in annual EU reports. Yet the ruling elite soon gave up on political reform and tightened control over society as the country’s economic growth skyrocketed. First the political opposition was marginalised, followed by repressing independent journalists over the last five years, and more recently by a purge against independent non-governmental-organisations (NGOs) and think tanks. Whereas the country’s relations with the EU will remain modest, Brussels and Baku have different views on their substance. Azerbaijan focuses on energy cooperation while the EU wants a stronger emphasis on democracy and human rights.

However, in contrast to its sanctions on Belarus the EU is not prepared to consider sanctions against Azerbaijan, unless mass violations of human rights take place. This can be explained by three interwoven factors. First, the EU is less concerned about developments in a country that is not a direct neighbour and has no desire for membership. Second, the EU views Azerbaijan as a future alternative to Russia for gas supplies. Yet, even though the volume of Azerbaijani gas supplied to Europe could increase by 2019 if the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) pipeline is built, it will be dwarfed by Russian, Norwegian, and Algerian deliveries. Last but not least, the country is an interesting partner to the EU (and the US) from a geostrategic perspective. Like neighbouring Iran, Azerbaijan is Shiite, yet moderate and secular, and is ethnically and linguistically close to (NATO member) Turkey.

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) poses a severe security threat to the Caucasus region and indirectly to Europe because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite many similarities with other protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space, this conflict differs in the sense that Russia is an indirect actor that cannot fully control either side. Whereas peace talks have made some progress over the last decade, the risks of a new war have not diminished. In this context, the EU’s feeble security clout in the region makes Brussels a secondary actor at best.

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: TIME FOR A REALITY CHECK

Launched in 2009, the EaP has offered new opportunities for South Caucasus countries to develop their relationship with the EU. On a bilateral basis, the main accomplishment of the EaP in the region has been the conclusion of an AA and DCFTA with Georgia. Moreover, all three countries are aiming for (albeit at different speeds) visa liberalisation, which also requires substantial reforms in key areas such as migration management or the fight against corruption. Georgia may get a visa-free regime this year, while Armenia may progress toward a visa liberalisation action plan. Azerbaijan is further behind, but visa facilitation and readmission agreements signed with the EU are in force.

With the EaP, the EU has emerged in the South Caucasus as an agent for domestic change (at least in Georgia, to some degree in Armenia and to a much lesser extent in Azerbaijan). But EU-inspired change has its limits, as the EU is only as influential as South Caucasus states allow it to be. Reforms often remain shallow and local elites carefully calculate the high short-term costs against longer-term (and vaguer) benefits. At the same time, by making its AA/DCFTA offer the main bilateral ‘take-it-or leave-it’ package, the EU has put itself in a difficult situation. So far, no plan B has been developed for countries that seek deeper relations with the EU but no AA or DCFTA.

The EaP’s multilateral track is also in need of revision as it is incapable of handling the growing differences between South Caucasus countries in their relationships with the EU. At the political level, the work of the multilateral track is affected by regional tensions and conflicts. For instance, the work of the EaP’s parliamentary dimension (Euronest) has often been paralysed by divergences between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Standard bilateral European Parliament Delegations with South Caucasus (or East European) countries would be more practical as is already the case with Moldova, Ukraine and soon Georgia.

At the technical level, thematic groupings (officially known as ‘platforms’ – the backbone of the multilateral track) are mainly EU-driven and their content primarily reflects EU concerns. The platform on economic integration is a blatant example of this. The emphasis on approximation with EU trade regulations is relevant to Georgia, but less so to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other platforms (for example, on democracy, good governance, and stability) also inspire uneven interest among the three partners.

However, the multilateral track does offer a useful framework for representatives of the three EU partners to meet. Regional tensions and conflicts feed into high-level meetings, but thematic platforms and panels provide fora where officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and East European states can discuss their respective reform experiences. In addition, the non-governmental formats (the Civil Society Forum, the Business Forum) have fostered contacts between South Caucasian societies. Meanwhile, the EaP’s six flagship projects – from integrated border management to environmental governance – need careful evaluation. Fruitful projects should be continued and strengthened, while those that have not produced results after five years should be either reformed or scrapped.

Even though results are likely to be modest and mostly long-term, in essence the multilateral track should help build confidence between the participating countries. For the EU, the multi-lateral track also offers a forum to explain its policies and to provide an alternative narrative to Russia’s policies. In the post-Soviet space Russia has highly problematic relations with some countries (foremost Georgia and Ukraine), while its EEU initiative does not meet much enthusiasm among current and potential members. Here the EU has an advantage as it can bring all countries together. The EaP multilateral track, therefore, has potential, subject to internal review and discussion with EaP partners regarding their preferences.

THE WAY AHEAD

The South Caucasus is a broken region with severe internal and external blockades to region- al cooperation, which will require the EU to prioritise bilateral approaches to the region. Relations should be increasingly country-tailored, taking into account the needs of both the EU and its partners. The multilateral approach to the six EaP countries can be an additional asset if focused on confidence building, possibly complemented by a few cross-border projects with mixed participation.

It is in the EU’s interest that the Caucasus becomes a stable and democratic region. But the EU has little influence to make this happen without two currently missing ingredients: a much more substantial engagement on security challenges and a clear finalité for its Eastern partners. The Russian authoritarian model will keep traction as it pretends to solve the short-term worries of some of these states and to safe-guard the incumbent regimes. At the very least, the EU should be ready to fully support those countries that do opt for in-depth political and economic reforms. Such an approach would not prevent the EU from setting democracy and human rights benchmarks with authoritarian states such as Azerbaijan.

The EU should also increasingly focus on linking EU member-state societies to those of the South Caucasus. This requires shifting its policy paradigm from narrow legal and technical approximation to broader societal integration, for instance through people-to-people contacts. Europe’s attractiveness remains high – also in Armenia and Azerbaijan – and in the long run will be more influential than short-sighted Russian propaganda. Civil society cooperation (including through the Civil Society Forum), visa liberalisation policies, and support to educational exchanges have been overshadowed by the EU’s focus on AA/DCFTA negotiations. However, societal links should be turned into both a key priority in current relations and a basis for a deeper long-term partnership.

The EaP sought to help stabilise the EU’s South Caucasus neighbours but lacked a security component from the outset. Neither a harder security posture from the EU, nor success in settling protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus (without Russian involvement and agreement), are on the table. The current EU engagement in security matters is largely confined to the Common Secu- rity and Defence Policy (CSDP) border monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the participation of an EU Special Representative in the Geneva talks between Georgia and Russia.

Besides stepping up EU engagement through NATO and the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Minsk talks concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, there is little more the EU can do. Specific Caucasus security strategies by the EU would seem overambitious since member states – for a variety of reasons – will likely not support heavier involvement in the region’s security. Nonetheless, the region’s protracted conflicts remain volatile and inflammable.

However, the EU could more strongly support the reform of the security sectors of those countries willing to engage, for instance by assisting in reforming partners’ police, border guards, judicial systems, and democratic oversight mechanisms. This should be possible in Georgia (and already undertaken to some degree), and it could be worthwhile to investigate such options with Armenia and Azerbaijan perhaps by linking it to confidence building measures between both adversaries. Furthermore, there are elements of security sector reform (SSR) in the EU’s visa liberalisation policies with Caucasus countries as these affect some aspects of the police, border guards and judicial systems; this can potentially be an entry point for broader SSR engagement.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing fragility and fragmentation of the South Caucasus will not be fixed anytime soon as the region is prone to domestic instability, inflammable protracted conflicts, and Russia’s heavy influence. The EU will not (and cannot) ix the Caucasus region, but it can have a positive bearing on its development, provided that it can design a clearer and firmer long-term vision. The EU should seek to play a responsible and more active security role in the South Caucasus by being prepared for further problematic relations with Russia, and being ready to cope with a shifting, complex, and uncertain domestic and regional environment. Also, the EU will need to adopt a more flexible bilateral approach complemented by renewed multilateral cooperation for- mats via the EaP. Last but certainly not least, given its attractiveness to South Caucasus societies, the EU should place societies and people-to-people contacts at the core of its policies in all three countries.

*About the authors:
Jos Boonstra is head of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia programme at FRIDE

Laure Delcour is scientific coordinator and research fellow of the EU FP7 CASCADE project at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme

Source:
The research for this paper is funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 613354 – CASCADE Project. www.cascade-caucasus.eu

This article was published by FRIDE as POLICY BRIEF – No 193 – JANUARY 2015 (PDF)

The post A Broken Region: Evaluating EU Policies In South Caucasus – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dan Steffens

In last week’s article I posted a chart from the International Energy Agency’s recent Oil Market Report that shows global demand for refined products catching up to supply by the 3rd quarter of this year. My opinion is that all of the analysts who are now blaming the sharp drop in oil prices on a “glut” of supply could change their tune quickly as consumers adjust to lower fuel costs. Just as higher costs reduce demand for any commodity, lower costs will increase demand. This is especially true for a commodity that has a direct impact on standard of living, like oil does.

When the price of gasoline plunged below $1.00/gallon in 1986, demand for motor fuels and other refined products increased by almost 5% within twelve months. Today, world demand for hydrocarbon based liquid fuels (including biofuels) is over 92.5 million barrels per day. You can go to the IEA website and see for yourself that normal seasonal demand is expected to push demand over 94.0 million barrels per day within six months. I think both the IEA and our own Energy Information Administration (EIA) are grossly underestimating the price related demand increase that is already starting to show up in the data.

Last week’s EIA report confirms that demand is already surging in the United States. Granted, part of the year-over-year increase in gasoline consumption may be a result of the harsh winter weather we had last year, but I think this story is going to play out. If gasoline prices remain low until this summer, we should see a sharp increase in the number of Americans that decide to take long driving vacations this year. We do love our SUVs.

Today’s low crude oil price is blamed on Saudi Arabia’s decision not to reduce supply even though the world is oversupplied by an estimated 1.5 million barrels per day. If gasoline under $2.00/gallon increases global demand for motor fuels by half of the amount it did back in 1986 (2.5%), demand for oil will increase by 2.4 million barrels per day and today’s “glut” will soon fade from memory.

Gasoline prices in Texas are now under $1.75/gallon at many discount stations.

It is going to take a while to work off the build-up in both crude oil and gasoline inventories, but if the IEA and EIA start reporting that demand is catching up with supply the NYMEX strip price for crude oil will adjust quickly. The December, 2015 futures contract for WTI crude oil closed at $53.12/bbl on Friday, January 23 ($7.83/bbl above the front month contract). By the way, this has a lot to do with why crude oil inventories are building.

Keep in mind that oil production is also going to drop in response to lower prices. The U.S. active drilling rig count dropped by another 43 for the week ending January 23, 2015 to 1,633. Based on the upstream companies’ capital budgets that I’m seeing, I expect the active rig count to drop below 1,000 by the end of May. We will soon have less than 700 rigs drilling for oil in this country and that means U.S. oil production will be on decline by the 4th quarter. In the last three years, only the U.S., Canada and Brazil have increased production. The rest of the world’s oil production has been in decline despite previous $100/bbl oil prices.

Even before the sharp decline in oil prices, global demand for oil was growing at a rate of 1 million barrels per day per year. In my opinion, within six months the rate of demand growth will accelerate to over 2 million barrels per day. Demand could go even higher if consumers adjust their driving habits like they did back in 1986.

The upstream oil & gas producers will soon be reporting 4th quarter results, including updated reserve reports. Now is the time to add the best oil producers and MLPs to play the coming rebound in oil prices.

For more on this topic see: http://www.prienga.com/blog/2015/1/20/supply-minus-demand-explained

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Increasing-Demand-For-Refined-Products-Will-Increase-Oil-Prices.html

The post Increasing Demand For Refined Products Will Increase Oil Prices – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On Wednesday, Jude Fernando Andreu of Spain’s National Court charged the former bosses, executives, and board members of the country’s two renowned banks, Caja Madrid and Bankia, for the secret spending of over USD 17.48 million between 1999 and 2012.

According to the judge’s ruling, 27 of the high-ranking officials are summoned to attend questioning sessions, which are scheduled to be held on February 16-18.

The scandal also involves Rodrigo Rato, a senior member of Spain’s ruling People’s Party, who served as the country’s economy minister from 1996 to 2004 and the managing director of the International Monetary Fund from 2004 to 2007. Reports show that the accused managers misused credit cards for personal purchases, and spent large sums of money on safaris, clothing, luxury meals and art.

High-profile corruption cases in Spain have sparked anger among people who suffer from high unemployment rate, harsh cutbacks in social welfare and an ailing economy. Back in November 2014, Spanish Health Minister Ana Mato resigned after an investigating judge accused her of gaining financial benefits from a bribe scheme that involved her former husband.

According to a government poll taken in 2013, Spaniards consider corruption as the second-biggest problem in the country after unemployment.

The post Spain: Court Charges 78 Banking Officials appeared first on Eurasia Review.

EU Ministers of Home Affairs and the Ministers of Justice, statement issued following the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January.

Profoundly shocked by the terrible terrorist attacks in Paris in early January which have endangered the core values of EU, the Latvian Presidency adjusted the agenda of the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga to dedicate the whole session for discussions by Ministers of Home affairs to the EU’s fight against terrorism and to add an information point for Ministers of Justice on judicial aspects of fighting terrorism.

Discussions at the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January 2015 were based on the Paris statement of 11 January 2015 broadly supported by the Member States.

The EU has already a long-standing counter-terrorism strategy, developing a large scope of measures in different areas supporting Member States’ counter-terrorism efforts and responsibilities.
Terrorism related issues have been an agenda point for the Justice and Home Affairs Council meetings over the last years. As a consequence, numerous measures have been discussed, approved, implemented and monitored.

The recent terrorist-attacks in France, the counter-terrorism measures taken in Belgium and the growing threat posed by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters all over the world sends a clear and strong message that counter-terrorism efforts have to be reinforced both at national and EU level.

We, the Ministers of Home Affairs and the Ministers of Justice, have a first line responsibility in the fight against terrorism. Our actions must continue to be part of a comprehensive approach that includes the various actions in different policies, including in the area of transport, finance, information technologies and in relations with third countries.

We had a thorough debate on a number of topical issues, upon which we conclude on the following:

• We reaffirm our unfailing attachment to the freedom of expression, to fundamental rights, to pluralism, to democracy, to tolerance and to the rule of law. They are the foundation of our democracies and are at the heart of the European Union. Respect of fundamental rights is crucial in the fight against terrorism. Our common work must be based on a proper balance between security and fundamental rights.
• We strongly emphasize the need to build further work on already existing tools by accelerating and amplifying their implementation in order to ensure a strong Member States’ and the EU’s response to this threat, including threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. The new initiatives could be adopted either to increase effectiveness of existing measures or to adjust the current instruments to ensure required response to the current threat.
• We reiterate that terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and financing related to terrorism are main common threats to internal security of the EU.
• It is important to provide a determined response at EU level. The latest events have clearly proved the existence of this multidimensional threat involving different areas of crime. The
  necessity and importance of effectively coordinated and coherent approach is of the utmost importance. In this regard, a European agenda on Security is needed to address the threats to internal security of the EU for the next years. To ensure the timely adoption of the European agenda on Security, we urge the European Commission to present its Communication by mid- April 2015 at the latest in order to review and update EU Internal Security Strategy by mid 2015 as concluded by the European Council.
• In the fight against terrorism, it is crucial to address not only the consequences but also the underlying factors of radicalization. In this regard, need for a comprehensive cross-sectorial approach guaranteeing the involvement of all policies concerned should be addressed, including the importance to promote culture of inclusion and tolerance through, for instance, education, social and regional policies.
• We confirm our determination to create without further delay an effective EU PNR framework in line with Council general approach and at the same time ensuring solid data protection safeguards. Constructive dialogue should be restarted with the European Parliament with a view of the adoption of the EU PNR directive as soon as possible.
• We reiterate the urgent need for further actions addressing radicalization to terrorism not only on EU but also on national and local level. The internet plays a significant role in radicalization. In this regard, we must strengthen our efforts to cooperate closely with the industry and to encourage them to remove terrorist and extremist content from their platforms. The further possibilities to detect and remove illegal content, in full respect of fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms and in full accordance to national legislation. The possible creation of effective counter-narratives, notably on social media, should also be explored. In this context, Internet referral capabilities, also through Check-the-web, could be developed within Europol to support efforts of Member States in detecting illegal content and improving exchange of information. The development of different preventive projects within the future RAN Centre of Excellence and the maximum use of the Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT) should also be strengthened.
• In order to derive full benefit from existing law-enforcement cooperation mechanisms and tools, we request Europol to provide a suitable information-exchange and data-matching environment to streamline current procedures, avoiding duplications. Further information exchange, including through the Focal Point Travellers and the multidisciplinary working group DUMAS, should be strengthened. Effective use and, if necessary, further development of criminal records information system (ECRIS) should be enhanced. Also potential of the Schengen Information System should be better exploited.
• We strongly reconfirm our commitment to ensure swift and enhanced exchange of information and best practices between Member States and all justice and home affairs agencies, in particular Europol and Eurojust.
• We consider that beyond the current efforts to make full use of existing Schengen framework, a targeted proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code is a necessary step to reinforce external borders by making it possible to proceed to systematic checks on individuals enjoying the right of free movement against databases relevant to the fight against terrorism based on the common risk indicators.
• We commit to ensure that our competent authorities reinforce exchange of information and develop further cross-border cooperation on fighting illegal trafficking of firearms, in particular by systematically inserting information into the Schengen Information System. We encourage decisive action, including legislation, where necessary, to curb this criminal activity. Specific attention should be given to deactivation of firearms, reinforcement of their traceability, information sharing and countering firearms’ trafficking on internet.
• In addition, specific consideration should be given to fight against financing of terrorism. Information on traceability of financial flows and the ability to freeze assets are crucial when combating terrorism. The reinforcement of the existing tools to ensure such control along with the development of new and specific tools to counter the financing related to terrorism should be considered.
• The joint efforts of the internal and external dimension in fighting terrorism, and in particular the phenomenon of the foreign terrorist fighters, is crucial. In this regard, the work of the Foreign Affairs Council is particularly welcomed. The increasingly unstable situation in certain parts of the EU’s neighborhood, such as Libya and Syria, is of great concern to the EU’s security and requires special attention. The mutual legal assistance with third countries, who are strategic partners in the fight against terrorism, should be strengthened, either through agreements or exchange of liaison magistrates.
• We consider the importance of judicial aspects in fight against the terrorism, in particular foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon. In this regard, major progress has been made in recent years in improving information exchange and cooperation between judicial authorities. It is now of fundamental importance to harness the full potential of existing instruments and to consider further developments when addressing the matter, including enhancing the share of best practices and information and the use of Eurojust, in particular in conformity with the Council decision 2005/671/JHA.

Preventing and countering propaganda and radicalization in prisons is also a relevant component of efforts in this field. It is important to consider further legislative developments with regard to the common understanding of criminal activities related to terrorism in light of the United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) and possible further development of criminal records information system (ECRIS).

The Presidency will ensure that the work on these issues as well as on other measures discussed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council over the last years and those provided in other contributions from Member States, from the European Commission, from the European External Action Service and from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is taken forward at EU level in the appropriate fora involving all relevant stakeholders.

The Joint statement will be an input of Justice and Home Affairs ministers for the discussion at the Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 12 February 2015.

The post Riga Joint Statement On Counter-Terrorrism appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On Thursday 29 January, at the Informal Meeting of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Riga the Ministers for Home Affairs discussed further steps of the EU action for strengthening counter-terrorism measures.

“The recent terrorist-attacks in France, the necessary counter-terrorism measures taken in Belgium and the growing threat posed by foreign fighters sends a clear message that counter-terrorism efforts have to be reinforced at national and EU level,” indicated the Latvian Minister for the Interior, Rihards Kozlovskis.

The discussions in the Informal Council Meeting were based on a Presidency discussion paper that defined further steps of the EU action. The discussion paper covered areas of prevention of radicalisation, in particular on the internet and social media, information sharing among relevant services, identification of travel routes of suspected terrorists, the need for an efficient EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system, and the tracking and limiting of access to firearms.

“The Ministers for Home Affairs and the Ministers for Justice, have a first line responsibility in ensuring the safety of our citizens. Our actions must continue to be part of a comprehensive approach that includes the various actions in different policies, including in the area of transport, finance, information technologies and in relations with third countries,” said Kozlovskis.

The Ministers had a thorough debate on a number of counter-terrorism issues and adopted the Riga Joint Statement on Counter-Terrorism.

The Presidency will ensure that work on the issues discussed during this informal ministerial meeting as well as on other measures is taken forward at EU level in the appropriate fora and including all relevant stakeholders. The discussions will also serve as an input for JHA Ministers to the discussion with the Heads of State and Government on 12 February 2015.

As has been reported before, the Latvian Presidency adjusted the agenda of the Informal Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga to dedicate more discussions to the fight against terrorism. The judicial aspects of fighting terrorisms will also be discussed among the Ministers for Justice on the second day of the informal JHA Council Meeting.

Discussions at the informal Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January 2015 were based on the Paris statement on 11 January 2015, which has gained broad support by the Member States over the past two weeks.

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By D Suba Chandran*

Ever since the horrible attack on school children in Peshawar, there have been a series of measures within Pakistan in responding to militancy. A National Plan has been prepared; military courts have been constitutionally set up to deal with the militants; groups have been banned, and recently the government has also decided to freeze the funds of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). There is a general perception within Pakistan, that today, the nation does not differentiate between the “good” and “bad” Taliban, leading to a new paradigm involving the State, society and militants.

What is this new paradigm? While many at the civil society level are keen to put the militant genie back into the bottle, does everyone within the Establishment share the same enthusiasm? Is there a section within the political and military Establishments that sees militants in terms of good and bad?

Two more important questions on this issue relate to the capacity of the State to deal with the militants and the willingness of the jihadi groups to be rolled back. Can the State really put the genie back into the bottle? Is the genie willing to get back?

The new paradigm that the civil society is talking about in Pakistan today relates to their own resolve to fight the militants, and that of the State to combat and neutralize them. Three issues are important while discussing this new paradigm in Pakistan. Is the civil society in Pakistan against the violence perpetrated by the militant groups, or against them and their ideology in principle? Is the State’s effort aimed at completely neutralizing the jihadi groups and their ideology, or only focused on bringing them under their own control, as it existed pre-9/11? Finally, is the State capable of creating an environment – social and economic – that would be competitive and not provide any substantial space for the jihadi groups and their ideologies to influence civil society?

Is the civil society only against violence, or against the jihadis and their ideologies?

This is an important question that will have a crucial impact on the future of not only Pakistan, but also the entire region. Pressure from civil society has been one of the most crucial components in the State’s proactive response against the militant groups. How far will the civil society go in pushing the case? Will it call for the complete annihilation of these groups, their infrastructure and their ideologies? Or, will it fall short?

The Peshawar attack undoubtedly has been an important event. The society has been shaken and is angry. Rightly so. But will the same sense of anger prevail against all forms of violence perpetrated by a small fraction in the name of religion? What has been the response of the civil society to the assassination of Salman Taseer, attacks on Imambaras, Shias, Ahmadiyas, etc? Unfortunately, the same sense of anger or condemnations does not exist. And even if it exists, it does not have the same intensity that has forced the government to take proactive measures after the Peshawar attack.

In fact, the attack on school children in Peshawar in December 2014 would not have happened if such resolve existed during the last two decades, when the militant groups were on a rampage against the minority communities in Pakistan. Their ideology would not have found support had the civil society rejected the case against Ahmadiyas and the blasphemy legislations that became a tool in the hands of a select few against the minority communities.

The civil society will find it difficult to succeed in Pakistan if its fight is narrowly focused. Those who are using suicide bombs against the Sufi shrines and school children did not start abruptly. They started decades ago, supported by a section within the civil society, social organisations, political groups and parties, and finally the intelligence and military. The media, even today, perhaps unintentionally (with a section perhaps otherwise) provide the much-needed space for those who support and believe in radical ideologies.

The civil society will also not be able to succeed if it is buoyed by so much anti-West, anti-Indian and multiple other “anti” sentiments. The jihadi groups and their patrons abuse this inherent sentiment to suit their purpose. While some of these sentiments are fed by different groups within the State and vested interests to perpetuate their monopoly, the rest of them have been blown out of proportion by regular ill-informed debates at various levels. Not only in Pakistan, but in the entire South Asian region, there have been such ill-informed debates, at times carefully planted and nurtured by a select few. This vitiates the entire atmosphere and provides the space for hate and anger.

The shift in paradigm will come only when the civil society distances itself from the militant groups and their ideologies. Simply condemning violence alone will not be sufficient. A crucial first step has been taken; now the civil society has to walk the talk in Pakistan.

Is the Establishment aiming at neutralizing the jihadis and their ideology, or does it simply want to bring them under its control?

The State has taken certain crucial measures during the last two months in Pakistan, the most important being the creation of military courts to deal with terrorists, banning certain militant groups and freezing the accounts of some others.

While the State seems to be serious in neutralizing those who have been attacking it, one is not sure whether the intensity and response is the same when it comes to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network and the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Though statements have been made that the distinction between good and bad Taliban now ceases to exist, actions during the last two months have created more confusion than clarity.

The State looks serious in fighting the TTP. The renewed measure as a part of its military offensive in the tribal regions and the neutralization of scores of Taliban militants belonging to the TTP clearly indicates the above.

But why is the State lukewarm in extending the same approach towards the Haqqani network and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)? While the TTP is being hounded in the FATA, the State has only frozen the JuD’s bank accounts; Hafiz Saeed is still being provided with State security. From analysts writing for the media in Pakistan to its Supreme Court, many are confused about the State’s approach towards the JuD and Haqqani network.

So, what is the new paradigm as far as the State is concerned in fighting militancy? Is it only fighting those who have turned against it and gone rogue?

Such an approach will backfire. The Establishment seems to be fighting only the symptoms of anti-State activities, and not the reasons that have provided the space for the jihadi groups to find root in Pakistan in the first place. The real problem in this context is the long term perception of India and Afghanistan by the Establishment and the use of proxies. Unless the Establishment changes this basic perception, the larger paradigm that provides a crucial space for jihadi groups is unlikely to change.

Besides the willingness, a larger question is related to the capacity of the State in Pakistan if it decides to fight back. Unlike other States, for example Afghanistan, the capacity of the State in Pakistan has not been questioned. At least, until now. If it leaves the genie to further strengthen and gather a critical mass both inside and outside Pakistan, the question of capacity may also come into to the equation.

Militant Groups in Pakistan: Is the Genie willing to go back?

Perhaps, this is the most important question when people talk about a paradigm shift in Pakistan vis-à-visthe militant groups. True, there may have been external reasons for their emergence a few decades ago. The State may have played a role in creating and nurturing them earlier, to be its proxies to fight the former’s battle both within and outside Pakistan.
Now, there is a realization amongst a section that the above strategy has started backfiring, and there is a roll back. Will the proxies remain committed to their patrons in the changed atmosphere? Or during the process have they developed their own objectives and are fighting their own battles? Certainly the Taliban has turned back and is not willing to go down. How about the JuD and Haqqani network?

The larger problem for Pakistan will not emanate from the Master’s changed heart to put the Genie back in bottle. Rather, it will come from whether the Genie wants to go back. The situation will become worse for the rest of the region if the Genie finds the bottle small, and wants a bigger space!

*D Suba Chandran
Director, IPCS

Originally published in Rising Kashmir

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The Congolese armed forces (FARDC) officially announced the start an offensive against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu rebel group active in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, reports MISNA.

Uganda also gave an ultimatum to Congolese militants of the defeated M23 (March 23 Movement) still present in its territory. The two rebel groups were main protagonists over the years of the crisis in DR-Congo.

Congolese chief of staff Didier Etumba stated that the operations against the FDLR will be entirely conducted by the national armed forces, without the participation of forces of the UN Mission in DR-Congo (MONUSCO) that instead intervened against other rebel groups.

The military commander of the UN forces, Brazilian Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz confirmed that it will not be a joint operation. The head of the UN mission, Martin Kobler, yesterday had however stated that the offensive was “imminent”, urging FDLR fighters to “surrender and return to Rwanda”. The offensive against the Rwandan rebels had been expected since they missed a January 2 deadline to disarm.

The government of Kampala instead gave M23 members currently based in Uganda three months to cross back over the border or be handed over to UN forces. According to Ugandan army spokesman, Paddy Ankunda, some 800 former fighters of the M23, defeated in 2013 by Congolese and UN forces, are still at the Bihanga military base. Other 120 were transferred out of the country in December. The delay in their transfer is officially due to fears expressed by the former fighters over their personal safety on return to DR-Congo.

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Mannar’s Bishop Monsignor Rayappu Joseph has urged the new Sri Lankan government to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) as soon as possible and release all the political prisoners through the legal procedure, in a first step toward a reconciliation process, reports MISNA.

After requesting a meeting with the President next month, Bishop Rayappu told the local media he intends to hand over a letter stating some of the events and matters that need to be addressed.

“President Maithripala Sirisena, then the common candidate for the presidential election, met me in Mannar where I expressed the plight of the political prisoners. Most of the political prisoners had quit the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) movement but were forced to rejoin during the last phase of the war. They were threatened and intimidated by the LTTE seniors. Keeping such men and women without proper legal hearing is a pathetic situation”, explained the Bishop, stressing that some of the prisoners are parents of young children. Based on estimates of Bishop Rayappu, there are about 400 to 500 political prisoners locked up in Boosa, Kandy, Vavuniya, Jaffna and Anuradhapura. Even at the Welikada prison in Colombo there are nearly 124 political prisoners, he said.

Stating that “justice delayed is justice denied”, Mannar’s Bishop went on to say that the ongoing missing Persons Commission ‘can be trusted’ under the Maithripala administration. “We should give justice to the affected people. I am not concerned about a local mechanism or international mechanism, but a credible mechanism to put an end to all burning issues of the Tamils”, the Bishop stressed, expressing ‘trust’ in the government led by a non-ambitious leader such as Maithripala Sirisena, who should do away with the PTA as it “tramples on the basic rights of the people”.

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