ByJoshua Kucera

Georgia would see a big boost in its U.S. military and economic aid under the White House’s new proposed budget, while aid to most of the rest of the region would decline.

Under the budget proposed on February 2, Georgia would get $20 million in Foreign Military Financing aid (which allows the country to buy equipment from the U.S.) in Fiscal Year 2016. That’s double the amount proposed last year (it’s not yet clear how much of that was actually disbursed). From the State Department document explaining the proposal:

Funds will be used to advance Georgia’s development of forces capable of enhancing security, countering Russian aggression, and contributing to coalition operations. This will include support for such things as upgrades to Georgia’s rotary wing air transport capabilities, advisory and defense reform, and modernization of Georgia’s military institutions.

“Countering Russia” is a priority for the U.S. across the region. Georgian economic aid (up from $38 million to $50 million) would be aimed at supporting “Euro-Atlantic integration and resistance to Russian pressure.” Moldova’s economic aid would support “European integration and mitigate vulnerabilities to Russian trade bans and other forms of pressure.” Ukraine’s will “support new initiatives to counter Russian pressure and aggressive action.” Regional economic aid to Central Asia is intended to”foster resilience to economic pressures owing to Russian political influence and overreliance on remittances.”

The budget documents described a variety of programs for the U.S. under Georgia’s economic aid:

FY 2016 resources will continue to support Georgia’s democratization, economic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and resistance to Russian pressure. U.S. programs will help strengthen institutional checks and balances and the rule of law; develop a more vibrant civil society; promote political pluralism; increase energy security and clean energy; promote reforms necessary to foster economic development; expand private-sector competitiveness; and attract foreign investment. U.S. programs will have a focus on Science, Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships (STIP). Increased funding will expand support to displaced persons within communities along the Administrative Boundary Lines with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, for example, through small scale infrastructure and income generation projects for vulnerable households. U.S. assistance also will improve access to independent, reliable, and balanced media to those living within the occupied territories.

The other two countries in the region which saw their total aid packages increase were Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While security assistance to each country remained about the same as from last year’s request, economic aid to each would be increased under this budget: from $36.3 to $45.6 million for Kyrgyzstan, and $21.1 to $28.4 million for Tajikistan.

For Kyrgyzstan:

U.S. assistance will support democratic institutions, helping the Kyrgyz Republic to consolidate its progress toward accountable, inclusive governance, and working towards increased economic opportunities and increased resilience to external shocks. Programs will also aim to address chronic instability by bolstering civil society, support the rule of law and human rights, empower the private sector as a means to foster economic growth, and address key social issues such as education. Assistance will also support domestic energy policy reform to increase energy efficiency.

For Tajikistan:

U.S. assistance will enhance Tajikistan’s stability, particularly along its long and porous border with Afghanistan. Programs will help build economic resiliency so that Tajikistan is less reliant on remittances, which make up fifty percent of its GDP, and less vulnerable to external pressures. Assistance will strengthen local governance and provide training opportunities to secure skilled employment. Programs will address systemic problems that contribute to food shortages such as inequitable access to water, inadequate supplies of seeds and fertilizer, a lack of modern technologies, and poor farm practices. [Economic Support Funds] will also help increase literacy rates, help young people find employment, and support domestic energy policy reform to increase energy efficiency.

Central Asia regional economic aid programs would get $21.7 million (up from $16.9 million last year):

U.S. assistance will continue to support regional cross-border activities under the New Silk Road initiative, which aims to further Afghanistan’s economic integration into the broader region and increase Central Asia’s access to diverse markets. Specifically, these resources will fund projects that increase economic growth and trade, including improving the transit of legal goods and services across borders, increase regional cooperation on the use of energy resources, increase cooperation and rational use of water and other natural resources, and improve governance along trade and transit corridors.

Interestingly, none of the Central Asian countries has been given Foreign Military Financing aid for FY2016, but the amount devoted to “Central Asia Regional” programs was $3.2 million, roughly the same as the region was promised last year.

The aggregate figures:

• Armenia: $22.4 million, down from the FY2015 request of $24.7 million;
• Azerbaijan: $11.1 million, down from the FY2015 request of $12.7 million;
• Georgia: $76.2 million, up from the FY2015 request of $54 million;
• Kazakhstan: $7.5 million, down from the FY2015 request of $8.3 million;
• Kyrgyzstan: $45.6 million, up from the FY2015 request of $36.3 million;
• Tajikistan: $28.4 million, up from the FY2015 request of $21.1 million;
• Turkmenistan: $4.5 million, down from the FY2015 request of $4.9 million;
• Uzbekistan: $6.2 million, down from the FY2015 request of $6.8 million.

It should be noted that in terms of military aid, the above figures are only part of the picture, an increasing portion of aid to the region is funded by the Department of Defense, rather than through the traditional State Department programs like FMF.

The post Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan See Boosts In US Aid – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nadim Al-Hamid

As gas shortages across Saudi Arabia continued, the National Gas and Industrialization Company (GASCO) on Tuesday removed a top executive from his position and appointed a new chief executive officer.

Iyas bin Samir Al-Hajari is the new man at the helm, with Salman bin Mohammed Al-Jeshi, Gasco’s chairman, no longer managing director.

The gas crisis started three weeks ago after the company retrenched many distribution employees without replacing them, according to reports.

This resulted in an acute shortage of gas across the Kingdom including Jeddah and Makkah, with the price of a cylinder shooting up from SR15 to SR100. Many restaurants in the Kingdom closed down because they were not able to get gas at a reasonable price.

Al-Hajari said on Tuesday that the shortage was caused by a lack of supply from the Aramco plants in Yanbu and Qatif. “Production at the Yanbu plant dropped over the past two weeks, which in turn affected the supply in Jeddah.”

He said there had been attempts to get additional supplies from Qatif to meet the demand in Jeddah. Poor weather conditions on the roads from Qatif to Jeddah delayed the arrival of trucks carrying cooking gas. The shortage has already been solved partially with the arrival of 50,000 cylinders of various sizes from Qatif on Sunday, he said.

He denied that the shortage was triggered by the industrial action started by Saudi workers who demanded the payment of an annual bonus. He said the company would not agree to any employee stopping working under any circumstances.

Arab News, however, discovered that three major gas-pumping stations were not operating because of the strike by workers.

Some workers told Arab News that they refused to work because they did not get their annual bonus, and also because some of their colleagues were sacked after asking for their “rightful payments.”

Jeddah residents have called for a quick resolution of the problem.
Many said they cannot believe that Saudi Arabia, which is one of the world’s largest producers of oil and natural gas, is facing such a problem.

Fawaz Al-Ghamdi said he had not been able to get a gas cylinder for the past two weeks because shops in most parts of the city were closed.

He was forced to borrow one from a neighbor who lives in his building.

Maher Al-Zahrani said a black market for gas cylinders have now appeared because of the shortage. He bought four small gas cylinders for SR100 each.

The post Saudi Arabia: Top Executive Removed As Gas Crisis Deepens appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Leading Zimbabwean securities trading company Inter-Horizon Securities in its recently released 2015 equity strategy report said that the Zimbabwean economy is at a crossroads.

“The Zimbabwean economy is coming under increasing stress characterised by depressed aggregate demand, high unemployment, pervasive structural issues linked to poor funding and weak commodity prices in Zimbabwe’s key sectors, mining and agriculture, and a persistent current account deficit. It is now imperative that government implements productive and proactive policy reforms to attract the much-needed FDI and restore the country’s external position as a prerequisite for accessing external financing,” the report said.

The Zimbabwean government has of late been extending its begging bowl to just about anyone who will indulge them, with the Chinese being Harare’s preferred investment partner. Last year, President Mugabe went on a state visit to China, with the hopes of securing significant funding. The Zanu PF led government however, has little to show for that and its other efforts to attract FDI into the country.

For instance, in the ten months from January to October last year, Zimbabwe received FDI flows of only $146.6mn compared to $311.3mn during the same period in 2013, an amount far below the medium term policy (Monetary policy) target of $1bn for the year.

Compared to its sub-Saharan Africa peers, Zimbabwe has fared poorly in terms of attracting FDI in the recent past, after impressing in the years immediately after dollarization, albeit coming off a low base. The country`s eastern neighbor Mozambique, recorded FDI flows of $7 billion in 2013, a record for the country according to data supplied by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Nigel Chanakira chairman of the Zimbabwe Investment Authority, in an interview with Bloomberg Business last year conceded that Zimbabwe’s FDI remains “embarrassingly low” when compared to its neighboring countries.

Indigenization, the elephant in the room

“The main deterrent to FDI at the moment is the lack of clarity around indigenization policies and the inconsistency around implementation. Until we provide clarity and build a consistent track record in implementation we will continue to see subdued FDI inflows into the country,” the report said. Pursuant to this, Inter-Horizon Securities suggest that policy clarity, transparency and key structural reforms must be made in order to enhance the business climate to attract FDI, boost productivity and competitiveness, and build confidence. Overall, they see policy inertia and the lack of a compromise solution to the country’s indigenization policy as the largest impediments to Zimbabwe’s growth.

Despite recently amending the indigenization law to include the role of line ministries in approving compliance plans, Mines and Mining Development minister Walter Chidhakwa recently asserted the Zimbabwean government`s hard-line stance towards indigenization, by announcing that there would be no change in the application of the 51-49% threshold for indigenization of mines. “We are still studying the system but what’s clear is that we will take a simple approach. The 51-49% threshold is a requirement enacted by Zimbabwean legislators as such it will stick. It`s not negotiable. We can only be flexible on the period that companies will be able on the period that companies will be able to achieve this,” minister Chidhakwa said last month.

However, the financial services boutique firm offering brokerage and advisory services forecasts that, 2015 will see Zimbabwe`s government become compelled to take a more moderate approach to indigenization and continue to take proactive measures to normalize relations with creditors and the foreign community. “

The economy is forecast to grow 3.2% in 2015 according to the Ministry of Finance, although this forecast is fraught with downside risks emanating from depressed commodity prices, stagnant domestic demand, adverse weather conditions and pervading liquidity shortages. In our view, GDP growth in the year will likely be closer to 2.0%. We expect deflation to persist in 2015 on subdued demand, a softening rand and bearish oil prices; corporates that are highly leveraged will be hardest-hit by the pervading deflationary pressures,” the report further mentioned.

Increased pressure on fiscal and external accounts

Zimbabwe has had to contend with a myriad of problems that have led to persistent current account deficits. Chief among these challenges is a burgeoning government wage bill accounting for over 80% of the government’s total expenditure. Last year, Zimbabwe`s employment costs amounted to $2.51 billion. The World Bank recommends that a country’s wage bill should not exceed 25% of its total expenditure. Clearly, the Zimbabwean government missed that memo and crucial investment projects continue to be crowded out.

“Reversing the budget focus from consumptive to developmental has become a key priority for the government and this can only be done by managing the wage bill. The external position remains unsustainable with a large current account deficit, low international reserves and an overvalued real exchange rate. The current account deficit constitutes about 24% of GDP while our SADC peers have current account deficit under 9% of GDP,” noted Inter-Horizon Securities.

“We re-iterate the urgent need for government to take proactive measures to attract FDI to restore the country’s external position as a prerequisite for accessing external financing. Encouragingly the IMF re-opened its Zimbabwean office in July 2014 and the EU proceeded to formally lift sanctions in November 2014 on the Zimbabwean Government, both of which bode well for the restoration of constructive foreign relations,” highlighted the report.

Bearish stock market

The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange was among one of the worst performing exchange in Africa, plunging by close to 20% in 2014. Market capitalization declined to $4.3 billion from $5.2 billion in 2013, and $876 million in shareholder value was eroded in what was a disastrous year for the bourse. “The general poor performance was driven by below par GDP growth, a continued lack of FDI, downward earning revisions, as well as poor sentiment exacerbated by political events particularly in the last quarter of 2014. There appeared to be little discernible trend between sectors as regards performance reflecting the generally poor economic environment, although retail counters were hardest hit with seven of the top ten losers on the ZSE being exposed to the Zimbabwean consumer,” added the report.

It’s tough times for the Southern African country, and the government appears bereft of any strategies to put the brakes on Zimbabwe`s apparent terminal decline. To the sober minded observer, not only have the wheels fallen off, but the axles and transmission too for Zimbabwe’s coach. And 2015 will most likely be another bumpy ride for Zimbabwe.

The post Zimbabwe At Crossroads As Controversial Indigenization Law Stands In Way Of Growth – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act came into effect on 25 September 2014. The impending dry season in the coming months will be the first test of its effectiveness in curbing transboundary haze pollution.

By Raman Letchumanan*

2014 was a year of unprecedented weather conditions in the region. Whether there will be a repeat of the prolonged dry season in the coming months is on everyone’s mind. On 26 January 2015, the 24-hour Singapore Pollution Standards Index (PSI) hit 76, crossing the half-way mark of the moderate air quality zone of 50-100. Beyond that the air quality becomes unhealthy. Satellite pictures showed very few scattered hotspots in neighbouring countries. The deterioration in air quality is therefore purely from local sources.

In 2014, Indonesia finally ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution after a delay of more than a decade while Singapore enacted its Transboundary Haze Pollution Act. How significantly will these two legal instruments impact on the region’s haze pollution problem?

Moving regional cooperation on haze a notch up

When the Haze Pollution Act was enacted by the Singapore parliament, there was wariness among neighbouring governments, apprehension from targeted entities, debates in the legal fraternity, and hopes tinged with scepticism among the long-suffering public.

The Act is, in fact, in line with and complements the provisions of the region-wide ASEAN Agreement which calls upon all States to take legislative, administrative and/or other measures to implement their obligations to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution. Furthermore, the Agreement obliges the State where transboundary haze pollution originates to respond promptly to a request for relevant information or consultation sought by an affected State.

The Singapore Act makes it an offence to engage in or condone a conduct which causes or contributes to any haze pollution in Singapore, which is distinct though related, from an offence of open burning which is illegal in most ASEAN countries. Therefore if a prosecution has commenced under the Act, the concerned government is obliged under the ASEAN Agreement to share relevant information, and most importantly to act correspondingly through their national laws against the open burning that is causing transboundary haze in Singapore.

Indonesia, for example, claims foreign entities are the cause of open burning, and other governments have told Indonesia to act on these entities through the full force of their national laws. The Agreement and Act should now put such rhetoric in the past to joint legal action. Indonesia has recently dealt severely with foreign illegal fishing, and such vigour should be pursued also for transboundary violations in another country.

In fact, regional cooperation will certainly alleviate the need to rely on the tenuous provisions on presumptions, and collection of evidence under the Act if Singapore were to act unilaterally.

Casting a wider net on violators

The Act presumes that there is haze in Singapore, if about the same time there is a fire in a land outside Singapore, and the smoke from that fire is moving in the direction of Singapore. It also presumes ownership or occupation of a land causing the fire from maps furnished by appropriate persons, governments or departments.

This presumption of causal link has caused some concern among entities. Generators of satellite hotspot information claim about 80% accuracy (actual fires vs number of hotspots). Entities dispute that it is, at best, only up to 30% based on ground monitoring. Such satellite information should be validated by near surface aerial surveillance and ground investigation by authorities.

Determining the direction of smoke movement can pose similar difficulties. In Indonesia, entities contest concession land boundaries and actual ownership, which the government is trying to address through its OneMap initiative.

Major companies have taken upon themselves to publish their own concession maps overlaid with hotspot information through the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) Secretariat. This is a proactive trend among these companies to ensure they are not unfairly targeted, much less to be charged under the Act.

Entities cannot now “outsource” their offending conduct, because that entity is also liable if it participates in the management including operational affairs, exercises decision-making or control, in another entity that commits the offence. In addition, the Act covers both owners and occupiers of land and those having the authority or right to operate on the land.

Deterrence and prevention

The Act tilts towards deterrence and prevention than punitive action, and closing the loopholes that violators have been frequently using so far.

The Act provides for preventive measures in advance by entities concerned if there is air pollution in Singapore caused by fire that is likely to move in the direction of Singapore. A notice in writing to prevent, mitigate or control the fire will be issued, and failure to comply attracts a fine of up to SGD50,000 per day to a maximum SGD2 million.

More than the criminal (maximum fine of SGD2 million) and civil liability (no cap on damages), entities will be greatly concerned of the reputational risks to their core business and image, which arises the moment they are charged under the Act.

The Singapore Act induces entities to be more truthful upfront in their claims of sound environmental management practices and challenges if they are to rely on the defence of a grave natural disaster or phenomenon causing haze. It also tightens the defence of shifting blame to other persons.

However, the Act would not be an appropriate tool to use against small holders and farmers, who can collectively cause transboundary haze. They need to be assisted with locally adapted small farm equipment, on a cooperative or community basis, to prepare their land without fire. Such equipment can also assist the community as the front line of attack to better control initial fires in their surroundings, than to expect them to swat fires by hand.

Governments should be better prepared with pre-mobilised necessary resources and appropriate equipment to put out fires in remote, inaccessible and difficult terrains as soon as the dry season starts. Urban fire-fighting equipment and methods does not work in these areas.

Silver Lining?

Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s minister responsible for the environment has reiterated the Act is “no silver bullet”. He further added that there will be challenges faced. Certainly he is being very frank and realistic in order to manage public expectations expecting immediate or even short-term relief.

Sustained and enhanced coordinated preventive action among governments and entities will certainly address many of the challenges faced, including of course in tackling the root causes focusing on sustainable management of fire-prone peatlands.

Singapore’s Act has taken on a novel and bold legal approach on the transboundary haze issue. It could well pave the way for governments to act decisively on the greater global threat of climate change.

*Raman Letchumanan is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. The views expressed here are strictly his own. Dr Raman was the person-in-charge of fire and haze issues at the ASEAN Secretariat for 14 years, and prior to that in the Malaysian Government. This is part of a series on the ASEAN haze issue.

The post Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act: Silver Bullet Or Silver Lining? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On January 17, a crowd of 15,000, many of them young people, took to the streets of Los Angeles to participate in the first “One Life” march, a demonstration in support of the rights of unborn children.

On February 1, 10 people demonstrated outside the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Angels to protest the proposed canonization of Father Junipero Serra, the priest who broug ht Christianity to California.

Guess which event the Los Angeles Times ignored and which one it covered?

Across the nation, the Washington Post covered the Los Angeles pro-life march, and the newswire in Times Square highlighted it. But the L.A. Times effectively censored it, even though the demonstration was held one block from its headquarters. Its omission of this huge event, and its flagging of the tiny protest, are a reflection of its politics: the Times is pro-abortion and not exactly Catholic-friendly.

The non-event protest was the work of the ill-named Mexica Movement. In fact, there is no movement: there is just a handful of Christian-bashing, European-hating activists. In 2000, a Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail, counted a “few dozen members” who showed up to protest Elton Johns’ appearance at Tower Records in Los Angeles (he allegedly sang a “racist song” on the soundtrack of the film, “The Road to El Dorado”). In other words, 15 years ago this rag-tag group marshaled more activists than it did last Sunday. Some “movement.”

The few who protested Father Serra showed how low-class they are when they compared the priest to the devil and Los A ngeles Archbishop José Gomez to Hitler. For good reasons, Gomez is well-liked by minorities, though his few detractors garner the news. Shame on the L.A. Times for profiling them.

Contact L.A. Times editor Davan Maharaj: davan.maharaj@latimes.com

The post How The L.A. Times Decides The News – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Neil Berry

For British Muslims, it seemed an epoch-making moment when, in 2010, the Conservative lawyer, Sayeeda Warsi, became Britain’s first female Muslim Cabinet minister in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government of Prime Minister David Cameron.

Five years on, “Baroness Warsi” is an ex-minister, having resigned from government last year over Britain’s “morally indefensible” position on Gaza. Though still dedicated to the Conservative Party, she alienated many fellow Conservatives when, in 2011, she alleged that hostility to Muslims had passed the “dinner party test,” meaning that it had become acceptable in polite British society to denigrate Muslims.

It has been a source of dismay to Warsi, as to many others, that the British government’s engagement with the UK’s more than 3 million Muslims appears confined to haranguing them to demonstrate that they are law-abiding patriots. Now she has issued a furious protest at a government letter, sent to more than 1,000 British mosques in the wake of January’s Paris attacks and urging them to do more to tackle extremism.

The letter — which was signed by the UK Communities Secretary Eric Pickles and his colleague Lord Ahmad — has ignited outrage among Muslims, with the Muslim Council of Great Britain deploring its picture of British Muslims as “inherently apart from British society.”

Reflecting this outrage in an article for the Observer, Warsi remarked that the letter was never likely to evoke a positive response, since it was not preceded by any significant effort by government to build friendship and trust. It seemed to her especially ill-considered because it went to mosques linked to organizations blacklisted by the British government. The letter, she believes, will simply add to the bitterness among Muslims provoked, for example, by obsessive official checks on the backgrounds of guest lists to Eid events and the pointed refusal of ministers to attend events that might be addressed by speakers deemed to hold unpalatable opinions.

Warsi is warning the British government that its conception of engagement with the Muslim community is “dangerously narrow,” with the potential to incite rather than pre-empt radicalism. Certainly, many Muslims are liable to conclude that David Cameron’s government is constitutionally incapable of viewing them as anything except a threat. This after all is a point at which, in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, there is endemic alarm about the prospect of a pan-European backlash against Muslims. Yet though Muslims have manifest cause to feel threatened themselves, their fears — in stark contrast to the fears of British Jews — have scarcely been addressed at all.

Muslims are bound to contrast how they are treated with the British government’s routine readiness to engage with Jewish groups.

David Cameron presides over an annual formal meeting with British Jewish leaders to discuss their concerns — though he has declined to accede to requests to hold such a meeting with leaders of Muslim and other faith groups. Since the Paris attacks, moreover, his government has gone to great lengths to show solidarity with Britain’s Jewish community and re-affirm its abhorrence of anti-Semitism — even as it has left Muslims with the sense that it regards them as fundamentally a national security problem.

The intervention of Warsi, herself the quintessential “moderate” Muslim, is a measure of how high feeling is running among British Muslim community over the government’s letter. The chances of a fresh radical attack in Britain are hardly to be minimized; the security services maintain that a major attack is inevitable. Yet it is precisely because of the combustibility of the situation following events in France that it is more than usually desirable that the British government be seen to be acting toward all communities with unimpeachable even-handedness. Indeed, one might argue that it is an abrogation of common sense, not to mention democracy, for elected politicians to display conspicuous solicitude toward one embattled community while giving another such community to understand that it is an object of chronic official suspicion.

The British Council has for years dispatched its officers round the world to instruct developing countries in the art of “good governance.” When it comes to dealing with its own Muslim citizens, it is the British government itself that often seems to require such instruction.

The post UK: Let Sanity Prevail – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Mike Kuhlenbeck*

Palestine has been granted membership into the International Criminal Court. After the first of April, this monumental step will allow Palestinian officials to bring charges against Israel for its numerous crimes, including the “Operation Protective Edge” bombing campaign launched on July 7, 2014 against the Gaza strip, slaughtering more than 2,300 Palestinians and destroying the lives of thousands more.

United Nations officials Navi Pillay and Richard Falk have labeled Israel’s actions as war crimes and crimes against humanity. By the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948), Israel is in violation of Amendments 1, 5 and 25, which state:

• “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”
• “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
• “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care…”

Describing the horrific conditions of Gaza, largely hidden from outsiders, journalist Chris Hedges writes, “[Gaza] has disturbing echoes of the Nazi ghettos of Lodz and Warsaw.” The 1.8 million residents of “the world’s largest open-air prison” live in crowded conditions and are often denied adequate water, food and medical supplies.

The director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies, Phyllis Bennis, dispels the false notions put forth by Israel’s guardians in media that it only uses military force for self-defense purposes:

“Violence is central to maintaining Israel’s military occupation. It is carried out primarily by Israeli military forces and Israeli settlers in the occupied territories who are themselves armed by the Israeli military, and its victims include some Palestinian militants and a large majority of Palestinian civilians, including many children.” (Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 2002)

Last year, Secretary of State John Kerry experienced a political Freudian slip by saying Israel risked becoming an “apartheid state” if US-sponsored efforts for an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement failed, a statement for which he quickly apologized. Kerry knows very well that Israel is already an apartheid state.

The Republican Party treats Israel as if it was the 51st state of the Union. Given the more than $3 billion in aid the US gives to Israel annually, one can see why they make this assumption. The party’s current presidential hopefuls are all ardent supporters of the regime, including Jeb Bush, Rand Paul and Chris Christie. Paul has gone so far to say that the US should cut off all aid to the Palestinians. While the GOP’s rhetoric is more thuggish and righteous, voters must keep in mind that maintaining the US’s relationship with Israel is a bipartisan effort.

The US Senate unanimously passed resolution S.498 on July 17, 2014 in order to support “the State of Israel as it defends itself against unprovoked rocket attacks from the Hamas terrorist organization.”

The Democratic Party’s 2012 platform reads, in part, “President Obama and the Democratic Party maintain an unshakable commitment to Israel’s security. A strong and secure Israel is vital to the United States not simply because we share strategic interests, but also because we share common values…The administration has also worked to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region.”

Democratic Party insiders have said that it is a foregone conclusion that Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will announce her presidential candidacy for the 2016 election. It is well known that Clinton supports the Israeli occupation and its military policies against Palestinians. Clinton, like the rightwing critics who profess their hatred of her, has repeatedly claimed that Israel is a “democracy.” This Israeli “democracy” she speaks of is sheer fantasy on the same level as Narnia and the Land of Oz.

This myth provides the US the necessary cannon fodder to arm its ally in the Middle East against its neighboring (aka Muslim) enemies.Clinton uses the same clichéd and tiresome arguments that one has to be an anti-Semite if they are anti-Zionist, which is a typical ad hominem attack against critics of Israel’s conduct. In an interview with The Atlantic, she employed the typical fear-mongering typical to the Imperialist foreign policy she would champion as president:

“You can’t ever discount anti-Semitism, especially with what’s going on in Europe today. There are more demonstrations against Israel by an exponential amount than there are against Russia seizing part of Ukraine and shooting down a civilian airliner. So there’s something else at work here than what you see on TV.”

However, Clinton’s outrage over such protests does not extend to the anti-Muslim rallies that have drawn tens of thousands of supporters in Germany and France. Responding to the tragic shootings at the Paris offices of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the French government has outlawed Pro-Palestinian demonstrations, rendering the term “freedom of speech” into a hollow political phrase to revamp the public’s fear of Islam. She did not condemn this flagrant violation of civil liberties, an act that is attempting to silence the call for human rights in Gaza at a time when it is most needed.

One of Clinton’s more controversial comments was made on the TV program Good Morning America in 2008. Her apocalyptic words on the subject of Iran are parallel to the kind of blood-thirsty rhetoric that would have been used against the former Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War:“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran (If it attacks Israel).”

There are progressive and moderate elements that do not want Clinton to be the so-called “liberal” alternative to the GOP. Last year, The Hill obtained numerous emails from liberal and progressive activists that show Clinton does not have the support she thought she once had. This publication summarized the main findings of these exchanges with the following: “Clinton’s too much of a hawk, too cozy with Wall Street, hasn’t spoken out enough on climate change, and will be subject to personal questions and criticisms.”

The only serious competition Clinton has (so far) is US Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts (D). To supporters, Warren is seen as a populist candidate for her anti-Wall Street rhetoric. Progressive and Center-Left publications such as In These Times and The Atlantic have encouraged Warren to run against Clinton for these reasons. But the editorial writers of these journals might be disappointed with Warren as they would with Clinton on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

On her US Senate website, the following seems to have been lifted nearly verbatim from her party’s platform: “The U.S.-Israel relationship is rooted in shared values and common interests, based on a commitment to liberty, pluralism, and the rule of law. These values transcend time, and they are the basis of our unbreakable bond.”

As the 2014 bombings commenced in Gaza, journalist Glenn Greenwald of The Intercept noticed that Warren’s position on the issue mirrored that of Benjamin Netanyahu, even using some of the same justifications. Warren voted to authorize an additional $225 million to Israel for its “Iron Dome” system. Quoting Cape Cod Times reporter C. Ryan Barber, Warren said:

“I think the vote was right, and I’ll tell you why I think the vote was right. America has a very special relationship with Israel. Israel lives in a very dangerous part of the world, and a part of the world where there aren’t many liberal democracies and democracies that are controlled by the rule of law. And we very much need an ally in that part of the world.”

A little further to the left of the spectrum is US Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont (I), a self-described “democratic-socialist.” He has long been lauded by social democrats who have urged him run for president, preferably within the Democratic Party to avoid being a so-called “spoiler” à la Ralph Nader. Like Warren, Sanders supported objectives of the Israeli government as strongly as his conservative counterparts. He was, after all, one of the 100 Senators who voted for Senate resolution S.498.

Sanders had to confront his critics when attendants of a town hall meeting heckled him in August 2014. Usually he wins the crowd over in situations like this, but in this case he was met with a hostile audience. Members of this congregation started yelling expletives and denunciations of Israel’s actions. He tried to regain control, going as far as resorting to the possibility of calling the police to restore order.

Those who vote according to the notion of “the lesser of two evils” will not have any luck finding a presidential candidate within the Democratic or Republican parties that will challenge the neo-colonialism of the Benjamin Netanyahu regime or his Likud party. Even a war of words condemning Israel’s conduct would not be enough to make an impact. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan once quipped, “Our American friends offer us money, weapons, and advice. We take the money, we take the weapons, and we decline the advice.”

The Israeli government’s crimes have been ignored for decades. Only in recent years the citizens of the free world, including nations allied with Israel, have taken notice and expressed outrage at these offenses. As observed by Israeli-born journalist Uri Averny:

“The persecuted has become the persecutor; David has turned into Goliath.”

*Mike Kuhlenbeck is a journalist and researcher whose work has appeared in The Humanist, Z Magazine and The Des Moines Register. He is a member of the National Writers Union and Investigative Reporters and Editors He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com.

The post The Democrats’ Israel Problem – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iraq was the second-largest crude oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2014, and it holds the world’s fifth largest proved crude oil reserves after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Iran. Most of Iraq’s major known fields are producing or in development, though much of its known hydrocarbon resources have not been fully exploited. All of Iraq’s known oil fields are onshore and the largest fields in the south have relatively low extraction costs owing to uncomplicated geology, multiple supergiant fields, fields that are typically located in relatively unpopulated areas with flat terrain, and the close proximity to coastal ports.¹

Iraq is re-developing its oil and natural gas reserves after years of sanctions and wars. Iraq’s crude oil production grew by 950,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) over the past five years, increasing from almost 2.4 million bbl/d in 2010 to almost 3.4 million bbl/d in 2014. These production estimates include oil produced in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, the semiautonomous northeast region in Iraq governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Despite this growth, Iraq’s production has actually grown at a slower rate than Iraq had expected because of infrastructure bottlenecks in the south, supply disruptions in the north, and delays in awarding contracts.

The Iraqi government has set ambitious oil production targets. The government is currently renegotiating field production targets set in Technical Service Contracts (TSCs) previously signed with international oil companies (IOCs). Based on some of the target revisions that have already been announced, the Energy Intelligence Group estimates that Iraq is now aiming for crude oil output of 9.0 million bbl/d by 2020.² Key challenges the Iraqi government faces to achieve this target include expanding southern export infrastructure and storage capacity, building a large common water supply and re-injection system in the south, passing a hydrocarbon law, a slow administrative process of doing business, and less favorable contract terms to attract IOCs to invest in new projects. Also, political instability, sectarian violence, and the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) spreading to other areas of Iraq pose significant uncertainty for Iraq’s future.

Petroleum and other liquids

Iraq holds about 18% of proved crude oil reserves in the Middle East and almost 9% of total global reserves. Despite having large reserves, increases in oil production have fallen behind ambitious targets because of infrastructure constraints and political disputes.

Reserves

Production

Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad

Crude oil exports

China was the largest importer of Iraq’s crude oil, followed by India and the United States in 2014. About 95% of Iraq’s crude oil exports came from the country’s southern export terminals along the Persian Gulf in 2014, which export Iraq’s Basra crude grade.

Natural gas

More than half of Iraq’s gross natural gas production is vented and flared, and Iraq was ranked the fourth-largest natural gas-flaring country in the world in 2011. Iraq is taking steps to reduce flaring and instead use its natural gas resources more for power generation and for reinjection into wells to increase oil recovery.

Reserves

Production and consumption

Export/pipeline ambitions

Electricity

After years of power shortages, Iraqi efforts to increase generating capacity are moving forward. Iraq plans to more than double its generating capacity by 2017.

Development plans

The post Iraq Energy Profile: Has Fifth Largest Proved Crude Oil Reserves In World – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shashwat Tiwari*

During the recent visit of the Egypt’s President Sisi to China, both sides agreed to work together on the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road projects. It was also emphasized that Egypt would actively welcome Chinese investment for its US $4 billion New Suez Canal project that will run parallel to the existing canal in linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The new canal is a natural fit for China’s Maritime Silk Road vision, with the planned route already moving through the Suez Canal to reach Europe. So far, China has invested US $1.5 billion in the Suez Canal development zone, which is expected to become the largest service centre for Chinese businesses based anywhere outside of China.

The significance of the Chinese investments lies in the fact that the existing Suez Canal, is the shortest and busiest maritime route between Europe and Asia. Currently, 8-10 percent of global sea trade in value passes through the Suez Canal, and earns Egypt annual revenues of about US $5 billion are in the form of transit fees (US $150-US $200/container). According to a report released by the International Energy Agency (IEA), merchant shipping from Asia taking the route around the Cape of Good Hope would add 15 days of transit to Europe and 8-10 days to the United States. Hence, the potential for developing maritime services to generate additional revenue is substantial.

The number of commercial ships that pass through the Suez Canal has increased steadily even during the recent political instability in the region (e.g., from 8,012 in January-June 2013 to 8,160 in January-June 2014). The drop in oil prices (which make the short cut offered by the Suez Canal all the more attractive), the volume of traffic is expected to increase substantially. However, ‘Port Said East’ is unlikely to be able to handle increasing volumes, and transit waiting times are likely to grow—hence the importance of developing the Suez Canal area.

The new canal is part of the Suez Canal Development mega project, which includes the development of several seaports in the three governorates bordering the canal – Suez, Ismailia and Port Said – in addition to a seaport in the South Sinai city of Nuweiba and the development of Sharm Al-Sheikh airport. A number of large-scale projects are also planned including a “Technology Valley” in Ismailia which will host several technology projects along with a new industrial zone west of the Gulf of Suez.

The initial cost of project infrastructure will be about US $20 billion; other estimates run as high as US $100 billion. At least a dozen countries, including the United States, China, Norway, India, Russia, and Holland, have expressed an interest in investing in the project. The Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are also in the fray. The first investor meet to concretize the sector participation is to be held in around March 2015.

The significance of Suez route lies in its close proximity to global oil producer’s hub i.e. Middle East. Europe which is heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies will see the development of Second Suez Canal Project as a viable alternative to reduce its dependence on Russia, as well as increase its maritime trade with China and other Asian countries. China’s trade relations with Africa has grown at 10 percent per annum, which makes this project also important to their trading interests in the region. However, in short term due to near stagflation like scenario in the European Union the feasibility of the Project might appear questionable, but in the longer run, the construction of this Project will play an important factor to Europe’s economic rejuvenation, by providing enhanced connectivity to energy resources and manufacturing hubs of Asia. An increase in the Suez capacity would mean more goods can travel at a faster speed to markets in Europe and also the trans-Atlantic North Americas.

The Suez Canal has been an important part of the global maritime commerce and Egyptian economy since its completion almost a century and half ago. The leadership of Egypt wants the project to be a symbol of Egypt’s national honor. If properly enlarged and upgraded, it can turn the region into a global port, and be an engine for development and growth in Egypt for the 21st century. But the mega project must be carefully planned and properly managed and lessons must be learned from similar attempts in other countries; otherwise, the project also risks draining valuable resources.

*The author is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or National Maritime Foundation. He can be reached at shashwatin2005@gmail.com.

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Corruption and favoritism have motivated people to protest against the ruling regimes. In Egypt, in particular, the protests brought down Hosni Mubarak’s government. To what extent this reduced the corruption and favoritism is less clear. This column sheds light on this problem. It present evidence that daily protest numbers were linked to variation in stocks prices of firms connected to the group in power. This suggests that popular mobilization and protests have indeed a role in restricting the ability of connected firms to profit from favoritism and corruption.

By Daron Acemoglu, Tarek Hassan and Ahmed Tahoun*

From the Arab Spring to the recent uprising against Victor Yanukovic’s government in Ukraine, corruption and favouritism have motivated people to pour into the streets to protest against the economic and political arrangements benefiting connected individuals and firms. Such protests have sometimes been successful in unseating unpopular rulers, as illustrated by the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Ukraine. But are they effective at limiting the extent of corruption and favouritism that set them off in the first place?

We shed light on this question by studying Egypt’s Arab Spring. On 11 February 2011, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president and de facto dictator since his accession to power in 1981, was forced to resign in the face of large protests in the main square of Cairo, Tahrir Square (Berman 2013). Mubarak’s regime was a perfect specimen of economic favouritism. Rampant corruption and repression, which excluded vast segments of the population from political participation, was a major trigger of the protests. Mubarak’s fall was followed by a phase of military rule until June 2012, when Mohammed Mursi, an Islamist, was elected president. Mursi’s presidency, in turn, was followed by a second phase of military rule starting in July 2013. Throughout these four phases of Egypt’s Arab Spring, politically connected firms (in particular, those connected to the Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), the military, and the Islamists) have seen their fortunes ebb and flow, offering a window to study the real-time effects of episodic street protests against a changing cast of ruling political elites.

The effect of street protests on the stock market valuation of connected firms

Using information from Egyptian and international print and online media, we construct a daily estimate of the number of protesters in Tahrir Square. We then analyse the effect of these protests on the returns of firms connected to the group then in power. Our main specifications estimate the differential changes in the stock market values of different types of connected firms relative to non-connected firms as a function of the size of the protests. The blue bar in Figure 1 shows the effect of 500,000 protesters demonstrating against the current regime in Tahrir Square on the daily stock return of firms connected to the incumbent regime.

• It shows that on days with such protests, firms connected to the incumbent regime tend to lose 0.8% of their value relative to non-connected firms.

The green bar shows the effect of the same protest on firms that are politically connected to one of the two rival groups. Interestingly, this effect is also negative, albeit statistically insignificant. So while protests against the regime appear to disrupt the ‘pipeline’ of privileges and unearned income that flows to politically favoured companies, their political rivals do not appear to benefit from this disruption. In this sense, investors appear to believe that protesters may effectively achieve their goal of reducing future corruption and favouritism in the economy.

Figure 1. Effect of 500,000 protesters in Tahrir Square on the daily stock returns of firms connected to the incumbent regime (blue bar) and rival connected firms (green bar), relative to non-connected firms.Notes: The red lines show 95% confidence intervals. The specification on the left hand side uses data from 1 Jan, 2011 through 31 July, 2013 and controls for time- and sector fixed effects as well as the interaction of time effects with various firm characteristics, such as its leverage, market beta, etc. The specification on the right hand side drops all trading days surrounding changes in regime, constitutional changes, elections, and other major political events.

Interestingly, the pattern shown in Figure 1 holds regardless of who is the target of the protests. Under Mubarak, we find a significant effect of protests on the relative valuation of NDP-connected firms, but no effect on military and Islamic-connected firms; under military rule, protesters harm the valuation of military-connected firms, but not the valuation of their rivals. When Islamists are the target of the protests, bigger protests harm Islamic firms but have no effect on NDP- and military-connected firms.

The right panel of Figure 1 shows that this association between street protests and the stock market valuations of firms connected to the incumbent power group is not just a reflection of spikes in protests during some of the key events, such as the fall of a president, a change in a constitution, elections, etc. When we drop all days surrounding such major political events from our sample, we find almost the same results as before. In other words, even during periods when protests did not lead to changes in governments or institutions, and even when such changes appear unlikely, protest activity is strongly associated with swings in the relative stock market valuations of (incumbent) connected firms.

Figure 2 shows that the timing of the effect of street protests on the value of firms connected to the incumbent power group is consistent with our interpretation that street protests, and not some other omitted variable, drive the relative fall in the valuation of firms connected to the incumbent government:

• The impact on stock returns is on the day of the protest and the following day, but does not occur before the protest itself.

Figure 2. Effect of 500,000 protesters in Tahrir Square on the daily stock returns of firms connected to the incumbent regime before and after the day of the protest.

We further use data from Twitter to shed light on several interrelated questions. First, we document that activity on Twitter predicts protests in Tahrir Square, suggesting that social media has helped coordinate street mobilisations. Second, we also find that this social media activity has no direct effect on stock market valuations with or without simultaneously conditioning on street protests.

Conclusion

We draw two main conclusions from these facts.

• First, since the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, a widespread view in political science has been that social media has fundamentally altered the nature of successful mobilisation against a repressive regime. Our results are consistent with the view that it has indeed facilitated coordination among potential demonstrators.

However, the fundamental challenge does not seem to have changed: discontent voiced on social media has no effect on corruption and favouritism unless it results in mobilisation in the street.

• Second, large protests and street mobilisation appear to be effective means of changing the future distribution of power and act as a constraint on the ability of connected firms to siphon off returns to corruption and favouritism.

This interpretation is consistent with the results in the previous literature that protests during various critical periods have an autonomous impact both on future protests and on certain economic and political outcomes (Aidt and Franck 2014, Madestam et al. 2013), and by our finding on the interplay between social media activity and protests.

*About the authors:
Daron Acemoglu
Professor of Applied Economics, MIT

Tarek Hassan
Associate Professor of Finance and Economics and Neubauer Family Faculty Fellow at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago; Research Fellow, CEPR

Ahmed Tahoun
Assistant Professor of Accounting, London Business School

References:
Acemoglu, D, T A Hassan, and A Tahoun (2014), “The power of the street: evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring”, NBER Working Paper w20665

Aidt, T S and R Franck (2014), “Democratization under the threat of revolution: evidence from the great reform act of 1832”, Working Paper .

Berman, S (2013), “The Continuing Promise of the Arab Spring”, foreignaffairs.com, 17 July.

Madestam, A, D Shoag, S Veuger, and D Yanagizawa-Drott (2013), “Do political protests matter? Evidence from the tea party movement”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), 1633–1685.

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By Jim Garamone

The battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is not a U.S. war, it is a large international effort to defeat a crazed and barbaric ideology, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby said Tuesday.

ISIL burned a captured Jordanian pilot alive in January. Kirby condemned the murder, and said it in no way will stop the effort against the terrorists. “We know that they have the ability to continue to generate young men that are attracted to this group and this ideology, and that’s going to be a long-term problem,” he said during a Pentagon news conference.

“It’s going to take a while to get at the ideology, which is the real center of gravity here,” the admiral said. “You’re not going to do that through bombs and airstrikes. That doesn’t mean the bombs and airstrikes aren’t going to keep happening. They are.”

A Coalition of 60

Kirby disputed allegations that the war against ISIL is a U.S. war. “I think a coalition of 60 nations proves that it’s not,” he said. “We’re not the only ones involved in this in trying to get rid of this group.”

U.S. air strikes on the group continue to be effective, he said. As indigenous forces become more capable, the attrition will continue. Still, ISIL is capable of bringing more people to the fight. “We are going to stay committed to this for the long-term, and it is going to be a long-term fight,” the admiral said.

Judging the coalition effectiveness against the group is difficult. “A better judgment of the strength of this group is their behavior,” he said. “So, we’ve seen them change the way they operate on the ground. They are hiding more. We’ve seen them not travel around in convoys. …They are not as agile as they once were. We know that they’ve lost literally hundreds and hundreds of vehicles that they can’t replace.”

Coalition strikes have also worked to hit the group’s main source of income – oil. “We assess that it’s no longer the main source of revenue,” Kirby said.

ISIL is largely in a defense posture now. The group launched a small offensive against Kirkuk over the weekend and it lasted a day, Kirby said. They took no new ground. “And they’re not on Kobani anymore,” the admiral said. “They are losing ground.”

The group is worried about lines of communications and supply now. “This is a different group than it was seven months ago,” he said. “I’m not saying they are not still dangerous. I’m not saying they are not still barbaric, but they are different. Their character, their conduct, their behavior is different. And that is a sign of progress.”

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By Francis Wade

The Burmese military’s response to allegations that soldiers gang-raped and murdered two Kachin women last month provides a sobering reminder that the country’s most powerful institution remains beyond the scope of public scrutiny and independent investigation. In late January the military published a statement denying involvement in the attack and threatening legal action against any media outlets that carry the allegations first raised by activists and community leaders in Kachin state. The investigation that did take place occurred after the site was sealed off to bar anyone who was not part of the investigation from entering. This would be normal procedure, were it not for the fact that the investigation team was comprised of police and military personnel – two entities with a patchy track record of forensic examinations of alleged military abuses.

It is not the first such instance of media intimidation following claims of extra-judicial killings by the army. As Fortify Rights notes in a statement, Brang Shawng, a 49-year-old ethnic Kachin man, faces at least two years in jail for filing a complaint to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) alleging the army was responsible for the death of his 14-year-old daughter. The lawsuit against him appeared tactical, in more ways than one, given the military has diverted what should be an investigation into the killing of the girl to an investigation into the actions of her father.

What is troubling about the two cases is the breathless support the military has received from President Thein Sein, whose office repeated the threats directed at journalists. It signals the continuation of a long-standing symbiosis between the two institutions, one that any genuine democratization process should necessarily seek to undo. It also severely limits any chance of an independent investigation into the allegations – even that a truly independent body exists in Burma that stands a remote chance of being sanctioned by the government to carry this out.

Implicit in the military’s threats towards the media is the expectation that journalists will not report on abuses. That expectation is born of decades of control of the media by the junta, which sought to precondition journalists to avoid matters of such sensitivity. Doing so would induce a self-censorship that frees the military up to do what is necessary to maintain its predominance. Two recent developments however have complicated this: one is that space has emerged for Burmese to challenge those processes, to a point; the other is that several years of cautious liberalization has meant the military’s raw power – namely its ability to use violence or the threat of violence without fear of punishment – has been constrained, albeit it in a very minor way.

Despite this, it can still resort to more subtle and institutionalized modes of intimidation – namely threat of punitive action. This is a prime example of why reform needs to be all encompassing, given how power in a country like Burma emanates from a single entity and is filtered through institutions. The military can therefore still use the cover of a corrupted and co-opted judiciary to carry out its work.

The key concern of the military in all this however isn’t the possibility that soldiers could be brought to justice, but rather the newfound sense of agency displayed at a grassroots level. While a free media doesn’t yet exist in Burma – these threats, issued by both military and “civilian” authorities, reflect this – the audacity of journalists and activists has meant the story has made it out of Burma, and thus the persistently criminal nature of the army, unbowed by reforms, is on show for all to see. It will continue its efforts to obfuscate whatever abuses it carries out – but those efforts, if given the light of day, are themselves evidence of where we’re currently at with the transition.

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By Adrian A. Basora*

Given the launch in early January of a vigorous new separatist offensive in eastern Ukraine, backed by a reported 9,000 Russian troops and abundant new armaments, it is now incontrovertible that Moscow is engaged in a full scale war in Ukraine.

Phase I of this initially undeclared war was the lightning Russian take-over of Crimea in March/April 2014, under the initial cover of a seemingly plausible separatist movement.

Phase II was the establishment of self-declared separatist governments controlling parts of the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, initially with crude attempts at plausible deniability as to the extent of direct Russian military involvement.

Phase III has now begun, with the separatists attempting to expand their enclaves to include the entirety of both of the contested provinces –this time with blatant Russian military backing on a larger scale.

Given Moscow’s now-familiar pattern of escalating military support for  the separatists each time the Ukrainian military seems to be gaining ground, this is now clearly a war that Ukraine cannot possibly win absent sharply increased U.S. and European backing.

For any Western intervention to succeed, it must include not just increased economic sanctions but also substantially enhanced military aid. It is true that the current financial sanctions have resulted in visible damage to Russia’s economy, and this damage has been multiplied by the precipitous drop in oil prices. However, Putin has obviously decided to double down on his aggression in Ukraine despite these economic setbacks–and, arguably, perhaps even because of them. This is not surprising, given that the war has been highly popular domestically and that it will be a long time before the mounting longer-term economic costs are fully apparent to most Russian citizens.

Phase I of Vladimir Putin’s undeclared war in Ukraine ended, from his point of view, in a resounding success. Russia’s stealth campaign in Crimea, triggered by the February 21 ouster of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich, took just one month to reach its triumphal conclusion.

By March 16, the entire province was under Moscow’s military control, and its puppet separatists held a sham referendum with an alleged 97 percent vote in favor of secession.

Crimea was formally annexed to the Russian Federation on March 21, thus permitting it to claim sovereignty over its major naval base in Sevastopol and a province that most Russians had long thought of as an intrinsic part of their country. At home, Putin’s popularity soared to over 80 percent in the polls, and it has remained in that range ever since.

The lesson for Putin was clear: given the weak Western response, he could score large geopolitical and domestic political gains with no significant price to pay internationally. Yes, there were numerous rhetorical condemnations by Western leaders, plus selective financial sanctions against a few members of Putin’s inner circle. But, for Putin, these were mere pinpricks, reminiscent of the initial outcries and minimal sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2008 war with Georgia. These minor costs have long since been forgotten, and Russia now enjoys full and unchallenged control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two provinces taken from Georgia via Putin’s intervention.

Despite this ominous Georgia precedent, many analysts and policy officials in both Europe and the US treated the Crimea annexation as a one-off event. They argued that Crimea was a special case, with a 60 percent ethnically Russian population and a strategic naval base on long-term lease that Moscow “understandably” wanted to secure permanently. Furthermore, Crimea had historically been a part of Russia until Nikita Khrushchev transferred the territory to the then Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, a decision that Putin argued was illegitimate.

Within just three weeks, however, this optimistic interpretation was proven to be delusional.

Phase II of the Ukraine war began on April 7, when pro-Russian separatists took over key government buildings in the capitals of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkhiv, proclaiming that these provinces would seek independence from Kiev. Although the Kharkhiv portion of the uprising fizzled, Russian-backed rebels in the other two capitals quickly expanded their territorial control. Only seven weeks later on May 11 the separatists held bogus referenda, with the polling centers surrounded by gunmen, “confirming” the two provinces’ secession from Ukraine.

Despite clear evidence that none of this could have happened without Russian instigation and strong (albeit semi-covert) military support, the EU temporized for months before deciding to join the U.S. in a significant escalation of economic sanctions. Brussels finally agreed to institute moderately punitive financial sanctions only on July 29. This was twelve days after the separatists had shot down Malaysian Airways Flight 17, killing 298 (mostly European) passengers. The shoot-down involved a sophisticated anti-aircraft missile system supplied by, and most likely directly supported by, the Russian military.

In August, the Ukrainian army launched an offensive to recapture territory held by the separatists, with some initial success. Since then, there have been both lulls and spikes in military action on the ground, with Putin at times giving the appearance of seeking a peaceful outcome. He and Ukrainian president Poroshenko agreed at a September 5 meeting in Minsk that they would both back a cease-fire. But the cease fire was repeatedly violated by the separatists and involved substantial casualties from shelling on both sides, despite the relatively stable battle lines that obtained through most of the fall. In retrospect, it is clear that Putin was simply buying time in which to help consolidate the rebel governments and their military positions in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Phase III began overtly in January with a new separatist offensive strongly backed by Russian soldiers and new heavy weaponry. On January 22, the separatists finally captured Donetsk airport, previously under siege for months. They also began shelling Mariupol, a key port city and transportation hub in the southeast corner of Donetsk province. Both places have major symbolic importance but they could also serve as strategic gateways for further expansion of separatist control into contiguous provinces.

Putin’s short-term goal is to ensure that the separatists gain full control of the two provinces whose independence they have proclaimed. Based on his well-established pattern of “two steps forward, one step (temporarily) back,” he might then order a pause in fighting, and he might once again go through the motions of seeking a negotiated solution while the separatists fully consolidate their new regimes.

In the middle term, however, if Putin succeeds in totally severing these two provinces from Kiev’s control his sights will most likely be set on a fairly prompt Phase IV. This fourth stage in the Russo-Ukrainian War would probably involve the establishment of a “land bridge” from Mariupol to Crimea, through the provinces of Zaparozhe and Kherson. There have also been signs that Putin may not have given up on Kharkiv, a key province immediately to the northeast of Donetsk and Luhansk.

And, for the longer term, there are continuing signs that Vladimir Putin still has his sights set on the eventual creation of a “Greater Novorossiya” stretching through Odessa all the way to Transnistria–the breakaway province of Moldova that was once part of Catherine the Great’s actual historic Novorossiya.

Unless the United States and its key European allies take prompt and decisive action, including major military assistance, there is every likelihood that the eastern and southern provinces of Ukraine will continue to be sliced away, one or two at a time. This would mean the dismemberment of Ukraine and the death knell of its Orange Revolution–once a beacon of hope for would-be democrats throughout post-communist Europe and Eurasia. It would also confirm the definitive end of the post-Cold War dream of a “Europe Whole and Free.”

About the author:
*Ambassador Adrian A. Basora is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Director of the Project on Democratic Transitions, an in-depth assessment of the political, economic and social transitions of postcommunist Europe/Eurasia twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Project continues to analyze the successes and failures of these countries’ transformation effortsand their evolving relationships with the U.S., the European Union and other Western institutions, deriving lessons learned that can strengthen current efforts to establish successful democracies and market economies in the region in the face of new adversities.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

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By P. Stobdan

India’s outlook towards global politics is at a turning point and it could mark the beginning of a new role for India on the global stage. Underlying this is the seeming desire of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to recover the lost dignity and pride (swabhimaan) of India or at least regain its primacy in Asia.

Among his many steps, the invitation to President Obama for a historic second visit was clearly meant to serve the twin goals of bolstering bilateral ties and finding a clear strategic congruent to contain China’s rise. To be sure, Modi stood firm in terms of not compromising upon India’s independent foreign policy, not buckling under US pressure to ink a climate deal, and his disagreement about Russia’s bad behavior.

President Obama’s visit was a huge success. Western policy thinkers particularly hailed the China-centric “Joint-Strategic Vision” document on the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as a triumph for the United States. They see it as a major success in terms of weaning India away from its long-pursued posture of neutralism to finally join the global line-up drawn by the US. Henry Kissinger, in his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, interpreted it as India entering the “Asia equation” and a system of US-China relationship. Zbigniew Brzezinski, however, cautioned that this could antagonize China and make it uncooperative on key global issues. Not surprisingly, the Chinese media quickly cautioned India not to fall into the US “trap” and wrote off Obama’s visit as a “superficial rapprochement”, reflecting more “symbolism than pragmatism”.

India had earlier remained skeptical of the US rebalancing strategy, but the realists now find good reasons for joining the balance of power game especially as the best way to boost immunity against threats, the best recipe to advance economic and military strength, and the shortest way for regaining India’s supremacy. However, many still hope that Modi’s diplomacy is not about joining the American bandwagon and putting a common front against China, but about leveraging the relationship with the United States to get the best deals out of US-China rivalry. From the latter perspective, the shift is, therefore, not ideological but only indicative of the transformation and refinement in the conduct of Indian diplomacy, which is becoming more robust and crafty for achieving national goals.

The strategic vision statement, however, carries the most definitive intent in terms of curtailing the spread of the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, which India considers to be within its sphere of influence. It is reflective of India’s seriousness in standing stand up against repeated incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, the growing presence of Chinese construction troops in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and continued arms supplies to a Pakistan that sponsors and propels terrorists across into India. Clearly, India wants to create compelling pressures on China to stop nibbling away on issues that concerns its core security interests. Many would argue that China respects balance of power and refer to how Beijing started taking India seriously only after the 1998 Pokhran tests and the 2008 nuclear deal with the US–compelling it to sign a Guiding Principle agreement to solve the boundary problem with India.

However, Obama’s real strategic message came in his parting shot when he tried to nudge India to ensure freedom of religion as enshrined in Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. His assertion on religion strongly conveyed the point that a close strategic partnership will come only if India is able to shed its growing sentiment for cultural exclusivity. The subtle meaning was that the West still considers India potentially a virgin and fertile ground for harvesting souls and that India will succeed only so long as it ensures freedom to practice and propagate religion.

This puts the current politico-ideological discourse, endorsed by the ruling party, in a paradoxical situation of whether to counter the Chinese expansionist threat or the Western messianic idea. After all, the idea of the revival of India’s supremacy embeds into it the need to see a new era of Hindu resurgence along with its territorial, demographic and materialistic vitality. The rising discourse in the country resents the increasing ideological infiltration, separatism and terrorism posing an enduring existential threat to the Indian (Hindu) culture. They are up against the missionaries resorting to conversion through allurement and exploitation, while also facilitating Ghar Wapasi movement for converts to return to Hinduism.

Many would argue that the Church considers Asia as a vital continent having the greatest potential for the expansion of Catholicism. The same goes for Islam and its growth. It is hard to argue and link Obama’s subtle message with those prospects of Catholic missions, but one cannot scoff at the notion that the Western world always sought its political and trade interests in Asia in a certain amorphous way.

In fact, the underlying contestation between the West and China is surely not about trade, military and power equations but a manifestation of Beijing’s firmness to eschew external ideological infiltrations, i.e., neoliberal, jihadi, evangelical, etc., which it thinks tends to subvert the core of the Chinese nation. China has long identified itself as being one of the targets and as such has adopted tougher ‘ideological security’ measures against the increasing influence of messianic orders that comes in the garb of soft power. In fact, Beijing finds itself locked in a zero-sum soft conflict with the West on this front.

India’s problem is the same as the one confronted by China. India’s seemingly conscious aligning with the US requires analysis in terms of how it confronts an admittedly difficult conundrum. How will the government reconcile the US advocacy of religious diversity with its own ideology and vision of containing the forays of external forces and expanding its own? Will Modi seek a deep ideological compromise and push the Hindutva agenda on the back burner of the political discourse or keep it in abeyance simply in the interest of containing China’s rise? The US Congressmen are already forcefully seeking the inclusion of religious freedom and human rights in the India-US strategic dialogue. These issues will be important aspects of the Indian discourse in the coming years.

For now, Modi will do well to find a balance between the American relevance in the economic arena and the need to collaborate with China on both economic and cultural revival theory. This is necessary because, as the Russians say, “markets alone cannot substitute for ethics, religion, and civilization.”

***

This debate apart, India needs to figure out its key problem with China and the need to contain its rise. China’s encirclement, not a new idea though, but understanding what it would mean, let alone actualizing it, is difficult. Despite favorable projections about India’s growth prospects, it will take us more than three decades to catch up with China.

While dealing with China, India needs to work on two basic premises. Firstly, the idea of selling the illusion of China as a villain in Asia may not work beyond a point. For years, China has sought integration with almost all regional systems of Asia and one should not deny China’s role as the moderator of Asian economic and security affairs. Americans may grudgingly deny it but India’s friend Russia is accepting it. Consequently, China’s profile and role will continue to grow. What may happen in the distant future is something that one cannot say of it at present. India should not waste time thinking about outstripping China’s rise and influence now. To that extent, the West would like to play on the Indian sentiment against China to sustain the nature of their strategic competition.

Secondly, India needs to understand how others nations outside the US camp perceive China to be. Curiously, they do not see the Chinese carrying any messianic idea, just like Indians and Japanese do not profess such ideas. The threat of power is a Western narrative sold to create rifts in Asia so that evangelists implement their projects smoothly. For example, none of India’s spiritual and trade missions beyond its frontiers was messianic in nature. The rationale behind the Chinese and Indian historical campaigns including the fabled Silk Road or Spice Route reaching up to Arab lands and Europe was economic in nature. They provided incentives for economic integration across Asia and beyond.

If we take the long historical view, the spread of Indian ideology and its interface with Chinese philosophies never threatened Chinese nationhood. In fact, the Indian and Chinese thoughts of Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism helped forge the early social, political and commercial systems in Asia that became an attractive reward for European colonizers.

Unfortunately, in the case of India, it had to experience repeated violent ideological onslaughts, and a long colonial intervention along with ideological reasoning that not only resulted in the Indian nation dividing into three parts but also continues to obscure its political and economic patterns to align with West.

China consistently worked to acquire the image for itself as a trading power backed by military power that helps it to counterpoise the messianic forces. Even the Islamic world began to respect the Chinese power, albeit grudgingly, for the Arab Jihadis were wiped out by the Mongols in the 13th century whereas India remained a killing field for the zealots for centuries.

Yet the vitality of Asian civilizations survives. In countries such as Japan and India, the consistent democratic practices are deeply rooted in the non-conflicting and inclusive philosophic traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism. They have defined Asia as a unique space, and in their highly flexible and responsive stances over long historical time their relative ability to catalyze economic prosperity, technological skills and others tools of meeting modern demands is growing. Therefore, any China-India congruity and trend of warming up could still spring surprises in Asia, though this is a difficult scenario given the diverse and complex array of interests. However, any such prospects could pose a direct challenge to American supremacy and thus bad news for the rest of Asia. Therefore, India’s economic resurgence and to play on the Indian sentiment against China may be a good idea to sustain the nature of strategic competition in Asia.

To be sure, the US will continue to do what it can for blocking any meaningful rapprochement between India and China or Japan and China for it knows the danger of its loss of a dominant role in Asia. However, despite all the distortions of time and space, the hard geographic reality of Asia will triumph just as it happened in Europe.

However, it is also a fact that both India and China are unable to produce any new political initiatives beyond the idea of securing their individual economic interests and narrow parameters of nationalism. Clearly, India-China problems are borne not out of any ideological conflict or territorial sovereignty but on the narrow view of nationalism built on the burden of the recent history of 1962 war. The legacy of mistrust persists less due to India’s sense of defeat than betrayal by China. Although it is yet to decipher what went wrong in the minds of China’s Maoist national strategic thinkers then, this element lingers in the Western and Indian discourse as a paranoia that weighs on any future prospect of a thaw.

To be sure, neither China nor India is going to do anything to remove the mutual mistrust, fearing that it would go against their respective views of nationalism. For India to recover its primacy in Asia, a comprehensive civilizational dialogue with China is necessary. It should transcend the boundary issue and cover aspects essential to assuage any ill feeling about the past and concentrate on the future together. Clearly, there is nothing wrong in Modi’s dream of reviving the notion of Bharatvarsh (Indian World) just as Putin’s notion of protecting “Russky Mir” (Russian World) in its Near Abroad or China’s attempt at securing its ‘glacis’ in its offshore islands. India’s interest demands consolidation of its own geopolitical ‘near abroad’ stretching from the Hindu Kush to the Indian Ocean.

Surely, both India and China will have to confront immutable pressures on the core of their nationhood. However, the Chinese need to drop their Leninist-style excessive aggressiveness and start to value and work within the Asian culture, for it should realize that its economic hand-outs in Xinjiang and Tibet alone cannot quell the cultural sentiments among the local population. Beijing must find a new intellectual common ground with India that would enable the two to collaborate to stop the division of Asia further. A frank dialogue can build bridges necessary for resolving local conflicts. This should offer India the prospect of considering less confrontation and more cooperation with Beijing. This will also instil confidence among those who are fearful of China’s aggressive ambition and its long-term objective.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ObamasVisittoIndia_pstobdan_040215.html

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Iran’s missile capabilities are not on the negotiating table in the talks with the 5+1, Iranian deputy foreign minister and senior nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday February 3.

Araghchi said Iran’s missile capabilities are part of a complete defense program and are not negotiable.

Yesterday, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki expressed concern regarding Iran’s rocket capabilities following the launch of Iran’s Fajr satellite on a rocket.

Araghchi said the launch of the Fajr satellite is in line with the Islamic Republic’s objective to expand its presence in space and strengthen the country’s communication and information infrastructure.

Araghchi stressed that Iran’s defence program in non-negotiable.

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Wednesday wished the neighbouring country Sri Lanka on the its 67th Independence Day.

In three separate tweets in English, Sinhala and Tamil, Mr. Modi said: “On their Independence Day, my greetings to people of Sri Lanka.The bonds of history, culture & shared values that we share are unbreakable.”

“My best wishes for the development of Sri Lanka in the years to come. I look forward to welcoming President Sirisena later this month,” he added.

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By Sousan Al-Shaer

The delegation that recently accompanied US President Barack Obama on his recent visit to the Kingdom was an interesting mix of people with opposing viewpoints over different regional and global issues. The selection of delegates indicated Obama’s perception about the difficult task of meeting with Saudi officials.

Obama had to put aside his pride by including some of his bitter opponents to join him during the visit to Saudi Arabia. Perhaps he knew that some members of the delegation would help facilitate his mission or maybe he thought some might have more credibility than him. Noteworthy delegates included Republican Sen. John McCain and Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, who has resigned from his position in protest against the administration’s decisions in its war on terror.

McCain was likely selected by Obama to bridge and regain some of the lost trust as a result of his policies in the region. McCain is an expert on the region and his views toward Iran and its nuclear issue are very much in line with the aspirations of the people of the region.

The US Middle East policy has been problematic under Obama in sharp contrast with the policies pursued by the GOP, whether we agree with them or not. The GOP usually leaves no ambiguity in its policies and strategies. On the other hand, the foreign policy approach of the Democrats appears to be immature and inconsistent. It lacks strategic depth and primarily focuses on short-term solutions. Charles Krauthammer, a writer for the Washington Post, accurately described Obama’s foreign policy, “It has lost any sense of reality.” These policies certainly lack reality when it comes to the complicated situation in the Arab world, as they have led to consequences that not only threatened the security of this region, but US interests in the region as well.

For example, the self-ascribed Islamic State (IS), which Obama wants Saudi Arabia to help weaken and demolish, demonstrates the adverse consequences of US policies in the region. IS could not have expanded in the region had it not been for the political vacuum in Syria and Iraq. The IS would not have been able to find social support in these areas had it not been for armed Shiite militants wreaking havoc on those areas and killing Sunni leaders and clans. Both a weakened central authority and the spread of Shiite militants were the results of US policy decisions under Obama administration. It was the US that decided to withdraw its forces without ensuring or planning for a viable alternative, and it was also the US administration that helped train Shiite militants and turned a blind eye to the absence of power in Syria, which was later grasped by Iran and Hezbollah.

In an attempt to end the Iranian nuclear standoff, the US has dangerously overlooked the expansionist designs of Tehran. At a recent hearing of the Armed Services Committee in Congress, Henry Kissinger reportedly highlighted the expansionist ambitions of Iran in the Middle East, noting that its foreign policy since the 1979 revolution has consisted of a mix of religion and imperialism.

According to Kissinger, the Iranian regime will not give up on its vision and ambition to restore Persian influence and control in the region, noting that obtaining a nuclear weapon is one of its specific tools to achieve this goal. “Has the Iranian political vision changed? We cannot judge that by its nuclear ambitions alone, and this is the challenge we are facing,” said Kissinger.

Regardless of the fact that Kissinger’s views focus on threats to US interests in the region, his views are not much different from ours. We also share the same apprehensions but Obama administration has been unable to link the nuclear issue with Iran’s imperialistic ambitions. This reflects a string of policies based on isolated issues; the US is waging a war on terrorism in isolation from the Iranian issue and its expansionist goals, which in turn has undermined the role of its Sunni allies, including regimes, tribes, and the vast majority of the region’s population in the war on terrorism. The result has been a lack of public participation in counterterrorism efforts and a hike in sectarian sensitivities, making the task of those in charge of the fight against terrorism all the more difficult.

Furthermore, when the Democratic administration announces that it does not see any Iranian role in Bahrain, Iraq or Yemen, such comments only reflect its sheer ignorance and illogical reasoning. Such statements are simply false, especially as Iranian support to Shiite militants in these countries is not only political, but also involves training and funding.

So, the presence of John McCain was clearly very important in the delegation. Despite the different points of view of Saudi Arabia and Sen. McCain on Egypt’s issue, they align when it comes to the Iranian issue. They even share similar views about energy and petroleum, as evidenced by McCain’s statement requesting the White House to thank Saudi Arabia for its policies that affected the Russian economy after the failure of US sanctions.

If Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states insist on the presence of a Republican such as McCain at meetings to discuss regional issues, it might help prevent further degradation of the Saudi-US ties. There is no doubt that the terrorism issue, which is linked to the Iranian issue, must be discussed with the US and thus requires experts who are connected and familiar with the realities on the ground.

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Saudi Arabia is clearly of great importance to the government of the United States. President Obama not only cut short his India trip to visit with newly installed king Salman, but brought along a who’s who of administration officials and congressional leaders for the ride. Secretary of State John Kerry, former secretaries Condoleezza Rice and James Baker, Vice President Joseph Biden, Senator John McCain, Democratic House leader Nancy Pelosi, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, and CIA director John Brennan were all part on the entourage. All that fire power was devoted to a visit which lasted for just a few hours. The show of force was not coincidental.

The reaction of the corporate media to the death of the late Saudi king Abdullah tells us everything we need to know about the United States/Saudi axis of evil. It is one thing for the president to call Abdullah his friend and for the secretary of state to claim that the absolute monarch was a “man of wisdom and vision” but it is another for the media to parrot the same words. The New York Times called Abdullah a “shrewd force” and a “cautious reformer.” He didn’t reform the policies of beheading and flogging his citizens or creating instability in other countries. Those facts don’t count when our government makes it clear that he was a partner in America’s imperial designs.

It is easy to tell who is and isn’t an American ally just by reading the newspaper. Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela three times but the most positive description from his New York Times obituary referred to him as “a polarizing figure.” Unlike the Saudi royals, Chavez didn’t intervene in the affairs of other nations. In fact he used his nation’s oil wealth to aid neighboring countries. You wouldn’t know any of that from the media which get and obey marching orders that come straight from the White House.

Saudi Arabia gets the kid glove approach from the press because it works hand in hand with Washington. It is now more than thirty years since the Saudis joined the United States in backing jihadists in Afghanistan to drive out a left wing government. The blowback resulted in past allies like Osama bin Laden attacking the United States on September 11, 2001. Similarly, ISIS wouldn’t exist without collusion between the west and the gulf monarchs. Now ISIS makes clear that it wants to rid the region of the same kingdoms that brought it into existence. ISIS is a United States/Saudi chicken that inconveniently came home to roost.

The Saudis backed jihadists in Libya to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi and in the process created an ongoing civil war and the destruction of a once prosperous country. They did the same in the as yet unsuccessful effort to dispatch Bashar al-Assad in Syria and now nine million people are refugees. They committed those crimes in full accord and cooperation with the United States.

Saudi Arabia is able to create so much damage because it has the world’s largest oil reserves and decides what everyone else on the planet will pay for energy. It may produce a lot of oil or a little and thus determines whether prices are low or high. Recent Saudi and American machinations have brought prices down very precipitously and caused considerable damage to other oil producers such as Venezuela, Iran and Russia. Because these governments demand their rights as sovereign states they have been declared enemies. The two bad actor nations are willing to forego temporary profits if they think they can rid themselves of troublesome countries that won’t obey their dictates.

The Saudis and the American government are locked in a loveless marriage of convenience. The Americans have military and economic dominance and want to keep it. That means working against the aspirations of any nation that refuses to toe the line. The Saudis are natural allies because they don’t want democracy in their own country or anywhere else in the region. They have become useful in providing support to the jihadists du jour who do their bidding for a brief moment in time but eventually wind up being very ungrateful.

Sometimes the Saudis want what the United States can’t give. Obama failed in his attempt to directly attack Syria in 2013. He also knew that the tide had turned in Egypt and Hosni Mubarak had to go. The Saudi monarchs have been itching for an attack on Iran but that is biting off more than America can chew. The two countries need but are also wary of one another.

Of course the president came running with a huge retinue to pay homage to Salman. He doesn’t really have a choice. The desperate imperialist game will go nowhere without the House of Saud. In turn, the new monarch needs American muscle on his side to make Saudi Arabia an undisputed power with the ability to decide who lives and who dies.

Any head of state who gets a visit from the American president, vice president, and current and former secretaries of state is up to no good. If all of those criminals descend at once it means that evil acts are in the works. The old adage is true. There is no honor among thieves.

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By Georgi Gotev

(EurActiv) — Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič said Wednesday that the Russian plan for a pipeline named “Turkish Stream” was not viable. It also became clear that the Commission is organizing a secretive ministerial meeting in Sofia on 9 February, to discuss alternatives to the supply of Russian gas to the region.

Announcing the results of the first orientation debate on the Energy Union, Šefčovič answered questions from the Brussels press, most concerning Russia’s plans to replace South Stream with Turkish Stream, which would bring Russian gas across the Black Sea to Turkey, and from there, to the Turkish-Greek border.

One of the aims of the project is to bypass Ukraine, and another, to punish Bulgaria, which Russia blames for having obstructed the construction of South Stream.

Šefčovič repeated that it was very “unusual” for a country such as Russia to communicate with its clients via press conferences. Indeed, the first announcement about Moscow’s change of plan was during a press conference of President Vladimir Putin, in Turkey.

The Commission Vice-President also said that none of the countries or companies involved in the South Stream project had been officially notified of the project’s cancellation.

‘Radical proposal’

The same happens with Turkish Stream, Šefčovič said, calling it a “radical proposal”, which is hardly in conformity with the bilateral agreements individual companies have signed with Russia, which stipulate a precise place of delivery.

“I doubt that this place of delivery is the Greek-Turkish border,” Šefčovič said, referring to Russian statements that Turkish Stream will bring gas to a hub at the Greek-Turkish border.

On top of it, he said he was questioning the economic viability of the project, because in his words Turkey needed some 15 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y), and the other countries of the region needed another 15 bcm.

“Why (do) you need to ship to that part of the world more than 60 bcm of gas?” he asked, referring to the fact that Russia said Turkish Stream will have the same capacity as South Stream, that is, 63 bcm.

“This will not work. I cannot see that this would be the final solution. I think that we will have to come back to a more rational debate on what should be the economically viable solutions for this project, and for overall gas cooperation between Gazprom and the European countries,” Šefčovič said.

EurActiv asked Šefčovič why Russia wants to bring gas to the Greek border, and whether this is linked to a scenario in which Greece would cease to abide by EU law.

Šefčovič avoided a direct answer, but said that when he was in Moscow on his first trip in his new capacity, on 14 January, the only Russian reasoning had been the need to bypass Ukraine, because the country was unreliable, and that the rehabilitation of its gas grid would be too costly.

He added that he didn’t agree with this reasoning, because Kyiv was committed to energy reform, and that the EU and other financial institutions were going to provide funding for the modernization of the gas transmission system. Moreover, he said that it was not possible that the current volume of transit of Russian gas of over 100 bcm could be immediately rerouted.

Secretive meeting

Asked about alternatives to South Stream, Šefčovič said that on Monday, EU ministers from the region would start “a very thorough discussion how to re-create the energy landscape in South Eastern Europe”.

“This part of Europe is not yet adequately integrated into the European energy system. There is still a big need for major infrastructural projects,” the Commission Vice-President said.

Regarding a proposal by Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov for a European gas hub near the city of Varna, Šefčovič said that the EU would support such projects if they are transparent, viable, and if they are supported by neighbouring countries.

As EurActiv has learned, the meeting in Sofia will be hosted by the Bulgarian authorities, but it is basically run by Šefčovič’ services. It will be held with the participation of energy ministers only from EU countries: Bulgaria, Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Serbia, a candidate country, will reportedly be informed of the results of the meeting afterwards.

No other stakeholders are expected to attend. Also, no press events are foreseen, except doorstep statements. Russian journalists have applied for accreditation, EurActiv was told, but it was not clear at the time of this article’s publication that they would be able to report from the meeting.

It also remains unclear what alternatives to Russian gas the region has, except some of the 10 bcm/y which would become available via the Southern gas corridor, when gas from Azerbaijan will start coming through the planned TANAP pipeline via Turkey, and the TAP (Trans-Adriatic) pipeline via Greece and Albania, by 2019-2020.

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By Sinisa Jakov Marusic

Macedonia’s Independent Journalists’ Trade Union, SSNM, has slated a ban on the publication of compromising material in relation to the case involving the head of the opposition Social Democratic Party, SDSM.

The union said journalists who obtain “information about potential conflict of interests, acts or statements by officials… that misinform the public, about unethical or illegal conduct of office holders, about crimes or serious legal breaches, have a professional responsibility to publish them”.

Naser Zelmani, head of the country’s oldest and biggest media union, the Journalists’ Association of Macedonia, ZNM, also said publication of such material was in the public interest.

On 24 Vesti TV, he said journalists had to balance respect for the law against the democratic principle not to “conceal anything that goes against the public interest”.

The Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights on Monday condemned the use threats of criminal charges against journalists to “neutralize” possible evidence of corruption “through the attempts to portray them as illegal and classified”.

On Tuesday, only a few media outlets published the statement by the Prosecution warning journalists that “publication of material that may become the subject of further criminal procedure is forbidden and punishable by law”.

The warning came after police charged the Social Democrat leader, Zoran Zaev, with espionage and with making violent threats to the government with the goal of undermining constitutional order.

In a TV address last Saturday, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski said Zaev had threatened to publish compromising data from conversations involving top state officials unless a caretaker government was formed that would include the SDSM.

He also said Zaev had obtained his information from foreign intelligence agencies.

The SDSM leader has been ordered to remain in the country and his passport has been confiscated. Three others have been detained in the same case, including the former secret police chief, Zoran Verusevski.

In spite of the warning not to publish sensitive material related to the case, the SDSM has said the charges will not prevent it from releasing the material soon.

“Publishing evidence and arguments about criminal activities of the authorities cannot be considered a coup attempt,” Zaev said.

However, the party has not published anything thus far.

The charges against the opposition come after almost a year of an opposition boycott of parliament, which started after the March-April early general and presidential elections.

The SDSM accused Gruevski of winning through electoral fraud. Gruevski, who has been in power since 2006, has dismissed the allegations.
The latest developments in Macedonia will feature on the agenda of Thomas Melia, visiting US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. During his stay he is meeting both leaders and opposition representatives.

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