Indonesia is enhancing the governance and transparency of its energy institutions and state-owned companies, reducing fuel subsidies and facilitating much-needed infrastructure investments, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said Tuesday in its second in-depth review of the country’s energy policies, but it must move to meet demand growth and ensure the environmental sustainability of energy supplies.

The new IEA review notes that even though Indonesia remains a net energy exporter due to the expansion of its coal and liquid biofuel production, the country is consuming ever more energy as a result of rising living standards, population growth and rapid urbanization.

In the review, Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries: Indonesia 2015, the IEA finds that energy subsidies lie at the heart of the challenge to developing the country’s energy sector. The report acknowledges progress made in decreasing fossil fuel subsidies since the first IEA review, in 2008: the government’s recent move to phase out gasoline subsidies is a powerful sign for change but needs to be sustained and extended to other fuels.

In the power sector, Indonesia’s achievements are notable: a steady increase of installed capacity, the partial opening of the electricity sector and a substantial increase in the electrification rate. But to avoid electricity shortages and large-scale brown-outs, the country must take action to increase investment immediately in generation transmission and distribution infrastructure.

“Multi-layer government approval procedures, unrealistic targets and unclear regulations, difficult land and licensing acquisition, and limited options in private financing for small and medium-sized project developers are all major barriers to investment in Indonesia’s energy sector development,” IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven said at the launch of the report in Jakarta.

Noting that Indonesia targets 23% renewable energy by 2025, Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries: Indonesia 2015 points out that the time frame is overly ambitious. Besides encouraging immediate investment in renewable energy, the report calls for enhancing the coal-mining sector’s sustainability . And it urges development of a more transparent and flexible domestic natural gas market. To do so, Indonesia needs to reform wholesale pricing and allocation to more closely reflect global markets as well as implement an integrated long-term development plan for natural gas infrastructure, and establish an independent regulator to monitor and co-ordinate the downstream sector.

Other key IEA recommendations include national energy plans and policies should be updated in tandem, based on reliable data and realistic implementation capacity and central-level institutions must be streamlined, with clearly delineated responsibilities to ensure that local level regulations conform to national plans.

The post Indonesia’s Economic Success Hinges On Energy-Sector Investment, Realistic Goals – IEA appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The United States and its allies cannot defeat the Islamic State simply by killing militants, said State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf, adding that it must target the underlying reasons people join the group, such as the lack of job opportunities.

Harf made the comments during an interview with Chris Matthews on MSNBC’s ‘Hardball.’ She said that while the American-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL) will continue battering militant strongholds in the Middle East, force will not be enough on its own.

“We’re killing a lot of them, and we’re going to keep killing more of them. So are the Egyptians, so are the Jordanians – they’re in this fight with us,” Harf said. “But we cannot win this war by killing them. We cannot kill our way out of this war. We need in the medium to longer term to go after the root causes that leads people to join these groups, whether it’s a lack of opportunity for jobs, whether…”

Matthews interrupted Harf at this point, arguing that world nations will never be able to put an end to poverty in our lifetimes, implying that such a strategy would never work.

The statement, made by deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf on Chris Matthews’ Hardball on MSNBC, came after ISIS allegedly released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Matthews suggested to Harf that the purpose of the act was to humiliate the West.

In return, Harf suggested a soft power-like approach: “We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people.”

She conceded, however, that there is “no easy solution.”

Earlier in the interview, Mathews asked what the next steps were following the news that 21 Egyptian Christians were recently beheaded and that ISIS was gaining momentum in Libya, a country that lies perilously close to Italy and, thus, Europe.

“I think this just underscores this isn’t just a fight in Iraq and Syria and that isn’t just a fight about dropping bombs on terrorists. It is about how we stop the causes that lead to extremism,” Harf said. “In a place like Libya, the fact there’s no governance and no opportunities for young people it lets groups like ISIL grow there, flourish there, which is what you saw with this awful situation with these Egyptians.”

Harf also mentioned that the White House is hosting a summit dedicated to countering violent extremism – one that will highlight domestic and international efforts to prevent militants and their supporter from committing acts of violence.

Obama administration officials also revealed on Tuesday their own social media campaign as a counter measure to the slick production values and social media savvy of ISIS through a State Department entity created in 2009 – the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. The White House plans to announce expansion of the center “to harness all the existing attempts at counter messaging by much larger federal departments, including the Pentagon, Homeland Security and intelligence agencies.” Additionally, it will establish connections to help the team coordinate with foreign allies, NGOs and Islamic leaders opposed to ISIS.

The post US Cannot Defeat Islamic State By Killing, They Need ‘Job Opportunities’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Southern Gas Corridor, net energy export route from the Caspian region, has gained more credibility after hot discussions at the Baku meeting of its Advisory Council, where it was named as a sole new gas supply source to Europe.

Azerbaijan has emerged as a geopolitical player and an insurer of European energy security without any rival as was declared “to be and will be one of the main objectives in the years ahead”.

The parties to the project voiced commitment to make this ambitious plan a reality and announced the route as a core of the strategic energy partnership with Azerbaijan.

“Azerbaijan’s gas produced in the Caspian Sea will, in the coming years, be the only new gas source for the European consumers,” President Ilham Aliyev said at the meeting.

Ankara reassured the EU, saying in Baku that the country is determined both politically and economically about the Southern Gas Corridor. “The $45 billion Southern Gas Corridor is one of the most significant projects for the supply of natural gas to European Union countries,” Energy Minister Taner Yıldız said.

With the profile of a reliable partner, Azerbaijan has positioned itself as a trusted energy partner to the West and complied with its obligations in all major projects.

Azerbaijan’s strategic significance in the east-west supply chain increased with the rise of natural gas on Azerbaijan’s offshore lands and changed the core drivers behind the Southern Gas Corridor initiative.

Azerbaijan’s firm stance and wise energy policy breathed life into the Southern Gas Corridor, which later become a relief for European politicians’ gas supply puzzle that become more difficult over the last year due to the protracted conflict in the Middle East and in Ukraine.

Diversified energy sources and transportation routes in the region, meets the interests of main buyers of oil and gas of Azerbaijan, as well as interests of the whole European continent.

President Ilham Aliyev noted that the diversification of routes is important, however, when the source remains the same, the situation doesn’t change very much, adding that the diversification of sources is important.

The Southern Gas Corridor, a key project of the country’s energy diversification policy, is the only westward route for exporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian with prospects of covering other “blue energy” sources.

The Southern Gas Corridor will help Europe to achieve its own strategic objective, that is, to diversify supplies of natural gas, said Matthew Bryza, the former deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, former US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, and director of International Centre for Defense and Security in Tallinn.

“New Southern Gas Corridor is a highway which will expand significantly, helping Europe to achieve its own strategic objective – to diversify supplies of natural gas,” he told in an interview with Trend during “This week in focus” program.

No time to lose

As European countries are too dependent on fuel and gas imports, one of the key objectives of the EU strategy is to keep its energy market open to countries outside the EU.

Maros Sefcovic, EU Commission Vice-President for Energy Union following the Baku meeting said, the EU is extremely tired to worry every summer about energy supplies for the coming winter, adding that energy security issues are controlled by top political leaders.

“The Southern Gas Corridor is the only project which guarantees major gas supplies from new source, TASS reported citing Sefcovic. “This is the largest project with the estimated cost of implementation at 45 billion euros.”

Anne Korin, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, also shared the views.

Korin said as long as Europe is intent on diversifying its gas supply away from Russia, Azerbaijani gas will remain a very attractive option.

“Azerbaijan, with its very significant gas reserves and its track record, would be a reliable source of supply expansion for Europe. Certainly the Ukraine situation increases the urgency, appeal of, and support for the Southern Corridor option,” she wrote in an e-mail to AzerNews.

Korin further explained that European options for supply diversification vary from North American LNG to supply from the East Med and of course Central Asia and – less attractive due to the volatile nature of the region – MENA.

“Currently, there is the less likely option that Europe will become more flexible about welcoming options to natural gas itself for power generation for example by becoming less hostile toward coal and nuclear,” she said.

Speaking about any delays in the Southern Gas Corridor realization due to rivalry with possible routes, Korin noted a favorable period for the project.

“Russia’s recent gas deals in China mark a shift in thinking away from reliance on the Europeans as the major customer, and this, coupled with Russia’s backing away from the South Stream project, creates a much more positive outlook for the Southern Corridor option than previously.”

Hopes for more gas

Surviving in a severe rivalry for bringing gas to Europe, the Southern Gas Corridor faced doubts of some opponents who indicated less feasibility of the project due to small gas volumes.

The Southern Gas Corridor being touted as Europe’s solution to reduce energy dependency on an unreliable Russia has secured strong political backing and even financial support, and its participants pledged to ensure the security of the route, which cannot be said in relation to other proposed routes.

The only downsize of the route could be named the volume of the gas it can deliver, but the potential to double its capacity and other Caspian’s countries rush to join the route minimizes this side effect.

Even if there would not be any other source, Azerbaijan’s proven gas reserves exceeding 2.5 trillion cubic meters can be enough guarantee for the project realization.

The Southern Gas Corridor has the potential to meet up to 20 percent of the EU’s gas needs in the future, with potential supplies from the Caspian Region, the Middle East, and the East Mediterranean in the longer term.

Edward Chow, a senior fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, said that there is no other readily available new gas from the region at this point.

“All the parties must concentrate on executing the agreements they have already made. There is a risk that some of the parties may be distracted by other developments,” Chow wrote in an e-mail to AzerNews.

He believes what is critical at this point is to proceed with the successful implementation of the long-planned Shah Deniz II gas field development and the TANAP/TAP pipeline projects to bring additional gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe.

“If the current Southern Corridor projects are successful, they can pave the way for other gas down the road to fulfill the corridor’s full potential. If these projects are delayed because of distractions or desire to revise existing agreements, then the opportunity will be lost and it will even jeopardize the future of other gas developments in the region that could supply Europe,” Chow emphasized.

Following the Baku meeting, Sefcovic said that Europe considers doubling (up to $20 billion cubic meters per year) of purchase volumes of gas on the Southern Gas Corridor.

The other Caspian states, including Turkmenistan which has repeatedly voiced westward export intention, can join the route.
The proven and probable gas reserve in the Caspian Sea exceeds 8 trillion cubic meters, according to EIA estimations.

The post Southern Gas Corridor Scores Historic Milestone – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The identities of those killed by the Islamic State in the Anbar Province have not been released, but local police chief, Col. Qasim al-Obeidi, said on Tuesday that many of the victims are believed to have been security forces.

He added that a compound housing the family members of Iraqi security forces and local officials also came under attack in al-Baghdadi.

The killings come days after Iraqi security forces retook from Daesh the center of al-Baghdadi district, located in the east of the city of Ramadi, the capital of the western al-Anbar Province.

The development came a week after most of al-Baghdadi was captured by Daesh. The town, which is located near the Ain al-Asad air base, was under siege for months.

Earlier, the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights said terrorists had kidnapped dozens of people, executing 15 others in Anbar and Mosul.

Local authorities have warned of a humanitarian catastrophe in the towns of Tarmiya and Dujail, where Daesh has diverted the course of water, causing destruction of crops.

Earlier this month, Daesh drew worldwide condemnation after it released a video showing militants burning Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh alive.

Daesh currently controls parts of Iraq and Syria. The extremists have been carrying out horrific acts of violence, including public decapitations, against all Iraqi communities such as Shias, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians.

Original article

The post Iraq: Islamic State Burns 45 To Death In Anbar Province appeared first on Eurasia Review.

President Barack Obama said his White House meeting Tuesday with Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who took the oath of office this morning, covered a range of security issues from violent extremism to Ukraine to maintaining the military.

“I just had an opportunity to meet for the first time in his official capacity with my new secretary of defense, Ash Carter, who talked about a wide range of security challenges and opportunities that we face around the world — everything from making sure that we are dismantling [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], and not only stabilizing the situation in Iraq but addressing the foreign fighter issue and countering the narrative of violent extremism that has been turbocharged through the Internet,” the president told reporters.

“We had a chance to talk about the situation throughout Ukraine,” Obama continued. “We also had an opportunity to talk about how we maintain the strongest and most effective military in the world and how we keep faith with our outstanding men and women in uniform.”

The commander in chief said he could not be more confident that Carter will do an outstanding job as secretary of defense.

“And he is hitting the ground running, having already spent a lot of time in this administration and in the Pentagon,” the president noted.

“So I want to thank the Senate for confirming him almost unanimously,” Obama said. “And I look forward to working with him in the years to come. I think America will be well served by Mr. Ash Carter.”

The post Obama Says Carter ‘Hitting The Ground Running’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

No provocation legitimizes violence. Surely the concept which needs to be stressed is not defamation but respect. Tolerance and respect go hand in hand.

By Ozdem Sanberk*

A lot has been said and written about the bloody attacks on the offices of the satire magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris last month, and it seems more will come to follow. Related commentaries will probably continue to pile up without an end. The general public opinion formed by these commentaries contends that the Paris attacks were essentially inspired by religious motives, even though such an explanation is usually refuted. Certainly there is some truth in these assertions.

An attack with strategic goals

Nevertheless, such an explanation does not sufficiently address the main motivation underlying the attack. Indeed, the main aim of the perpetrators was to deepen the already serious divide between Christians and Muslims all over the world by playing upon the inherent ideological contradictions, which have been sharpening in recent years, between Muslims and locals in France and elsewhere in Europe. This way, it is believed that racist and xenophobic political movements will replace mainstream parties in the European public sphere and political arena.(**) The implicit meaning of such a strategy is the effective jostling of Huntington’s prophecy into action.

It is true that legal immigrants as well as refugees of Muslim origin living in Europe have become one of the essential political resources, if not the most important one, on which far-right parties in France, the Netherlands, the U.K., Germany, and the Nordic countries feed. Muslims in Europe also provide an indispensable human resource for terrorism by joining radical organizations like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra Front; all of which wage total wars against the civilized world.

The majority of European Muslims denounce violence

The vast majority of European Muslims, whose total population is today approaching 40 million, remains distant to violence and terror, and is not interested in political Islam. For the most part, these people’s basic concern is to find jobs, make a decent living, and to have more peaceful, safer, and freer lives while retaining their own cultures and identities. After leaving behind the mass poverty and insecurity in their home countries, it has been a truly difficult task to make their way to Europe, which they are well aware of. Indeed, Islam is an element of moderation, conservatism, and stability in the lives of most of these people.

Religions which lose their cultural aspect revert to their fundamentals

France, which has a total population of 66 million, harbors 5 million Muslims mostly coming from North Africa. And public opinion polls suggest only one third of these 5 million people are interested in politics. But this group, even though it represents a relatively small minority, can easily be radicalized. This is because, as Oliver Roy remarks, religions are susceptible to the loss of cultural depth and therefore inclined to revert to their fundamentals under the influence of the surrounding cultural context in overwhelmingly secular settings. This is when devout followers of a certain religion begin to seek a sense of belonging and identity outside of the framework of commonly shared values and future prospects exhibited by the society in which they live, instead turning toward their own religious convictions. Inevitably, they become alienated and introverted, clinging blindly to anything they associate with their past. Such susceptibility to isolation from external reality renders the calls of extremist movements with a tendency to violence more enticing for those alienated individuals, and makes radical doctrines seem relevant in the eyes of those looking for a way out.

Indeed, it is possible to observe such a tendency at different degrees in all the European countries harboring Muslim populations. Considering the developments that have been taking place throughout the continent over the last couple of decades, it is possible to predict that European Muslims could face greater introversion and detachment from the prevalent cultural codes of the societies they live amongst to the extent that they continue to be pushed around, subjected to discrimination, and marginalized. As political, social, and cultural exclusion leaves them no other option but to seek peace in their roots, more of these people will gravitate toward extremist groups fighting in the Middle East, providing them with an even larger pool of militants.

Forces of attraction and repulsion

Far right movements in Europe serve as a type of repulsive force, while religious extremist organizations in the Middle East serve as an attractive force. The two actually end up aggravating each other through a spiral of violence which they create in almost subtle cooperation. On the one hand, Marine Le Pen’s National Front (FN) in France, Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) movement in Germany, and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands all dream of expanding their electoral bases by dragging moderate Muslim masses into extremism after playing Europe’s conservatives off against Muslim immigrants and provoking moderate Europeans against Islam.

On the other hand, violent groups in the Middle East such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Nusra Front aim to recruit as many warriors as possible from among the Muslims in Europe. The most effective way to achieve this, i.e. the method preferred by these groups, is by appealing to destructive acts of violence which in turn cause public indignation and lead devout Europeans in urban centers and all over the region to react harshly. In that regard, a goal of the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo attack was to infuse a new identity shaped by a culture of violence into the moderate and conservative masses which constitute the majority of the Muslim population in France. Likewise, the objective held by far right parties in Europe is to invent a new identity for the moderate segments of the European public on the basis of a shared fury towards Muslims and under the pretext of needing a just response to the violence which native Europeans have now been subjected to.

Deepening social cleavages

This method of deriving political profit from the fueling of inherent contradictions within a society is actually nothing new. It was put into practice when the opportunity presented itself at the beginning of the previous century during the October Revolution in Russia, and under Stalinist-Leninist regimes in various other countries in the decades to follow. It eventually collapsed, causing public frustration and widespread misery. In more recent history, this method has also obviously been employed in the case of sectarian conflicts between Shias and Sunnis that still rattle the Middle East.

If waves of extremism are allowed to run riot, the resultant wars can potentially spread to a wider region that may cover significant portions of Europe as well. That is because the real threat for both Europe and the Middle East is the crystallization of an ideological antagonism that shapes the two parties’ policies around two hostile and diametrically opposed identities, which would inevitably motivate them to nurse a mutual grudge and to seek the extermination of one another.

All extreme ideologies, no matter religious or secular, interpret the world mainly with reference to the idea of an absolute enemy. If such an enemy does not actually exist, the ideology will create one and subsequently seek to destroy it. If the world is divided in the near future into two hostile identities based on mutual hatred, humanity may end up rewriting last century’s recipe of disaster in the century we currently find ourselves. That the fire of mutual hatred was ignited in Paris of all places is extremely unfortunate, regardless of whether the attacks deliberately sought to incite wider polarization or not. That is because over the last three centuries, France has proven itself as a country from which large political movements and social revolts successively spread to the rest of Europe and then to the whole world.

The French government didn’t fall into a trap

President Hollande and French government officials handled the incident with a historical consciousness and sense of responsibility, like true statesmen. The French people did not want to see the terrorist attack as their 9/11. They didn’t want to embark on a strategy of waging war on the entirety of the Muslim world under the pretext of catchphrases such as “fighting terrorism” and in a manner that would cause the repetition of the tragedies witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the perpetrators of the attacks aimed to trigger an anti-Muslim wave of absolute rage and enmity that would spread from France to Europe and then to the whole world, the massive rally which united the leaders and the peoples of the civilized world in Paris on January 11, 2015, dashed their hopes, at least for the time being. The participants of the rally did not antagonize Islam, despite the objective set by the perpetrators. Indeed, the rally gave a very clear message that united all participants. It was a message that the sensitive balance should be preserved between respect for fundamental human rights, liberties, and democracy on the one hand, and security on the other.

Turkey’s position

Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s participation in the rally demonstrated Turkey’s firm stance in solidarity with those countries that prioritize basic rights and defend liberties. The rally confirmed the existence of a strong political will not to elevate racism into the ranks of mainstream political currents. Preserving such political will be possible only if the European governments avoid the traps set by the assailants, which are intended to provoke a violent reprisal and an all-out crack down on the freedom of speech, religion, and the media, the imposition of oppressive laws on the society, and the silencing of dissident voices. No provocation legitimizes violence. Surely the sentiment which needs to be stressed at this juncture is not defamation but respect. Tolerance and respect go hand in hand. The most important repercussion of the rally which was held in defiance of the challenge posed by extreme currents was the universal realization of the fact that Europe is facing the future and not the past. Contrary to their shared expectation of agitating Europeans against Islam and marginalizing Muslims altogether, racist and xenophobic parties in Europe as well as extreme ideological groups in the Middle East were confronted with a democratic and liberal response.

*Ozdem Sanberk, Director of USAK

(**) Juan Cole, “Sharpening Contradictions: Why al-Qaeda attacked Satirists in Paris,” January 7, 2015.

The post Charlie Hebdo: Religious Motives Don’t Fully Explain Attack – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Gary C. Gambill*

US Secretary of State John Kerry has repeatedly pledged that the prospective nuclear agreement being hammered out between the P5+1 world powers and Iran will extend the Islamic Republic’s “breakout time” – how quickly it can produce sufficient fissile material for an atomic bomb should it make a rush to build one – from “about two months” to “a minimum of a year.”^[1]  While U.S. officials have been tight-lipped about details of the talks, this seemingly tangible metric is clearly going to be the big selling point when Kerry seeks to win support for an agreement from a skeptical Congress.

Kerry gets his numbers by calculating how long it would take Iran to produce a bomb’s worth (around 25 kg) of weapons grade uranium (WGU) given the number and types of centrifuges it currently has installed (18,458 first generation IR-1s and 1008 IR-2s) and operating (around 10,180 IR-1s) at its two enrichment plants,^[2] and the amount of under 5% low enriched uranium (LEU) it has on hand to use as feedstock.  Cap these variables at whatever levels are needed to lift the other side of the equation to a year, put in place an augmented inspections regime to make sure Iran isn’t cheating, and voila … ten months back on the clock.

Well, not exactly.  A multitude of “ifs”, “ands”, and “buts” render Kerry’s pledge all but meaningless.

There is No Clock

While nominal breakout time,^[3] a simple function of overall enrichment capacity and available feedstock, is convenient shorthand for a country’s ability to produce a weapon, it isn’t a meaningful threshold in a real-world breakout attempt. Producing one bomb’s worth of WGU – what the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) terms a significant quantity (SQ)^[4] – wouldn’t be much of an achievement, as the Iranians can’t put it on a warhead (assuming they’ve designed one) without first conducting a nuclear test (lest no one believe they’ve split the atom), while carrying out a test without having stockpiled enough material for at least one weapon would announce their aggressive intentions to the world without simultaneously acquiring a nuclear deterrent.  To be sure, an Iranian dash to produce one SQ of WGU would be a proliferation threat, but that doesn’t mean it would make sense for the Iranians (unless their objective is to deliberately provoke military intervention).

Iran’s effective breakout time^[5] – to enrich enough WGU to be reasonably certain of ending up with a deployable nuke – depends on how certain the Iranians want to be.

Two bomb-loads of WGU would be sufficient to acquire a modicum of nuclear deterrence only if the test is successful, but that’s hardly a sure thing (North Korea had two failed tests in a row, albeit with plutonium bombs).  Even three would be a crapshoot given Iran’s poor track record of getting things right the first time around in its nuclear program.

This is an important distinction because the Obama administration’s public rationale for accepting an inferior deal feeds off of the common misconception that Iran is eight weeks away from a nuclear weapon (almost anything looks better than that). The Iranians are portrayed as too close to the finish line to be pushed or prodded most of the way back.  Press too hard, Kerry has suggested, and Iran might “rush towards a nuclear weapon.”^[6]   In fact, it’s not too late for the international community to deny Iran a viable chance of succeeding in a future breakout attempt.

Untested “Disablement”

Kerry’s post-agreement breakout time calculations assume that Iran does not bring more centrifuges into operation for a whole year after kicking out inspectors and beginning its sprint for a nuke.  Dismantling the large majority of Iranian centrifuges that fall outside of the agreed-upon quota could ensure this, but Iran has long insisted that it will never destroy any of them.  Instead, the White House is proposing that excess centrifuges and associated equipment merely be disconnected, removed to IAEA-monitored storage offsite, and disabled in some way that cannot be quickly reversed (but without removing components that would render them permanently inoperable).^[7]

Although U.S. nuclear scientists are said to have studied a range of technical measures designed to make the process of reconnecting centrifuge cascades and piping more time-consuming, “disablement” is not an exact science.  The only real-world application of such measures thus far was in North Korea, which “was able to reverse many of these steps faster than expected,” according to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).^[8] In the case of Iran, analysts at ISIS were unable to identify even a hypothetical disablement process that would take more than six months to reverse.^[9]  Considering that the Iranians would be sure to immediately begin training personnel to reverse the disablement steps, there’s little reason to be confident that such technical speed bumps can prevent a ramp up of Iranian enrichment capacity for an entire year if excess centrifuges are left intact.

Unknown Inventories

Even a perfectly functioning disablement regime won’t suffice unless the international community has an accurate count of Iran’s centrifuges, particularly those it possesses beyond the 19,466 installed at its Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants.  The latter include around a thousand, non-operating IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz, which have an average enrichment output three to five times greater than the IR-1.^[10]  Olli Heinonen, the former deputy chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), recently said that Iran could have thousands of additional IR-2m centrifuges, or the components for assembling them, stored outside of these declared facilities.^[11]

As Lee Smith has warned,^[12] there’s little indication that the Obama administration is demanding the kind of invasive inspection regime that would be needed to verify Iran has no appreciable stockpile of undeclared centrifuges.  Given the administration’s unwillingness to demand full disclosure of past nuclear weapons research,^[13] this is unlikely to change.

Limitations of an LEU Cap

Although the Obama administration initially proposed a limit of 1,500 IR-1 centrifuges,^[14] it is widely reported to have agreed to let Iran operate somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,000 to 6,500 IR-1 centrifuges under the terms of a prospective agreement, and may yet settle for an even higher number.^[15]  There are only two ways to produce a nominal breakout time of one year with this many centrifuges running.

The first is to reduce the amount of LEU the Iranians can accumulate at any one time.  LEU, as Frank von Hippel and Alex Glaser put it, is essentially “stored enrichment work.”^[16]  Reducing LEU supplies below the roughly 1,000 kg needed to produce one SQ  would lengthen nominal breakout time by forcing the Iranians to enrich some quantity of natural uranium all the way up to WGU.  According to ISIS calculations, for example, 6,000 IR-1 centrifuges and 500 kg of LEU would correspond to a one-year breakout time.

U.S. officials have proposed achieving this by requiring Iran to either convert the LEU normally produced by its centrifuges into an oxide form (unlikely, as this can be reversed in a matter of months) or have it shipped to Russia,^[17] in exchange for specialized fuel rods for its Bushehr power plant that cannot easily be weaponized.^[18]

The problem with a many-centrifuges-little-LEU cap is that it requires Iran to continuously surrender or reprocess material it already possesses for its extended breakout time to remain constant.  But suppose it simply stopped doing this? If the Iranians were going to attempt a breakout, they would likely begin by “feigning problems in the conversion plant or delays in transporting” the LEU, notes ISIS President David Albright.^[19]  By the time it would be unmistakably clear to the outside world that a breakout was underway, they would have substantially exceeded whatever LEU cap is established.  With a few-centrifuges cap, a “creepout” is impossible, as Iran would have to install more centrifuges to narrow its breakout time, not merely fake an industrial accident.

The Iranians could also stop surrendering LEU, while otherwise abiding by a prospective agreement, as a means of wresting additional concessions from the West, calculating that no one will start a war in response to inaction.

Moreover, having a larger number of centrifuges in operation would make it easier for Iran to build centrifuges in secret and hide illicit procurements for a covert facility,^[20] particularly if the Obama administration drops the longstanding P5+1 demand for substantial curbs on centrifuge research and development. Iran has built and tested prototypes of advanced centrifuges with even higher enrichment capacities than the IR-2, most notably the IR-8, with an annual SWU capacity anywhere from seven to 16 times that of the IR-1.^[21] Because far fewer are required to produce a given output, advanced centrifuges allow for the construction of smaller, harder-to-detect clandestine enrichment facilities.

Limitations of an SWU Cap

Unfortunately for the Obama administration, the Iranians have insisted on keeping such a high number of centrifuges in operation that a practical LEU cap alone can’t extend Iran’s nominal breakout time to a year.   In recent months, U.S. officials have warmed to an Iranian proposal to instead cap the net output of its centrifuges, measured in separative work units (SWU).  Several prominent NGOs endorsed an SWU cap last year, including the Arms Control Association and the International Crisis Group.^[22]

The Iranians initially proposed that the SWU cap be enforced by reducing the rate of spin on the centrifuges.  But this process can be quickly reversed.^[23]

US officials have instead proposed that the SWU cap be enforced by limiting the amount of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas that is fed into the centrifuges.^[24]  But this begs the question of how quickly Iran can ramp up production of UF₆ once it begins a breakout, and what new, untested disablement regime will be needed to slow this process.  Elaborate mechanisms to limit gas supplies simply cannot provide the same degree of confidence as dismantling the centrifuges they feed into.

Wrong Enrichment Plant

However much the limited centrifuge, LEU, and SWU caps the Obama administration has in mind may extend Iran’s nominal breakout time, this figure won’t mean much in a contested breakout.  Iran isn’t likely to get very far trying to produce fissile material for a bomb at its main Natanz enrichment facility, where all post-agreement enrichment is to be carried out – the site is too vulnerable to outside air strikes that would likely follow such brazen defiance of the international community.^[25]

A contested breakout can only succeed at Iran’s smaller Fordow plant, which is buried sufficiently deep underground to likely survive Israeli, perhaps even American, air strikes. This route to the bomb will take longer to achieve than an uncontested breakout at Natanz.  Since Iran has pledged to discontinue industrial enrichment at Fordow once an agreement is signed, it will first have to get centrifuges back up and running, and even then its output will be a fraction that of Natanz.

According to Albright, a full complement of 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow would take about a year to produce a bomb’s worth of WGU using only natural uranium, and “significantly” less if a substantial quantity of LEU is available (which, as underscored above, will likely be the case) or if more advanced centrifuges are available for installation (ditto).^[26]  But time doesn’t matter as much when the centrifuges are spinning deep underground.

The more interesting question is how long it takes to restart and ramp up enrichment at Fordow – or at least move centrifuges and other vital equipment inside the subterranean fortress.  That is when the process is most vulnerable to outside disruption.

Naturally, the Iranians are adamant that this timeline be as short as possible.  They have refused to demolish, strip down, or even close the Fordow bunker, insisting that it remain in operation as “research and development and back-up site for Natanz.”^[27] After initially insisting that Fordow be shut down completely, the Obama administration has agreed that Iran will merely be required to suspend enrichment and accept unspecified provisions that “constrain the ability to quickly resume enrichment there,” in the words of one senior American official.^[28]

But the timeline for stage one of a Fordow-centered breakout is difficult to quantify, let alone delimit, reflecting such myriad factors as the number and competency of Iranian scientists and technicians, how much they’ve drilled, the availability of relevant equipment, etc. – all of which are sure to improve for Iran in the years ahead.

Moreover, Iranian actions during the vulnerable stage of a Fordow breakout aren’t likely to be regarded as a clear casus belli by the international community.  While this path to the bomb can be readily obstructed when centrifuges are being moved back into the facility, simply moving equipment around in violation of treaty isn’t likely to trigger decisive external military intervention.  Just to be sure, Iranian clerics could simultaneously summon thousands of women and children to the site to act as human shields.  Named after a nearby village known for having the largest martyrdom rate during the Iran-Iraq war,^[29] Fordow would be ideally suited for such a stunt.

Although details concerning the status of Fordow remain unresolved,^[30] it’s clear that the facility will remain operational under a prospective agreement, subject to untested technical provisions to obstruct the rapid resumption of industrial enrichment, and its status as a symbol of Iranian resistance thus formally consecrated.

Time Isn’t Everything

Finally, Kerry’s breakout time argument – and the Obama administration’s Iran counter-proliferation policy as a whole – is predicated on the widespread, but hardly self-evident, assumption that having as much time as possible to stop a future breakout in progress is the touchstone of a “good” agreement.

Kerry may be right that, all else being equal, more “time to act” if Iran reneges and starts racing to enrich WGU is better than less.^[31] But how much better?  The U.S. and/or Israel won’t need more than a few weeks to flatten Iran’s enrichment facilities as best they can if it comes to that.

Of course, military intervention isn’t certain to succeed.  The problem with a short breakout time, according to the prevailing conventional wisdom, is that it doesn’t allow for a peaceful, negotiated restoration of the status quo ante (which everyone agrees is a more reliable fix than bunker busters).   “If Iran were to make the decision to make a weapon, military intervention would be the only available response,” explains Albright.^[32]

Fair enough.  But why should we expect a diplomatic resolution to be possible in the midst of a breakout attempt?  The assumption that Tehran can be made to have second thoughts after beginning a headlong sprint for the bomb flies in the face of everything we know about the Iranian regime – a product, perhaps, of anti-proliferation specialists accustomed to dealing with mercurial dictators like Moammar Qaddafi and Kim Jong-il.

The challenge is giving the Iranians second thoughts before they begin a breakout. Might not the perception that prompt military intervention will be the only response available to Washington do more to deter an Iranian breakout attempt than the expectation that the international community will have all the time in the world deliberating how to respond and bargaining for Iranian concessions?

Conclusion

Although Kerry has stopped publicly promising a one-year breakout time since negotiators failed to reach an agreement before their self appointed deadline in November, by all accounts it remains a key focus of the U.S.-led negotiating team.^[33]

Why this fixation with a number that doesn’t mean anything? Because a one-year nominal breakout time “is what they need to have in order to sell the deal to Congress and U.S. allies,” according to Gary Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction during Obama’s first term.^[34]  At this stage in the game, the Obama administration’s red lines in the negotiations have more to do with politics at home than with preventing the Islamic Republic from going nuclear.

Although the administration’s efforts to frame the Iran nuclear debate as foremost a question of how far from the “finish line” Iran is and will be under a prospective nuclear agreement have been fairly successful thus far (critics of its Iran posture who complain that a year is not enough unwittingly play along), the White House is giving short shrift to a host of other factors critical to thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, such as the status of an underground enrichment bunker purpose-built for a contested breakout, the ability of inspectors to fully account for Iranian inventories, and curbs on research and development.  At the end of the day, neither Congress nor American allies are likely to be very impressed when the particulars of the impending nuclear accord become known.

About the author:
*Gary C. Gambill is a frequent contributor to The National Post, FPRI E-Notes, The Jerusalem Post, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest. He is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum and was formerly editor of Middle East Intelligence Bulletin and Mideast Monitor.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] “U.S. Lays Out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, November 24, 2014.

[2] According to a September 2014 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, Iran presently has 15,420 IR-1 centrifuges and 1008 IR-2 centrifuges installed at Natanz; 328 centrifuges of different types at the aboveground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) attached to Natanz; and 2,710 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow.  Of the IR-1s currently in operation, 9,156 are at Natanz, 328 at PFEP, and 696 at Fordow. See “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), September 5, 2014.

[3] The term “nominal breakout time” was first widely used in this context in “Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes,” The International Crisis Group, December 10, 2014.

[4] The IAEA defines significant quantity (SQ) as “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.” IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition, IAEA.

[5] I borrow (but slightly modify) this term from Greg Thielmann and Robert Wright. See Greg Thielmann and Robert Wright, “The Trouble With ‘Breakout Capacity’,” Slate, June 18, 2014. Thielmann and Wright define effective breakout capacity as “the time it takes to produce a deliverable weapon,” including construction of non-fissile bomb components and delivery vehicle.

[6] “Kerry’s Interview on Iran Pact with CNN’s Candy Crowley,” U.S. Department of State, November 24, 2013. Prior to the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran in 2013, “Iran’s nuclear program was rushing full speed toward larger stockpiles, greater uranium enrichment capacity, the production of weapons grade plutonium, and ever shorter breakout time,” Kerry told reporters in Vienna in November 2014. John Kerry Solo Press Availability in Vienna, Austria, U.S. Department of State, November 24, 2014.

[7] The Iranians feel that the removal from their possession of any vital component they cannot readily replace constitutes destruction of the centrifuge.  “U.S. Hopes Face-Saving Plan Offers a Path to a Nuclear Pact With Iran,” The New York Times, September 19, 2014.

[8] David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, “Five Compromises to Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,” ISIS, June 3, 2014.

[9] David Albright, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 3, 2014.

[10] David Albright and Christina Walrond, “Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges,” ISIS, October 18, 2011. Ariane Tabatabai, “Hitting the sweet spot: How many Iranian centrifuges?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 27, 2014.

[11] “Iran’s Nuclear Threat is Five Times Bigger, Warns Ex-IAEA Chief,” International Business Times, November 9, 2014.

[12] “If the IAEA investigators can’t get in to count and catalog what Iran has pre-deal, post-deal inspections are a waste of time, and any agreement coming out of Geneva will not be worth the paper it’s printed on,” he writes.  See Lee Smith, “Understanding the P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations With Iran: The Verification Regime,” The Weekly Standard, November 13, 2014.

[13] See Gary C. Gambill, “A Limited Disclosure Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Promise or Peril?” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), June 2014.

[14] “U.S. Lays Out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, November 24, 2014.

[15] “Report says U.S. may OK more centrifuges in Iran nuclear talks,” The Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2014. Ariane Tabatabai, “Hitting the sweet spot: How many Iranian centrifuges?” Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, October 27, 2014. Arash Karami, “Iran official: US proposals in Oman ‘back to zero’,” Al-Monitor, November 16, 2014.  “Israel: US deal will leave Iran with 6,500 centrifuges spinning, months from a bomb,” The Times of Israel, January 31, 2015 (citing Israeli officials who spoke anonymously to Israel’s Channel 10 TV news).

[16] Frank von Hippel and Alex Glaser, “The potential value of stricter limits on Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched UF6,” Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, September 25, 2014.

[17] “Iran and US tentatively agree on formula to reduce nuclear programme,” The Associated Press, January 2, 2015.

[18] “Role for Russia Gives Iran Talks a Possible Boost,” The New York Times, November 3, 2014.

[19] David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, “Five Compromises to Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,” ISIS, June 3, 2014.

[20] David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, “The Six’s’ Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran,” ISIS, July 22, 2014.

[21] David Albright, “Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge,” ISIS, September 23, 2014. http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/technical-note-making-sense-o…

[22] See “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: Toward a Realistic and Effective Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement,” The Arms Control Association, June 2014.

“Iran and the P5+1: Getting to ‘Yes’,” The International Crisis Group, August 27, 2014, pp. 13-15.

[23] Iran would “remain a flip of the switch away from sprinting for the bomb,” according to a report by the Gemunder Center Iran Task Force of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). See “Separative Work Units (SWU) and a Final Deal with Iran,” Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), September 22, 2014.  Robert Joseph, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security under George W. Bush, notes that such an arrangement “would permit Tehran to maintain a reserve capacity to enrich uranium far in excess of that suggested by the SWU allowance.” Robert Joseph, “The Path Ahead for a Nuclear Iran,” National Review Online, August 7, 2014.

[24] “AP exclusive: US, Iran discussing nuclear talks compromise,” The Associated Press, February 3, 2015.

[25] “Up in the air,” The Economist, February 25, 2012.

[26] David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article on the Fordow Enrichment Plant,” ISIS, November 30, 2009. When Fordow’s existence became public in 2009, administration officials told a White House press briefing that Fordow could produce “enough for a bomb or two a year.” Press Briefing, The White House, September 25, 2009. Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimated in late 2009 that it would take 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges four years to produce sufficient WGU for a weapon using natural uranium.   However, this estimate was based on a calculation of the IR-1’s effective  separative capacity to be only about 0.44 SWU per year. See Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka, “A technical evaluation of the Fordow fuel enrichment plant,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2009.  Subsequent studies have shown the IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow to average about 0.75 SWU per year.  See David Albright, Christina Walrond, and Andrea Stricker, “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,” ISIS, February 20, 2014.  Robert J. Goldston calculates that Fordow would take 2 years to produce one SQ, though he assumes an SQ for Iran’s purposes to be higher than Albright does – around 1,300 kg. Robert J. Goldston, “Negotiating with Iran: Breakout and sneakout,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 10, 2015.

[27] “Iran says offers ways to ease impasse over underground nuclear plant,” Reuters, July 9, 2014.

[28] Another official said that these conditions include dismantling the system that feeds LEU into the facility’s centrifuges, which the officials said would take weeks or months to rebuild. See “As Negotiators Ease Demands on Iran, More Nuclear Talks Are Set,” The New York Times, February 27, 2013.

[29] Ali Hashem, “In Iran, Fordow Nuclear Plant Virtually Sacred Ground,” Al-Monitor, September 19, 2013.

[30] “Iran, 6 Powers Move Closer to Nuclear Talks Deal,” The Associated Press, January 2, 2015.

[31] “President Obama, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Lew Underscore and Reaffirm the Strength of the U.S.-Israel Relationship,” The White House, March 6, 2014.

[32] David Albright, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 3, 2014.

[33] Numerous mainstream media reports indicate this.  See “Have the Iran Nuclear Talks Reached an Impasse?” The Wall Street Journal, February 12. 2015. According to the International Crisis Group, which interviewed numerous American and European officials, and a one-year nominal breakout time remains a “red line” of the P5+1. “Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes,” The International Crisis Group, December 10, 2014, p. 4.

[34] “U.S. Lays Out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, November 24, 2014.

The post Seven Problems With John Kerry’s Iranian Nuclear Clock – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dilek Kütük*

A heated topic of discussion in the Balkans nowadays is the final ruling of the International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN), on 3 February, 2015 to dismiss the genocide claims of Croatia and Serbia.

In short, Croatia was the first to file a claim against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999. Yet seeing that FRY consisted of the two states known today as Montenegro and Serbia, after Montenegro declared independence in 2006, Serbia was left as the sole defendant state for the remaining duration of the case. Nonetheless, Croatia resumed legal action against Serbia, alleging that it had violated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of the Genocide during the War between Serbs and Croats before 27 April, 1992. In response, Serbia filed a counter claim on 4 January, 2010 against Croatia, challenging that systematic genocide was in fact actualized by Croatians in Kninska Krajina, a region that was inhabited by a Serbian majority. Conversely, Croatia claimed that Serbia committed genocide in Vukovar, where a majority of Croats had lived during the War of Yugoslavia.

After the announcement that the ICJ had dismissed the claims made by both parties, the two countries’ governments issued statements on the decision. Namely, Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic specified that the decision was on the one hand a total disappointment, but on the other hand the rejection of the Serbian counter-claim was satisfactory. Nonetheless, the Croatian government announced that it would not give up pursuing the rights of Croatians on topics such as the issue of missing persons, the return of stolen cultural heritage, etc. By contrast, the Serbian authorities were rather pleased with the ICJ’s decision stating, “It will positively affect the future of Serbia”. Furthermore, President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic declared that “Croatia and Serbia would resolve their issues together in order to bring the region to peace and prosperity”. In this way, it can be said the relations between Serbia and Croatia will not break down due to the decision as both sides have already accepted it in a civilized manner.

Indeed, both sides failed to adequately prove their claims according to the framework of the ICJ’s definition of genocide. Here, genocide is defined in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” by way of “killing members of the group”; “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”; “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”; or “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. With these parameters in mind, Serbia and Croatia’s cases were based upon claims that did not consider the historical implications of the case or the shifting borders of the times. Thus, based on a lack of evidence, the ICJ decided that genocide was not explicitly committed by one side or the other.

To better understand the issue, one should take a closer look at the breakup of Yugoslavia. The roles of Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic during the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were of great importance. Considering the economic hardship, rising nationalism, and the sense of Serbian hegemony by way of Milosevic rule, Slovenes and Croats thought the best solution was to secede from the SFRY with a vote. Throughout the process the Croatian and Serbian sides became engulfed in a vicious circle that was characterized by the Serbs fearing the revival of the Ustasha, and the Croats fearing the revival of Serbian hegemony. In addition to the poor economic circumstances of the times, this endless loop of understanding reinforced the growing strength of both the Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements. In this context, attempts for secession were kicked off with the fiery rhetoric of self-determination movements. In this vein, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina) had established itself as a self-proclaimed independent territory within the Republic of Croatia during the War employing Milosevic’s argument that “All Serbs should live in Serbia”, a discourse which represented the idea of “Greater Serbia”. Respectively, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was reconfigured, its ranks were filled with Serbs, and its attacks against Croatians intensified.

It’s a well-known fact that the United Nations tried to prevent the conflict, especially through the efforts of Representative Cyrus Vance and General Secretary Boutros Ghali. During the conflict, however, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did not apply physical force, either by way of deploying armed forces or by conducting air strikes. This owed in large part to international reluctance to get involved and the unpredictability of the conflict itself. UNPROFOR operated primarily in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA), consisting of East Slavonia, West Slavonia, and Krajina, where its mission was not only to keep the peace but also to ensure the safe access of migrants to the UNPA. The presence of UNPROFOR in the UNPA facilitated the withdrawal of JNA troops from these areas. Throughout this period, UNPROFOR’s mission was extended from time to time and the body was reorganized to include the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) and the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP). After UNCRO’s mission was concluded with the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established in cooperation with the UNCHR to contribute to peace and security in the region. Here, the United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) worked together for a period of time with the latter’s role in ensuring security eventually being increased by the UN. The actual performances of all organs are still contested due to the fact that they failed to disarm the UNPA and thus were not so successful in providing favorable conditions for the return of refugees to the Area.

The ICJ’s decision, which specifies a lack of international elements of genocide in the cases, can be read as a manifestation of the general agreement today that the UN would like the states of the Balkans solve their conflicts in line with EU regulations, free of direct outside intervention. Although the ICJ admitted that crime was committed at the time of the Croatian and Serbian claims, the acts were not classified as “genocide” according to the decision of the ICJ. However, the final judgment, despite Croatia’s discontent therewith, will positively influence Serbia’s EU accession process and has set a precedent in the eyes of international organizations. Notably, of the litigating states, one is a member of the EU and the other is a candidate country that could be the 29th member granted access to the Union; although this is not likely to happen until 2020.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the decision does not mean that there was no injustice, that people were not killed, that inhabitants weren’t forced to emigrate, or that residential areas were not destroyed. The ICJ’s decision was issued based on a conservative attitude in order to set the bar high when it comes to the judicial body’s official recognition of genocide.

*Dilek Kütük is Asistant Specialist at Istanbul based think-tank, Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies – TASAM.

The post ICJ’s Conservative Stance In Ruling On Serbian And Croatian Claims Of Genocide – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Islamic State recalls Bluebeard, the French knight who tortured and murdered children.

By Valerie Ogden*

Islamic State butchers wantonly rape, enslave, burn, crucify and slaughter thousands of adults and children – including 21 Egyptian Christians beheaded in the latest outrage – without apparent qualms or remorse. They are all too reminiscent of Bluebeard, the notorious fifteenth century serial killer of children.

Gilles de Rais had been the paragon of the high medieval prince, almost Renaissance in his talents and accomplishments. He fought alongside Joan of Arc in the Hundred Years’ War and was honored by the King for his service to the crown. But he became crazed, a psychopath nicknamed Bluebeard, because his perfectly groomed horse sometimes glowed blue in the sun, who took demonic pleasure in torturing, raping and viciously murdering innocent boys and girls in France.

In the hellish modern day Middle East, ISIS grew out of the Sunni terrorist organization formed by al Qaeda, specifically the Iraq group, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Until an America airstrike killed him in 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi headed AQI, with the experienced Iraqi fighter known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeding him. But for a while a US-backed alliance of Iraqi Sunni tribes effectively battled against this jihadist force, with AQI losing its influence in Iraq.

Then in 2011, AQI recognized that it could regain some of its power and increase its ranks as the Syrian conflict developed, by moving its troops to that war-torn country. By 2013 it returned to Iraq where al-Baghdadi changed the group name to ISIS, reflecting its greater regional aspirations.

The brutality of war can turn soldiers into monsters, during or after combat. Bluebeard appears to have killed because of a mental illness, possibly precipitated by his experiences on the battlefield. He killed many men in vicious hand-to-hand combat, and saw many others mangled and dismembered.

He was Joan of Arc’s protector, yet he was powerless to save her from the enemy. She was burned as a witch with instructions from the English command that she be kept far enough from the flames to suffer a slow, gruesome death. Bluebeard’s inability to save this heroine possibly caused him to suffer from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), which triggered his latent psychopathic tendencies and led him to commit hundreds of murders.

The psycho-political connection of ISIS to slaughter is simpler. Islamic State happily recruits the most depraved, hate-filled, remorseless servants of extremist Islam from all corners of our planet. It gleefully eradicates all who will not agree with its primitive ideology, killing children and adults savagely for that single reason. Its game plan includes violence to instill fear and conversion, and violence for its own sake.

It has extended its caliphate in Iraq and Syria by and while taunting, torturing and executing thousands of unarmed prisoners. Men and boys who stayed in their villages were compelled to convert and join the ISIS army, or were summarily shot, crucified, beheaded, dismembered, or buried or burned alive.

During the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), English soldiers and brigands roamed France, torturing and murdering citizens with the same perverse predation. ISIS’s burning captured Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Moaz al-Kasasbeh alive in a cage is similar to the fate suffered by some prisoners in Bluebeard’s time. But death by fire as legal punishment is unprecedented in the modern era, even in the war-torn Middle East, and is considered heinous and barbaric.

ISIS extremist machinations began stunning the world in August 2014, when it proudly released its video showing American journalist James Foley being horrifically beheaded. His executioner, hiding behind a black mask and speaking perfect English with a British accent, threatened the US and its allies with more beheadings, unless they discontinued airstrikes against ISIS troops and the regions it held.

When they beheaded another U.S. freelance journalist and British and American aid workers, United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron accurately called them monsters, underscoring how brutality and derangement are often complimentary in war. Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihide Suga, described the online video of the recent beheading of journalist Kenji Goto as terrorist propaganda.

These bloodthirsty executions have elevated ISIS’s status in the extremist world, with thousands of disoriented, hot-headed freaks rushing to join its forces – including at least 100 from the United States and 3,000 from other Western countries. Learning quickly from the “evil” West, it has effectively used social media, beheading videos and shocking images of Lieutenant al-Kasasbeh burning in agony, to recruit more savage butchers, terrify anyone who might think of resisting it, and frighten civilized society into denouncing ISIS, wringing its collective hands … and doing little or nothing of substance.

Blood money has poured in from bank robberies, pillaging, and revenue from stolen oil and selling victims’ organs. Using its military expertise and seized and purchased weapons, ISIS has rapidly taken over of a third of Iraq and Syria, and now proclaims this land to be a transnational Muslim caliphate.

Bluebeard, a military hero who witnessed Joan of Arc’s treatment at the hands of his sworn enemies, emerged as a cruel, deranged demon who represented the worst in humankind. He lived in a time when people believed in battles between the forces of good and evil, and was hanged for his evil deeds in 1440.

Those forces are now colliding again, as ISIS steamrolls over people and countries, its atrocious actions overwhelming almost anyone in its path. It seems clear that these fanatics are intent on continuing their relentless drive to destroy modern civilization and bring the world back to Bluebeard’s medieval era of sadism and submission, 570 years ago.

ISIS under al-Baghdadi publicly fought with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Osama bin Laden successor of al Qaeda, over the future of another al Qaeda front, al-Nusra in Syria. The al Qaeda faction became so angry with al-Baghdadi that it cut off connections with him. Then, by declaring himself caliph of the Islamic State, al-Baghdadi challenged al Qaeda leadership directly for the allegiance of all Muslim extremists.

It would be ironic if Islamic extremists in al Qaeda found ISIS too bestial and powerful to tolerate – and devised a plan to dismantle it as a threat to civilization. From his grave, Bluebeard would chortle an insane laugh, as evil battles worse evil, and civilization watches and waits from the sidelines.

*Valerie Ogden is author of Bluebeard: Brave Warrior; Brutal Psychopath (History Publishing Company, November 2014).

The post ISIS Butchers: Medieval Serial Killers On Steroids – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Nepal’s most wanted wildlife criminal and the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice, has been arrested in Malaysia following close international collaboration via INTERPOL channels.

Rajkumar Praja, the ringleader of a rhino poaching network in Nepal, is wanted to serve a 15-year sentence for rhino poaching and trading internationally in rhino horns. Nepali authorities requested a Red Notice, or international wanted persons alert, for the 31-year-old after he fled the country.

In 2013, Nepal Police, with the support of the Nepalese Army and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, arrested a network of more than a dozen poachers in suspected of killing some 19 rhinos in the Chitwan National Park, however Praja managed to escape.

Information exchanged between the INTERPOL National Central Bureaus in Nepal and Malaysia on the case and Praja’s possible whereabouts eventually resulted in his arrest by the Royal Malaysian Police in January 2015, where he was found in possession of a fraudulent passport issued under a false name. He has since been returned to Nepal.

“What we have achieved with the arrest of Rajkumar Praja is a testament to how law enforcement agencies can utilize INTERPOL resources to share information and coordinate beyond national boundaries to combat transnational organized crime,” said DIGP Hemant Malla Thakuri, Director of the Nepal Police Central Investigation Bureau.

“This arrest sends a strong message to criminals hiding in a foreign country that no matter where they are, they are not safe and will be caught one day,” he concluded.

Praja was a target of INTERPOL’s Operation Infra Terra in 2014. As INTERPOL’s first global fugitive operation focused on criminals wanted for environmental crimes, Infra Terra targeted 139 fugitives wanted by 36 member countries for illegal fishing, wildlife trafficking, illegal trade and disposal of waste, illegal logging and trading in illicit ivory and more.

Other high-profile targets of Operation Infra Terra who have been arrested as a result of the global operation include suspected illegal ivory trader Ben Simasiku, and Feisal Mohamed Ali, the alleged leader of an ivory smuggling ring.

INTERPOL’s activities to investigate and disrupt wildlife crime networks operating in Asia come under its Project Predator. The project aims to support and enhance the governance and law enforcement capacity for the conservation of Asian big cats and is primarily funded by the US Agency for International Development.

The post Nepal’s Top Wildlife Criminal Caught In Malaysia appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Talmiz Ahmad*

At the end of December last year, as the 90-year old King Abdullah was admitted to a hospital with a lung infection, Saudi Arabia maintained a respectful calm as its revered monarch of ten years prepared to go into the sunset. But among several American observers there was a near-hysteria as they competed with one another to presage the most dire or outrageous prognostications. The themes were familiar: A fierce power struggle among the royal family members involving princes divided into well-defined factions; the poor health of the crown prince; and the Saudi state on the verge of collapse. Simon Henderson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and one of the most prolific writers on Saudi Arabia confidently predicted two weeks before King Abdullah’s death on January 23 that the “coming transition is unlikely to be smooth” and spoke of “two factions [in the royal family] vying for pre-eminence.”1

Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah. File photo.

Another commentator, Stephen Kinzer, wrote just three days before Abdullah’s demise that “[t]he most intriguing candidate for collapse is Saudi Arabia.”2 He mentioned a possible power struggle within the royal family which could be “intense or violent.” On the same lines, Richard Haass wrote in the Financial Times that “the succession issue has been shelved, not solved,” even though a prince of the next generation aged just 55 years has been named in the succession line.3

Royal Family Numbers

The smooth transfer of power on the day of Abdullah’s death and the clear line of succession for the next two rulers has confounded the doomsayers, but is not surprising to most serious observers of the Kingdom’s royal family. It must be admitted that the family itself, by maintaining a studied opacity about every aspect of its functioning, does not make any effort to facilitate studies by political scientists, leaving the field open to ill-founded speculations. Even the size of the royal family is not known with any degree of certainty. John Gordon Lorrimer of the Indian Civil Service prepared a family tree of the Al Saud family in 1908.4 Starting with Mohammed (d. 1765), the paterfamilias of the family in the 18th century, Lorrimer ended the family tree with the older children of King Abdulaziz (1880-1953), born in the first decade of the last century. Every descendant of every person shown on this chart is a member of the Saudi royal family today.

In 1980, a British military attaché in Riyadh, Brian Lees, prepared an updated family tree, confined largely to the children and grandchildren of King Abdulaziz, who numbered nearly 800 at that time.5 It is estimated that the royal family today numbers at least 15,000 members who are entitled to be referred to as His/Her Highness (HH).6 There is a sub-grouping within the family: All children and grandchildren of monarchs are entitled to be called His/Her Royal Highness (HRH). The number in the latter, more exclusive group is not known, but male members are usually estimated at 1,500.

Royal Family “Politics”

What is astonishing about the family is that, in spite of such large numbers, its affairs remain shrouded in secrecy. There is hardly ever an instance of a prince commenting on family matters, although the size of the family and the sub-groups (complicated by inter-marriages, usually arranged) should inevitably throw up a fair share of disgruntled individuals denied a suitable role in the political or economic order.7 Two points need to be noted in this regard: One, the family has its own meritocracy, so that the most able members from different branches are brought into the government and given a chance to prove themselves; and two, every effort is made to ensure that no section of the family is marginalised to the extent that its discontent festers and corrodes family unity from within. This has enabled the family to cope with extraordinary challenges, such as the abdication of King Saud in 1964, the assassination of King Faisal by a nephew in 1975 and the prolonged illness of King Fahd, when he was largely incapacitated for ten years from 1995 to 2005.

There is certainly “politics” within the family, as in any state order, with monarchs attempting to strengthen themselves by bringing full brothers, sons or members of certain sub-groups close to them by placing them in senior government positions. In this, the royal family is not very different from a modern political party, with members joining factions of like- minded individuals to position themselves for power and influence.

To maintain family unity (and, by extension, the family’s credibility with the Saudi population at large), monarchs tend to function in a collegial manner, so that policies on issues of family or national importance are the result of consensus among senior royals. This imparts continuity and stability to the national order and avoids dissident groups within the family. There is consequently no room for capricious conduct on the part of rulers; thus, while the political order is authoritarian, it is not a tyranny such as Saddam’s Iraq, Gaddafi’s Libya, Syria of the Assads, or Egypt of its four military dictators.

This is not to suggest that there is never any discord within the family. Recall here the abdication of King Saud in 1964, forced upon him by a coalition of senior royals backing Faisal; or more recently, the abrupt dismissal in November 2012 of interior minister Prince Ahmad, full brother of Fahd, Sultan, Nayef and Salman, and a contender for the throne; or the dismissal of Prince Khalid bin Sultan and later of Prince Khalid bin Bandar as deputy defence ministers. But the point to be noted is that in not one instance did any person express dissatisfaction publically at the treatment meted out to him. Clearly, family unity trumps personal ambition. In any case, unhappiness is not allowed to fester, since a position is usually found for the person concerned or his close family member.

Outside the royal family too, there is a meritocracy in place, so that the Kingdom’s leaders have access to the best possible advice. However, no non-royal has any real role in policymaking. Officials, however exalted their position, are advisers and implementers of policy, so that there are no changes if they are moved out.

Appointments by King Salman

The appointments that have been recently made by King Salman have to be seen against this backdrop. He used the Allegiance Council8 to endorse the appointment of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef as deputy crown prince and second deputy prime minister, thus placing him in the line of succession to the throne after Crown Prince Muqrin, the first scion of the next generation of the Al Saud family in this position. He has also removed two sons of the late king who were governors of Riyadh and Mecca provinces, while retaining Prince Miteb bin Abdullah as the head of the National Guard. Most dramatically, he has named a younger son of his, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, aged just 35 years, as defence minister and head of the royal court. These appointments follow previous patterns of kings showing their special affection for their younger sons by giving them exalted positions. Often, such elevations have not survived the departure of the ruler.

On the day of King Abdullah’s death, 34 royal decrees were issued which collectively constitute a thorough overhaul of the government. Besides the succession line and the appointment of governors from the royal family, the king abolished 12 governing bodies and replaced them with just two, the Council of Political and Security Affairs, which will be headed by Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and the Council of Economic and Development Affairs to be headed by his son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, thus giving the latter a position of extraordinary power and influence in the new administration. Again, for the first time in Saudi history, a non-royal military officer has been appointed the head of foreign intelligence.
Already there are speculations in the media and academic circles that the new arrangements are a serious setback to the sons of the former king on the ground that two sons have been removed as governors while Prince Miteb’s aspirations to be named deputy crown prince have been quashed. David Hearst was among the first commentators to rush into print his views on the day of the late king’s death; not surprisingly, he got most things wrong.9 He referred to the new king’s first appointments as a “palace coup” on the ground that Prince Miteb had not been named deputy crown prince and that Khalid al-Tuwaijry had been removed as the head of the royal court.

The scenario does not merit such a dramatic assessment. Given the secrecy that surrounds all royal family matters, Prince Miteb’s ambitions will not be made clear in the near future, if at all.10 His control over the National Guard will in any case ensure that he will remain an important centre of influence in royal counsels for several years to come. What cannot be denied is that Mohammed bin Nayef, besides his excellent pedigree, had been seen as a rising star in the royal family for several years and was known to be close to the late ruler.11 In fact, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came to Riyadh in February 2010, King Abdullah requested him to meet Prince Mohammed (then deputy interior minister) even before the official commencement of the visit, so that he could be briefed on what the Kingdom was doing to combat extremism. Again, Hearst has given disproportionate importance to Tuwaijry; yes, he did enjoy the king’s confidence (as any senior courtier should), but that does not translate into him being the architect of the Saudi policy to back al-Sisi in Egypt, as implied by the author. Contrary to what Hearst says, there should be no change in the Saudi approach to Egypt only due to Tuwaijry’s departure.

More seriously, Hearst has painted a picture of a country with a near- incapacitated ruler, one that is devoid of national institutions and in the throes of a vicious power struggle among senior royals. He repeats that King Salman “is known to have Alzheimer’s, but the exact state of his dementia is a source of speculation.” These points were perhaps first made by Simon Henderson, and have gained credence through repetition, so that in a recent piece, Henderson has referred to sources by name (Bruce Riedel and the BBC) who had merely repeated what he himself had first said about Salman’s health.12 This point has been repeated so many times that scholars no longer feel the need to give any evidence to support their statement.13 While there is no denying the fact that King Salman is 79 years old and has had health problems, he still presides over cabinet meetings, receives foreign dignitaries and travels abroad. It is still much too early to write him off as non-functional.

One last point to make about the royal family pertains to the all-too- frequent references to the so-called “Sudairy Seven,” the seven sons of King Abdulaziz from Princess Hassa Ahmad Al Sudairy, of whom the first four (Fahd, Sultan, Nayef and Salman) have been prominent in Saudi affairs for half a century. After Salman’s accession and the appointment of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef as deputy crown prince, the theme of Sudairy resurgence in royal family matters has been resurrected. This is perhaps being overdone—the Sudairys certainly do not now have the cohesiveness they might have had earlier. Two full brothers, Abdul Rehman and Ahmad, were deliberately excluded from succession, while the children of Crown Prince Sultan do not have important positions so far in the reign of their uncle. Prince Ahmad was removed as interior minister by King Abdullah and Ahmad’s own nephew Mohammed bin Nayef was appointed in his place. The interplay among the royals of the next generation will be influenced, first, by their access to power sources (i.e., security, national guard and the armed forces), and second, by personal ability. In any case, all major decisions on matters of national interest will continue to be taken collectively by the senior royals.

Al Saud and Wahhabiya

A word about the ties of the Al Saud with Wahhabiya: Saudi Arabia is a unique modern state founded on a religio-political affiliation between the royal family and the doctrines of an 18th century Islamic reformist movement that upholds the centrality of God (tawhid, ‘oneness’), and rejects any form of association with Allah. Its tenets are the most rigid and literalist among all of Islam’s schools of thought. These tenets have spilt into the public domain—they provide for hudud punishments (beheadings and amputations of limbs for serious crimes) and impinge on the personal conduct of all residents in the country, enforcing norms of female modesty, restrictions on women’s movements and employment, and gender segregation that do not exist in any other polity. What makes them particularly onerous and obnoxious is the fact that they are enforced by the intrusive institution called the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which enforces its diktat through the ubiquitous muttawwa, loosely referred to as Islam’s religious police. It cannot be denied that while the Saudi state is not a tyranny and its rulers favour co-option over coercion, the muttawwa are an instrument of coercion which, in the name of Islamic norms, are used to enforce conformity and suppress dissent.

However, the affiliation of the state to the tenets of Wahhabiya, while legitimising the rule of the Al Saud, also circumscribes the options available to the rulers and demands their continued subordination to its norms. The affiliation has given a relatively free hand to Wahhabi clergy in the areas of religion, education, and social and cultural life, in return for their support in the political arena. Over the years, this has proved to be a mutually beneficial arrangement. The royal family has obtained fulsome clerical support at times of national crisis, such as the use of Western troops against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait or the mobilisation of a national effort against Al Qaeda, while the clergy have imbued the state order with their most rigid and demanding doctrinal values.

What is more, the requirement of continually being subject to the tenets of Wahhabiya can be used to judge the royal family’s own actions and find them wanting, to see the state order as corrupt, or as indifferent to Muslim interests, or as accommodative of aspects of modernity that are viewed as un-Islamic. These issues led to the first attack on the royal order in 1979, when a radical Islamic group occupied the Haram Sharif in Mecca to protest against the “anti-Islam” policies of the monarchy.

Later, in the 1990s, a group of dissident intellectuals emerged from within the Wahhabi establishment and criticised the royal family for deviating from Islamic values and principles, and demanded a thorough reform of the country’s political, economic, administrative and cultural order. The royal family used coercive measures against these dissidents, collectively referred to as the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, but could not extinguish the campaign. Today, it has re-emerged after the Arab Spring and constitutes the most serious challenge to the Al Saud order.

Domestic Challenges

One of the unique aspects of the rule of the Al Saud family has been its ability to cope successfully with serious challenges that it and the country have faced over the last one hundred years once the modern Kingdom was established. In the early days of national conquest, King Abdulaziz had used the Ikhwan, zealous and ruthless Wahhabi warriors, as his principal armed force. After the Kingdom had been consolidated, the Ikhwan attempted to influence Abdulaziz’s administration so as to make it conform to their rigid norms. The king would not tolerate any challenge to his authority and in time physically annihilated them, thus establishing royal prerogative over the state order.

In the 1950s, the Kingdom faced an ideological and military threat from the revolutionary rulers who had taken power in Egypt, and blandished Arab socialism as the alternative to monarchical rule. The Kingdom used the services of the Muslim Brotherhood members, then living in exile in Saudi Arabia, to counter these secular pan-Arab allures with the alternative of Islamic identity, which resonated with common people in the Arab world. Later, Saudi Arabia mobilised the entire Muslim world on the platform of Islam by leading the establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

In 1979, Saudi Arabia met the twin challenges of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the occupation of the holy mosque in Mecca with two initiatives of its own: One, it supported Iraq in confronting Iran in the First Persian Gulf War to stem the tide of the revolution into the Gulf; and two, it participated in the global jihad in Afghanistan against “godless communism” alongside Pakistan and the US, giving birth, as an unintended consequence, to a pervasive jihadi mindset among Muslims globally as well as to Al Qaeda, the institution that would represent their aspirations. Throughout the 1990s, it coped with the dissident movement organised by the Awakening Sheikhs (the Sahwa Movement) through large-scale arrests and long detentions.

However, the havoc that was wreaked upon the United States on 9/11 by a 19-person group that included 15 Saudi nationals dealt a body-blow to the Kingdom’s self-confidence and compelled it to review its accommodative approach to jihad both at home and in the region. Led by King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia, under considerable US pressure, embarked on reforming its education system, and, through a series of national dialogues, began a process of nation-wide consultations on national issues such as democracy, place of religion in the polity, gender-related issues and human rights. In this period, the ruler was inundated with petitions advocating comprehensive national reform, and there was every indication that sweeping changes relating to human rights, gender issues and elections were in the offing. However, with the inability of the US forces to subdue the insurgency in Iraq, external pressure in support of reform died away and the US re-affirmed its ties with the authoritarian rulers in West Asia.

Deteriorating Strategic Environment

Saudi leaders strongly counselled the US against the assault on Iraq in 2003, pointing out that regime change would empower the Shia and thus redound to the advantage of Iran. Its concerns were well-founded. The US commitment to the Shia in Iraq came to define Iraqi politics purely in sectarian terms, so that over time the Sunni community felt increasingly marginalised, even as Iran expanded its influence in the country. There are reports that state and private sources in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries backed the mobilisation of Sunni groups to oppose the Baghdad government, thus directly or inadvertently preparing the ground for the jihadi forces that emerged in Iraq—the Al Qaeda in Iraq under Zarqawi, which later became the Islamic State of Iraq under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, before emerging in June 2014 as the Islamic State of Iraq and (Greater) Syria (ISIS) under the same leader.

During the 2000s, Iranian influence came to dominate much of West Asia: The Hamas in Palestine are beholden to Iran as are the Hizbollah in Lebanon, and Syria has already been a strategic ally for a few decades. Iran then made an entry into Yemeni affairs by supporting a nascent Zaydi (Shia) dissident movement, the Al Houthi group, which was seeking to assert Zaydi influence in Yemeni affairs, which it had lost due to the increasing affiliation of the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, with Sunni groups sponsored by Saudi Arabia. Thus, at the end of 2010, Saudi Arabia saw itself at a great strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis Iran across the whole region, and viewed the so-called “Shia Crescent” surrounding it as a threatening reality.

Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Photo Credit: Presidenza della Repubblica (Italy), Wikipedia Commons.

The Arab Spring further complicated the situation from the Saudi perspective. With the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Kingdom lost an important strategic partner, and the situation worsened with the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt, given the possibility that groups affiliated with it would take over power in other countries where tyrants were toppled as well. The last straw for the Kingdom was the demand for reform in Bahrain; the Saudi view was that any reform there would empower the majority Shia community which would bring Iranian influence to the very doorstep of Saudi Arabia, besides encouraging similar agitations for reform among the Shia in the Kingdom itself.

Saudi Arabia saw these developments as an existential threat. In defence of its interests, it now abandoned its quietist, behind-the-scenes diplomatic approach to regional developments and embarked on an active policy of confrontation against Iran, commencing with regime change in Syria. Rami Khouri sees this period as “a new season of Saudi assertiveness.”14 Its intention was to snap Iran’s ties with Syria and the Hizbollah, so that two major Arab states would return to the mainstream Arab fold in one stroke. Similarly in Egypt, Saudi Arabia confronted the Brotherhood challenge by supporting the military coup by General Al Sisi and providing the latter with the required financial support that was initially denied to the regime by western powers.

The Kingdom’s activist policies have not yielded the results it had anticipated; on the contrary, the security scenario has deteriorated considerably to its disadvantage. First, regime change in Syria has proved to be much more difficult than the Kingdom had anticipated. Although over 220,000 people have been killed, millions displaced and major cities destroyed, the regime remains resilient, with no sign of a robust US military intervention to topple Bashar Al Assad. In fact, there are now suggestions that the US may have given up on regime change and sees the Assad regime as the main instrument against the ISIS.15

Second, the conflict in Syria and the tacit support given by the GCC countries to Sunni dissident elements over the last decade have led to the emergence of the ISIS, which has declared a caliphate in territories militarily occupied by it across the Levant. ISIS is now in competition with Al Qaeda for ideological influence and geographical space, and poses a doctrinal and military threat to the Kingdom, thousands of whose citizens have rushed to join this militant movement and savour Sunni resurgence and military triumph.

Third, to great Saudi dismay, just when its competition with Iran was at its peak, the US, at the end of 2013, opened a dialogue with Iran to address the longstanding nuclear issue. While progress has been slow and a positive outcome is still not assured, the cordial atmosphere at the talks and constructive approach on both sides have considerably diluted the ill-will and animosity that had characterised the West’s interaction with Iran over the last few decades. This new Iran-West bonhomie is creating a nightmare scenario for the Saudis, in which the US could countenance a greater Iranian role in the security architecture of the region.

Four, what has further aggravated the situation for Saudi Arabia is that the hitherto ragtag Houthi movement has now become audacious enough to mount an assault on the Yemeni capital itself, occupy large parts of the country, remove President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his government, and put in place their own governing council. Thus, the political order put in place by the GCC in 2011 (after encouraging Saleh to step down) is in disarray. The Kingdom is watching with concern as its former protégé, Saleh, has been guiding the Houthis in expanding their presence across the country while the government in Sanaa has ignominiously ceded power.16 More seriously, the Houthi triumph means for the Saudis a pernicious Iranian influence on the other side of the 1,400-km southern border it shares with Yemen.

Security Prospects

In the face of the Arab Spring, the Kingdom felt sufficiently threatened to make a series of bold moves of its own, such as distancing itself from the US—which it felt had betrayed Mubarak and showed no regard for Saudi interests in respect to Syria and Iran. Happily, the shared threat from ISIS has brought the US back to West Asia in a military role, in which it is being supported by GCC military forces. But recent developments indicate a major change in Saudi-US ties: The earlier relationship, where each side gave full and unquestioning support to the other, has irretrievably ended. Recall here the US’s accommodativeness in re-affirming its partnership with Saudi Arabia after the attacks of 9/11, and the logistical support given by the Kingdom during the US assault on Iraq even when it opposed the attacks and felt they would advantage Iran strategically. The recent Saudi posture suggests the emergence of a new “transactional” relationship in which each side will take positions on regional issues in terms of its own interests. This is a coming-of-age on the part of Saudi Arabia, in that it now feels confident enough to project political and military power in the region.17 Saudi leaders Abdullah and Salman defined and implemented this new approach, which will be the hallmark of Saudi diplomacy in the years to come.

Arab commentators have deplored the deteriorating security situation in West Asia over the last two years. In a recent article, the Kuwaiti observer Abdullah al Shayji stated that earlier he had believed 2013 to be the worst year for the Arabs, but he had later felt that 2014 was worse, when “the Arab centre had broken at the seams.”18 However, it already seems that 2015 will be even more damaging, due to the death of King Abdullah, the collapse of the government in Yemen, extremist activity in the Sinai, falling oil prices, and overt threats from President Rouhani against those he holds responsible for the sharp decline in oil prices, for which he has named Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The precipitate fall in oil prices over the last six months has important implications for the health of the West Asian economies as well as their political prospects. The causes of this fall are being widely debated: They are clearly linked with a short-term oversupply which could be corrected in a year or so. While many analysts and policymakers have looked toward Saudi Arabia to lead a cut in OPEC production, the Kingdom has seen this as ineffective and has decided not to intervene in the markets. However, Iran, whose exports are severely limited by sanctions, has been adversely hit; the poor state of its ties with Saudi Arabia has led its leaders to accuse the Kingdom of deliberately seeking to harm Iran and also to make some intemperate remarks about retaliatory action. The oil issue would certainly benefit from Saudi-Iranian engagement and dialogue.

The regional scenario inherited by King Salman has been described by Rami Khouri as ”total chaos in some areas, partial state collapse in others, widespread use of political violence and terrorism, and massive intervention by foreign actors.”19 He then goes on to point out that all these conflicts are directly linked to greater regional powers and at times even reflect global confrontations, so that in effect “there are no more local conflicts in this region [West Asia]”—almost all of them are the result of the Saudi-Iran regional strategic and sectarian competition.

Consequently, if peace and security are to prevail, King Salman and the new Saudi leadership will need to review their confrontationist approach against Iran which has yielded little advantage to them, but has strengthened the jihadi elements, spread the virus of sectarianism across West Asia, and caused death and destruction across the region. While the threat from ISIS has brought the US to the region in a limited military role, there is no indication of whether its effort, made up mainly of air attacks (with some ground action by the Kurds and the refurbished Iraqi army), will truly be effective or even whether the US has the stamina to stay on in West Asia in the face of increasing domestic disquiet. While the Kingdom has revealed its self-assurance in defining and projecting its interests on the basis of its political and military resources, the challenge before it is to engage with Iran constructively on the basis of this same self-confidence. It is only through collaborative effort with Iran that ISIS can be combatted effectively, Iraq stabilised, the Syrian conflict brought under control, the turmoil in Yemen ended and the sectarian scourge neutralised.

Iran – Saudi Arabia relations

Saudi-Iranian cooperation and the defining of their actual collaboration on the ground will not be easily achieved in view of their deep-seated mutual suspicion and, on the Saudi side, a sense of existential threat from Iran which has sectarian and strategic dimensions. But, the fact that the Americans are now committed to a rapprochement with Iran, see no merit in regime change in Syria and are not averse to some interaction with Brotherhood figures20 should affirm to the new Saudi leadership the need for “new thinking,” as suggested by Tehran Times in a recent comment.21 The paper said that conditions that had prompted the hostility between them “have fundamentally altered,” and that the two countries now face “several unrelenting challenges” which should encourage them to work with each other.

On similar lines, Rami Khouri has pointed out:

I say there is no real conflict between Saudis and Iranians because these two countries do not threaten each other militarily or strategically, though they do react hysterically when they sense that the other is trying to undermine them ideologically. Tehran and Riyadh are regional powers who must be able to protect their national strategic interests in the region. They can do this best by having good bilateral relations and … agreeing on a regional security framework.22

Clearly, the advent of a new regime in Riyadh should be an opportunity not for continuity but real change. Re-engaging with Iran is likely to be one of two most serious challenges before the new regime in Riyadh in the coming months. The other will be that of domestic reform.

Domestic Prospects

As noted above, the Sahwa movement was cowed down in the 1990s as a result of state intimidation. However, it re-emerged after the events of 9/11 when pressures for reform from internal and external sources were at their peak. An ”Islamo-liberal” petition, incorporating Islamic principles and modern ideas of democracy, was submitted to the ruler. The petitioners sought a constitution, separation of powers in the polity, human rights, and elections and an elected assembly. In December 2003, another petition called for the setting up of an “Islamic constitutional monarchy.”23 This effort at reform too died away in the face of US indifference and state coercion.

Later, the Arab Spring was enthusiastically welcomed in Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Salman Awda, who had been a lead role-player in the Sahwa movement of the 1990s, now broke his silence: In a statement addressed to “all Arab countries,” he called on the authoritarian rulers to “proclaim [their] commitment to substantial and radical reform,” and went on to say:

We have witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt that a spark set off in one place can catch fire elsewhere in an instant. We need a new relationship between the ruler and the ruled, one that is not based on fear.24

Further on in April 2014, he criticised the crushing of democracy in Egypt thus:

The Gulf governments are fighting Arab democracy, because they fear it will come here. [The coup in Egypt] is a Gulf project, not an Egyptian project. … If [the Saudi government] continues on this path, it will lose its own people and invite disaster.25

This view was echoed by another Islamist activist who said,

“[Countries supporting the coup in Egypt are] taking part in committing a sin and an aggression forbidden by the laws of Islam.”26

The Kingdom now has a new generation of intellectuals who are active in academic circles and the social media. According to Stephane Lacroix, a close observer of the Sahwa and contemporary Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia, these activists are “the only force [in the Kingdom] theoretically able to threaten the system.”27 Since the commencement of the Arab Spring, they have been demanding constitutional reform, including a constitutional monarchy, an elected and empowered parliament and a prime minister answerable to it. The regime has responded with generous financial gifts for the poor, the young and the establishment clergy, with coercive measures being used against social media activists.

As of now, the promises of the Arab Spring lie in ruins, with authoritarian rule restored in Egypt and civil conflict and widespread destruction in Syria, Libya and Yemen. In this scenario, it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for reform on democratic lines in Saudi Arabia and other Arab autocracies. However, though the Kingdom’s leaders may feel they have neutralised the reform movement, there is in fact no room for complacency for King Salman and his immediate successors for several reasons.

First, the idea of a democratic order has seeped deep into the Arab psyche; it is now intolerant of authoritarian rule, regardless of the basis on which it may be justified, such as national security or economic transformation. Second, the gap between the Islamists and the secular- liberals has been steadily bridged, with compromises being made on both sides, so that there now exists a pervasive Islamo-liberal discourse in the Kingdom that has reconciled the norms of Islam with the principles of democracy and has brought activists from the two streams onto the same platform.

Third, the agitation for reform in Saudi Arabia is being spearheaded by intellectuals steeped in Wahhabi learning but also familiar with modern political values and institutions, so that their Islamist discourse has a substantial liberal content. Therefore, they cannot accept national policies that have placed their country on the wrong side of almost every issue that resonates globally: Freedom, human rights, multiculturalism, transparency and accountability, gender sensitivity and personal dignity.

Four, given that the Sahwa movement has shown its resilience and dynamism over 20 years, in spite of considerable state coercion (as also generous blandishments to allure the disgruntled), it is unlikely that the modern-day activists will be easily intimidated or compromised.

The Saudi leadership that has just emerged perhaps represents the “last gasp of the old order”;28 the Saudi commentator, Jamal Khashoggi has explained this best:

It’s time to raise questions for the future. Democracy, popular participation or shura [consultation]—call it what you what you wish—will inevitably be realised. It’s a natural and inevitable development of history. One of most important conditions is the right to choose…. Democracy cannot be postponed until prosperity prevails and the economy improves and people’s awareness increases… Tyranny cannot achieve prosperity and ensure a stable economy because the rules of disclosure, accountability and punishment will not be respected.29

About the author:
*Talmiz Ahmad joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1974. He served in Kuwait, Baghdad and Sanaa early in his career, followed by postings in New York, Jeddah, London and Pretoria. He was the ambassador to Saudi Arabia twice, between 2000-03 and then again in 2010-11. He also served as ambassador to the UAE (2007-10) and Oman (2003-04). He was Additional Secretary for International Cooperation in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas during 2004-06. In 2006-07, he was Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs. After retirement from foreign service in 2011, he worked in the corporate sector in Dubai for three years. He is now a business consultant in Dubai. He has written three books: Reform in the Arab World: External Influences and Regional Debates (India Research Press, 2005), Children of Abraham at War: The Clash of Messianic Militarisms (Aakar Books, 2010) and The Islamist Challenge in West Asia: Doctrinal and Political Competitions after the Arab Spring (Pentagon Press, 2013). He writes and lectures frequently on the politics of West Asia, political Islam and energy security.

He is currently a Visiting Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation as Occasional Paper 59 (PDF).

Endnotes:
1. Simon Henderson, “Royal Roulette,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2015, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/royal-roulette; WINEP has been described “as part of the core” of the Israel lobby in Washington, which it has itself denied.
2. Stephen Kinzer, “Terrorism in Paris, Sydney the legacy of colonial blunders,” The Boston Globe, January 18, 2015, www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/18.
3. Richard Haass, “Saudi Arabia: threat from ISIS will only grow,” Financial Times, January 26, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/868f3396-a319- 11e4-9c06-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QxBarLEp.
4. John Gordon Lorrimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. A few dozen copies were first published by the Government of India as a secret document in 1908 and 1915 in order to provide British agents and policymakers with “a convenient and portable handbook to the places and interests with which they are likely to be concerned”; reprinted in six volumes [5000 pages] by Cambridge Archive Editions in 1986; Vol. 6 contains 23 genealogical tables of the ruling families of the Gulf, including the Al Saud.
5. Brian M. Lees, A Handbook of the Al Saud Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia (London: Royal Genealogies, 1980).
6. “Palace Coup,” The Economist, March 14, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/03/saudi- royal-family.
7. A rare instance of public dissent was the outburst of one Prince Khaled Farhan Al Saud in August 2013, who accused the monarchy of corruption and silencing all voices of dissent. (He seems to be from a minor cadet branch of the family.)
8. Set up by King Abdullah in October 2006, the Allegiance Council initially had 35 members, comprising of sons and a few grandsons of King Abdulaziz. Its principal responsibility is to appoint the crown prince. This council approved Prince Nayef as crown prince after Sultan in 2011, but was not convened when Salman was so named after Nayef’s death in 2012. In 2014, the council met to affirm Muqrin as deputy crown prince, which it did with a three-fourth majority. (King Abdullah sought the council’s support since Muqrin’s mother was not a Najdi tribal but a Yemeni, which should normally have ruled him out of succession; Muqrin (b.1943) is the youngest living son of King Abdulaziz.)
9. David Hearst, “A Saudi Palace Coup,” Huffington Post, January 23, 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hearst/a-saudi-palace-coup.
10. In a recent interview, Theodore Karasik, an academic and risk consultant based in Dubai, says it was the conventional wisdom in the Arabian Peninsula that “King Abdullah was attempting to promote his son Prince Miteb into the succession chart.” “Saudi sovereign transition: Dr. Theodore Karasik [One],” SUSRIS, February 3, 2015, susris.com/2015/02/03/sovereign-transition-in-saudi-arabia.
11. Prince Mohammed has been a hero-figure in the Kingdom for his pioneering role in seeking to rehabilitate jihadis through a re-education programme and because he survived a suicide bomb attack in August 2009 perpetrated by Al Qaeda; he was also responsible for counter- terrorism action. From February 2014, he handled the Syria file with King Abdullah’s son, Prince Miteb. F. Gregory Gause III has this to say about Prince Mohammed: “He earned a reputation as an efficient manager and an effective strategist, but also as an opponent of political dissent. He has presided over a crackdown on political activists of both Islamist and more liberal inclinations since the Arab Spring.” “Saudi Arabia’s Game of Thrones,” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142842/f-gregory-gause- iii/saudi-arabias-game-of-thrones.
12. Simon Henderson, “The Dangers of Saudi Succession,” The Atlantic, January 26, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2015/01/the-dangers-of-saudi-succession/ 384820/.
13. This cavalier attitude is perhaps being reviewed: The Washington Post retracted and published a correction of its report that King Salman was suffering from dementia; the paper now said this claim was “too speculative and unsubstantiated” and did not meet its “standards for publication.” Salma El Shahed, “WashPost retracts ‘unsubstantiated’ report on King Salman’s health,” Al Arabiya, February 2, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/television-and- radio/2015/02/02/Washington-Post-apologizes-for-unsubstantiated- report-on-King-Salman-s-health.html.
14. Rami G. Khouri, “Will royal succession change Saudi Arabia’s regional role?,” Al Jazeera, January 26, 2015, www.america.aljazeera.com/ articles/2015/1/26.
15. Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Springtime for Assad: Syria dictator in spotlight as potential US ally against ISIS,” Huffington Post, January 28, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/bashar-assad- obama_n_6559194.html?ir=India; Eyad Abu Shakra, “US Middle East policy after the Midterms,” Asharq al Awsat, November 6, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/11/article55338249/opinion-us- middle-east-policy-after-the-midterms.
16. Haifa Al Maashi, “Partnership takes backstage as tribe dominates in Yemen,” Gulf News, January 31, 2015, http://gulfnews.com/ opinions/columnists/partnership-takes-backstage-as-tribe- dominates-in-yemen-1.1449278.
17. Rami Khouri has pointed out, “Perhaps the most intriguing facet of Saudi foreign policy assertiveness has been its independence from US influence… But [Saudi] tough talk doesn’t… disguise the fact [that] many Saudi attempts to project power in the region in recent years have floundered or failed, often to the benefit of Iran.” Khouri, “Will royal succession.”
18. Abdullah Al Shayji, “Arab world can expect more turmoil this year,” Gulf News, February 2, 2015, http://gulfnews.com/ opinions/columnists/arab-world-can-expect-more-turmoil-this-year- 1.1449905.
19. Rami Khouri, “No succession drama, but plenty of regional drama,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, January 28, 2015, http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.as px?aid=754.
20. Linda S. Heard, “US Hobnobbing with ‘the enemy’,” Gulf News, February 2, 2015, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us- hobnobbing-with-the-enemy-1.1450344.
21. “Iran-Saudi ties: toward a measured assessment,” IRNA, January 12, 2015, http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81461044/.
22. Rami G. Khouri, “Changed Ties with Iran will Re-configure the Middle East,” Middle East Online, May 16, 2014, http://www.middle-east- online.com/english/?id=65997.
23. Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in ContemporarySaudiArabia, (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress, 2011), p. 245-49.
24. Quoted in: Jean Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprisings (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 159-60.
25. Robert F. Worth, “Leftward Shift by Conservative Cleric Leaves Saudis Perplexed,” New York Times, April 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/04/05/world/middleeast/conservative-saudi-cleric-salman-al- awda.html?_r=0.
26. Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring,” (research paper no.36, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in Gulf States, May 2014), p. 26.
27. Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists,” p.1.
28. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “Arab Spring, Islamic Ice Age: Islamism, Democracy, and the Dictatorship of the “Liberalism of Fear” in the Era of Revolutions,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 30, no.4 (2013): 10.
29. Jamal Khashoggi, “It’s democracy and not political Islam,” Al Arabiya News, November 17, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/ en/views/news/middle-east/2014/11/17/It-s-democracy-and-not- political-Islam.html.

The post Royal Succession In Saudi Arabia: Challenges Before The Desert Kingdom – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Georgian PM’s special envoy for relations with Russia, Zurab Abashidze, said implementation of the 2011 Swiss-brokered Georgia-Russia agreement on monitoring of trade between the two countries will be “one of the central issues” of discussions when he meets Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin in Prague later this month.

Georgia agreed to give its go-ahead to Russia’s WTO membership only after Tbilisi and Moscow signed a Swiss-mediated agreement in November, 2011, envisaging putting in place sophisticated systems for tracking and auditing of cargo passing through breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The agreement envisages, among other issues, hiring of “neutral private company” to carry out monitoring of cargo movement through three “trade corridors” two of which run in the breakaway regions and the third one on the Zemo Larsi-Kazbegi border crossing point on the undisputed section of Georgia-Russia border. Georgian negotiators at the time argued that this provision, setting unified “trade regime” on all three sections, located both in breakaway regions and in undisputed part of Georgia, was a significant achievement for Tbilisi. Monitoring should be carried out, among other means, also through presence of company representatives at entry/exit points of these corridors, meaning that they will be present outside of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

SGS, the world’s largest inspection, verification, testing and certification company headquartered in Geneva, has been selected for carrying out the monitoring.

Abashidze said that work has been underway on the text of contracts, which the company has to sign separately with Georgia and Russia.

The work of the company will be financed by Georgia and Russia in equivalent of the costs of the work performed by the company in respective countries. While being “accountable” before Switzerland, according to the deal, the company will also have to “regularly report all its findings” to the Joint Committee, a body that has to be established by Georgia, Russia and Switzerland to supervise the implementation of the agreement.

“The work that was underway since 2011 [after the signing of the agreement] is actually already over and now we have to agree with the Russian side when we are starting to actually impalement this agreement,” Abashidze said, adding that it has to be agreed when the contracts with the company will be signed, when the joint committee will be established. “And after that the actual implementation of the agreement will start.”

“In order to clarify these issues we will meet in Prague in bilateral format [with Karasin],” Abashidze continued. “Our Swiss partners are informed. Our EU partners are also informed. By the way I will have consultations in Brussels in coming days about the Georgian-Russian relations, which will be then followed by a meeting in Prague [with Karasin].”

“Now the time has come to start the implementation of this agreement,” he added.

Abashidze said that nothing has been changed in the original agreement that was signed between the two countries in 2011.

According to this agreement Georgia and Russia will also have to provide a private company with standard set of data on all goods that enter or exit the trade corridors, among them detailed information about cargo, name and address of a consignee, country of export, country of origin and final destination of cargo, invoices, information on means of transport crossing the border. This information in addition will also be sent on monthly basis by Georgia and Russia to the WTO’s Integrated Data Base, which will also be audited by a private company.

The agreement also envisages carrying out monitoring through “electronic seals on all cargo entering trade corridors”, as well as GPS/GPRS monitoring systems for tracking the movement of cargo after its entry into the trade corridors.

Planned meeting of Abashidze and Karasin will be their first one in last four months. These meetings, informally known as Abashidze-Karasin format, was launched in December, 2012 and focus mostly on trade and economic relations. But their last meeting, which was held in Prague in October, was apparently dominated by a treaty, which Russia eventually signed with breakaway Abkhazia in November and which Tbilisi condemned as a step towards the region’s “annexation” by Russia.

Representatives from UNM opposition party, who have long been highly critical of Abashidze-Karasin format, criticized the authorities for resumption of these meetings. Zurab Tchiaberashvili of UNM, who in his capacity of Georgia’s ambassador to Switzerland was a member of Georgian negotiating team on WTO deal with Russia in 2011, said that implementation of WTO deal between Russia and Georgia is very important for Georgia, but no Abashidze-Karasin meeting was needed for it. Instead, he said, the sides should meet in presence of Swiss mediators to discuss the launch of implementation of this agreement.

Speaking at a news conference on February 17, Abashidze said that among other issues that he plans to discuss with Karasin will be the fate of those Georgian citizens, who are convicted in Russia for spying in favor of Georgia. Last year several Georgian citizens, who were serving prison terms in Russia, were handed over to Georgia.

Announcement about the planned meeting was first made by the Russian Foreign Ministry earlier on February 17, which said that Karasin and Abashidze held a telephone conversation to discuss “some of the practical issues of bilateral Russian-Georgian relations,” adding that the two diplomats agreed to meet in Prague in late February.

The post Georgian, Russian Diplomats To Meet Late February appeared first on Eurasia Review.

For Naftali Bennett, leader of the Jewish Home party, to become a Prime Minister, or even Defense Minister under another dangerously misguided Netanyahu government, is nothing but a kiss of death to the peace process and foretells the assured destruction of the Jews’ dream to live in a free, secure, and peaceful sanctuary.

By Dr. Alon Ben-Meir*

It is hard to imagine how a devious, delusionary and destructive individual like Naftali Bennett, the leader of the Jewish Home party, can rise to prominence while openly advocating a racist political agenda. His “solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a recipe for obliterating Israel as both Jewish and democratic, and converting it into an apartheid state, reviled by the international community and condemned to live in isolation and disgrace.

No, this is not what Israel was created for, and the fate of the country cannot be entrusted to the hands of a conniving hypocrite like Bennett. He is an imposter whose rainbow political agenda is nothing but a cover for an insidious plan to deprive the Palestinians of a state their own, but little does he realize that it will bring Israel ever closer to self-destruction.

In an arrogant and unflinching manner, he declares that since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is stuck, it is time for new thinking. Israel should focus, he argues, on improving the lives of the Palestinians by “upgrading Palestinian autonomy in areas A and B,” and goes on to say that the Palestinians will have “political independence” and can run their internal affairs as they see fit.

He is also generous to offer the Palestinians a “massive upgrade of roads and infrastructure, as well as the removal of roadblocks and checkpoints,” and to “build economic bridges… between Israelis and Palestinians.”

But, here is the caveat: “The Palestinian entity will be short of a state. It will not control its own borders.” And the worst is yet to come—his plan is to annex Area C, which represents 60 percent of the West Bank.

From his perspective, the Israeli settlements should continue to expand, starting with the annexation of the main three blocs by “applying Israeli law and asserting national sovereignty in those blocs.”

What this means is that the Palestinians will be allowed to live in cantons in places like Ramallah, Jenin, Bethlehem, and other small cities and villages—provided, of course, they behave themselves and dare not threaten or commit any violent act against Israel.

To be sure, Bennett is offering the Palestinians improved conditions in the same prison where they currently reside. Their “new” prison will now be renovated and better furnished, with open air and even clean, running water.

Bennett does not accept the premise that the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own, but rather they must settle for the crumbs that Israel tosses them.

After all, he maintains that “we are not occupiers in our land,” and out of compassion the Israelis are prepared to give up a big share of their homeland – a land which is historically theirs. What is more, this is the “Land of Israel,” which has been bequeathed to them in perpetuity by the Almighty.

As a hard core religious, revisionist Zionist, Bennett finds great comfort in resorting to his Savior. He justifies his twisted political agenda by putting the onus on God: “Public opinion isn’t my compass, the Torah is my compass.” How convenient!

Religious conservatives often like to claim that “If there is no God, everything is permitted.” But as the philosopher Slavoj Žižek has observed, it is precisely the reverse that is the case: “If there is a God, then anything is permitted… it is for those who refer to ‘god’ in a brutally direct way, perceiving themselves as instruments of his will, that everything is permitted” [emphasis added].

Although he admits that the proposal is not perfect, as “it seems to go against everything Israel, the Palestinians and the international community have worked toward over the last 20 years,” it should be the government’s policy, he says, “because there is a new reality in the Middle East.”

Bennett should know that his plan is not only imperfect, it is an illusion, as if the Palestinians have no say and will simply bow to his whims. Under what circumstances will any Palestinian accept the continuing occupation under the guise of self-rule?

Bennett is mired in illusions, as illusions are based on wishes and not reality and one of the predictable psychological consequences of holding onto them is denial; that is, denial of the stubborn reality which refuses to accommodate itself to one’s pipedreams.

The Palestinians want to live in their own independent state—in their homeland as well—and this is the bitter, unshakable reality that Bennett must face. The Palestinians have resisted the existence of Israel for decades and now they have come to accept the two-state solution, precisely “because there is a new reality in the Middle East”—Israel’s unshakable reality.

There is nothing that Bennett or any of his schemers can do to change that, just as much as there is absolutely nothing the Palestinians can do to dislodge Israel.

All that any Israeli leader can justifiably demand is a permanent cessation of all hostilities, which the Palestinians must ensure if they wish to be independent. Any peace agreement ought to be structured in such a way to meet this unqualified Israeli requirement.

For Bennett to invoke the withdrawal from Gaza and the violence that erupted as a case in point, which must not be repeated in the West Bank, is disingenuous and misleading. No one in their right mind should evacuate the West Bank overnight, the way Prime Minister Sharon withdrew from Gaza.

Any negotiated peace agreement with the Palestinians will have to be implemented in stages over a period of at least ten years, with security arrangements fully coordinated with the Palestinians that leaves nothing to chance. This must be coupled with economic developments and cooperation on every level to foster trust and mutually-vested interests.

Only a suicidal Israeli government would follow Bennett’s nightmarish political treachery. For Bennett to become a Prime Minister, or even Defense Minister under another dangerously misguided Netanyahu government, is nothing but a kiss of death to the peace process and foretells the assured destruction of the Jews’ dream to live in a free, secure, and peaceful sanctuary.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

The post Israel’s Naftali Bennett: Demagogue On The Loose – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Green alternatives to conventional lighting – such as LED bulbs – are increasingly being used in homes and offices due to their high efficiency and extremely long lifetimes. In contrast, their use in the lighting of architectural features and large public spaces has to date been limited. Key problems include a perceived decrease in light intensity and strength along with poor uniformity over large areas.

In order to overcome these challenges, the EU-funded LASSIE project, which was launched in January 2014, is developing innovative, large-area, low-cost solid-state lighting (SSL) modules that aim to offer high efficiency and high lighting quality. Given that the EU has sought an outright ban on incandescent light sources by 2020, this represents a real market opportunity for energy-efficient lighting solutions.

SSL uses not only semiconductor light-emitting diodes (LEDs) but also organic light-emitting diodes (OLED) or polymer light-emitting diodes (PLED) as sources of illumination rather than electrical filaments (as used in fluorescent bulbs). Compared to incandescent lighting, SSL creates visible light with reduced heat generation and less energy dissipation.

Furthermore, the typically small mass of a solid-state electronic lighting device provides for greater resistance to shock and vibration compared to brittle glass tubes/bulbs and long, thin filament wires. They also eliminate filament evaporation, potentially increasing the life span of the illumination device.

This means that SSL is incredibly efficient and offers a greener alternative to conventional lighting. LED bulbs are mercury-free, have a long lifetime and could help Europe to achieve significant energy savings if rolled out extensively. Indeed, by switching to LED lights, Europe could decrease carbon dioxide emissions from electric power use by up to 50 % in just over 20 years.

Over the next two years, the LASSIE project, which has received EU funding totalling EUR 3.15 million, will trial new lighting modules that integrate light-management structures with new colour changing coatings that contain highly efficient and reliable organic fluorescent dyes. LED chips and multispectral sensors for intelligent colour-sensing will also be installed.

The project specifically targets the standard sizes used by the professional lighting sector, thus ensuring compatibility for the fast deployment of intelligent LED solutions. The end result will be a selection of viable low-cost, energy efficient architectural lighting modules that combine the efficiency and long lifetime of LEDs with the flexibility of colour-changing coatings. The team is confident that the lighting quality will be able to match anything on the market.

The LASSIE project will dramatically increase the market penetration of LEDs and other SSL innovations, and help to encourage the rapid adoption of new SSL lighting modules. The project is due for completion in December 2016.

Source: CORDIS

The post Lighting The Way To An Energy-Efficient Europe appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hindu travelers are arriving from all over the country and neighbouring India at the temple of Pashupatinath, Nepal’s most sacred shrine situated along the banks of the Bhagmati River on the eastern side of the capital Kathmandu.

The pilgrimage is marking the Maha Shivaratri festival which began yesterday. Thousands of volunteers have been put in charge of handling the crowds, and 5,000 security force members were deployed to impede any acts of violence and maintain public order. Maha Shivaratri is the festival devoted to lord Shiva, in the manifestation of Pashupatinath, meaning Lord of Beasts.

The immense logistic operation has begun, as organizers are scrambling to provide food, hygienic services, drinking water and medical services to the around one-million pilgrims, hosted in the temple compound and traditional hostels. At least half the participants should be able to visit Shiva Lingam, Lord Shiva in the form of a phallus, which is the focus point of the recurrence.

The Pashupatinath temple is on the UNESCO World Heritage Sites’s list and is among the world’s most ancient active Hindu temples, according to the legend built in the 5th century BC.

The post Nepal: 1 Million Pilgrims Expected At Pashupatinath Temple appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Mohsen Shariatinia*

Wang Yi, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China, paid a visit to Iran on the official invitation of the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Sunday, February 15, 2014.

There are some noteworthy points about his Tehran trip:

1. As announced by both countries’ officials, the Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to pay an official visit to Iran, which will be the first of its kind during the past ten years. The anticipated trip will be a hallmark in bilateral relations between the two countries and will need suitable grounds to take place. Perhaps, providing grounds for that trip has been one of the key issues discussed by foreign ministers of Iran and China in their bilateral discussions.

2. The foreign policy of China in the period which started in 2012 and will probably continue up to 2022, during which the fifth generation of the country’s leaders will be in power, is apparently undergoing a strategic U-turn. This means that during this period, China is practically leaving behind its past silent and passive diplomacy in favor of adopting a new foreign policy approach that is proactive and based on initiatives. The new Chinese leaders have so far come up with the following initiatives during the past two years:

• Revival of the Silk Road economic highway, whose proposal was offered during a visit to Central Asian countries by the Chinese president. Since that time, China has been ardently pursuing this initiative;
• Proposing a new security structure for Asia, which was offered by China during the latest summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA);
• Seeking a new type of relations among big powers (in order to regulate China’s relations with the United States);
• Proposing establishment of an Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank as well as the New Development Bank (NDB), which was formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank.

Proposing such initiatives and further activation of China’s diplomatic efforts across the world, clearly shows that Chinese officials are attaching high importance to “global action,” in their new political agenda. This type of action has prompted some people in the Western countries to ironically call it the new “Chinese imperialism.” Iran, for its own turn, is a country, which along with the region where it is located, enjoys high geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. Therefore, it is natural for Iran to be at the focus of attention for any global power, including China. On the other hand, management and regulation of relations with the emerging world power is of high significance to Iran.

3. China seeks a variety of benefits through further expansion of relations with Iran. Economic benefits of relations with Iran will include purchasing more crude oil from Iran and securing a strong foothold in Iranian market and economy, which has been a major goal for China. On the other hand, China wants to use Iran as a leverage in any possible bargaining with the United States, Europe, Israel and the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council [(P)GCC]. China also eyes more cooperation with Iran in those areas where the two countries’ interests overlap, including with regard to the ongoing crisis in Syria and fighting Salafist terrorism. At the same time, China is naturally trying to prevent Iran’s increasing maneuvering room in international arena from having a possible negative impact on its interests in the above fields.

4. During past years, especially when Iran was under tremendous international sanctions, China insisted that diplomacy is the sole way to find a solution to Iran’s nuclear case. Now that everybody believes in diplomacy on this issue, China can play a more proactive role in this regard, though it has practically appeared passive with regard to this issue so far.

5. There is no doubt that China and Russia enjoy enough potential to mount pressure on the US Congress. The US Congress has been trying to make Iran’s nuclear case, which is a key international security issue, a hostage of the United States’ domestic policies. If China shows necessary initiative in this regard, it will have a lot of opportunities for its future ties with Iran. In other worlds, such a behavior by China under the present sensitive circumstances that surround Iran’s nuclear case will play a great role in shaping future image of this country among Iranian elites and lay people alike. In addition to playing this role, China can also help establish sustainable stability and security in the Persian Gulf region which is the source of more than 50 percent of Beijing’s imported oil.

6. On the other hand, Iran’s national interests call on Tehran to increase the benefits that it can gain through bolstering relations with China. Almost all investments made by China in Iran have become problematic, including commodities exported by China to Iran. Of course, international sanctions against Iran have been playing a role in this regard, but empowerment of a national bureaucratic system in order to be able to bargain with China more strongly is also of strategic importance.

7. Our relations with China are expanding and becoming more sophisticated in time. In addition, China’s power is increasing as well. Therefore, in order to regulate our relations with China in a way that would meet our national interests in the best way, we need to have direct understanding based on Iran’s interests of China’s politics and economy. We will also need national consensus and a powerful bureaucratic system to deal with this country in the future. In a bigger picture, Iran’s relations with China will be at their best when Iran’s maneuvering room in international arena is at its most.

*Mohsen Shariatinia
PhD, Researcherat The Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Tehran

Source: Fararu Analytical News Website
http://fararu.com/
Translated by: Iran Review.Org

The post Iran, China Opening New Chapter In Bilateral Ties – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By John R. Haines*

All warfare is based on deception…
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. –Sun Tzu

We will not forget!  We will not forgive! –CyberBerkut motto

In the vanguard of the non-linear war now raging in eastern Ukraine is an old weapon, disinformation, wielded by an unconventional force.  Exemplifying that force is the hacktivist group, CyberBerkut.  It recently issued an ultimatum to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to end the war in eastern Ukraine that “has plunged the people of Ukraine into an abyss of war, poverty, unemployment and despair.”^[1]  It directed an additional threat to Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk:

“Mr. Yatsenyuk! We start the countdown. You have three days to stop what you started.  In the event our conditions are not met, we will open the world’s eyes to all that is happening in the country. Personal correspondence top officials, telephone calls, secret documents — everything that we found by hacking the computers of employees of Ukraine’s Security Service.  You decide: to stop the bloodshed in your own country and start over from scratch, or to commit public suicide in front of millions of people.”^[2]

The newest fulfillment of this threat is the release of a set of documents CyberBerkut alleges it obtained by “cracking”^[3] Ukrainian Defense Ministry computers.^[4]  The documents, published on CyberBerkut’s website and the Russian portal LifeNews, purport to be correspondence between Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Secretary, Peter Mehedi, and a senior Syrian commander, Brigadier General Talal Makhlouf.^[5]   If the documents are to be believed, they suggest American arms shipments intended for frontline units in eastern Ukraine were diverted by Ukrainian government officials and sold illegally for private financial gain to the Assad regime.^[6]

Risible as this claim may seem, it is impossible to disprove on the basis of open-source evidence, but then again, that misses the point.  The objective of disinformation, to borrow from Whitehead, is to impose a pattern on experience.  It is a lens used to distort and pervert our understanding of facts.  It is telling Ukrainians that their government is corrupt and has betrayed the forces fighting in eastern Ukraine.  It reinforces the narrative among the “Territorial Defense Battalion” paramilitaries — for example, the “cyborgs” of the Azov Battalion whose defense of the Donetsk Airport lasted longer than the siege or Stalingrad or Moscow — that they are being sacrificed in the war, a common and recurring social media theme.^[7]  It provokes demoralizing backlashes — a 2 February protest on Kyev’s Independence Square included calls for the imposition of martial law and the dismissal of senior defense and security officials — that are reported gleefully in Russian news portals.^[8]

Americans and Western Europeans are not the intended audience for Russian disinformation about Ukraine.  Instead, Ukrainians are: the intent is, at the minimum, to demoralize; and at the maximum, to provoke a popular backlash against the Ukrainian government, even a putsch.  It is intended to sustain a narrative that the political leadership has abandoned the frontline forces fighting in eastern Ukraine, especially among army conscripts and nationalist paramilitary volunteer units.  The purported Mahedi-Makhlouf correspondence is a variation on the Dolchstoßlegende,^[9] the mythical “stab-in-the-back” of the army by craven politicians, exemplifying the corrosive effect of even less-than-artful disinformation.

This, then, is the less-noticed side of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.  Bringing incidents of disinformation to light for discussion purposes can have risks since disinformation thrives on repetition.  It is nonetheless important to understand the instrumental effect of Russian disinformation on eroding Ukrainians’ confidence in their civil institutions and creating fertile ground for extremist groups on all sides.

A Non-Linear War^[10]

Vladislav Surkov’s use of the term non-linear war^[11] exemplifies how Russian theorists characterize 21^st century warfare.  He wrote, “The old wars of the 19^th and 20^th centuries involved two sides.  Now, it is all against all.” Valery Gerasimov expands the term with a distinctly Russian view of modern warfare (with echoes of eastern Ukraine):

“A perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.”^[12]

As Russians see it, all conflict is a means to a geopolitical end.  Nonmilitary instruments — in one embodiment, the purposeful distortion of an adversary’s sensibilities^[13] — can rival the power of weapons in their effectiveness.^[14]  Peter Pomerantsev refers to this as “the weaponization of information.”^[15]  For Gerasimov, “The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the enemy’s fighting potential.”^[16]  The coordinated use of nonmilitary instruments to provoke civil unrest and instill fear to the point of panic last year in Crimea is a good illustration of the theory in action.  The information space is the main battlefield in this conception of information warfare, “a battle between states involving only the use of information weapons in the sphere of information models.”^[17]  It is, simply put, “to wage war without ever announcing it officially.”^[18]

What is “Disinformation”?

The English word “disinformation” is a translation of a Russian one, dezinformatsia.  It involves a carefully constructed, intentionally deceptive message leaked by an operator who conceals his identity, either by hiding behind a cloak of anonymity or by acting indirectly through agent, witting or otherwise.^[19]

An element of the Soviet-era concept of maskirovka, disinformation is the deliberate use of misinformation or misleading information.^[20]  In Shmuel Vaknin’s deft description, it is “an open and authorized policy, a conscious decision to subvert language itself, to divert topology, to disinform, to transform reality into an inane hall of mirrors.”^[21]  A former deputy chief of the Czechoslovak ŠtB^[22] analogized disinformation to poison, saying, “One drop may not be a problem, but together, a dose could be fatal.”^[23]

Active measures — a Soviet-era term for political warfare — were defined by a Russian naval officer term as:

“A means of eliminating, distorting or stealing information for the purpose of obtaining necessary data after penetrating the security system; blocking of access to information by its legitimate users; and in the final account, disorganization of all means of society’s life support, including the enemy military infrastructure.”^[24]

Naked active measures can come dangerously close to open war.  It would constitute an overt act of state aggression were the Russian government to admit openly to hacking Ukrainian government networks and stealing official documents.  The same would be true if the Russian government admitted openly to disseminating stolen or counterfeit documents.  Disinformation allows Russia to direct active measures aimed a destabilizing Ukraine without having to take public ownership of those measures.

Feliks Dzerzhinskii^[25] established a “special disinformation office” within the Soviet Union’s State Police Directorate in 1923.^[26]  Dezinformatsiya first received institutional status in 1959 when the Soviet KGB established a special unit in its First Chief Directorate known as the “Department For Active Measures.”  Using the cryptonym “Department D” and operating under the direct authority of the Communist Party Central Committee, Department D specialized in black propaganda and disinformation.^[27]  It was from the start true to its description by Dzerzhinskii’s deputy, Martin Latsis, as “a fighting organ…It does not judge, it strikes.”^[28]

Propagandistic disinformation strives to demoralize.  A classic if simple method of Soviet propagandistic disinformation was to disseminate forge documents^[29] which for effect, however, contained at least some genuine information: “Every disinformation message,” wrote Ladislav Bittman, “must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views.”^[30]  The overall purpose is to damage the target — Ukraine’s government — by playing on the audience’s prejudices and biases — a widely held suspicion of corruption among public officials.  This allows propagandistic disinformation to be effective even when it comes from a source that the audience finds dubious or unreliable.

Technopower

Suspicion often creates what it expects. –C.S. Lewis

Timothy Jordan conceptualizes technopower as a condition in which war no longer involves the conquest of new territory, but, rather, the destruction of the opponent’s will to resist.^[31]  In the conflict in eastern Ukraine, dezinformatsia is a potent instrument of Russian technopower.  It is a central component of what Russian theorists call information warfare (aka “information operations”), which is potentially one of the most damaging applications of force.  Gerasimov described information operations as “military means of a concealed nature.”^[32]  The aim is to manipulate information and exert psychological influences on another state’s political and military leaders, soldiers, and civilian population.^[33]  Applied in Russia’s near abroad, it is “information warfare as domestic counterinsurgency,”^[34] something “capable of shaping public opinion to mobilize political forces against the authorities in their state.’’^[35]

The creation and dissemination of disinformation in cyberspace is an important tactic in modern conflicts.  Unlike the classic domains of military conflict (i.e., land, air, sea & space), cyberspace is not strictly speaking a domain.  Rather, it is a built environment, which means it can be un-built and remodeled (and in the extreme, destroyed).^[36]  In the cyber frame of a broader cybered conflict, defensive information operations protect the integrity of electronic data.  Their main function is to prevent “cracking” and other cyber attacks from successfully accessing, changing, and/or destroying electronic data, which might includes efforts to alter its context or otherwise manipulating it for purposes of deception.^[37]

Cyberspace confers some distinct advantages on dezinformatsia: when dealing with electronic data or documents, neither style nor provenance (how it was obtained) is a reliable signal to indicate deception, unlike handwritten or typewritten material.  An effective way to create disinformation with electronic data is to begin with a genuine message and then change some critical element (e.g., time, place, name) in a systematic way.^[38]  Disinformation created this way is easily disseminated through defaced governmental websites, which has the added benefit of confounding the adversary’s information flows.^[39]

Disinformation based on forged or altered electronic data is an important tool since governments rely on information and reputation to exercise moral influence and to model public opinion.  Comingling strategic content (information that is genuine but compromising) and disinformation can alter a political balance and/or legitimate a broader conflict.  It is an effective way to intervene in a target state’s domestic affairs^[40]  that skirts the principle of international law that foreign agents cannot carry out activities within the territory of another state without its permission.  As a practical matter, most states engaged in systematic campaigns to disseminate dezinformatsia do so in ways that makes its attribution difficult to prove.

From Asymmetric Warfare to Dissymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is a concept that is broad, inclusive, and as often as not, misapplied.  It denotes where two sides in a conflict have such divergent strengths and weaknesses that they resort to drastically different — thus asymmetric — tactics to achieve relative advantage.  The superior force in an asymmetric conflict will attempt to limit operations in order to keep its costs low.  The inferior force will attempt to inflict the highest possible costs on its more powerful adversary, and to draw it into a war of attrition in which asymmetry favors the inferior force.  One aim of asymmetric warfare is to make any countermove by the stronger force look like a significant and unwarranted escalation, which in the current conflict might be a pretense for deploying Russian “peacekeepers” into the territory.

Asymmetrical actions, Gerasimov wrote, include informational ones: “The information space opens wide asymmetrical opportunities to reduce the enemy’s fighting potential.”^[41]  It is primarily a figurative war of narratives in which favorable ones are reinforced and multiplied while “foreign” interpretations are neutralized and pushed to the margins where they pose no threat.^[42]  Rastorguyev has long argued that defensive tactics in this kind of war would lead to defeat.  Russia has accordingly reframed how it defines the threat in eastern Ukraine to fit an offensive war: the focus of Russian dezinformatsia is a purported rising anarchy in eastern Ukraine and the right of separatists to self-determination.

The opposite of asymmetric warfare is dissymmetric warfare, which results from the application of massive force against a weaker opponent in a military conflict.  Ukraine confronts both asymmetric and dissymmetric dimensions in the war in eastern Ukraine.  Pro-Russian separatists wage asymmetric warfare against the Ukrainian government — information warfare shares many features with classic guerrilla warfare, for example, the absence of a single frontline or a formal declaration of war — while Russia prosecutes a parallel, dissymmetric one.^[43]  The Ukrainian government has been unable to transform the asymmetric war against pro-Russian separatists into a dissymmetric one in which Ukraine could exploit its advantages.  This reflects several factors.  The separatist forces have demonstrated considerably higher esprit de corps than Ukraine’s, whose regular army units are increasingly dependent upon conscripts^[44] (thus Ukraine’s risky gambit to “stiffen” army units by deploying ultra-nationalist paramilitary units to front line positions).   Separatist forces also have limited their actions to waging a genuine asymmetric conflict that makes optimal use of terrain and keeps to guerrilla warfare tactics.

The dissymmetric war in eastern Ukraine (for the most part so far) is a cybered conflict.^[45]   Ukraine faces a determined, capable adversary — the Russian government — that is highly skilled in the use of dezinformatsia to impose virtual costs and virtual collateral damage, in this case on Ukraine.  The hostile use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is a Russian conceptualization meant to influence or damage an adversary-state’s information resources and telecommunication systems.  It includes disseminating disinformation and creating virtual depictions in cyberspace that misrepresents reality, all geared toward disorienting, destabilizing and demoralizing a civilian population.^[46]  Properly used, disinformation has an outsized “shock and awe” effect that saps an adversary’s will to fight, largely by distorting how its civilians perceive and understand the conflict.^[47]  In the current one, cyberspace has becomes Ukraine’s second ungovernable badland, one in which it is fighting an unconventional cybered war alongside the conventional one in the physical space of eastern Ukraine.

CyberBerkut & the Conflict in in Eastern Ukraine

The hacktivist group CyberBerkut^[48] is the vanguard of a sophisticated dezinformatsia campaign in Ukraine.  Since first emerging in March 2014, it has been implicated in multiple incidents of cyber espionage, including direct denial of service (DDoS) attacks against NATO as well as Ukrainian and German government websites.^[49]  More recently, it has focused on the online publication of “cracked” or maliciously hacked electronic documents obtained from the computers of Ukrainian governmental and political figures.

The membership of CyberBerkut is anonymous, but reportedly includes former officers in the Crimean Berkut. That unit was part of Ukraine’s Interior Ministry until Crimea’s March 2014 annexation, upon which the Crimean Berkut was incorporated into Russia’s Interior Ministry.^[50]  CyberBerkut’s “Ukrainian identity” is vigorously asserted, however, as it postures as an internal opposition group.  This, too, is consistent with the Russian playbook, for as Gerasimov wrote, “Asymmetrical actions…[include] internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions…”^[51]

In the past several days, CyberBerkut published several sets of documents online that it claims were obtained from electronic records the group purportedly “cracked” from the Ukrainian Security Service, known as the SBU.^[52]   The first set of documents purport to show SBU complicity in a 13 January rocket attack in Volnovakha in which a civilian passenger bus was destroyed, killing 10 persons and injuring 17 (it is important to note that the circumstances of the rocket attack conflict with much of the “evidence” produced by CyberBerkut and others).  One key document in this set purports to be a confidential letter from Vasili Gritsak to Hennadiy Kuznetsov^[53] dated 13 January 2014.  Gritsak is the SBU’s First Deputy Chairman and the head of its Anti-Terrorism Center.^[54]  Kuznetsov, an SBU Colonel, at the time was head of Special Operations Center “A”, a unit responsible for special anti-terrorist operations.  The document contains what appear to be written directions from Gritsak directing Kuznetsov to carry out so-called “false flag”^[55] attacks in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions.  The objective, according to the document, is to produce civilian deaths that can be blamed on pro-Russian separatists.  A companion document purports to be a report from the SBU Donetsk Regional Unit regarding its implementation of a propaganda campaign citing several media reports of the Volnovakha rocket attack.

Not surprisingly, similar documents have surfaced before.  In December 2014, the online portal Russiya Vesna^[56] (“Russian Spring”) published a document on its website that it purported to be a 25 November order signed by Gritsak.  In it, he directs SBU units to execute false flag artillery attacks against several villages north of Donetsk, an area in which separatist units were known to operate.  Afterwards, the document reads, the SBU will “organize visits to the villages by Ukrainian and foreign correspondents, who will be provided with evidence that ‘terrorists’ launched the artillery attacks.”

On 28 January, CyberBerkut published another set of documents the group claimed are cracked electronic files belonging to Anatoly Matios, Ukraine’s Deputy Prosecutor General and Chief Military Prosecutor.^[57]   The document that received the most attention orders an end to public reporting of the number of casualties suffered by Ukrainian forces “in the area of the ATO” (anti-terrorist operations) by hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

However, the most scandalous purports to be an order dated 25 January 2015 from Lieutenant-General Serhiy N. Popko,^[58] who commands Ukrainian ATO forces in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (and who currently is in the Debaltseve area).  In it, he orders the formation of “protective detachments” comprised of members of “the volunteer corps,” a reference to the Ukraine Volunteer Corps aka DUK-Right Sector, a paramilitary force organized by the ultra-nationalist political party Right Sector.  The formation of protective detachments is intended “to prevent mass defections soldiers from the battlefield near Debaltseve.”^[59]  The geographic reference is to a salient centered on the town of Debaltseve — a strategic railway hub connecting Donetsk and Lugansk — in which separatist forces are attempting to trap a force of several thousand Ukrainian soldiers and paramilitary.  In a related document, Matios purportedly orders all personnel rotating out of the combat zone to first surrender their weapons.

A clear objective of the current dezinformatsia campaign being waged against the Ukrainian government is to exploit fissures: within Ukraine’s coalition government; between the government and combatants in the field, especially the DUK-Right Sector and Azov Brigade paramilitaries; and between the Ukraine’s regular army and paramilitaries.  DUK-Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh^[60] in late January threatened to split Ukraine’s armed force by creating “a parallel General Staff…that would receive the support of many military units, both regular and volunteer.”  Shortly after Yarosh leveled the threat, the Ukrainian army’s general staff announced its intention to disband all so-called “volunteer organizations” including the Aydar Battalion^[61] and to “merge” them into other army units.

Within the past few days, the dezinformatsia campaign has taken direct aim at Yaros when CyberBerkut released documents that purportedly implicate him in a host of economic crimes:

“Today we are publishing documents that expose the criminal activities of the head of Ukrainian neo-Nazis, which confirm multiple incidences of extortion – the illegal and cynical seizure of properties and businesses belonging to Ukrainian citizens by Yarosh and his associates. The stolen money is then taken out of the country through fronts and deposited in offshore accounts in Cyprus.  Now everyone will know that the Ukrainian neo-Nazis led by Yarosh are common gangsters, and have used policies of the Maidan to cover up criminal activities and self-enrichment at the expense of the citizens of Ukraine.”^[62]

All this seems oriented toward driving a deeper wedge between Yarosh’s Right Sector political allies — and the DUK-Right Sector paramilitary — and Ukrainians in and out of government who have long harbored suspicions about the proper place of far right ultranationalists in Ukraine’s civil society.

A Potent Fifth Column

War in general is not declared. It simply begins. — Georgii Samoilovich Isserson

It is a dubious suggestion that a field commander would commit an order to writing directing subordinates to commit what indisputably constitutes a war crime.  That alone casts doubt on documents purporting to order false flag incidents against civilian populations.  It is not, however, probative regarding all of the documents in question.  It is certainly conceivable that military commanders would be reluctant to disclose casualty numbers in the midst of a mobilization and might direct that these statistics be withheld.  As to alleged criminal acts committed by individuals associated with political parties that are part of the Ukrainian governing coalition (or regarding government-aligned paramilitaries), those claims are impossible to assess from the outside.   Suffice it to say, however, that the bar should be high — far higher than allegedly cracked documents of dubious content and provenance — to seriously entertain taking such documents at face value.  At the end of the day it is up to the Ukrainian people to decide.

There is no independent way to assess the status of the allegedly cracked documents released by groups like CyberBerkut or Russiya Vesna.  It is possible some are genuine and mean what they say, but at the same time, genuine documents can be placed in a misleading context when bundled with altered or forged ones.  It is also possible that some may be sourced from genuine documents but altered to create false meaning and to deceive.  As to whether either is probable, the reader is left to decide.

There is no expectation that Russian dezinformatsia will lead to a groundswell of support for the pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine.  That is not the intent.  It is to shape Ukrainian perceptions that the Maidan movement of just a year ago is a revolution betrayed.  The intent is not to mobilize; it is to demoralize.

Vladislav Surkov’s short story “Without Sky” concludes on a powerful note:

“We organized a rebellion of the simple, the two-dimensional people against the complex and cunning. We are against those who never say ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  Who say neither ‘black’ nor ‘white.’  Who know the third word.  There are many, many third words.  Empty, false, confusing ways that darken the truth.  These ways are the house of Satan.  There, they make money and bombs, saying ‘Here’s money for the benefit of the honest, here’s a bomb for the protection of love.’  We begin tomorrow. We will win. Or lose. There is no third option.”

The siren song of Russian disinformation notwithstanding, there is indeed no third option for Ukraine: it is either a sovereign nation or it is not.  What is unresolved is whether a sovereign Ukraine will remain territorially intact, and whether democratic government will wither or flourish there.  That is a struggle in which Russian dezinformatsia poses a potent fifth column.

About the author:
*John R. Haines is a Senior Fellow and Trustee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and directs the Princeton Committee of FPRI. Much of his current research is focused on Russia and its near abroad, with a special interest in nationalist and separatist movements. He is also the chief executive officer of a private sector corporation that develops nuclear detection and nuclear counterterrorism technologies.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] http://www.cyber-berkut.org

[2] “Яценюку дали три дня для прекращения войны” (“Yatsenyuk given three days to end the war”). Pravda.ru [online Russian edition, 30 January 2015]. http://m.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/ukraine/30-01-2015/1246317-kibe…. Last accessed 1 February 2015.

The post Russia’s Use Of Disinformation In The Ukraine Conflict – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ronn Pineo*

If nothing else, Americans know two true things about Mexico. One is that a vast number of Mexicans have immigrated to the United States without authorization, and the other is that illegal drug-related violence has spiraled out of control in that country in recent years. But knowing about a situation and effectively addressing it are two different matters, and it is U.S. actions, based upon emotion, based upon serious misunderstandings, that lie at the core of these problems. For progress to come to Mexico on these issues, policies will first have to change in the U.S.

Border issues and the war on illegal drugs are very real challenges for Mexico, but President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012 – present) has chosen instead to focus his energy on pushing through a raft of born-again free-market economic changes, at least when he is not otherwise preoccupied in battling corruption charges against his family. Peña Nieto has done rather little about immigration, and his policy on violence seems to be wishing it would stop, or at least that people would stop talking about it. Still, if the Peña Nieto has failed to effectively address these issues, part of the reason is that these problems are not solely of Mexico’s own making.

In fact, it would be fair to say that it is U.S. policies that have most contributed to these challenges for Mexico. With both pressing matters, immigration and illegal drugs, the U.S. has advanced what amounts to muscle-bound, military solutions that carry with them little prospect for success. These efforts range from beefing up the Border Patrol to pushing for a more aggressive assault on the illegal drug trafficking organizations. Meanwhile, pro-gun laws in the U.S. have led to a steady flow of high-powered arms into Mexico. The arrival of so many weapons of war have turned much of Mexico’s northern frontier into a multi-sided war zone, with the government fighting the cartels, cartels fighting cartels, and cartels killing anyone and everyone in their way.

The problem is not that U.S. has failed to commit enough resources to pushing its proposed solutions through to victory. Indeed, if the U.S. decided to vastly deepen its financial support for its currents policies, the status quo could get considerably worse for Mexico. The problem is that the solutions the U.S. is perusing cannot possibly work. True, in the end of the day it is up to Mexico to own its problems, but for things to begin to get better for Mexico, the U.S. will need to turn away from unreasoned, emotional, chest thumping policies—man up, get a gun, seal the border, smash the cartels–to reasoned ones–sane gun control, fair immigration policies, and the encouragement of a harm reduction approach in dealing with illegal drugs and the cartels.

What Does Reasonable Immigration Reform Look Like?

Today there are around 161 million paid jobs in the United States, but only about 156 million workers to fill them. Meanwhile in Mexico, every year more than one million people enter the workforce, but there are jobs for only about half of them. These demographic and economic realities, along with the wage differentials between the U.S. and Mexico, do much to explain why over 6 million Mexicans have left their homes to come and work in the United States.[i]

In the post-9/11 U.S. political environment, security concerns have come to dominate conversations about the U.S.’s southern border.[ii] The hidden element in this conversation is racism. (If this were not true then we would hear equally about building a wall along the Canadian border.) Built around unreasoning fear and xenophobia, American immigration policy as presently constructed is causing considerable damage. It harms U.S. interests, for the economy plainly has a need for these workers. No one leaves their homeland in search of unemployment. But more, current U.S. policies are cruel. They bring gratuitous misery and considerable danger to the Mexicans and other Latin Americans who come to work, rejoin family members, and to make a better life. It is a continuing outrage that over 400 people die each year trying to cross this international boundary.

Republicans and Democrats should be able to come together to construct a reasoned policy. It is worth recalling that in 2004 Republican President George W. Bush proposed a change to U.S. immigration policy based on the principle of “matching willing workers with willing employers.”[iii] If an individual wishing to immigrate could show that they would have employment in the U.S., and if the employer could show that they had made a good-faith effort to first try to find a U.S. citizen to take the job, then under the Bush plan the immigrant could enter lawfully. This was a reasonable solution.

Bush abandoned his proposal when his own party refused to support it in Congress. Now, with a Republican-controlled House and Senate, it will be impossible to pass anything like this. For the moment we can only hope for actions like the current executive order by President Obama, removing the fear of deportation for some of the unauthorized immigrants already in the country.

The Way of the Gun: From the United States into Mexico

Mexico and the United States have long maintained a two-way “smuggler relationship.”[iv] Mexico has supplied products not readily available in the U.S., from alcohol during the Prohibition Era; marijuana, when the counter-culture turned on in the 1960s; to Andean cocaine, and now Mexican-made meth-amphetamine, and other illegal drugs. The United States has returned the favor, today providing handguns, all manner of ammo, and military grade weapons, all of which are illegal in Mexico.

Tapping into this trade, the weapons used by the illegal drug cartels have grown ever more deadly. The majority of confiscated crime weapons in Mexico (68 percent) come from American gun sales.[v] The same vehicles and people used to smuggle drugs into the United States, use the money obtained from pandering to the U.S. drug demand to purchase weapons in border states and then smuggle them back to Mexico. In U.S. states where gun laws are more permissive, the adjacent Mexican states are more violent. In U.S. states where gun sales are more restricted, the adjacent Mexican states suffer fewer homicides. Controlling U.S. gun sales is critical if the violence in Mexico is to be reduced.[vi]

But clearing a path for changes in U.S. gun laws would almost certainly have to come from the high court. With a 5-4 conservative majority, the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has been the best of friends to the gun lobby, and has made it impossible to enact any laws that would make it harder to sell guns. For the laws to be transformed the court will have to change, and achieving this won’t be easy.

Either President Obama, or, after the 2016 election the next president, will probably get to nominate justices to the fill the seats of Ruth Bader Ginsberg, 81 years old; Anthony Kennedy, 81; as well as Antonin Scalia, 78. Replacing either Kennedy or Scalia with a Democratic president’s nominated justice should shift the balance on the court to align it with Democratic Party values. To lift the present high court ban on gun law reform would require the election of a Democratic president who would call for liberal-oriented justices and the return of a Democratic Senate to confirm these candidates.

However, even a Democratic-controlled Senate may not be able to confirm the nominees to the court made by a Democratic president. The Senate would additionally have to change its own filibuster rules so that Senate confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee would not require a 60 vote majority. This is now the case with lower level court appointments, but not with the Supreme Court. The Democratic Party might well retake the Senate in 2016, but it is extremely unlikely to win a filibuster proof majority. Without it, or without a change in Senate rules, the Republicans would no doubt continue their practice of blocking all Democratic Party initiatives.

But if a liberal majority did command the Supreme Court, it would then be free to return to its longstanding position that the Second Amendment does not, in fact, forbid state and federal gun control laws. The gun laws could change, and the bleeding would begin to slow, both in the United States and in Mexico.

Illegal Drugs: Extending the Harm Reduction Approach

With Oregon now joining Colorado and Washington in legalizing marijuana for recreational use, more states are sure to follow. At long last the irrationality of the war on illegal drugs may be coming to a close in the United States. This change would have important implications south of the border as well, and could allow Mexico to deepen its already existing impulse to decriminalize drugs.

In Mexico today an array of otherwise illegal drugs–marijuana, hash, peyote, cocaine, LSD, even heroin–may be possessed in small quantities for personal use. But as long as the U.S. remains committed to an all out war on illegal drugs, it will remain politically impossible for Mexico to even begin a conversation about extending drug legalization. In the present environment, the United States could make things economically impossible for Mexico if it threatened to become the new Amsterdam.

But if U.S. pressure abated, it would be possible for Mexican to begin to think about what ending its drug prohibition might look like. One thing seems certain. If the trade in drugs were made legal, this would remove the violence that presently accompanies this commercial activity. Legal drug companies, or ones that sell other dangerous or addictive products like alcohol or tobacco, do not routinely murder the people who are employed by their economic rivals. Mexico might be ready at some point to consider substantial steps toward decriminalization, but only if U.S. pressure to continue battering away in the war on illegal drugs were finally removed.

Harm reduction theory is usually advanced as an approach for best dealing with the problems associated with the production, sale, and use of illegal drugs.[vii] The harm reduction school holds that we must accept that people will use drugs, and instead redirect our energy toward seeking to minimize the problems that stem from this hard fact. Harm reduction advocates treating drug abuse as a public health concern, not as a criminal matter.

In El Salvador President Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) set up a truce between the two dangerous gangs, the MS-13 and the 18th Street, that were tormenting the nation. The Funes truce led to a dramatic lowering of the nation’s homicide rate. When the new president, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, scrapped the truce, the homicide rate shot back up. Next year El Salvador’s murder rate may become the highest in the world. It must have been extraordinarily difficult for President Funes to agree to this accommodation with the maras, but the government-led truce managed to save Salvadoran lives. Needless to say, it took great courage for Funes to take this decisive step.

It may be time for Mexico to think about the unthinkable: extending harm reduction theory to dealing with the world of illegal drug cartels. Could a truce be arranged, returning to the previous arrangements where the Mexican government turned a blind eye to cartel drug activities in exchange for fewer bodies?

This is what the old, pre-2000 PRI dynasty did, when it worked with the cartels in exchange for bribes and a lower homicide rate. Of course, the PRI was quiet about all this, and any return to such an approach would have to be done without public announcement. It would certainly involve preferential treatment by the government towards selected cartels, but would eliminate or reduce the turf battles that result from cartel fragmentation and uncertainty.

Given the torrents of blood let loose by the cartels, any of this, maybe all this, is all but unimaginable. It is not possible to forgive what they have done. But if the cartels are not brought inside the legal system, the blood will just keep oozing out, body after body. As with Funes in El Salvador, sometimes making a deal with the devil can be on the side of the angels.

The last election, bringing PRI back to power, showed that Mexicans want an end to the carnage. Mexicans want to explore Mexican solutions to their woes. But to do this, to even begin this conversation, the U.S. will need first to get out of the way.

*Ronn Pineo, COHA Senior Research Fellow and Professor and Chair, Department of History, Towson University. Research Contributed by Cameron McKibben, COHA Research Associate.

Notes:
[i] Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 62.

[ii] Payan, Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars, 13.

[iii] George W. Bush, “Remarks on Immigration Reform,” (Washington, DC, January 7, 2004).

[iv] Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

[v] Ioan Grillo, “Mexico’s Drug Cartels Ramp Up Arsenals with Rockets,” TIME, accessed January 29, 2015, http://world.time.com/2012/10/25/mexicos-drug-lords-ramp-up-their-arsenals-with-rpgs/.

[vi] Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Ronn Pineo, “Violence in Mexico and Latin America,” February 21, 2014.

[vii] Susan E. Collins, et al., “Current Status, Historical Highlights, and Basic Principles of Harm Reduction,” in Harm Reduction, Second Edition: Pragmatic Strategies for Managing High-Risk Behaviors, edited by G. Alan Marlatt, Mary E. Larimer, and Katie Witkiewitz (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), 6.

The post Harm Reduction: A New Direction For US Policy For Mexico – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China’s Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday that both Sri Lanka and India are important and friendly neighbors and China hopes to maintain sound relations with both countries.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said China welcomes the constant growth of relations between Sri Lanka and India.

Responding to media queries on Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena’s visit to India and the two neighboring countries reaching several cooperation agreements, including those on civil nuclear energy, the spokesperson said China hopes to work with both countries.

“We hope to work with India to further develop the strategic cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. We also look forward to fostering the strategic cooperative partnership featuring sincere mutual assistance and long-lasting friendship with the Sri Lankan side,” the spokesperson said.

“We hope that both China-India relations and China-Sri Lanka relations can maintain the sound momentum of development.”

Meanwhile, China welcomes the constant growth of relations between Sri Lanka and India, the Spokesperson added.

“If the three pairs of relations can promote each other through sound interactions, it will benefit regional peace, stability and development,” the Spokesperson emphasized.

President Sirisena just finished visiting India, his first overseas visit since assuming office in January.

The post China Welcomes Growth Of Relations Between Sri Lanka And India appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nick Cunningham

It may be difficult to look beyond the current pricing environment for oil, but the depletion of low-cost reserves and the increasing inability to find major new discoveries ensures a future of expensive oil.

While analyzing the short-term trajectory of oil prices is certainly important, it obscures the fact that over the long-term, oil exploration companies may struggle to bring new sources of supply online. Ed Crooks over at the FT persuasively summarizes the predicament. Crooks says that 2014 is shaping up to be the worst year in the last six decades in terms of new oil discoveries (based on preliminary data).

Worse still, last year marked the fourth year in a row in which new oil discoveries declined, the longest streak of decline since 1950. The industry did not log a single “giant” oil field. In other words, oil companies are finding it more and more difficult to make new oil discoveries as the easy stuff runs out and the harder-to-reach oil becomes tougher to develop.

The inability to make new discoveries is not due to a lack of effort. Total global investment in oil and gas exploration grew rapidly over the last 15 years. Capital expenditures increased by almost threefold to $700 billion between 2000 and 2013, while output only increased 17 percent (see IEA chart).

Despite record levels of spending, the largest oil companies are struggling to replace their depleted reserves. BP reported a reserve replacement ratio – the volume of new reserves added to a company’s portfolio relative to the amount extracted that year – of 62 percent. Chevron reported 89 percent and Shell posted just a 26 percent reserve replacement figure. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips fared better, each posting more than 100 percent. Still, unless the oil majors significantly step up spending they will not only be unable to make new discoveries, but their production levels will start to fall (some of them area already seeing this begin to happen). The IEA predicts that the oil industry will need to spend $850 billion annually by the 2030s to increase production. An estimated $680 billion each year – or 80 percent of the total spending – will be necessary just to keep today’s production levels flat.

However, now that oil prices are so low, oil companies have no room to boost spending. All have plans to reduce expenditures in order to stem financial losses. But that only increases the chances of a supply crunch at some point in the future. Put another way, if the oil majors have been unable to make new oil discoveries in years when spending was on the rise, they almost certainly won’t be able to find new oil with exploration budgets slashed.

Long lead times on new oil projects mean that the dearth of discoveries in 2014 don’t have much of an effect on current oil prices, but could lead to a price spike in the 2020’s.

All of this comes despite the onslaught of shale production that U.S. companies have brought online in recent years. U.S. oil production may have increased by 60 to 70 percent since 2009, but the new shale output still only amounts to around 5 percent of global production.

Not only that, but shale production is much more expensive than conventional drilling. As conventional wells decline and are replaced by shale, the average cost per barrel of oil produced will continue to rise, pushing up prices.

Moreover, with rapid decline rates, the shale revolution is expected to fade away in the 2020’s, leaving the world ever more dependent on the Middle East for oil supplies. The problem with that scenario is that the Middle East will not be able to keep up. Middle Eastern countries “need to invest today, if not yesterday” in order to meet global demand a decade from now, the International Energy Agency’s Chief Economist Fatih Birol said on the release of a report in June 2014.

In fact, half of the additional supply needed from the Middle East will have to come from a single country: Iraq. Birol reiterated those comments on February 17 at a conference in Japan, only his warnings have grown more ominous as the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated markedly since last June. “The security problems caused by Daesh (IS) and others are creating a major challenge for the new investments in the Middle East and if those investments are not made today we will not see that badly needed production growth around the 2020s,” Birol said, according to Reuters.

If Iraq fails to deliver, the world could see oil prices surge at some point in the coming decade. Despite the urgency, “the appetite for investments in the Middle East is close to zero, mainly as a result of the unpredictability of the region,” he added.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Why-Oil-Prices-Must-Go-Up.html

The post Why Oil Prices Must Go Up – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.