By A.D. McKenzie

“What the world needs now is love, sweet love” goes a syrupy Burt Bacharach-penned song from 1965. But love is difficult, if not impossible, to teach, so education experts have come up with another solution: teaching respect for all.

“And by all, we mean all,” says Christophe Cornu, senior project officer in the Section of Health and Global Citizenship Education at UNESCO, the United Nations agency responsible for science, culture and education.

The organization, in association with the governments of the United States and Brazil, has produced specific tools and resources to fight discrimination and violence through education as well as within education, even as the level of hatred and intolerance rises in many regions.

The tools include a 300-page manual, a range of relevant UN documents, online interactive forums, and proposals for student activities such as writing articles and staging plays, all of which were highlighted at the Second UNESCO Forum on Global Citizenship Education (GCED) that took place January 28 to 30 in Paris.

“Teaching respect for all is a means of promoting an educational response to combat discrimination and violence by strengthening the basics of mutual tolerance and cultivating respect for all people,” Cornu told IDN.

In its manual, UNESCO says that the project is founded on the “universal values and core principles of human rights,” and is targeted at learners aged 8 to 16, with the aim of equipping them with skills to “cultivate respect and stop discrimination on all levels”.

Educational institutions need to adopt a “holistic” approach where “all aspects of the school environment work to ensure non-discrimination,” the agency says.

It adds that “curricula must dedicate time to sensitive issues, such as discussing stereotypes and recognizing injustices”. Teacher-training is also a key part of this approach as educators – who can be victims of discrimination as well – need to be skilled in teaching conflict resolution and dealing “sensitively with issues of discrimination”.

The Paris-based organization’s mission has acquired increased urgency with the growth of extremism and intolerance, which has seen certain groups and individuals targeted, officials say.

According to UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova, the agency is strengthening efforts to address the “worldwide rise” of discrimination and is especially promoting Global Citizenship Education.

“The opportunities for exchange of knowledge and information have never been so numerous, but intolerance is on the rise, notably in the form of a violent and destructive extremism,” Bokova said at the conference.

“Young people are often the ones calling for change, but they are also the first victims,” she added. “What education do we need then, to build a more peaceful and sustainable future for all?”

According to UNESCO, the aim of Global Citizenship Education is to “equip learners of all ages with those values, knowledge and skills that are based on and instill respect for human rights, social justice, diversity, gender equality and environmental sustainability and that empower learners to be responsible global citizens.”

“Teaching Respect for All”, meanwhile, seeks to involve all of society’s “stakeholders”, from parents to pupils to policy makers; and the media also has a role to play.

The role of media

“Media is a duty-bearer to increase public awareness,” states the UNESCO implementation guide. “Media professionals have a particular responsibility in combating negative stereotypes, fostering respect for diversity and promoting tolerance among the general public.”

This was drafted before the January 7 assault on the staff of French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo, in which 12 people including journalists were murdered. Critics accused the magazine of Islamophobia and racism, while the cartoonists and supporters defended the right to freedom of expression and the liberty to satirize subjects that included religion and politics.

The current divide in France and many other countries is indicative of a lack of understanding of both religion and secular values, some commentators have argued, while the attacks have meanwhile focused attention on the lives of Europe’s marginalized youth and the failings of education.

“When you teach respect for all, you acknowledge that everyone has prejudices, and there should be a space to discuss these prejudices, to demystify stigma,” Cornu told IDN in an interview.

This dialogue can take place in both formal and informal educational settings, with curricula “shaped around such values as a culture of peace, human rights, tolerance and respect,” say experts involved in the project.

While these values should be recognized as “universal”, they should also be adapted and draw from local systems and culture, UNESCO advises.

Dr. Helen Bond, an associate professor at Washington DC-based Howard University and one of the authors of “Teaching Respect for All”, said that “manifestations of discrimination” can take many forms.

These can include bullying, name-calling, stereotyping, stigma, anti-semitism, Islamophobia and gender and poverty-based prejudices, she said during the GCED conference.

Discrimination can also be seen “in targeted laws, which prevent certain groups from obtaining access to certain government programmes”, participants noted. They said that discrimination and intolerance usually start with “micro aggressions”, and that the violence can become even greater if policy makers don’t take necessary action.

‘Respect for all’

In France, after the Charlie Hebdo assault and related attacks at a kosher supermarket, students in some schools refused to observe the national minute of silence that the government had requested, highlighting their feelings of exclusion from the mainstream and the contention that the newspaper had added to stereotype and stigma.

Further, in a case that shocked many people, school officials reported an 8-year-old pupil to the police in the southern French city of Nice when the boy expressed “solidarity” with the “terrorists” even though he seemed not to know the meaning of “terrorism”.

The latter incident, which occurred as the GCED conference was taking place in Paris, underscored the importance of discussing “respect for all” in school settings and having teachers who are trained in this area.

“The tragedy has been an eye-opener about something missing in the curriculum,” Cornu told IDN. “We need to teach all students how to live together, and focusing on just one religion is not the right approach.”

The UNESCO scheme has examined how “Teaching Respect for All” can be “integrated” into the school curriculum and “incorporated in all subjects and across school culture”.

Pilot projects have taken place in Brazil, Ivory Coast, Guatemala, Indonesia and Kenya, looking at different aspects of the issues. The Kenyan government has focused on developing peace education, while the Ivory Coast has examined how to prevent discrimination against people with disabilities.

Some of the questions raised by “Teaching Respect for All” include: how can “difficult discussions and situations in the classroom be managed”, and how can students be empowered and motivated to “confront discrimination, prejudice and bullying”?

In a section of the UNESCO manual aimed at children and youth, the advice is to “be brave and say ‘NO’,” even if this is “not an easy thing” to do.

“Everyone has the right to be treated with respect,” the advisers state, adding that “no matter what, being discriminated against is NEVER OK.”

The post UN Plan To Teach ‘Respect For All’ Aims At Fighting Discrimination – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Is ISIS Islamic? Indeed, is it — as The Atlantic claims — very Islamic?

Strangely, these questions have been treated by many commentators in the West as questions about the nature of Islam rather than questions about the nature of ISIS.

Thus, multiple arguments have been presented to show why ISIS should not be regarded as an authentic expression of Islam — arguments which do a better job of educating non-Muslims about Islam than they do in providing much if any insight into ISIS.

Understandably, many Muslims, appalled by ISIS’s actions, naturally want to assert vigorously that ISIS does not represent Islam and in that sense should not be called Islamic. Fine.

But once one moves beyond the headlines about the atrocities committed by ISIS and beyond the intra-Islamic discourse on the religion’s true nature, it soon becomes clear why the group should indeed be described as being Islamic.

That observation need not be treated as a slur on Islam or a condemnation of Muslims, but seen simply for what it is: a characterization of the religious foundation upon which ISIS rests, in its conception, expression, and goals.

To claim that ISIS is Islamic, is not to claim that it is “an inevitable product of Islam,” or that it reveals the true nature of Islam.

To understand why in objective terms without making qualitative judgements, ISIS can very reasonably be described as Islamic, consider the following report by Ali Hashem. (Based in Beirut, he is a columnist for Al-Monitor who also reports for Al Mayadeen, and has previously reported for Al Jazeera, the BBC, and numerous Arab newspapers.)

When the average Islamic State (IS) member is asked why he is fighting, he typically responds, “So that Sharia prevails and Islam’s banner stays high.”

Marwan Shehade, an Islamic scholar and expert on jihadist groups, told Al-Monitor, “There’s no doubt the organization is built on three main elements: the Sharia, the military might and media. Their main slogan is derived from Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous saying, ‘The foundation of this religion is a book that guides and a sword that supports.’ By ‘a book’ they mean the Quran and religion.”

Despite the debate over whether IS represents Islam and what “true Islam” is, Islamic movements, sects and scholars perceive IS as truly believing it is enforcing the rule of Allah according to the Quran and the Hadith under the guidance of the organization’s Sharia Council, probably the group’s most vital body. The council’s responsibilities include overseeing the speeches of the self-declared Caliph Ibrahim (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and those under him, dictating punishments, preaching, mediating, monitoring the group’s media, ideologically training new recruits and advising the caliph on how to deal with hostages when it is decided to execute them.

Underlining the central decision-making role of the Sharia Council, Hashem goes on to quote a former ISIS mufti he spoke to in Iraq in January, who told him: “There’s nothing that is decided without the Sharia Council’s approval.”

The average American may not know much about Islam, but by this point most have heard the term caliphate and know that it refers to a kind of Islamic state.

They also know the term Sharia but typically have a distorted understanding of what this means and easily succumb to irrational fears about its implementation.

The effect of hearing President Obama insist that ISIS is not Islamic is to make many Americans believe that the commander-in-chief is in a state of denial. They question whether he really understands who the U.S. is fighting against in its war on ISIS.

Worse, denying that ISIS is Islamic, has the perverse effect of empowering Islamophobes by making them sound like realists — the only people willing to speak the truth about ISIS.

If the only people in America willing to say that ISIS is Islamic are also people who make a radically different claim — that ISIS reveals the real nature of Islam — then Islamophobes will dominate popular discourse on ISIS.

The post The Danger In Denying That ISIS Is Islamic – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kamer Kasim

The relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan can be defined as a true strategic partnership. Since its first days of independence, Azerbaijan has always had the support of Turkey in its struggle to recover its territorial integrity. The motto of “two states, one nation” has frequently been used to define the relationship between the two states. And now, the tension originating from misconceptions surrounding around the Turkey-Armenia protocols has been swiftly resolved. The high-level visits and intense frequency of contacts between these two countries have help to preserve their strategic partnership.

The fact that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev chose Turkey as the first official destination visit abroad after being elected highlights the importance that both countries ascribe to their special relationship. Indeed this year was not the only year that Ilham Aliyev made Turkey the first destination of his choice; he also did so in 2013. Additionally, Azerbaijan was the second country after the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to be visited by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after his election as a President. The two leader met on 2-3 September 2014.

Aliyev’s most recent visit to Turkey coincided with the fourth meeting of the Turkey-Azerbaijan High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which resulted in a joint declaration between the two countries being issued on 15 January 2015. It was also here that a series of agreements were signed endorsing bilateral cooperation to combat the funding of terrorism via money laundering as well as the formation of a partnership committee between Turkey’s Ministry of Customs and Trade and Azerbaijan’s State Customs Committee.

Matters of economic and energy cooperation have always enjoyed a predominant place in Turkey-Azerbaijan affairs. During Aliyev’s visit, President Erdoğan expressed the objective to increase the trade volume between the two countries to 15 billion dollars by 2023, up from its current level of approximately 5 billion dollars. The development of mutual investments is also another important topic in the economic relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey. This can be demonstrated in the 5 billion dollar investment of Azerbaijan on the construction of the Star refinery in Turkey. Additionally, when it comes to the flow of energy between the two countries, in addition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, the mega project seen in the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) will be of significant importance. The intergovernmental agreement on the project was signed in 2012 and the pipeline is expected to become operational in 2018. This pipeline exhibits a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2020, 23 bcm by 2023 and 31 bcm by 2026. The purchase contract for TANAP’s main pipeline that was signed on 14 September 2014 between Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the completion of the project, is a cornerstone of energy cooperation between the two countries.

Another topic that was discussed during Aliyev’s visit was the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. Here, President Erdoğan stated that the railroad will be open for usage by the end of 2015. During the visit, president Erdoğan also invited all heads of state to attend the 100th Anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign, announcing that himself and Aliyev plan to meet for the event on 24 April 2015.

Among one of the many factors that have continue to affect Turkey-Azerbaijan relations is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Similar views shared by Turkey and Azerbaijan in this conflict have expressed the intensity of existing Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic partnership. Because of this that Azerbaijan has closely followed the dealings between Turkey and Armenia. The worsening relations between Russia and the West after the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict have now come to be characterized by an atmosphere reminiscent of the Cold War after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the escalation of conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In this environment, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Turkey has become all the more vital. Even though Azerbaijan has not experienced any significant problems in its relations with Russia, its northern neighbor’s use of force to redefine borders and its formation of spheres of influence are nonetheless a cause for concern. The presence of Russian military forces in Armenia is another factor that should not go unnoticed. While Armenia, which continues to occupy Azerbaijani territory, has now became a part of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union project, Azerbaijan declined and has instead opted to maintain its course of multi-lateral diplomacy. In this way, Aliyev’s policy can be seen as an extension of Azerbaijan’s dedication to preserving its independence.

Recent international conjunctures have also increased the degree to which Turkey attaches importance to its relationship with Azerbaijan. Close cooperation with Azerbaijan in the field of energy could turn Turkey into a prominent actor in the European energy market seeing that Europe aims to decrease its dependence on Russian energy resources. In an environment in which Russia draws the lines of its own economic sphere with the Eurasian Economic Union, states that are left out of this constellation such as Azerbaijan are important for Turkey in terms of their ability to facilitate access to the markets of the Asia-Pacific. In terms of access routes to the People’s Republic of China and eventually to the Asia-Pacific, the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan corridor is an important project. Turkmenistan already enjoys a very special relationship with China and improvements are being seen in its relations with Azerbaijan.

Seeing that it is an item of central importance for Azerbaijani foreign policy, Armenia’s continued occupation of Karabakh and the reclamation of these occupied provinces is in turn a critical topic in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations overall. In this sense, Azerbaijan had been nervous about the lack of any mention of the Karabakh issue throughout Turkey and Armenia’s process of developing bilateral protocols. The thought that Turkey would turn around on its commitment and open its land borders with Armenia without a resolution to the Karabakh issue caused concerns to rise in Azerbaijan. However, in what may be considered as Azerbaijan’s most valued moment of Aliyev’s visit to Turkey, President Erdoğan stated that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity should be assured through peaceful methods and that Turkey would never back step on its support and dedication to the Azerbaijani cause throughout the Turkish-Armenian protocol process. Yet, during this time a significant rise has been observed in the amount and intensity of propaganda aiming to open the Turkish-Armenian land border. However, Turkey sealed these borders because of the Armenian occupation of Karabakh; therefore, it would be contradictory for Turkey to open the borders without a resolution to the Karabakh issue. Moreover, opening the borders would not pose an economic gain for Turkey, and even if they were to be opened, contrary to the beliefs of some Western countries, Armenia may not come to focus on the West seeing that it is now a part of the Eurasian Economic Union. Furthermore, opening the borders would not free Turkey of the allegations of genocide that it is confronted with, as the well-rooted Armenian diaspora will continue to push the issue.

Turkey and Azerbaijan’s continued efforts to strengthen their strategic partnership will bolster both countries’ positions in the region and worldwide. The protection of this partnership and intimate state of bilateral relations will continue to depend on the exertion of the two countries’ leaders as well as the maintenance of comprehensive, continuous inter-institutional dialogue.

*This article was first published in Analist Monthly Journal’s February issue in Turkish language and was translated into English language by Şeyma Okutan

The post Aliyev’s Visit: Strengthening Azerbaijan-Turkey Strategic Partnership – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

USAK experts have expressed their opinions on the lightning operation of the Turkish Armed Forces that saw the evacuation and demolition of the tomb of Suleyman Shah, an act which has deeply affected the global and Turkish agendas with regard to the war in Syria.

According to the Ankara Agreement signed in 1921 between France and Turkey, the tomb of Suleyman Shah falls within Turkish territory. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the Karakozak village in the governorate of Aleppo, where the tomb is located, was first controlled by the Free Syrian Army and was later taken over by IS last year in March. IS announced they would destroy the tomb immediately after they entered the region, and subsequently, Turkey stepped up its military activity along the Syrian border.

View of 1973-2015 building complex of the Tomb of Suleyman Shah from the Euphrates river. Photo by Céline Rayne, Wikipedia Commons.

Because of the continued instability in Syria, the Turkish Armed Forces entered the country on February 22 with 572 personnel, 39 tanks and 57 armored vehicles, whereupon they emptied the tomb of Suleyman Shah, taking historical artifacts and demolishing the tomb as they left. The mausoleum is planned to be rebuilt in the village of Esme, Syria, close to the Turkish border.

Osman Bahadır Dinçer from the USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, sees the military operation as an expression of Turkey’s path dependency at the current conjuncture, as “limitations emerged during the process of Syrian crisis and eliminated an alternative approach”. Dinçer pointed out that as a result of Turkey’s policies towards the Syrian crisis and IS, without considering its capacity, Turkey had to carry out this operation in the fashion it did.

Highlighting another aspect of the issue, Dinçer mentioned the success of both the Turkish soldiers who protected the tomb and those who carried out the operation, saying, “regardless of political considerations, the soldiers who protected the tomb for months and those who carried out the operation have successfully fulfilled their missions”.

Vice President of USAK Prof. Selçuk Çolakoğlu underlined that the evacuation of the Turkish soldiers guarding the tomb does not equate to Turkey’s renunciation of sovereignty over the site, which is assured by international agreements. He added that subsequent to stability being provided in the region, Turkey would construct the tomb anew at the same site and would once again send Turkish soldiers to protect it.

Çolakoğlu stated that the territory on which the Tomb of Suleyman Shah lies legally belongs to Turkey and that the changing of the Turkish guards through Syrian territory has up until now been a right granted to Turkey; thus, the operation was legitimate. Additionally, Çolakoğlu remarked that both the domination of IS in territories surrounding the tomb and the lack of the central government’s control in the region eliminated the need for Turkey to receive authorization from the Syrian government before commencing the operation.

On the other hand, Çolakoğlu also emphasized that Turkey’s unilateral attempt to relocate the tomb is not possible under international law, remarking that Turkey and Syria are obliged to sign an agreement for such a transposition. Çolakoğlu also noted that if such an agreement were to be brought before and approved by the UN, it would become binding for third parties. Here, Çolakoğlu stressed that the Assad regime in Damascus is still the legitimate representative of the Syrian Arab Republic at the UN and that although the PYD and IS have de facto control over some areas of the country, they lack the authority granted by legitimate representation. Taking this into account, Çolakoğlu stated that “without an agreement between Ankara and Damascus, the relocation of the tomb lacks legal basis”. At this point, he evaluated the construction of a new tomb in the village of Esme near the Turkish-Syrian border as a “legally null unilateral declaration of will”, and considering the Assad regime’s protest to the operation, he emphasized that there is no mutual understanding between Ankara and Damascus.

Dinçer also shared his foresights on the potential impacts of the operation, stating that “this situation adds an utterly different dimension to issues that are already disadvantageous to Turkey, such as the Kurdish question and PKK/PYD in Rojava”. He also posited that the way the operation has been conducted will be the topic of political debate and that Turkey’s impasse will continue to deepen as its alternatives dwindle.

The post Şah Fırat Operation To Open New Facet Of Turkey’s Policy Towards Syria appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Coastal communities in 15 states that depend on the $1 billion shelled mollusk industry (primarily oysters and clams) are at long-term economic risk from the increasing threat of ocean acidification, a new report concludes.

This first nationwide vulnerability analysis, which was funded through the National Science Foundation’s National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, was published today in the journal Nature Climate Change.

The Pacific Northwest has been the most frequently cited region with vulnerable shellfish populations, the authors say, but the report notes that newly identified areas of risk from acidification range from Maine to the Chesapeake Bay, to the bayous of Louisiana.

“Ocean acidification has already cost the oyster industry in the Pacific Northwest nearly $110 million and jeopardized about 3,200 jobs,” said Julie Ekstrom, who was lead author on the study while with the Natural Resources Defense Council. She is now at the University of California at Davis.

George Waldbusser, an Oregon State University marine ecologist and biogeochemist, said the spreading impact of ocean acidification is due primarily to increases in greenhouse gases.

“This clearly illustrates the vulnerability of communities dependent on shellfish to ocean acidification,” said Waldbusser, a researcher in OSU’s College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences and co-author on the paper. “We are still finding ways to increase the adaptive capacity of these communities and industries to cope, and refining our understanding of various species’ specific responses to acidification.

“Ultimately, however, without curbing carbon emissions, we will eventually run out of tools to address the short-term and we will be stuck with a much larger long-term problem,” Waldbusser added.

The analysis identified several “hot zones” facing a number of risk factors. These include:

• The Pacific Northwest: Oregon and Washington coasts and estuaries have a “potent combination” of risk factors, including cold waters, upwelling currents that bring corrosive waters closer to the surface, corrosive rivers, and nutrient pollution from land runoff;

• New England: The product ports of Maine and southern New Hampshire feature poorly buffered rivers running into cold New England waters, which are especially enriched with acidifying carbon dioxide;

• Mid-Atlantic: East coast estuaries including Narragansett Bay, Chesapeake Bay, and Long Island Sound have an abundance of nitrogen pollution, which exacerbates ocean acidification in waters that are shellfish-rich;

• Gulf of Mexico: Terrebonne and Plaquemines Parishes of Louisiana, and other communities in the region, have shellfish economies based almost solely on oysters, giving this region fewer options for alternative – and possibly more resilient – mollusk fisheries.

The project team has also developed an interactive map to explore the vulnerability factors regionally.

One concern, the authors say, is that many of the most economically dependent regions – including Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia and Louisiana – are least prepared to respond, with minimal research and monitoring assets for ocean acidification.

The Pacific Northwest, on the other hand, has a robust research effort led by Oregon State University researchers, who already have helped oyster hatcheries rebound from near-disastrous larval die-offs over the past decade. The university recently announced plans to launch a Marine Studies Initiative that would help address complex, multidisciplinary problems such as ocean acidification.

“The power of this project is the collaboration of natural and social scientists focused on a problem that has and will continue to impact industries dependent on the sea,” Waldbusser said.

Waldbusser recently led a study that documented how larval oysters are sensitive to a change in the “saturation state” of ocean water – which ultimately is triggered by an increase in carbon dioxide. The inability of ecosystems to provide enough alkalinity to buffer the increase in CO₂ is what kills young oysters in the environment.

The post Study Outlines Threat Of Ocean Acidification To Coastal Communities In US appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On February 25, 2015, the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Kofi Annan Foundation will host a conference in Bogotá, titled “Truth Commissions and Peace Processes: International Experiences and Challenges for Colombia.”

The day-long conference will gather major political figures and international and national experts to reflect on experienced gained from truth commissions that have emerged from peace processes around the world and how they may enrich the discussion in Colombia.

Mr. Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia; Mr. Kofi Annan, Chair of the Kofi Annan Foundation; and Mr. David Tolbert, President of the International Center for Transitional Justice will open the conference.

“I look forward to sharing our experiences drawn from peace processes and truth seeking initiatives while at the same time learning about Colombia’s own efforts and challenges in this field,” said Mr. Annan. “We hope that experience will be helpful to Colombians as they embark on such an important public discussion.”

An essential element of all peace processes is how to establish the truth about the violence and abuses that have been committed during the armed conflict. This search for truth concerns Colombian society as a whole, and the conference will provide space for Colombians with diverse views to contribute to the scope and design of the country’s truth-seeking process.

“The truth commission should be at the center of a broader truth-seeking process in Colombia, focusing on issues that have not yet been adequately addressed,” said Mr. Tolbert. “One such issue is the need to establish not only the responsibilities of individuals but also of institutions, state and otherwise, for serious human rights violations.”

He added, “The acknowledgment of the suffering of victims is an essential and fundamental contribution that a truth commission can make towards lasting peace.”

Following a reflection on truth commissions and peace process, ICTJ and KAF published the report “Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes” last year. A Spanish edition will be launched at the conference.

According to this report, mandates of truth commissions have expanded in recent years to cover a growing list of functions and violations. “It’s a balancing act,” said Mr. Tolbert. “In order to be legitimate, the mandate should reflect the real demands of Colombians, but at the same time it must be realistic and accomplished within a reasonable time frame.”

The conference is organized with the support of the Norwegian Embassy in Colombia and Forum Semana. ICTJ’s work in Colombia is also supported by the Government of Sweden.

The post ICTJ And Kofi Annan Foundation Convene Discussion In Bogota On Truth Commissions And Peace Processes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Neil Thompson

The country of just 2.8 million is encased between her two giant neighbors, Russia to the north and China to the south. For most of the twentieth century Mongolia was, like many Eastern European states, part of the Soviet empire. Then in 1990 the withdrawal of the Soviet military and of Russia’s economic support ended decades of communist government, and with it control by Moscow. It also plunged the country into food shortages and economic collapse.

Today Mongolia presents a curious picture. In a region of autocracies it is still a democracy two decades on from the 1990 communist collapse. Despite sitting on vast quantities of untapped mineral wealth it has not succumbed to the ‘resource curse’ yet. Mongolia was also one of the world’s fastest growing economies until recent times, with high growth rates reported in 2012 and 2013. Driven by a number of massive mining projects, foreign direct investment has been transforming its post-communist economy.

Yet, still suspicious of China and on a whole fiercely nationalistic, relations between Mongolia’s government and Western and Chinese firms there have often been rowdy; it refuses to play the part of an anti-Russian satellite in any other state’s ‘zone.’ This makes the striking absence of Russia from Mongolia’s contemporary economic development even more conspicuous, and it reflects Russia’s diminishing ability to influence events in its former sphere – President Putin’s ongoing violent reaction to Kiev’s westwards drift notwithstanding.

The Russian leader has laid down several markers that there are geographical limits to Western and Chinese influence, from backing old Soviet ally Syria (where Russia has a strategic naval base) to inviting the new North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un to travel to Moscow for his first trip overseas as leader. North Korea’s previously cozy ties with China have come under strain by Kim Jong-un’s erratic leadership style, including the execution of his moderately pro-Chinese uncle last year which disturbed Beijing. Mr. Putin has built his recent foreign policy around the paternalistic notion that Russia has special ties and interests in the former Soviet bloc that preclude the presence of other security or trading choices. It was the possibility that Ukraine would join the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) that first sparked Moscow’s intervention there, not that Ukraine was drawing closer to NATO.

The instrument Putin wants to use as a political barrier against the creeping rise of Chinese economic influence, or the dreaded Western soft power, is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC). The stated goal of that new union was that a single economic area would be created for the free flow of capital, services, and labor in the post-Soviet space (but with a single financial market scheduled for 2025). Yet when the EEC came into force in January 2015, it had only three official members – Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The post-revolutionary Ukrainian government refused to join, which led straight to Russian backing for separatists in the eastern Donbas region.

The gap between the EEC’s smaller states’ economic focus, and the Kremlin view that the EEC is useful as a political tool of influence was highlighted last autumn. Moscow introduced import sanctions against Western goods in retaliation for Western sanctions placed on Russia over its behavior in Ukraine. Before the EEC even officially started functioning, rows between the three member states had begun about the re-exporting of banned products to Russia, and the limitation of goods destined for Kazakhstan routed across Russian territory. At roughly the same time a symbolic shift passed almost unnoticed in Mongolia when the Mongolian parliament voted in October 2014 to adopt a rail gauge compatible with China’s for the first time, to create a special 240-kilometer track from the Tavan Tolgoi coal basin to the Chinese border.

In the last century, when Mongolia’s leaders looked westwards for political and economic support, the Soviet Union helped build Mongolia’s network and a twist of history means that Russia’s railway gauges are different from the global standard used by China. China’s rise as the world’s largest energy consumer however has helped consign Russia’s Mongolian legacy to history. Coal is Mongolia’s second biggest export, and China is its largest customer. The new gauge will reduce the cost of transporting coal to China by a third, from $6 a ton to $4 a ton, once the line is completed in late 2016.

Mongolia is not rushing blindly into economic dependency upon Beijing. Suspicion of China’s state-owned mining companies is strong, and even the proposal to approve the new track took years to pass. Ulaanbaatar has long cultivated friendly ties with Western governments as a counter-balance to China’s embrace. Vast deposits of gold and copper at the new Oyu Tolgoi mines, which could amount to up to a third of national GDP when fully operational, are jointly owned by a British-Australian mining group and the Mongolian government. They also account for almost all of Mongolia’s foreign direct investment to date.

By contrast Russian influence has drastically declined in Mongolia’s economic calculations in the space of a generation. The problem for Putin is that while he can still act as a spoiler to other countries’ ambitions, he has been unable to articulate beyond bullying what vision Russia offers Eurasian states instead. There is now talk of Sino-Russian gas pipelines and railways crossing Mongolia, but they will be on Chinese terms. China’s leader Xin Jinpeng has made the development of a ‘Silk Road’ economic belt crossing Central Asia a national priority. He has recently announced a $40 billion budget for the new Silk Road Fund and promises further massive financial investments from the Chinese-dominated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

This begs the question: as Chinese and Western companies and institutions increasingly seek to sign post-Soviet states up as partners and members, is Mongolia, not Ukraine, the future of Eurasia?

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com.

The post Mongolia: The Future Of Eurasia? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Clément Doleac  and Lucas G. Guest*

The European Union (EU), which has been working to normalize its ties with Cuba since 2010, defined the announcement of the reestablishment of the United States-Cuban relations as a “historical turning point.”1 The EU foreign affairs head, Ms. Frederica Mogherini said that “another wall has started to fall,” and that the European Union is willing to “expand relations with all parts of Cuban society.”2 Representatives from Cuba and the EU will meet in March 2015 for a third round of negotiations aimed at normalizing relations after a decade tainted by the already recognized hypocritical European Union Common Position which pressed Cuba to discuss human rights and the role of civil society in the Cuban politics.3 These new negotiations can not help but bring on a high level of uncertainty because the turn in US-Cuban relations will impact EU-Cuba relations. Among other concerns, the economic standing of the European Union in Cuba as its second largest trading partner remains at risk.4

EU common position and the Progressive Improvement of EU-Cuba Relationship

In 1996, the then-15 EU member states adopted a Common Position (CP) related to Cuba.5 Under conservative Spanish leadership this position supported the latest U.S. round of sanctions against Cuba, the Helms-Burton Act, which had the clear objective to tighten restrictions against the Castro regime.6 The U.S. and EU intended to force the Cuban government to reform different sectors of its economy and society, and its political system, including the human rights situation.7

Unsurprisingly, the CP was strongly criticized by Cuban authorities and led to a political stalemate between the EU and Cuba. Despite such a tense political situation, European companies were among the first to invest in Cuba when the government loosened economic restrictions in 1995, know as the “special period in times of peace” following the Soviet Union’s collapse which resulted in Cuba’s GDP falling 30% in 4 years.8 However, European Companies had to comply with the extremely strict and restrictive application of rules on foreign investments imposed by the Cuban government such as the obligation to submit to 50/50 Joint-Venture with the State, the difficulties to repatriate dividends, and the impossibility to manage human resources directly. Even with the CP, the EU had always been significantly less strict than the United States toward Cuba.9 The EU gradually improved such ties with Cuba during the last two decades. In fact, 18 member states of the European Union have signed cooperation agreements with Cuba.10 Also, as one observer put it, “[the EU has] never excluded Cuba from participating in their summits with Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the Iberoamerican conferences of heads of states and government since 1992, and the Latin America and Caribbean-European Union summit gatherings since 1994.”11

However, in July 2003, several independent journalists, trade union activists, and dissidents were arrested across Cuba, and accused of conspiracy for cooperating with the Director of the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba, James Cason.12 The accusations were based on diplomatic invitations of dissidents to attend official receptions, in order to symbolically further their struggle against political repression.13 Seventy-five persons were sentenced to six to 30 years in jail.14 Consequently, the EU Council froze its diplomatic ties with Cuba, halting all cooperation and development aid that existed before. In addition to clamping down on the US-financed dissent, Fidel Castro apparently felt that the previous economic opening was too much, too fast. Thus, he reversed decision regarding the still small Cuban private sector (“cuentaspropistas”), and placed additional restrictions on Cuban economic liberties and foreign investments.15 Yet, it is fair to recognize that some foreign investors might have tried to escape the Kafkaesque Cuban system by illegal means, leading to corruption cases. As a result, the number of joint-venture companies was halved between 2001 and 2007 and the government used the occasion to seize some valuable assets.16

In 2004 Cuba released a number of dissidents and the EU revised its strategy to maintain more discrete contacts with local dissidents. After nearly two years of tensions passed, the EU chose not to invite opponents of the regime to official celebrations.17 Consequently, Cuba normalized its ties with a number of European countries, including France, Spain, and Germany.18 It was not until 2006, when Fidel Castro handed his leadership in Cuba to his younger brother, Raul Castro, that this diplomatic conflict ended. However, it would take two more years for the EU to restart cooperation with Cuba after the release of the majority of the dissidents.

In 2008, Cuba was hit by three successive hurricanes, which caused significant damages in part of the country, crippling its economy, and leading to a partial default vis-à-vis its main trading partners. Since then, the European Commission has committed nearly €60 million for post-hurricane reconstruction, food security, climate change policies, renewable energy, culture, and education in Cuba. The EU also allowed Cuba to take part in E.U.-funded regional programs. 19

This pursuit of a more comprehensive approach toward Cuba was strengthened by the position of Spain, which has advocated since 2010 for a revised CP. At the time, Ms. Trinidad Jimenez, Spain Secretary of State, declared the CP to be a “discriminatory, inefficient and illegitimate” policy.20 Still, for a policy change to occur, the unanimous support of the 27 EU member states was necessary. While several countries were supportive of the Common Position, mostly because of their past suffering of soviet authoritarism, other EU countries had a more flexible idea of what should be the nature of EU-Cuba relationship.21 On May 12, 2010, the first Country Strategy Paper was adopted on Cuba, including an additional fund of €20 million during the period 2011-2013 in order to pursue the EU’s ongoing cooperation, as well as an additional aid of €4 million in order to help the Cuban population affected by the Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.22 After the 6th Cuban Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2011 revealed its lineamientos (“guidelines”) to “actualize [the] Cuban economic model,” as well as introduced the first reforms started to be implemented sin prisas pero sin pausas (“slowly but surely”) by Raul Castro. The EU-Cuba relationship continued to improve.23

Finally, during the first months of 2014, all the EU member states agreed to give a negotiation mandate to the EU’s foreign policy chief to discuss and renew EU-Cuba partnership. The CP and its flexibility led to a significant improvement of the EU-Cuba relationship by encouraging Cuban government policies to move towards more liberal economic and political practices.

The EU as Cuba’s 2nd largest economic partner

The EU is an important economic partner of Cuba, filling the void US trade sanctions produced. Trade between the EU and Cuba is now dynamic, representing a positive balance for the European Union. Among the top 10 trading partners of Cuba, four countries are member states of the EU: Spain is third, Holland seventh, Italy ninth and France tenth.24 In 2013, the European Union imported €837 million from Cuba and exported €1,834 million to Cuba, representing a nearly €1 billion surplus (see Figure 1).25 In 2013, transactions with the European Union and the rest of the continent accounted for 28.3 percent of Cuba’s foreign trade. This statistic shows that 36.7 percent of Cuban exports go to the EU market and 25.9 percent of national imports come from that region.

Figure 1:

As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the trade relationship between the EU and Cuba is concentrated in two kinds of goods: agricultural and industrial products. Agriculture represents 42.5 percent of EU imports from Cuba while Cuban imports from the EU are 84.7 percent industrial products. On one hand, the EU imports foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco, including rum, cigars and sugar derivatives (40.8 percent) and mineral products such as nickel and scrap metal (33.6 percent). On the other hand, the EU exports to Cuba machinery and appliances (34.5 percent), and products of the chemical, plastics and allied industries (13.4 percent).26

Figure 2: Exports from Cuba to the European Union

In Figure 2, minerals, fuels, lubricants and related materials appear in red, in green alimentary products and animals, and in purple beverages and tobacco. Source: See reference 26.

Figure 3: Exports from the European Union to Cuba by categories

In Figure 3 alimentary products and animals appear in red, in green chemical products, in purple the machinery and transportation equipment and in blue other manufactured products. Source: See reference 26.

It is easy to see that the trade relationship between Cuba and the EU is unbalanced: Cuba exports mostly primary products (85 percent of their trade total), while the EU exports manufactured ones (around 81 percent of their total exports).27

EU-Cuba trade recently suffered a setback with the exemption of Cuba on January 1st, 2014 from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).28 The Cuban exclusion is due to the way Cuba changed its method to calculate its nominal GDP in the early 2000s in order to give it a statistical boost of 15 percent.29 Automatically, the country jumped to higher level in EU’s GSP ranking, making it a middle income nation. Aware that this new methodology could present such a risk, Cuban authorities preferred to keep their obscure statistics and reduce its market in Europe, in order to appear among the “developed economies.”30 Thus, under the new rules, taxes on Cuban cigars jumped from 7.8 percent to 26.9 percent in 2014.31 Despite being considered a part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) since 2010, Cuba does not benefit from the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol, and therefore loose an advantageous tariff for its sugar.32

Other EU Economic Presence in Cuba

The EU presence in Cuba is not only a trade relationship. European companies are present in many areas of Cuba’s economy. For the last 20 years, the EU is the second largest provider of tourists to Cuba. Tourism brings the cash-starved Cuban economy $1 to 2 billion USD every year, and is its 3rd source of cash after medical services and remittances.33 Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Cuban tourism industry is dominated by European operators from Spain, France, and Germany. But, since Obama’s easing measures in 2008, Cuban-Americans and authorized (or not) American visitors have also significantly increased.34

Also, one would be surprised to see how many French Peugeots and Renaults are driven along with 1950s American Chevies and 1970s Soviet Ladas in Havana’s streets. Spanish Seats and Italian Fiats are not unknown either. European exporters of food, machinery, industry, and chemicals also represent an alternative to cheap but unreliable Asian materials, antique Russian products and, of course, banned American goods. To finance this trade, European banks are also vital to the Cuban economy. Indeed, it is clear that European companies benefit partly from the absence of American competitors in Cuba thatwere forced out by U.S. sanctions.

The Damocles Sword of the Helms-Burton Act for European Businesses

The United States government has imposed a continuous embargo on Cuba since 1961 strengthening it twice, through the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which contributed significantly to Havana’s dire economic situation, and.35 The latter act installed the embargo as an entrenched law, while it previously was an executive authority action, conditioning its removal by free and fair elections in Cuba and excluding the Castro brothers, among many other conditions (Title I and II).36 The Helms-Burton Act, far from being of any help with the development of democracy in Cuba, has led to a continued grip of the Castro brothers on the island, and raised opposition towards the embargo amongst the international community.

Even though trade in Cuba is not impossible after Helms-Burton, it is considerably more complicated, leading to an increase in the cost of operations. Among the many obstacles, European businesses can face fines and sanctions for activities such as the use of the US dollar for their trade with Cuba (which Cuba oddly oblige its trading partners to use), the intermediation of a US-based clearing house for money transfer, and the trade of any goods or products composed of more than 10 percent of US based components, such as an operating system running on Microsoft Windows. Shipping is also problematic as a boat can not deliver goods to Cuba. In the U.S., boats have to wait more than 3 months before being able to stop in a U.S. port or to operate for a U.S. company, increasing the cost of importation to Cuba. In the end, the U.S. suffered retaliatory measures from several countries, including Mexico and Canada, and the EU, all close allies of the United States.37 When the legislation was approved several companies suffered sanctions, such as the Canadian mining company Sherritt International Corporation of Toronto. Many Mexican companies such as Mexican Cements (Cementos Mexicanos, CEMEX) and potential investors in Cuba withdrew from Cuba.38

In theory, the financial sector in Cuba should be particularly concerned with the restrictions of the Helms-Burton Act because of the nationalization and expropriation of the banks by the Cuban government in 1960. In fact, the Helms-Burton Act Title III allows U.S. Citizens and Cuban-Americans who suffered nationalization of their property by the Cuban Revolution to file lawsuits against international companies doing business with such properties.39 On October 13, 1960, through Law 1890 and 1891, Fidel Castro nationalized 37 banks which were the property of rich Cubans and American citizens, and on September 17, 1960, the Cuban government nationalized the North American banks on the island.40 With these three measures the financial system in Cuba was completely under control of the revolutionary government and, therefore, potentially included under the Helms-Burton Act’s Title III.

The EU attacked the Helms Burton Act in the World Trade Organization (WTO), fearing a dangerous precedent of U.S. extraterritorial application of its national laws, and threatened to establish a “blacklist” of U.S. companies filing suits against European firms not in accordance with the Helms Burton Act.41 This conflict was resolved in May 1998 during EU-U.S. summit through the acceptance by US executive power to protect EU companies from any penalties called for in Helms-Burton Act.42 However, protection of European companies has still not been enacted by U.S. Congress, even if they are able to benefit in any manner from an executive branch waiver renewed every six months.43 The Sword of Damocles remains present and highlights the hypocrisy of U.S. diplomacy by never enacting the agreement, even with its close allies.

However, even if every President of the United States provided a waiver for the Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, many enterprises suffered fines, specifically in the banking and finance sector, mainly because of the use of U.S. based subsidiaries and of U.S. dollar for their transactions with Cuba.44

One such enterprise was the French bank BNP-Paribas because of its operation in Cuba and Iran since its U.S. based subsidiaries. As stated by CubaStandard, “the use of U.S. dollars in transactions with Cuba and other U.S.-sanctioned countries violates U.S. laws. SWIFT payments in U.S. dollars must clear through U.S.-based computers, and that violates U.S. sanctions, policy enforcers in Washington insist.”45

Figure 4: Some of the fines imposed for violating US sanctions, involving Cuba. Source: Granma 46

Other enterprises which suffered these sanctions, as displayed in the Figure 4, are the DN Amro Bank from Netherlands, the U.S. based JP Morgan Chase., the German Commerzbank, the Dutch’s bank ING, the Swiss’s bank Credit Suisse, Bank of Nova Scotia, as well as many others.47 European companies preferred to not comply with their own laws rather than risk losing their licenses in the US or being forbidden to use the access to U.S dollar.48

The EU urged the U.S. government to change its approach towards Cuba numerous times. In 2014, the EU emphasized the “existing restrictions on rights and freedoms” in Cuba, but also was very positive talking about “the adoption by the Cuban Parliament in August 2011 of a package of economic and social reforms […] that will address the key concerns of the Cuban population”.49 The EU statement emphasized the disastrous effects of the U.S. embargo, claiming that it “contributes to the economic problems in Cuba, negatively affecting the living standards of the Cuban people and having consequences in the humanitarian fields as well.” 50 The actions of the UN institutions in Cuba, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) are also complicated by the embargo and its financial effects, complicating their day-to-day work and communication with their headquarters in New-York. Still the U.S. government reminded resolute in its stance, until recently, and the EU never did more to oppose the U.S. government.51

The Re-Opening of U.S.-Cuban Relations and Its Affect on EU-Cuban Trade

The recent changes announced in U.S. policy on Cuba might alleviate numerous restrictions, but the change will come slowly and will require much strength from the White House. As stated by CubaNow, the lobby of Cuban Americans is calling for a new approach towards Cuba and the U.S. executive branch can already freely grant exceptions for commerce and trade, for export and sale of goods and services, license U.S. travelers to Cuba to have access to U.S. financial services, to expand general license travel related to business in the financial services sector, travel and hospitality-related industries as well as banking, insurance, credit cards, and consumer products related to travel. President Obama can also, without Congressional support, allow the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to assist Cuba technically. Cuba remains excluded from IFI’s as any new member indirectly needs U.S approval.52 Recent announcements might change the course of the restrictions, but it is not clear yet how far US companies can go and it is even less clear for foreign companies.

United States Interest Section in Havana

However, one thing is certain, EU businesses will suffer if the US-Cuban relationship is fully reestablished without trade and economic restrictions. For example, the food-processing industry will experience difficulties because of the additional costs for the importation of products from the EU compared to the reduced costs from the United States. The EU stands to lose a $150 million wheat market in Cuba if the embargo is lifted.53 Wheat is the second largest import of Cuba, after refined oil, and the country bought nearly $149 million dollars of wheat from the EU last year, mainly from France.54 Because of its unsuitable climate for growing wheat, the island represents the biggest market in the Caribbean, and also a natural geographic market, for the U.S.

Cubans already buy corn and food stuffs from the U.S. making it its 7th trading partner and Steve Nicholson, Vice President for Food and Agriculture Research at Rabo Agrifinance in St Louis has stated, “Cuba would be foolish not to be a good customer given the close proximity to the U.S.”55 According to Bloomberg the “grain shipping costs to Cuba from the U.S. Gulf are in the range of $6 to $7 a ton, while for France they’re more like $20 to $25 a ton.”56 The EU is not the only region that will suffer from a reestablishment of mutually beneficial U.S.-Cuban relationship. For example, Cuba has to import milk powder from New Zealand, even though the U.S is the largest milk powder producer in the world. The cost will be incredibly lower for Cuba to import from 90 miles away rather than across the Pacific.

In other sectors, the U.S. will have to fight to gain market shares in Cuba. Even if the U.S. strategy of “cleaning the field” by forcing the European banks to shut their representation and cut most of their links with Cuba was quite successful, European banks still process credit cards and have an advantage over their American competitors there. At the end of the day, Cuban administrators and Cuban public trading agencies are the ones that will decide who comes in or not.

Expectations for the future

It would be very surprising if the U.S. Congress chose to lift the embargo and repeal the Helms Burton Act before the 2016 Presidential elections. The 2016 elections dictate that there is at least a 2-3 year window of opportunity for non-US companies in Cuba. The United States still needs to clarify its position regarding several subjects that will be a source of tension with Cuban authorities, such as the Guantanamo Bay military base and the property claims by the enterprises and properties nationalized in 1960.57

The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission also ratified nearly 6,000 property claims by U.S. corporations and citizens for a value estimated at $1.85 billion.58 Today, the United States government claims $7 billion because of the interests.59 This problem is also amplified by Cuban Americans, who are now U.S. citizens and are also eligible for compensation, against the international jurisprudence applying for such cases.60 The U.S. State Department estimates the number of potential claims around 200,000 for an estimated amount of tens of billions of dollars.61 The Cuban government acknowledges the legitimacy of U.S. claims, even if it also asks for counter-claims of $181 billion because of the damage done by the U.S. embargo and the CIA’s secret war on Cuba. For now, the Cuban authorities deny the legitimacy of Cuban Americans demands.62

Also, it seems quite unlikely that the Cubans will show more interest toward U.S. companies than what is needed to keep them in the game and maintain their pressure on U.S. politicians. If we believe the Cuban response to their partners’ concern of being left on the side of the road, Cubans will not forget those who were on their side during the last decades. Undoubtedly these problems are going to take a long time to be solved, and the U.S. Cuban economic relationship will need decades to reach its full potential. During that time, the EU firms and government cooperation are still free to invest in the field and to create privileged links with Cuba.

*Clément Doleac, Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Lucas G. Guest Contributor for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

References:
1“Pope leads global praise for ‘historic’ US-Cuba rapprochement” In Channel News Asia, on December 18, 2014. Consulted on http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/pope-leads-global-praise/1537086.html on February 10, 2015.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 AFP, “Cuba, EU agree new talks in March: European sources” In Yahoo News, on January 14, 2015. Consulted on http://news.yahoo.com/cuba-eu-agree-talks-march-european-sources-201201275.html on February 10, 2015.

5“96/697/PESC: Posición común de 2 de diciembre de 1996 definida por el Consejo en virtud del artículo J.2 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, sobre Cuba” in Diario Oficial n° L 322 de 12/12/1996 p. 0001 – 0002. Consulted on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996E0697:ES:HTML on February 10, 2015.

6 HOFFMANN Bert, “The Helms-Burton law and its consequences for Cuba, the United States and Europe » in Prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago Illinois, Latin American Institute at the Free University of Berlin, Germany o nSeptember 24, 1998. ; “A new phase in EU-Cuba relations” in European Parliamentary Research Service, on June 25, 2014. Consulted on http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/ on February 10, 2015 ; LAMRANI Salim, “Cuba et la Position commune de l’Union européenne” in Agoravox on November 2, 2010. Consulted on http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/cuba-et-la-position-commune-de-l-83801 on February 10, 2015; TAMAYO Juan O., « Unión Europea mantiene Posición Común », El Nuevo Herald, October 25, 2010.

7Ibid.

8 DOLEAC Clément, “Why Obama and the U.S. Congress Should Go Further With Cuba” on Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on December 19, 2014. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/why-obama-and-the-u-s-congress-should-go-further-with-cuba/ on February 10, 2015. ; International Monetary Fund, HERNANDEZ-CATA Ernesto, “The Fall and Recovery of the Cuban Economy in the 1990s: Mirage or Reality ?” in IMF Working Paper, WP/01/48, on December 2000.

9The list of these projecjts can be found on http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/

10“A new phase in EU-Cuba relations” in European Parliamentary Research Service, on June 25, 2014. Consulted on http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/ on February 10, 2015 ; ALZUGARAY TRETO Carlos, « A New Stage in Cuban relations with the European Union: Its Implications for the United States » on Inter-American Dialogue, on April 28, 2014. Consulted on http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3583 on February 10, 2015.

11ALZUGARAY TRETO Carlos, « A New Stage in Cuban relations with the European Union: Its Implications for the United States » on Inter-American Dialogue, on April 28, 2014. Consulted on http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3583 on February 10, 2015.

12“The Cuban Black Spring” on CubanSolidarity, Consulted on http://solidarnizkuba.pl/en/spoleczenstwo,damywbieli,czarnawiosna on February 10, 2015.

13HARE Paul, “The Odd Couple: The EU and Cuba 1996-2008” on Brookings, on September 2008. Consulted on http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/09/cuba-hare on February 10, 2015.

14“The Cuban Black Spring” on CubanSolidarity, Consulted on http://solidarnizkuba.pl/en/spoleczenstwo,damywbieli,czarnawiosna on February 10, 2015.

15HARE Paul, “The Odd Couple: The EU and Cuba 1996-2008” on Brookings, on September 2008. Consulted on http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/09/cuba-hare on February 10, 2015.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18Ibid. ; For example, the Czech Republic and Poland opted to continue to apply their pro-dissidents policy without regard for the EU Common Position. See more in “A new phase in EU-Cuba relations” in European Parliamentary Research Service, on June 25, 2014. Consulted on http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/ on February 10, 2015

19As stated on the European Union External Action Service webpage dedicated to Cuba: http://eeas.europa.eu/cuba/index_en.htm

20 LAMRANI Salim, “Cuba et la Position commune de l’Union européenne” in Agoravox on November 2, 2010. Consulted on http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/cuba-et-la-position-commune-de-l-83801 on February 10, 2015.

21 The conflict inside the EU about the CP arose between anti-CP member states such as Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, or Ireland, against the UK, Sweden, Czech Republic, Germany, and Poland, more supportive of the CP ; EFE, « Afirman que la UE mantendrá posición común », on Efe, 25 octobre 2010 ; AFP, « UE prevé mantener Posición Común con Cuba pero estudia un gesto de apertura », on AFP, 20 octobre 2010 ; Agence France Presse, « Cuba : la position de l’UE plus souple ? », on AFP 22 octobre 2010. ; LAMRANI Salim, Double Morale. Cuba, l’Union européenne et les droits de l’homme, Paris, Editions Estrella, 2008.

22 As stated on the European Union External Action Service webpage dedicated to Cuba: http://eeas.europa.eu/cuba/index_en.htm

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 The economic ties between the European Union and Cuba are not a novelty though. In 2001-2002, the EU was Cuba’s largest trade partner, exporting €1.43 billion (44 percent from Spain), while imports from Cuba stood at €581 million. ; See more in “European Union, Trade with Cuba” in Directorate General for Trade, European Commission, August 27, 2014.

26« Cuba and the European Union closer in trade » in OnCuba Magazine, on November 21, 2014. Consulted on http://oncubamagazine.com/economy-business/cuba-and-the-european-union-closer-in-trade/ on February 10, 2015 ; “European Union, Trade with Cuba” in Directorate General for Trade, European Commission, August 27, 2014.

27 This asymmetry is very typical of Latin American trade, and of the history of Cuba, which has suffered a similar relationship with several “tutors” : Spain before the 19th century and the United States after the Spanish-American War. Even after the Cuban revolution, that hoped to give Cubans full sovereignty, the domestic economy didn’t succeeded in industrialization despite Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna’s innovative attempts as Minister of Industry. Cuba quickly had to turn to the Soviet Union, which overpriced imports of Cuban sugar and underpriced exports of oil and machinery to Cuba, fueling the country with (soviet) cash and creating an artificial bonanza. But when Soviet cash, oil, nitrates, machinery and food imports stopped suddenly in 1992, Cuba was pushed into its darkest moment. Then, with Hugo Chavez coming into power in Venezuela in 1998 and proposing its massive “oil vs medics” scheme, Cuba made that country its first partner (more than 40% of its trade). Yet, learning from the past, Cuba’s partners are slightly more diversified now with the EU, China, Canada, Brazil and Mexico coming next. See more in CASTANEDA Jorge, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara, Vintage, October 27, 1998. ; Also see more on the web-page of the Observatory of Economic Complexity on http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/cub/

28This system aims to favor lesser and developing nations’ access to the EU market with reduced tariffs on their exports.

29 “CEPAL dice Cuba acepta modificar metodología de cálculo del PIB” in Terra, on December 17, 2008 http://economia.terra.com/noticias/noticia.aspx?idNoticia=200812172029_RTI_1229545784nN17385797, Consulted on February 12, 2015

30Cuban observers and economist agree that Cuban GDP figure is partly artificial and over valuated by the exchange rate of 1 Cuban peso (CUP) = 1 USD, used in the books, while the exchange rate is 1 USD = 25 CUP for the average Cuban.

31« Cuba and the European Union closer in trade » in OnCuba Magazine, on November 21, 2014. Consulted on http://oncubamagazine.com/economy-business/cuba-and-the-european-union-closer-in-trade/ on February 10, 2015 ; “European Union, Trade with Cuba” in Directorate General for Trade, European Commission, August 27, 2014.

32http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=cu&status=new

33« Cuban Tourism Industry Stalls in 2013; Up 3.9 Percent Through June « in Voice of America, on July 30, 2014. Consulted on http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-cuban-tourism-industry-stalls/1968496.html on February 17, 2015.

34FRANK Marc, “Americans traveling to Cuba in record numbers » in Reuters, on October 18, 2013. Consulted on http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/us-cuba-usa-tourism-idUSBRE99H0J320131018 on February 17, 2015.

35“A new phase in EU-Cuba relations” in European Parliamentary Research Service, on June 25, 2014. Consulted on http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/ on February 10, 2015 ; HOFFMANN Bert, “The Helms-Burton law and its consequences for Cuba, the United States and Europe » in Prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago Illinois, Latin American Institute at the Free University of Berlin, Germany o nSeptember 24, 1998.

36Ibid.

37 Jana No MBA, “Analyze of Helms- Burton legislation », on Jana No MBA Blog, on July 26, 2012. Consulted on http://jananomba.blogspot.com/2012/07/analyze-of-helms-burton-legislation.html on February 10, 2015.

38Ibid.

39 HOFFMANN Bert, “The Helms-Burton law and its consequences for Cuba, the United States and Europe » in Prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago Illinois, Latin American Institute at the Free University of Berlin, Germany o nSeptember 24, 1998.

40 FERNANDEZ MARTI Armando, “Nacionalizacion de la banca en Cuba” on TV Santiago, on October 13, 2014. Consulted on http://www.tvsantiago.icrt.cu/index.php/es/9-portada/6307-nacionalizacion-de-la-banca-en-cuba on February 10, 2015. As the same time the Cuban government took control of 380 important enterprises “including 103 sugar mills, 47 stores, 13 department stores, 18 distilleries, 11 cinema circuits, 16 rice mills 11 coffee roasters and dozens were nationalized textile factories, dairy products, soaps and perfumes, among others.”

41ARENDT, Michelle, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: Isolationist obstacle to Policy of Engagement, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 00087254, Winter98, Vol.30, Issue 1.

42“EU, Spain Warn U.S. of Action Over Helms-Burton Cuba Measure,” International Trade Reporter, August 18, 1999, p. 1364.

43 TAMAYO Juan O., “Cuba calls U.S. fine on bank “an abuse” “ in Miami Herald, on July 3, 2014. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1974004.htm February 17, 2015 ; « Helms-Burton Act: Resurrecting the Iron Curtain » in Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on June 10, 2011. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/helms-burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-curtain/ on February 17, 2015.

44TAMAYO Juan O., “Cuba calls U.S. fine on bank “an abuse” “ in Miami Herald, on July 3, 2014. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1974004.htm February 17, 2015 ; WERNER Johannes, ECHEVERRIA Vito, “French bank accepts harsh U.S. conditions, pulls out of Cuba” In CubaStandard, on July 1st, 2014. Consulted on https://www.cubastandard.com/?p=10834 on February 17, 2015.

45 WERNER Johannes, ECHEVERRIA Vito, “French bank accepts harsh U.S. conditions, pulls out of Cuba” In CubaStandard, on July 1st, 2014. Consulted on https://www.cubastandard.com/?p=10834 on February 17, 2015.

46This figure is based on GONZALEZ DELGADO Dalia, “ ¿Qué implica ser acusado de patrocinar el terrorismo?” in Granma, on February 12, 2015. Consulted on http://www.granma.cu/mundo/2015-02-16/que-implica-ser-acusado-de-patrocinar-el-terrorismo on February 18,2015.

47JEAN Diane, PARIENTE Jonathan, VAUDANO Maxime, DAMGE Mathilde, “Amende BNP, si vous avez raté un épisode” In Le Monde, on May 30, 2014. Consulted on http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/05/30/bnp-pour-tout-comprendre-a-l-amende-record-brandie-par-les-etats-unis_4429206_4355770.html on February 10, 2015 ; AIN, “Washington Fines German Bank for Operations with Cuba” on Jamaica News, on December 19, 2014. Consulted on http://www.newsjamaica.net/index.php/agriculture/item/902-washington-fines-german-bank-for-operations-with-cuba on February 10, 2015 ; LUTON Daraine “Ja to back Cuba at UN again but… » on Jamaica Gleaner, on October 27, 2013. Consulted on http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131027/news/news1.html on February 10, 2015 ; TAMAYO Juan O., “Cuba calls U.S. fine on bank “an abuse” “ in Miami Herald, on July 3, 2014. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1974004.htm February 17, 2015 ; SANDELS Robert and VALDÉS P. Nelson « Cuba Détente » on CounterPunch, on January 28, 2015. Consulted on ;http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/28/cuba-detente/ on February 10, 2015 ; WERNER Johannes, ECHEVERRIA Vito, “French bank accepts harsh U.S. conditions, pulls out of Cuba” In CubaStandard, on July 1st, 2014. Consulted on https://www.cubastandard.com/?p=10834 on February 17, 2015.

48TAMAYO Juan O., “Cuba calls U.S. fine on bank “an abuse” “ in Miami Herald, on July 3, 2014. Consulted on http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1974004.htm February 17, 2015 ; EU Annual Report on U.S. Trade Barriers, 2005, p.1.

49ATANET Miguel, “The EU votes at UN on the necessity of ending the embargo imposed by the USA against Cuba,” Le blog de Miguel Atanet, on October 29, 2014. Consulted on http://www.matpe.eu/2014/10/the-eu-votes-at-un-on-the-necessity-of-ending-the-embargo-imposed-by-the-usa-against-cuba.html on February 10, 2015.

50 Ibid.

51 LAMRANI Salim, Double Morale. Cuba, l’Union européenne et les droits de l’homme, Paris, Editions Estrella, 2008.

52 TOUSSAINT Eric, “Domination of the United States on the World Bank” on CADTM, on September 1, 2014. Consulted on http://cadtm.org/Domination-of-the-United-States-on on February 10, 2015. As stated in this essay, the United States has 15,85 per cent percent of the vote rights in the World Bank, and a new member can be accepted only if obtaining 85 percent of the vote, as every major decision in the World Bank. Be a member state of the World Bank is obligatory to be part of the International Monetary Fund. ; This list is non-exhaustive and other possibilities can be explored by the executive branch, without any necessity of acceptance by the Congress. Our list is based on the one of the CubaNow website, on http://cubanow.us/new_realities/demystifyingpolicy/

53 RUITENBERG Rudy, “Cuba Deal Costing Europe in $150-Million Wheat Export Market” in Bloomberg, on December 18, 2014. Consulted on http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-18/europe-may-lose-150-million-wheat-market-in-cuba-on-u-s-thaw on February 10, 2015.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid ; Economic Eye on Cuba, February 2015 “2014 Was 2nd Lowest Level In 13 Years For Food/Ag Exports 2014 CDA Exports Less Than 50% Of 2013”.

56 Ibid.

57 GIOIA Paul and KEEN Timothy, “The Guantanamo Base, A U.S. Colonial Relic Impeding Peace with Cuba » on Council on Hemispheric Affairs, on February 12, 2015. Consulted on http://www.coha.org/the-guantanamo-base-a-u-s-colonial-relic-impeding-peace-with-cuba/ on February 17, 2015.

58 LEOGRANDE William M. “Normalizing Relations With Cuba: The Unfinished Agenda” in Newsweek, on January 30, 2015. Consulted on http://www.newsweek.com/normalizing-relations-cuba-unfinished-agenda-303232 on February 10, 2015.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid ;The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission itself some 30 years ago had stated

categorically”It is simply unlawful under established international jurisprudence for the U.S., pursuant to Title III of the Helms- Burton law, to lend support and assistance to the claims of Cuban Americans with respect to properties taken from them while they were Cuban cititzens.”

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

The post Will US-Cuban Rapprochement Affect Relationship Between EU And Cuba? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — Azeribaijan’s central bank devalued the manat on Saturday (21 February) by 33.5% to the dollar and by 30% to the euro, as slumping oil prices and an economic crisis in major trading partner Russia put pressure on the currency.

The bank abandoned the manat’s dollar peg on 16 February and began using a dollar-euro basket to manage the exchange rate after a nearly 60% drop in crude prices since June and Western sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Crimea.

Azerbaijan has been less affected than other former Soviet states by Russia’s economic problems but its economy is heavily exposed to price swings on global energy markets.

The manat was set at 1.05 to the dollar and 1.19 to the euro, down from Friday’s 0.78 and 0.89 manats respectively.

“This decision was made in order to support diversification of Azerbaijan’s economy, strengthen its international compatibility and export potential as well as to provide balance of payments sustainability,” a central bank statement said.

The bank said it would continue to take part in the foreign exchange market and that it would target a corridor for the manat against the dual-currency basket. The manat has been pegged at just over 0.78 per dollar since mid-2011.

Azerbaijan is becoming an increasingly important partner to the EU, largely in the context of the Southern Gas Corridor, project. The term stands for a project to bring Azeri gas from the Shah Deniz offshore field to Europe via the planned TANAP pipeline through Turkey and the Trans-Adriatic TAP pipeline via Greece and Albania to Italy. An interconnector in Greece is planned to bring Azeri gas also to Bulgaria and further

Oil and gas sales account for 95% of Azerbaijan’s exports and more than 70% of government revenues.

The post Azerbaijan Devalues Currency Over Falling Oil Price appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Michael Lelyveld

After years of driving world energy markets, the growth of China’s oil demand is slowing to a crawl.

A recent study by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the country’s oil demand will rise at an average annual pace of 2.6 percent through 2020, only about half the rate during China’s explosive expansion of the previous decade.

China’s oil demand is slated to grow 2.5 percent this year to 10.63 million barrels per day the IEA said in its Medium-Term Oil Market Report.

That compares with consumption growth of 16.8 percent in the boom year of 2004 when China used 6.74 million barrels per day, according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

While China’s oil demand will increase twice as fast as that of the world as a whole, it will add less than 300,000 barrels per day annually through 2020, or about one-third less than it did in 2009-2014, the IEA said.

The new estimates represent a substantial drop from the IEA’s forecast for China last year, shaving as much as 500,000 barrels per day from demand totals for 2017-2019.

The adjustment reflects a perception of significant changes in China’s growth patterns, economic policies and energy efficiency, the report indicates.

“President Xi Jinping’s ‘new normal’ encompasses curbed oil demand growth as the closure of excess capacity in many industries, most notably coal and steel, filters through to lessened oil demand growth,” the IEA said.

“These heady efficiency gains, coupled with deliberate government efforts to curb energy demand in order to satisfy tightening clean-air regulations, and the recent easing in macroeconomic conditions, explain the definite shifting in gears that has been seen in China,” it said.

Taken by itself, China’s “new normal” of lower economic growth rates would be a likely cause of slower growth in demand.

Last year’s 7.4-percent rise in gross domestic product (GDP) was the smallest since 1990, decelerating from 7.7 percent in each of the two prior years.

In its recently updated forecast, the International Monetary Fund projected further ebbing of growth to 6.8 percent and 6.3 percent for this year and 2016.

‘New normal’ trends

But the IEA report highlights several “new normal” trends taking place in China at the same time, all of which lead to eased oil demand.

Since a surge in construction-related energy waste in 2003-2005, China has gradually improved its efficiency efforts, despite setbacks from its 4-trillion yuan (U.S. $640-billion) economic stimulus plan in 2008.

In 2014, China cut its energy intensity, which measures energy use per unit of GDP, by 4.8 percent, according to the State Council, or cabinet, exceeding the annual target of 3.9 percent for the first time in years.

The performance could put the country on track to meet its current five-year goal of reducing energy intensity by 16 percent this year compared with 2010.

The IEA estimates that China reduced its oil intensity index by 18 percent from 2008 to 2014 and will see a similar improvement by 2020.

The study projected that new cars sold in China this year would be nearly 15 percent more fuel efficient than in 2000 and will be over 20 percent more efficient in 2020.

The gains take some of the impact out of the rise in auto ownership with 154 million cars now on the road, according to the Ministry of Public Security.

Car sales rose 6.9 percent to 23.5 million last year, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers reported. But the growth was far less than the 13.9 percent increase in 2013, the official Xinhua news agency said.

The IEA also sees China’s push to cut overcapacity in construction-related industries like steel and cement as paying dividends.

Significant drops in diesel fuel consumption, for example, cannot be explained by the relatively small decline in official GDP growth numbers alone, it said.

The study reasons that pressures to reduce air pollution are leading to cutbacks at the least efficient production facilities, reducing the huge volumes of coal previously transported to the outdated plants.

“These additional efforts have accordingly curbed the amount of diesel that was then required, tapering truck/rail needs, an important sub-sector of diesel demand that we cannot emphasize enough,” the agency said.

Less coal is also being trucked because mines are producing less coal.

China’s coal production fell 2.5 percent last year, marking the first decline since 2000, Xinhua reported, citing partial figures from the China National Coal Association (CNCA). It is unclear how much anti-pollution measures have contributed to the drop.

The coal industry itself has been plagued by overcapacity and low prices, forcing cutbacks due to losses.

Last month, northern Shanxi province declared a five-year moratorium on new coal projects, state media reported. The central government also will not approve any new coal projects in eastern China, the CNCA’s chairman Wang Xianzheng said.

Areas of uncertainty

While the combination of factors adds up to lower oil demand growth, Philip Andrews-Speed, a China energy expert at National University of Singapore notes at least two areas of uncertainty that may affect the forecast.

One is pricing.

Andrews-Speed argues that the amount of oil or products that China uses in transport may be price sensitive because the country has been aggressively promoting the use of other fuels, namely gas and electricity, for environmental reasons.

“If oil prices stay low, the switch from oil to gas or electricity in the transport sector will be constrained,” he said.

The IEA study uses price assumptions based on the futures market rather than forecasts, but these show an expectation that oil prices will rise only moderately from an average of $55 per barrel (2,519 yuan per ton) this year to $73 (3,343 yuan per ton) per barrel in 2020.

If prices are weaker, fuel switching in transport could move more slowly, suggesting greater oil demand.

Andrews-Speed also sees an effect from economic policy decisions, particularly if the government shifts gears again and decides to stop the slide in growth rates with another major stimulus package.

“Then, energy intensity will rise and oil use in transport will rise,” Andrews-Speed said.

So far, the government has limited its response to “targeted” stimulus measures, despite continuing expectations in the international business press that it will do more to promote GDP growth.

The post China Slows Oil Demand Growth – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Riley Walters*

Maritime connectedness continues to be a key asset for U.S. economic and strategic interests. Threats to port and vessel network systems have long been overshadowed by concerns about kinetic attacks and supply-chain security. All maritime stakeholders remain at risk of cyber intrusion as cyber attackers seek any and all means of accessing maritime networks. Therefore, key measures need to be in place to evolve symbiotically as new threats emerge.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and maritime stakeholders need to stay ahead of these risks in order to keep trade flow maximized, while avoiding the creation of regulations that may slow trade and hinder business.

Risks for Port Cybersecurity

For all U.S. industries, cybersecurity costs are growing.[1] Cyber attacks on port systems can have a variety of negative effects. The economic losses from port delays or closure can vary in severity. One port’s failure negatively affects all connecting regional ports. In 2002, the 11-day closure of 29 ports on the West Coast cost an estimated $11 billion. Northeast ports lost an estimated $50 billion—$1 billion in cargo delays alone—because of Hurricane Sandy in 2012.[2] As labor disputes that began in October 2014 continue in West Coast ports, trade partners in Asia are feeling the effects of undelivered goods.[3]

With port and vessel network systems implementing new technology, stakeholders are moving away from traditional stand-alone systems, and maritime industrial control systems (ICS) are becoming more integrated. While new systems help to streamline production and increase the flow of trade, the number of vulnerabilities in network systems is also increasing. Cyber threat actors continue to find new ways of accessing network systems, through traditional land-line connections, new or pre-existing Wi-Fi ports, and USB-introduced threats, such as installing malware (Stuxnet) or extracting information (Edward Snowden). Vulnerabilities in smaller systems can be exploited to gain access to larger networks—a time-consuming type of attack for the everyday hacktivist, but a credible investment for drug smugglers and nation-state sympathizers.

In September 2014, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported that Chinese hackers were behind the successful advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks on contractors in U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), dating as far back as 2008.[4] The military relies on these commercial vessels for strategic and humanitarian contingencies, transporting 95 percent of U.S. Forces’ dry cargo annually.[5] According to the report, Chinese military compromised “multiple systems” on a commercial ship contracted by TRANSCOM for logistics routes. Between June 2012 and May 2013, the FBI reported two shipping companies and eight technical service providers of TRANSCOM were victims of cyber intrusion.

A report by CyberKeel, a maritime cybersecurity group, later showed how in late 2013 drug smugglers hired hackers to move drugs through the Port of Antwerp, the second largest seaport in Europe and a member of the Cargo Security Initiative since 2011.[6] The hackers bypassed remote terminals to allow release of the containers and deleted the container transportation information—attributing this to “ghost shipping.” The report also showed that, if the hackers had wanted, they could have caused severe congestion and port disruption with the information they accessed.

Two Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports in 2014 highlighted the DHS’s need to enhance cybersecurity for maritime systems and DHS facilities. Much like the TRANSCOM report, the GAO reports echoed the need to better define cyber threats and to establish how and to which agency cyber threats are to be reported. The reports also raised a concern about the lack of information sharing among agencies—a cyber threat may fall to the DHS, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department of Defense, or any combination, depending on the victim of the attack.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) began taking public comments at the end of 2014 on how to better develop guidance for maritime cybersecurity.[7] The USCG noted past instances of drug smuggling, disgruntled employees sabotaging network systems, and the disruption of an unmanned crane through cyber intrusions of its GPS.[8] U.S. Coast Guard Commander Joseph Kramek reported that cybersecurity awareness and culture at U.S. ports—specifically in the ports of Baltimore, Houston, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Vicksburg, and Beaumont—were relatively low.[9] He recommended that the DHS, along with the USCG and Federal Emergency Management Agency, need to better address port cybersecurity more, while still focusing on kinetic defense.[10] Only in 2014 did the Port Security Grant Program start allowing grants based on cyber vulnerability assessments.[11] While the threat of a physical attack on or through ports still exists, stakeholders need to realize that cyber threats cannot be addressed in the same way as kinetic defense, although cyber attacks can affect kinetic systems.

What Should Be Done

Congress should:

• Readdress legislation on increasing cyber information sharing. The DHS and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) have taken the lead on cyber information sharing in the past. As they continue to lead, all stakeholders need to agree on threat-defining language. Port stakeholders across federal departments, agencies, and private businesses need to increase cyber information sharing and the ease with which information is shared. The President’s recent executive order highlights the importance of information sharing, but falls short in addressing liability risks.[12] Increasing cyber information sharing includes working with international partners because cyber attackers may enter U.S. port networks by any available means. Domestically, agencies should address continuity and simplicity in identifying cyber threats, such as the definition and severity of threats, attacks, and solutions, while avoiding the creation of catch-all regulation that hinders business.

The Administration should:

• Include a focus for handling cybersecurity for port security in the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC).[13] The recently introduced agency, modeled after the National Counterterrorism Center, aggregates cybersecurity information across government. Cyber attacks can happen in a manner of seconds, which is why simplifying reporting of cyber threats is important, including to which agency the threat is reported and the information to be shared interdepartmentally. This will give stakeholders an advantage in responding to cyber threats.

The DHS should:

• Continue to work with the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) program as the USCG continues to receive public comment on how to address cybersecurity.

Conclusion

The continued growth of port and network systems is critical for a strong U.S. economic and strategic system. Cyber threats emerge across all network spectrums. While some systems may be considered more critical than others, system administrators need to able to trust that intermediary software, hardware, and connections are also secure. While kinetic defense will always take priority for port and vessel security, cybersecurity should come into focus as the number and severity of cyber attacks continues to grow.

*Riley Walters is a Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] Riley Walters, “Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2014,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4289, October 27, 2014, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/cyber-attacks-on-us-companies-in-2014.

[2] U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, “ICS Security in Maritime Transportation: A White Paper Examining the Security and Resiliency of Critical Transportation Infrastructure,” July 2013, pp. 6–7, http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/48000/48000/48074/DOT-VNTSC-MARAD-13-01.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

[3] Chang-Ran Kim, “Japan Automakers Hit Production Snags as U.S. Port Dispute Drags On,” Reuters, February 6, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/us-usa-ports-japan-idUSKBN0LA0MR20150206 (accessed February 10, 2015).

[4] U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “Inquiry into Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S. Transportation Command Contractors,” 113th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2014, pp. 9–10, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC_Cyberreport_091714.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

[5] U.S. Transportation Command, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 15, http://www.transcom.mil/documents/annual_reports/annual_report.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015).

[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, “Best Practice—Port of Antwerp: Information-Sharing Network,” February 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bulletin_feb2014_antwerp.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015), and CyberKeel, “Maritime Cyber-Risks: Virtual Pirates at Large on the Cyber Sea,” October 15, 2014, http://www.cyberkeel.com/images/pdf-files/Whitepaper.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015).

[7] U.S. Coast Guard, “Guidance on Maritime Cybersecurity Standards,” Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 243 (December 18, 2014), pp. 75574–75575, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/12/18/2014-29658/guidance-on-maritime-cybersecurity-standards (accessed February 13, 2015).

[8] Lieutenant Jodie Knox, “Guidance on Maritime Cyber Security Standards—Part 3 Cyber Command Remarks,” Coast Guard Maritime Commons, January 23, 2015, http://mariners.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2015/01/23/1232015-guidance-on-maritime-cyber-security-standards-part-3-cyber-command-remarks/ (accessed February 13, 2015).

[9] Commander Joseph Kramek, “The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities,” Brookings Policy Paper, July 3, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/07/03-cyber-ports-security-kramek (accessed February 13, 2015).

[10] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity,” GAO–14–459, June 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663828.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP),” July 25, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1406300857129-09e62587b8f79e748c585e37cdba09a9/PSGP_Fact%20Sheet_Final.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

[12] Barack Obama, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Executive Order, February 13, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari (accessed February 13, 2015).

[13] Steven Bucci, Paul Rosenzweig, and David Inserra, “Q&A: What Is the New Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center and How Will It Work?” The Daily Signal, February 11, 2015, http://dailysignal.com/2015/02/11/qa-new-cyber-threat-intelligence-integration-center-will-work/.

The post US Needs To Secure Maritime Ports By Securing Network Ports – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In the first U.S. study of urinary arsenic in babies, Dartmouth College researchers found that formula-fed infants had higher arsenic levels than breast-fed infants, and that breast milk itself contained very low arsenic concentrations.

The researchers measured arsenic in home tap water, urine from 72 six-week-old infants and breast milk from nine women in New Hampshire. Urinary arsenic was 7.5 times lower for breast-fed than formula-fed infants. The highest tap water arsenic concentrations far exceeded the arsenic concentrations in powdered formulas, but for the majority of the study’s participants, both the powder and water contributed to exposure.

“This study’s results highlight that breastfeeding can reduce arsenic exposure even at the relatively low levels of arsenic typically experienced in the United States,” says lead author Professor Kathryn Cottingham. “This is an important public health benefit of breastfeeding.”

Arsenic occurs naturally in bedrock and is a common global contaminant of well water. It causes cancers and other diseases, and early-life exposure has been associated with increased fetal mortality, decreased birth weight and diminished cognitive function. The Environmental Protection Agency has set a maximum contaminant level for public drinking water, but private well water is not subject to regulation and is the primary water source in many rural parts of the United States.

“We advise families with private wells to have their tap water tested for arsenic,” says senior author Professor Margaret Karagas, principal investigator at Dartmouth’s Children’s Environmental Health and Disease Prevention Research Center. Added study co-lead author Courtney Carignan: “We predict that population-wide arsenic exposure will increase during the second part of the first year of life as the prevalence of formula-feeding increases.”

The post Baby Formula Poses Higher Arsenic Risk To Newborns Than Breast Milk appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C. S. Kuppuswamy

Fighting between the government troops and ethnic Kokang rebels known as Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (North-East Myanmar) began on February 09 and is still continuing.

The military has used airpower (helicopter gunships) in this offensive. The Myanmar Army has lost at least 47 of its troops and over 60 wounded in this war while the exact number of rebel casualties are not known. On 17 February 2015 President Thein Sein declared a state of emergency and martial law in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. (See map)

Background

Ethnic Kokangs are Han Chinese. The MNDAA was originally part of the Communist Party of Burma. Consequent to the breakup of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989 MNDAA had signed a bilateral ceasefire with the Myanmar Government. When the MNDAA was forced to transform into a border guard in 2009, it resisted and the ceasefire collapsed.

The government launched a major offensive in August 2009 in the zone’s main city Laogai (Laukkai) resulting in over 30,000 Kokangs taking refuge in China. The Chinese government was surprised and upset and had taken up the matter diplomatically with the Myanmar Government. The then Kokang leader Phone Kya Shin (Peng Jiasheng) fled the country and took refuge in China or somewhere in the Wa region. Myanmar had installed a rival and more pliable faction in change of the region.

The Current Offensive

Media reports indicated that the MNDAA and allied rebel groups under the leadership of Peng Jiasheng had initiated the attacks in trying to retake Laogai (Laukkai) with over 1000 troops mustered from across the borders. The offensive started on 09 February 2015.

The Myanmar army having been taken by surprise or due to intelligence failure was left with 47 troops (5 officers and 42 other ranks) dead and 73 wounded by 12 February 2015. However, the Myanmar Army had swiftly retaliated by using artillery and helicopter gunships and has inflicted heavy casualties on the rebel troops (exact figures not known).

The Civilians in the war zone have fled with the Kokangs (ethnic Chinese) moving to China and the Bamars moving to Lashio and Mandalay. According to Xinhua News Agency over 30,000 have crossed the border (into China) since the fighting began on February 09 2015.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said in Beijing that more fighting “will have an impact on the stability of the China-Myanmar border areas and the security on the Chinese side of the border” (Mizzima 18 February 2015).

President Thein Sein declared a state of emergency in the Kokang region and imposed martial law for a three month period. The Global New light of Myanmar reported that the military was “protecting sovereignty and ensuring territorial integrity” President Thein Sein during his visit to wounded soldiers in a hospital in Lashio “vowed not to lose an inch of Myanmar’s territory” (Mizzima 18 February 2015).

The military Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing who had also visited the wounded soldiers had announced that the army will not give in and is prepared to fight.

According to an AP news report, the government has also accused three more rebel groups (Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army-South and the Ta`ang National Liberation Army) of being involved in armed clashes in the Kokang area. A KIA spokesperson has denied their involvement in these clashes.

Peng Jiasheng, the leader of the MNDAA, sent an open letter to President Thein Sein on Wednesday (18 February, 2015) in which he appealed for recognition of his group, greater rights for the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority and the start of talks to restore peace in the area.

Information Minister Ye Htut told in a reaction, however, that the government saw “no reason to consider this” letter. He said Naypyidaw does not recognize the MNDAA and sees it as a “renegade Kokang group,” adding that it neither accepts the group’s participation in the nationwide ceasefire process, which involves 16 ethnic groups, including the TNLA. (The Irrawaddy February 18, 2015).

News Analysis

The fact that the Army suffered heavy casualties in the first three days indicates an intelligence failure and that the army has been taken by surprise.

This is only the second time the army has used air power against a rebel group (The first was against the Kachins).

Participation of Chinese mercenaries along with the rebels in the war as per media reports is rather intriguing. There has been no official confirmation either.

This is a repeat of the August 2009 incident though this time the initiative has been from the rebels side.

By declaring a state of emergency and martial law, the Government has viewed the incident seriously. It is making an all-out effort to return to status quo in the Kokang Area.

China has expressed its concerns on the war in the close vicinity of its border and seeks an early settlement of the issue. Myanmar is not seen to have taken up the issue with China so far.

This will further delay the peace process and the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.

The post Myanmar: The War With The Kokangs – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

Political turbulence has again started in Maldives – a situation reminiscent of 2012 when former president Nasheed was coerced to resign from his post.

The opposition parties mainly the MDP and the Jumhooree have joined together to start a movement called “save the constitution” and Male is witnessing night marches and protests for the last few days again reminiscent of the 2012 days.

The Government instead of dealing with the situation politically is using strong arm tactics to muzzle the opposition. It is also reaching out to one power that supports “rogue regimes”- as a hedge in case other countries around do not go along with it. Everyone knows how China fully dominated the military regime in Myanmar when other countries tried to isolate a “non democratic country.”

It is time for the Prime Minister of India to visit Maldives sooner than later to ensure stability in the neighbourhood and as part of India’s objective to reach out to its neighbours.

“ We worked, begged and slaved away to get him elected”- Gasim Ibrahim.

Too late in the day Gasim Ibrahim now regrets of having supported Yameen in 2013 to get elected as President in the last presidential elections. When he wanted to stand for election to the post of Speaker in the Majlis, he was unceremoniously removed from the ruling coalition.

On 29th last month, Gasim Ibrahim in a public rally made a serious allegation that the government was trying to rob the citizen’s rights by amending the constitution. Specifically he made the following charges;

• Centralising power.
• Influencing independent institutions
• Nepotism
• Prejudice against State Employees who have views opposing the government
• Twisting of Bills in favour of the government- like the SEZ bill, the bill on offensive weapons, the Judicature Act and the Public Finance Acts.

“In Defence of the Constitution”

The two major parties, the MDP and the Jumhooree have formed an “Inter Party Commission” under a new agreement for the defence of the constitution.

The MDP team is led by none other than former President Nasheed and the Jumhoore is led by Gasim Ibrahim. The initiative for the agreement was perhaps taken by Gasim on 26th last month when he invited all opposition parties to begin talks on defending the constitution. The Maldives Trade Union has also joined the movement in view of “persistent violations that have eroded crucial checks, balance and accountability mechanisms.”

One could accuse Gasim that he awoke to the danger only when his business interests were being targeted by Yameen’s regime. The latest in this move is the demand of the government to the Villa Group of Gasim to return the uninhabited islands that were given to them for development of tourist trade.

Gasim has a point when he said that the government is twisting/changing constitution to consolidate Yameen’s hold on the government. One of the bills that is being proposed is to ensure that the President’s elect should not be over 65. This will effectively prevent Gasim from contesting as he will be 66 by 2018 when the next Presidential elections are due.

Media reports indicate that President Yameen is also planning to amend the constitution to extend the Presidential term from 5 to 7 years.

The Curious case of former Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim:

In our last paper on Maldives, we had mentioned about a midnight raid on the flats of the then Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim. The Police gave a spin to the raid in that they were not aware that it was the residence of the Defence Minister. Male is a very small place where everyone knows about everyone else. To say that the Police were not aware of the Defence Minister’s residence is unbelievable.

Initial reports were that nothing incriminating was found except some documents. Subsequently it was leaked that a pistol was found. After a few days it is said that the Police recovered not only a handmade gun but also an improvised explosive device, 3 bullets and a magazine.

Can anyone imagine that any military coup can be made with these few devises as is made out in the case against Nazim on charges of plotting a coup against a well-armed security force?

The former Defence Minister is under detention now.

“Save me”: Nasheed

In an interview to an Indian media, former President Nasheed has expressed fears of being arrested and asked the Indian government to protect him.

Nasheed claimed that President Yameen is on a ‘witch hunt’ to purge his political contenders and gave the example of former Defence Minister Col. Mohamed Nazim.

They are back to a form of governance that they are familiar with, he said.

To me it is Gayoomism with a vengeance now. Nasheed’s case for illegal detention of a judge during his presidentship can at anytime be brought to a conviction and thus prevent him from contesting the next presidential elections.

Over to China:

No one is more enthusiastic than President Yameen in promoting the Chinese initiative for a maritime silk route along the Indian Ocean. Maldives being strategically located in the Indian Ocean, its support is vital to the Chinese. India on the other hand appears to have some reservations on the proposed MSR. (Maritime Silt Route). In one of his speeches earlier, President Yameen had fulsome praise for the Chinese proposal.

On the 11th of this month, in connection with the Chinese new year, the Ambassador to China made the following promises.

• will facilitate Maldivian fish products to be exported to China.
• will encourage more Chinese tourists to visit Maldives?
• will provide more training and scholarship opportunities to Maldivians.
• will improve cooperation in areas like technology, culture and weather.
• will enhance cooperation particularly on issues like climate change.

What Yameen wants from China is to fully support him in every respect when other countries turn against him in his quest for consolidation of power by fair or foul means.

The post Maldives: Turbulence Ahead, India To Watch Out – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Bhaskar Roy*

Eager to counter US President Barack Obama attending the Indian Republic Day parade (January 26) as the chief guest, Pakistan jumped the gun announcing that Chinese President Xi Jinping would be the chief guest at Pakistan’s National Day parade on March 23.

The Pakistani foreign office, which thinks and speaks more on the lines of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) text, where India is concerned, exposed their utter ignorance of larger regional and global issues, especially that of their ‘iron friend’ China.

The Pakistani announcement on the Chinese President’s supposed visit without getting concurrence from Beijing smacked of Islamabad taking Beijing for granted. It projected that China was eager to counter the growing US relationship with India and, thereby, US influence in South Asia. Further, the Pakistani statement suggested the tail was wagging the dog.

Islamabad was frustrated that Barack Obama did not mention Pakistan even once in his speeches in India, indicating thereby that in American foreign policy the hyphenating of India and Pakistan has ceased to play. Pakistan is afraid that it is beginning to be ignored to the point of irrelevance and its days of using terrorism to attract global attention (and aid) are getting over.

In this context, an article in the Chinese communist party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily’s (February 11) overseas edition, makes interesting reading. To note, the article was meant for maximum dissemination internationally and its message to Pakistan was loud and clear.

The article clarified that last year Xi Jinping had to cancel his visit to Pakistan (when Xi visited India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives) because of the unstable political situation there, but stated it that the decision had no negative impact on their bilateral relations. It conveyed that Xi would visit Pakistan “as soon as possible”.

Almost simultaneously, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi who was in Pakistan ostensibly to prepare for Xi Jinping’s visit, announced (Feb.12) that Xi would visit “later in the year”.

The People’s Daily persuasively but emphatically explained that China was not playing a Pakistan sponsored “zero sum” game. It had its interest with India and advised Pakistan not to open a broadside against India.

The article encapsulated China’s policy as follows: Pakistan would play an important role in China’s strategic vision of economic corridors, the Silk Routes and Maritime Silk Road, otherwise known as “One Belt One Road” policy, combating terrorism, and development for all. Beijing is pushing the formulation that development ensures security rather than peace ensures security and development.

In an article “China’s Big plans for Pakistan National Interest – And why India should be concerned” (Dec. 10, 2014 The National Interest Magazine), eminent China expert Gordon G. Chang made a comprehensive analysis, pointing out how Pakistan is becoming “Beijing’s newest colony”. The evidence has been staring us in the face. Last November Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated a section of the Hazara Motorway which will connect Islamabad to China through the Karakoram Highway; it will be completed in two years, with China picking up the $ 297 million bill.

This is part of the Pakistan – China Economic corridor, an arterial corridor connecting China, (through the India claimed Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to the Gwadar deep sea port on the Baluchistan coast. The Gwadar port was built by Chinese engineers and workers, and financed by China. Pakistan has designated it as a defence establishment, but strategic analysts have for long been viewing the Gwadar port as a potential Chinese naval base.

The economic aspect of this corridor is also very strong. The Chinese plan to carry oil from Gwadar port through a pipeline to South-West China. It was to build an oil refinery in Gwadar but the project was shelved due to local Balochi resistance.

Along the corridor, however, a large number of projects are planned and paid for by the Chinese, including Special economic Zones (SEZs). The over-capacity built by the Chinese will now be expended in Pakistan – a win-win situation for China. Pakistani leaders believe that this is a win-win situation for them too, since all the expenditure will be borne by China. Basically, Pakistan is well on the way to be mortgaged to China.

This corridor has serious security implications for India. Pakistan has already ceded an area of over five thousand square miles of disputed Pak territory to China in a 1963 agreement. China is using its military engineering squads to construct infrastructure in the area, counter to its stated position in other places that disputed areas cannot be developed by a third party. This is a strategic area bordering India in Kashmir and Chinese troops would be able to roll down easily in case of a conflict.

Chinese military supply can be transferred more expeditiously and safely to Pakistan through this corridor if necessary. During India’s Operation Parakram in response to the Pakistani terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, China requisitioned arms and ammunition from its military formations for Pakistan.

China is interested in a stable and friendly Afghanistan. A troubled and terrorism infested Afghanistan was serious security threat to China with Uighur separatists from Xinjiang being trained on Afghan soil, including by the ISI.

Landlocked Afghanistan, strategically located and forming a gateway to Central Asia, is very important to China both economically and strategically, and is a staging post for China’s Silk Routes (Beltway) to Central Asia. While in Pakistan (Feb. 11) Wang Yi openly declared China’s intention to support peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the government in Kabul. With the US retreating, it was obvious that China would move in.

Again, Pakistan is a major player in China’s Afghanistan strategy, having hosted the Afghan Taliban after the Russians were driven out of Afghanistan. Pakistan was also one of two countries which recognized the Taliban government in Kabul.

Here on, Pakistan is unlikely to have a free hand in Afghan affairs. Wang added that he had a strong sense that Pakistan would act as a constructive partner in resolving the Afghan issue. Wang Yi’s statement came obviously after his discussion with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad, including with the Pakistani army. Making such a statement on Pakistan’s soil appears almost like a directive. It will have to be seen what role the ISI plays. With their role in Afghanistan channelized in a particular direction, and a restrictive hand on adventurism against India, the political importance of the Pakistani army may decline, and its corporate nature dented.

India has suffered a set back in Afghanistan. The new Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani appears to have opted for a greater Pakistan-China role. India dithered in some areas, especially military supplies. The US will continue to play an important role; the key to international financial assistance, which Afghanistan needs directly, is in Washington’s hands.

It will have to be seen how far the US carries India in Afghanistan on the basis of its strategic partner relationship and the various pronouncements that President Obama made during his visit to New Delhi in January. Nothing comes without a price. That brings us to the Iran issue where the US and India are not really in sync. But strategic cooperation is not a narrow band and India will have to play its cards very astutely.

Although the “One Belt One Road” strategy is generally attributed to Xi Jinping, it was being developed for over a decade and more. In the 1990s official positions were taken to build a railway from the Chinese coast to Antwerp in Europe through Kazakhstan and other countries. It must be remembered no Chinese major policy is formulated overnight. The “One Belt One Road” policy has been tested out through official statements and articles by experts in the official Chinese media.

The old Silk Belt comprising ancient trade routes, (first used during the Han dynasty- 206 BC- 220 AD) connecting China to Europe, is being revived. (See Map)

Route information, Length: 4,000 mi (6,000 km). Source: Wikipedia

Today, China has much to export and import, and vitalize its western region. In the current global sense China’s interest in the “Silk Roads” is backed by strong economic and strategic reasons.

China has been repeatedly and emphatically stating that their strategy is not a reaction to Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia. True, the Chinese concept is much older. But such a wide and deep strategy, backed by influence and money can be used effectively in a variety of directions.

In their usual flowery and sanctimonious propaganda, the Chinese have put forth a “win-win” situation for all. Their key statement is, “If there is development, there will be peace”. The contrary however, is also true: “If there is peace, there will be development”. The Chinese concept of peace entails submitting to Chinese demands including on territory. And, thereupon, with Beijing’s opaque military policy which borders on the offensive at times as India has experienced, peace may be difficult to come by.

China recently operationalized its Silk Road fund of $40 billion, to connect countries from Asia-Pacific/South East Asia, to South Asia and beyond by land and sea.

The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) concept, which started from mid-1995, was probed at several strategic levels, with a view to building ports and infrastructure in the smaller Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries, supplemented by military aid. For ruling groups in small countries military power is an important instrument. In the initial stages this was to encircle India – the well discussed ‘string of pearls’ theory.

With growing military and financial power the strategy has emerged into a much larger envelope, enclosing Asia and parts of Africa, and a dominant position in the Indian Ocean.

Sri Lanka is China’s first Indian Ocean post. Although Colombo cannot be compared to Pakistan, there have been fissures between New Delhi and Colombo, some of which can be blamed on Indian policies. The Mahinda Rajapaksa government took an anti-India stand and invited China in. Dudley Senanayake, a two-time prime minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) asked (Feb. 1965) Prime minister Mrs. Banderanaike, whether the Trincomalee port was given to China, in which case the next India-China war would be fought in Ceylon, and Ceylon stood to be occupied by the Chinese as Tibet was. The Hambantota container terminal and port, Colombo deep water port, roads and other infrastructure projects were built by China, along with military aid to fight the LTTE. The quiet visits of two Chinese submarines to Sri Lanka in recent months have changed the strategic picture.

China has extended itself to the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles, where port constructions are high on the agenda. According to Chinese military experts, these ports including in Sri Lanka can be converted into bases in due course.

The Indian government was aware of China’s Indian Ocean strategy since early 2000, but paid little heed. The aim was to appease China and the mantra was ‘watch China, but do not provoke (read displease) China’.

It is significant that under China’s leadership an MOU was signed in Beijing to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to be located in Beijing. India is among the group of 21 countries that signed on.

The MOU specified $100 billion as the authorized capital of the AIIB and the initial authorized capital is expected to be around $ 50 billion (Oct. 24, 2014, Xinhua). The bank will be an inter – governmental regional development institution in Asia. The Articles of Agreement are expected to be signed by the end of 2015 by the founding members.

Most, if not all, countries involved are bending towards China for investments and infrastructure construction. India is going overboard in its enthusiasm, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. China has overcapacity in steel and cement, and many workers freed after the slowdown in growth.

Declaring intentions publicly is one thing but arriving at agreements/contracts with Chinese companies is something quite different. An influx of construction materials can seriously affect the growth of Indian industries, especially those producing heavy construction material, as well as the labour market.

The Indian government must carefully consider the specific areas which will be opened to Chinese companies. Ports, airports, telecommunications and computer applications are strategic areas all tied to the defence establishment of India. It is important at this juncture to examine the experiences of the US, and Western European countries which have heavy Chinese business. Indian intelligence agencies must be involved in the decisions of the government of India.

This does not mean we should shut the door to the Chinese but tread carefully.

The maritime Silk Road policy needs to be examined with acuteness. Pressure form Beijing will soon be felt by New Delhi to sign on the Bangladesh, China, Indian and Myanmar (BCIM) connectivity, which will provide China an overland route to the Bay of Bengal (and Indian Ocean). There are moves in Bangladesh to bring in China to construct a deep sea port in Sonadia, much like Gwadar in Pakistan.

How does all these match up to India’s Look East or Act East policy? India has done little till now towards road connectivity with Myanmar and Thailand.

The enormity of the “One Belt One Road” can be visualized while Pakistan is a lynch pin in this strategy. Sri Lanka is being pushed on the Maritime road; Bangladesh may fall in and there will be a tussle over the Maldives. Narendra Modi’s decision to visit Sri Lanka, and other Indian Ocean countries has not come too soon.

Xi Jinping will be in the US on a state visit in September at the invitation of Barack Obama. Xi will be carrying with him the offer of ‘new type of relations between major powers’, and the US is unlikely to reject it. The soft cold war between China and the US will continue. China is making some amendments towards lowering the temperature with Japan and other US interests in that region.

A subtle change in China’s foreign policy is discernable. Of course, it does not intend to replace the US in taking a leading role in hot areas like Ukraine. But it is out mortgaging many small countries.

*The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

The post China’s New Great Game: Pakistan Eager To Sell Out – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By D. S. Rajan*

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), providing major sea routes for world commerce, connecting East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, with Europe and Americas is growing day by day.

Author Robert Kaplan is right in pointing out in his book (“Monsoon- the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power”, 21 November 2010), that in this region, the interests and influence of China, India, and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect and that therefore the IOR is bound to become a centre of 21st century international conflicts and power dynamics.

2. Taking the position with regard to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first, it has to be admitted that till now its focus continues to be on the Pacific and not on the IOR. It would however be a folly to ignore the gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR. Beijing’s principal interest at this juncture seems to lie in the need to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean, vital for the country’s energy imports. While this is being so, the PRC’s official-level articulations on IOR are gradually gaining intensity; the day may not be far off when Beijing comes out with a comprehensive Indian Ocean doctrine for implementation. In the present scenario, suffice to note that China, through its aggressive soft power diplomacy, has begun to shape the IOR strategic environment. By providing large loans on generous repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, dams, ports, power plants, and railways, and offering military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through its veto power, China has been able to secure considerable goodwill and influence among countries in the IOR.

3. It is not difficult to trace the connection between China’s increasing maritime security interests and its fast changing perceptions on the IOR. To help achieving the declared goal of turning the country as a fully modernized one by middle of the century, the PRC has evolved an overall strategic approach towards procuring much needed resources from all over the world; it has set demands on China to ensure security of supply routes, both land and maritime. The IOR has thus become vital for China. As corollary, the PRC’s naval objectives have undergone a shift – from that of conducting coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately to far sea defence. A case in point is the stress noticed in China’s Defence White Paper (2013) on “protecting national maritime rights and interests” and “armed forces providing reliable support for China’s interests overseas”.

4. The allotted responsibilities for the PLA Navy (PLAN) now include “defeat invasion from sea, defend territorial sovereignty and protect maritime rights”. For fulfilling them, the PRC is making naval modernization efforts aimed at equipping the Navy with capabilities to operate in waters far beyond its borders. Such efforts encompass[1] a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines both nuclear and conventional, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization has following main orientation- addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; regulating foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.

5. The first official signal that China has begun paying attention to the IOR, came through a statement (Galle, Sri Lanka, 13 December 2012) made by Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, Commander of the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy. It laid stress on the ‘freedom and safety of the navigation in the Indian Ocean’ acting as a crucial factor in global economy and declared that the Chinese navy will actively maintain the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean through carrying out ‘maritime security cooperation’ with the navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime security ‘code of conduct’ between them under the ‘premise of respect for each country’s sovereignty and maritime interests’[2]

6. Next clue was seen in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) released in June 2013. It had chapters on India’s “Look East Policy” and the “U.S-India axis of relation in Indian Ocean region”. As a document of an authoritative Chinese think tank, it appears as policy indicators. The Blue Book observed that “In the past, China’s Indian Ocean strategy was based on ‘moderation’ and ‘maintaining the status quo’, but the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates China play a more proactive role in affairs of the region”. It frankly admitted that Beijing presently is not having any Indian Ocean strategy unlike U.S. and India who were following a well-defined “Look East” policy and the “pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy respectively. Adding that in absence of a strategy, China’s development prospects would severely be hit, it observed, “With changes in the relations among countries in the Indian Ocean Region and in the international situation, China’s diplomacy should also change, but Beijing’s interests will be driven only by commercial, and not military, objectives”. The document asked China to deepen economic ties with the nations in the IOR while cautioning that if China, United States and India do not constructively engage each other, the Indian Ocean can end up as an ocean of conflict and trouble. As the CASS publication predicted, no single or regional power including Russia, China, Australia and India, can control the Indian Ocean by itself in the future and after jostling among powers, a fragile balance of power might be reached in the region. It acknowledged that the rise of China was worrying the littoral states of IOR, particularly India.

7. Among subsequent commentaries on the IOR made by influential Chinese academicians, an article of a leading state-controlled Chinese think tank[3], look very significant. The write-up declared that China’s strategic focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean and the PRC lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy India’s geographic advantages. It asserted that China follows a naval strategy aimed at ensuring a ‘harmonious sea’ through capacity building and international cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle. China’s seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world, particularly the IOR.

8.The article added that Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region littorals is part of the PRC’s economy-oriented ‘Going Global’ strategy. Interpreting India’s views on the Indian Ocean region as a sum-up of senses of crisis and destiny, it says that as for crisis, Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages between Indian Ocean and India’s national security and as for destiny, India’s unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of India’s aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into India’s Ocean. Contrasting India’s position with that of the US , the article found that the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, it finds an unfavorable condition in that regard, i.e the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power and seeking to sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean.

9. In conclusion, the article said that although confrontations and conflicts between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of China’s maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different results. It added that given the China’s policy aims, intent and capability, the PRC cannot afford to challenge either the United States or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India–US potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterize the Indian Ocean region landscape than the ‘China threat’

10. Significant have been the remarks of the spokesperson of China’s ministry of National Defense admitting [4] on 29.1.2015 that China has plans to conduct escort missions of the naval ships in the Indian Ocean. The PRC in this way seems to justify its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, after being asked a question on the PLAN submarine movements in the Indian Ocean, tried to downplay Chinese naval activities in the region, characterizing them as “normal” and emphasizing that “there is no need to read too much into them.” He added, “China has sent various kinds of naval ships to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast to conduct escort missions since 2008. And in the process, we have notified relevant countries of the escort missions of the PLA naval ships, including the PLA naval submarines. In future, the Chinese military will send different kinds of naval ships to take part in the naval escort missions in accordance with the situation and the requirement to fulfill the task.”

11. Close to China’s admission of its plans to dispatch of naval escort ships to the IOR, unconfirmed reports appeared that the PRC will soon be adding one additional fleet to the three existing ones (the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets) it currently operates. This new fleet could be headquartered in Sanya on Hainan Island and project Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean.[5] If true, this development is bound to have security implications for the IOR.

12. Taking India’s case next, more than 70 percent of India’s liquefied energy supplies travel through the Indian Ocean, making it vital to the country’s energy security. It is therefore natural that for that purpose, India is stepping up efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals. They include Indian External Affairs Minister’s recent visits to Maldives and the UAE, the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the new Sri Lankan President in New Delhi and the Indian Prime Minister’s impending visits to Sri Lanka and Maldives in March 2015. Also, India and Sri Lanka under President Sirisena have of late agreed in New Delhi to expand their cooperation on defense and security issues. Getting focus now is their maritime security cooperation, including in the trilateral format with Maldives. India is keen to strengthen the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Apparently to counter the likely Chinese challenges in the Indian Ocean, India is considering plans to build seven frigates equipped with stealth features and six nuclear-powered submarines. [6]

13. Washington’s interest in the IOR centers round three imperatives for the US- Securing Indian Ocean for international commerce, avoiding regional conflict on issues of strategic choke points in the IOR- Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca strait, and dealing with Sino-Indian competition in the IOR. [7] The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010 of the US Department of Defense had the goals of ensuring open access to the IOR to be achieved through a more integrated approach across civil and military organizations. The Department’s document “ Strategic Choices and Management Review” ( July 2013) stressed the need for US to develop an Indian Ocean policy on the basis of building coalitions with regional allies like Australia, Japan and the Philippines and partners like Vietnam and India. The QDR for 2014 has said that the US will support India’s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, and deepen strategic partnership with it including through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. It added that “the US will continue efforts to help stabilize Central and Southwest Asia and deepen its engagement in the Indian Ocean region to bolster US rebalance to Asia”.

14. The US follows an “Indo-Pacific” concept as part of its approach towards the IOR; it aims to achieve through implementing the concept, the freedom of navigation and reassurance to allies and partners in the region. But this means differently to India and China. New Delhi views the concept in the background of India’s ‘geographical, historical and political ‘necessity. It displays wariness to China’s expanding engagement in the region. For China, the concept marks creation of a highway connecting Indian and Pacific Oceans which can play a role in transporting much-needed resources. But it is suspicious of US intentions to use the concept for containing China[8].

10. The data given above, give enough hints to the likely shape of future Indian Ocean Region (IOR) scenario. The following conclusions can be drawn:
(a) China’s priority will continue to be on protecting its energy security interests, by way of securing the Sea Lanes of Communications, spreading from the Gulf to the South China Sea. In the short and middle terms, realizing its existing inferior position compared to US maritime power and India’s strategic advantage in the IOR, China may persist with its ‘harmonious sea’ approach. It will shun a military approach and push for ‘constructive engagement’ in the IOR between three powers – the US, China and India, and concentrate on achieving ‘greater space’ in the IOR by way of promoting maritime security cooperation with the Indian Ocean littorals. China’s wish for a maritime code of conduct in the IOR is notable in this context. In strategic terms, China, under perceived conditions of continuance of India’s domination and the US strong presence in the IOR, may intend to project its own power into the region to bring about a balance in its favour to the situation. ’
(b) China’s current fears that the US is trying to contain the PRC by roping in Indian Ocean littorals, under an ‘Indo-Pacific’ framework, might motivate it to woo these littorals through economic and other means so as to keep them away from the US influence. Its drive to build infrastructure in IOR littorals as part of its ‘going global’ strategy, is setting the trend in this regard.
(c) Important is the Chinese analyses that India, with its regional economic and political power rising, may become more assertive in the IOR. At the same time, China tends to believe that India will always maintain its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis other nations and will not gang up with the latter, particularly the US, against the PRC’s interests. Wooing India will therefore be China’s long term endeavor; the PRC’s “Look West” strategy accords primacy to and rebalance ties with India (this idea is being publicized through highly placed Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi).

(d) India’s understanding with President Sirisena led Sri Lanka on defence cooperation and the trilateral format with Maldives, along with its initiatives towards other littorals, could mean the country’s intentions to increase its strategic influence over the IOR, as a counter balance to rise of China’s clout there.

(e) The US links its Indian Ocean policy with its rebalancing approach in Asia, revealing its overall current outlook aimed at securing its strategic interests at a time when China is asserting itself in the region.

11. Of specific interest to the situation in the IOR, are the developing scenario in Sri Lanka and Maldives as the three parties- China, India and the US, jostle for power there. There is no doubt that the PRC’s courting of Sri Lanka will continue during President Sirisena’s rule. The reason is the demand on China arising from its Indian Ocean strategy. The strategy is indeed related to China’s global requirement – it needs access to raw material from resource-rich regions to facilitate the country’s domestic modernization. To facilitate that, it visualizes in particular the necessity to link the country with Europe via Indian Ocean , Central Asia and Middle East and has accordingly announced two grand schemes – New Silk Road and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the first providing new road and rail links through land route and the second aimed at building a network of commercial port facilities in the Indian Ocean. It is natural that China would like to increase its physical presence both along land and sea routes net work in order to ensure safety of energy imports. The countries concerned especially the Indian Ocean littorals on their part have reasons to worry about the strategic component of China’s schemes, which on the surface look only economic.

12. It is natural for China, in the circumstances above, to follow a proactive policy in Sri Lanka. The approach to that policy is two pronged – commercial and strategic. The first aspect is compelling China to woo Sri Lanka economically, The PRC is the biggest creditor to Sri Lanka and has invested heavily in the latter’s infrastructure projects, besides supporting it on human rights issues. Its development loans to Sri Lanka with respect to latter’s projects are very substantial. The Chinese-aided projects in Sri Lanka include US$ 361 million Hambantota port project (first phase over now, 85% Chinese loan), US$ 1.4 billion Colombo port terminal project, first four-lane expressway and National theatre. Sri Lanka has granted Chinese state-owned companies operating rights to four berths at the Hambantota Port once they are completed in 2016. The new President of Sri Lanka has given go ahead to the Colombo port project, though in his election campaign it was told that the project could be abandoned. Colombo says that as per stipulation, the project needs parliament’s approval within three months, which has elapsed now. This is putting a question mark on the project’s implementation. China is Sri Lanka’s biggest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). China-Sri Lanka bilateral trade exceeded US$ 3 billion in 2013. The latter at the same time has trade deficit with China (US$ 2.4 billion in 2012). China is the destination for less than 2 percent of total Sri Lankan exports. It is Sri Lanka’s second largest source of imports behind India. The two nations are now working towards concluding a Free Trade Agreement between them.

13. Strategically, China considers ties with Sri Lanka as key to the success of its Indian Ocean policy. It realizes that Sri Lanka is the gateway to resource rich regions of Middle East and Central Asia, especially Iran, a vital exporter of oil to China. The commitment of Sri Lanka to join the Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative indicates the proximity of the strategic aspirations of the two countries and is a reflection of the assimilation of national interests. President Sirisena had indicated prior to his election that his government would “review some of the Chinese projects”. In such a situation, the PRC may fear that with a new regime in charge in Colombo, its erstwhile influence over Sri Lanka might diminish. Beijing’s efforts to fill this gap are therefore likely to intensify from now on. Much would depend on what happens during President Sirisna’s proposed visit to China in March 2015.

14. India’s overwhelming influence over Sri Lanka vis-à-vis China cannot be denied. It comes from India’s huge geographic size, economic strength and global political influence from times immemorial. Strategically important from India’s point of view is the question whether China’s port facilities in Sri Lanka can cater to the needs of the PLA Navy. In 2014, Chinese submarines have made port visits to Sri Lanka twice, raising India’s concerns. China on its part explains that the submarnies’ port call is part of its escort mission undertaken with the permission of Sri Lanka (para 8 above). But India’s concerns seem to be justified as potentials for dual use of ports that service Chinese cargo ships cannot be ignored. President Sirisena’s visit to New Delhi, first foreign destination since he assumed office, saw the two sides signing civil nuclear and defence cooperation agreements. Sri Lanka under President Sirisena, appears to be intent on resetting its ties with India and China, to make them more balanced.

15. Notable are the emerging fresh US perceptions on Sri Lanka under President Sirisena. Welcoming Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Samaraweera to Washington DC, Secretary Kerry has hailed the ‘new directions’ of Colombo after the elections. He has expressed support for a Sri Lanka that is peaceful, democratic, prosperous, inclusive and unified and to the Government’s 100-day programme, The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal has said in Colombo that the US hopes for ‘brighter’ reality for all Sri Lankans, an indication of US unhappiness with the earlier regime. Sri Lanka has been included as part of a 2015 US National Security Strategy where the US Government will assist countries in transition, as pointed out by US National Security Advisor Susan Rice. The Deputy US State Department Spokesperson Marie Harf has praised the ‘commendable’ steps taken by the new Sri Lankan Government to address reconciliation and other long-standing issues.

16. In Maldives also, the three powers- China, the US and India, are engaged in a power play. In a development signifying success of China’s regional aspirations, Maldives has given its support to the former’s 21st century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) initiative. China- Maldives economic cooperation is gaining momentum. The decision to sign the country’s first-ever free trade agreement was made during the first Maldives-China Joint Commission meeting held in Beijing in December 2014. Beijing has also signed a deal to modernize the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport (INIA) in Maldives and an agreement to build Male-Hulhule Bridge which will connect Male with the city’s international airport. Talks are on between Male and Beijing on oil exploration. China-Malidives defence cooperation is progressing. The two countries signed a military aid agreement in 2012. According to reports, China may seek a naval presence in Maldives as part of its strategic stretch in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has denied such reports.[9]President Xi JInping’s visit to Maldives in September 2014 has symbolized the emerging closeness in Beijing-Male ties.
17. India has not lagged behind China in offering assistance to Maldives. India has expressed willingness to cooperate with Maldives in the field of oil exploration. In 2012, India offered to help the Maldives government in its surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends for 200 nautical miles (370 km) from its shores. This will allow Maldives to safeguard its economic and strategic maritime assets. India has also agreed to supply Maldives a state-of-the-art 260-ton fast-attack craft to aid in guarding coastal waters, in addition to providing other defense equipment and setting up of radar systems on all 26 Maldivian atolls. India’s Prime Minister may visit Maldives in March 2015 which could take relations between the two nations further forward.

18. Concerning US role in Maldives, reports suggested [10] that Maldives government is in the process of signing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States which will allow the country to establish a military base in the atoll nation. President Yameen of Maldives has denied such reports.[11]

*The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

Notes:
[1] Ronald O’Rourke “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

[2] “Chinese Navy to Actively Maintain Peace and Stability of Indian Ocean”, China Military Online, 15 December 2012.

[3] “Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don’t Exaggerate the China Threat”, 24 October 2013, Chun Hao Lou, Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations –CICIR, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-the-indian-oce….

[4] Franz –Stefan Gady, “China’s Navy to Send More Ships to the Indian Ocean”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-navy-to-send-more-ships-to-the-indian-ocean/
[5] Franz- Stefan Gady, “China’s Ghost Fleet in the Indian Ocean”, the Diplomat, 7.2.2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-ghost-fleet-in-the-indian-ocean/

[6] Sanjeev Miglani, “ India clears $8 billion warships project to counter Chinese navy”, Times of India, 18.2.2015

http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/18/india-defence-navy-idINKBN0LM1A…

[7] “Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy”, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2012 issue, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf

[8] “ Different Visions of the Indo-Pacific”, dated 9.1.2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/09/Different-visions-of-the-…

[9] PRC Embassy, Maldives denial of former President Nasheed’s claims over China’s plans to build a military facility at laamu atoll. Minivan News, Mhammad Saif Fathih, 26.1.2015

[10] Naseem, Editor of Maldivian blog Dhivehi Sitee [http://www.dhivehisitee.com], 24.1.2013

[11] AFP dispatch on President Yameen’s statement , “ The Maldives will not participate in a proposed military cooperation pact with the United States”, 22.1.2015
– See more at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1718#sthash.T2rKLAVq.dpuf

The post Indian Ocean In Focus: China-India-US Jostling For Power – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

As promised, US President Barack Obama has vetoed a bill from Congress which will halt construction of the controversial Keystone XL pipeline.

Defying the wishes of the Republican-led House and Senate, the president on Tuesday rejected the years-in-the-making would-be legislation that sought to pave the way for a 1,179-mile pipeline to carry crude tar sands oil from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.

Congress authorized the bill more than a week ago, and in recent days it was handed off to the White House.

“The president does intend to veto this pace of legislation, and we intend to do it without drama or fanfare or delay,” Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, said at a scheduled media briefing early Tuesday afternoon in Washington, DC. It was confirmed later in the day that the president had, in fact, vetoed the bill.

Ahead of the president’s expected decision, House Speaker John Boehner and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell – top-ranking Republicans representing Ohio and Kentucky, respectively – published an op-ed condemning Obama’s intentions.

“The allure of appeasing environmental extremists may be too powerful for the president to ignore. But the president is sadly mistaken if he thinks vetoing this bill will end this fight,” they wrote. “Far from it. We are just getting started.”

The National Journal noted that the president’s action signifies only the third time that the Obama administration has issued a veto. According to reporter Clare Foran, the move may “usher in a new era of hostile confrontation between the president and the Republican Congress.” President Obama previously vetoed bills in 2009 and 2010.

Indeed, the predominately right-leaning House and Senate may try to override the president’s veto, but doing so would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers to accomplish as much — a feat which, according to the Associated Press, is uncertain at the time being. AP reported on Tuesday that Sen. John Hoeven (R-North Dakota), the bill’s top GOP sponsor, said the Republican P arty is still about 15 votes short of obtaining a majority. According to Fox News, the House and Senate will need 281 and 67 votes to override the president’s veto — not a far cry from the 270 and 62 votes that lawmakers in those chambers cast when they approved the Keystone pipeline before sending it to the White House.

The post Obama Vetoes Keystone Pipeline Bill appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Martin Tillier

If you have been following the price of oil over the last few months, the chances are you’re a little confused. On the one hand you have the likes of A. Gary Shilling who, in this Bloomberg article, loudly trumpets the prospect of oil at $10/Barrel, and on the other there is T. Boone Pickens, who, at the end of last year was predicting a return to $100 within 12-18 months. Pickens prediction has moderated somewhat as WTI and Brent crude have continued to fall, but in January he was still saying that oil would return to $70 or $80/barrel in the near future. So, who is correct?

The answer is neither one. As with most things in life it is unlikely that the truth lies at either extreme. Pickens, and Shilling and other commentators suggesting that oil will fall to levels not seen since 1998, purport to have sound reasons for saying what they do, but the real reasons for such comments are most likely the two oldest human motivations in the book, greed and hubris. “Talking your book” is nothing new in financial markets and, while Pickens has an insider’s knowledge of the oil business, he also has a massive stake in driving oil higher however he can. Shilling is in the business of garnering eyeballs and clicks, hence the competition for the most outrageous prediction among the bears.

I know it isn’t sexy and it probably breaks some unwritten rule of internet hackery to say it, but the most likely scenario is that WTI futures will bounce around current levels for a while before gradually recovering to the $60-$70/Barrel level. It could even reach Pickens’ revised $70 or $80 level before too long, but we are unlikely to see $100 in the near future without some major external influences.

Now that the dust has settled somewhat, the reasons for the big drop are becoming clearer, and it is clear that supply was not the only factor. It was obvious for a while that as fracking unlocked oil deposits in shale and sand that had previously been thought unreachable, supply, particularly in the U.S. would grow considerably. That wasn’t seen as too much of a problem by the market, though, until questions about slowing global economic growth and a rapidly appreciating Dollar were added to the mix in the middle of last year. Once that happened and OPEC made it clear that they would not immediately cut supply and hand power to the upstart U.S. shale producers, the collapse began.

The drop halted at a logical level. In 2008 and 2009 when a complete global economic collapse looked on the cards oil was trading in the mid $40s and that is where support was eventually found. According to EIA data, global oil production in 2008 was an average 74.016 million barrels per day and in the first 10 months of 2014 averaged 77.427 million barrels, an increase of around 5%. Consumption in 2008 was 86.045 million barrels per day and in 2014 was 92.13 million, an increase of 1.2%.

Put simply, supply has increased faster than demand, so a rapid return to oil over $100/Barrel looks extremely unlikely. That said though, in order to believe that the price will fall much further you have to believe that the economic outlook today is worse than it was at the beginning of the deepest recession since 1929. That too seems like a bit of a stretch.

The only logical conclusion then is that in the near term oil will trade in an approximate range of $50-$70. Incidentally, the bottom end of that range represents the inflation adjusted 100 year average price, according to one Morgan Stanley analyst quoted in another Bloomberg article. We shouldn’t, therefore, be shocked that oil is here any more than we should be shocked that publicity hungry columnists and heavily invested oilmen are predicting further wild swings.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Is-Oil-Returning-to-100-Or-Dropping-To-10.html

The post Is Oil Returning To $100 Or Dropping To $10? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Stockholm is one of the world’s most sunlight-deprived capitals for almost half of the year. But now, the city’s premier technical university, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, is home to one of the world’s few solar laboratories.

Concentrated solar power can be part of the solution for sustainable energy in the future — not least in those developing countries where sunshine is plentiful.

On February 27, one of the few solar laboratories in the world is will be officially opened at Sweden’s KTH Royal Institute of Technology.

“Because there are so few facilities of this type in the world, we started by building one,” says Björn Laumert, associate professor at the Department of Energy Technology at the School of Industrial Engineering and Management.

In three years, he along with a number of graduate students and echnicians built up the KTH Solar Lab, with a solar simulator to enhance knowledge and research on, among other things, concentrated solar power, or thermal solar power.

“Solar cells have been applied commercially since the 1970s, while concentrated solar power started becoming news in the 1990s,” Laumert says.

He suggests, however, that for centuries people have known the principle of concentrating solar power in a very small area using mirrors or dishes that create high levels of heat and thus can generate energy.

Legend has it that in the siege of Syracuse, between 212 and 214 BCE, Archimedes concentrated solar energy through mirrors directed against enemy ships. The sails were burned up, and the supposedly ships sank.

The heat and radiation in today’s concentrated solar power is much more potent, as a visitor can easily see.

The inside of the laboratory resembles a square tin. All surfaces are covered with metal that can handle the power, radiation and heat, which can easily climb to 2,000 C degrees. Rigorous ventilation is a must. The plant is controlled from a control panel outside the laboratory. Apart from computer screens, you can follow the experiments with the naked eye through small peepholes of reinforced glass on one side.

Twelve extremely powerful spotlights simulate the sun at 7 kilowatts each, generating and shining light on a small area of ​​20 square cm. By using different types of lenses, loupes, and filters they can experiment with and concentrate solar energy in different ways, which creates a light output of up to 6.7 megawatts per square meter.

Experiments are controlled from outside of the solar simulation chamber.

“The solar energy in here is 6,000 times stronger than the way we experience the sun on the earth, Laumert says.

The light is converted to heat in a receiver that drives a gas or steam turbine alternatively, via a Stirling engine, which in turn generates electricity or heat.

Unlike solar cells that convert light into electricity directly, the concentrated solar energy can be stored as heat and used even when the sun does not shine. Storage, cost, and conversion are the central challenges in order to use solar power as a sustainable resource.

Solar power is free and available energy that creates no greenhouse gases. To live up to the EU’s climate goals and create a sustainable society, it one of several indispensable renewable energy sources,” he says.

What works best is, of course, dependent on each country’s conditions. Solar power works best where the flow of sunlight is even and strong, such as in desert areas like the Sahara.

“Industrialization and energy are interrelated. You could say that the industrialized countries exhausted their right in terms of energy consumption and emissions to build their wealth,” Laumert says.

“Should developing countries industrialize correspondingly, it requires much more energy than you can get from coal and oil, since those are destructive and not sustainable. Many developing countries have plenty of sunlight so it may be a way forward.”

More ways to store energy and lower the cost of generation will be key to competing in a commercial market, he says.

KTH’s Solar Lab will primarily be used for research into solar power and solar receivers. However, the laboratory will also be used for basic research on one hand, high temperature material, as used in the construction of rocket engines or fusion reactors, and also to investigate chemical reactions under high light output.

Even though Sweden is not bathed in sun and light, especially in winter, there is a strong industrial interest in developing both parts of the technology as a whole, both here and in Europe.

Today there are a number of research projects in collaboration with Siemens in Sweden, Cleanergy and the Swedish Energy Agency around the development of photovoltaics and solar power plants. For example, under examination is how photovoltaics can be made more effective and how solar energy interacts with other fuels.

Outside the laboratory stand doctoral student Luke Aichmayer and Wujun Wang. They have, like Jorge Garrido and departmental technicians, helped build the lab.

“It has been very exciting to develop the entire design. Every little detail is important,” Aichmayer says.

His thoughts are echoed by Wang, who eventually sees the opportunity to develop many small-scale solar power plants in rural areas of China to replace dirty diesel generators.

“I think this has the potential to become a success story,” he says.

The post Unique Solar Lab Shines Year-Round Light In Stockholm appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Truly, US President Barack Obama’s recent call to address the root causes of violence, including that of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) and al-Qaeda was a step in the right direction, but it is still miles away from taking the least responsibility possible for the mayhem that has afflicted the Middle East since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

“The link is undeniable,” Obama said in a speech at the State Department on 19 February “When people are oppressed and human rights are denied – particularly along sectarian lines or ethnic lines – when dissent is silenced, it feeds violent extremism. It creates an environment that is ripe for terrorists to exploit.”

Of course, he is right. Every word. However, the underlying message is also clear: it’s everyone else’s fault but ours. Now, that’s hardly true, and Obama, once a strong critic of his predecessor’s war, knows it well.

Writing at MSNBC.com, Sarah Leah Whitson went a step further. In “Why the fight against ISIS is failing,” Whitson, criticised the anti-IS alliance for predicating its strategy on militarily defeating the group, without any redress of the grievances of oppressed Iraqi Sunnis, who, last year welcomed IS fighters as “liberators”.

“But let’s not forget how Iraq got to that point,” she wrote, “with the US-led Iraq war that displaced a dictator but resulted in an abusive occupation and destructive civil war, leaving more than a million dead.”

Spot on, well, almost. Whitson considered “displacing of a dictator,” as a plus for the US war, as if the whole military venture had anything to do with overcoming dictatorship. In fact, the “abusive occupation and destructive civil war” was very much part of the US strategy of divide and conquer. Many wrote about this to the extent that that the argument itself is in fact, history.

At least, however, both arguments are a significant departure from the pseudo-intellectualism that has occupied the larger share of mainstream media thinking about terrorism and violence. Not only does the conventional wisdom in US media blame the bloody exploits of IS on the region itself, as if the US and western interventionism are not, in any way, factors, at least worth pondering. (In fact, for them US intervention is a force of good, rarely self-seeking and exploitative.) Even worse, no matter how they unravel the argument, Islam somehow ends up being the root of all evil – a reductionist, silly and irresponsible argument, to say the least.

It is also a dangerous one, for it infers the kind of conclusions that will constantly point the arrow to the direction of a self-destructive foreign policy, the kind that has set the Middle East ablaze in the first place.

But that is not your everyday diatribe. The constant injection of all sorts of bizarre arguments, like that of Graeme Wood’s recent piece in the Atlantic, is aimed at creating distractions, blaming religion and its zealots for their “apocalyptic” view of the world. Wood’s argument, designed to be a methodical and detached academic examination of the roots of IS is misconstrued at best, disingenuous at worst.

“That the Islamic State holds the imminent fulfilment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succour if it stays true to the Prophetic model,” Wood concluded with the type of liberal positivism that has become as galling as religious zeal.

Mohamed Ghilan, an Islamic law scholar,  dissected Wood’s argument with integrity based on real, authentic knowledge of both Islam and the Middle East region. “An analysis of what ISIS is about and what it wants that looks to Islam as a causal source of their behaviour is not only misguided, but also harmful,” he wrote.

“It obscures the root causes for why we have an ISIS, an al-Qaeda, an Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and any of the other groups that have risen and continue to arise. It creates further confusion and contributes to a rising Islamophobic sentiment in the West. And when given the guise of academic rigour, it accomplishes all of this rather perniciously.”

Indeed, the age-old ailment of shallow, lacking writing about the complex and involved reality in the Middle East persists, even after 25 years of full American military engrossment in the region.

Since the first Iraq war (1990-91) until this day, America’s mainstream intellectuals and journalists refuse to accept the most prevalent truth about the roots of the current crisis; that military intervention is not a virtue, that war begets chaos and violence, that military invasion is not a harbinger of a stable democracy, but invites desperately violent polices predicated on winning, regardless of the cost.

Nonetheless, that very admission came from former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who, by virtue of his previous position should indeed be able to assess the link between the US war on Iraq and the current upheaval. Although he rightly blamed regional powers for exasperating the conflict, he laid the blame where it surly belongs: the Iraq war, invasion and the way the occupation was handled afterwards. “I was against this invasion and my fears have been founded. The break-up of the Iraqi forces poured hundreds if not thousands of disgruntled soldiers and police officers onto the streets,” he said.

That was indeed the backbone of the initial home-grown resistance in Iraq, which forced the US to shift strategy by igniting the powder keg of sectarianism. The hope then was that the “disgruntled soldiers” of Iraqi resistance would be consumed in a civil war inferno involving Sunni-based resistance against Shiite-based militias, themselves working for or allied with the US and US-imposed Shiite government in Baghdad.

“The aim of creating democracy without the existing institutions ushered in corrupt sectarian governments,” Annan said. For Annan, the war and invasion come first, followed by the sectarian-mismanagement of Iraq, also by the Americans, an admission that is rarely echoed by US officials and media as demonstrated by the obstinately deficient media coverage.

One is rarely proposing to ignore existing fault lines in Middle Eastern societies, standing sectarianism, fundamentalism, brewing, unresolved conflicts, and of course the monster of authoritarianism and corruption. None of this should be unheeded, if indeed a peaceful future is to be made possible. On the other hand, the argument that desperately seeks every possible pretence – from blaming Islam and believers of some strange apocalypse to everyone else but the US and its allies – is a poor attempt at escaping a heavy moral, but also political responsibility.

The danger of that argument lies in the fact that its promoters don’t mind seeing yet another war, like the one that was visited upon the Middle East a decade or so ago, the one that wrought al-Qaeda to the region, and orchestrated the rise of IS, and the bloodbath that followed.

The post Obama’s Admission Not Enough: US Spin On Middle East Violence Must Change – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.