Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh, chairman of the board of senior scholars, has urged journalists to report the truth and defend the country against rumor-mongering and attempts to undermine state security.

“Journalists have a huge responsibility on their shoulders. It is to highlight and defend the position of the Kingdom as the land of Islam and Muslims, and the two holy mosques …”

Speaking to journalists at his home on Monday night, he said media people have to be especially careful now that the country was involved in the operation in Yemen, which was aimed at “defending our country, Muslim territories, its rulers and the people.”

He said journalists must ensure that they report the truth at all times, and work to ensure the community is unified as the country aims to “rescue our brothers in Yemen from the brutalities of the misguided Houthis.”

The grand mufti said the operation launched by Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman has “divine blessing” and was “an act of piety” because it was aimed at helping a neighbor and defending the Kingdom.

The mufti said media people must not be tools for those seeking to spread false information to “stir up discord and sow dissension in the community.

He said King Salman was constantly speaking with citizens to brief them and hear their views.

The post Saudi Arabia: Grand Mufti Wants Media To Promote National Cohesion appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By K.V. Kesavan*

March 31 was the deadline for countries to join as founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initiated by China. As of now, over 40 countries are expected to endorse the AIIB. They include India, Russia, Britain, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN countries. These countries are quite anxious not to miss the bus.

However, the AIIB initiative appears to have created fissure among the allies of the US – in Asia as well as Europe. While many of its allies like Germany, Britain and South Korea have decided to join the AIIB, the US and Japan have decided to remain out of it.

In fact, China’s decision to establish the AIIB was one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives in the region and expectedly, it generated a great deal of interest as well as concerns among the major countries of the Asia-Pacific region. When it was launched in October 2014 with a proposed capital of $ 50 billion, many feared that it could pose a challenge to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank.

There has been, however, a perception in Asia and other regions that these institutions, which have been the major fund-giving bodies of the world for well over 50 years, have been dominated for a long time by the US and its allies like Japan, Germany and others. As the need for developing infrastructure facilities has grown massively across the Asian continent, there emerged a funding gap which the old funding agencies alone cannot fill. In this sense, China’s initiative is timely and given its present economic and political clout, one can understand the rationale for its ambitious project. China also argues that the AIIB will focus only on infrastructure projects whereas the World Bank and the ADB have distributed their funds in a wide variety of economic and social sectors.

Further, China also complains that even though it is the largest economy in Asia, its power is not reflected in the actual operations of the ADB. It is true, Japan, the founder of the ADB, does not enjoy veto power, but in combination with the US, it controls about one fourth of the votes whereas China’s voting share is only about 6%. Japan has also always managed to keep a Japanese national as the Bank’s president ever since its inception. Further, attempts to increase the vote shares of other countries have proved unsuccessful and this feeling of alienation is also one reason that has driven China to float the AIIB.

Driven by its suspicion of western domination as well as its own growing self-confidence following its remarkable economic growth in the last several decades, China has been keen to expand its economic influence in the region. Its proposal to promote economic cooperation with Eurasian countries by contributing $40 billion to the Silk Road Fund is another of Beijing’s regional initiatives to bolster its influence.

When China launched the AIIB in October 2014, it was attended by 21 countries, mostly from Asia. They included India, Thailand and Malaysia. However, conspicuous by their absence were countries like Japan, Australia and South Korea, close to the US. Washington had lobbied quite hard to dissuade its allies and friendly partners from supporting the AIIB, because it thought the AIIB would undermine its preponderance in the region.

One could see some major differences in the attitudes of the US and China. The US State Department says that the new infrastructure bank should fulfil certain international standards of governance and transparency in its lending policies. Many in the US and Japan fear that China might use the new bank as an instrument for leveraging its own political and economic objectives. They have expressed their concerns about certain ambiguous aspects of the AIIB proposal.

In a bid to dispel these doubts and suspicions, China has assured that it will not insist on exercising any veto power in the bank. China’s stress on no-veto position was obviously meant to entice countries like South Korea, Japan and Australia to support the AIIB. Chinese President Xi Jinping in a moderate tone admitted that the AIIB in its multilateral rules, procedures and operations has to learn from the World Bank, the ADB and other such institutions. Jim Liqun, the official picked by the Chinese government to set up the bank, also stressed, “China will not bully other members, but will work together with them to reach consensus in all the decisions we make. China will not brandish its majority status.”

Since 31 March has been set as the deadline for countries to join as founding members, they are quite anxious not to miss the bus. Though they can join the bank as ordinary members after that date, the difference is that only founding members can play a role in determining the rules and regulations of the bank. There is a strong feeling among the Western allies that they, as founding members, can exercise a great deal of restraint and moderation on China at the time of framing the rules and regulations of the bank and that it would be an advantage to be “insiders” at the time of framing the rules.

Important US allies like Britain, Germany, Italy, South Korea and Australia have decided to join the AIIB. UK’s decision join the bank on March 12 triggered a trend on the part of many European countries to follow suit. George Osborne, British Chancellor of Exchequer, even stated that the AIIB would fill a major gap in the infrastructure investment in Asia. He said that joining the AIIB at this stage would create “an unparalleled opportunity for the UK and Asia to invest and grow together.” As one of the founding members of the new bank, Britain will participate in important discussions concerning issues on governance and accountability arrangements of the new institution.

In the meantime, several highly placed officials of the IMF, World Bank and the ADB have expressed their support for the new institution. ADB President Takehiko Nakao met with China’s Finance Minister Lou JIwei on March 24 and expressed his hope to work with the AIIB as there was great room for cooperation in building infrastructure. Similar hopes were also expressed by Christine Lagarde , IMF’s director.

Despite all these strong pro-AIIB trends, both the US and Japan have decided to opt out of joining the AIIB as they still have serious reservations. Opinion in Japan is quite divided on the issue. Though Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso indicated on March 20 that Japan could still ease its position, the Abe administration, because of its strong commitment to the US as well as its strained relations with Beijing, decided not to join the Bank. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida commented on March 30 that Japan has not received any clear assurances dispelling its concerns on the bank’s governance. Strong business groups in Japan, however, worry that they might miss many investment opportunities which could now go to many developed Western countries. Having opted out of the AIIB, it will be interesting to watch what strategies both the US and Japan will adopt in the coming months.

*Prof K.V. Kesavan is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

The post US-Japan Dilemma Over China-Led AIIB – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Bhaskar Roy*

Neither the Indian side nor the Chinese gave any details of the Special Representative (SR) level talks between the two countries held in New Delhi recently (March 23).

According to Xinhua, the Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi “exchanged in depth their opinions on the boundary issue”, and made “strategic communications” on bilateral ties as well as international and regional issues of common interest.

The SR level talks not only address the boundary issue but facilitate exchange of views on subjects of common interest in regional and international developments. The core of this arrangement is to seek ways and means to advance towards a final resolution of the boundary issue. At this meeting, preparatory talks on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China was expected to be on the agenda. His visit, as prime minister, is expected to enhance bilateral relations.

Irked by the Chinese troop build-up in Chumar in the disputed western sector during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India last year (September 2014), Mr Modi openly stated that bilateral relations depended on the stability of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The talks, aimed at keeping the border stable and ensuring that Modi’s visit goes smoothly, has not resulted in any forward movement.

While no shots have been fired by troops on either side of the border since the Peace and Tranquillity Treaty of 1993, the situation has not been as stable as made out to be.

In April-May 2013, Chinese troops transgressed in Depsang plains (western sector) across the Indian perceived LAC and remained there for three weeks – just before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India. It is significant that both these major incursions happened during or around the time of the visit of two of their most important leaders to India. There was a distinct message from the Chinese – there was no room for negotiations over the Chinese occupation of areas (Aksai Chin) during the short 1962 war. In fact China has been expanding its hold on this area through what is known as “salami slicing”, a creeping expansion, almost invisible.

The theatre of Chinese hard-line position appears to be shifting to the eastern sector, where the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is viewed as disputed territory by China. China does not issue visas to people from Arunachal Pradesh.

A Chinese position not necessarily brought to the table was – if India “made concessions in the East, China would consider making concessions in the West”. This position appears to have been quietly shelved.

China’s position in the eastern sector appears to have shifted and hardened recently. Reacting to Mr. Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh on February 20, to inaugurate a railway line, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin called in Indian Ambassador Ashok Kanth and stated that Mr. Modi’s visit “infringes on China’s territorial sovereignty and interests, magnifies the dispute of the border issue, and violates the consensus on appropriately handling the border issue”.

The Chinese reaction to Mr. Modi’s Arunachal Pradesh visit was unusually sharp. While Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh’s visit to the state in 2009 was sharply criticized by the Chinese, it was not at the vice ministerial level. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao had smoothened the situation when he met Manmohan Singh soon after, at the Hua Hin meeting of the ARF in Thailand. This time also, at a briefing on the side-lines of the National People’s Congress (NPC), foreign minister Wang Yi stated (March 8) that the border dispute has been “contained”. He informed observers that the acrimony was now behind. They had made their point, and it was time to prepare for Mr. Modi’s visit.

Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj had suggested an “out of the box” solution to the border issue when she was in Beijing recently for the China-India-Russia trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting. She had also stated to the Chinese that the issue not be passed to the next generation. President Xi Jinping remarked to Swaraj, when she called on him, to “patiently manage differences”.

First, what is an “out of the box” solution? In such a case, the two sides would have to give up their stated positions. Can their domestic political opinion be contained? The Chinese had indirectly proposed approaches like “package deal” (all three sectors of dispute be taken up together) and sector by sector approach. In the eastern sector, they made a demand on Tawang, one of the grounds being the fourth Dalai Lama had been born there, and the Tibetan people had strong attachment to the place. The historical process of finding the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, however, does not allude to his place of birth.

The modalities for resolution of the border issue agreed on by the two sides in 2005 states clearly that areas with settled population will not be exchanged. Are the Chinese trying to renege on that?

The Chinese appear to have expanded their claim, stalled identification of the LAC by exchanging maps, and are not willing to discuss or negotiate on Aksai Chin.

India, on the other hand, has been remiss by not insisting that the disputed Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) which India claims as its sovereign territory, be taken into account. Pakistan has transferred more than 5000 sq kms of POK to China in a 1963 agreement. Further, China is building infrastructure in POK. It may be recalled that China opposed and scuttled an Asian Development Bank (ADB) assistance for infrastructure projects in Arunachal Pradesh on grounds that it was disputed territory.

New Delhi must also demand that China clearly and unequivocally clarify whether it recognizes Sikkim as a sovereign territory of India. India needs to take up these subjects forcefully with the Chinese interlocutors. China is using the border issue as a pressure instrument against India. China was almost convinced that as prime minister, Narendra Modi would downgrade relations with USA. But President Obama’s India visit, that too as chief guest at the Republic Day Parade, led to the perception that India was a potential partner, if not a hidden accomplice, in USA’s plan to encircle China, along with Japan, an US ally. Recent amendments in the Japanese Constitution, especially in the ambit of action of its armed forces, the Self Defence Force (SDF) is perceived by Beijing as incremental steps towards constricting China even in the South China Sea. India’s Malabar naval exercises with the USA in which Japan is likely to participate this year are viewed with suspicion by the Chinese. Although China accepts India’s position on Tibet, and has no evidence of India-US collusion on using the Tibetan issue against it, the suspicion lingers strongly.

Mr. Modi needs to disabuse the Chinese leaders on these two issues in his forthcoming visit, There is a sense among the Chinese that Mr. Modi and his government are desperately looking for Chinese investment in India to drive the government’s urgent development programme. Mr. Modi will have to address this issue too.

These challenges do not indicate that bilateral relations needs to be frozen and suspicions allowed to grow. But caution is the key – there is no need to rush into the unknown and uninvestigated. There exists a wide range in the bilateral, regional and international fora where the two countries can work together, addressing each other’s needs and concerns. For instance, bilateral trade and confidence building measures, the Afghanistan peace initiative and international terrorism can be addressed, to start with.

Returning to the border question – unfortunately, China has been pushing it to territorial dimensions, at least for negotiations. It is generally believed that Xi Jinping is even stronger than Deng Xiaoping, with no peer group to challenge him. But this is not entirely true. There are both internal and external challenges.

Traditionally, nationalism has been invoked and fanned by the Chinese communist party to divert people. Currently, territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, conflict with Japan in the East China Sea and movements in Tibet and Xinjiang are connected with territorial integrity. China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh and India’s on Aksai Chin fall in this category. In India’s case no withdrawal is possible from territory claimed by Beijing.

The greatest pessimists in India will believe that real forward movement on the ground has been achieved, if exchange of maps of territorial control (to identify the LAC) takes place during Mr. Modi’s visit.

*The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

The post 18th Round Of Special Representative Talks Show Glimpses Of China-India Relations – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Hassan Mohammadi*

Perhaps the extreme tranquility around Beau Rivage Palace Hotel in the Swiss city of Lausanne was one of the reasons why this city was chosen for the continuation of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group, so that the last five steps toward a nuclear final would be taken without unwanted debates.

Diplomats representing Iran and the P5+1 group of countries say they have so far taken important steps to achieve a final nuclear deal and have reached a point where returning to the situation that existed at the beginning of talks has become very difficult, if not impossible, for both sides. Perhaps, this is why the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told reporters after taking part in the negotiations that, “We are facing decisive days ahead. After almost 12 years of negotiations with Iran, now the last ‘match’ of the negotiations begins.” Also, in spite of expectations that some diplomats had about the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius to oppose a deal with Iran – as he had done during last year’s nuclear talks in Geneva – he did not utter any controversial remarks upon his arrival in Lausanne and even defended Iran’s right to enrich uranium.

On the other hand, the US Secretary of State John Kerry, had already made remarks criticizing a proposal offered by opponents of the US President Barack Obama’s administration to withdraw from nuclear talks with Iran, noting that such a withdrawal from talks would lead to collapse of sanctions regime against Iran.

Some Western media have been also brandishing promising headlines these days about the situation of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group. But why the current stage of the negotiations is so important? The answer to this question will also reveal the secret of promising reports that have surrounded Iran’s new talks with world powers during past days.

The reason for the importance of this round of the negotiations is the main issue, which has been mostly ignored by mass media, including domestic media in Iran. During this round of talks, all involved parties are trying hard to find solutions for all problems that have so far stalled nuclear talks. And in doing that, they are looking for win-win solutions which would enable both sides to leave the negotiating table in a state of satisfaction. Negotiations in Lausanne are, in fact, a long stride among five long steps that should be taken by the two sides in the period that remains before a deadline set for the first of June. Finding solutions for all problems is the main point which will raise hopes about reaching a final solution because the negotiating sides have actually found satisfactory solutions for all problems. Therefore, the next steps will be dedicated to discussing the details and implementation of those solutions.

Although the details of solutions are no less important than achieving such general solutions, but the fact that solutions have been found for every bone of contention between the negotiations parties is, per se, of high significance. The emphasis put by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Supreme Leader on an agreement to be achieved in one stage attests to the importance of this fact.

Iranian diplomats believed that if general outlines of a deal are made public while their details cannot be publicized until the deadline reaches, the opponents of the nuclear deal will have a good opportunity to scuttle the entire course of the negotiations and raise many questions about it. Of course, this viewpoint is not solely held by Iranian diplomats and one of the foreign ministers taking part in the nuclear talks has noted that if they made the general outlines of the deal public, he would have sore throat for the next three months and would not be able to take part in any interview!

In fact, all parties have reached a consensus over a one-stage agreement and maintain that it would facilitate a final deal. However, pressures mounted by the US Congress have forced the American side to seek a written understanding, even in a few pages, to feed it to the Congress and keep its members content until the deadline. The Iranian side, on the other hand, will most probably issue a press release about the meetings that have taken place among foreign ministers of seven countries with no mention of the general outline of the negotiations.

*Hassan Mohammadi
Editor in Chief of Iranian’s Nuclear Hope Website

Source: Tabnak News Site
http://www.tabnak.ir/
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

The post Five Steps To Nuclear Final – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif says he hopes the parties attending talks over the country’s nuclear energy program could arrive at the expected understanding on Wednesday.

“We’ve been working since 7:30 in the morning and it’s been a very long day for all delegations. We have accomplished quite bit, but people needed to get some rest and start over early in the morning,” he said.

“I hope that we can finalize the work on Wednesday and hopefully start the process of drafting tomorrow,” he added.

Representatives from Iran and the P5+1 have started new negotiations in the Swiss city of Lausanne over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

The talks began on Wednesday following intensive talks the day before, which lasted into early Wednesday but were then adjourned until later in the morning.

A senior Iranian negotiator also said any deal with the P5+1 group of world powers on Tehran’s nuclear program should certainly guarantee removal of all sanctions.

“It is not possible to have a deal without lifting sanctions, all sanctions must be removed,” Abbas Araqchi said.

The Iranian official pointed to the difficulty of the task to see all sanctions removed all at once, stressing, however, that the lifting of major economic and oil embargoes constitutes the cornerstone in any agreement.

“…The type and the entity by which the sanctions have been imposed are very variable, they must be distinguished, but we insist that in the first step of the agreement all economic, financial, oil and banking sanctions must be lifted,” Araqchi said.

The Iranian negotiator also stated that the removal of sanctions should be based on a “clear and precise perspective, otherwise there would definitely be no deal.”

Araqchi added that minor but key problems still remain in front of the two sides, which are mostly related to the issues of sanctions as well as research and development on Iran’s advanced centrifuge machines.

“Until we have solutions to all problems we cannot have a comprehensive agreement,” Araqchi said.

According to Araqchi, a joint statement, declaring the progress the two sides have made over the past days in Lausanne, would be issued later on Wednesday.

The seasoned diplomat said Iran has no rush for reaching a flawed conclusion in the ongoing talks, saying, “Time is important to us, but the content of the negotiations and our demands are more important.”

Hamid Baeidinejad, another member of Iran’s delegation to Lausanne talks, said that Tehran and the P5+1 group of countries have reached an agreement on the removal of anti-Tehran sanctions, but minor issues still remain.

“Sanctions have many aspects, there are unilateral sanctions, US sanctions, EU sanctions, UNSC sanctions… I should say that many of these aspects have been resolved, but still there are some limited areas that also need to be resolved, and we are now concentrating on those remaining technical aspects with regard to the sanctions,” Baeidinejad said.

The post Iran Hopes To Start Process Of Drafting N-Deal On Wednesday appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“I consider these acts as a demonstration of irresponsibility on the part of Congress”, said Peruvian President Ollanta Humala in regard to the censure vote against Prime Minister Ana Jara, accused by the opposition of domestic spying into activities of top officials by the National Intelligence Directorate, or DINI.

“The censure destabilizes the country, creating political chaos and jeopardizing investments”, added the President. Humala did not confirm national media reports that Jara will be replaced by current Housing minister Milton von Hesse.

According to Humala, the lawmakers who initiated the motion to censure the premier – ‘pro-Fujimori’ and ‘Aprista’ opposition members – “do not have the moral authority to attribute Jara facts that occurred with the DINI”. The President has so far refused to comment on the replacement of who he described as “the best premier of my government, for her service to the nation”.

The post Peru: Humala Calls Congress ‘Irresponsible’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eric Edi*

Although the national reconciliation process is a fiasco, the deeply fractured Ivory Coast is mulling a presidential election in 2015. The subject is raising a lot of controversies as some argue that a presidential election is inappropriate and others claim that it would end the current crisis. At least seven candidates have already made known their intentions to contest the ballot if it takes place. While it is not surprising that Alassane Ouattara is one of them, it is confusing that Essy Amara, Charles Konan Banny and Kouadio Konan Bertin intend to run, whereas on 1 February 2015, the political party they are members of, the PDCI, endorsed Alassane Ouattara. Not only do they object to the decision of the political bureau of the PDCI, but also they are opposing the same person they helped into power in 2010 in the most unconstitutional manner. Other potential candidates like Ahipeaud Martial and Mamadou Koulibaly also offer contradicting postures. They lambast the government for violating the rule of law but they want to contest the ballot. All this is puzzling and debilitating.

No one denies that the constitution of the Ivory Coast requires that a presidential election take place every five years to elect the president, consolidate democracy and strengthen national cohesion. But can this requirement be fulfilled this year? For many pressure groups like the Committee of Actions for Ivory Coast in the United States (C.A.C.I-USA), there cannot and should not be any election in Ivory Coast in 2015, unless the political body wants to trigger new violence and erase the democratic gains that Ivorians have enjoyed starting April 1990.

I. REASONS AGAINST AN ELECTION

The first reason to refrain from a presidential election in 2015 is that the disputes over the results of the 2010 presidential election and the unprecedented violence that followed it have not yet been elucidated. The UN Secretary General, who was deeply involved in the dispute, has been silent if not ambiguous about the true result of the 2010 presidential election, but hurriedly declared that all records were destroyed. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been unable to gather evidence to support the charges against Laurent Gbagbo. Consequently, Laurent Gbagbo’s trial has not yet started, though it has been more than three years since he was transferred to The Hague. Is there any legal basis that can account for this long detention? For many Ivorians, Laurent Gbagbo’s case underlines the pervasiveness of the question: Who won the presidential election of 2010? Until this question is answered, hopes of a successful reconciliation and return to political normalcy are slim.

The second reason is that accepting a presidential election in 2015 would legitimate the regime in power, condemn Laurent Gbagbo, approve violence as a means to access power, and negate Ivory Coast’s right to sovereignty and democracy. It is worth emphasizing that many groups like the C.A.C.I-USA and mostly the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), the main opposition party, continue to refute Alassane Ouattara’s legality and legitimacy on the basis that he did not win the 2010 election. This claim was repeated by the individuals and dignitaries of Laurent Gbagbo’s administration, who faced trial in Abidjan for charges related to the post-2010 presidential election violence. Ake Ngbo, Bro Gregbe and Simone Gbagbo, just to mention these three defendants, said that Laurent Gbagbo won in 2010, was regularly sworn into office by the Constitutional Council, and that they did nothing wrong by serving in his administration or supporting his regime. What is thought-provoking is that a great majority of Ivorians have firmly stood on the conviction that Laurent Gbagbo won the election and the feeling that the charges against him, his entourage, and supporters are unfair and lopsided.

This feeling has increased since a tribunal in Abidjan sentenced the defendants. It is obvious that the sentences, which may include a possible 20 years in jail for Simone Gbagbo, are baseless and a new obstacle to the reconciliation process. For four years, this reconciliation has stalled. The Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission concluded its mission in 2014 without appeasing prevailing tensions. The chairman of this defunct commission, who is himself a potential candidate, has acerbically critiqued the regime in power for not taking the required steps to end political violence. There are sufficient grounds to claim that the prevailing tensions will lead to new waves of violence, perhaps more dramatic than what happened in 2010. In fact, no one should mistake the current quietness for a regained political normalcy. The truth is that Alassane Ouattara is exercising severe repression on opposition parties, leaders and ordinary citizens.

Under Alassane Ouattara, political repression is the new political order. It consists of freezing opponents’ assets, detaining opponents without trial, torture, impunity, protecting warlords, rebels, and fighters who forcefully took lands and farms from their rightful owners, forcing Ivorians into exile, denying political parties public funding, prohibiting opposition parties’ rallies, and operating an unjust judicial system. The rebel fighters, who helped Alassane Ouattara into power, still possess their weapons. Nearly 18,000 of them are reported missing, and those who were inserted in the national army continue to threaten security by holding major cities and towns to a stand still to request the money due to them. The government temporarily won their appeasement by promising to pay them lump sums instead of proceeding with the disarmament and demobilization program. Peace is therefore fragile and does not guarantee a transparent and fair election.

Another reason has to do with the old-new or new-old debate about Alassane Ouattara’s Ivorian citizenship and eligibility to contest a presidential election in Ivory Coast. Predictably, the debate has resurfaced. It has never been put to rest anyway! The debate about changing or not changing Article 35 of the Constitution, which defines the criteria of eligibility to the position of President of the Republic, illustrates the relevance of the subject. In reality, Alassane Ouattara has not renounced the intention to alter this article although he recently declared that it would not happen until after the election. It shall be remembered that in 2003, Alassane Ouattara, the rebels and some opposition leaders blamed the Ivorian crisis on Article 35. They claimed it discriminated against members of the ethnic groups from the northern part of Ivory Coast.

If, despite his access to power, the debate over Article 35 has resumed, it means that Alassane Ouattara’s answers and handling of questions about his Ivorian-ness have been critically opaque. Therefore, if in 2010, Laurent Gbagbo used Article 48 of the Constitution to authorize him into the presidential election, nothing similar can be done in 2015, unless the intention is to perpetuate the violations of the constitution of Ivory Coast. Unfortunately, Alassane Ouattara is not ready to clarify the muddy waters around him, which will fuel more tensions.

A final reason is that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Constitutional Council are not transparent and fair as they currently stand. The IEC is chaired by Youssouf Bakayoko, the same person who sabotaged the 2010 election and pushed the country into an unprecedented political stalemate and violence. His continued presence at the head of this institution illustrates the weakness of political institutions and the preparation of massive electoral frauds. Next to him is the unconstitutional appointment of Mr. Kone Mamadou, a former rebel leader, to the chairmanship of the Constitutional Council.

II. THE BEST ALTERNATIVE

“Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it.” Frantz Fanon

The relative obscurity for Ivory Coast is the uncertainty of durable peace and independence. There are two ways to end this obscurity: refraining from a presidential election in 2015 and installing a political transition. There are ample constitutional reasons to object to the presidential election now. The most important is avoiding further chaos and giving the political body sufficient time to install a political transition. Indubitably, a political transition is the golden alternative for peace in Ivory Coast. This strategic alternative is based on the premise that Alassane Ouattara is the instigator and beneficiary of the political violence, ethnic hatred, and unimaginable fracture that Ivory Coast has been undergoing and that his exit from power through street pressure is opportune.

Civil disobedience and street mobilizations are two ways to pressure Alassane Ouattara out of power. Pro-democracy forces have used these tactics all over the world and more recently in Burkina Faso, where the “Balai Citoyen,” opposition political parties, and civil society organizations mobilized to prevent Blaise Compaoré from changing the constitution to ensure a new term in office. The pressure concluded with the peaceful exit of the ruler after 27 years in power. The countries of the international system acknowledged the street movement, the power shift and asked Blaise Compaoré to capitulate to the will of the citizens. If these countries accepted the fall of Blaise Compaoré as a victory of democracy, there is no reason to believe that they would not do the same thing if a similar movement was to take place in Ivory Coast, where the rule of law does not exist anymore.

Organizations report that human rights and economic democratization have fallen to low levels under Alassane Ouattara. This means that the economic emergence that Alassane Ouattara boasts about is a mirage. According to the World Bank, the double-digit economic growth rate has not yet increased average households’ purchasing power. Rampant poverty and soaring unemployment rates keep the chances of renewed political violence very high. It is unbecoming to say that the success of the national soccer team at the last African Cup of Nations is a sign of national reconciliation.

The prevailing tensions and likelihood of renewed violence are the rationale for a political transition, that is to say, a political interval during which political and social actors will prioritize the birth of a new contract and prepare a new electoral cycle by building on the failures of the 2010 experience. The aim of the political transition is to put the constitution back at the core of Ivorian political discourses and behaviors, restore the national army in its pre-Ouattara nature, disband all para-military groups and militia born of the rebellion and the post-election crisis of 2010, and create a political spectrum that will allow political actors to exercise their constitutional rights and obligations without restraints.

The aim of the transition is also to achieve national reconciliation via a new culturally, regionally, and politically sensitive reconciliation commission. The imperative for this commission is to free Laurent Gbagbo, end political detentions and tortures, return all the refugees and exiles home and facilitate their re-entry into work force, give the stolen goods, properties and lands back to their rightful owners, unfreeze all assets, audit the results of the 2010 presidential election, and seek the truth about who did what and why. When these reconstructive steps are complete, Ivory Coast will have built a safer state to hold a free, open, and transparent presidential election.

* Eric Edi, PhD, is with the Committee of Actions for the Ivory Coast. See blog (French).

The post Ivory Coast Needs A Transition Phase – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Daniel McAdams

With an Iran nuclear deal within striking distance in the P5+1 talks, John McCain is horrified to see the possibility of his longed-for US attack on Iran slowly slipping away. So, to retaliate, he took to the Senate Floor last week to urge Israel to undermine his own country’s diplomatic efforts and “go rogue” on Iran.

Said the Senator from Arizona:

The Israelis will need to chart their own path of resistance. On the Iranian nuclear deal, they may have to go rogue. Let’s hope their warnings have not been mere bluffs.

His meaning was clear: the Senator hopes decades of Israeli threats to wipe Iran of the face of the earth were not mere bluffs. He urges Israel to launch a pre-emptive war against an Iran that even the Mossad does not believe is pursuing nuclear weapons.

But the Senator is no dummy. Along with his sidekick Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and the indicted Sen. Bob Menendez (R-NJ), McCain has planted a few little magic pills into recent legislation calling on the US to support Israel if it happens to heed McCain’s calls to attack Iran. As Jon Rainwater points out in the Huffington Post today, Senate Res. 65 — the “Backdoor to War” bill — was drafted to say:

[Congress] urges that, if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.

The language was later diluted, but the marker was laid down. The seed was planted. That is how Congress works.

While McCain winks and hints to Israel that they should attack Iran soon if they want to really scuttle the nuclear talks, the lunatic fringe of the neocon movement like John Bolton can still get ample space in the New York Times to call for the US to just go ahead and “bomb Iran.” In the dialectics of the neoconservative universe, a call for US bombs on Iran will be compromised back to an outright rejection of any nuclear deal and — what the heck — perhaps some more sanctions. Define the extremes as extreme as possible so that the “compromise” pushes the argument inexorably toward conflict.

The “free press” in the US is of course a mouthpiece of the neocons and interventionists, and in the case of John Bolton’s article the New York Times is an accessory to the commission of a criminal threat against the Iranian people. Don’t look for McCain or Bolton or even Dean Baquet in the Hague, though. The “exceptional” nation still operates with impunity. But overseas anger against the US warmongers puts all Americans at risk. No empire lasts forever…

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post McCain To Israel: Go Rogue – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Srecko Latal

After six months of political wrangling that took the country to the edge of the abyss, Bosnia and Herzegovina finally got new state-level and Federation entity governments.

Leaders of Bosnia’s ruling parties averted political and financial disaster – literally on the stroke of midnight – by approving new state and Federation entity governments as well as Federation entity budget for 2015.

Administrative problems, procedural shortcomings and political squabbling had blocked the formation of new governments on different levels for a full half year after general elections last October.

Although Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian parties agreed a ruling coalition at state level and in the Federation entity by December, they needed three more months to work out the share of key posts at different levels.

The failure of the parties to agree on the formation of new governments threatened to further destabilize the economically troubled and ethnically divided Balkan country.

March 31 became the deadline for the formation of the state and Federation governments and for the adoption of the Federation budget for 2015.

Without a breakthrough, the Federation entity would have been left without financing and was in danger of bankruptcy, while the ruling coalition would have probably collapsed and the parties would have had to start negotiations anew.

March 31 started with more delays, confusion and uncertainties, as parliamentary commissions reviewed the candidates and party leaders burned phone lines, fine-tuning last-minute details.

Finally in the afternoon and evening hours of Tuesday, the pieces of this complicated, multi-layered jigsaw finally fell into place.

Bosnia’s state parliament first approved a new state government – the Council of Ministers – under the chairmanship of Denis Zvizdic, from the [Bosniak] Party of Democratic Action, SDA.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a country of capable and efficient institutions, with a competitive economy, qualitative health (system), modern education and a successful people,” Zvizdic told parliament in his expose.

As soon as the new state government was confirmed, the President of the Federation entity, Marinko Cavara, nominated a new Federation government. The Federation assembly then confirmed the new government in a late-evening emergency session.

“I will focus exclusively on the measures and goals of economic policy which, with your support, I plan to carry out in this mandate,” the Federation’s new Premier, Fadil Novalic, a businessman and member of the SDA, said in his address to the Federation assembly.

As soon as it was confirmed, the new Federation government held an emergency session to prepare a new entity budget. This was then approved by the the Federation assembly’s two chambers, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples, just before midnight.

While appointment of new governments and the adoption of the Federation budget have averted an immediate crisis, queations remain about the ability of the new governments to deliver the tough and unpopular reform agenda that confronts the country.

“What can we expected from them when difficult reforms start, if they needed half a year only to form new governments,” one disgruntled EU official told Balkan Insight.

Persistent political quarrels, personal mistrust and different – sometimes conflicting – ideologies and agendas will not make the process any easier.

Signs of the troubles to come were visible already during the hubbub on March 31.

The strongest Bosnian Serb party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, which is in opposition at state level but leads the government in the Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska, continued its boycott of the state parliament even during the confirmation of the new state government.

As SNSD deputy from the chamber’s House of Representatives, Stasa Kosarac, said that as fas as his party was concerned, the new state government was “illegal” and the SNSD would never support it.

“What is happening today in the [state] parliament today is a complete circus,” he maintained.

The SNSD boycott will impede the work of the state parliament and block further preparations of the ambitious reform agenda prepared last year under EU auspices.

Opposition parties in the Federation also expressed scepticism about the prospects of the new Federation government.

“Not a single statement from the address of Premier Designate Fadil Novalic is backed up in the 2015 Federation budget,” Denis Gratz from the opposition Nasa Stranka [Our Party], remarked.

The Federation President, Marinko Cavara, said the new team deserved support, however. “The new members of the [Federation] government are neither the most capable nor the most beautiful ones, but at this particular moment, they were only possible ones. I hope that we will help our new government in resolving key problems,” he said.

The post Bosnia Beats Deadline To Form New Governments appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rufiz Hafizoglu

A Turkish Airlines plane flying the Istanbul-Lisbon route has returned to Istanbul after receiving information about an explosive device on board, reports  the Milliyet newspaper.

All the passengers of the airplane have been evacuated and the bomb squad is searching the explosive device on the board of the airliner. It should be noted that Turkish Airlines has faced several such emergency situations in recent days.

A Turkish Airlines passenger plane flying from Istanbul to Sao Paulo made an emergency landing in Casablanca over a possible bomb threat on March 30. After the plane took off from Istanbul, ground service informed the pilots that the airport received an anonymous call about a planted bomb on board of the aircraft.

The pilots decided to land in the Casablanca airport. No other details of the incident were reported.

Moreover, a Turkish Airlines plane flying from Istanbul to Tokyo had to urgently cut its flight short on March 29 due to the information about an explosive device in the cargo compartment of the aircraft. However, no explosive device was found after the inspection.

Note: This article has been edited

The post Bomb Threat Forces Turkish Airlines Plane To Return To Istanbul appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Blogs continue to wield influence; governments and bloggers could coordinate on regulations to increase the potential.

By Nayef Al-Rodhan*

The internet and global interconnectivity, while often taken for granted, has changed the face of social reality. Weblogs, more commonly known as blogs, have emerged and in many ways manifest both extremes of positive and negative potential.

Because blogs have tremendous potential to be used either for good or ill, they could be dubbed  a new avatar of a power group supplementing the old. The modern expression of the separation of powers in the executive, legislative and judicial branches became known as the three estates, later to be followed by a “fourth estate” in the form of the media. The designation has often been contested simply because the media does not implement policy or mandate particular activity, yet these criticisms miss the larger point. The essence of “estates” as used here refers to sources of power.

When the term “fourth estate” was coined by Edmund Burke and referred to by Thomas Carlyle, their astute observation was that the press had come to wield an equal or occasionally greater power to influence policy than the original three state powers.

The internet multiplied this power, providing the possibility for previously unheard voices to gain an audience as well as provide another check on the power of the other estates. This led me in 2007 to designate blogs as the fifth estate.

The revelations of Edward Snowden via WikiLeaks are a resounding example. The evidence he provided about the extent and mechanisms of US state surveillance have sparked overdue global discussions about the limits of privacy in the age of the Internet, as well as closer investigations into the legal and technical aspects of spying and surveillance. Blogs have emerged almost imperceptibly, especially as so much content is non-political. Still, blogs nonetheless represent a tremendous capacity for the masses to disseminate information, encouraging public participation and interest in politics, and opinions, which in many countries can be openly expressed without censorship, barriers or editorial boards. This realization has started to cause anxiety in some countries that have a poor record of civil liberties. In China, for instance, blogs like “China Change” have emerged as sources of news and commentaries on human rights and civil society issues in the country.

Blogs have been bolstered by more frequent contributions from experts and shown themselves to be the least constrained forum. Examples come from established journalists, members of parliaments, and political parties from different ends of the political spectrum or key figures in global politics such as John Kerry.

In a hyper-capitalist environment dominated by media giants, the means available to independent journalism have narrowed considerably. The advent of blogs has reinvigorated such possibilities of independence, giving not only journalists but anyone with access to the internet the capacity to express views and disseminate information. At the same time, some adverse effects have been recorded as so-called netizens and bloggers covering political events or revolutions in real time later became targets of backlash. Recently Avijit Roy, an influential Bangladeshi-born American blogger, was hacked to death in Dhaka. He was a persistent critic of the Islamist radicals.

As a mechanism of positive policy reform, blogs continue to face challenges:

How the blogosphere tends to be perceived: Despite general acknowledgment that freedom from influence or constraint of major media channels or ideological bias is a favorable quality, blogs often suffer from the concern that their authors lack journalistic experience or other relevant credentials.

Absence of oversight: Questions are raised about blogs’ lack of editorial review and insufficient fact-checking mechanisms. Such shortcomings leave readers in a dilemma. Yet well-researched and reviewed information from dominant media outlets can be prone to biases, too. Doubts can also emerge by the perception of the blogosphere as a source of entertainment and “light” information, rather than contributor of serious content. Further issues of credibility arise also as some bloggers joined programs like the “paid blogger program” where they commit to endorse companies or products in exchange for money.

A source of polarized views: Without oversight and checks, blogs can serve morally dubious intentions by those who aim to spread propaganda, radicalize readers or exacerbate antagonisms. For readers who deliberately seek out only blogs that reinforce their views without checks, such content ceases to become a source of understanding.

Sensitive or dangerous information: Blogs can disrupt society, business and government activities, such as by disclosures of secret information. Apple Computers, for instance, reportedly filed a lawsuit against bloggers who communicated confidential company information on their blogs. Other blogs  disseminate information or blueprints for constructing weapons of mass destruction or propagate anarchist messages. All of these concerns would be ruled out in more traditional media sources by journalistic integrity and institutional checks.

A primary countermeasure to these negative implications is education. The ways in which readers encounter and relate to information is dramatically influenced by their education as well as their awareness of the pitfalls relating to the information source.

Furthermore, serious bloggers should welcome expert guest commentary, critical feedback and open dialogue in their blogs. Only through education and critical engagement can readers become more demanding and circumspect, which in turn improves the quality of blogs.

The question of oversight-free authorship remains the prevailing concern, and people must become critical readers with a heightened sensitivity to unjustified positions or unsubstantiated claims.

Other regulatory steps are also necessary to limit the extreme abuses of blogs. The question of absolute anonymity has a downside from the viewpoint of global security. Anonymity can protect activists working in the world’s most brutal areas, but can also allow rogues or criminals to spread ideas without being easily tracked.

Governments must combat bloggers engaging in deliberately radicalizing rhetoric, employing hate speech, or engaging in criminal activity including human trafficking or pornography.

These recommendations might raise concerns about censorship and rights to free speech, but  just as there are reasonable limits to free speech in public life, the same logic and amount of regulation should be applied in the digital domain. There are inherent difficulties about establishing such limits in an even-handed way yet this should not mean that these limits should not be sought and imposed.

The blogosphere must function as an extension of the public space, where people can be held accountable and liable for their actions as well as potentially investigated for threats of violence or criminal activity.  Nevertheless, the plurality of legal systems and many interpretations of freedom of speech or hate speech remains a persistent challenge in the blogosphere. Conundrums are bound to arise as the internet is a global medium and the removal of some content will be problematic especially if the servers are located in countries where those messages are not illegal. As an information stream that reveals public opinion largely free from outside influence, the capacity of blogs for shaping attitudes positively is tremendous. Governments must ensure that the power of blogs is cultivated and implemented in collaborative ways, with a view to preserve peace and human dignity. Contributors, too, must become more proactive and committed to integrity and responsible content. The idea of a bloggers’ code of ethics, proposed a few years ago, deserves renewed consideration.

Undoubtedly, the future of information holds high potential for blogs. Their political relevance is only expected to expand.

The question is not whether or not the influence of the fifth estate will increase, but what form this influence will take and what regulatory mechanisms are necessary to implement to cultivate blogs’ positive potential.

*Nayef Al-Rodhan is a neuroscientist, philosopher and geostrategist. He is an Honorary Fellow at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and senior fellow and head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also the author of The Emergence of Blogs as a Fifth Estate and their Security Implications (Slatkine: Geneva, 2007).

The post Free-Wheeling Web Commentary Challenges Media’s Traditional Power – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Haizam Amirah-Fernández*

Tunisia is the only country of the so-called ‘Arab Awakening’ where democracy is consolidating. This has earned it enemies in a region marked by autocratic regimes and extremist ideologies opposed to political pluralism and social diversity. The absence of bad news since the fall of Ben Ali served to keep this North African country out of the headlines of the international media. To the misfortune of Tunisians, media neglect came to an abrupt end on March 18 with the perpetration of a new terrorist outrage.

The aim of the slaughter in the Bardo Museum is threefold: to try to derail the promising democratic transition; to torpedo the economy by hitting the all-important tourism industry; and to drag Tunisia into a scenario of Jihadism that generates chaos. The Tunisian transition is still fragile and needs to address serious and pressing challenges at two levels: socioeconomic conditions (creating and fairly distributing wealth) and security (combating terrorist groups that, until recently, had focused their attacks on the army and security forces).

A failure by the existing leadership to provide solutions to these challenges may well lead to growing social frustration and political instability. Such a climate could be seized upon by the more hard-line elements (including those of the former regime) in an attempt to go back to an authoritarian system. Under this scenario, they would use the promise of restoring law and order as a lure to attempt to gain ground. Matters would only reach such a pass if there were a fracturing of the consensus that has so painstakingly been constructed in Tunisia, a consensus that distinguishes the country as a unique case in contemporary Arab politics.

Over the past four years there have been several instances in which the Tunisian people have been an example: first, by deposing an autocrat by peaceful means; then, by voting freely for a range of political options; and, no less difficult, by building a consensus in order to establish ground rules and equip themselves with the most democratic constitution in Arab history. The first reactions to the attack, with thousands of people taking to the streets of the capital to demonstrate against terrorism, are encouraging and highlight the fact that there is a Tunisian society that exhibits a significant civic maturity.

No one says that political transitions after long periods of authoritarianism are easy, and the Tunisian example has proved to be no exception. Certain key factors account for the success of the Tunisian transition to date. First, no single player has found a way of imposing itself on the others. Neither the ancien régime of Ben Ali, nor the Islamists of Ennahda, nor the armed forces had the resources, the support or the perception to try to marginalise the other political and social forces and launch a lone bid for power.

Unlike in other countries in the region –notably Egypt, Libya and Syria, where an attempt has been made, with varying degrees of violence and brutality, to impose the logic of the zero-sum game–, the winner does not take all in Tunisia. Furthermore, Tunisian civil society has been vigilant and ready to mobilise in order to avoid committing the same mistakes made by neighbouring countries. It was also quick to respond in 2013 when the assassination of two opposition leaders threatened to derail the transition.

Despite this brutal attack, Tunisia has not had to contend with widespread insecurity or large-scale violence since the dictator’s fall. Indeed, the transition has been peaceful in relative terms, compared to both regional and global precedents. That said, the presence of a small number of violent radicals represents a serious threat to the State and, more alarmingly still, they are capable of inflicting enormous damage on the country’s economy and image through actions that do not require large resources. The instability and violence in neighbouring Libya is an added cause for concern, given the threats that could emanate from that quarter.

If the Tunisian transition fails and if the EU is unable to support and protect with all the means available the only democracy in its immediate southern neighbourhood, then Europe would effectively be acknowledging and accepting its irrelevance as a global actor. It is in the interests of many to abort the democratic experiment in Tunisia, starting with those who do not want this ‘malaise’ to spread to their own countries. In this, as in other instances, the best weapon against terror is more and better democracy.

About the author:
*Haizam Amirah-Fernández is Senior Analyst for the Mediterranean and Arab World at the Elcano Royal Institute| @HaizamAmirah

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute.

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Trevor Noah, the comedian chosen by Comedy Central to replace Jon Stewart on “The Daily Show” has gotten himself into some lukewarm water by trashing women and Jews. The only reason he is not in hot water is because he is Comedy Central’s new hire, the favorite network of liberal elites. If Noah were a conservative, and was slated to air on Fox News, he’d be toast.

Noah is not from the U.S. and has yet to learn the ropes of political correctness. If he wants to keep his job, he needs to heed my advice.

Rule 1:

Never call women “chicks,” never mind “fat chicks,” and refrain from cracking jokes about Jews controlling Rap artists.

Rule 2:

Play it safe by labeling all priests as pedophiles, but never even suggest that most of the predators have been homosexuals.

Rule 3:

If you slip up and offend any of the protected classes—Jews, Muslims, African Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, women, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, as well as those who are transgendered, questioning, or queer—then apply for a job at HBO. Just promise that you agree to tell only Bill Maher-type jokes, the kind that libel priests, bishops, and the pope. They’ll never can you.

The post How Trevor Noah Can Keep His Job – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Palestine’s decision to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the face of strong opposition – including from the United States, Israel, and Canada – deserves international support, according to Human Rights Watch.

The ICC treaty officially went into effect for Palestine on April 1, 2015, giving the court a mandate dating back to June 13, 2014, over serious crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on or from Palestinian territory.

“Governments seeking to penalize Palestine for joining the ICC should immediately end their pressure, and countries that support universal acceptance of the court’s treaty should speak out to welcome its membership,” said Balkees Jarrah, international justice counsel at Human Rights Watch. “What’s objectionable is the attempts to undermine international justice, not Palestine’s decision to join a treaty to which over 100 countries around the world are members.”

On January 2, 2015, Palestinian authorities transmitted a copy of Palestine’s ICC accession instrument to the United Nations Secretariat. As depository for the ICC treaty, the UN secretary-general officially accepted the document on January 6 and circulated a notification indicating that Palestine would formally become an ICC state party on April 1, making it the 123rd member of the court. On January 1, the Palestinian government had also lodged a declaration, giving the court a mandate back to June 13, 2014, to cover the 2014 conflict in Gaza.

Based on her policy for when she receives declarations accepting the court’s jurisdiction, Fatou Bensouda, the ICC prosecutor, opened a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine on January 16. During the preliminary examination phase, the prosecutor determines whether the criteria have been met to merit pursuing a formal investigation.

The US has stated that it does not believe that Palestine is a state and that it is therefore ineligible to join the ICC. The US also opposes an ICC investigation of Israeli officials. In December, President Barack Obama signed into law an appropriations act that would cut off some aid to the Palestinian Authority if “the Palestinians initiate” or “actively support” an ICC “judicially authorized” investigation “that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians.” Seventy-five US Senators have also urged the Obama administration to make clear that the ICC is not a “legitimate or viable path for the Palestinians.”

From January to March, Israel withheld about US$400 million in tax revenue that Israel collects on behalf of Palestinian authorities in response to the decision by the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to join the ICC. As a result, 160,000 Palestinian public employees have been paid only 60 percent of their salaries for three months. On March 27, Israel announced it would release some of the accrued Palestinian tax revenue.

Despite reports that the Palestinians are set to lodge a complaint against Israel at the ICC, only the court’s prosecutor and in some instances its judges have the authority to decide what cases – if any – to pursue for investigation based on the information available, Human Rights Watch said. However, countries may submit information to the prosecutor for analysis by her office.

“The ICC prosecutor examines allegations of serious crimes no matter the perpetrator, and makes her own determinations about how to proceed based on the evidence” Jarrah said. “Any decision whether to pursue an investigation and against whom is not in the hands of the Palestinians or the Israelis.”

The Office of the Prosecutor’s ongoing inquiry includes analyzing whether ICC crimes have been committed, whether those crimes are sufficiently grave to merit the court’s attention, and whether national authorities are genuinely carrying out credible investigations and, if appropriate, prosecutions in relation to potential cases being considered for investigation by the court, Human Rights Watch said.

There is no specific timeline for how long a preliminary examination might take, which varies from situation to situation. Bensouda has said she is conducting eight other preliminary examinations in situations around the world, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Ukraine.

Human Rights Watch documented unlawful attacks, including some that are war crimes, during the 2014 hostilities in Gaza. Fighting killed more than 1,500 civilians in the Gaza Strip, damaged hospitals and other critical infrastructure, and destroyed the homes of more than 100,000 Palestinians. Palestinian armed groups launched rockets and mortars indiscriminately toward Israeli population centers.

Neither side has yet to make meaningful progress in providing justice for serious laws-of-war violations during the 2014 conflict. Israeli military inquiries into the Gaza hostilities are ongoing, and Israel has announced an investigation by its state comptroller. The Palestinian government in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza are not known to have carried out any investigations. Both Israel’s and the Palestinians’ history of accountability for violations by their forces is poor, Human Rights Watch said.

At issue is not only both sides’ conduct of the Gaza war. The ICC statute also classifies as a war crime an occupying power’s transfer of its own civilians “directly or indirectly” into territory it occupies. The transfer of people in the occupied territory from their homes to within or outside this territory is also a war crime.

Since it occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967, Israel has facilitated the movement of its citizens into West Bank settlements, including East Jerusalem. Since Benjamin Netanyahu became Israel’s prime minister in 2009, Israel has begun construction of more than 10,400 settlement homes. Israeli demolitions in the West Bank during the same period left more than 5,333 Palestinians homeless, including 1,103 in 2013 and 1,177 in 2014. Israel published tenders for 450 new settlement units in the West Bank on January 30.

“Given that the ICC prosecutor will act only in the absence of credible national proceedings, both Israeli and Palestinian authorities have the opportunity to avoid the court’s intervention by undertaking their own genuine investigations and prosecutions,” Jarrah said. “In the absence of credible domestic efforts, the ICC could step in to diminish the accountability gap for grave abuses.”

The post ICC: Palestine Is Newest Member appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Emre Turkut*

On 25 March 2015, the international community witnessed another massive campaign of destruction in the form of a military intervention against the Houthis in Yemen launched by Saudi Arabia. The operation called “Operation Decisive Storm” is being conducted by a coalition including such countries as the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait.

In a letter written on 24 March 2015, the Yemeni President asked the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait to provide instant support by all means necessary by evoking the right of self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the military intervention indeed elicits some problems and pitfalls when it comes to its validity under international law.

First, even though the UN Security Council reaffirmed “its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen” and expressed its “concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen”, Resolution 2204, passed on 24 February 2015, does not yet authorize military intervention under Section VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the legal basis of this military intervention must be found in the invitation of Yemeni President Hadi.

In a word, the military intervention taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Yemen may be justified on the account of “intervention by invitation”. Generally speaking, if a sovereign state has consented to the use of force from abroad on its territory, such consent would suffice to preclude a violation of the prohibition on the use of force that represents one of the most basic tenets of international law as prescribed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Such “consent”, or legally speaking, “invitation” has also been extended by Iraq for its fight against ISIS.

However, seeing that Syria had not taken a path of consent, and in legal terms, had proposed a “coordinated military action”, the US and Iraq took the position that if a state is “unwilling or unable” to eliminate the threats of a terrorist group, then a military action can be justified on these grounds within the territory of another state, in this case, Syria. Suffice to say that this is a controversial argument under contemporary international law and can be evidenced in the doubts cast on the legality of recent military operations in Syria; however, such a discussion goes well beyond the scope of this article.

Collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter has been long understood in purely inter-state terms. However, whether the wording of the article sanctions self-defence against non-state actors is still a matter of controversy and ambiguity under contemporary international law. This was the case in Iraq, with ISIS, and this is still the case in Yemen, with the Houthis. It should be noted that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not yet ruled or opined that Article 51 can be exercised in a case of non-state armed attack. However, starting from 9/11, the legal discussion around this matter has intensified and gained further traction. As evidenced in the recent case of ISIS, state practice supports the proposition that Article 51 of the UN Charter references not only inter-state armed attacks, but also the armed attacks of non-state actors. It goes without saying that collective self-defence always preserves its inter-state dimension. Even if a military action is taken against a non-state actor, this practice can generally take place with the consent of a state, on the territory of another state in which a non-state actor holds partial control.

This requires us to define the current armed conflict in Yemen in terms of international law. Legally speaking, as determined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Dusko Tadic case, a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) exists “whenever there is […] protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State”. As in the Yemeni case, the intensity of the conflict between Yemeni forces and the Houthis seems to have reached this threshold.

In this vein, President Hadi’s invitation would mean that the current conflict in Yemen represents a “Non-International Armed Conflict”. For this, it is a certain requirement under international law that the governmental authority must be valid. Assuming that there is still a valid government in Yemen, regardless of the destructive consequences of a military intervention, Saudi-led military operations seem to occupy reasonable legal grounds. However, it should be noted that the intervening states have legal obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) in a case of use of force in a state’s territory upon its invitation.

One important legal aspect of the Yemeni crisis is the scope and form of interference of other states. It seems so normal that, depending on their interests, states may be opposing parties to the same armed conflict. However, there is a fine line between being an opposing party and being a party to an armed conflict. A state could be a party to a conflict through formal and informal processes. This includes all sorts of arming, equipping, financing and supplying rebel forces or supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities as determined by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Moreover, if a state engages in conduct of the aforementioned activities, this will make it a “co-belligerent” state under the international law of neutrality, and IHL will be applied to govern the actions.

As aptly put by the GCC, the Yemeni crisis “has become a major issue to the security and the stability of the region and a threat to world peace and security.” Aside from the fact that the “intervention by invitation” is perfectly legal under international law, one can argue that this military intervention carries potential risks of complicating the conditions in Yemen. In such a situation, it may not be possible to bring the parties around the same table for negotiations. Moreover, it is obvious that the consequences of a military operation have not been sufficiently considered. In this manner, it must be kept in mind that a military intervention is a long process, not a quick fix. As a matter of fact, this is a central problem regarding the policies of military interventions in general. Once rapid action is taken, the international community shows no interest in providing governmental or financial assistance after a military intervention. This was exemplified in the traumatic experience lived by, and indeed, still being lived by Libya after the toppling of Qaddafi. In this regard, the international community as a whole must start drafting the future of the Yemeni people. As in the process of military intervention, the GCC must perform important duties in the process of reconstruction as well. This is, indeed, the main task to preserve hopes for the future of humanity.

*Emre Turkut is a research assistant at Turgut Özal University, TR and holds an LLM from University of Kent, UK. Turkut is an active researcher in the field of public international law, international criminal law and human rights law and has published his works in national and international journals.

The post Yemen Crisis: New Test For International Community appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The EU Council adopted on Tuesday a decision providing a maximum of €1.8 billion in further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine.

The aim is to support economic stabilization of the country and a substantive reform agenda, contributing to its balance-of-payments needs as identified by the IMF.

The assistance will be available for a period of two and a half years. It will be provided in the form of loans, to be disbursed in three installments. The loans will have a maximum maturity of 15 years.

The Commission and Ukraine will also agree a loan agreement laying down the detailed terms of the macro-financial assistance.

The Commission will decide on the release of funds. The assistance will be subject to a memorandum of understanding (MOU), to be agreed between the Commission and Ukraine. The MOU will lay down clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances.

The €1.8 billion of loans will be additional to €1.61 billion of macro-financial assistance already decided in 2010 and in 2014. Ukraine has requested further assistance in view of its worsening economic situation.

The decision adopted by the Council does not change the Commission’s proposal, submitted on 8 January 2015. The European Parliament approved the Commission’s proposal without amendment on 25 March 2015.

The decision will enter into force on the third day following publication in the Official Journal.

The post EU Council Approves €1.8bn In Loans For Ukraine appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The amount of milk produced in the EU will for the first time in three decades be determined by market forces only after European milk quotas ended on 1 April.

The quotas were introduced in 1984 when production outstripped demand with the aim of putting an end to Europe’s “milk lakes and butter mountains”. It is hoped that by scrapping the quotas, Europe’s milk producers are able to supply fast-growing markets in Asia and Africa. However, some farmers worry it could lead to price volatility.

The idea behind the abolition of milk quotas is to give the EU’s milk producers more flexibility to respond to growing demand, particularly on the world market. Even with quotas, EU dairy exports have increased in value by 95% over the past five years. Exports of dairy products to Korea alone more than doubled between 2010 and 2014.

Polish EPP member Czesław Siekierski, chair of the Parliament’s agriculture committee, noted that while dairy farmers have some concerns, they have been aware of the move since 2003: “Milk quotas did not safeguard the market from significant fluctuations in prices, incomes and production.”

The quota system has often been blamed for preventing EU producers from responding to growing demand for dairy products on the world market. Siekierski said: “The Russian embargo forced a search for new export markets, which will be helpful after the abolition of milk quotas. Some opportunities to secure new markets also emerge through bilateral trade negotiations.”

Milk is produced on roughly 650,000 EU farms. The industry is worth close to €55 billion, while dairy processing companies employ 300,000 people.

UK ECR member James Nicholson sees the abolition of milk quotas as the end of an era for the dairy industry: “After 31 years it will understandably be cause for some nervousness and trepidation for dairy farmers.”

Nicholson, who is in charge of drafting a report on Europe’s dairy sector, views the abolition of quotas as “an opportunity to build a more confident and robust dairy sector for the future”. He also urged the EU to help mitigate the effects of price volatility on farmers.

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We’d like to believe that our opinions are nuanced, balanced, high-minded, wise and above all, unique, but alas they are not — or so says Twitter. Most often, those we engage with on the popular social media site are like-minded, and the ensuing electronic maelstrom of 140-character missives most often serves to reinforce, pulling us and them further along in the direction we were already trending toward — so that at the end of the day, we all tweet to the converted.

All that sound and fury can signify something, however: researchers at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid in Spain have recently developed a model to detect the extent to which a conversation on Twitter — and thus the actual offline argument and political climate — is polarized.

According to the researchers, a group is “perfectly polarized” on a given topic when it has been divided into two groups of the same size holding opposite opinions. The death in 2013 of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, known to his supporters as El Comandante, provided an ideal case study, with opponents of the deceased politician suddenly emboldened to speak out and supporters stirred to eulogize and venerate.

“A politically polarized society implies several risks, such as the appearance of radicalism or civil wars. We were interested to find out how can political polarization be detected, and therefore be fixed,” said Rosa Maria Benito, a professor at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid.

This week in the journal Chaos, from AIP Publishing, Benito and her colleagues describe the construction and implications of their model, which can now be applied to any network to detect its degree of polarization.

Benito and her colleagues first developed a computational model to estimate the effect that a minority of influential individuals, or “elite users,” had on the opinion of any given user based on the average opinion of their neighbors. Predictably, most of these elite users were politicians, journalists and mass media accounts with well-known political positions. The model yielded an opinion distribution, which gives the probability that a random individual has a given opinion. The researchers then proposed an index to quantify the extent of the polarization of the resulting distribution.

“The index is inspired by the electrical dipole moment of a molecule,” said Benito. “We quantify the distance between the two opinions by determining the gravity center of the positive and negative opinions.”

Benito and her colleagues downloaded over 16,383,490 messages written by 3,173,090 Twitter users from one month before and one month after Chavez’s death on March 5, 2013, a total of 56 days. They used these messages to create retweet networks, in which retweets could be considered a proxy for influence and adoption of ideas, and applied their model and polarization index to the networks.

Once assembled, this confluence of data gave them a day-by-day breakdown of the extent of political polarization in Venezuela over the course of 56 days. The researchers found that during the most critical days of the conversation — between Chavez’s death and state funeral — polarization dropped to its lowest levels, due to the fact that foreign users joined the conversation. This temporarily caused the polarized structure of the network to disappear until the political electoral campaign began six days later.

Benito and her colleagues then plotted the geo-located tweets on a map of Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, and compared the polarity expressed — officialism or opposition — with the voting records and political affiliations of each municipality, finding a strong correlation between the two. This same approach could be applied to make political “polarization maps” of other cities as well.

Future work for Benito and her colleagues will include the generalization of the methodology of polarization for application to situations with more than two poles, and the measurement of the emergence of polarization in a wider scope of political situations. Ultimately, Benito and her colleagues will explore strategies that could help reduce polarization in societies.

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By Cherian Samuel

The Hague Global Cyber Security Conference, the fourth in the series of the eponymously named London Process Conferences, is set to take place on the 16th and 17th of April 2015. The London Process has had a chequered history. Begun in 2011 as a mechanism to propagate the values and ideals of an open and global cyberspace, it was conceived as a state-sponsored summit that gave fair and adequate representation to all participants to discuss issues at the intersection of security, economic growth and human rights. Positioned as a forum midway between the two extremes of the multi-stakeholder centric Internet Governance Forum and state-dominated fora such as the International Telecommunications Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, it has struggled to get traction. The last iteration of the conference was held in Seoul in 2013. Since there were no takers to host a conference the next year, the Dutch took on the mantle of hosting the Conference in 2015.

In the intervening two years, the Dutch government has expended a considerable amount of energy and resources on shaping an agenda and gathering support for a successful outcome. The areas of focus have remained the same from the first London Conference; that of strengthening international peace and security, spurring socio-economic growth, reducing crime and ensuring freedom and privacy online. The Summit has also taken many cues from the report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts report published in 2013, and incorporated many of the latter’s recommendations into its agenda. The stumbling blocks of low multi-stakeholder participation and low participation from the developing world have sought to be mitigated through support for a series of regional conferences to provide inputs to the larger summit.

While Asia is home to the largest number of internet users on the planet, there is comparatively little contribution from the region to the discussions on cybersecurity. A look at the region throws up many contradictions. Although there are many cyber-conflicts taking place in Asia, there is insufficient discussion within the region on the strategic dimensions of cybersecurity. Much of the discussion takes place in silos and focuses on technical issues, or cybercrime, or protecting critical infrastructure without an overall appreciation of the impact of cyberattacks on regional peace and security. No forum exists for cross sector discussion on cyber issues. Instead, it has fora such as ASEAN and APEC where cyber security is just one of many issues discussed. In a regional environment where there is a vast gap in capacities and capabilities of states institutions, technical organisations and the private sector, such fora with their emphasis on geo-political issues do not provide an optimum environment for discussion and follow-up actions on cybersecurity. Consequently, the Asia-Pacific is present at the table but does not make any meaningful contribution. This would not be of importance were it not for the fact that the template for discussions on cybersecurity includes regional organisations, with discussion taking place among multiple stake-holders at the national and regional levels within this template. While this is a well-established process in the developed world, such a model has not found traction in the developing world for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of capacity to inadequate institutional mechanisms.

For the developed world, the Hague Summit offers the opportunity for incremental progress on issues of interest to them such as the creation of norms through discussion on adapting international laws to cyberspace and reinforcing the open and global nature of cyberspace with particular regard to e-commerce. Whilst these are to the good, there is only glacial movement on issues such as international co-operation on cybercrime, issues relating to fixing vulnerabilities in hardware and software, and supply-chain vulnerabilities. Ultimately, it is the vulnerabilities that contribute to the strategic insecurities.

The London Process does suffer from a few deficiencies; the Conferences have been seen to be too state-centric, but with varying participation at the highest levels of government from different countries. Pre-set agendas and positions by various countries have limited the room for dialogue. The huge number of participants has evoked comparisons with the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which is seen as a talk shop, albeit a much more vibrant one. Nonetheless, while the IGF presents a yearly snapshot for posterity of the major cybersecurity issues on the agenda, the previous iterations of the Global Cybersecurity Conferences have vanished without a trace at the end of the Conference, at least in cyberspace. There are no records of speeches or papers, or even of the conference websites of any of these summits, be it London, Budapest or Seoul. That is quite ironic, considering the topic of discussion is internet and cyberspace, which is the repository of a virtually unlimited amount of content. A major initiative that is expected to be announced at the Hague Summit is the establishment of a Global Forum of Cyber Expertise at Oxford, UK alongside the existing Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre announced and set up by the UK after the Budapest summit in 2012. It is as yet not clear how one will be distinct from the other.

The London Process has become an important forum to discuss cross-sector concerns. But to gain traction, it would have to progress from being a single country led initiative, which lives or dies by the resources devoted to it by the host country, to a more sustainable endeavour. Options that could be considered include global summits being sponsored by regional organisations by rotation.

Asia, too, has to improve its game if Asian voices are to be heard. An appropriate forum to discuss cyber security issues is still lacking where countries can go beyond discussing less controversial issues like cyber crime to more contentious issues that affect the stability and security of cyberspace. Further, one particular aberration is the complete exclusion of West Asia from the regional discussion in Asia, since the existing frameworks are centred on South-East Asia.

To succeed, the London Process has to continuously evolve and become more broad-based and inclusive. At the same time, regions that are currently under-represented in the global discussions on cybersecurity should not be content to sit by the sidelines, but make an active effort to contribute to the cause of an open, global, secure and safe cyberspace.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AsianParticipationintheLondonProcess%20_csamuel_310315.html

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By S. K. Bhutani*

One day in December 2010, twenty-six year old Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi, a jobless youth, succumbed to despair and immolated himself. Fortuitously, the event was captured on Facebook, discovered by al-Jazeera’s Mubasahr television and aired on the network. The consequences were incendiary: fuelled by the electronic media, massive protests broke out. In response, the authorities blocked websites and arrested online activists. Other activists took over and ensured that the tweets, videos and photographs reached the social media through proxy sites. A new method of mass political protest came into vogue.

As protest spread, the initial grievance against unemployment and corruption was transformed into a demand for political change – the removal of President Zainul Abedin Ben Ali and the system he presided over. He had been in power for 23 years, and the entire economic elite of the country, it was claimed, was related to him by blood or marriage! The scale of civil unrest persuaded the Tunisian Army to advise the President to go into exile. Had the mould of ‘military intervention in support of authoritarian elite’ cracked? The Tunisian example became contagious – people in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere in the Arab world took ‘to the street’ to seek political change. This was the birth of the Arab Spring. But it turned out to be short-lived and was replaced by ‘Islamic resurgence’ – a divisive development whose lethal consequences have come to the fore.

Ben Ali’s departure on 26 January 2011 did not end the protest; demonstrators wanted the whole system to change. Prime Minister Mohammad Ghannouchi was made to resign and replaced by Beiji Caid el Sebsi, with the mandate to hold elections to a constituent assembly, which would revise the constitution and supervise the executive (an innovation in political life in the Arab world).

Elections & New Constitution

The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in October 2011. It became a contest between the ruling party and Ennahda, which had been banned for its Islamic links by the Ben Ali government. With the change in regime, it was legalized and its leader, Rachid Ghanouchi, returned from a 20-year exile. As expected, Ennahda emerged as the strongest party with 37 per cent of the vote. The Assembly elected Moncef Marzouki of the then ruling party as President and Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda as Prime Minister.

Rachid Ghanouchi advocated moderate Islamism, along the same lines as the ruling Freedom & Justice Party in Turkey. But the secular and leftist elements were not convinced: the gulf between the urban Francophile elite and the majority Arabic speaking populace made Ennahda’s task more difficult. It needed to compromise. Freedom enjoyed by women in Tunisia became the test case.

Women’s Rights

Under the previous regime, women enjoyed more freedom than anywhere else in the Arab world – polygamy was banned and women could seek divorce on equal terms with men. The draft constitution mentioned “complementarity” between men and women in the family. When this was vigorously contested by women’s groups, Ennahda agreed to replace the word with “equality”. Said Ferjani, a politbureau member of Ennahda, asserted: “the party is “not looking to impose a lifestyle on anyone, we are here to defend freedom.”

Islamists

Simultaneously, the hard-line Islamists demanded the introduction of Sharia and clashed with the security forces on several occasions in 2012. In 2013, at least one person was killed in clashes between police and Salafi Islamists of the Ansar al-Sharia group in Tunis where it was holding a meeting. Police also clashed with protesters in Kairouan, a historic city near Tunis. Assassination of opposition politicians – Chokri Belaid, an anti-Islamist in February 2013 and opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi in July the same year, prompted demonstrations and a general strike, and calls for the government to resign.

Constitution and new government

The adoption of the new constitution was followed by the resignation of the Ennahda-led government. A caretaker government of independent figures was formed with the mandate to organise fresh elections under the new constitution. Nidaa Tounes, a newly organized party that included secularists, trade unionists and liberals, emerged as the largest party in the parliamentary elections held in October 2014. In December 2014, Nidaa Tounes candidate Beji Caid Essebsi was elected as president defeating the incumbent Moncef Marzouki.

President Essebsi and his party mark less of a break with the old system. He has been prominent in politics for more than half a century, and has served two autocratic rulers – Habib Bourguiba, leader of the freedom struggle against French colonial rule, and Zainul Abedin Ben Ali, the recently deposed president. Despite that, he won support from a cross-section of voters.

“Mr Essebsi and his party have demonstrated that a political party can change its opinion and attitudes,” commented Meherzia Labidi, one of Ennahda’s most senior members of parliament. “I hope that both he and his party understand that whoever is governing Tunisia shall respect the constitution. It’s the achievement of all Tunisian people,” she added. But there are powerful dissenters.

Extremists

The representative character of the new government has not deterred the extremists from challenging the authority of the government. The recent attack on the Bardo museum (housed in a 15th century palace) and killing of foreign tourists has demonstrated that the challenge from the hardline Islamists remains. The choice of this target is similar to the destruction of ancient sites and artefacts in Iraq by the Islamic State extremists.

Tunisians form the largest national group among Islamic State volunteers operating in Syria and Iraq. Many young recruits receive training in neighbouring Libya, where no one is in total control. In January 2015, Tunisian Minister of Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou admitted that 9,000 Tunisians, banned from travelling to Syria, were inadequately monitored. “Counter terrorism efforts remain insufficient within both the society and the cyberspace,” he indicated. Slaheddine Ben Frai, a sociologist, referred to the recruitment of youth especially in the age group of 13 to 17: “Takfiri” groups made use of preaching tents and mosques to attract youths, enclosed areas such as prisons were also favourable spaces for recruitment.

Economy

In its region, Tunisia is relatively well-developed economically and has benefitted from links to the European Union (EU). But the prolonged recession in the global and EU markets impacted the Tunisian economy adversely: one consequence was high unemployment, which was what had triggered the protest leading to the change of regime. The improving international economic outlook should have beneficial effect. For social peace and, specifically, the campaign against the extremists, it is imperative to bridge the economic gulf between the “urban Francophile elite and majority Arabic speaking populace.”

*Ambassador S.K. Bhutani is a retired diplomat with a wide-ranging expertise on the Middle East. He had served as Ambassador to Egypt in the late 1980s.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ArabSpringorIslamicState_skbhutani_310315.html

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