Smokers who are able to quit might actually be hard-wired for success, according to a study from Duke Medicine.

The study, published in Neuropsychopharmacology, showed greater connectivity among certain brain regions in people who successfully quit smoking compared to those who tried and failed.

The researchers analyzed MRI scans of 85 people taken one month before they attempted to quit. All participants stopped smoking and the researchers tracked their progress for 10 weeks. Forty-one participants relapsed. Looking back at the brain scans of the 44 smokers who quit successfully, the researchers found they had something in common before they stopped smoking — better synchrony (coordinated activity) between the insula, home to urges and cravings, and the somatosensory cortex, a part of the brain that is central to our sense of touch and motor control.

“Simply put, the insula is sending messages to other parts of the brain that then make the decision to pick up a cigarette or not,” said Merideth Addicott, Ph.D., assistant professor at Duke and lead author of the study.

The insula, a large region in the cerebral cortex, has been the subject of many smoking cessation studies that show this area of the brain is active when smokers are craving cigarettes, said Joseph McClernon, Ph.D., associate professor at Duke and the study’s senior author. Other studies have found that smokers who suffer damage to the insula appear to spontaneously lose interest in smoking.

“There’s a general agreement in the field that the insula is a key structure with respect to smoking and that we need to develop cessation interventions that specifically modulate insula function,” McClernon said. “But in what ways do we modulate it, and in whom? Our data provides some evidence on both of those fronts, and suggests that targeting connectivity between insula and somatosensory cortex could be a good strategy.”

Neurofeedback and transcranial magnetic stimulation, used to improve depression, are two treatments that modulate brain activity. With the findings in this study, researchers now have more information on where to further investigate, McClernon said.

“We have provided a blueprint,” McClernon said. “If we can increase connectivity in smokers to look more like those who quit successfully, that would be a place to start. We also need more research to understand what it is exactly about greater connectivity between these regions that increases the odds of success.”

The post Brains Of Smokers Who Quit Successfully May Be Wired For Success appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It is six times more expensive for society – and for you individually – if you travel by car instead of cycling. This has been shown in a Lund University study of Copenhagen, a city of cyclists. It is the first time a price has been put on car use as compared to cycling.

In the comparative study, Stefan Gössling from Lund University and Andy S. Choi from the University of Queensland have investigated a cost-benefit analysis that the Copenhagen Municipality uses to determine whether new cycling infrastructure should be built.

It considers how much cars cost society and how they compare to bicycles in terms of air pollution, climate change, travel route, noise, road wear, health and congestion in Copenhagen.

The study concluded that cars have a greater negative impact on the economy than bicycles:

If the costs to society and the costs to private individuals are added together, the impact of the car is EUR 0.50 per kilometre and the impact of the bicycle is EUR 0.08 per kilometre.

The study by Stefan Gössling and his colleague also shows that if we only look at costs/benefits for society, one kilometre by car costs EUR 0.15, whereas society earns EUR 0.16 on every kilometre cycled.

“The cost-benefit analysis in Copenhagen shows that investments in cycling infrastructure and bike-friendly policies are economically sustainable and give high returns”, says Stefan Gössling.

Cost-benefit analysis is a method used to calculate the benefits to society of infrastructure investments.

The post Six Times More Expensive To Travel By Car Than By Bicycle appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Emily B. Landau

Probably the most common response to the criticism that has been leveled at the P5+1-Iran negotiations over the past year is: “but what’s the alternative?” For the Obama administration, this of course is a rhetorical question. The administration believes that the critics have no real alternative, which leads them to the inevitable conclusion that these critics are opposed to any kind of negotiation, and what they really want is war. Indeed, over the past year critics of the negotiations have been marginalized as ’hawks’ and ’warmongers’, and sometimes brushed aside as incompetents, lacking knowledge and analytic skills to properly assess what is going on. But surely this is not a serious response to the very serious criticism that has been voiced from many quarters, and continues to be voiced following the April 2nd development in Lausanne. In fact, this response is looking more and more like a very lame excuse for a poorly handled negotiation.

There is an alternative to the current negotiation that is neither war nor Iran racing to the bomb: doing a better job at the bargaining table. Indeed, the true answer to the question of what could be done differently goes to strategies of bargaining with a difficult and intransigent partner. Basic bargaining skills could have engendered a more effective negotiation with Iran, not only over the past year, but since negotiations were first embraced as a strategy for dealing with Iran’s violations of its safeguard agreements back in 2003.

The key factor in this particular negotiation – which is a game of compellence for the P5+1, because the goals of the two sides are incompatible – is pressure on Iran, in order to buy leverage at the negotiating table. Until 2012, leverage was in very short supply for the P5+1; only then were good and biting sanctions finally imposed on Iran, and with them the chance to gain some benefits at the negotiating table. But to have the desired effect on Iran’s policy, imposing sanctions (as difficult as that has proven to be) is only the first of two essential steps. Once in place, the negotiators have to use the leverage gained thereby with acumen at the bargaining table. To bargain effectively means to communicate your resolve to the other party, while secure in the knowledge that you have something that the other party wants very much (in this case that would be sanctions relief), and that you won’t give it up unless you get what you want. It requires getting the message across to the other side that even if they leave the table, you know they will come back because they cannot get sanctions relief without cooperating on a deal.

But if you are afraid to use your leverage because the other side might balk, leave the table or otherwise lash out, then you are basically squandering the effect of sanctions, and they won’t help you to get what you want in the bargaining process. Using leverage effectively means dictating the terms of the negotiation to the other party – what topics will be on the table, what will under no circumstances be compromised, and where there is some room for flexibility. But if the other side says they refuse to discuss an issue that you think should be on the table, and you agree not to discuss it because “the other side won’t agree to negotiate if it’s there”, obviously you are thereby strengthening the leverage of the other party, not your own. Overall, communicating to the other side that you are eager for a deal, and therefore willing to make concessions even if the other side remains intransigent, has the effect of emptying your leverage of any meaning or ability to impact the other side. By doing so you teach the other side that if they hold fast for long enough, you will lower your demands even further, because you will not give up on the negotiation.

These are the kind of mistakes that the P5+1 negotiators have been making over and over again, especially since negotiations began in earnest in late 2013. The US in particular has been communicating an eagerness for a deal, and has been making more and more concessions to Iran, rather than Iran – the NPT violator – making concessions to the P5+1. When Iranian leaders have lashed out at the US and Israel, the Americans kept silent, never pushing back for fear of upsetting the delicate diplomatic initiative. When Iran’s president and supreme leader have proclaimed all that Iran will not compromise on, it is not taken seriously by the US, but rather chalked up to “internal politics”. Every indication of (partial) progress that is loudly celebrated by the Obama administration and proclaimed an “historic” achievement, later becomes a liability at the bargaining table because it ties the US even tighter to the diplomatic process, making it less and less likely that it will ever back down. When the US projects the sense that it will never risk losing the precious gains it made, this also empties of meaning any threat of military consequences for lack of seriousness on Iran’s part, which could have been an additional effective lever of pressure on Iran in the negotiations.

Negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue are too important to fail because of the mistakes that are being made at the bargaining table. The arrogance of those that would advocate that every step they have taken in this negotiation is the best step that could have been taken is unwarranted. Negotiators should be cognizant enough of the gravity of the situation to take their critics with utmost seriousness and try to incorporate as many insights as possible in order to improve the results of their negotiations. A failed negotiation is in some cases reversible; nuclear capabilities are not. If Iran becomes a nuclear state down the road it will be in the first place due to Iran’s intransigence; but it will also be the result of over a decade of poor negotiating by the international community. With so many experts pointing out the problems and pitfalls along the way, no one will be able to make a convincing case that “there was no alternative.” There was, and there still is.

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(Emily Landau is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute of National Security Studies, Tel Aviv)

The post Bargaining With Iran Should Have Been Much Better – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Melanie Diaz and Timothy Keen*

In February 2015, a large-scale prison uprising broke out at the Willacy County Correctional Center in Raymondville, Texas. The detention center has experienced riots like this in the past over several other issues, such as inadequate health services, inhumane conditions, and sexual abuse.[i] However, the grievances that sparked this most recent uprising are representative of a larger and more elusive epidemic. The covert and insidious world of the prison industrial complex (PIC)[1] is witnessing the rise of for-profit prisons largely devoid of oversight and regulatory measures, allowing rampant human rights abuses to persist.[ii] Unfortunately, events that took place in Raymondville are far from isolated incidents under this new paradigm.[iii] Operating in the shadows of U.S. bureaucracy, private prison corporations (PPCs) have garnered an infamous reputation for profiting from the government-subsidized business of immigrant detention. Due to this, for-profit prison corporations lobby extensively and provide exorbitant political contributions so that Congress will appropriate more money into immigration enforcement, fueling the revenue of the PIC.

How It Works

Figure 1: Infographic by Timothy Keen, Research Associate at COHA

The increased detention rate of undocumented immigrants in the United States is primarily caused by a cyclical process occurring between three main actors: government agencies, private prison corporations (PPCs), and Congress. Each of these entities play their own role in adding to the existing problem, but together they create a cycle that is difficult to break. While Congress passes anti-immigration legislations, government agencies enforce these laws and contract with PPCs to facilitate an increasing number of federally convicted detainees. In return, PPCs, whose profits are dependent on the number of incarcerated individuals, rely on lobbying efforts to influence Congress into passing laws and appropriating spending to increase strict immigration policies.[iv] These efforts allow PPCs to reap better financial deals from contracts with government agencies, like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which enforce the anti-immigration laws passed by Congress.[v] These combined factors cause incarceration rates to skyrocket, thus making PPCs the ultimate winner in this deceptive cycle that hinders progressive immigration reforms and the promotion of immigrant rights.

The Role of ICE

The government agency responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws is the Bureau of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), organized under the DHS. According to ICE’s website, the agency’s mission is to identify, apprehend, detain, and remove “criminal aliens and other removable individuals located in the United States.”[vi] In 2005, however, the DHS launched its zero-tolerance Operation Streamline policy, making it a federal crime for undocumented immigrants to enter and re-enter the United States. This immigration policy, which criminalizes more immigrants than before, is one of the primary reasons for the rise in detention rates. Wayne Cornelius, Director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) and former President of the Latin American Studies Association, describes the anti-immigration laws throughout the early 1990s as “prevention through deterrence,” and Operation Streamline is just a later policy of this same tactic.[vii]

ICE is attempting to deter immigrants from coming to the United States by criminalizing undocumented entry, and housing migrants in detention centers. The United States has even detained immigrants seeking refugee status, which is an act that is highly controversial in the public arena. The Artesia Detention Center, for example, housed 287 families from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador in 2014.[viii] These families were completely made up of mothers and children (no men at all), totaling to 603 people.[ix] Not only is it an international abnormality for children immigrants to face detention, but it is also extremely difficult for these women and children to receive separate hearings to determine their refugee status. Finally, the result of ICE’s attempts to increase the number of detained people is the predictable over-crowding of its own facilities. Therefore, ICE has begun to reach out to PPCs in search of a solution.

How PPCs Benefit

PPCs are a growing industry that recognizes increasing border patrol as a method to secure immigrant detention rates and thus increase their profits. Between 1990 and 2010, the private prison industry in the United States increased by 1600 percent. Annually, PPCs earn about $3 billion USD, with over half of the profit coming from facilities holding undocumented immigrants.[x] In the United States, there are currently 13 privately-operated “Criminal Alien Requirement” (CAR) prisons, with the five in Texas housing almost 14,000 immigrant prisoners altogether in July 2014.[xi] The two biggest corporations running these private prisons are the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates 67 prisons in the United States, and the GEO Group, which operates 95 in the United States and abroad in countries such as the United Kingdom.[xii] These PPCs do not work alone, though. Government agencies often provide the companies with contracts in order to reduce their costs, and over the years, the amount of the public-private contracts have only increased. For example, in 2005, the GEO Group received $33.6 million USD from ICE contracts and CCA received $95 million USD.[xiii] However, by 2012, these ICE contracts had risen to $216 million USD and $208 million USD, respectively.[xiv]

While these contracts allow PPCs a great deal of financial advantage to run their facilities, cost cutting is a common profit-saving tactic, which oftentimes results in inadequate inmate living conditions. For example, despite annual revenues of $1.4 billion USD in 2012, the GEO Group has been criticized for its cost-cutting practices that have created issues, such as insufficient wages and benefits for workers, poor oversight of prisoner maltreatment, and prisoner riots.[xv]

Less Accountability with PPCs

Contracting with PPCs for detention facilities, however, is an issue because they are not held accountable to the same regulations that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a government agency that manages federally-operated prisons, sets for public prison facilities[xvi] It has been reported that some PPCs hide behind “trade secrets” and their private status in order to avoid publicizing documents.[xvii] This loophole in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967, a federal law allowing for disclosure of governmental documents, allows PPCs to run regardless of human rights abuses that they fail to report to the public due to their fear of budget cuts. For instance, an Amnesty International (AI) report sheds light on the human suffering that is oftentimes found in PPCs, with abuses ranging from malnourishment to a lack of medical assistance for inmates.[xviii] AI also reports high levels of sexual harassment of transgender people who are oftentimes sentenced to long-term solitary confinement due to the lack of better safety precautions.[xix] Yet, despite these human rights violations, the private prison industry continues to operate largely unrestrained as a result of a lacking transparency and ability to circumvent regulatory measures.

However, there have been numerous attempts by Congress to introduce legislation that adds more transparency and accountability to the activities of PPCs. Yet despite the fact that a public-private partnership is still subject to the disclosure laws within FOIA, PPCs have suspiciously lacked in transparency. Legislation changes have repeatedly been put forth to Congress, without success, to cancel PPCs’ usage of FOIA’s loopholes.[xx] This consistent failure is possibly due to PPCs’ lobbying efforts, with CCA spending over $7 million USD on transparency legislation prevention maneuvers since 2005.[xxi]

Another issue with private prisons is that, oftentimes, these prisons are strategically located in rural and isolated areas in an effort to restrict detainees from proper access to due process. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reports that immigrant detainees often suffer from a lack of headway on their immigration cases due to the prisons’ geographical isolation in towns that are too small and underdeveloped to have sufficient lawyers present.[xxii] In addition to this, two recent Supreme Court rulings further restrict access to proper litigation in cases of prisoner maltreatment and abuse. The Correctional Services Corp. vs. Malesko (2001) ruled that private prison companies cannot be subject to and are not liable to violations of constitutional rights.[xxiii] More recently, Minecci vs. Polard (2012) ruled that individual private prison guards could no longer be held accountable for violating prisoners’ constitutional rights so long as the guards are following state laws.[xxiv] These Supreme Court rulings therefore justify and allow private corporations to act more autonomously, with less judicial oversight or accountability.

Money Talks

Proponents of PPCs contracting with the U.S. Government could certainly make the argument that they act within the contours of any typical business. That is, responding to external demand for a particular service; in this case, immigrant detention centers. This argument, however, is only legitimate when the PPCs are not actively involved in altering market demand to suit their monetary interests. Extensive revelations on the lucrative cycle of lobbying and campaign contributions suggest otherwise that private prison corporations, such as CCA, have dubious records of influencing immigration enforcement policy. [xxv]

While PPCs deny allegations of influencing policy through lobbying and campaign contributions, their own statements contradict this. For example, the industry has widely exploited the United States’ post 9-11 paranoia towards immigrants. James E. Hyman, Chairman of the large private prison corporation Cornell Companies, stated: “It is clear that since September 11 there’s a heightened focus on detention…The federal business is the best business for us, and September 11 is increasing that business.”[xxvi]

Infographic by Timothy Keen, Research Associate at COHA

Exploitation of tragedy and social issues, however, is a norm in the PIC. In reference to their 2010 annual report, CCA stated that policy reform regarding immigration could affect the number of people arrested and detained, resulting in decreased demand for its detention facilities.[xxvii] In fact, CCA believes that progressive immigration reform would greatly limit their main source of profit: immigrant detainees. Thus, the industry has developed a strategy to maintain their lucrative business model through political channels.

According to the Justice Policy report titled “Gaming the System”, the strategy of these for-profit prison corporations to influence policy is based on three primary factors: lobbying, campaign contributions, and associations.[xxviii] This tactical trifecta has allowed PPCs to heavily influence U.S. policymaking in order to maintain a status quo, restrict regulatory measures, and enact tougher enforcement laws.

CCA as an Example

CCA representative, Steven Owen, has explicitly remarked that CCA does not lobby to influence immigration enforcement legislation.[xxix] Digging a little deeper into such statements, however, reflects an entirely different reality. According to CCA’s 2013 Annual Report on Political Activity and Lobbying, the for-profit prison corporation openly admits to appropriating funds for lobbying and political contributions to federal and state candidates even in states where inflated corporate contributions are not allowed. In addition, given the recent Supreme Court decision on Citizens United Vs. The Federal Election Commission, which eliminates caps on campaign contributions, CCA’s contributions to political campaigns are made easier by the Supreme Court ruling. In fact, CCA spent a grand total of $769,000 USD on political contributions according to their 2013 Annual Report on political expenditure.[xxx] Their lobbying expenditures in the report, on the other hand, were exponentially higher, with costs on direct and indirect lobbying reaching a whopping $4.4 million USD.[xxxi]

In its 2013 Annual Report, CCA explicitly stated that it focuses on government activities that primarily affect their private detention facilities. CCA also made the assumption that policies regarding the construction and operation of detention facilities are completely separate from immigration enforcement policies. Considering the fact that CCA contracts with ICE, whose chief goal is to enforce legislative measures regarding immigration, CCA’s argument that they do not actively lobby to influence immigration policy is proven fallacious.

In fact, CCA and other similar private prison corporations certainly have a cash incentive to lobby against easing immigration policy. In 2011, CCA received $208 million USD in revenues from ICE contracts, compared to $95 million USD in 2005, according to company filings with the Security and Exchange Commission.[xxxii] Furthermore, in 2011, the Justice Policy Institute found that 50 percent of CCA’s revenues derived from its state contracts.[xxxiii] So without government contracts, CCA would essentially have its profits cut in half. This means that the industry is incentivized to lobby for secured and increased contracts from the government.

Immigration Enforcement Legislation

In 2010, National Public Radio (NPR) undertook an in-depth investigation into the drafting of one of the most controversial immigrant enforcement laws in recent history: Arizona SP1070. Ratified by then Arizona Governor Jan Brewer in 2010, the law entitles law enforcement authorities to arbitrarily arrest people whom are suspected of being in the country illegally.[xxxiv] Critics of the bill believe that it has provoked pervasive racial profiling of Latin American communities based on the law’s provisions to suspect people based solely on how they look or sound. The ACLU reports that the legislation inspired other states to make copycat laws in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah.[xxxv] The ACLU indicates that Arizona’s state legislators were not the only ones involved with drafting the bill. In fact, it was heavily influenced by external stakeholders, such as PPCs, who would profit from its passing since it would ramp up immigrant incarceration rates.[xxxvi] According to the NPR, several PPC representatives were directly involved with drafting the highly controversial bill.[xxxvii] To make the connection between prison corporations and state legislators elusive to the public, PPCs operated through one of the most conservative and powerful lobbying organizations: The American Legislative Executive Council, otherwise known as ALEC. A conglomeration of powerful corporate industries, ALEC has an infamous track-record for engaging in secretive dialogue between state legislators and corporate representatives to draft model legislation, and CCA is an active member of the organization.[xxxviii]

NPR’s report also revealed that Arizona’s state legislators secretly met with CCA representatives operating through ALEC at the Grant Hyatt Hotel in Washington, D.C.[xxxix] In the meeting, the group of stakeholders discussed, debated and voted on what would become a draft for Arizona’s SB1070, and four months later, the content of the law was almost verbatim.[xl] Coincidentally, 30 of the 36 co-sponsors of the bill received donations over the next six months, from both prison lobbyists and prison companies.[xli] Even more illuminating, Governor of Arizona, Jan Brewer’s top two advisers were former private prison lobbyists. With these revelations in mind, it is clear that PPCs are not only spending vast amounts of money on lobbying and campaign contributions, but are also highly associated and connected to state legislators who are drafting draconian immigration enforcement bills to further their corporate interests.

The private prison industry has not only been involved with writing legislation for Arizona SB1070. Other reports have shed light on its long history with ALEC consisting of a task force that established model legislation including mandatory minimum sentencing, three strikes laws that give repeat offenders 25 years to life, and “truth-in-sentencing” laws that require that prisoners serve most or all of their time without a chance for parole.[xlii]

Quotas & Congressional Appropriations

While PPCs do influence legislation directly, their efforts are also indirect as they concentrate on influencing congressional appropriations. The more appropriations that they can persuade congress to funnel into the DHS, the more money becomes available to them in federal contracts. A prime example of this is the bed quota or occupancy quota.

The bed quota, which mandates that ICE must hold at least 34,000 individuals on a daily basis, is a contractual agreement between ICE and PPCs.[xliii] The quota secures and maintains revenue streams for PPCs by forcing ICE to meet a minimum standard based on an arbitrary quota, which has increased from 10,000 beds to 34,000 over the last 15 years.[xliv] It is particularly unprecedented in that no other law enforcement agencies have occupancy quotas.[xlv] A 2013 report by In the Public Interest, a resource center on privatization and responsible contracting, found that 65 percent of all private prison contracts with the Government include clauses on occupancy quotas.[xlvi] These clauses generally contain a rigid minimum 90 percent occupancy guarantee, with some prisons requiring as much as 100 percent.[xlvii] It is no surprise that PPCs profit from the bed quota and actively lobby for increased appropriations to fuel their lucrative industry. In their 2010 annual report, CCA stated that “filling these available beds would provide substantial growth in revenues, cash flow, and earnings per share.”[xlviii] Since the bed quota officially went into effect after 2010, the share of detention beds operated by PPCs expanded from 49 percent to 59 percent, while 69 percent of all lobbying expenditures by private prison companies have included direct lobbying of DHS appropriations and immigrant detention issues.[xlix] There have been attempts in Congress to eliminate the bed quota from federal contracts with prisons, but all have been shot down due to the immense political leverage of PPCs.

In an effort to ensure that profits from contract conditions are maintained or increased, PPCs have been strategically targeting members of Congress who are in committees that deal with immigration reform. For example, Florida Senator Marco Rubio is a member of the Senate Sub-Committee on Homeland Security and has received $27,300 USD in contributions from the second largest prison corporation, the GEO Group.[l] Another example is Arizona Senator John McCain who received $32,146 USD from CCA, and has since introduced legislation appropriating greater funds for immigration detentions through Operation Streamline (2005).[li] Both McCain and Rubio are also members of the “Gang of Eight,” a bi-partisan group of eight senators who spearheaded the Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) in 2013. PPCs have spent more than $200,000 USD on political contributions and lobbying to “gang-of-eight” members.[lii] Consequently, greater appropriations to the DHS will result in the agency having to find a way to spend that money for that particular year. Increased congressional appropriations to ICE increase the potential for ICE to contract with private prisons. In effect, this pattern can cause greater detainment of undocumented immigrants. In fact, this year’s DHS appropriations act saw an increase of $400 million USD compared to the fiscal year of 2014, and includes amendments that limit President Obama’s recent executive actions on immigration and requires the DHS to enforce current immigration laws.[liii] In 2014, lobbyists from CCA issued six reports lobbying for the passing of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2015, specifically in regards to funding for the Bureau of Prisons, the Immigration and Enforcement Agency, and the U.S. Marshalls.[liv] In addition, 2014 saw the GEO Group’s 28 reports of lobbying in the following sectors: homeland security and the Immigration and Law Enforcement.[lv] Despite this evidence, however, GEO Group Vice President of Corporate Relations, Pablo Paez, states that the “GEO Group has never directly or indirectly lobbied to influence immigration policy.”[lvi][lvii]

Costs to the American Taxpayer

By far, the most dominant justification for pursuing public-private partnerships with prison corporations is that it saves the state taxpayers’ money, and at face-value it may seem to be true.[lviii] ICE, which is funded by government taxes, outsources management of prison facilities to the private industry thus transferring costs over to private corporations and not the taxpayers. If only this was the true reality. Put simply, the more Congress succumbs to the private prison industry’s lobbying efforts to funnel more money into the DHS, the more prison populations have increased. And, alas, the taxpayer pays the ultimate costs as increased numbers of detainees eventually drive up taxpayer expenditures.

Today, reports indicate that the United States incarcerates up to 34,000 immigrants per day, costing taxpayers $2 million USD annually.[lix] Every individual detainee costs around $159 taxpayer dollars per day, according to a report by the National Immigration Forum, an immigrant advocacy organization.[lx] Furthermore, the aforementioned bed quota has additionally attributed to hikes in costs to the taxpayer in recent times.[lxi] For example, the third largest for-profit prison corporation, Management and Corp., threatened to sue the State because the contractual condition for the occupancy quota was not fulfilled, claiming the depreciation of inmates resulted in a $10 million USD loss in profits.[lxii] After a series of negotiations, state officials and prison corporate representatives agreed that the State would pay a total of $3 million USD in fines for empty bed fees.[lxiii] This is but one example of how governmental institutions submit to the interests of the powerful for-profit prison industry, costing Congress its legitimacy and taxpayers their hard-earned money.

Failing Policies and Alternatives

With harsher immigration policies and higher rates of immigrant detention, Washington has hoped to deter migrants from coming to the United States. According to the International Detention Coalition, “detention does not deter irregular migrants,” which explains the surge of 51,000 unaccompanied child migrants from Mexico and Central America that arrived to the United States between October 2013 and June 2014.[lxiv] In essence, “prevention through deterrence” has been proven not to work and instead has created other issues, such as unreported human rights abuses in PPCs, more deaths due to new and more dangerous routes into the United States, and increased likelihood of permanent residency for undocumented people. According to a 2014 ACLU report, BOP still had not responded to FOIA requests about oversight within PPCs, causing alarm at the number of human abuse cases that may go unrecorded in these facilities.[lxv] In relation to the increased number of immigrant deaths, Wayne Cornelius, Director of CCIS, has reported that between 1995 and 2004, over 2,460 migrants died on their way to the United States as “the probability of dying versus being apprehended by the Border Patrol has doubled since 1998.”[lxvi] Lastly, in light of stricter anti-immigration policies, undocumented people are now more likely to permanently reside in the United States, since the increasing cost of crossing the border has made cyclical immigration patterns less likely due to immigrants’ fears of being unable to return to the United States after their first arrival. [lxvii]Obviously, current U.S. border policies have a negative impact on migration issues, and given this, Congress has a responsibility to start fixing the failing U.S. immigration policies.

To combat the uncontrolled power of PPCs, the Government must begin increasing means for PPCs’ transparency. The Puente Human Rights Movement also recommends that the Government open an independent office dedicated to monitoring the actions of PPCs and ensuring that they are held accountable for any human rights violations.[lxviii] Furthermore, since taxpayer dollars go into the government agency contracts given to PPCs, the ACLU advocates for Congress to amend the FOIA legislation to apply to PPCs so that the public will have access to the information on what they are funding and that transparency within this industry is heightened.

On a brighter note, alternatives to detention do exist. In a House Report by the 112th Congress, it was stated that enrollments in alternatives to detention (ATDs), such as parole or monitoring programs, are as low as $7 USD a day, which is a great financial bargain when compared to the detention costs averaging $159 USD per day.[lxix] It is obvious that costly endeavors to pass anti-immigration policies and deter immigrants with the horror of detention centers are not having the intended effect of limiting immigration. Instead, these tactics are creating more immigrant residency, more immigrant deaths, and more human rights abuses in PPCs, which are gaining enormous annual profits. As another and more progressive alternative to detention, Congress could also consider expanding on development programs in Latin America in order to provide people, including refugees, with alternatives to emigration. Although this will take a longer time to prove successful, it could have the long-lasting impact that Washington is currently aiming for, but without the cost of more immigrant lives.

*Melanie Diaz and Timothy Keen, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] The Prison Industrial Complex refers to the overlapping of for-profit business and government to achieve a particular interest.

[i] Spencer Hsu and Slyvia Moreno, “Border Policy’s Success Strains Resources”, The Washington Post, 2 February 2007, Accessed 30 March 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/01/AR2007020102238.html.

[ii] “Revolt at Ritmo…”, DemocracyNow!.

[iii] “Private Prisons”, American Civil Liberties Union, Accessed 30 March 2015, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/privatization-criminal-justice/private-prisons?redirect=prisoners-rights/private-prisons.

[iv] “Warehoused and Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow Private Prison System,” American Civil Liberties Union, June 2014, Accessed 18 March 2015, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] “Enforcement and Removal Operations”, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Accessed 18 March 2015, http://www.ice.gov/ero.

[vii] Wayne Cornelius, “Reforming the Management of Migration Flows from Latin America to the United States”, Brookings: Partnership for the Americas Commission, June 2008, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/latin-america/~/media/projects/latin%20america/migration_flows_cornelius.pdf.

[viii] “US: Halt Expansion of Immigrant Family Detention”, Human Rights Watch, 29 July 2014, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/29/us-halt-expansion-immigrant-family-detention.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] “Prison Inc: The Secret Industry,” Online Paralegal Degree Center, 2015, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://www.online-paralegal-degree.org/prison-industry/.

[xi] “Warehoused and Forgotten…”, American Civil Liberties Union.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] “Prison Inc….”, Online Paralegal Degree.

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] The PRW Staff, “Meet George Zoley, America’s Highest Paid “Corrections Officer”, The Center for Media and Democracy’s PR Watch, 26 November 2013, Accessed 20 March 2015, http://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/11/12320/meet-george-zoley-america%E2%80%99s-highest-paid-%E2%80%9Ccorrections-officer%E2%80%9D.

[xvi] “About Us”, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Accessed 2 April, 2015, http://www.bop.gov/about/.

[xvii] “Warehoused and Forgotten…”, American Civil Liberties Union.

[xviii] “Jailed Without Justice: Immigration Detention in the USA”, Amnesty International, June 2008, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] “Who is CCA”, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Accessed 27 March 2015, http://www.aclu-tn.org/whoiscca.html.

[xxi] Ibid

[xxii] “Warehoused and Forgotten…”, American Civil Liberties Union.

[xxiii] Ibid

[xxiv] Ibid

[xxv] Avivia, Shen, “Private Prison Spend $45 Million On Lobbying, Rake in $5.1 billion for Immigration Detention Alone”, ThinkProgress,, August 3, 2012, Accessed 1 April 2015, http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/08/03/627471/private-prisons-spend-45-million-on-lobbying-rake-in-51-billion-for-immigrant-detention-alone/

[xxvi] “Detention and Deportation Consequences of Arizona Immigration Law (SB1070)”, Detention Watch Network, Accessed 1 April, 2015, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/SB1070_Talking_Points.

[xxvii] “2010 Annual Report on Form 10-K”, Corrections Corporation of America, 2010, Accessed 25 March 2015, http://www.cca.com/investors/financial-information/annual-reports.

[xxviii] “Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies”, Justice Policy Institute, June 2011, Accessed 30 March 2015, http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf.

[xxix] “Steven Hale, “CCA has eight lobbyists on Capitol Hill—and yet it says it doesn’t lobby on incarceration issues. Maybe it doesn’t have to”, Nashville Scene, 22 May 2014, Accessed 30 March 2015, http://www.nashvillescene.com/nashville/cca-has-eight-lobbyists-on-capitol-hill-andmdash-and-yet-it-says-it-doesnt-lobby-on-incarceration-issues-maybe-it-doesnt-have-to/Content?oid=4171659.

[xxx] “2010 Annual Report on From 10-K”, Corrections Corporation of America.

[xxxi] Catalina Nieto, “The Human Face: The Con to Criminalize Immigrants”, WitnessForPeace, 2 February 2011, Accessed 25 March 2015, http://www.witnessforpeace.org/article.php?id=1064.

[xxxii] Chris Kirkham, “Private Prisons Profit From Immigration Crackdown, Federal and Local Law Enforcement Partnership,” The Huffington Post, 26 November 2013, Accessed 30 March 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-federal-law-enforcement_n_1569219.html.

[xxxiii] “Gaming the System…”, Justice Policy Institute.

[xxxiv] Randal Archibold, “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration”, The New York Times, 23 April 2010, Accessed 1 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?ref=us&_r=0

[xxxv] “Arizonas SB 1070”, American Civil Liberties Union, Accessed April 2015, https://www.aclu.org/feature/arizonas-sb-1070?redirect=arizonas-sb-1070.

[xxxvi] Ibid

[xxxvii] Laura Sullivan, “Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law”, National Public Radio, 28 October 2010, Accessed 2 April 2015, http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.

[xxxviii] “The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of Corrections Corporation of America”, GrassrootsLeadership, Accessed 1 April 2015, http://grassrootsleadership.org/cca-dirty-30.

[xxxix] Laura Sullivan, “Prison economics help drive…”

[xl] Ibid

[xli] Ibid

[xlii] Ibid

[xliii] “Eliminate the Detention Bed Quota”, National Immigrant Justice Center, Accessed 25 March 2015, https://www.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota.

[xliv] “End the Quota Narrative”, DetentionWatchNetwork, Accessed 25 March 2015, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/EndTheQuota.

[xlv] Ibid

[xlvi] “Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and ‘Low-Crime Taxes’ Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations”, In The Public Interest, September 2013, Accessed 25 March 2015, http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Criminal-Lockup%20Quota-Report.pdf.

[xlvii] Ibid

[xlviii] “2010 Annual Report on Form 10-K”, Corrections Corporation of America.

[xlix] Christina Filaho, “Adelanto: Unlimited Prison Possibilities”, The Huffington Post, 18 October 2014, Accessed 1 April 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christina-fialho/adelanto-unlimited-prison_b_5683538.html.

[l]Sasha Chavkin, “Immigrant Reform and Private Prison Cash”, Columbia Journalism Review, 20 February 2013, Accessed 30 March 2015, http://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/key_senators_on_immigration_get_campaign_cash_from_prison_companies.php.

[li]Lee Fang, “Private Prison and Immigration Policy”, The Nation, 27 February 2013, Accessed 28 March 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/173120/how-private-prisons-game-immigration-system.

[lii] Laura Carlsen, “With Immigration Reform Looming, Private Prisons Lobby to Keep Migrants Behind Bars”, Americas Program, 5 March 2013, Accessed 23 March 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/immigration-reform-privation-prisons-lobby_b_2665199.html.

[liii] “House Approves 2015 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill”, The U.S. House of Representtaives, 14 January 2015, Accessed 19 March 2015, http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=393935.

[liv] “Bills Lobbied 2014: Corrections Corporation of America”, Open Secrets, Accessed 19 March 2015, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940.

[lv] Ibid

[lvi] “Lobby Report 2014: GeoGroup,” Open Secrets, Accessed 20 March 2015, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000022003.

[lvii] Lee Fang, “Disclosure Shows Private Prison Company Misled on Immigration Lobbying”, The Nation, 4 June 2013, Accessed 18 March 2015, http://www.thenation.com/blog/174628/disclosure-shows-private-prison-company-misled-immigration-lobbying.

[lviii] Richard Oppel, “Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings”, The New York Times, 18 May 2011, Accessed 26 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html

[lix] “The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies”, National Immigration Forum, 22 August 2013, Accessed 1 April 2015, http://immigrationforum.org/blog/themathofimmigrationdetention/.

[lx] Ibid

[lxi] Ibid

[lxii] Ibid

[lxiii] Chris Kirkham, “Prison Quotas Push Lawmakers to Fill Beds, Derail Reform”, The Huffington Post, 20 September 2013, Accessed 25 March 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/19/private-prison-quotas_n_3953483.html.

[lxiv] “Ten things IDC research found about immigration detention,” International Detention Coalition, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://www.idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/capfindings/. ; Alicja M. Duda, “Destined to be the Biggest of Wars – the Humanitarian Crisis of Immigration,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 27 June 2014, Accessed 20 March 2015, http://www.coha.org/destined-to-be-the-biggest-of-wars-the-humanitarian-crisis-of-immigration/.

[lxv] “Warehoused and Forgotten…”, American Civil Liberties Union.

[lxvi] Wayne Cornelius, “Evaluating Enhanced US Border Enforcement”, Migration Policy Institute, 1 May 2004, Accessed 16 March 2015, http://icirr.org/sites/default/files/Migration%20Information%20Source%20-%20Evaluating%20Enhanced%20US%20Border%20…pdf.

[lxvii]Wayne Cornelius, “Reforming the Management of Migration Flows from Latin America to the United States”, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, accessed 20 March 2015, http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/WP-170.pdf

[lxviii] “Puente Human Rights Movement Shadow Report: Torture and Human Rights Abuses Within Arizona Immigration Detention Centers”, Puente Human Rights Movement, 15 September 2014, Accessed 18 March 2015, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CAT_CSS_USA_18544_E.pdf.

[lxix] “112th Congress House Committee Report 112-492”, The House of Representatives, 2013, Accessed 19 March 2015, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp112OLFck&r n=hr492.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC 546602&

The post How US Private Prisons Profit from Immigrant Detention – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Subhash Kapila*

China’s persistent strategy is to play the ‘Pakistan Card’ against India both as leverage and its strategy of coercion against India. Prime Minister Modi on his visit to China next week will face a more subtle playing by China of its ‘Pakistan Card’.

In fact, much before Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing, China played its ‘Pakistan Card’ against India on a more gigantic scale when Chinese President Xi visited Pakistan last month and unveiled China’s massive outlay of $ 44 billion in the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. It was not an economic move only as it was accompanied by China’s decision to supply Pakistan with six Chinese submarines and over 100 frontline Chinese fighter combat aircraft.

So, in actual fact, Chinese President Xi signalled two forceful messages to India, as follows:

• India-US Strategic Partnership evolving proximity supplemented by Japan will be strongly checkmated by intensified playing of China’s ‘Pakistan Card’ against India.
• The ‘Pakistan Card’ in China’s strategic formulations will be a ‘constant’, recurring at every stage irrespective of India’s ascendant power trajectory.

The Indian Prime Minister struck an optimistic note on the prospects of his forthcoming China visit by asserting that both India and China have learnt the lessons of history as they embark to strive for a new China-India relationship. India may have learnt the lessons of history but there are no substantial indicators that China has learnt the lessons of history.

If China had learnt the “lessons of history” and that too from contemporary history, then China would not have repeated the mistakes that the United States committed in its ‘Pakistan First” policy in the Indian Subcontinent. United States belatedly has realised that it cannot artificially balance India’s natural predominance in the Indian Subcontinent, which China persistently continues to do.

China has also not learnt from history when it comes to investing in Pakistan’s mischief potential as China’s surrogate spoiler state against India. Moreso, when China itself realises how fragile Pakistan’s internal stability and security is concerned. Why did the Chinese leaders insist that a special Pakistan Army division-sized force be raised for the protection of its proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? What and from where are the threats within Pakistan to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?

China invests heavily in personal links with Pakistan Army generals and underwriting Pakistan Army’s combat potential, again not learning the lessons of history from the United States experience in which the Pakistan Army resorted to double-timing of the United States over Afghanistan despite receiving US munificence of billions of dollars of military aid. A rental Army can be bought over by anybody who can outbid the earlier patron.

China has every right to pursue its obsession with Pakistan to further its national security interests. But, when such dubious linkages impinge on Indian national security interests then India has no logical grounds to give clean chits to Chinese intentions in relation to India. On the contrary India is expected to stand up to China and stand tall.

Patently, even in 2015 China’s intentions towards India remain unchanged and that is to keep India strategically off-balance through what it perceives as a very effective and India-rattling ‘Pakistan Card’. The answer for India if it cannot singly neutralise such moves is then to seek other off-set options.

So while India must continue to engage China at all possible levels and appear to be seeking normalisation of relations with China, the stark reality for India is otherwise.

The stark strategic reality is that China is unlikely to give up the playing of its ‘Pakistan Card’ for the very simple reason that when it comes to China’s choices in the Indian Subcontinent, India is a strategic and contending rival with historically carrying potential of conflict with China whereas Pakistan is China’s strategic cats-paw, a rental military state where China is now willing to pay a higher rent to hire Pakistan’s ‘regional spoiler state’ potential and services.

Hopefully, these strategic realities are not lost while the Indian Prime Minister makes his innovative approaches during his China visit next week. Historically, India must remember the appropriate lesson from the history of China-India turbulent relationship that Indian leaders must not repeat Nehru’s mistake of assigning ‘pious intentions” to Chinese protestations of peace with India.

One more lesson that India should not lose sight of in relation to China, historically, is that “National Security Cannot be Bought by Extending Olive Branches.”

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

The post China Unlikely To Give Up ‘Pakistan Card’ In Its Outreach To India – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nurzhanat Amenbek

Chinese and Russian ships started to perform joint military exercises in Novorossiysk in the Mediterranean Sea this Monday, and they are expected to last until May 21. This collaborative act shows that relations between the two countries have become closer and that Chinese naval ambitions continue to increase. According to Geng Yansheng, China will send two frigates and a supply ship to participate in the Mediterranean military exercises. These warships participated in the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Yemen in the April of this year, before which they were carrying out anti-piracy patrols.

Four stages of the Chinese-Russian military exercises

Chinese media reports the exercises as divided into four stages. The first stage was from May 11-12, during which time the parties prepared to commence the joint exercises; the second stage will be from the night of May 12 until May17, during which time participating vessels from Russia will travel from Novorossiysk to gather with their Chinese counterparts at the exercise area in the Mediterranean Sea; the third stage will be from May 18-21, when ships and their crews will perform exercises focusing on the maintenance of the security of ocean shipping by practicing maritime defence formations, sealifts, escorting manoeuvres, weapons drills, etc.; stage four will then be on May 21, represented by the dissolution of the cluster and end of the exercise.

According to Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng, the main subject of the drills will focus on safeguarding maritime shipping security. He said, “the aim is to deepen both countries’ friendly and practical cooperation, and increase our navies’ ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats”.

Nonetheless, Chinese-Russian joint military exercises also carry a different meaning for China and Russia in the current international context. Russia finds itself estranged from the West due to the Ukraine crisis, while China is increasingly worried about a tightening US-Japan alliance. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have emphasized that the bilateral relations of their countries are in line with their own mutual interests.

The meaning of the exercises to China

Professor Shi from Renmin University of China’s Faculty of International Relations said that China’s fleet has never engaged in any exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. China and Russia want to show that their strategic partnership has been upgraded, especially as China has voiced sharp criticism of Shinzo Abe’s declaration during his visit to Washington that the US and Japan would strengthen their military cooperation. In this way, the Mediterranean exercises can be considered as China’s response to these recent developments in the US-Japan alliance.

According to military analysts quoted by the New York Times, even though the scale of the Mediterranean exercise seems to be limited, this will be the farthest away from its own shores that the Chinese Navy has engaged in a naval exercise. One of the goals of China is to show that its naval forces can not only sail just outside of its own coastal waters, but also that they can traverse the international seas. At the same time, these exercises show China’s growing ambitions in the Mediterranean Sea itself.

James Hardy stated in IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly that the fact that the Chinese Navy is willing to take risks to perform military exercises in a place so far away from its mainland shows that China has new confidence in its own military ability.

The United States and NATO are not unaware of the geopolitical implications of the Chinese-Russian exercise, and furthermore, Chinese experts have found Western’ complaints about the exercise to be hypocritical considering that the United States and its allies regularly hold joint military exercises in waters near China.

The meaning of the exercises to Russia

Russia’s actions in Ukraine angered European leaders, as seen in their refusal to attend this year’s Victory Day festivities in Moscow. Nonetheless, Xi Jinping was one of the most important international dignitaries to attend the events, a confirmation of the close relationship between China and Russia.

Russia has steered away from a U.S.-dominated post-Soviet world order, pivoting instead toward China, its eastern neighbour. With the Mediterranean joint exercise, Russia wants to indicate to the United States that Russia has not been isolated and that it is able to carry out exercises in the vicinity of Eastern Europe.

Gilbert Rozman, a Princeton University professor who writes and teaches on Northeast Asian affairs, doesn’t concur that Chinese-Russian cooperation acts as an indication of “an axis of convenience”, rather, he believes that “This is a relationship about national identity and the big efforts in both countries to establish a different kind of international order,” Los Angeles times reported.

The message speaks louder than the exercise

Prof. Peter Dutton from the United States Naval War College claims that the Mediterranean exercise itself may not be as important as the message it conveys. While the Chinese-Russian joint military exercise is small in scale, it is in fact quite symbolic of the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow, and displays China’s growing status as a maritime force.

In the face of Abe’s visit to the United States and the commitments to strengthening US-Japanese military ties that was made therein, Xi Jinping would like to show the United States that China has good relations with Russia. Alternately, Russia has turned its face to its old ally of China after the Ukraine crisis and the enactment of Western sanctions.

To sum up, the Chinese-Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea have three primary implications: relations between China and Russia are tightening, Chinese naval ambitions continue to increase, and Russia is pivoting to China. Russia and China are sending a political message to the United States and Europe right at their doorstep: these two continental powers will unite and support the expansion of each other’s interests.

The post What Do Chinese-Russian Joint Military Exercises Tell Us? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Dozens of Palestinians were injured in a large explosion in the northern Gaza Strip on Thursday, witnesses and medics said.

Medical sources said at least 70 Palestinians were injured. Fifteen of those were taken to al-Shifa hospital for treatment as a result of the explosion.

The Palestinian ministry of interior said the explosion happened during the dismantling of an unexploded F16 rocket left by the Israeli army.

Ambulances rushed toward the scene of the blast in the al-Atatra neighborhood of Gaza City, with black smoke plumes visible from a distance.

Locals reported that the blast caused an electricity blackout in the area.

The post Gaza: 70 Hurt As Israel Ordnance Explodes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The knock-on effects of the economic downturn have been explored in economy and psychology. Now researchers are examining the effects of unemployment on an even darker subject – cancer mortality.

One would think that dealing with unemployment was challenge enough. But according to the latest research published in ecancermedicalscience, rises in unemployment are associated with significant increases in prostate cancer mortality.

This is the first study that has systematically explored the consequences that changes in unemployment – in particular the Great Recession of the late 2000s – have had in generating excess deaths due to a treatable disease such as prostate cancer.

The effect continued for at least five years after a 1% rise in unemployment, said study author Johnathan Watkins of King’s College London, London, UK.

But was the effect simply due to the fact that the unemployed patients might belong to social groups that are more likely to experience prostate cancer mortality?

Apparently not. The trend continued even after researchers controlled the effect of competing forces such as economic factors, infrastructure, hospital resources, and health care spending.

The researchers are keeping an open mind about the exact causes of this correlation – it’s likely due to a cohort of factors influenced by macroeconomics, such as changes in nutrition, societal challenges, and possibly even psychological outcomes.

“There are two broad implications emerging from this study,” Watkins said. “First, policies that support employment may have positive knock-on effects on mortality rates from a treatable disease such as prostate cancer.

“Second, healthcare professionals should be aware of the additional risks entailed by unemployment, and facilitate access of care to this population.”

“Both policy makers and clinicians can work together to mitigate the health outcome effects of unemployment.”

But there’s some hope to be found in the study: initiatives that bolster employment may have societal knock-on effects of their own.

Watkins and colleagues suggest that support initiatives may thus help to minimise prostate cancer mortality during times of economic hardship.

The reasons for avoiding economic downturns and prostate cancer are obvious to all, but it’s good to see another reason to take an interest in economic and physical health.

The post Unemployment Linked To Rise In Prostate Cancer Deaths appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Human rights activists worldwide are demanding clemency for cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, sentenced to death in Saudi Arabia for taking part in Shia Muslim minority protests in 2011. They warn the execution could inflame the whole of the Middle East.

The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) an independent non-profit organization based in London, have asked the UN to intervene and prevent al-Nimr’s execution. He is the most respected Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the approximately 18 million population are Sunni.

In their address they say: “It is a severe blight on the reputation of this office if it is not able to work to protect the rights of individuals to free speech, to protest, to practise their religion, to a fair trial, to not be subjected to torture, and the right to life.”

Despite global condemnation the forthcoming execution has been largely ignored by Saudi Arabia’s key allies – the UK and the US, nations that profess to upholding democratic values.

The representative of Bahraini Shiite leader, Shaykh Ali Salman, told the ABNA news agency that US Secretary of State John Kerry was dismayed by the Saudi decision to execute Ayatollah al-Nimr. Allegedly, Kerry was informed about the Saudi decision during a meeting in Riyadh on May 6.

“John Kerry expressed his surprise to President Barack Obama over the decision made by the House of Saud, and by their silence they gave the green light to Saudi Arabia to go ahead with the execution,” the representative said.

In London, where Shia Muslims staged a #FreeNimr rally, RT spoke to former Bahraini MP Jawad Fayruz. He said since Saudi Arabia is “mainly backed by the US and the United Kingdom,” it could be just “one word” from US or UK officials to reverse things and save al-Nimr’s life.

Our clear message is to Downing Street, to [PM] Cameron: you have the ability and you can do a lot of things,” said Fayruz, explaining that the British prime minister could use his influence on Saudi Arabia and secure Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr’s release.

The lawmaker also said: “There’s no independent judiciary system in Saudi Arabia” and the case of Sheikh al-Nimr is “politically oriented.” This is especially due to the ongoing war against Yemen, where Shia Houthi rebels overthrew the president, a Saudi Arabian protégé.

Skeikh al-Nimr became a symbol of the 2011 insurrection when the Arab Spring came to Saudi Arabia. He led Shia Muslim street protests throughout the country, demanding constitutional changes, liberties and an end to anti-Shia discrimination in the kingdom.

Sheikh al-Nimr was arrested on July 8, 2012 in disputed circumstances, after police tracked him down in the eastern province of Qatif and shot him in the leg during a shootout.

The Sheikh’s relatives insisted al-Nimr didn’t own a gun, but the cleric was accused of terrorism and apostasy and put on trial in March 2013. Human rights activists shared concerns since the outset that al-Nimr was unlikely to get a fair trial.

The arrest of Skeikh al-Nimr provoked even more disturbances in Saudi Arabia, as protesters demanded his immediate release, which led to an even greater escalation of violence between protesters and Saudi security forces.

The arguably biased trial lasted until October 2014, with al-Nimr being sentenced to death for “disobeying the ruler,”“inciting sectarian strife” and “encouraging, leading and participating in demonstrations.”

The sentence aroused the strongest condemnation from international human rights watchdogs.

Joe Stork, the organization’s deputy Middle East director, said: “Saudi Arabia’s harsh treatment of a prominent Shia cleric is only adding to the existing sectarian discord and unrest,” adding that if Saudi Arabia wants to gain stability in its eastern province, it should put an end to “systematic discrimination against Shia citizens.”

According to Said Boumedouha, deputy director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, “the death sentence against Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr is part of a campaign by the authorities in Saudi Arabia to crush all dissent, including those defending the rights of the Kingdom’s Shiite Muslim community.”

Shia Muslims around the world have been holding rallies and petitioning to prevent the execution. When Saudi Arabia announced al-Nimr will be executed on May 14, protests intensified and people took to the streets in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, India and Iraq.

In Iran, the regional superpower and the only country with a predominantly Shiite population in the Middle East, clerics and scholars staged a mass sit-in on Wednesday in the two holy cities of Qom and Mashhad, to express their solidarity with Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Iranian Shia Muslim clerics warned that Saudi Arabia is going to pay a heavy price if it dares to execute the religious leader, saying the execution could trigger “an earthquake” that would lead to the fall of the Saud dynasty.

Last week, following the beheading of five foreigners, human rights groups condemned Saudi Arabia for a dramatic increase in public executions. Eighty people have already been executed so far in 2015, compared to 88 during the whole of 2014.

Despite mounting international criticism from foreign governments and human rights campaigners, Saudi Arabia has shown no willingness to end public executions.

The post Saudi Arabia Shia Cleric To Be Hanged Amid Large Protests appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Daniel McAdams

How appropriate to their outsized egos and ambitions that the foreign ministers of NATO countries joined arms and hands to sing an impromptu rendition of the 1980s aid to Africa fundraiser song “We Are The World” yesterday at a military alliance meeting in Turkey.

The song was originally recorded to raise funds to provide some relief to those suffering famine in Africa.

But what a cruel and revealing irony that those impoverished in Africa these days come from places like Libya, which was bombed by the very same NATO in the name of “liberation” in 2011.

NATO’s “We Are The World” in that case becomes a rather menacing song, suggesting its expansionist ambitions and perhaps that there are no hiding places from NATO bombs.

War is peace. Freedom slavery.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute

The post NATO: ‘We Are The World’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

New regulations for oil exploration off the coast of Belize that are being studied by the authorities, threaten the coral reefs, fishing and tourism warned the environmental organization, Oceana, dedicated to preserving the oceans of the world.

According to the Oceana office in Belize, all restrictions covering approximately 99 percent of the marine territory in Belize would be eliminated, including seven sites considered to World Heritage and protected zones.

According to information shared by the press, the proposal would lift all restrictions on the oil industry, but it has not received final approval.

Oceana contends that “a map released in February, 2010, by the Geology and Petroleum Department confirmed that massive oil exploration concessions have been granted throughout the country of Belize — including in marine reserves and national parks.”

“Offshore drilling of this magnitude would be devastating to Belize’s tourism and fishing industry, our marine food security and the viability of coastal communities. Oceana believes the process should be transparent, with input from all relevant parties and the general public,” the organization said.

Tourism, which generates 25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Belize, will be one of the sectors most affected. Also, about 200,000 people, almost 60 percent of the country’s population, live in coastal communities depending on tourism and fishing.

Harmful impacts

For environmental experts, any oil spill will affect the cays of white sand and blue water, as well as threaten the coral reefs that serve as barriers to hurricanes, heavy waves and rising sea level. Also, the coral reefs are home to a great diversity of marine flora and fauna.

Past explorations did not find any petroleum in the coastal waters of Belize and the fall of international oil prices put the brakes on this kind of initiatives.

Nevertheless, Janelle Chanona, Oceana representative in Belize, states that although petroleum wasn’t found, oil exploration can also have a harmful impact.

“Drilling exploratory wells can introduce mud into ecosystems, for example, and seismic testing can interfere with dolphins´ ability to use sonar to identify food and predators,” she indicated.

Fishing, which 20,000 people depend upon, and represents 15 percent of the GDP, will be affected by the petroleum industry as well as by climate change.

In March the Project on Climate Adaptation and Marine Conservation of Belize began to be implemented. Its objective is to adopt measures to adapt to climate change and marine conservation.

“We will concentrate on protected marine areas, but at the same time we will begin to focus on economic production activities because sometimes people do not see the alternatives, they don’t believe in what is attempting to be done.”

“We are going to look at the marine protected areas, but at the same time we are going to start the livelihood activities, because sometimes if you don’t show people the alternatives, then they will not believe in what you are trying to do,” said the project coordinator, Sandra Grant.

Fishermen and other people dependent on fishing will receive economic benefits planting seaweed, sea cucumber harvesting and diversification of business into value-added products, commented Grant.

The post Belize: Coral At Risk From Oil Exploration appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Désiré Nimubona

Major-General Godefroid Niyombare on Wednesday announced the ouster of President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi over his controversial bid to run for a third term in office. The apparent coup took place after almost two weeks of street protests in the capital, Bujumbura, and while Nkurunziza was away in Tanzania attending a summit.

Here’s what we know about the man behind the coup attempt:

During the 1993-2005 civil war, he fought among Hutu rebels alongside Nkurunziza and against the government forces of then president Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi.

After the war, he served in several senior positions before being appointed in 2009 to the post of army chief-of-staff, becoming the first Hutu to occupy that position.

His wife, Spès Niyonkuru, was a member of parliament for the ruling CNDD-FDD party in southern Rutana province.

Niyombare later served as ambassador to Kenya. On his return, he rejoined army headquarters before being named head of the intelligence services. He only stayed in this job for three months before being fired by presidential decree.

His sacking was widely linked to his alleged authorship of a memo suggesting Nkurunziza could endanger himself if he ran for a third term, a bid many regard as unconstitutional and in violation of a 2000 peace accord.

Niyombare justified the overthrow of the president on a number of other grounds, in addition to his decision to run for a third term. According to Niyombare’s announcement, these include:

• “The cynicism and sadism that has characterised the attitude of Pierre Nkurunziza.”
• “The vertiginous impoverishment of the people of Burundi over the last 10 years.”
• “A worrying degradation of relations between the people and security forces brought to light over the past two weeks.”

He also said:

• “The use of negative forces in Burundi constitutes a threat to seriously destabilise not only Burundi but also neighbouring countries.”

• “Nkurunziza’s regime has been marked by acts of vandalism of national resources, by unspeakable crimes of blood and massive violations of human rights.”

The post Who Is Burundi’s Coup-Maker? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Tamar Friedman*

The post Reforming The Israeli Electoral System: What’s Needed? What’s Possible? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Eurasian Economic Union

In early May 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the three founding member states of the recently-established Eurasian Economic Union (EEU): Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.1 These three countries founded the EEU in May 2014, and the EEU came into effect at the start of 2015.2 During his visit, President Xi and his delegation signed almost 90 agreements with the EEU founding members on issues of economic cooperation, including trade and investment in key sectors like energy and infrastructure.3 These agreements mark the acceleration of bilateral and regional cooperation between China and the EEU founding members, including cooperation within the frameworks of regional economic development initiatives like China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.4

The EEU is significant for the Silk Road Economic Belt as it represents a common market of over 170 million people, and the economy of the EEU has been predicted to grow by 25% by 2030.5 China sees the Silk Road Economic Belt as contributing to the economic growth of the EEU by bridging the regional economies of the EEU and the Asia-Pacific, thereby offering an economic stimulus to both regions.6

Eurasian Economic Union. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

Prior to the launch of the EEU in January 2015, the establishment of a customs union in 2010 between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus stimulated trade between these countries and China. In 2012, China accounted for 114.6 billion USD in trade with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and China became the largest trading partner with the customs union.7 To further this trading relationship, China and the EEU will work towards the establishment of a free trade zone. In the meantime, China and the EEU will facilitate economic integration through the establishment of transborder economic cooperation zones and industrial parks.8

China and its partners in economic cooperation in the EEU have to do a delicate balancing act to ensure that their economic cooperation—especially over the Silk Road Economic Belt—is not perceived by Moscow as an attempt by Beijing to subvert Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.9 This is important as economic growth for all the countries concerned will be negatively impacted by a revival of the Cold War-era Sino-Soviet split. As such, it is important that Russia continue to be involved in the regional economic cooperation over the Silk Road Economic Belt, and that it achieve economic gains from this cooperation. As the Silk Road Economic Belt has been designed by China to be a non-hegemonic path towards win-win cooperation and economic growth for all the participating countries, Russia should have no reason to fear that its continued political preeminence in the EEU will be at risk.10

Russia

Russia

During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, he recognized the contributions of Russian advisors to China’s development, both during the early days of the People’s Republic of China, and later during China’s period of economic reform after 1978.11 This was significant as it highlighted China and Russia’s long history of friendship, and the hope that this friendship will continue to flourish in the future. In this historical context, the Sino-Soviet split may be seen as an unfortunate aberration in the broader trajectory of Chinese and Russian friendship. The current warmth between China and Russia dates from Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts at rapprochement. Since the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1992, the friendship between China and Russia has deepened.12 Russia was the site of President Xi Jinping’s first state visit after assuming office in March 2013, and in the two years since then both Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have held over ten meetings.13

This long-term friendship between China and Russia has been greatly facilitated by their shared outlook on international relations, in particular their suspicion of American assertions of unipolarity, and their common interest in creating a multipolar world order. While both nations have had their occasional disagreements, for example, when China chose to remain neutral with regard to Russia’s intervention in Georgia, their relationship has generally been characterized by cooperation.14 One good example is their ongoing cooperation under the framework of the BRICS bloc of high-growth emerging economies. Apart from their efforts to establish the BRICS New Development Bank, which is currently scheduled to be launched in late 2015, China, Russia, and their counterparts in the BRICS bloc are also launching a common reserve fund to serve as an alternative to emergency loans from the American-dominated International Monetary Fund.15 Apart from their cooperation on the BRICS initiatives, China and Russia are also cooperating on China’s “Belt and Road” development framework, including the AIIB financing initiative, of which both are serving as founding members.16 In the social field, both China and Russia have sought to encourage mutual understanding between their peoples through the establishment of Russian and Chinese cultural centres. China, for example, has opened over twenty Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in Russia.17 In terms of bilateral trade, China has become Russia’s largest trading partner. From 1994 to 2014 Sino-Russian bilateral trade dramatically increased from 7.7 billion to 95.3 billion USD.18

The economic linkages between China and Russia are set to deepen with the cooperative projects established by President Xi’s visit. Due to Western sanctions over Russian intervention in Ukraine, Russia’s cooperation with China has become critical for its economic growth.19 On the eve of Russia’s massive 2015 Victory Day parade, Presidents Xi and Putin signed 32 bilateral agreements, including the construction of a high-speed rail line between Moscow and Kazan, and a road map for Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia that balances the Silk Road Economic Belt projects with those of the EEU.20 Under this road map, China will seek to connect its Silk Road Economic Belt with Russia’s initiative for a Trans-Eurasian Belt. In particular, President Putin’s plan for a trans-Eurasian railway will be connected with rail infrastructure development in the Silk Road Economic Belt. Cooperation makes sense as the improvements to infrastructure that will take place under the Silk Road Economic Belt will benefit Russian economic development in its Far East.21

China and Russia will also increase their economic cooperation in a range of sectors including energy, infrastructure, and finance, and both countries will also seek to increase their bilateral investment.22 One of the new joint ventures in the energy sector is a project by China Three Gorges Corporation and RusHydro to build a 320-megawatt hydropower plant on Russia’s Bureya river.23 Also in the energy sector, China and Russia signed an agreement on the supply of Russian natural gas through the planned Western Route pipeline, which will provide China with 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.24 In May 2014, China and Russia had signed an earlier deal on natural gas worth 400 billion USD. Under this deal, Russia will supply China, through its Eastern Route pipeline, 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from 2018 for 30 years.25 In November 2014, China and Russia deepened their energy cooperation with a further similarly-sized deal on natural gas.26 These mega-deals with China will help Russia diversify its energy exports from the politically difficult European market.27

Outside of the energy sector, the new cooperative projects between China and Russia include gold exploration as well as the joint development of a new heavy-duty transport helicopter to rival Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook helicopter.28 China will also increase its debt financing of Russian companies, allowing these companies access to financing they had previously lost because of Western sanctions against Russia.29 China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) will jointly extend up to 25 billion USD in loans to Russian companies, with CCB being responsible for 85% of the financing. In addition, CITIC Merchant and RDIF will jointly establish a Russia-China Investment Bank which will give Russian companies greater access to Chinese financing.30 Western sanctions hence have ironically allowed Chinese banks to take over the market share that was previously occupied by Western lenders.31

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

President Xi’s visit to Kazakhstan was significant as this was where he first announced the Silk Road Economic Belt in 2013.32 While Kazakhstan has welcomed its participation in the Silk Road Economic Belt as a means of reducing Kazakh dependence on Russia’s troubled economy, the Kazakh government has in the meantime developed its own economic development strategy.33 Like his Russian counterpart, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev seeks to connect his country’s Bright Road economic policy with the Silk Road Economic Belt. Both development strategies complement each other as they focus on infrastructural development of key areas including energy, industry, and transportation. Also, Kazakhstan, which is a founding member of the AIIB, will have financing options from the AIIB for its Bright Road infrastructure projects. For example, the road construction projects under the Bright Road development plan over the next 2 years are estimated to cost 9 billion USD.34

Kazakhstan sees its geographical location as providing a strategic bridge between Europe and Asia.35 This strategic location offers significant opportunities for trade and investment, especially from regions of economic growth like China. Indeed, during President Xi’s 2013 state visit to Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev expressed his hope that cooperation with China would accelerate his country’s economic growth.36 China has since become the largest trading partner of Kazakhstan. Their bilateral trade increased from 20.4 billion USD in 2010 to over 28 billion USD in 2013, but fell to 22.4 billion USD in 2014. China and Kazakhstan aim to increase their bilateral trade to 40 billion USD in 2015.37 China has also become one of the top investors in Kazakhstan. In December 2014 China and Kazakhstan signed agreements worth 14 billion USD in energy, housing and infrastructure, and in March 2015, further agreements worth 23.6 billion USD were signed in the automobile, hydropower, steel, and oil refining sectors. Indeed, Kazakhstan has become an important source of primary resources for China, including oil.38

To further accelerate such investment, China has encouraged its entrepreneurs to invest in Kazakhstan, especially in industrial projects.39 China and Kazakhstan have also planned further joint projects at the Khorgos free trade zone, which already serves as a key source of economic growth for Kazakhstan’s Almaty region.40 Such economic development has implications for security, as economic development in Kazakhstan has the potential for spilling over into economic development—with possible dividends for peace—in China’s restive Xinjiang region.41 The parallel development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has similar security implications for Xinjiang.42

Belarus

Belarus

Both China and Belarus have aggressively pursued economic cooperation since they upgraded their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013.43 During President Xi’s visit, China signed an estimated 15.7 billion USD worth of infrastructure investments and trade deals with Belarus. One such deal, for a shipment of 4 million tonnes of potash over 5 years, was worth 1.3 billion USD. China also extended 5.5 billion USD in loans to Belarus, with 1 billion USD to finance Belarusian banks. Not only do these economic linkages with China allow the Belarusian economy to reduce its dependence on the troubled Russian economy, the planned modernization of Belarusian infrastructure will help Belarus to accelerate its economic development. Also, as with Kazakhstan, the improvements in its infrastructure will allow Belarus to leverage its strategic geographical location to become a key hub for overland trade between China and Europe. Trade between Belarus and China expanded from just 34 million USD in 1992 to almost 4 billion USD in 2014.44 China is now Belarus’ largest Asian trading partner and fifth largest global trading partner. Chinese investment in Belarus has been growing since 1992, and currently stands at over 400 million USD. To facilitate trade and investment, China’s and Belarus’ central banks have signed a 1.15 billion USD currency swap agreement.45

Like Kazakhstan, Belarus has been a key supporter of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has highlighted the primary importance to the success of the Silk Road Economic Belt of the construction in Belarus of the land transportation infrastructure of highways and railways, as well as infrastructure for air transportation. For its part, to further enhance China-Belarus cooperation, China will align its Silk Road Economic Belt projects in Belarus with the Belarusian government’s national development plans, including President Lukashenko’s strategic vision of economic integration across Eurasia.46 Such alignment can be seen in cooperation between China and Belarus in key social development projects like the construction of low-income housing. China and Belarus are also exploring cooperation in science and technology as well as tourism and other forms of cultural exchange.47 To deepen Sino-Belarusian economic cooperation, President Xi has called on local governments in China and Belarus to explore opportunities for investment and other modes of economic cooperation at the local government level.48

Like Russia, Belarus’ support of Chinese economic engagement has been intensified by Western sanctions. Belarus has suffered international isolation since 2010 when the US and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on the Lukashenko regime following its crackdown on the opposition. While the Belarusian economy has been propped up by Russia—whose economy has itself been negatively impacted by Western sanctions—the Belarusian government is seeking to diversify Belarus’ economic lifelines by encouraging investment from China. Chinese investment is particularly attractive given the Chinese government’s stand against foreign interference in a country’s internal affairs, including interference over human rights.49

The major site of Sino-Belarusian economic cooperation is the Great Stone Industrial Park near Minsk, which is being positioned by China and Belarus as a flagship project of the Silk Road Economic Belt.50 Its importance is such that its success will showcase to the rest of the region the economic benefits of engagement with the Silk Road Economic Belt.51 Costing an estimated 5 billion USD, Great Stone Industrial Park will locate Chinese manufacturers within 170 miles of Poland and Lithuania, both gateways into the EU, as well as offer customs-free entry into the Russian and Kazakh markets of the EEU. It will also allow these manufacturers to enjoy the cost benefits of the educated Belarusian workforce, whose wages cost approximately half that of their Polish counterparts. Belarus, in turn, seeks Chinese investment to stimulate its economy. The first stage of Great Stone Industrial Park is anticipated to be ready by 2020 and the second stage by 2030.52 Even before the scheduled 2020 completion of the first stage of the industrial park, President Lukashenko has sought the expansion of the Great Stone project.53 The Belarusian president has been inspired by China’s economic reforms for his government’s restructuring of the Belarusian economy. In particular, China’s successful implementation of industrial parks inspired the Great Stone project, which President Lukashenko expects will contribute 50 billion USD in exports to the Belarusian economy.54

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Notes:
1. “Chinese president to visit Russia, Kazakstan, Belarus, attend WWII celebration in Moscow,” Xinhua, May 4, 2015, accessed May 4, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/04/c_134207443.htm.
2. Zhong Nan, “China vows to enhance trade with Eurasian bloc,” China Daily, May 11, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2015-05/11/content_20676192.htm.
3. “Belt and Road Initiative gathers steam,” Xinhua, May 13, 2015, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/921538.shtml.
4. “Xi’s next visits to uphold post-WWII world order,” Xinhua, May 5, 2015, accessed May 5, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150505000055&cid=1101&MainCatID=0.
5. Philip Iglauer, “Eastern interest in Eurasian economic deal,” Asia Times, June 11, 2015, accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-01-110614.html.
6. “Xi’s next visits.”
7. Yang Shu and Wang Shusen, “Development and Impacts of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,” China Institute of International Studies, September 23, 2014, accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-09/23/content_7254454.htm.
8. Zhong Nan, “China vows.” “China, EAEU pledge to further cooperation,” Xinhua, May 10, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/920775.shtml.
9. Björn Alexander Düben, “Can the China-Russia Warmth Last?” The Diplomat, May 8, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/can-the-china-russia-warmth-last/.
10. Marcin Kaczmarski, “China and Russia: Two Approaches to Integration,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-russia-two-approaches-to-integration/.
11. “Xi hails aid of Russian experts for China’s early development,” Xinhua, May 9, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/920727.shtml.
12. Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng, EAI Background Brief No. 346: China-Russia Relations: New Opportunities and Old Problems (Singapore: East Asia Institute, 2007), 2.
13. “Xi’s visit boosts Sino-Russian ties,” People’s Daily, May 10, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/920839.shtml.
14. James Bellacqua, “Introduction: Contemporary Sino-Russian Relations: Thirteen Years of a ‘Strategic Partnership,’” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 4-5.
15. Astrid Prange, “BRICS launch new bank and monetary fund,” Deutsche Welle, July 16, 2014, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.dw.de/brics-launch-new-bank-and-monetary-fund/a-17789608. Jerin Mathew, “Russia ratifies $100bn Brics reserve fund rivalling IMF,” International Business Times, May 4, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russia-ratifies-100bn-brics-reserve-fund-rivalling-imf-1499554. Madhura Karnik and Manu Balachandran, “An old hand in Indian banking will head the new BRICS bank,” Quartz, May 11, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015, http://qz.com/402168/an-old-hand-in-indian-banking-will-head-the-new-brics-bank/.
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Some of the recent articles written from a Tamil perspective on the 19th Amendment blamed Colombo for not accommodating Tamil demands for devolution of power when enacting the Amendment. Arguments centered around the point that if the government was sincere in resolving the Tamil problem, it could have done so within the framework of the 19th Amendment because the government had more than enough majority in parliament to successfully adopt the new changes to the constitution. A striking feature of these analyses is that they failed to look internally at how the Tamil parties approached the issues of constitutional change that were made in April 2015.

TNA and the 19th Amendment

Pertinent questions here are, did the Tamil parties make any demands for their support of the 19th Amendment? Why should Colombo concede when the Tamil parties were not asking for anything in terms of devolution of power?
Tamils who expected the government to voluntarily devolve powers, one can safely argue, have not learnt anything from the more than half a century of conflict. It is clear from the past that the government will not treat the devolution issue like a charity. The Tamils need to work, in fact work hard if they want political powers devolved. This should be done within accepted democratic principles taking advantage of political tools, not through violence. The use of violence for political purposes almost completely destroyed Tamil society and the country as a whole.

According to one source, the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) requested the government to include provisions in the amendments to address Tamil issues. This should be considered as token because the party did not pursue this goal openly or earnestly. However, the EPDP is a minor party in terms of its vote bank and parliamentary representation. What about the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the largest and leading party that represents the Tamil community in parliament and outside? The TNA did not link the 19th Amendment to the question of devolution of power in any way. In fact, there was tacit approval for the Amendment sans any new arrangements to address the ethnic conflict.

The original proposal for the 19th Amendment was presented without provisions to either implement the 13th Amendment fully or improve upon it. It is this draft that was taken to the Supreme Court. M. A. Sumanthiran, now a leading figure within the TNA, defended vehemently the draft presented in the Supreme Court. His speech on the 19th Amendment in parliament did not include the words “Tamil” or “devolution of power.” Obviously, the party voted for the Amendment. Therefore, the party approved and lobbied for the Amendment in its original form. Hence, it is not reasonable to blame the government when the Tamil parties were not demanding anything to resolve their issues and unconditionally extending support.

Should they have raised the devolution issue? Some of the Tamil commentators believe that the ethnic conflict resolution issues should have been linked to the question of constitutional reform. On the other hand, a moderate section maintains that it should not have been linked to the voting. The consensus is that while voting in favor of the Amendment, Sumanthiran, in his speech, should have insisted on the need to address devolution issues. This was an important opportunity to highlight Tamil issues.

There are at least two reasons why the Tamil parties represented in parliament should have raised this issue. One, the 19th Amendment was not only dealing with presidential powers. It tried to resolve some of the major problems facing the country. Resolving the political issues of the Tamils is also important. Second, although the possibility for incorporating devolution issues in the 19th Amendment was nil, it provided an opportunity to highlight minority grievances. The opportunity should have been exploited strategically. Through its attitude towards the 19th Amendment, the TNA has now contributed to the view that ethnic issues are not significant anymore. This would certainly upset the Tamil nationalists.

Post-Election Politics

In fact, President Sirisena’s election provided a new opportunity to engage the government constructively because the Tamils played an important part in his electoral victory. That opportunity was also not used wisely by the Tamil parties.
When the war ended, the victorious government headed by Mahinda Rajapaksa had two major means to achieve a desirable state of national integration and perhaps ethnic reconciliation: (1) through a political process where Tamil grievances are addressed within a reasonable framework, and (2) through military means where attention is paid only to national security at the expense of the rights of people who live in the North and East. The former government chose the second path. Military control over Tamils was tightened and the governor, a former army commander, ran a military type administration. This was one reason why the Tamils constantly insisted on a civilian governor.

Also, election to the Northern provincial council was delayed. This election was eventually conducted under pressure from India. The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) was set up only as a delaying tactic. The TNA refused to participate in the PSC process. The party had a reason to refuse to engage because the Rajapaksa government did not give the impression that it was serious about finding a political solution. It was not sending conciliatory signals. Obviously, Rajapaksa was catering to his voter base.

The political environment changed with the election of the new president. Positive signals were sent constantly. For example, Major Chandrasiri was removed from the governor’s office. Ms. Vijayaletchumi, former Chief Secretary of the Northern Province, who was hostile to the TNA and obviously serving the interest of the Rajapaksa government, was also removed. Some of the disputed land that was under military control was returned to its original owners. Reports from the North also indicate that normalization is taking place in the region. Although they do not guarantee that a reasonable solution to the ethnic conflict will be found under President Sirisena’s government, at least positive signals are being sent.
The TNA either remains ignorant or sends hostile signals. For example, the Northern provincial council adopted a resolution calling for an international investigation in March. To put it mildly, this was hostile and badly timed.

Interestingly, Chief Minister Wigneswaran who hitherto resisted the resolution suddenly decided to bring it before the council as soon as Rajapaksa was gone. This was a poor strategy. It is imperative to note that the resolution was originally proposed by Sivajilingam last year. It is not clear why Wigneswaran thought that this March was the time to get it endorsed. Obviously, he was catering to his constituency.

The resolution and content of the discussions that Wigneswaran had with international leaders who visited him clearly demonstrate the belief that the international community, namely the United States and India, will find a solution for the Tamil problem. This is one reason why the TNA leaders are more interested in discussing their problems with international figures visiting Sri Lanka rather than constructively communicating with the new government.

From the inception, it was clear that the United States was promoting the resolution against Sri Lanka for strategic reasons, although humanitarian concerns also played a role. Some Tamils, including some of the leaders of the TNA believed that the US would punish Sri Lanka for human rights violations. This was a misplaced belief. Since the new government has demonstrated willingness to collaborate with India and the West, these two countries will now work very closely with the Sri Lankan government. The visits of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Secretary of State John Kerry to Sri Lanka were certainly a setback for the Tamils who believed that the international community would save and defend them. Therefore, it is high time that Tamil parties paid more attention to internal processes rather than international help.

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US Secretary Ash Carter met yesterday with Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss the U.S.-Saudi bilateral defense relationship, according to a Defense Department news release.

The meeting was held ahead of Prince Mohammed’s scheduled visit to Camp David today, as part of the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council summit, the release said.

Carter emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and reiterated both countries shared commitment to ensuring a stable and secure Middle East, the release said. He also pointed out the importance of working together through bilateral security cooperation to confront the most pressing security challenges in the region.

According to the release, the meeting ended with a discussion of regional issues, including the GCC-led air campaign in Yemen, the coalition countering the Islamic State in the Levant and ongoing regional negotiations. It was the first face-to-face meeting of the two defense leaders, and at its conclusion, the secretary and the deputy crown prince committed to continuing close consultation on Middle East security issues, the release said.

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The United States announced that it will deploy nuclear-capable strategic bombers in Australia as China becomes increasingly concerned about US interference at its borders. The United States will station B-1 strategic bombers in Australia, US Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday.

The move comes amid increasing Chinese concern over the United States’ military activities in the South China Sea. On Wednesday, China’s ambassador to Washington said that the US has “no right whatsoever to intervene in the legitimate activities conducted by China in the South China Sea.”

The South China Sea has been the site of increasing tensions in recent months as Vietnam, China and the Philippines accelerated the building of installations on the disputed Spratly Islands.

China has cautioned the United States against intervening in the dispute. According to a Xinhua state news agency commentary on the US role in the dispute, “Desisting from taking sides on the South China Sea issue would be a good start.”

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The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) took many by surprise last week when it decided to cut interest rates by a quarter percentage point to 5.1%. This was the third cut in just six months, and it risks exacerbating certain structural economic risks in the Chinese economy such as ballooning debt and frothy stock markets. So why would the PBOC opt for short-term gains at the expense of bigger problems down the road? It would seem that the economic slowdown in China is a lot more pronounced than previously thought.

Ever since the Chinese government set its 2015 GDP growth rate target at 7%, there has been a torrent of data to suggest that it will not be reached. The real estate market in particular is floundering, with Fitch Ratings recently dubbing it the “biggest threat to China’s banks.” Prices have fallen in 70 Chinese cities for more than a year and overall sales have dropped in 11 of the past 24 months. Since Chinese banks often use real estate holdings as collateral for other lending activities, a collapse in the real estate market poses a systemic threat – one made all the more serious by the increase in borrowing-fueled speculation that follows any interest rate cut.

The gloom doesn’t stop at the real estate sector. Chinese exports unexpectedly fell 6.4% in April, after an even steeper drop of 15% in March. This combined with deflationary pressures and general overcapacity from years of easy money and inefficient investment means a looming threat to Chinese labor markets, and it is here where the Party gets nervous. The stated government policy of intervening against threats to the labor market reflects a widely held belief that a spike in unemployment could be politically destabilizing to Party rule.

Stock markets are another concern weighing against the wisdom of a rate cut. Shanghai shares have risen 109% over the past year in what has generally come to be accepted by all as one of the world’s premier stock market bubbles. News outlets are replete with stories of Chinese retail investors pouring money into the markets, some of them just out of high school. Last week’s rate cut will only encourage this bullish sense of euphoria by making it cheaper to borrow money to buy equities. And though there are reports of new regulations on margin trading coming down in the near future, these regulations have yet to be officially announced let alone implemented. Thus we see a 3% gain in Shanghai in Monday trading – more froth for an already frothy market.

Analysis

There are two takeaways from last week’s rate cut. For one, headwinds on the Chinese economy are likely a lot stronger than the official statistics let on. Numbers out of China generally need to be taken with a grain of salt, an unsettling fact given that these recent numbers are already pretty grim. Beijing is gambling that a cut will stimulate the economy just enough to ride out its recent downturn without any major disruptions, and that all of the negative consequences (ballooning debt and speculation) will remain within controllable limits. It’s a policy that’s heavily weighted towards the now, conspicuous from a government and even political system that is often praised for its long-term outlook, and it betrays a lingering anxiety on the part of the authorities in Beijing about what might happen should unemployment become a real concern.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

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Greece has been invited to become a member of the development bank of the BRICS economies, including Russia and China, which is seeking to become a counterweight to the IMF, a government source said Monday, AFP reports.

The invitation came during a telephone conversation between Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Russia’s deputy finance minister Sergei Storchak, the government source said in a note to the media.

This announcement came late Monday as Greece was meeting with its eurozone partners in Brussels to try reach a deal with its EU-IMF creditors that would release the 7.2 billion euros ($8 billion) remaining in its bailout programme, which expires at the end of June.

Tsipras called the bank’s invitation “a happy surprise” and expressed interest, saying he would “study the proposal in detail,” the statement said.

The BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — had announced last July that they were creating a new bank, based in Shanghai, aimed at financing major infrastructure projects in emerging countries. But it was also seen as a move to shake up global economic governance, dominated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Greece’s debt-wracked government is running out of cash and in desperate need of the remaining bailout funds.

The IMF and its eurozone partners have conditioned the release of the funds on Athens keeping to its reform pledges.

Negotiations have stalled as Tsipras, whose leftist Syriza party won January elections, vows to stick to his anti-austerity campaign promises.

The Greek premier will discuss the BRICS bank with top representatives at an economic forum in Saint Petersburg on June 18-20, the source added.

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By Stephen Westcott*

While negotiations during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming China visit, expected to occur on 14-16 May, will mostly focus on deepening economic ties and reducing the trade deficit, there is growing speculation that there will be some progress on resolving the long deadlocked boundary question. Indeed, this expectation has been fed by a flurry of talks between the two sides over the border in the past month. The 18th round of the Special Representative Talks were held between 23-24 March, marking the first formal talks on the border dispute since Modi took office. The Joint Military Talks were held in early April. Little has been revealed publicly about the outcome of the talks, apart from the usual platitudes over the desire to uphold ‘peace and tranquillity’ along the border. However, viewed in the light of recent statements such as the India Foreign Minister’s comment that both sides are seeking ‘out of the box’ solutions, these talks conducted smoothly so close to Modi’s visit have raised the expectations that some form of deal is in the making. Is a breakthrough in the long deadlocked negotiations imminent?

At least since the 2005 agreement on the principles for resolving the boundary question, the negotiations have pursued the less ambitious target of seeking to manage the dispute rather than resolve it. Indeed there has been only incremental progress aimed primarily at reducing tensions and establishing institutions for trust-building exercises such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. However, both Modi and Xi have expressed their desire to remove the dispute that has acted as a spoiler in bilateral relations and prevented it from reaching its full potential. Modi in his tenure so far has demonstrated that he is keen to resolve some of India’s longstanding border disputes, most notably with Bangladesh, which he has framed as being in the national interest to slap down criticism from hardliners in his own party. Another sign that a deal could be in the offing is both countries have expressed strong interest in increasing their bilateral trade. Several Chinese officials and commentators in particular have been recently talking up the compatibility between the economic policies that could be easily capitalised upon with the removal of the border obstacle.

While there is ground to be optimistic, it is also sobering to remember that both countries have been in a similar situation in the past. Once negotiations were restarted in the 1980s they started with great expectations but proceeded slowly before being nearly derailed by some border clashes, most notably the 1986 Somdurong/Wangdung incident which came close to becoming a lethal military skirmish. Though tensions were defused by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit, it is widely considered that a chance was lost to resolve the boundary question when he did not respond to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘package deal’ offer. This proposal effectively would have seen the formalisation of the status quo with China recognising India’s control over the east and India recognising China’s control over the west and is considered probably one of the fairest resolutions possible. While the talks that followed Gandhi’s visit marked the beginning of the establishment of the various institutions to maintain peaceful relations along the border, the desire to definitively resolve the dispute has slowly leached out of the border negotiations.

Nonetheless both Modi and Xi appear to be signalling that they wish to be the ‘future generation’ that Deng spoke of who would resolve this issue. In India, Modi is only a year into his electoral term and if a settlement with China is reached now, he can overcome criticisms as he has done with Bangladesh by painting it as being in the best interest of security and economic interest of the country. Should a deal, at least in principle, fail to eventuate early in Modi’s term, it is unlikely that he or his government would be willing to counter one as it would open them up to domestic criticism and damage electoral chances. The Chinese government for their part is facing a slowing economy and several security concerns in Tibet, Xingjian and in the seas to its west, which provide a powerful incentive to remove this distraction and focus on more important issues.

Whether these factors will be enough to break the typical inertia that surrounds the border negotiations or whether it will be another in the litany of missed chances remains to be seen. It would be naive to believe that this would be final as any deal will require some mutual relinquishing of territorial claims which has so far proven unpalatable, at least for the Indian side. Even if it is achieved, changes on the border are unlikely, at least for several years, with the terrain needing to be rigorously surveyed and demarcated, a process that has proven to take over a decade in other disputed border areas and is likely to raise fresh issues during the process. Both countries are undoubtedly aware that the sooner this process gets underway, the sooner it can be completed. Nonetheless, the odds are any progress in this upcoming visit will fall short of such a final development but remain better than nothing. Whether it will adequately neutralise the border as bilateral issue remains to be seen, though it can be said with certainty that both countries diplomats’ will be engaged with this problem for many years to come.

* Stephen Westcott
Research Intern, IPCS

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