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Iran Denies Ties To Jordan Terror Suspect

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Iran is rejecting Jordanian state media reports that a suspect arrested in Jordan for allegedly planning attacks against the kingdom had ties to an Iranian group, AP reported Tuesday.

General Ramazan Sharif, spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, described the reports as “baseless.”

According to Jordanian state media, security forces also seized 45 kilograms of explosives following the arrest of the suspect, who is reported to have ties to the Beit al-Maqdis Iranian group.

Sharif dismissed the allegations as part of “phobia and propaganda” against Iran, comparing it to “past claims” by other countries, AP reported.

Original article

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Greece To Request New Financial Program

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By Henriette Jacobsen

(EurActiv) — Greece did not submit any new reform proposals at Tuesday’s (7 July) meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Brussels, but will request a new financial programme tomorrow, according to Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem.

New Greek Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos, carried many documents under his arm as he walked into the Council’s Lex building for the extraordinary meeting, but made no new suggestions to solve the crisis.

Instead, Greece will request a new programme on Wednesday (8 July), Dijsselbloem said, and ministers will take part in a Eurogroup conference call afterwards.

A week ago, Greece failed to make €1.6 billion loan payment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), becoming the first developed country to default on an IMF loan. On 20 July, Greece has to repay the European Central Bank (ECB) another €3.5 billion, or funds for its banks will likely be cut off.

Over the past six months, Greece and its creditors – the IMF, the ECB and the EU – have discussed reforms to Greece’s current bailout programme, at the request of the Greek government.

Smaller countries call for ‘Grexit’

Ahead of the Eurogroup meeting, finance ministers, especially from smaller eurozone countries, expressed their frustration with the Greek government, which won a No vote in Sunday’s referendum on whether to accept bailout terms.

Latvia’s Jānis Reirs told reporters that Greece leaving the eurozone is a solution which the financial markets already have looked into. “It won’t be a problem for Europe or Latvia,” he said.

The minister said many other EU countries have been in a similar situation to Greece, like Latvia in 2008, but these countries overcame the crisis by introducing structural reforms.

“Latvian people don’t understand the Greeks. They are surprised,” Reirs said.

Maltese finance minister Edward Scicluna pointed out that Greece, as part of the eurozone, could soon be a thing of the past.

He said that while Grexit has been mentioned previously as a threat or a stick to the country, it is now “a realistic possibility”.

No debt relief

Slovakia’s Peter Kažimír said that prolonging the bad situation would be detrimental for the country. He said that debt relief is the most delicate issue for the Eurogroup and that the issue is “impossible for me”.

While Finland’s Alexander Stubb today stated that the Eurogroup would not look into how Greece could potentially leave the eurozone, he said that the purpose of the meeting was to look at the short-term financial needs of Greece, and the role of Greece in the eurozone.

But Stubb said that the eurozone would not be ready to ease Greece’s debt burden. “We have already done that in 2011-2012. Conditionality is not going to be softened,” he said.

The solidarity with Greece has been beyond what anybody could have been expected, the Finnish finance minister said. He added that 10% of his country’s annual €50 billion budget has gone to the debt-ridden southern European country.

Luxembourg’s Pierre Gramegna pointed out that since his country is currently in charge of the rotating EU presidency, his job is to listen to everybody and see what is on the table. “I know debt restructuring is an important issue for the Greeks,” he said.

The Eurogroup meeting exposed divisions between the two Commissioners in charge of financial affairs and the euro, Pierre Moscovici and Valdis Dombrovskis. While the former said that Greece leaving the eurozone would be a collective failure, the latter declared that if the Greek government is unable to soon rebuild trust, “Grexit” can’t be excluded.

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Israel’s Sephardic Jews Act ‘Makes Spain A Better Nation’

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On the second day of their visit to the Middle East, the Spanish Minister for Justice, Rafael Catalá, and the Spanish Minister for Home Affairs, Jorge Fernández Díaz, attended various high-level meetings with members of the Israeli Government. In the morning, the Spanish delegation was received by the President of Israel, Reuven Rivlin.

Accompanied by the Director-General for International Legal Cooperation and Relations with Religious Groups, Javier Herrera, Rafael Catalá provided details about the recently approved law to grant Spanish nationality to Sephardic Jews, in which Reuven Rivlin had shown great interest.

Under this law, those Sephardic Jews who duly accredit their status and special ties to Spain will have a period of three years from the entry into force of the law in which to express their interest in acquiring Spanish nationality. This period may be extended for one additional year. The substantiation of special ties will require the successful completion of an assessment on knowledge about Spanish language, culture and customs, which will be overseen by the Cervantes Institute.

“In recent years”, said Rafael Catalá, “it has been our desire for our policies to also be based on values and sentiment, and that is the ultimate basis for the law on granting Spanish nationality to Sephardic Jews”. The Spanish minister went on to say that “this is about recognising a past mistake that seriously damaged us as a nation insofar as we lost some of the best men and women of Spain in the 15th Century. The open, diverse and tolerant Spain of 2015 is thus concluding a long process of reunion with those who, for over 500 years, have carried with them the language, culture and memory of Spain as an exemplary response to intransigence and contempt.

Rafael Catalá also stressed that Spain will be a better nation when it has recovered its ties with the Jewish people; ties that should never have been broken.

As regards the situation in the region, the Spanish Minister for Justice recalled that the Government of Spain is fully aware of its complexity and expressed the desire for collaboration based on dialogue and agreement shown by the Government of Spain and the Lower House of Parliament to President Reuven Rivlin.

The Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs also met with the National Security Advisor, Yossi Cohen, to discuss the regional situation in the Middle East and issues relating to the fight against radicalisation and Jihadi terrorism. At the meeting, they shared their concern over the situation in the region and their interest in finding tools for collaboration to make effective that fight, such as some of those already provided by the new Criminal Code in Spain.

In the afternoon, Rafael Catalá attended a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Ayelet Shaked, with whom he reviewed relations in terms of judicial cooperation between Spain and Israel within the framework of various international agreements that the two countries have signed, both in the scope of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. The two ministers agreed on the excellent health of bilateral legal relations on both civilian and criminal matters.

As regards the political situation in the region, the two ministers exchanged points of view on the possible options for taking steps in the search for a solution to the conflict. In response to the critical opinion expressed by Minister Ayelet Shaked regarding the two-State formula, Rafael Catalá expressed the Government of Spain’s support for said solution and the use of consensus and negotiation to achieve it.

Rafael Catalá also provided Ayelet Shaked with details on the recent legislative reforms undertaken by Spain on issues of particular interest to the State of Israel, such as those of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act to more effectively combat terrorism and to include the offences of hatred and incitement to violence based on ethnic or other similar grounds. He also mentioned the reform of the Constitutional Law on the Judiciary aimed at defining the application of universal justice in Spain to achieve a proper balance between the necessary search for justice and the advisability of not interfering with other jurisdictions.

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Nigeria: Public Officials Killed In Bomb Attack In North

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At least 20 people were killed in a bomb blast in the city administration offices of Zaria, in Kaduna State in northern Nigeria, confirmed the state governor Nasir Ahmad El Rufai.

Based on a first reconstruction, a suicide bomber carried out the attack.

The blast occurred as public sector staff underwent screening at government offices in the city.

On Twitter, El Rufai said people in the city should be vigilant and avoid crowded places, such as “markets, mosques and churches”, in the next few weeks.

The Islamist Boko Haram armed group has claimed various attacks in Kaduna, a complex state on an ethnic and religious viewpoint.

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HSBC Fires 6 Employees For Staging Mock Islamic State Execution Video

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HSBC has fired six employees who staged a mock Islamic State (ISIS) group-style execution during a team-building exercise.

The Sun newspaper reported Tuesday the footage posted online showed five workers wearing overalls and balaclavas laughing as a South Asian colleague wearing an orange jumpsuit knelt at their feet.

One held a coat hanger as a pretend knife while another held the kneeling man by the shoulders. One employee then yells “Allahu Akbar!” — Arabic for “God is great” — a phrase often used before hostages are slain.

HSBC says in a statement it had fired those involved in the “abhorrent” video as soon as the The Sun brought it to their attention and apologized for any offense the video caused.

The post HSBC Fires 6 Employees For Staging Mock Islamic State Execution Video appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkey: Erdogan’s Fall From Grace – Analysis

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Erdogan’s dream to preside as President during Turkey’s one hundredth anniversary in 2023 with near-absolute power and become the Atatürk of modern Turkey has now evaporated. His insatiable lust for power, arrogance, and the dictatorial manner by which he wielded his authority have finally done him in.

By Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

Turkish President Erdogan’s May 2013 plan to raze Gezi Park in Central Istanbul and replace it with a replica 19th century Ottoman barrack prompted anti-government protests in Istanbul and other cities across Turkey, which led to violent confrontations where the police used disproportionate force. Thousands of demonstrators were injured, and thousands more faced legal proceedings and lost their jobs. Some defendants were charged with terrorism offenses (many are still on trial) and many others spent up to 10 months in detention before being bailed out. I believe that the Gezi Park incident was a historic turning point marking the beginning of the end for Erdogan’s political fortunes.

What appeared to be a reaction to Erdogan’s plan was in fact triggered by a much deeper and long-simmering public resentment toward the Erdogan government. The steady erosion of sociopolitical conditions, the growing restrictions on free speech, and the pervasiveness of the governing Justice and Development (AK) Party created deep anxiety and fear among the general public as they witnessed the gradual transformation of their country from a democracy to a police state.

There are five dimensions that demonstrate how Erdogan has badly regressed from what would have otherwise been his great legacy.

The first is the social dimension in which, undoubtedly, Turkey made noteworthy progress between 2002 and 2010. In 2001, Turkey adopted the Accession Partnership that provided Ankara with a roadmap to bring about “democracy and the rule of law…, human rights and protection of minorities” as a prerequisite for EU membership negotiations to begin.

The parliament passed several laws to protect the rights of defendants and detainees, transfer supervision of civil society organizations from the police to civil authorities, institute judicial reforms, and guarantee freedom of speech. In addition, Turkey passed laws allowing Kurdish radio broadcasts as well as providing the option for private Kurdish-language education.

However, these reforms begun to erode as Erdogan started to compromise on the progress that sustained his power base, all for the sake of amassing more power, while pushing ever more the Islamization of the country.

According to Human Rights Watch’s 2015 World Report, the government increasingly betrayed its principles and committed violations, including unjustified prosecutions for alleged speech crimes, the “abusive” use of terrorism charges such as “membership of an armed organization,” prolonged pretrial detention (especially of journalists, student and lawyers), and the systematic intimidation of any individual or party that objects to, or opposes, government policy, not to speak of the rampant corruption at the top.

The second dimension is the political reforms that Erdogan has embraced, including changes in Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) regulations to reduce the military’s omnipotent power over it by increasing its number of civilian members and appointing a civilian as Secretary General, increased governmental transparency, and the abolishment of the State Security Courts.

In recent years, however, Erdogan started to freeze these political reforms and rob them of their essential purpose of developing a progressive form of democratic governance. He used a democratic façade to direct electoral authoritarianism, where politically-motivated indictments detained nearly one-third of the high military brass, and government opponents were put under house arrest on trumped-up charges of conspiring to topple the government.

The third dimension is economic development, where the government aggressively embraced capitalism and, due to diplomatic openings in the global market (especially in the Middle East), managed to open several new markets for Turkish exports.

These efforts have accelerated economic growth to unprecedented levels in Turkey’s modern history. From the time the AK Party took power in 2002, Turkey’s per capita income almost tripled by 2011, with the GDP exceeding $774 billion that year, making it the eighteenth largest economy in the world.

That said, Turkey’s economic growth has not benefited the Turkish population equitably. Tens of millions of people still suffer from economic disparity. In 2012, the Turkish economy’s growth slowed to 2.2 percent, far behind the 9 percent growth of 2010 and 2011, a downturn that has seriously eroded Erdogan’s political base.

The fourth dimension is foreign policy, which was centered on the principle doctrine of ensuring “zero problems with neighbors” that Prime Minister Davutoğlu (the then-foreign minister) espoused and worked diligently to implement.

Yet presently, the picture looks drastically different. There is hardly any neighboring country (and many others in the region) that Turkey does not have a problem with, including Armenia, Greece (over Cyprus), Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, etc.

Turkey has also strained its relations with the US and the EU over their differing policy toward Syria and the campaign against ISIS. The irony is that while “zero problems with neighbors” requires political and diplomatic savviness to resolve problems, Erdogan largely opted for a confrontational approach.  The fifth dimension is the growing imbalance between Islam and democracy. By all accounts, the government has gone far beyond a healthy mix of religion and democracy. Erdogan has systematically embraced religiously-oriented policies both domestically and within Turkey’s foreign relations. He favors any organization or country with strong Islamic credentials (such as Qatar and Hamas) over others, regardless of the conflicting issues involved.

Instead of striking a balance between a democratic form of government and Islam as the religion of the state, Erdogan’s deliberate abandonment of political and social reforms in favor of growing Islamic indoctrination (in contradiction to the republic’s founding principle) began to backfire. Erdogan badly underestimated the strength and popularity of Turkish secularism.

To be sure, Erdogan’s backsliding on all fronts has finally caught up with him. His successes during his first two terms seem to have blinded him. As a result, his ambition to change the constitution to grant him near-absolute power as president was overwhelmingly rejected by the electorate.

The Turkish public will do well to remember that only through the power of the ballot were they able to stifle Erdogan’s blind ambition, and by the wise use of the ballot in the future they can restore Turkey’s potential as a great democratic power and a significant player on the global stage.

Erdogan’s dream to preside as President during Turkey’s one hundredth anniversary in 2023 with near-absolute power and become the Atatürk of modern Turkey has now evaporated. His insatiable lust for power, arrogance, and the dictatorial manner by which he wielded his authority have finally done him in.

As Shakespeare once observed, “it is excellent to have a giant’s strength; but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant.”

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

The post Turkey: Erdogan’s Fall From Grace – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Chinese Submarines In IOR: Game Changers? – Analysis

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By P K Ghosh*

If media reports are to be believed, the alarm bells in the Indian Ministry of Defence have been ringing again – the ministry was once again taken aback when a modern Yuan-class 335 conventional submarine crossed the Arabian Sea and entered Karachi port on May 22 for a week.

But such “surprises” had occurred earlier, when Chinese boats docked in Sri Lanka at the end of last year – upsetting India considerably – and yet again when the Chinese deployed a Shang-class nuclear submarine for anti-piracy patrols – a unique deployment unheard of in submarine operations. The unending saga of surprises never seems to cease, with little action on New Delhi’s part to respond to its growing concerns about the Chinese operating in an area perceived by many as India strategic backyard.

Indeed, India’s responses have been woefully inadequate, on the equipment front with thirteen aging submarines in its fleet (many of which are under repair) and a long delayed Scorpene project (with the first boat expected to roll out in 2016). The P75I project has yet to even get off the drawing board, hindered by strident calls for it to be a model “make in India” project, albeit with foreign help.

On the strategic front, a pusillanimous attitude towards participating in tri or quadrilateral naval exercises with the U.S., Australia and Japan have placed India in limbo, while attempts to get other friendly littorals within a common maritime security grid have produced mixed results.

To be fair, the Chinese are not doing anything illegal and as a growing maritime nation are only following in the footsteps of earlier rising powers Britain, the U.S., and the Soviet Union by expanding their “power projection” capabilities beyond their immediate waters into the strategically relevant Indian Ocean region. They are in effect following their maritime strategy of “going out” and building relationships across the region for the safety of critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs), while also projecting power. Moreover, Pakistan is scheduled to purchase eight of the modern Yuan-class submarines (Type 093A) and the recent visit would have been a good opportunity to display the operational performance of this class of boats to the buyers.

Many analysts have linked the frequent deployment of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with the unfolding strategic Great Game and the dynamics of the balance of power in the region. However, the question is whether individual Chinese submarines really do serve as “game changers” within the context of the regional dynamics.

It must be remembered that submarines, although they are force multipliers of sorts and create awe amongst adversaries, need to be deployed in constrained spaces such as choke points (whether virtual or real) or off harbors to be effective. Hence, submarines by themselves cannot be game changers in any real sense of the word. However, the Chinese are not just making forays with a few submarines; Beijing plans to build forward bases (virtual or real) for frequent naval deployments in the region while enhancing naval relations with South/Southeast Asian and East African countries in a bid to develop its famous “string of pearls” policy. Needless to say, in any such encirclement strategy, the role of China’s all-weather friend Pakistan will be stellar. Pakistan’s geographical location next to the Gulf, coupled with its growing economic dependence on China, has fostered an ideal symbiotic relationship that could well encourage deep naval partnership.

Interestingly, the Chinese Maritime Silk Route initiative, ostensibly proposed to create economic hubs in the ports of the region and exclusively for trade and economic purposes, may well help enhance maritime relations with these countries. Thus, the deployment of Chinese submarines is indicative of a larger game plan that seems to be unfolding and needs to be analyzed carefully.

Still, at the tactical level the deployment sent a strategic message, especially to the Indian security establishment, which has endlessly debated the implications of the Chinese naval forays into the IOR – specifically, that the People’s Liberation Army Navy has the ability to project and sustain its blue water reach, operating thousands of miles from its base for an extended period of time. Interestingly, the earlier Xia-class Chinese nuclear submarines were unable to operate for even short periods beyond nearby waters. The newer submarines are far superior technologically, with China reaffirming its prowess in creating high-tech weapons platforms.

Given that the Chinese submarines are likely to be found operating frequently in the IOR, the Indian defense establishment must develop some adequate responses, rather than just being alarmed repeatedly. The Ministry of Defence must probe China’s maritime vulnerabilities and stop bending to perceived Chinese apprehensions. At the inventory level it is necessary to reverse the nation’s depleting submarine strength by commencing the P75 I project, while enhancing ASW capabilities on surface ships. At the strategic level, India must encourage quadrilateral naval exercises in the Indian Ocean with its maritime partners, the U.S., Japan, and Australia and undertake expansive maritime relations with the littorals in the IOR. It must take a holistic view of the current developments and bolster naval partnerships in an attempt to get the friendly littorals into a security grid.

*Dr. P K Ghosh is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.

Courtesy: thediplomat.com

The post Chinese Submarines In IOR: Game Changers? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Japan: Empowering The Youth – Analysis

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On 17 June 2015, the Japanese Diet passed a bill to lower the voting age to 18 from 20, adding 2.4 million new potential voters to the nation’s current voting population of 104 million and to the country’s rapidly greying electorate.. Japan last changed its voting age in 1945 when Japanese women gained the right to vote, when it lowered the requirement from 25 to 20. This is the first extension of suffrage in Japan since then. Japan’s decision is in conformity with the world’s trend of empowering the youth in the process of governance as 90 % of nations across the world have a voting age of 18. However, it is a matter of concern that Japanese youths are not particularly active in exercising their franchise. For example, less than a third of 20-something voted in the last general election. With 26% of the country over the age of 65, Japan has the world’s fastest aging population.

The legislation will come into effect when elections are held for the Upper House in the summer of 2016, unless the more powerful Lower House is dissolved first for a snap election. It may be remembered that a similar law was passed in 2014 lowering the voting age to 18 in 2018 for national referendums on the Constitution. In an ageing society, politicians have often courted older voters with generous pension benefits, which have led to ballooning the national debt as Japan rapidly ages. In contrast to the voters’ turnout in the younger age category, those in their 60s and over 70s were 68 % in the last general elections.

The latest enactment of law of 17 June is the biggest reform of the nation’s electoral laws in 70 years. The intention behind the law is to encourage younger voters who have remained politically inactive so far. After the Lower House approved the bill to revise the Public Offices Election law, the Upper House unanimously passed it. Hereon, the “voices of young people will be more reflected in politics”, observed the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga. This new law gives added responsibility to the teachers in senior high schools and universities to educate their wards the importance of exercising their right to vote. The promulgation of the revised law shall apply to both national and local elections whenever they are held.

Earlier a survey made by the National Diet Library in 2014 had found that over 80% of the 198 countries in the world have set their minimum voting ages at 18. The lower of the voting age would also mean that political parties need now to revise their electioneering strategies targeting not just the elderly but also take into consideration the aspiration and expectations of the younger lot. Drawing the younger voters to participate at the electioneering whenever they are held by discarding their lethargic attitude will be a new challenge because the elderly segment are more responsive whenever elections are held to cast their franchise. What this author has observed during his several visits to Japan is that the younger generation of the Japanese are least interested in the country’s politics and the governance process. Therefore drawing this segment into the political process cannot be taken for granted. It is likely that the 2.4 million new voters shall remain relevant for only statistical purposes as not a higher percentage from this segment is expected to exercise their franchise. That seems to be a short-term scenario.

The question that arises is that given the apathy of the younger generation if there was no popular demand for lowering the voting age, what was the provocation for the Abe administration to do this at this point of time? Prime Minister Abe seeks to amend the war-renouncing Constitution for the first time since it took effect nearly 70 years ago. The minimum voting age for national referendums on constitutional amendments is already set to be reduced to 18 from 20 in 2018, under a revision to the national referendum law that was enacted in 2014. Simultaneously, the statutory age of adulthood may also be reduced from 20 and the maximum age covered by the Juvenile Law from 19. This could be a tricky issue as the issue of lowering the age ceiling in the Juvenile Law is controversial. There is no consensus on whether 18- and 19-year-olds should be punished in the same manner as adults. A related issue that too needs to be resolved is whether the minimum age for eligibility to run for public office lowered. At present, the minimum eligibility age to run for Lower House elections is 25 and 30 for the Upper House seats. There are other issues too. Empowering the youth in the age group of 18-20 in the category giving the right to vote would also mean empowering them to engage in election campaigns. But what happens if they are accused or suspected of committing serious violations of electoral laws, such as vote buying. Will they be prosecuted for such violations? There is no clarity on such issues at the moment.

There are some students who are in the new eligible voters’ list upbeat at the new opportunity to exercise their responsibility. Though some of them are disenchanted with the entire political system, they are also sceptical that much would change with the change. The young voters are critical of the most aging politicians and yet are unwilling to take up responsibility. That is basically the problem of the present Japanese society. Too much of materialism has insulated the youth from taking serious decisions as their perspective of life does not go beyond personal comforts. This lot has little interest in national affairs. This is a new challenge the Japanese society is facing. While many say that there are not many politicians with policies who deserve to be elected, they are not prepared to offer any alternatives. Many of this empowered youth lack enough knowledge about getting involved in public affairs. This issue needs to be addressed while they are either in the senior high schools or at universities so that political awareness is cultivated.

Greater involvement of young people in the political processes would strengthen democracy. Though 18 is the standard voting age as is the case in other parts of the world, Japan is late in joining the international mainstream. Though the lowering of the voting age accounts for a mere 2 per cent of all voters nationwide, the induction into the political processes of the young voters may induce important changes in society. With low birth rate and Japan being a greying society, the government faces huge fiscal deficits and increased social security expenditures. The induction of the youth into the political mainstream could bring in new perspective to tackle this situation.

In order to achieve this objective, an element of activism into the nation’s educational system needs to be introduced to create awareness among the youth about their political responsibility. The Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry plans to distribute supplementary materials explaining the election system and election law violations to all high school students this year, in cooperation with the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry. Holding mock elections that simulate the experience of going to the polls could be another means to educate the youth. However, care needs to be given that such exercises do not drift towards political indoctrination and ensure that political neutrality is maintained. The extension of suffrage “should be regarded as an opportunity to increase youths’ interest in politics and to implement more policy measures in which more importance will be attached to younger generations, who are the bearers of Japan’s future”.

As said, the youths need to take seriously the importance of exercising their franchise. It is a matter of concern that the voter turnout in the Lower House elections at the end of 2014 hit a post-war low at 52.66 per cent, and the turnout for those in their 20s was 32.58 %, less than half the figure for those in their 60s at 68.28 %. Therefore, increasing awareness at the school and university amongst the youth about participatory democracy is needed. This does not mean to suggest that any political indoctrination should be done; on the contrary explaining to respect different views and deepening their opinions on various issues through debate will help students learn the rules of democracy. At the same time, students must not be discouraged to discuss specific policy measures under the name of political neutrality. Greater participation in politics could mean injecting a new force to change track. The revised law offers a good opportunity to the new eligible voters to scrutinise the policies of political parties and individual candidates before casting their ballots in public office elections.

The revised law has different implications from the point of view of increased life expectancy in Japan. Japan is a country full of elderly people and has the highest life expectancy of any major country, with women averaging 87 to men 80, compared to 81 years for Americans and 76 for American women. Diet has been a major factor contributing to the longevity of Japanese people. It is amazing that being a stressful place with immaculate sense for punctuality where being late is frowned upon, Japanese still manage to live long amidst stress. Cuisine could be a major factor contributing to this.

The current legislation takes a long term perspective of what the Japanese society would be in the coming years as there shall be serious imbalance in the age category and therefore empowering the youth is in the right perspective. According to projections made by researchers, Japan will have no children under the age of 15 in 999 years if the current trend continues, which means Japan faces ‘extinction’ in 1,000 years. Japan’s under-15 population fell to 16.6 million in 2012 from 16.9 million in 2011 and if this trend continues, Japan’s demographic situation is a matter of worry. Besides the economics of ageing, Japan’s population clock suggests that the child population of Japan shall drop one every 100 second and going by this rate, Children Day 3012 (May 5) will never come. The overall trend is towards extinction and this started in 1975 when Japan’s fertility rate fell below two per women. Japanese law makers hope, and rightly so, that empowering the youth and getting them involved in the process of governance, shall address to some of this impending problems that Japanese society is going to face in the coming years.

Dr. Panda, former Senior Fellow at the IDSA, is a leading expert on Japan from India, based in New Delhi. He can be reached at rajaram.panda@gmail.com

The post Japan: Empowering The Youth – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


A New Take On Britain’s Chronic Identity Crisis – Analysis

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By Neil Thompson

The United Kingdom has been a fixture of European and global politics for several centuries and remains a key player. But after decades of decline the next few years seem certain to test the integrity of its political make-up as it faces the consequences of a long avoided question: What does Britain stand for in the twenty-first century?

As a state the UK is still a key global player diplomatically and militarily. It plays leading roles in the EU, UN, and Nato among other institutions. Even within these organizations it has retained its independence of action and the ability to surprise, such as when it recently applied to join China’s nascent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This caused a rare breach with its close ally the United States and prompted a flurry of applications from other European countries. But while the UK still commands attention abroad, at home there has long been a sense of malaise at the direction the country has taken.

Composed of at least four distinct ‘nationalities’ plus a multitude of regional, religious, and linguistic identities, the British state was always an awkward construct to have to manage as a political unit, even before it became the melting pot of migrants it is today. The territories that would eventually form the United Kingdom were originally only joined by their (frequently forced) allegiance to a thuggish series of tenuously interlinked royal dynasties. Some areas, such as the Scottish Highlands or the Border retained their separate status for centuries after their supposed integration into ‘England’ or ‘Scotland,’ never mind the idea of a United Kingdom. The largest two parts of the United Kingdom shared a king for over a century before two thrones became one. Britain today is still not a national federation along the lines of Australia or the United States. Political union through the ‘personal union’ of a divinely chosen monarch did not merge the inhabitants of the British Isles into a unified people.

Indeed the original reason behind the creation of the United Kingdom in the 18th century was a political project from the top. The new kingdom of Great Britain was intended as the central hub of a British Empire that included neighboring Ireland. Though Ireland was belatedly inducted into the UK in the early 19th century, the partition of that island between the heavily colonized north and the freer south showed how shallow and legalistic the idea of a centrally imposed ‘British’ identity could be. The Empire’s demise has since nullified the Union’s original purpose for the English and Scottish upper classes. Meanwhile the end of the industrialization that was associated with being British for many workers in the 19th and 20th centuries has left a big void of purpose at the heart of many UK communities around the country.

The story of the UK since the mid-twentieth century, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, has been the resurgence of local and national pride. The devolution of powers to Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland is one result. But even within England there has been a move away from the center. Cornwall in the south-west of England was granted the status of a protected national minority in 2014. Meanwhile the deindustrialized north of England has long resented the economic and cultural dominance of the capital and the feeling is often mutual. Now plans are afoot to try to create a northern counterbalance to London. The UK has long been considered unusual in lacking a second large city outside the capital that can generate substantial national economic activity. The sense of economic disadvantage stemming from geographic distance from London’s prosperous classes feeds wider discontent. As elsewhere in the digital world the periphery is in revolt against the center.

Britain’s national political parties have fallen victim to this trend. For much of the recent past their energy went in to political and social reform rather than questions of identity. In the last twenty years this has included a concerted effort to devolve power back down to a local level in a previously over-centralized state. But many of their arguments, such as their 2014 campaign in favor of Scotland remaining inside the UK, seem to boil down to an appeal to economic self-interest over personal conviction. Troublingly often British politicians have failed to make the case for a common British identity that adds up to more than numbers. Since the demise of industry and empire the UK has not sought a new national narrative such as America’s Manifest Destiny, Scandinavia’s collective promotion of peace and human rights or the republicanism of France’s slogan ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité.’ The result is anti-European and separatist sentiment has continued to spread through the British electorate, whose advocates sound passionate and have the appeal of novelty without responsibility.

Yet the British people actually share more in common than they may think at first. A recent DNA study of Britons has shown that genetically those of Celtic ancestry in Scotland and Cornwall were more similar to their English neighbors than they were to each other. Ancestry is no respecter of later political frontiers it seems. In Scotland today the case might be made against separation from the UK because of the infrastructure, economics and military consequences. I prefer to make it based on the narrative of a common past that saw a hodgepodge of unrelated groups of British ‘subjects’ successfully struggle to assert their rights against first the monarchy and then the upper classes of each era. From the Magna Carta to the suffragettes’ movement, it is these people who made Britain what it is today. Our notions of personal liberty, democracy, and human rights (however far we have sometimes strayed from them in practice) have been the UK’s most enduring and influential global export and continue to shape the modern world.

Many Britons’ sense of these shared cultural values has been strained by the huge disruptive effects of changes in technology, the labor market, and geopolitics that have occurred in just thirty-five years. Since the end of the post-war consensus in 1979, the UK has grown richer, yet more divided. It is more diverse and multi-ethnic, yet smaller and has a less important geopolitical role to play. The devolution of the UK has opened up the space for different expressions of modern Britishness to appear, and thus a gap in expectations of the Union to be exposed. What an Ulster Unionist voter in Belfast and a first generation immigrant in London think of as being ‘British’ is very different. To an SNP voter ‘British’ is often just code for ‘English.’ The idea of there being a British identity can seem like an ideological straitjacket that was invented, after the fact, to justify the creation of an artificial political union from a monarch’s personal estates.

I would turn that argument on its head and say that the very artificiality of an overarching British identity in an era of multiple overlapping loyalties is a good thing. Like these islands I am a patchwork of different peoples and places. For example I am the son of an English father and a Scottish mother, who was born in Aberdeen and grew up in the north-west of England. I went to study in Scotland for my university education and today work in London. The identity of being ‘British’ is broad and flexible enough combine all these parts of me and more. The civic nationalism of a British identity is less reductionist than the ethnic nationalism of an English, Scottish or Welsh nationalist. It includes those of us who don’t feel particularly ‘Welsh,’ ‘English,’ or ‘Scottish’ but who are still part of the population of these islands.

With a large first generation immigrant population and the next generation a diverse and heterodox group the time is right to make an argument that an open, post-imperial British identity is the only way the peoples of these islands will thrive in the 21st century. Separation, whether from Europe or each other, is in the end only political theater. It does not change the deeper issues facing us all about the future of work in an age of job-destroying smart information technology, or the fraying ties between British governments and their people, or more effective in tackling global problems like climate change, migration, terrorism, or transnational crime. If Britain were to shrink we would only all be diminished culturally and politically. A successful three hundred year old union deserves better treatment than that from its members.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

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Iran Nuclear Deal: Expect Limited US-Iran Détente – Analysis

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The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries have witnessed unprecedented diplomatic engagement between the United States and Iran. Contrary to expectations, a final nuclear deal will not achieve a significant rapprochment, but only a limited détente in US-Iran ties.

By Sumitha Narayanan Kutty*

A final nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) will have far-reaching implications. The 80 million-strong country ends its isolation and the world’s last frontier market will be finally open for business.

Of course, this will come about only if Iran complies with an intrusive verification and monitoring regime for at least 10 years ( per the framework agreed in April). Sanctions will be lifted in a phased manner only if these “agreed-upon benchmarks” are met. Through this period, the breakout time of the Iranian nuclear programme will be kept at one year. Perhaps the most awaited historic change is that of a détente in Iran – United States relations.

The day after a deal

When American Secretary of State John Kerry met Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on the sidelines of the UN summit in September 2013, it was the first substantive high-level interaction between the two countries in 30 years. Following this meeting, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s 15-minute phone conversation with US President Barack Obama was most significant.

Subsequently, there has been a strong demonstration of commitment from both sides to resolve the nuclear issue. Kerry and Zarif have met at each round of talks and together worked long hours to hammer out various stages of the agreement.

So what does the day after the deal hold for this relationship? The realisation of a nuclear deal cannot be extrapolated to imply a significant thaw in US-Iran relations. Both sides have made it amply clear that their present mandate focuses purely on the nuclear problem and will not extend beyond that.

Thus, in the short term, an Iran-US détente remains limited.Here’s why.

What does not change

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Iranian regime has rallied around anti-Americanism. For the 75-year-old Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his legacy after a nuclear deal will shape the future of Iran’s political system. Only the second Supreme Leader of the state, Khamenei has no intention of challenging the status quo or cozying up to the ‘Great Satan’ in direct contradiction to the core principles of the Islamic revolution.

He played a very delicate balancing act during the negotiations process. As soon as indications of optimism emerged from Lausanne or Geneva, Khamenei would yank the conversation back into the anti-American orbit with tough rhetoric, tweets, or messages at Friday prayer sessions.

A second constraint on both Iranian and American ends is domestic politics.

In the Iranian case, the president’s powers are limited. Hassan Rouhani does not dictate Iran’s foreign policy. It is the Supreme Leader who has the constitutional authority to do so. Even though the negotiations with the West began with Khamenei’s blessings, the Iranian hardliners (the far right conservatives closest to Khamenei) have not played nice with Rouhani and his cabinet. They have spared no efforts to keep Rouhani in check given that he was elected on a populist mandate. Furthering engagement with the US will prove detrimental to his political career.

On the American side, President Obama would have already expended a great deal of political capital to bring a nuclear deal with Iran to fruition. Getting a Republican-majority Congress to take a middle-of-the-road approach in an election year would be tremendously taxing by itself, leaving a reduced appetite for wider engagement with Iran. That battle would be left for the winner of the 2016 presidential race to follow through, if he or she thought fit.

Third, a nuclear deal will not change the US’ stance on Iran being a state sponsor of terrorism. In May, Obama called out the country yet again for supporting “violent proxies inside the borders of other nations”. The US State Department labelled Iran a “serious threat” facing the US and its allies in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism released in June. A nuclear deal will also not deter Iran’s activities in Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen. Furthermore, Washington will not overlook human rights violations and detentions of American citizens by the Iranian regime.

Another major factor that limits the warming up of US-Iran ties are America’s commitments to its allies in the Middle East – primarily, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The issue of US rapprochement with Iran was powerful enough to bring these traditional rivals together. After the deal, the Obama administration will have to adopt policies that reassure these allies, specifically on the security front. Such posturing will only further discourage bilateral engagement with Iran.

A final consideration is this – even if Iran’s economy gradually opens up, American businesses cannot engage with Iran. This is because the US does not plan to lift the “primary” sanctions against Iran anytime soon. These sanctions prohibit companies owned by US individuals (and their subsidiaries) from doing business with Iran.

Modest opportunities

Despite the above factors, there may be some room to manoeuver in a post-deal environment.

The stability of Afghanistan and the fight against Islamic State (IS) are two major issues where the US and Iran currently find common ground. It is possible that a nuclear deal may dissuade the Iranians from flirting further with the Taliban or harming American interests in Afghanistan. On combating IS, both sides have not ruled out the possibility. However, the US will first demand that Iran demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear deal.

What definitely changes though is this – there will be a rise in people-to-people interactions. Certain forms of academic engagement were authorised by the Obama government on Nowruz (the Persian New Year) last year. This is expected to gain momentum after a deal. In the medium term, there are proposals floating in Washington to establish an interests section in the Swiss embassy that currently manages American interests. Yet another idea is to house a trade representative there.

An Iranian nuclear deal certainly sets change into motion, just not in the days right after an agreement. There are some modest opportunities here but a significant rapprochment between Iran and the US remains unlikely.

*Sumitha Narayanan Kutty is Associate Research Fellow, South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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Re-Configuring The Middle East: Islamic State And Changing Demographics – Analysis

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The Syrian civil war and Iraqi sectarian conflicts involving Islamic State (IS) have had far-reaching consequences for the demographics across the region. Once a relatively ethnically homogeneous autonomous region, Iraqi Kurdistan has seen its demography change radically as large numbers of Arab refugees pour into what was once an independent Kurdish state-in-waiting. The influx of refugees fleeing areas of Iraq controlled by IS and fighting across the country, has pitted the Iraqi military and Shia militias against the jihadists.

As a result, it is in Kurdistan where the impact of IS on borders and demographics is likely to have the most immediate and far-reaching consequences. That is all the more true given that neither Syria nor Iraq are likely to remain the nation states that they were since achieving independence.

Consequences for Kurdish independence

That has consequences for Kurdish aspirations for independence that peaked in the immediate wake of last year’s sweep of northern Iraq in which IS captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Initially, Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), responded to the IS blitzkrieg by seizing control of the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk and speeding up his timetable for a referendum in which the Kurds would vote on declaring independence.

However, with non-Kurdish refugees who are likely to stay for the foreseeable future, if not sprout roots, now accounting for almost a third of Iraqi Kurdistan’s population of 5.2 million, prospects for independence have been significantly complicated. The stream of refugees is imposing a mixed complexion on what was once a region with an almost exclusively Kurdish identity. This unintended fallout of the refugee stream ironically fits IS’ anti-nationalist vision of a pan-Islamic empire (caliphate).

The continuous military threat posed by IS has also forced Barzani to temper his aspirations. Ironically the reverse is happening in north-western Syria, where Arab Sunnis accuse Syrian Kurds, who have recently scored significant victories against IS, of cleansing areas they control in preparation of a future Syrian Kurdish state.

Multiple sensitivities

The refugee influx involves multiple sensitivities. Like in Jordan and Lebanon where refugees from Syria and Iraq have already changed demographic balances and are putting severe strains on the countries’ service infrastructures, Arabs are competing on Kurdistan’s job market at often far lower wages than the local Kurdish population had become accustomed to. Similarly, rents and real estate prices have skyrocketed limiting access to local Kurds who no longer can afford the hikes.

Potential social tensions that have already become visible in Lebanon and Syria could take on an extra dimension in Iraq where Kurds and Arabs have long co-existed uneasily. Kurds have not forgotten that Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons in his bid to subdue Kurds who were seeking autonomy. Immediately after Saddam’s fall in 2003, Kurds forced the departure of Arabs who had settled in Kurdistan with Saddam’s encouragement.

Signs of bubbling tension are becoming visible among a Kurdish population sympathetic to those fleeing discrimination, repression and violence because of their own history of suppression. Kurds are beginning to voice resentment that they are having to fight IS on the frontline to protect the Arabs seeking refuge in their midst.

The threat of social tensions is enhanced by IS’ interest in stoking problems between Kurds and Arabs. A Kurdish student admitted responsibility in April for a car bomb that exploded near the US consulate in the KRG capital of Erbil.

Separatism on the rise

Analysts have praised Jordan and Lebanon for maintaining calm despite mounting tensions between Syrian refugees, who account for up to 25 percent of the population, and the local population despite regular flareups between them. Tensions are visible in Turkey too but with a population of 75 million, Turkey has less demographic and identity problems in absorbing the refugees.

The rise of IS has moreover not only created a puritan Islamist entity in the heart of the Middle East that is irredentist and expansionary in nature, it has also fuelled long-standing Kurdish nationalist aspirations and sparked separatist trends among many other groups.

Iraqi Sunnis are divided with scores fleeing to Kurdistan while others fearful of rising anti-Sunni Shia nationalism see IS as the lesser of two evils. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite minority may see a retreat to its heartland on the Syrian coast as the only way to escape the wrath of his opponents should he be unable to hold on to the capital Damascus. Separatist tendencies are also emerging in Iraq’s relatively safe and oil-rich Shia south that is the economic engine for the government in Baghdad.

Across the Middle East, IS and violent conflict are changing realities on the ground and forcing multiple ethnic and religious groups to reconsider their options. In Kurdistan collapsing oil prices add to the cost of accommodating refugees and have altered what Patrick Osgood, the Kurdistan bureau chief for the Iraq Oil Report, calls “the mathematics of when the KRG can exit Iraq”. Osgood notes that “the (demographic) numbers (now) weigh in favour of doing a deal within the federal system” of Iraq rather than opting for independence.

As noted by Fuad Hussein, Barzani’s chief of staff: “You cannot sleep if ISIS is your neighbour. You will have many nightmares. The reality is now different. We are facing a threat … the bubble has burst.”

This article was published by RSIS

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Warrior Economist: The Varoufakis Legacy – OpEd

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“And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride.” — Yanis Varoufakis, Jul 6, 2015

It was always going to be difficult for Greece’s Yanis Varoufakis to remain in his post after Sunday’s victory for the Syriza coalition. Seemingly playing his own variant of game theory, Varoufakis got what he wanted: a resounding rejection of the bailout-austerity terms by sovereign will. Even in the flush of triumph, its value was always going to be tempered by casualties. Such have been the costly spoils of economic war.

When the choking dust settles on this European tragedy, finance minister Varoufakis will remain one of its great, if not notorious figures displayed in historical big print. He proved aggressive and flinty in his confrontation. His fellow finance ministers squirmed under his lecturing barrage on debt relief and renegotiated terms with the Troika. “They are unanimous in their hate for me – and I welcome their hatred.”

But the Varoufakis style singes and burns. It does not abide much short of getting the goods. It is individual – notably, he remained outside Syriza’s membership during his time in office. He keeps shirts untucked for battle. He doesn’t wear ties. Nothing additional needed when the pugilists come out to play.

The German media was immediately taken by Greece’s new warrior economist, falling for the flamboyance. He became the “Bruce Willis” of financial negotiations, after a ZDF news anchor could not resist the comparison as he stormily held the fort against the creditor’s clutches. “Varoufakis is without doubt a man full of charisma,” claimed the swooning Marietta Slomka. “Visually, he is someone you could imagine starring in a film like ‘Die Hard 6’ – he’s an interesting character.”

Stern magazine decided to recall the precedents of antiquity, seeing the finance minister as a figure transmogrified into marble. “He rattles around Athens on a big, black mortorcycle, never tucks his shirts in and radiates a sort of classical masculinity that you usually see in Greek statues.”

Die Welt decided to run with “What makes Yanis Varoufakis a sex icon.” There was a certain tabloid tone, pondering that “balding head, cool style and muscular Yamaha motorcycle.” Debt negotiations had ceased to be dull. While having not succeeded in forcing “any creditors to their knees,” the economics academic “is shaking up the suits in Europe with a casual appearance and cool stare.”[1]

In June, his startling manner, part bouncer, part buccaneer, was visibly agitating colleagues on his side of the anti-austerity fence. The crisis, more than ever, was showing that Greece was not an island, and even Syriza’s grouping was wondering whether this, by implication, was what Varoufakis was seeking. Could Greece be free within Europe, or out of it?

Certainly, Varoufakis used all the images of war and terror appropriate for Greece’s appalling predicament. Prior to Sunday’s vote, his comments on economic terrorism on the part of the creditors cut to the bone. On receiving the referendum results, he colourfully penned that the referendum “will stay in history as a unique moment when a small European nation rose up against debt-bondage.”

The parallel currency option was certainly suggesting that the EU yoke had to be thrown off. This was the language of serfdom and acute bondage. To save Europe, Athens would have to effectively walk away.

Varoufakis’ writings show a preoccupation with the theme of Europe as a modern market disease. The European Union, as he argued in the New York-based art magazine Brooklyn Rail, had become the great commodifier of culture, utilising the tools of the Single Market and bureaucracy.[2] “For three decades now exchange value has been wiping the floor clean with any other form of value”.

The public sphere had been retreating for years; the demos was falling silent even as the market was roaring with savage confidence. Territorial borders are terrifying; but not having citizen participation to tame economic forces is even more so. In 1978, when France’s Valéry Giscard D’Estaing and Germany’s Helmut Schmidt contemplated a common monetary system before the remains of Charlemagne, totemic figure of European unity, they were engaging in an act of “euro-kitsch ‘pilgrimage’”. Less than four decades later, Europe was effectively “divided by a common currency.”

With the No vote victory, it was time for Alexis Tsipras to get down to the tables and do more talking. This meant removing the weapon that was Varoufakis. (For some months, he had actually been concealed from finance meetings to avoid further excitement.) To make a deal, few expected it to happen with the strident economist in the room. The revolver had to be put away.

“Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants [eurozone finance ministers], and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the prime minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance today.”[3]

As he slums on the back benches, gazing at the arena of combat, Greece’s financial system is starved of funds; chronic shortages are manifesting themselves across the economy; and some of Europe’s finance ministers are pondering life after a potential exit. A “proper resolution” now will have to involve “debt restructuring, less austerity, redistribution in favour of the needy, and real reforms.”

No one familiar with this episode will forget that Varoufakis was the child of a crisis born from a failure. Instead of settling for the wet hen, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev explained on the art of compromise in 1958, he never gave up seeking the bird of paradise.

Notes:
[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-eurozone-greece-varoufakis-germany-idUSKBN0LD1RI20150209

[2] http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/03/31/reaching-for-our-revolvers-how-a-united-europe-defused-its-culture-and-divided-its-people/

[3] http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/06/minister-no-more

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Finally, Modi Goes To Russia – Analysis

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By Uma Purushothaman*

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi this week makes his maiden visit as Prime Minister to Russia, one of India’s closest strategic partners. This seeming delay in travelling to Russia may surprise some, given that the Prime Minister has travelled to almost all the major powers—US, Germany, France, China, Japan, Australia and Brazil—as well as most of India’s immediate neighbourhood.

But it is not a sign of flagging interest in Indo-Russia ties. In fact, President Vladimir Putin and Modi have met thrice since May 2014—at the BRICS Summit at Fortaleza, at the G20 Summit in Brisbane and at the Annual India-Russia Summit of the heads of Government in New Delhi in December 2014. This incidentally is the only such Annual Summit mechanism, which India has with any country. In addition to this, there have been visits by several high level delegations from both sides, including by President Pranab Mukherjee for Russia’s Victory Day celebrations.

India, along with China, has had a special place in Russian foreign policy ever since the Ukraine crisis. They are the only two major powers, which have not been openly critical of Russia. India despite discomfort with referendums and the idea of hybrid wars, having faced the brunt of this strategy used by Pakistan for many years in Punjab and more recently in Jammu and Kashmir.

New Delhi and Moscow have a special relationship forged by their cooperation during the Cold War. For India, Russia continues to be a major source of arms and military technology and a strong supporter at multilateral forums. India has also expressed interest in cooperating with the Eurasian Union, a pet project of President Putin.

Moreover, there are striking similarities between Putin and Modi. Both are strong personalities. Both have appealed to nationalism in their electoral campaigns.

Finally, both have experience of Western attempts to isolate them.However, this is not to say that the all is well with the relationship. India watches with concern Russia’s growing closeness with China, widely perceived in India as the main strategic challenge. New Delhi is particularly worried about their growing military cooperation. Earlier, Russia had adopted a discriminatory approach to military technology transfer to India and China, always ensuring that India got more advanced technology than China did. This policy now seems to be under pressure with the Russians reportedly selling the SU-35s and the S 400 air defence systems to Beijing.

Additionally, in the last couple of years, Russia has reinvigorated its relationship with Pakistan and has offered it Mi-35 Hind E heavy attack helicopters, apparently to fight against militants. A Russia-China-Pakistan triangle could mean India’s complete geostrategic encirclement.

Russia, on its part, views with concern India’s diversification of its arms imports. Russia has slipped from being the undisputed leader in arms exports to India. In the last few years, Russia has lost a few high-profile military contracts to France and the US for example. New Delhi’s growing strategic closeness to Washington is also a cause for concern for Moscow.

Despite these geostrategic concerns on both sides, thorny issues in military-technical cooperation along with ways to boost trade are likely to come up in any bilateral talks has with Putin in Ufa. Modi is also likely to ask for Russian support for and involvement in his ambitious “Make in India” campaign, which is meant to revive the country’s stagnating manufacturing sector. Russia, on the other hand, is looking for import substitution because of difficulties caused by the Western sanctions. This could be a unique opportunity for Indian business to enter the Russian market – both through trade and investment.

But, the real focus of the visit will be on the BRICS and SCO summits, which have been given pride of place by Russia. In Russia’s view, the summits will prove both domestically and internationally that Russia is not isolated despite the Ukraine-linked efforts of the Euro-Atlantic bloc.

While some mistakenly see the BRICS as an anti-Western alliance, for India BRICS is primarily a forum whose members share views on the need to reform the global governance structures. China and Russia feel kept out of the economic structures of global governance like the IMF and World Bank. India, Brazil and South Africa are out of both the economic and political structures. BRICS wants an evolutionary change in the rules of global governance. It wants the world to reflect the realities of today’s world. All five countries want to become norm setters instead of being just norm followers. India, in fact, could be one of many nations which could act as a bridge between the West and Russia.

As for the SCO summit from India’s perspective, it will be of particular interest because it expects to finally be admitted as a member of the forum. Membership of the SCO will increase India’s footprint and visibility in Central Asia and institutionalise its ties with the region. The race for influence in Central Asia is resulting in promises of many infrastructure and development projects. Many of these are likely to be undertaken under the aegis if the SCO and India, as a member, expects to benefit.

There is also a fortunate confluence of interest among the major powers about India’s forays into Central Asia. As eminent Indian strategist, C Raja Mohan says, the US has openly expressed support for a more visible India presence in the region. China too does not want to push India into an anti-China coalition with the US and is open to cooperating with India regionally. Russia, on its part, feels that an active Indian presence can add to regional multipolarity. The Central Asian Republics also want a more active Indian presence as this gives them some limited strategic manoeuvrability.

India’s participation in the SCO and BRICS summits as well as its attempts to energise its relationship with Russia is reflective of New Delhi’s desire to maintain good relations with all major powers. India faces a number of challenging domestic tasks like providing millions of jobs to its youth, building modern infrastructure, and maintaining a high growth rate. It needs peace, stability, and cooperation of other countries, in terms of funds and technology, to achieve this. Any confrontation among the great powers could significantly impact India’s development plans.

*Uma Purushothaman is a Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

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Islamic State Boosts Russian-Language Propaganda Efforts – Analysis

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By Joanna Paraszczuk

(RFE/RL) — The militant group Islamic State (IS) has stepped up its Russian-language propaganda efforts, another sign that its Russian-speaking contingent is becoming more powerful.

Though Russian-speaking IS militants have put out their own propaganda for some time, in recent weeks a new Russian-language IS media wing — Furat Media — has emerged that appears to have taken on official, or at least semiofficial, status within IS’s overall media operations.

IS currently produces official propaganda messages in Arabic, English, Kurdish, French, and Russian, according to Aaron Y. Zelin, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

And though IS has not made any specific announcement declaring that Furat is an official IS media wing, Zelin says it is an “unofficial official account.”

Furat has opened accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and the Russian social network VKontakte and maintains a website, Furat.info, through which it disseminates various forms of IS propaganda, including video messages by Russian-speaking militants and Arabic- and English-language videos dubbed into Russian.

Furat, whose name comes from the Arabic word for the Euphrates River, even has its own logo, a blue square with two white, wavy lines suggesting water.

Formalizing Operations

That Russian-speaking militants in Syria are disseminating propaganda is nothing new.

The various factions of militants — including those fighting alongside IS as well as individual factions — have had their own websites and social-media accounts almost since they first emerged in Syria in late 2012.

But as IS’s Russian-speaking faction has grown in prominence — and in numbers — it has transformed its media operations from piecemeal efforts by what appeared to be a handful of militants into an increasingly slick and semiprofessional operation.

The main precursor to Furat began life around early 2013 as FiSyria, a website run by a group of Chechen militants led by Umar al-Shishani, an ethnic Kist from Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. At first, FiSyria was effectively Shishani’s personal site, offering news about battles he and his fellow Chechen militants were involved in.

But when Shishani moved on to bigger things — he is now IS’s military commander in Syria — FiSyria changed, too.

After Shishani swore an oath of allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and moved over to IS with a group of militants in late 2013, FiSyria went with him and became a Russian-language IS propaganda website.

Now, FiSyria redirects to Furat’s website.

Furat also seems to have swallowed another IS media group, ShamToday, which was previously active on Russian social media and which was run by a group of North Caucasian militants.

Increased Output

Furat has significantly increased the volume of IS propaganda available to Russian-speakers, primarily by publishing existing IS videos with Russian subtitles.

But to do this, the group will have had to recruit additional “staff” who have a good enough understanding of spoken Arabic to allow them to translate the videos into Russian.

Clues of how IS’s Russian-language media operations work can be found on social media, where Russian-speaking militants have posted photographs of IS media offices.

A Kazakh IS militant who goes by the name Artyom posted a photograph of what he said was an “IS Media Center” on July 1. The photograph shows Artyom and another militant sitting in an office with laptops and cellphones.

Not Just Chechens

The presence of Artyom, who is based with a Russian-speaking IS contingent in Mosul, in an IS “media center” is another sign that IS’s Russian-language propaganda efforts are changing and growing.

In the past, Russian-speaking IS propaganda efforts appeared to be run primarily by and for North Caucasian militants.

Recently, however, Central Asians have also been photographed undertaking IS propaganda work.

Prominent Tajik militant Abu Daoud (real name Parviz Saidrakhmonov) has been photographed several times working in an IS “Media Center.”

Saidrakhmonov, who is thought to have been killed, has been linked to several prominent Russian-speaking IS ideologues, including Daghestani preachers Akhmad Medinsky and Nadir Abu Khalid. Both Daghestanis are close to Abu Jihad, an ethnic Karachay who is Shishani’s close confidante and who has been involved in IS propaganda efforts for many months — and who is likely one of those behind Furat Media.

Recruitment And Retention

Furat’s work has two main purposes.

First, it is dedicated to recruiting new Russian-speaking militants, both from the Russian Federation — particularly the North Caucasus — and from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, especially from Central Asia.

Furat is also engaged in spreading IS messages to Russian-speaking militants who are already fighting alongside the group, both via social media and by creating and sending CDs containing Russian-subtitled IS propaganda videos to various Russian-speaking militant groups in IS-controlled territory.

A July 1 Facebook post included photographs of one batch of CDs with an explanation that these were for “brothers in the caliphate,” the term used by IS for territory under its control.

By translating Arabic-language material into Russian, Furat is able to ensure that all Russian-speakers in IS-controlled territories have access to the same messages and ideology as their Arabic-speaking counterparts. So, too, can potential recruits back home in the Russian Federation or Central Asia.

Furat is also playing an important role in building ideological bridges between militants in Syria and Iraq, and those who are still in the North Caucasus.

It was Furat which announced that IS had declared the establishment of a “province” in the North Caucasus. The propaganda wing also issued a professionally produced video, Unity Of The Mujahideen (Jihad Fighters) Of The Caucasus, which included interviews with Russian-speaking militants in Iraq and Syria who praised the pledges of allegiance to IS by North Caucasians.

Resilience

Although there have been efforts by social-media websites like Facebook and Twitter to crack down on pro-IS accounts, Furat has so far been resilient.

Furat’s Facebook account has already been banned, but the group opened a new one — this time a closed group — on July 1. By July 2, the group had 87 members.

And while several countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, have banned pro-IS and other Islamist websites, they have been less successful in blocking social media.

A group of websites listed by the Tajik Interior Ministry on July 2 as being banned does not include Furat Media’s site or its social-media accounts.

The post Islamic State Boosts Russian-Language Propaganda Efforts – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

No ‘Crisis In Islam': Just Apathy Of So-Called ‘Historians’– OpEd

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On the “BBC This Week” program, historian Tom Holland labored to counter the argument that the so-called Islamic State should not be labeled as such: “The Islamic State”.

Holland’s logic in the program seemed more philosophical, concerned with dialectic and logic of language, and hardly situated in any proper historical context.

His comments were in response to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s objection to the BBC’s use of the phrase ‘Islamic State’. Cameron prefers ISIL – which, itself, stands for the ‘Islamic State in the Levant’ or the cynical qualifier ‘so-called’ to be placed before the phrase.

Although Holland asserts that Cameron’s protestation to the use of the phrase ‘Islamic State’ is essentially principled, he does not agree with the Prime Minister. By denying ‘IS’ the right to use the phrase, according to Holland, Cameron is replicating the ‘IS’ strategy of denying any Islamic credentials to their Muslim opponents, describing them as ‘heretics’. Cameron is playing the same game as ‘IS’, according to Holland.

However, in an article published in March by the New Statesman, Holland tries to live up to his own credentials as a ‘historian’ by delving into history, but a selective version of it. His take on Islamic history struck me as alien and foreign draped with what seemed like an authentic reference, but lacking in genuine knowledge in the overall values and meaning of Islam and the spirit of its message.

“The problem faced by the orthodox religious authorities in the Muslim world, however, is very similar to that which confronted the Catholic Church in the 16th century,” he wrote. ‘Very similar,’ he says, yet offers little by way of demonstrating his out-and-out assertion.

In the BBC program, he concluded with another unqualified claim, closing with an earth-shattering remark that ‘Islam’ is experiencing a ‘crisis’.

For someone who protested Cameron’s simple request to apply a ‘so-called’ before ‘Islamic State’, while declaring that there is a crisis in the heart of Islam – a religion that is rooted in a culture that spans over 1400 years, which manifests itself throughout numerous cultures and geographies, the world over – Holland needs to exercise more caution.

History, with all its complexities, cannot be isolated from the present, notwithstanding current political turmoil. To be dubbed ‘history’, it should not be made a landscape for underhanded political ideas masquerading as historical facts, simply because the likes of Holland can utilize past historical references and market them to his audience as genuine analogies.

I found it particularly telling that Holland’s views on history are borrowed from ancient references such as early Islam, 16th century Christianity, etc., but fail to examine a more immediate – and much more relevant – history that made possible the rise of the so-called ‘Islamic State’.

It is impossible that Holland did not know or, at least, appreciate the relationship between western military interventions in the Middle East, especially in Iraq in 2003, and the rise of jihadist groups in the region.

To completely ignore the gradual rise of ‘IS’ from the early fundamentalist outlets that flooded Iraq following the US-British invasion, morphing into the fighting force that it has become, is a catastrophic gaffe to anyone who claims to know history.

While sectarianism exists in Muslim societies, as with any other religious groups in other societies, it was the American Governor of Iraq, Paul Bremer, who initiated the current sectarian violence in the region when he launched his campaign of ‘De-Ba’athification’ of Iraq in May 2003. It resulted in the rooting out of every aspect of the Ba’ath Party’s influence in Iraq, the dismantling of the army, and every aspect of state institutions. It entailed the minimizing of any form of Sunni influence in the country, setting the stage for the takeover by Shia groups, including numerous Shia militias that continue to constitute the Iraqi Army.

Absent from Holland’s speech, and that of other ‘historians’, is the role of former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who, although largely disliked by the general public, continues with his political meddling and shady politics. Blair was the closest ally to the US President, George W. Bush. Together, they turned Iraq into a killing field, where the bloodletting is yet to cease.

Of course, Holland is not alone in promoting the ‘crisis of Islam’ jargon. It was, and remains, at the heart of the discredited neo-conservative thinking. The purpose of such claims is largely to disown any responsibility regarding the mayhem gripping the Middle East, and putting the blame squarely on local actors for their countries’ misfortunates.

Such a discourse does not just absolve the US, the UK and others from any responsibility: it positions them as a victim in a war propelled by Muslims and their own crisis of religion and sect.

“The continued rise of violent, anti-Western, Islamic fundamentalism is one of the defining challenges of our time,” wrote Mark Mardell on the BBC website (July 02, 2015). ‘IS’, he wrote, “controls vast areas of Syria and Iraq and has more than mere footholds in Libya, Yemen and Nigeria.”

Although Mardell gave all the keywords required to place the rise of ‘IS’ in proper context, he still fails to see it.

What have Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen have in common? Both Iraq and Libya have suffered two massive western wars, and Syria and Yemen are being victimized by unrelenting western intervention. The war on Iraq brought al-Qaeda-turned-IS to the country; the war in Libya divided the country among hundreds of western-armed unruly militias, and so on. Do you see the logic?

But Mardell is not concerned with any of this as he, like Holland, is busy haggling with irrelevant terminology: “And, it seems to me, once we start passing comment on the accuracy of the names people call their organizations, we will constantly be expected to make value judgments. Is China really a “People’s Republic”?”

Although Mardell is not a ‘historian’, he is a ‘presenter’; a media man should, at least, be aware of some current affairs that are of direct relevance to his topic.

One such current affair, the Arab Spring, had the potential of ending the radicalization of Arab youth by offering them a democratic outlet that did not see a contradiction between Islam and democracy, on one hand, and economic opportunity, on the other.

But every single one of these experiences were quashed by military force, leaving little Tunisia fighting for its nascent democracy against ‘IS’ recruits and their benefactors.

The idea behind the violence is to destroy any possibility of seeing a harmonic marriage between political Islam and democracy, and the so-called ‘Islamic State’ is the demon unleashed against the forces of moderation and modernity in the region.

This is far from being a ‘crisis in Islam’, but a political struggle that will, ultimately, define the future of the region for many generations to come.

The post No ‘Crisis In Islam': Just Apathy Of So-Called ‘Historians’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Saudi Arabian Fund To Invest $10 Billion In Russia

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By Khalil Hanware

An agreement has been signed between the Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Saudi Arabia and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) to create a partnership to invest SR37.5 billion ($10 billion) into projects implemented in Russia, reports revealed on Tuesday.

Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of RDIF, said Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, second deputy premier and defense minister, had played an immense role of support in sealing the deal.

The prince visited St. Petersburg with a large delegation during the economic forum and took part in President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with global investment fund heads.

Top economic dailies such as Wall Street Journal and Financial Times (FT) gave wide coverage to the investment plan on Tuesday.

Explaining the significance of the deal, John Sfakianakis, Middle East director at Ashmore Group, told Arab News: “It’s strategically wise from a diversification point of view for Saudi Arabia to explore other investment destinations.”

Fawaz H. Alfawaz, a Riyadh-based economic consultant, said: PIF is embarking on a new strategy with PIF acting as a sovereign fund while its history has been that of government domestic investment arm. Traditionally, the foreign investment has been done by SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency).”

According to Russian media, the majority of Saudi investment will be made on Russia’s agricultural projects, as well as on medicine, logistics and the retail and real estate sectors.

Commenting further on the deal that was initiated with a memorandum of understanding during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Sfakianakis said: “Russia is a very important economy, in 2014 the tenth largest, that can’t be ignored, and within the larger Eurasian context of paramount importance.”

He added: “In the areas of infrastructure, logistics and agriculture, Russia offers vast expertise and opportunities. As of 2013, Russians spent 60 percent of their pretax income on shopping, the highest percentage in Europe.”

Sfakianakis said: “Others from the Gulf have invested in Russia in a direct government-to-government context recently. China and South Korea have established important investment and trading ties which can’t be ignored.”

He said: “Investment ties are always the best way for establishing a bridge of friendship and trust that could be enhanced within a multitude of areas.”

According to FT, Dmitriev said RDIF had been working for more than a year on bringing PIF to Russia, and the political climate might have helped close the deal.

“Sometimes the wind can help bring the ship to its destination,” he was quoted as saying in the FT report.

RDIF said PIF’s funds would be invested in projects for infrastructure, retail, logistics and agriculture over a period of up to five years, and the Saudi investment vehicle would invest together with other foreign sovereign wealth funds mostly from Asia, including the Russia-China Investment Fund, a $2 billion vehicle backed by the China Investment Corporation and RDIF.

PIF’s commitment adds to pledges from Asian and Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds to Russia.

Until 2013, RDIF had established partnerships with western sovereign funds.

Since then, the Russian fund’s new partnerships have been dominated by Asia and the Middle East.

The RDIF also disclosed that it signed an agreement with Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), to undertake projects in Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries.

The post Saudi Arabian Fund To Invest $10 Billion In Russia appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lanka: Sirisena Appoints New Member To Central Bank’s Monetary Board

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Sri Lanka’s President Sirisena has appointed Chrishantha Priyange Richard Perera as a Member of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka with effect from June 24, 2015 in terms of Section 8(2) (c) of the Monetary Law Act.

Perera has previously served as Chairman of the Sri Lanka Tea Board, Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation, Public Entrerprises Reforms Commission and Bank of Ceylon. He retired as Chairman of Forbes & Walkers Ltd. and its subsidiary companies in June 2005 after almost 44 years of continuous service in the Group.

Currently, Perera holds directorships in several public listed and private companies, including the post of Chairman in some of these institutions, the bank said in a press release.

He has also served as a Committee Member of The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, The Planters’ Association of Ceylon and on the Committee of Management of The Ceylon Planters’ Provident Society.

The post Sri Lanka: Sirisena Appoints New Member To Central Bank’s Monetary Board appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Poverty Plays Complex Role in Entrepreneurship for Indian Women

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Over a billion entrepreneurs in the world operate in subsistence economies, often living hand to mouth. Is there a relationship between such poverty and entrepreneurial activity? A new study in the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing says “yes” and sheds light on the way in which two kinds of constrained consumption spur—or in some cases impede—entrepreneurial activity.

“There is a complex interplay when it comes to entrepreneurship between what we define as ‘chronic’ constrained consumption and ‘periodic’ constrained consumption,” write the authors of the study, Srinivas Venugopal , Madhubalan Viswanathan (both University of Illinois), and Kiju Jung (University of Sydney). “An increase in chronic constraints can lead poor people to start small businesses, but if periodic constraints are numerous, the burden and stress that they place on the poor are so great that entrepreneurial activity is essentially stymied.”

The authors base their findings on a study of over 150 poor women who live in an urban community in southern India. “Chronic” constrained consumption is a measure of a household’s average monthly expenditures: the lower the average expenditures, the more chronic the constrained consumption. “Periodic” constrained consumption refers to changes in consumption that are particular to a time of month or year.

Increases in chronic consumption constraints spurred entrepreneurial activity as long as periodic constraints were kept at a minimum. A barrage of periodic constraints created too much uncertainty for the women who were more chronically constrained, hindering their ability to see a way out of poverty and thereby diminishing entrepreneurial intention. However, even for women who suffer a lot of periodic constraints, education that increases marketplace literacy can, by increasing entrepreneurial self-efficacy, enable them to overcome a temporary economic setback and still seek a livelihood through entrepreneurial activity.

“There is a psychology of poverty that is important for researchers to understand, and it is crucial to know the triggers, enablers, and suppressors of entrepreneurship in subsistence. Scholars must be sensitive to the motivations and social structures that emerge within contexts of poverty rather than imposing pre-existing theories evolved in affluent contexts of the West.”

The post Poverty Plays Complex Role in Entrepreneurship for Indian Women appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel Introduces Elite Unit To Fight Islamic State After Obama’s Pentagon Speech – OpEd

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While President Barack Obama during his Pentagon visit on Monday explained his approach to fighting and defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with the statement that “Ideologies are not defeated by guns; they’re defeated with better ideas,” Israeli political officials and their security commanders announced their own plans for a specially trained brigade.

According to an Israeli source, Geoff Gotfield, a former member of a police counterterrorism team, the new unit — created and trained in secret — was also formed to deal with the threat of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, despite Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry enthusiastically trying to “sell” their attempt to achieve a nuclear agreement with Islamic Republic.

Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, on Tuesday during an Armed Services Committee hearing, criticized President Obama’s comments at the Pentagon on Monday about his progress against ISIS as being delusional. “President Obama’s comments today reveal the disturbing degree of self-delusion that characterizes the Administration’s campaign against [ISIS],” McCain said. Others said they were disappointed that some of the military leaders at the Pentagon showed no “backbone” and stood behind Obama while he pontificated about a non-existent coalition of 60 nations.

According to Israel Defense Force (IDF) officials, the new fighting force is being trained and armed for unconventional counterterrorism and anti-Iranian missions. The announcement is being characterized as a wake-up call for the general Israeli population. The new force’s missions include protecting southern and northern Israel against rocket and mortar fire and preventing Islamist groups using armored carriers captured from Syrian and Iraqi militaries to storm the Jewish State’s border.

“The new commando brigade is designed for quiet, bold, covert and effective action against terrorist groups posing a threat from the Sinai Desert to Egyptian sovereignty and Israel’s southern border. Such action would be coordinated closely between Israeli and Egyptian military and intelligence arms,” said an IDF statement. “Israelis are taking no chances against a declared enemy.”

Other possible IDF operations are Israel’s continued battle against the Lebanon-based Shi’ite terrorist group Hezbollah or any Syrian groups including the Nusra Front who decide to attack the region’s only true democracy. All members of the Israeli warrior group are experts in different aspects of covert and stealth operations deep behind enemy lines. The yet to be named brigade is said “blend U.S. Delta Force, Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, and Britain’s Special Airborne Service commandoes all rolled into one war fighting and covert operations unit.

The post Israel Introduces Elite Unit To Fight Islamic State After Obama’s Pentagon Speech – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran And Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Reciprocal Strategies And Viewpoints – Analysis

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By Behzad Khoshandam*

The 15th summit meeting of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as the most important decision-making organ of the organization, will be held on July 9, 2015, in Ufa, the capital city of Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan. The meeting will be held concurrent with the escalation of tensions between Russia and the West over the crisis in Ukraine and simultaneous with the final steps taken toward Iran nuclear deal by Tehran and the P5+1 group of countries. The SCO has been considered among the most important Asian actors in international system in interactions among big world powers since the termination of the Cold War. The capacities, goals and importance of strategic and tactical actions of this international actor in the arena of big powers game and also in Eurasia have been a focus of attention for countries like Iran during the past decade. Understanding relations between the SCO and Iran, as an observer member of the organization, and explaining the reasons for the attention of these two actors to each other need due attention to goals and activities of this organization, the influence of big powers on the organization as well as fateful international developments that have taken place over the past decade. These factors will facilitate future studies on relations between these two actors.

SCO’s strategy toward Iran

SCO’s strategy toward Iran in the past decade can be described as “a biased approach toward an effective international actor.” Therefore, on the one hand, the SCO’s strategy toward Iran has been under the influence of two main forces of this organization, that is, China and Russia. On the other hand and through a more in-depth analysis, it has been affected by the United States’ aggressive reaction to Iran’s foreign policy orientations and approaches followed by the application of the sanctions and threat policy against Iran. In their approach to the SCO, China and Russia have seen this world body and its actors as a tool in the geopolitical expanse of the world’s heartland, which can be used for bargaining and meeting the maximum degree of their national interests. In its first step toward geographical expansion within the international system, the SCO has been trying to attract new members in order to boost the international credit and prestige of its major actors. As a result of this kind of look at countries like Iran, Tehran’s membership request was finally granted in 2005 and the country became an observer member of the organization. From 2005 to 2015, Iran’s participation in the SCO’s meetings was considerable. However, due to later limitations, partly as a result of the bureaucratic red tape, and partly blamable on positions taken by the main members – Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan – and also due to Iran’s foreign policy restrictions as a result of Tehran’s nuclear case, the permanent membership of the Islamic Republic in this organization has not been realized yet.

Having the cooperation of powerful partners like Iran will increase the influence of the SCO in such areas as fighting terrorism and drug smuggling; elimination of poverty and economic inequalities; preventing foreign interventions; bolstering regional security, realizing a multipolar world; strengthening border security; and overcoming border problems. In such fields, Iran’s cooperation will have serious, powerful and long-term outcomes for that organization and its member states.

Due to anti-American positions of the SCO members during summits meetings in 2005 and 2006, and because of the sensitivity of the United States foreign policy about Central Asia, the SCO has been a focus of special attention for Washington since 2006. Since the current bipolar situation inside the SCO will actually turn into a tri-polar situation through full membership of countries like Iran, the main members of the organization have adopted a strategy of “biased approach toward an effective international actor” and have no serious plan to promote Iran’s observer status to a full member in the short run. A possible paradigm change in the SCO may alter the situation of a country like Iran in the SCO summit meeting to be held in the Russian city of Ufa. Some reports have indicated that a change in the status of India and Pakistan from observers to full members is going to be discussed in the meeting.

SCO has been seen as the source of one of the most important geopolitical convergent capacities in the world which can create balance in rivalries among big powers, including those involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, according to the regional agenda of the SCO’s organs, the organization doesn’t seem willing or capable enough to move toward a full-blown confrontation with the Western alliance. Under these conditions, gaining maximum success in international and regional levels by ending its biased approach to such important and effective members as Iran would allow the SCO to realize part of its goals and strategic plans.

Iran’s strategy toward SCO

Iran’s strategy toward the SCO is influenced by the country’s foreign policy goals and orientations, restrictions it faces at international and regional levels, and its attitude toward China and Russia as driving forces in this organization. On the whole, Iran’s strategy can be discussed under the general heading of “increasing partnership in regional alliances.” To understand historical developments related to Iran’s strategic approach to the SCO, the country’s historical attitude toward collective security, Iran’s new foreign policy goals following the Cold War, as well as the country’s needs, restrictions and motivations for interaction with the SCO from the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 up to the middle of 2015 should be analyzed.

Fighting terrorism, extremism and irredentism, which have been mentioned as three main goals pursued by the founders of the SCO within the international system, have been also among major items on Iran’s foreign policy agenda in the past three and a half decades despite overt animosity of the Western bloc against the Islamic Republic. In addition to these agendas, other issues like attention to peripheral regions, Asian expectations and the “look to the east” approach of Iran’s foreign policy have been the main driving forces behind Iran’s growing participation and role in the SCO. Before the revolution, Iran’s membership in the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) was the sole instance of Iran’s membership in a “collective security system.” However, since the Islamic Revolution; Iran has been known as an impartial country in the world and has never been a member to any security treaty, which would conform to the logic of “collective security.” Iran’s observer status in the SCO has been the first experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the area of membership in a real multilateral security community subsequent to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. On the whole, Iranian elites have followed two approaches to the SCO during the past 10 years. One group has believed that Iran’s powerful participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would be a step forward on the basis of the alliance-building logic of the country’s foreign policy, and will also promote international and regional standing of Iran in security, economic, cultural and political terms and within regional cooperative frameworks.

There is also a second group, which believes that for a country like Iran, the SCO is an international organization equal in importance to other international and regional bodies such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the NATO, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council [(P)GCC]. Therefore, Iran’s membership in the SCO must be balanced and equal to its participation in other international and regional organizations based on the impartial and nonaligned approach that has governed Iran’s foreign policy following the Islamic Revolution. Based on the imperial and nonaligned approach that has governed Iran’s foreign policy after the Islamic Revolution, the country, as an observer member of the SCO, has put tremendous emphasis on the organization’s soft approach to such issues as color revolutions, unilateralism, interventionism, NATO’s eastward expansion, NATO’s missile defense shield, and also such crises as those in Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine. Therefore, from Iran’s viewpoint, membership in the SCO, as a cooperative, regional and east-oriented organization, would be a step toward establishment of a multipolar balance-seeking world system in the first century of the third millennium, when Asia’s power is constantly on the rise.

The bottom line is that the three following key points should be taken aboard when offering any futuristic scenario on the type, orientation and quality of relations, interactions and possible confrontations between Iran and the SCO during the forthcoming summit meeting of the organization in the Russian city of Ufa. Firstly, qualitative and applied role and importance, real and objective goals, as well as the final result of the SCO’s measures and performance should be made clearer for its relatively heterogeneous members, especially China and Russia, as the main players within this important regional organization. Secondly, serious attention should be paid to developments related to Iran’s nuclear issue and a possible deal between Iran and the P5+1 group. It should be noted that the scope, volume, effects and consequences of this international development can weigh on many regional equations, including the level at which Iran would be cooperating with the SCO. Thirdly, special attention should be paid to the issue of strategic stability, balance of powers, as well as temporary encounters and hostilities in relations among big powers in Eurasia as the main operational environment of the SCO. Such issues, in view of the possible acceptance of the full membership of India and Pakistan in the SCO, can have very serious effects on the nature of the organization and its goals.

*Behzad Khoshandam
Ph.D. in International Relations & Expert on International Issues

The post Iran And Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Reciprocal Strategies And Viewpoints – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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