By Peter Draper and Mzukisi Qobo

Heads of state of the BRICS countries will gather in Ufa, Russia, this week for the grouping’s seventh summit, which comes at a particularly challenging time for Russian diplomacy. Precipitated by the conflict in Ukraine, Russia is barred from Group of Seven/Group of Eight processes and increasingly estranged from the West.

It intends to use the BRICS summit to project itself as a major global power.

By holding the summit at the same time as the annual meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), Russia is attempting to impress its Central Asian neighbours and highlight its growing strategic co-operation with China, co-organiser of the SCO. This also sends a message to the West that Russia has other platforms on which to challenge for global power. Russia’s agenda preferences can be conceived along two axes: global security and politics; and economics.

BRICS national security advisers are meeting regularly, discussing a range of international issues such as the rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East. To the extent that the BRICS can agree on co-ordinated positions on such difficult issues, this will presumably build the group’s coherence over time.

Offsetting this potential is their disagreement on how to reform the United Nations Security Council — a key gap since it is at the apex of the global security architecture. Accordingly, Russia emphasises economic co-operation.

Discussions at the Ufa summit are broadly divided into two parts: the financial co-operation package and the evolving Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership.

The strategy is too general and vague and unlikely to grow in substance at Ufa. Perhaps, for this reason, the Russians are pushing for a move beyond a strategy ‘on paper’, to identify concrete trade and investment projects up to 2020.

Nonetheless, three top priorities appear to have been identified in the BRICS economic strategy discussions.

BRICS Economic priorities

The first is co-ordination on e-commerce, and Russia proposed the establishment of a working group. This was apparently downgraded to a limited agreement to convene a dialogue leading, possibly, to the establishment of a working group.

More cynical observers of the BRICS believe Russia wants to use this discussion to market a cellphone operating system they have developed.

Second are ongoing discussions about trade facilitation. These centre on the creation of a virtual working group on trade and export promotion agencies. There have also been discussions about establishing a single window for electronic processes connected to trade.

Third, China has proposed closer collaboration on intellectual property rights regimes. Observers are understandably sceptical of the prospects and co-ordination possibilities, since the focal points in each country are not obvious. But agreement has ostensibly been reached to exchange information on member states’ systems.

At Ufa, there will be much discussion of the two signature BRICS achievements to date: the Contingency Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank.

BRICS and South African business

Given the closed nature of BRICS processes, it is difficult to discern South Africa’s positions on the grouping’s economic agenda but some contours are apparent.

South Africa seems to regard the economic partnership strategy as being weak and less of a roadmap of how to get things done than a ‘ticking the check box’ exercise for Russia to notch up some ‘success’.

For South Africa it is not clear how the strategy will promote more value-added exports and attract investment in minerals beneficiation or processing at source. The draft trade ministers joint communiqué is seemingly noncommittal and soft.

South Africa has some challenges with agreeing to create a single window for trade facilitation. It has to navigate through legal arrangements within the Southern African Customs Union, especially on external agreements SA has with third parties that may see the free movement of goods in the common customs area.

Although the government supports India’s proposed business travel card, modelled on the Schengen visa arrangement, South Africa views it as unfair that its liberalised visa arrangement for the BRICS countries has not yet been reciprocated.

Several working groups have been set up under the auspices of the BRICS Business Council: for manufacturing, ICT, small business and finance. The president of the South African delegation to the council, Brian Molefe, proposed new working groups for deregulation and agribusiness.

South African business is interested in common issues affecting BRICS trade and investment and specific issues pertaining to particular companies and industries — such as pharmaceuticals — for which they want to identify important platforms for joint technology development.

They support the trade facilitation agenda in principle, but want progress in promoting transparency in the financial incentives each country makes available to its companies, and progress in approvals for businesses from other BRICS countries.

They want to promote ‘fair’ trade. The concern is that South Africa has the lowest average import tariffs of all BRICS countries, but implements the fewest nontariff barriers.

South African business representatives to the BRICS Business Council are concerned about how the government is managing the BRICS process.

It is regarded as too bureaucratic and there is a strong feeling that the government is not prepared to tackle the real issues, such as ‘fair’ trade.

There are problems within the council. Brazil has not been driving the process, and Russia and China are represented primarily by state-owned enterprises — unlike India, Brazil and South Africa — with the interests of the private and state sectors not being sufficiently aligned.

The BRICS process seems to be of limited use to South African business.

Promoters of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement argue that it will provide ‘insurance’ to South Africa in the event of investment status downgrades by the ratings agencies, and an ensuing capital flight — an increasingly likely proposition. South Africa could tap these resources during balance of payments crises, enabling the government to cover calls on forex reserves.

However, the Contingency Reserve Arrangement is not capable of providing more than an initial first line of support. The amount South Africa could call from it is capped at $6.5bn — 130% of its contribution of $5bn — a small fraction of the daily turnover in South African currency markets.

Clearly, a lot more money would be required to prevent a run on the rand, assuming the South African Reserve Bank wishes to intervene to prevent a slide in the currency, which it does not. In the extremely unlikely event that such funding was to be sought, it would come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Contingency Reserve Arrangement rules explicitly provide for this. The idea put forward by some BRICS promoters, that the Contingency Reserve Arrangement will enable the BRICS countries to avoid IMF conditionalities, therefore holds no water.

An Ambitious Agenda

South African officials have indicated they will seek to revive African infrastructure development as an important issue for the Ufa communiqué. They are of the view that this lost momentum during the 2014 BRICS summit. There is much speculation about the New Development Bank’s Africa Regional Centre, whose agreed establishment is regarded as a diplomatic victory for South Africa.

The government is still working on the Africa Regional Centre’s articles of association. There seems to be agreement it will be located in Johannesburg. It could, in effect, be a “mini New Development Bank”, targeted at African markets, but it is not clear how it will relate to the New Development Bank’s head office in Shanghai, and what autonomy it will enjoy.

The BRICS Business Council has expressed an interest in playing an advisory role in the New Development Bank, as it wants more say in project selection and the disbursement of funds. But there is no clarity on the interest rates that will be charged; how small and medium enterprises will be treated; the methodology to be applied in selecting projects; and how considerations such as sustainability will be integrated into project design and selection.

Further complicating matters, the government recently decided to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which will be heavily focused on infrastructure projects in Asia. It is not clear what the strategic value of this move is — apart from earning kudos from China. But it could erode the effectiveness of the New Development Bank and the Africa Regional Centre.

The BRICS agenda for Ufa is ambitious. It is important South Africa identifies its clear interests and thinks carefully about its allocation of resources vis-à-vis potential returns.

*Peter Draper is a senior research fellow at SAIIA and Mzukisi Qobo is a political economist. This article was first published in Business Day.

The post South Africa Needs A Concrete BRICS Strategy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkey is an increasingly important transit hub for oil and natural gas supplies as they move from Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East to Europe and other Atlantic markets.

Turkey is well placed to serve as a hub for oil and natural gas supply headed to Europe and other Atlantic markets from Russia, the Caspian region, and the Middle East (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Turkey’s major oil and natural gas transit pipelines
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and IHS EDIN

Turkey has been a major transit point for oil and is becoming more important as a transit point for natural gas. Growing volumes of Caspian oil are being sent to Black Sea ports such as Novorossisyk, Russia and Supsa, Georgia and then to Western markets by tanker via the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles waterways). Caspian oil and oil from northern Iraq also cross Turkey by pipeline, through the Ceyhan oil terminal on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

Turkey is primed to become a significant natural gas pipeline hub. However, currently most of its natural gas pipeline connections only bring natural gas into the country, as growing demands have left little natural gas for export.

Since 2010, Turkey has experienced some of the fastest growth in total energy demand among countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Unlike several other OECD countries in Europe, Turkey’s economy has avoided the prolonged stagnation that has characterized much of the continent for the past several years.

Petroleum & other liquids

Over the past decade, Turkey’s economy has expanded, and its petroleum and other liquids consumption has increased. With limited domestic reserves, Turkey imports nearly all of its oil supplies.

Sector organization

Exploration and production

Consumption and imports

International oil transit

Turkey plays an increasingly important role in the transit of oil. It is strategically located at the crossroads between the oil-rich former Soviet Union and Middle East countries, and the European demand centers. It is home to one of the world’s busiest chokepoints, the Turkish Straits, through which almost 3 million b/d flowed in 2013.

Natural gas

Turkey has a strategic role in natural gas transit because of its position between the world’s second-largest natural gas market, continental Europe, and the substantial natural gas reserves of the Caspian Basin and the Middle East.

Sector organization

Consumption, imports, and exports

Turkey is increasingly dependent on natural gas imports as its domestic consumption, especially in the electric power sector, continues to experience significant growth.

Storage

Pipelines

Liquefied natural gas

Coal

Coal, particularly lignite, is Turkey’s most abundant indigenous energy resource and is an important fuel for electricity generation.

Electricity

Following the restructuring of Turkey’s electricity sector, both consumption and generation of electricity have expanded. Most electricity is generated using fossil fuel sources, although the government plans to displace at least some of this generation with nuclear power.

Sector organization

Nuclear

Notes

Endnotes

The post Turkey Energy Profile: Increasingly Important Transit Hub For Oil And Natural Gas – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Marinko Bobić and Scott N. Romaniuk*

The shift in demographic and economic weight from Europe to East Asia has intensified over the past 20 years, which makes East Asia and its coastal areas increasingly important – a critical shift in current and future international relations dynamics underscored by the United States’ (US) “Pivot to Asia” or East Asian foreign policy of the Obama administration. Four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, plus China/Taiwan either partially or fully claim sovereignty over the South China Sea and its territorial features: islands, reefs, and atolls. Given the importance of the South China Sea’s islands and sub-soils, we seek to assess whether a Chinese policy towards the South China Sea’s territorial disputes endangers regional stability and cooperation.

Economic and Strategic Importance of the Spratly Islands

China’s extensive borders, surrounded by sea and a rich diversity of neighbors, from large Russia, unstable Afghanistan, to maritime neighbors such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, presents a host of security challenges. The South China Sea forms part of the complexity of China’s border security challenges. The following claimants surround the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Territorial disputes contribute to regional volatility. The Sea is considered a flashpoint for conflict in the Asia Pacific Region. There are two groups of islands in the South China Sea: the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all of the Paracel and Spartly Islands, while Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei only claim parts of the Spratlys. Claims put forward by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are historically based, whereas claims made by Malaysia and Brunei are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLoS), the proximity principle, and the continental shelf principle. The Philippines’ claim is based on proclaimed discovery of unclaimed islands in 1956.

Disputes in the South China Sea are exacerbated by the economic and strategic importance of the area. The emergence of China as a major economic and military power resulted in sharp increases of consumption of energy resources for industrial growth, creating an increased international trade of minerals and manufactured goods. China’s hunger for natural resources thus, largely rests on its dependency on energy and mineral imports. The majority of Chinese imports and exports use South China Sea lanes for transportation. Therefore, it is in China’s interest to secure the region in order to ensure a continuous movement of goods into China. Put differently, China seeks to dominate and control the South China Sea for securing its trade interests, exploring natural resources under the seabed, and politically dominating East Asia.

Strategically, the passageway in the South China Sea connects North and East Asia with Gulf countries and the world in terms of trade, particularly the import of crude oil, which is critical to economic development (especially for aspiring or rising powers in the region) (Rousseau, 2011). Not only is this passageway the world’s busiest sea route, transporting two-thirds of global oil supplies, the South China Sea also connects the US and its allies in Northeast Asia, which serves as a strategic transportation route and a communication channel for its commercial and military interests (Dillon, 2011). The importance of this area thus, creates a dual necessity for all players, especially China: (1) Gain control of the region’s resources. (2) Maintain security/stability so that economic growth can go uninterrupted.

China’s Foreign Policy, Contradictions, and Unpredictable Actions

Despite some military incidents that have bred instability, China’s foreign policy, as per their Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), focuses on the principle of China’s “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development.” This reflects a need for stability and security in the region by encouraging harmonious neighborly relations, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, China claims to actively facilitate the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational. It takes an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities, preservation of world peace and facilitation of common development. As well, it promotes consultation and peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts between the countries and without the use or threat of force. It is clear that all these statements reflect a need for stability and security in order for economic development to continue uninterrupted.

Yet, over previous decades China’s foreign policy has been tested on many issues at different stages, making China’s actions rather unpredictable. These tests range from China’s democratized foreign policy, meaning that voters are increasingly demanding certain policies, to internal influence of xenophobic nationalism demanding more aggressive policies on global issues. China’s high running nationalism can promote more aggressive policy in the South China Sea, as China rises as a global economic, political, and military power. These contradictions constraining China’s foreign policy combine with China’s aspiration to be a global power, but its failure to adopt the responsibilities of a major power. Namely, China aspires to see the global integration of its economy but emphasizes its sovereignty and reluctance over interference in its internal affairs. This reluctance is also visible in Chinese government’s suspicion of multilateralism and a strong preference for bilateralism. China is also against any third party interference or mediation in the South China Sea dispute and has always been successful in sidelining the issue of territorial dispute and militarization of the disputed area at multilateral forums like ASEAN. Instead, it has put forward bilateral and peaceful solutions, while at the same time asserting its undisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and also heavily investing in military modernization, as well as constructing structures for military use in disputed areas.

China’s Relations with Claimant Countries and ASEAN

China and Vietnam are the two major contenders in the South China Sea dispute and they have clashed several times over the occupation and control of islands in the region; both countries assert historical claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Vietnam originally sought help from ASEAN to counter China’s power, thus endorsing ASEAN’s declaration on the South China Sea for multilateral discussions on territorial disputes. The Mischief incident in 1995 encouraged Vietnam to invite the US into mediation talks in the dispute settlement. At the same time, China and Vietnam also held various bilateral negotiations with the aim of resolving the disputes by “mutual understanding and accommodation and the spirit of friendly consultation” and “international law and international practices.” In 2000, both countries successfully negotiated and agreed on the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea. Despite the success of several diplomatic talks and negotiations, both countries are actively involved in unilateral activities that have resulted in several skirmishes and protests on both sides. Vietnam, one of the new ASEAN members, is China’s traditional adversary. They have fought on several occasions on land and at sea. In 2008, both countries made a joint declaration for efforts to safeguard stability in the South China Sea and restrain from action that would complicate or amplify the dispute. However, both countries again became involved in a diplomatic dispute in 2009 after Vietnam appointed a governor for the Paracel Islands.

The dispute between the Philippines and China began in 1995 when China started building structures in the Mischief Reef near the Philippine’s island of Palawan. The Philippines blamed China for building a shelter for the military, while China claimed that the structures serve as shelter for fishermen. Both countries signed a code of conduct to avoid similar future incidents, but the situation remains tense with a flaring of disputes. The Philippines, after ending its military leases to the US in 1992, extended its military lease after China’s growing power led to deep feelings of insecurity. The Philippines continuously raised the South China Sea dispute at many multilateral forums and has also endorsed the China-ASEAN declaration on the code of conduct of parties. China-Philippines relations improved in 2005 after both countries signed a tripartite agreement with Vietnam for oil exploration. Both China and the Philippines experienced a “golden age” of partnership. It ended in 2009 when the Philippines passed a new law that asserts their claim over the disputed Spratly Islands. China immediately dispatched a diplomatic protest against this action and also sent a patrol boat to the area.

Malaysia is one of the four occupant countries of the Spratly Islands, including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China protested, asserting its claims, when Malaysia built tourist and military facilities on the occupied features. Malaysia initially expressed concern over the assertiveness of China’s position in the Spratly Islands, which was backed by Chinese naval presence in the area. Malaysia also felt vulnerable in the wake of growing Chinese power because of past experiences with Communist insurgency. This is only exacerbated by the fact that one third of the Malaysian population has Chinese roots. However, several mutual visits, to increase political and economic cooperation, followed by a military cooperation, have built strong(er) relations between the two countries. Malaysia also supported the Chinese view of bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute over the Spratly Islands and thus, has expressed doubt over a multilateral approach by suspecting further complications. Both countries progressed with a bilateral approach and have built strong political, economic and military ties. Malaysia is convinced of China’s seriousness in a peaceful resolution of a dispute over Spratly Islands and is also working towards a joint development in a disputed territory. Furthermore, Malaysia and China issued a joint communiqué for strategic cooperation, enhanced bilateral consultation, and cooperation; Malaysia has also reaffirmed its support of the “One China Policy.”

ASEAN is the main multilateral forum in the East Asia region. It acts as the main platform for a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute and it is seen as being helpful in countering the rise of China’s economic, political, and military power – a major concern of smaller (and weaker) countries. ASEAN members have at many times raised concern in various forums and meetings in support of a multilateral approach for the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute, but China remains skeptical of the multilateral diplomacy approach and thus, is reluctant to address the issue at such forums. ASEAN, however, has to be careful to not look as though it will abandon its previous postures of accommodating Chinese because of China’s assistance to ASEAN members during the recent economic and financial crisis. These countries do not want to jeopardize their relations with China and believe that China will act more positively by demonstrating a greater degree of self-restraint in a dispute over the Spratly Islands. ASEAN also provides an opportunity to its members to discuss their concerns related to the South China Sea on the sidelines, which is also known as “quiet diplomacy” or the “ASEAN way.”

US Involvement or Interference?

Countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, which considered their positions vulnerable as a result of Chinese military power, were trying to internationalize the South China Sea territorial disputes by seeking active US involvement. The aim was simply to counterbalance China’s growing military power, which has taken place over the past two decades. Although the US should not be too worried about losing its military advantage due to its advanced technologies, China occupies a very comfortable position in terms of its strategic relations with Southeast Asia. In 2010, the US stepped in by declaring its national interest to ensure the freedom of navigation, unrestricted access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea region. The US seeks a multilateral diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve the various territorial disputes without the threat of force or the use of force. China, on the other hand, has always opposed interference of non-claimant countries like the US, which has resulted in the deterioration of US-China relations. The US supports multilateral dialogue for dispute resolution and it expressed an interest in active participation in open and frank discussions over territorial disputes. This was a result of a new policy of reengagement in Asia that sought to restore its image and clout by showboating its alleged interests in safeguarding the interests of smaller and weaker nations via diplomatic and military influence.

China’s “Behavior” in Recent History

Since the 1990s, China has campaigned for its “peaceful rise” image and sought support for a “harmonious world” concept to reassure its smaller and weaker neighbors that China’s resurgence is not a threat to their economic and security interests, and that China has peaceful intentions for mutual growth and development. China acted on this new policy and successfully negotiated land border disputes with Vietnam, actively took part in ASEAN institutions, aided struggling economies during the 2007 and 2009 financial crisis, and it also partially lifted trade barriers for selective items to improve harmony and growth with its neighbors. On the other hand, on many occasions, China also diplomatically protested unilateral action by its neighbors in the South China Sea without engaging in any large military actions, but the skirmishes between China and other claimants have been consistent. Over the past several years, China’s foreign policy has become more aggressive and has undone decade’s worth of good neighborly diplomacy in Asia by declaring the South China Sea a “core interest” of Chinese territory and power. China’s assertive diplomacy is a consequence of growing Chinese military power and high running nationalism that, due to the financial crisis, underestimates other global powers.

Conclusion

From this analysis we see that a threat of regional instability over the South China Sea is overstated, because China’s aggressive diplomacy in relation to the South China Sea territorial dispute is always complemented by China’s emphasis on peaceful relations with its neighbors and attempts to resolve territorial disputes peacefully. This may seem like a paradox, but hardly so. China needs to secure control over the resources located in the South China Sea while also maintaining security in the area if the state is to enjoy the benefits of uninterrupted economic growth. This means that China needs to walk a fine line in order to maintain peace, but also to secure resources. It is extremely unlikely that it will abandon either of these goals by becoming either extremely cooperative or extremely aggressive. But this does not mean that China will continue to test the boundaries of either trajectory in an attempt to “know” its political surroundings. In the past, China successfully resolved many territorial disputes with its neighbors, including Vietnam, and it is a country overall more likely to compromise on territorial disputes. China and ASEAN signed a declaration on the conduct of parties in South China Sea, which advocates a peaceful resolution and strides away from the use of force. China has also shown that it maintains a position of openness to further dialogue for dispute resolution, and reaffirms that it will adhere to the South China Sea “code of conduct.” China’s focus on economic growth and increased trade with ASEAN rejects the possibility of the use of force. However, because China is engaged in a “balancing act,” we cannot dismiss the possibility of a limited military conflict between China and ASEAN because of miscalculations. It is also possible that due to a high domestic level of nationalism, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines can use this issue to divert attention from domestic problems, if the need arises.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post China’s Need For Resources And Stability In South China Sea – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Right now, in relation to Venezuela, we hear nothing but the word crisis. There are vehement protests on behalf of the opposition, detentions of key opposition leaders, an economy on the ground, an infamous scarcity of goods, one of the highest inflation rate of the world culminating in a political-economic impasse. In fact, the already existing pressing economic difficulties worsened with the decline of oil prices starting in 2013 since – even though Venezuela’s economic system was mismanaged before – the high oil price could at least cover up the worst malfunctions and signs of demise, and secure most of the necessary imports.

Surely, building up a functioning economic system with effective industries other than the oil sector is very difficult for a so called “petro state” like Venezuela. Simple enough, it is just cheaper and easier to live on the oil revenues and import the greatest part of the needed goods – be it food, pharmaceuticals or spare parts – than producing that oneself. However, whereas the described phenomenon called Dutch disease earns some merit in explaining the Venezuelan situation, it can certainly not explain the severity of the economic problems in the country. Venezuela pursues a flawed economic policy, which is not even socialist as declared but state capitalist. It is clearly of sync with good market conditions and economic orthodoxies.

Let’s concentrate on one of the main reasons for the rampant economic distortion, which is directly interrelated with major problems like inflation and scarcity of goods: the currency exchange system. Trying to fight capital flight, under the presidency of Hugo Chávez, a restrictive currency exchange system was introduced, which over time grew more and more confusing and inefficient thus negatively impacting the already existing malfunctions given by the Dutch disease.

So, in Venezuela there exists one grotesquely overvalued “preferential exchange rate” of 6,3 Bolívar – the local currency – pegged against the US-Dollar. This is the exchange rate to import essential goods like foodstuffs and medicine, which make up 70 per cent of all imports. Then there is another exchange rate for non-essential imported goods, which is now called “SICAD” (formerly there was SICAD I and II which in February this year were laid together) making up 30 per cent of all imports. SICAD is defined as a quasi auction system starting at and also staying right now close to 12 Bolívar to the US-Dollar. Together with the amendment of SICAD a whole new exchange rate being called “SIMADI” was introduced, which should reflect real supply and demand for dollars and stays around 200 Bolívar to the US-Dollar. However, participation in this system is very limited, thus an individual person can only buy a maximum of USD 300 daily and USD 10.000 annually. So this is really just a drop in the ocean and thus cannot exert any palpable impact.

And still SIMADI does not reflect the black market price, which is in fact the normal way to exchange currencies in both directions given that you have the necessary money: an example of such a person would be a foreigner with access to Euros or Dollars when staying in Venezuela, or a Venezuelan who is saving Euros or Dollars since there is no trust at all in the Bolívar – which is quite natural given an inflation that is one of the highest in the world measuring up to 70 per cent last year. The black market which in 2012 was at around the now SICADI level of 12 Bolívar against the US-Dollar is now up to 250 to 300 Bolívar, which is around 40 to 60 times the first official exchange rate of 6,3 Bolívar/US-Dollar.

Naturally, this system not only encourages corruption, it invites illegal enrichment and the creation of a grand scale illegal currency trading and contraband network. People with a political office or economic position – being from the government or not – with access to cheap dollars can profit immensely. So just imagine a “best-case”-scenario where a business owner with government contacts or being even part of the government him/herself claims to import essential goods at the very preferential rate and uses some of the received dollars to change either huge loads of Bolívar at the black market or to save the dollars and/or take them out of the country.

On the other hand it is also attractive for ordinary, non-wealthy Venezuelans to make a living out of acquiring dollars and selling them at the black market since you can easily earn several monthly salaries that way. Such measures can be fundamental for having a dignified life in a country characterized by such a high inflation rate. This system works out as follows: people can obtain a limited amount of dollars for a preferential rate in order to travel abroad, which is called the “Cupo Viajero”. Then they try to spend the least amount possible when travelling and change it back at the black market upon their return. The government now tries to prevent this phenomenon being called “rascacupos” by having just reduced the Cupo Viajero. For travelling to the US right now one might receive USD 300 for a journey lasting one to three days, USD 500 for a journey between four to seven days and between USD 525 and USD 700 for journeys over eight days.

Apparently this exchange rate system is not conducive to fight capital flight but rather encourages it since all the restriction make it all the more unattractive to keep money in the country in the first place. In fact, the initial idea should be the other way round: create conditions that make it as attractive as possible to keep the money in the country. However, tourists and business people –given you have the right contacts – can profit immensely right now from this system with the latter awaiting incredible profit margins. All this leads to the paradox that Caracas is simultaneously the most and least expensive city in the world.

The post Venezuela: Four Exchange Rates Distorting Economy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A freshly released IMF’s World Economic Outlook brings (yet again, for the sixth year in a row, and for the third time this year only) no comforting picture to anyone within the G-7, especially in the US and EU. Neither is comforting the latest pre-Davos summit released Oxfam study. It hints that 1% is fat and furious, as some 99% of us are too many on this planet.

Will the passionately US-pushed cross-Atlantic Free Trade Area save the day? Or, would that Pact-push drag the things over the edge and mark an end of the unionistic Europe? Is the extended EU conflict with Russia actually a beginning of the Atlantic-Central Europe’s conflict over Russia, an internalization of mega geopolitical and geo-economic dilemma – who accommodates with whom, in and out of the Union? Finally, does more Ukrainian (and Eastern Europe) calamities pave the road for a new cross-continental grand accommodation, of either austerity-tired France or über-performing Germany with Russia, therefore the end of the EU? For whose sake Eastern Europe has been barred of all important debates such as that of Slavism, identity, social cohesion (eroded by the plunder called ‘privatization’), secularism and antifascism? Why do we suddenly wonder that all around Germany-led Central Europe, the neo-Nazism gains ground while only Russia insists on antifascism and (pan-)Slavism?

However, the inner unionistic equilibrium will be maintained only if the Atlantic-Central Europe skillfully calibrates and balances its own equidistance from both assertive Russia and the omnipresent US. Any alternative to the current Union is a grand accommodation of either France or Germany with Russia. This means a return to Europe of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries – namely, direct confrontations over the Continent’s core sectors, perpetual animosities wars and destructions.

Both Russia and the US has demonstrated ability for a skillful and persistent conduct of international affairs, passions and visions to fight for their agendas. It is time for Brussels to live up to its very idea, and to show the same. Biology and geopolitics share one basic rule: comply or die.

* * * *

Conclusively, we should today be grateful to Greece for offering us an essential lesson of democracy, and very importantly; of socio-political and economic inclusion. It is deeper than the choice between austerity and prosperity, between Rain and Tears and those fat and furious.

Be it a street cry of indignados or TV-fame of (hereditary) promies, arguments of Podemos or ignorance of oligarchs – all is pointing at the same direction: Europe used to bare more solidary, above all used to be far more pragmatic and foresighted.
Some 65 years ago, it reflected upon and clearly understood the twisted logics of monetary-fiscal talibanisation in the interwar period. By acting preemptively, Europe then prevented yet another weaponisation of financial instruments (enrichment of financial plutonium and other toxic derivatives) and their utilization as the weapons of mass destruction that are causing death and life-changing injuries to many (like any other WMD).

Consequently, already in 1953, Europeans managed its best ‘F-WMD non-proliferation treaty’ ever – the so-called London Agreement on German External Debts (also known as the London Debt Agreement or Londoner Schuldenabkommen). By the letter of this accord over 60% of German reparations for the colossal atrocities committed by this Central Europe nation in both WW were forgiven (or generously reprogramed) by their former European victims, including Greece. Back then, with memories of Nazi bestialities still fresh, Europeans showed more vision and courageous leadership, and managed to close the deal in less than 6 months (from February 27 to August 8, 1953) – a stark contrast to the ongoing disheartened and irrational purge of Greece that is cryptically and cynically labeled the ‘talks on Greek debt’.

The price will be beyond the shift in geostrategic orientation of particular EU member states. The EU is at the critical crossroad: either Syriza-ating reconciliation or Syria-anitzating escalation.

Author is professor in international law and global political studies, based in Vienna, Austria. His previous book Geopolitics of Technology – Is There Life after Facebook? was published by the New York’s Addleton Academic Publishers. Just released is his newest book Geopolitics – Europe 100 years later.

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By Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty*

Within a span of less than two months earlier this year, India had to launch rescue operations in Yemen and Nepal. In Yemen, the operations focused on rescuing Indian citizens and others caught up in a civil war and in aerial bombardment by a coalition of countries, led by Saudi Arabia. In Nepal, the operations were for both rescue and relief in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake. In both cases, the Indian effort was a well-oiled one, with complete synergy between various agencies of the government. The Indian air force and navy played stellar roles in these operations.

In normal times, the Indian government is known to operate in silos, with its constituent ministries and agencies guarding their turf zealously and generally following their own path. But in times of crisis, when push comes to shove from the prime minister himself, the same Indian government gets its act together to mount operations in Yemen and Nepal that attract the attention of the world for the planning, coordination and high-level international diplomacy that included direct telephonic contact between the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, and Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the new king of Saudi Arabia.

Beginning March 26, 2015, the Saudi-led coalition, comprising nine other Arab countries, backed by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, launched air strikes in Yemen against the Houthis and army units loyal to the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The coalition put together by Saudi Arabia includes all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (except Oman) and forces from Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Sudan. The US is providing intelligence support by pinpointing targets. Saudi Arabia has a history of conflict with Yemen with which it shares a long border of 1750 kilometres and “Operation Decisive Storm”, as the current military campaign is named, has sought to degrade the military capabilities of the Houthis.

Saudi-Yemen relations have a long history of both conflict and cooperation as neighbours. A fairly large area with ethnic Yemeni population was incorporated into the Saudi kingdom. Kinship ties on both side ensured that the border was porous and difficult to control. Side letters exchanged between the leaders of the two countries were interpreted by the Yemeni side as giving unrestricted right of entry to Yemenis into Saudi Arabia.

The oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s, led to a very large migration of Yemenis to work in Saudi Arabia. Yemenis from the north were allowed entry fairly easily compared to other nationals. Yemeni migrants were allowed to own their business. Thus many important business families, like the bin Ladens and Al Rajhis, sprang from Yemeni ranks. At its height, the Yemeni expatriate population in Saudi Arabia grew to over two million. This had a debilitating effect on northern Yemen as able-bodied males migrated and the traditional economy, based on agriculture, went into decline. Before the unification of north and south Yemen in 1990, the Saudis made the two Yemens keep each other busy. Saudi meddling in both parts of Yemen has been a constant feature. North Yemen profited financially from Saudi support but it created a huge dependency, since remittances from Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia became the main income for North Yemen. Yemen is the poorest among all Arab countries and is a neighbour of the richest Arab country – Saudi Arabia.

The Yemeni Houthis, mainly from the Zaidi sect of Shi’ite Islam, form the majority among the population in the northern highlands of Yemen and comprise a third of the population of Yemen as a whole. Almost a quarter of Yemen’s population comprises the Zaidi Shia whose main population is concentrated in the north of the country. Once ruled by the Hashemite Zaidis (those claiming to have descended from the family of the Prophet Mohammad) for more than 1,000 years. In 1962, they were overthrown by a group of nationalist military officers. This group founded the Yemen Arab Republic. Zaidi Muslims are nominally categorized as Shia Muslims although they are actually closer to the Sunni schools of jurisprudence.

The Zaidi cleric, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, was the first leader of the rebels and the Houthis get their name from him. The Houthis have consistently alleged that their community was being subjected to systemic political discrimination and socio-economic marginalization. They also opposed the rise of the Salafi/Wahabi ideology that had encouraged the al Qaida, both of which has spread in Yemen. Badreddin channelized the grievances of the Houthis by founding the Shabab al-Momineen in 1992 in their home province of Saada. They began their struggle against the government led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The dispute started when Saleh, then supported by Saudi Arabia, charged the Houthis with sedition. Saleh alleged that the Houthis wanted to re-establish the Zaidi Shia Imamate rule which was deposed four decades earlier. Saleh felt threatened by the rise of the Houthis and he sent the army to attack them in 2004. Badreddin was killed in this assault and the Houthi militia, under the name of Ansarullah, took root to carry on the fight under the leadership of Badreddin’s younger brother, Abdelmalik Al Houthi. Since 2004, the Houthis have confronted Saleh’s army and fought six major battles launched by Saleh to decimate them as a military and political force. Spooked by the consolidation of the Houthis, the Saudis had earlier launched attacks against them with their sophisticated American weaponry in 2009. The Yemeni government had launched an offensive against the Houthi rebels in 2009. The Saudi regime had amassed troops along the Saudi-Yemeni border and shelled the northern province of Saada, the stronghold of the Houthis. But the Houthis gave the Saudis a bloody nose and did not give up their struggle for an equitable stake in Yemen’s governance. The Saudi regime is not known for fighting wars. Its preferred tool has been “cheque book diplomacy”, buying influence using its vast cache of petrodollars.

The Houthi militia’s successes attracted more recruits and its ranks swelled to over a lakh as it consolidated its control over the Northern provinces and even reached the sea. The Houthis have taken advantage of the political chaos and the civil war to capture Sanaa, the capital city, moving further south over the past year. Ironically, they have received support and backing of the former president, Saleh. The civil war in Yemen led to the Gulf Cooperation Council taking the initiative, led by the Saudis mainly, to force Saleh to hand over power to his deputy, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in early 2012.

Saudis injected the sectarian issue into this civil war by stoking fears that the Houthis were acting as a proxy for Iran, the main Shi’ite country and a regional rival of mainly Sunni Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime believes that the Houthi thrust into southern Yemen will undermine Saudi security, sharpen the sectarian chasm and add heft to al Qaida group operating in Yemen. In early 2015, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, a Saudi appointee, resigned as president when the Houthis reached Sanaa and surrounded the presidential palace, took control of the Parliament building and dissolved the government. In February 2015, Hadi fled to the port city of Aden, withdrew his resignation and denounced the Houthi takeover as a coup d’état. The Houthis advanced southwards relentlessly, reaching Aden without facing any serious resistance. On March 25, Hadi fled to Riyadh, which launched “Operation Decisive Storm” the very next day.

The Houthis are putting up considerable resistance to the coalition of Arab states that is attacking them. The current assault by the Saudi-led coalition came at a time when the political dialogue was on the verge of yielding a compromise on power sharing. The Saudis raised the issue of Iranian meddling in Yemen as the immediate provocation. The Saudi assault has taken a massive humanitarian toll and international human rights organizations have accused the Saudis of using banned cluster munitions. The Saudis have bombed the international airport at Sanaa and also blockaded the port at Aden. This has prevented humanitarian supplies from reaching civilians. Iran has strongly denied any involvement in training and arming the Houthis and criticized the Saudi-led air strikes as illegal and against international law. Iran has attempted to provide humanitarian assistance which has led to a stand-off between Iranian ships carrying humanitarian material and the US and Saudi naval ships which have mounted a virtual naval blockade of the main port of Aden. The Saudis have been unable to halt the Houthi advance.

The Saudi-led assault on Yemen has been severely criticized by the United Nations for targeting schools and hospitals. The Saudis have admitted doing that but say that these places are being used for storing arms and Houthi leaders are taking shelter in such buildings. The Saudis have claimed that they have given advance warning to civilians to vacate certain areas before the air strikes and blamed the Houthis for using civilians as human shields, all familiar excuses in such situations.

The Saudis have also pleaded with their trusted brotherly country Pakistan for help in providing ground troops. Pakistan’s response has been a classic case of public prevarication, ending with the Pakistani Parliament voting on a resolution to reject the Saudi request for help. The Saudis reacted with fury publicly. Many believe that the public response was choreographed and the Pakistanis have quietly agreed to let the Saudis recruit retired Pakistani soldiers and officers for putting “boots on the ground” in Yemen. The Pakistanis have long been at Saudi Arabia’s beck and call and have been rewarded handsomely with funds. Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, spent 10 years in exile in Saudi Arabia when Pervez Musharraf, then the president, agreed to a deal to let him out of prison. There are rumours being floated that the Pakistanis will provide nuclear weapons to the Saudis in gratitude for the funding the latter has provided to Pakistan for its nuclear weapons programme, following the nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran.

The civil war in Yemen can only be ended if there is a political settlement. It is not going to end if the issue is framed as a struggle for influence between the Saudis and the Iranians or a sectarian struggle between the Sunnis and Shias. The Saudis are building a narrative of a rising threat from Iran which is interfering in the affairs of its neighbours and must be stopped from doing so to preserve Arab security and solidarity. The Houthis do have some contacts with Iran, though it is unclear if these links have any substantial financial and military components. The Houthis are being painted as an Iranian proxy.

The changes in the Saudi regime with the appointment of young new defence and interior ministers from among the grandsons of Abdul Aziz Al Saud, have also brought about a more muscular Saudi response. The Saudis believe that the Arab countries must secure their own destiny and fight to deter Iran and not depend upon the US as the primary security provider. They also do not want Yemen to follow an independent foreign policy and have a democratic polity which is seen as a threat to the hegemony of the Saudi ruling family.

Attempts to find a political solution led to talks in Geneva last week but ended without any resolution. The Saudis have resorted to more indiscriminate bombing that has taken 3,000 lives so far. The Saudis and Hadi have fallen back on implementing UN security council resolution 2216 which the Houthis have rejected, on the grounds that it calls for their withdrawal from all cities, surrender of all arms and return of the Hadi government. The Houthis remain in control in large parts of Yemen and have increased attacks on Saudi positions. The humanitarian situation is quite desperate. The Saudis are hoping that the humanitarian situation will force the Houthis to capitulate. There are no signs that this will happen soon.

The Saudis are already facing some blowback. There have been two suicide bombings of Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province where the majority of Saudi Arabia’s Shias live and where the country’s oil resources are located. The Saudi regime may be embroiled in the Yemeni conflict for several years without any exit strategy, leading to greater interference of other regional countries and more humanitarian distress. The Saudi regime is unhappy with the US, its godfather for several decades, for engaging Iran via the nuclear deal. The escalation in Yemen is the Saudi regime’s way of warning the US to back off from the Iranian nuclear deal. That is unlikely to happen. There are other complicating factors like what happens in Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State, a fanatic Sunni body, is still managing to survive.

The Arab world is in turmoil mainly because of undemocratic regimes, lack of institutions, the absence of a spirit of scientific enquiry and societies that have yet to adjust to the 21st century. While the Arabs tend to blame the West for their troubles with some reason, much of the blame they have to shoulder themselves.

*The author is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, and former secretary in the ministry of external affairs.

Courtesy: The Telegraph, July 7, 2015

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By Alvaro de Juana and Elise Harris

When leftist Bolivian president Evo Morales on Thursday presented Pope Francis with a “communist crucifix” – a carving of Christ crucified on the hammer of a hammer and sickle – the Pope’s only reaction was to say, “This is not ok,” while shaking his head.

Shortly after his July 8 arrival at the Bolivian administrative capital of La Paz, Pope Francis made a courtesy visit to Morales at the Palace of Government. At such meetings, the leaders customarily exchange gifts; Pope Francis gave the Bolivian president a mosaic of the Marian icon of the “Salus Populus Romani,” her role as patroness of Rome.

Morales explained what his gift to the Pope was as he gave it to him. In the video, filmed by the Vatican Television Center and transmitted throughout the world, the Pope’s disapproval of the gift can be seen, and he says “No está bien eso” – “This is not ok” – while shaking his head.

While the audio is a bit marred by the clicking of journalists’ cameras, the embarrassment of the Pope seems clear.

The cross with a hammer and sickle is a reproduction of another carved during the 1970s by Fr. Luis Espinal Camps, a Spanish Jesuit who was a missionary in Bolivia who was killed in 1980 during the Bolivian dictatorship.

At a July 9 press briefing the Holy See press officer, Fr. Federico Lombardi, noted the lack of clarity in the audio of the exchange, and remarked that Pope Francis had been unaware the crucifix was a replica of Fr. Espinal’s.

He also claimed that Fr. Espinal’s use of it was not ideological but expressed a hope for dialogue between communism and the Church, adding that Pope Francis’ remark likely expresed a sentiment of “I didn’t know”, rather than “This is not right.”

Morales’ gift has sparked a worldwide controversy, and reactions were not long in coming. The majority of them accuse Morales of trying to politicize the Pope’s visit.

Morales is head of Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism party, and his administration has focused on implementing leftist policies in the nation. Since coming to power in 2006, Morales has frequently sparred with the Bolivian bishops.

Catholics from various Hispanophone countries rejected Morales’ gesture, considering it offensive to the numerous victims of terrorist groups in Latin America and of the historical totalitarian communist regimes.

Bishop Jose Munilla Aguirre of San Sebastián, a Spaniard, tweeted: “The height of arrogance is to manipulate God in the service of atheistic ideologies … Today, once again: #ChristCrucified”.

Fr. Espinal – whose “communist crucifix” was the model for Morales’ gift to the Pope – was a journalist who advocated for human rights and democracy, continues to be a source of controversy in Bolivia.

While en route from the La Paz airport to the presidential palace, Pope Francis stopped to pray at the location where Fr. Espinal’s corpse was found after his March 21, 1980 kidnapping and murder.

“Dear sisters and brothers. I stopped here to greet you and above all to remember. To remember a brother, our brother, a victim of interests who did not want him to fight for the freedom of Bolivia,” the Pope said to those gathered at the site, after arriving by way of an open popemobile.

“May Christ draw this man into himself. Lord give him eternal rest and may light shine for him that has no end.”

Some regard Fr. Espinal as a martyr who lived the Gospel with the same spirit as Blessed Oscar Romero – who was martyred by right wing Salvadorans two days after Fr. Espinal’s death – while others claim the priest was a communist and became too involved in politics.

Born in 1932 in Barcelona, Fr. Espinal studied both philosophy and theology before entering the Jesuit novitiate in Veruela in Zaragoza at the age of 17.

The same year he traveled to Bergamo, Italy to study audiovisual journalism. After two years he returned to Spain and began to work for Spanish radio and television corporation TVE at the height of Francisco Franco’s rule.

Fr. Espinola denounced the censorships placed on TVE under Franco and left Spain. He moved to Bolivia in August 1968, where he took over as chair in the journalism department of the Bolivian Catholic University, and later become sub-director.

He was granted Bolivian citizenship in 1970, and over the course of the next 10 years worked in both the written and radio press, produced documentaries on social themes and got into screenwriting.

As an avid defender of human rights, the priest co-founded the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights in Bolivia in 1976. During the 1971 military coup led by Hugo Banzer Suarez, Fr. Espinola intervened on behalf of persecuted and detained politicians and trade unions.

In 1977 he participated in a three-week-long hunger strike to gain general amnesty for political exiles, validity of trade unions and the withdrawal of the army from mining centers.

In 1979 Fr. Espinola founded the weekly newspaper “Aqui,” which was quickly dubbed “leftist” due to its anti-establishment views and vocal criticism of government corruption.

As a result of his work, the priest was kidnapped by a group of paramilitaries March 21, 1980, while on his way home.

According to police and militants at the time, the militants took Fr. Espinola to La Paz’ Achachicala slaughterhouse, where he was tortured for five hours before being shot 17 times. His body was found handcuffed and gagged the next morning.

In 2007, Morales officially declared March 21 as the “Day of Bolivian Cinema” due to the priest’s contributions in the area. On that day, cinemas and television channels are obliged to show national films, particularly relating to the themes of human rights and indigenous peoples.

Fr. Lombardi noted during a July 6 press briefing that no cause has been opened for Fr. Espinal’s beatification.

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By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The Supreme Court judgement has divided the political leadership and the legal community over- whether the judgement is political in character and whether the Supreme Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in calling for a halt in constitution making.

Though there have been snide remarks that it was a “Madhesi judgement given by a Madhesi Judge on a petition from a Madhesi,” there have been saner voices calling for a review on the restructuring of the state before the promulgation of the new constitution. Fortunately, these have emanated not only from those living in the Terai and elected from Terai, but also from other regions as well.

One such approach that impressed me was from an advocate- Pratyush Nath Upreti, in Kathmandu Post of 6th July that said – “(the) decision should not be seen as a step backwards but rather as an opportunity to work collectively in finding ways to think more inclusively on existing issues.”

Instead, the government appears to be inclined to approach the Supreme Court with an appeal and is said to be waiting for the new Chief Justice to take over.

This will be a wrong move and will be misunderstood both by the Madhesis and the Janajathis who perhaps form over forty percent of the population. Unwittingly, the government would also be making heroes of people like Upendra Yadav who have been steadily losing their support base.

The better way for the government to do would be to quickly form the high power commission to delineate and name the eight provinces within six months or even a little more before the actual promulgation of the constitution.

The interim constitution could continue to prevail and nothing is lost in delaying by a few months something that has been delayed for many years due to the incompetence of the political leadership. Change of Prime ministership need not wait for the new constitution but could come before. The point is- the unity of the country is more important than political expediency.

The draft constitution is said to have 297 articles, 37 parts and 7 annexures and it is now in public domain after having been endorsed by the constituent assembly. There appears to be many shortcomings- but the most controversial one is said to be the denial of equal citizenship rights to women.

A fortnight’s time has been given to the public to go through the draft and come up with suggestions and recommendations. After this, the Assembly will discuss the issues.

There are two difficulties in this. First is the lack of time for real participation of the public in endorsing the draft. It took much more time for Bhutan when it went over the exercise of consultations.

The second and more serious is that a constitution without properly delineating the boundaries of the provinces cuts at the very root of federalism and as someone has said is like a “lifeless body”.

Would anyone like to have a child born without its head?

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One of the most cynical methods the Soviet government employed to divide and rule non-Russian nations was the establishment of republics with two titular nationalities because such arrangements guaranteed that the two were more likely to view the other as a problem and threat than to see Moscow as responsible.

At the end of Soviet times, there were three such republics, Chechen-Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. The first broke up at that time, but the other two have survived because they are part of a larger concern that still animates Moscow’s policies in the region: keeping Circassian nations from coming together and forming a single republic.

Were either of those republics to fall apart, it would almost certainly trigger a broader reordering of the borders in the region as Circassians – including the Adygey, the Kabardins, and the Cherkess – would certainly view a separate Kabardin or Cherkess republic as the nucleus of a future state.

And because of that likelihood, at least some in Moscow are quite willing to play up fears of that happening to keep the Turkic Balkars and Karachays in line and to continue its campaign to divide the Circassian national movement, a campaign that shows no sign of ending especially because the Circassians are gaining more support abroad.

But if Moscow found it relatively easy to maintain bi-national republics in Soviet times – it could appoint officials to reflect the ethnic “balance” it wanted to ensure by using quotas – the task of the enter now is complicated by the fact that in winner-take-all elections, the local majority will win more than its share of seats and positions, freezing out the other.

That appears to be happening in Karachayevo-Cherkessia now, to judge from an article entitled “The Cherkess are Upset by the Election Policies of the Authorities” in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta” (ng.ru/regions/2015-07-09/2_cherkesy.html).

Its author, Aleksandr Shapovalov, the Rostov correspondent of the Moscow paper, reports that yesterday, Mukhamed Cherkesov, the head of the Adyge Khase-Chekess Parliament, declared that “over the course of recent times, the situation of the Cherkess in the republic has significantly worsened.”

“Cherkess are practically not represented in the organs of power; their rights are violated in the formation of the government of Karachayevo-Cherkessia and of other organs of power,” Cherkesov said. As evidence of this, he pointed to the fact that only one Cherkess has been hired by the republic procuracy over the last five years.

Given this, the activist said, the Cherkess plan to convene an extraordinary congress of Adyge-Khase this fall. That meeting, according to the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” journalist, “in all probability” will raise the issue of restoring a separate Cherkess Autonomous Olbast as it had existed until 1957.

At present, the Cherkess are the third largest nationality in the republic, after the Karachays and the Russians. They number some 60,000 people with “the majority of them living compactly on the territories of Khabez and Adyge-Khabl districts, a settlement pattern that makes their situation both worse and better.

On the one hand, as activists complain, the Karachay-dominated government can and does direct funding to other districts where the Karachays or Russians are the more numerous, something that angers the Cherkess but about which they have been able to do little to change in recent times.

But on the other, this settlement pattern means that there is a territorial basis for the Cherkess challenge to Karachayevo-Cherkessia; and the very fact that it has now been mentioned in a central Russian newspaper is certain to set off alarm bells in Moscow, which will now have to come up with a new strategy to try to block the resurgent Circassians.

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The world eagerly awaits the outcome of the 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development this month which will be a real test of the international community’s commitment to sustainable development. In this context, it is worth underscoring that the Asia-Pacific region – a dynamic and vibrant market – has already been at the forefront of deliberations on financing for development and has endorsed initiatives that will unleash its resource potential. With substantial scope for tapping domestic resource mobilization and infrastructure financing, the region will build on the development achievements secured in past years which have simultaneously driven global growth. Our region has made impressive gains in reducing the incidence of extreme poverty from a staggering 53 percent in 1990 to 12 percent today, illustrating its resilience to the 2008
financial crisis given that most countries strengthened their financial systems regulatory frameworks in the aftermath of Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. Trade growth has remained steady, with the level of intra-regional trade second only to that of the European Union.

Official Photo of Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations & Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP Photo/Suwat Chancharoensuk)

The key to financial stability and people’s well-being will be their improved access to financing for development, which involves broadening coverage of financing to all segments of society, including the unbanked and sustainable businesses. Given the growing demands to implement the ambitious and wide-ranging sustainable development agenda in the period after 2015, financing systems will need to be harnessed further to channel the right financing mix and blend. Home to 60 percent of the world’s population, ESCAP estimates that the financing requirements of the region, which are growing faster than advanced economies, could be anywhere between $2.1 trillion and $2.5 trillion per year to fund a comprehensive sustainable development agenda which includes ending poverty, improving access to basic services, the provision of social protection, infrastructure development and addressing both climate mitigation and adaptation. Asia Pacific, which accounts for almost 57 per cent of global trade finance transactions, needs to launch initiatives to meet the region’s trade finance requirements which currently account for more than half of the global trade finance gap, estimated at nearly $2 trillion. Inadequate levels of finance can hurt firms’ productive and export capacities and limit their participation to only low value-added stages of production.

While the amount of money involved may seem daunting, the region is nonetheless known for its high saving rates, build-up of reserves and ability to attract large capital flows and remittances. Moreover, in 2013, the region’s fiscal revenue was estimated to be $4 trillion, and private sector savings were estimated to amount to another $6 trillion. In the same year the stock of financial assets of the region’s most wealthy individuals amounted to $35 trillion.

If financial resources are, in principle, more than sufficient to fund the required investments in sustainable development, why then, are they not being applied more effectively? The first reason is that investments in sustainable development, such as social protection or climate change mitigation and adaptation, have high social returns but are perceived to have low or zero private returns in the traditional sense. A second reason is the skewed distribution of financial needs and resources with a few countries having a repository of large surplus of funds, while the majority have needs exceeding their own financial resources. Lack of long term and risk capital is a serious obstacle to the implementation of key infrastructure projects – including cross-border infrastructure – which has the potential for high payoffs for the region’s competitiveness and prosperity.

Recognizing these challenges, Asia and the Pacific, with ESCAP’s support, has engaged in two high-level consultation processes in last twelve months. Conversations between regional political leaders, financing experts, the business community and civil society have led to a consensus on a tangible and actionable agenda for dealing with these financing shortfalls. Among others, proposals have been tabled on:

• Establishing an Asia Pacific Forum to raise tax-to-GDP ratios bybroadening tax bases, removing exemptions and loopholes, and improving administrative efficiency and collection. These should be implemented.
• Better and efficient deployment of public expenditures to reduce wasteful and unproductive expenditures.
• Implementing BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting) by promoting regional cooperation among national tax authorities with the aim of reducing revenue losses due to tax evasion by multinational corporations and to illicit financial flows.
• Ensuring that countries deliver on official development assistance and directing it where it is most needed and leveraging more financing.

The region will further benefit from a range of diversified approaches and mechanisms of South-South and triangular cooperation. On one hand, this involves the concrete actions taken by China, Russia and India to operationalize new development banks, establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Silk Road Fund. On the other hand, there has been welcome capital enhancement of the Asian Development Bank. Close cooperation between these new and existing multilateral development banks will play a critical role in financing sustainable and resilient infrastructure in the region, including supporting better transboundary connectivity.

There is further scope for developing regional financial markets by adopting modern, harmonized financial regulations and institutions which would facilitate mutual recognition arrangements – where two or more States agree to recognize the adequacy of each other’s regulation. This can facilitate the trading of securities across countries and can lay the groundwork for developing a regional capital market at a later stage. The ASEAN Capital Market Forum –consisting of capital market regulators of the 10 ASEAN members – is the first move in the region to develop mutual recognition in primary offerings, financial intermediaries, market professionals, collective investment schemes, and securities exchanges.

The good news is that the Asia-Pacific region is not waiting but has already moved towards providing the necessary means to implement these sustainable development goals. Although the region has taken a leading role in these first important steps, it is vital that this momentum be maintained, that the consensus developed be maintained and implemented, so that Asia and the Pacific can continue to lead on inclusive and sustainable development.

* The author is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). She is also the UN’s Sherpa for the G20 and previously served as Governor of the Central Bank of Pakistan and Vice President of the MENA Region of the World Bank.

The post Financing For Development In Asia And The Pacific – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fernando Heller

(EurActiv) — Spanish anti-austerity party Podemos, seen by many as the ideologically closest political force to Greece’s Syriza, is scrutinising how Prime Minsiter Alexis Tsipras’ intransigent position with international creditors can bring political gains.

The massive “No” vote in the Greek referendum, and the political poker played by Tsipras with the creditors, is giving hope to the leftist Podemos (“We Can”), which is currently the third political force in Spain. General elections are expected to be held in Spain in November.

Many in Madrid are asking if the “Syriza style” could be a model for Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias.

According to some political analysts, the results of the referendum in Greece (“No” – 61.31%, “Yes”- 38.69%) has given more credibility to Podemos, which claims that Greece has been “blackmailed by Brussels, Washington and Frankfurt.”

But who exactly is blackmailing who was a question raised in a special late-night debate on the Spanish public television (RTVE-24 Horas) on 7 July.

“So far, Tsipras has played his cards in this game very well. Actually he has managed to capitalise in political terms the EU’s fear about a ‘Grexit’, something nobody wants in Europe,” said senior political analyst Esther Esteban.

Alexis Tsipras, a good gambler?

Journalist Esther Jaén said the Grexit panic was being used by Tsipras as leverage in the talks.

But even if Greece represents just 2% of the Eurozone GDP, a possible “Grexit” would have very serious political consequences on the European project as a whole, Miguel Puente, spokesman at the European Commission’s Representation in Madrid told EurActiv Spain.

For Iglesias, the interpretation of the facts is very different. The referendum gave Tsipras the legitimacy to take a hard line stand with Brussels, “in the name of democracy”. In Iglesias’ view, even Spain’s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, of the right-wing Popular Party (PP), has softened his previous hardline position.

Madrid has followed Berlin´s inflexible tone with Greece, demanding Athens to implement -at once- the reforms needed, as a “sine qua non” condition to receive more credit.

Iglesias also welcomed the fact that Spain’s economy minister (and candidate for the post of next president of the Eurogroup), Luis de Guindos, has –in his view- adopted a more calmed tone, saying more “reasonable things” in the Greek crisis.

The Spanish example

But Rajoy, De Guindos and the majority of the Spanish government keep repeating the same message. Spain has undertaken a big austerity effort (with painful cuts, among other in the health and education sectors) in the past years. It avoided a bailout in July 2012, and the economy is in the path of recovery and, last but not least, others (Greece) should follow the “Spanish example”.

Spain, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel García-Margallo, recalled recently, has lent €26 billion to Greece as part of the European bailout. He also warned that Athens cannot cancel a debt coming from EU’s “taxpayers money”. In an interview with the television channel Antena 3, Margallo urged Tsipras to present a concrete proposal for final negotiations “once and for all.”

Who fears Podemos?

But not only Rajoy belongs to the group of “hawks” demanding an urgent solution to the crisis from Tsipras. Pedro Sánchez, the leader of the Socialist Party (PSOE), is asking Athens to act with a sense of responsibility and urgency because “at the end, is the Greek people who suffers the most”, he said.

Sánchez preferred to join the ranks of the right-wing “hardliners”. Possibly because he and Rajoy feel that after the regional and municipal elections held last May, Spain’s two-party system is gradually fading away, thanks to Podemos and Ciudadanos (Citizens), a new centrist party directly competing with the PP for the conservative niche.

The PP and the PSOE, analysts say, think a Syriza victory in Brussels could also mean that Podemos’ political expectations for the general elections would be high.

Spaniards dislike a possible alliance Podemos-PSOE

If general elections were held in Spain today, the ruling PP would win them again with 25.6% of the votes. The socialists would come closer to the conservatives, with a gap of just 1.3% between them, according to a recent survey conducted by the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS), quoted by El Pais. Podemos would come third, with 16.5% of the vote.

But expectations are high for Ciudadanos. Albert Rivera’s party comes fourth, with 13.8% of the vote, the CIS said.

But according to a new poll published last week by Metroscopia, Spanish citizens wouldn’t like to see a possible government agreement between PSOE and Podemos, as they still “mistrust” Pablo Iglesias’ party.

The survey says 45% of Spanish citizens would prefer an agreement between PSOE and Ciudadanos, followed by a possible agreement PP-Ciudadanos (42%).

The post Spain’s Podemos Seeks Political Boost From Syriza Victory appeared first on Eurasia Review.

At least 15 civilians were killed and another 20 injured on Thursday when a Syrian warplane dropped a fuel-air weapon, also known as a “vacuum bomb,” on Syria’s Kerm ul-Beyk region, according to local civil defense sources.

The explosive device fell on a public square near the Ibad ar-Rahman Mosque during taraweeh prayer, the sources told Anadolu Agency, adding that most of the casualties were women and children.

The same sources said that at least 10 people remained trapped under debris caused by the bombing.

Syria’s civil war, now in its fifth year, was triggered by a violent crackdown on anti-regime protesters by the government of President Bashar al-Assad in early 2011.

Half of the country’s population has since been displaced by the violence, with nearly four million Syrians currently seeking refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

Original article

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Does the specter of bioterrorism or similar threats justify treating disease as a significant danger to international security? Joao Nunes has his doubts. While diseases can indeed be weaponized by non-state actors, overly militarized responses to the threats they pose may do more harm than good.

By Joao Nunes*

In August 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa to be a ‘public health emergency of international concern’. The following month, Médecins sans Frontières made an appeal for a robust civilian and military intervention to tackle the epidemic. Spurred by the fact that Western nationals had become infected, Western governments responded to these appeals, with the United States committing up to 3000 troops and the United Kingdom deploying a contingent of 750 troops.

Ebola may have been presented in the media as an unprecedented threat, but the story around it was very familiar. The Western public was bombarded with images reminiscent of blockbusters like Outbreak or Contagion: chaotic scenes in makeshift hospitals, nameless individuals in pain or in mourning, health workers in biohazard suits, rioting crowds, military personnel enforcing quarantines, somber declarations in Washington and Geneva, the arrival of Western assistance. These fictional stories could well have been real; real stories could easily be fictionalized. Overall, it seems uncontroversial to accept the suggestion that epidemic disease is a security threat, not only to the cohesiveness of a society but also to international stability. Lurking in the background of these scenarios there are anxieties about disease leading to uncontrolled population movements, the closing of borders, disruption of international trade, depletion of militaries and competition over scarce resources. All of these problems fall within the remit of security.

But is disease really a security issue? Who or what is being threatened?

The landscape of fear

On the 20^th of March 1995, members of the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo released a deadly nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, killing 13 people and leaving 6000 suffering from lasting effects . This was one of the first incidents of bioterrorism to receive worldwide attention in the post-Cold War era. Shortly after 9/11, letters containing anthrax spores were sent to several news media and US Senate offices, killing 5 people and triggering panic in an already charged political and social environment. The world had awakened to the prospect of a future in which disease agents could be easily weaponized in biological warfare or used to cause terror and havoc. ‘Health security’ has since included concerns over the protection of critical infrastructure against the possibility of deliberate contamination of water supplies or food chains. In general, the rise of the vocabulary of health security in the post-9/11 period has less to do with actual diseases than with anxiety over the fragility of the complex systems and networks that sustain life in a globalized world. Nowadays, the WHO claims that there is ‘an inevitable linkage between public health security and bioterrorism’, while poor health can be one of the ‘contributors to conflict and international terrorism’.

In this context, it may seem strange to question the status of disease as an international security threat. As Hollywood understands well enough, our imaginary when thinking about disease is ruled by fear. Uncontrolled outbreaks – so the story goes – constitute threats to the very existence of modern societies. They threaten to irrevocably disrupt our way of life. They demand rapid measures – and, sometimes, that normal rules and deliberation procedures are circumvented. Health is thus a fertile ground for securitization, that is, for the framing of diseases using a ‘defense modality’ normally reserved for threats of a military nature. In this securitized scenario, the deployment of militaries seems a natural response. It is not surprising that normal responses to disease outbreaks emphasize ‘emergency preparedness’, ‘containment’ and ‘crisis management’. Diseases, after all, are emergencies that demand swift decisions and unfettered action. How else are we expected to deal with problems like Ebola?

Emergencies or everyday challenges?

These kinds of narratives about health security ultimately take the state as the frame of reference. Where weaponized disease agents are not the primary concern, disease is said to threaten state capacity or resources, or the stability of the state is deemed to be at risk because of the societal turmoil caused by outbreaks. Based on a particular idea of whom or what is threatened by disease, these kinds of narratives prescribe certain responses, particularly militarized ones, as natural or desirable. Insofar as state fragility can have regional and international repercussions, this national security framing of health is then reflected in relations between states, where it becomes an international security concern.

Health, however, can also be conceived as a threat outside this national security frame – particularly if one shifts the focus towards the individual. For individuals, health security pertains to assuredness, predictability or stability in relation to one’s present and future health status. In this perspective, rather than being a source of social-political disturbance, ‘disease’ regains its fundamental meaning: that of a bodily experience. Health security then pertains to the forms of harm and vulnerability that individuals experience: not only those resulting from or multiplied by disease (like disability or destitution), but also pre-existing vulnerabilities that give rise to disease in the first place (like malnutrition or insufficient knowledge about the causes of disease). Even though an individual’s health status obviously depends on the societal context and on conditions that are provided by states (like health systems or sanitation infrastructure), the ultimate referent for thinking about health security in these approaches is the individual. These approaches therefore imply that health issues should be considered security matters insofar as they decisively restrict the ability of individuals to shape the course of their lives.

This shift of focus raises an important issue: why use security language at all to discuss questions of individual survival and well-being that are normally left to discourses of development and rights? There is at least one compelling reason for doing so: perhaps more than any other term, invoking ‘security’ frames experiences of disease as the ‘life-or-death’ matters that they really are. Every year, millions of people die because of health problems that could be easily prevented and cured. In 2012, for example, 1.5 million people died as a result of diarrhoeal disease and 1.1 million of preterm birth complications . These are issues that do not figure high on the list of policy priorities, but they are nonetheless a daily insecurity for millions. They constitute an enormous source of suffering and anxiety – as well as being a tremendous economic and social burden for societies. The widespread acceptance of individual experiences of disease as matters of security would raise the profile of these problems and facilitate political action to address them. This political action need not entail undemocratic or heavy-handed measures. Rather, using security language can help to raise consciousness about the seriousness of an issue and to transcend political deadlock.

Health and global security

Of course, diseases can have important national security implications, and, in some cases, military participation in disease response is indeed beneficial. After all, in the case of the recent Ebola outbreak, it was Médecins sans Frontières, one of the organizations that has done the most to alleviate the suffering caused by the disease, that called for an intervention involving military measures. The problem is that an excessive focus on military crisis management and emergency preparedness can obscure the reality that, for the majority of people living in less developed regions of the world, disease is anything but exceptional – it is part of daily life. In fact, excessive ‘crisis thinking’ can actually contribute to insecurity because it privileges containing existing crises over addressing the long-term, structural problems that give rise to crises in the first place.

It is not difficult to envision a situation in which uncontrolled disease might potentially threaten international security. But the international dimension is only one part of the story. Disease is a daily security threat to countless people around the world. These people are fundamentally insecure because disease has rendered or threatens to render them unable to exercise significant control over their lives. Recognizing the relevance of these everyday disease experiences can help to improve the security of these individuals in the complex environments in which they live.

*João Nunes is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York. Previously, he was a Research Fellow at the University of Warwick and a Visiting Fellow at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development. He is currently working on the project “Neglected Diseases: Addressing the Limits of the International Politics of Health.”

The post Is Disease A Threat To International Security? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Last month the US, came out with a report that claimed that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International financial network was active. This news came as a fodder for many anti-LTTE armed chair critics, academics and governments too.

In India the Intelligence Bureau report referred to vulnerability and threats from “Islamist terror outfits, remnant cadres of LTTE and Naxals” and had advised precautionary measures in reference to the Mullaiperiyar dam, quickly picking a cue, the Tamilnadu government made this as a big issue and due to pressure from other political parties withdrew the allegations.

The State Department’s assessment, through its ‘Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014,’ acknowledges that the LTTE, which suffered military defeat in May 2009 at the hands of the Sri Lankan government led by Mahinda Rajapaksa, has been “largely inactive” since then. Yet, it adds, “The LTTE’s financial network of support continued to operate throughout 2014.”

There were no such claims by the State Department since May 2009 and most importantly in 2012,2013 and 2014 when the US brought about three continuous resolutions against Sri Lanka to investigate war crimes committed during the last stages of the civil war which ended in May 2009.

The former Sri Lankan Defense Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapakse on many occasions has spoken on how the LTTE has been completely wiped out. The atrocities committed on civilians during the course of the wiping out of the LTTE constituted gross violations of the Geneva Convention, prompting Canada and a few other European countries to initiate action against Sri Lanka as they urged the UNHRC to investigate War Crimes committed during the course of civil war.

In 2012, the US which joined the UNHRC and took the lead in bringing the first of the three resolutions in Geneva. Domestic pressure from Tamilnadu prompted India to vote against traditional ally Sri Lanka.

Many Tamils were apprehensive of the interest shown by the US in the Sri Lankan affairs. They felt that the US was more interested in neutralizing the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region in partnership with the Draconian regime of Mahinda Rajapakse, the erstwhile President of Sri Lanka who did not toe the line of US, and was closer to China and Pakistan at the expense of India.

The Tamils sensed that the US was using War Crimes Investigation as a tool to check Mahinda Rajapakse and to control him and his inclination to China, used the three resolutions and the UNHRC as a threatening tool. Now that the Mahinda regime is no more, the US wants to wean out of the web it has created for Sri Lanka.

The US has been successful in bringing in a regime change and place their man Ranil Wickremasinghe as the Prime Minister of the country. Now they are not interested in the issues of Accountability and Inquiry into War Crimes. They did not pressurize the UNHRC to produce its report during the March Session and the report is to be submitted in the next session in September.

The US may not press for another resolution on a friendly regime. The ruse they are using is the nonexistent LTTE. The easiest way out is to create a sensation and divert the issue. There are enough number of people to write about the threat of the LTTE to the US, India and the world at large.

A recent illustration of that is the article reproduced in Eurasia Review on 28th June written by Mr. N. Sathya Moorty, Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation titled Sri Lanka: US Report On LTTE A Caution For India, Too – Analysis. The author wants the world to help Sri Lanka overcome the nonexistent terrorism threat.

The author pulls in the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam into this debate and projects them as a LTTE front organization which the TGTE never claimed. After the end of the war the UN urged the Sri Lankan government to address “the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Tamil people”.1 This was echoed by the EU, USA, India and other countries2,3.

Whatever the TGTE has done so far is not secretive, they have democratically elected their Members from 12 countries, and does the author seem to suggest that the TGTE is carrying out the unfinished agenda of the LTTE in a clandestine manner in which the intelligence agencies of the 12 countries have no idea? This is ridiculing the intelligence of the intelligence agencies and questioning the democratic space allowed to the legitimate aspirations of the people in these 12 countries.

The TGTE boasts of a plethora of intellectuals, academics and professionals of the highest order as its advisors and senators including great personalities like Mr. Ramsey Clark, Former US Attorney General of USA, Mr. Robert Evans, Former Member of European Parliament from UK, Prof. David Matas, renowned Human Rights Attorney from Canada, Mr. M. Manoharan, Attorney at Law and Former member of Parliament from Malaysia, Mr. Satya Sivaraman formerly with the Indian Express and UN ESCAP, from India, Francis Boyle, Professor of International Law at Harvard University, USA, Prof. Peter Schalk from Uppsala University, Sweden, Prof Ramasamy, Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, Malaysia and Karen Parker, Ph.D. Humanitarian Lawyer,USA to name a few.

Academics who respect the Human Rights of the Tamils have travelled far and wide to spread the message of the Genocide that took place in Sri Lanka in 2009, is there anything wrong in that, especially if there are benevolent Tamils in the Diaspora who fund their travel?

The author further relates this problem to Tamil Nationalism in the Indian state of TN and drags the name of Senthamilan Seeman who had organized a massive rally in Trichy on the 24th of May attracting a crowd of nearly 200,000 Tamil youth. This raly was organized in preparation for democratically contesting the state elections in 2016. Here is the link to the speech in which he made some just demands. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QetYbnGBzxI

Never in his speech had Seeman spoken anything against India except for reiterating that India is a Union of States and the aspirations of the Tamils in Tamilnadu need to be respected. The false case foisted against him is a political vendetta of the state government of Tamilnadu.

Tamil nationalism did not emerge out of sympathy for the LTTE. The concept of “Tamil nationalism” was initiated at the end of the 19th century mainly to protect the separate identity of the Tamil language. When a false impression was created that the pan Indian culture was Sanskrit, a section of educated Tamils asserted the point that Tamil culture was distinct from Sanskrit culture and demanded its independent recognition. 4

Tamil nationalism reemerged recently as their legitimate humane issues have been completely sidelined by the Indian government including issues such as the killing of nearly 540 Tamil fishermen by Sri Lankan navy, Cauvery water problem, the methane issue, Kudankulam nuclear power plant which the Tamils do not want on their soil, the killing of 20 innocent Tamils by Andhra police on the pretext of they being red sander smugglers and to cap it India’s support to Sri Lanka in the

Genocide of the Tamils.

One must also note that for nearly 50 years a Tamil has not ruled Tamilnadu as the Chief Minister with the exception of O.Paneerselvam, who was a dummy of J.Jayalalithaa.

The issue of the Tamil struggle for the Right to self-determination in Sri Lanka must be understood from the prism of Human Rights not from the point of state security. Very few remember that there was not a single instance in history where the LTTE attacked US or Israeli facilities anywhere.

To conclude one must understand that the Tamil Diaspora does not have the backing of even a single state on their demand for a separate state and organizationally it is impossible for the Tamil Diaspora to seed another civil war in the present circumstances. Hence the world need not fear the reemergence of the LTTE as ‘Terror Group’. The US should not go back on its promise to fulfill the legitimate demands of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and it must pursue its lost interest in pushing for an International Inquiry into War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity during the course of the civil war.

*The author holds a Doctorate of Philosophy on ‘Internal Displacement and Human Rights situation in Northern Sri Lanka from Bangalore University. He was one of the four public speakers at the Permanent People’s Tribunal on War Crimes against Sri Lanka. He also the Coauthor of ‘Unfettered Genocide in Tamil Eelam’, published by Karnataka State Open University, Mysore, India in November 2014,

Notes:
1. “Geneva, 19 May 2009 – Joint Press Conference held by UN Secretary-General and World Health Organization Director-General, Margaret Chan”. United Nations. 19 May 2009.
2. Council meeting, Conclusions on Sri Lanka”. European Union. 18 May 2009.
3. “Daily Press Briefing May 18, 2009″. United States Department of State. 18 May 2009.
4. Tamil nationalism, then and now, Frontline,  January 25, 2013

The post US Finding New Way To Escape From Sri Lankan UN Imbroglio – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C Uday Bhaskar*

The killing of almost 150 innocent people in Nigeria in end June by the Boko Haram, a group that has identified itself with the Islamic State (IS), and the violence that has engulfed the Sinai where the Egyptian military is battling IS affiliated militias with the death toll nearing 120 killed is a continuation of the blood-splattered footprint of the IS in the month of Ramadan. The group has also claimed responsibility for the July 3 rocket attacks on Israel – though these did not cause any serious damage to life or property.

Earlier in June, the ideologues wedded to the tenets of the IS carried out multiple attacks among which Tunisia was the most widely noticed, given the manner in which foreign tourists were massacred. Evidently this spate of IS related attacks has a certain temporal rationale.

On Monday, (June 29) the dreaded Islamic State completed one year as a self-proclaimed caliphate and the run up to this first anniversary has been celebrated in a predictably macabre manner by the blood of innocents splattered from Tunisia to Kuwait. In the two terror attacks that took place on Friday (June 26) almost 70 people were killed and the IS has proudly claimed responsibility for these attacks in the month of Ramadan wherein the ‘kafir’ (infidel) has been targeted.

While it was the foreign tourist who was the victim in Tunisia, in Kuwait a Shia mosque was attacked by a suicide bomber, and in social media and elsewhere the IS has threatened more such attacks in this month of fasting for the Islamic world.

In yet another development, a lone killer beheaded his boss at a small town in France on the same day (Friday) and the manner of the decapitation reflected the signature of the IS, and while a direct link is yet to be established, the anxiety that has been triggered in France and other parts of Europe is palpable.

The sectarian character of the IS wherein the Sunni brand of Islam is deemed to be the only theologically acceptable form in the new caliphate, is a defining trait of this new entity that has now replaced the Al Qaida as the most potent and ideologically motivated armed group challenging regional and global stability.

Describing the IS as a non-state actor may be misleading for it now controls almost 10 million reluctant citizens in a territorial swathe running through large parts of Syria and Iraq, and it also has funds estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars in cash. Revenue is generated from the sale of oil and taxes levied – almost in a manner akin to a state, and more importantly, the IS has been able to acquire large amounts of US military inventory from Iraqi forces, and this has enhanced the military profile of this very determined and ruthless militia.

The genesis of the IS lies in the ill-advised and feckless US attack on Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent disbanding of the Iraqi Army. A power vacuum arose in the aftermath of the removal of the Saddam Husain regime and the long suppressed but numerically larger Shia faction of Iraq became the political masters and the seeds of a bitter sectarian battle were sown. The deeper political contestation between a Saudi-led Sunni constituency and the aspirations of a resurgent Shia Iran became all too evident and spread through the region.

In this bloody phase the Al Qaida represented by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began to target Shias across the region and the sectarian virus entered the complex geopolitics of West Asia. Zarqawi was killed in a US air strike in 2006 and his followers then formed the ISI – the Islamic State in Iraq.

The ISI was one of many militias that were engaged in local battles across Iraq, and in 2010 the current leader of the IS – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed control and further consolidated the virulent Sunni profile of the group. Concurrently, the unrest in Syria fanned the sectarian nature of the local insurgencies and civil wars and the external powers, namely the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Israel, were actively supporting different militias and armed groups. Often working at cross-purposes, the intensity of the ‘topple Assad’ campaign helped the growth of the ISI and also created a rift within the group.

While the ISI was focused on Iraq, another group – the Al Qaida in Syria morphed into the Nusra Front in 2011 and stoked the sectarian Sunni-Shia animosities. An intense leadership tussle between the Baghdadi- led ISI and the Al Qaida-affiliated Nusra resulted in Baghdadi severing ties with the Al Qaida in April 2013 and creating the ISIS – the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. By May that year the ISIS took control of the Syrian city of Raqqa which became the seat of the soon to be formed caliphate and the world was suddenly confronted with images of beheadings and the targeting of non-Sunni tribes such as the Yazdis.

In the last year, since the creation of the IS caliphate, Baghdadi and his core team have demonstrated an astute understanding of the prevailing socio-political and technological trends and have launched a successful propaganda-cum-recruitment campaign. The IS is estimated to have 10,000 cadres in Syria and upto 15,000 in Iraq, and these include over 2,000 foreign fighters and sympathizers. The latter include many Europeans and some North Americans, and the surprising development is the large number of young women who have been drawn to the cause of the IS.

In recent days, the media in the UK and USA have revealed a pattern wherein IS recruiters have been skilfully using social media (Twitter and Facebook) to entice young women from both nations, and it is understood that similar cases have been reported from Germany and France. That this constituency has a larger Asian footprint was evident in December last year when an Indian software engineer in Bangalore – Mehdi Masroor Biswas – was identified as a major communication-cum-propaganda resource person of the IS.

Containing the malignancy of the IS and its obscurantist interpretation of Islam will call for a much greater degree of consensus among the major powers and the regional actors. The radical ideology associated with the IS and its many clones will continue to challenge existing global rhythms and practices. These can range from attacks on foreign tourists a la Tunisia to the attacks on Shia mosques in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia amongst other places.

The insular cyber world that many young global citizens inhabit and the need for societal and family intervention to resist the lure of the IS is imperative. For instance Twitter has many accounts that herd the impressionable youth towards the IS and its recruiters. Where is the equally persuasive and cyber-attractive alternative?

Since inception, the IS has engaged in considerable violence across West Asia and both Iraq and Syria have borne the brunt of these killings. A poisoned geopolitics animates the troubled region and countering the IS both politically, militarily and theologically is critical if the second anniversary in June 2016 is not to be even more blood soaked.

*C Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. He can be contacted at cudaybhaskar@spsindia.in

The post Should World Wait For Another Blood-Soaked Islamic State Anniversary? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Swagata Saha and Pratnashree Basu*

The arrest of a senior functionary, Khumlo Abi Anal alias Ambison of the rebel group National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (NSCN-K) by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on June 29 is another important development marking the recent series of events following the June 4 ambush in Manipur that left 18 Indian army men dead. Since the rebels taking shelter on the other side of the porous Indo-Myanmar border operate through transit camps near the border during such attacks, Ambison was captured while returning to the Indian side after having slipped into Myanmar post the attack, according to media reports.

Force as an instrument of statecraft has been rarely used by India excepting for those like Operation Parakram (in response to the Indian Parliament attack, 2001) or Operation South Bhutan (to eliminate militant groups who had taken refuge in 2003). This is an undeniable part of the Non-Alignment, Panchsheel and non-interventionism orientation propagated by our first prime minister. However, after years of observing indiscriminate passivity, the much-acclaimed ‘Doval doctrine’ seems to have demonstrated a clear intent in tune with commensurate action through the Indian Army’s June 9 counter surgical strike in Myanmar

Nicholas M. Poulantza defines ‘hot pursuit’ in his book, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law, as the right of the state to continue pursuit of wrongdoers outside its territory. The right originally codified in laws of the sea may be exercised under certain conditions: the pursuit must start immediately after violation and it must be sanctioned unless an agreement exists to that effect. The Indian state exercised its right of pursuit within a period of five days after the NSCN (K) offensive. The legal agreement between India and Myanmar on terrorism and security dates back to 1990s, the recent ones being the 2010 agreement on deporting terrorists and the May 2014 agreement on Border Cooperation. On a case at point basis, a formal approval from the Myanmar side could be secured as per reports and interviews of Indian high-level military officers. Also the Director of the Office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, Zaw Htay confirmed the raid, saying the two countries had cooperated in the operation, but that the Myanmar military had not taken part. Thus, from definitional point of view, India could fulfill the basic minimum before launching the ‘hot pursuit’.

The media has been polarized on the number of ‘significant casualties’ that the elite group of Indian Army had inflicted on the insurgents because the main rebel bases are located far from the border. While this appears logical, it is also reasonable to understand that the areas hit during the operation still housed a significant number of rebels as the ambush had taken place just days earlier. The arrest of Ambison indicates as much. To flush out insurgency in more comprehensive manner, deeper access into Myanmar’s territory is indispensable. To this end, hot pursuit has its own limitations and is primarily a reciprocal technique in pursuit of immediate violators.

Myanmar on its part has been drained by militancy and insurgency for decades. This has been stalling the opening up of Myanmar and attaining optimization of its resource potential. China has been filling the coffers and supplying arms to many militant groups in Myanmar as well as India’s north-east, to expand its sphere of influence in the strategically important region. In this regard, Chinese investments have stridden far ahead of Indian ones in Myanmar. According to IHLO (Hong Kong Liaison Office of the international trade union movement), by 2013, China had made a total of US$14.1 billion investment, accounting for 41.7% of Myanmar’s cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) estimated that the total Indian investment in Myanmar amounts to $280 million (approx.) in 2013. However, China is facing a stiff culture of protest in Myanmar. The Myitsone dam, Shwe gas line, Letpadaung copper mine, Mwetaung nickel mine projects have met varied degrees of protest on grounds of forced relocation, pollution, damage to religious sites and are either stalled or had to be largely re-compensated.

The social unrest in Myanmar had spill over in Chinese territory too. In June 2011, China was suddenly faced with an influx of about 30,000 refugees into its southwestern Yunnan province after fighting reignited between the Tatmadaw and the rebel Kachin Independence Army after a 17-year cease-fire. More recently in February, the Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MDAA) launched a fight against Myanmarese army, breaching a truce after 6 years. This conflict had forced as many as 50,000 civilians to cross the border seeking refuge in China. In June, during Aung San Suu Kyi’s China visit, the group settled for unilateral ceasefire. Apart from United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) chief, Paresh Barua, NSCIN (K) chief, S.S. Khaplang is believed to have sought safe haven in Yunnan province, as per many reports following the ambush.

Having to counter the insurgency of Kokang, Kachins and other factions in its homeland, it is difficult for Myanmar to step up defences and launch an offensive in the North Sagaing region and Chin State, all on its own. From this perspective, Myanmar will welcome a hot pursuit by India with whom it had cooperated in flushing out militancy in past like that of NSCN (K) in 2006. The impending visit of a Myanmar army delegation led by the commander-in-chief himself to India further ascertains chances of joint security operation to obliterate the remaining camps. With elections round the corner, cozying up to India would allow the semi-civilian government in Myanmar more chances of rapprochement with democracy especially when Suu Kyi’s pro-democratic posture and Western allegiance is expected to work well in her favour.

A hot pursuit will fall flat if it is an instrument of popular gimmick without having a long-term security strategy in place. In this context, the assassin’s mace of Chinese folklore fame is laid out for India. The Myanmar attack has raised caution in Pakistan. The Pakistan Senate unanimously passed a resolution that declared Pakistan would “never allow its territory to be violated by India under any pretext”. “We are not Myanmar,” Pakistan’s Minister for Defence Production, Rana Tanveer Hussain, told the Indian English-language daily Hindustan Times following Indian Minister of State, Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore’s comment about the Myanmar incident setting a precedent for more cross-border raids including Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

India has to develop an inclusive and target-oriented security vision which will defy party lines and regime changes. If recourse is taken to the contrary, it will create more fissures in the sub-continent and the ‘neighbourhood first’ policy will remain rhetorical. This will also make room for countries outside the sub-continent to earn strategic mileage from its granulated national positions.

*Swagata Saha and Pratnashree Basu are researchers at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata. They can be reached at <swagatasaha@orfonline.org> and <pratnashree@orfonline.org>

The post India Must Develop Inclusive Security Vision – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Former Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal has died at the age of 75 two months after he was replaced by Adel al-Jubeir following some four decades in office.

Family members and a foreign ministry spokesman on Thursday confirmed the death of al-Faisal, the world’s longest-serving foreign minister.

“May God accept him in paradise,” the prince’s nephew Saud Mohammed al-Abdullah al-Faisal said on Twitter.

Original article

The post Former Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal Dies At 75 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Greece has submitted proposals on potential economic reforms to its international creditors for a deal that would rescue the country from looming bankruptcy, according to Eurogroup’s press office.

“New Greek proposals received by Eurogroup President Dijsselbloem,” the spokesman of Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who chairs the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, tweeted.

Dijsselbloem would offer no comment on the content of the proposals until the institutions responsible for the review complete their assessment of whether there is a basis for negotiating a loan, Michel Reijns also said.

The proposals were made on the eve of the Thursday midnight deadline. After review, the EU Parliament may vote on the Athens’ offer late on Friday.

Greece is reportedly seeking €53.5 billion in a new bailout package until July 2018.

While no details of the new proposals have yet been officially revealed, sources told AFP that Greece was offering to overhaul pensions and eventually ditch early retirement, as well as raise taxes, in return for a 3-year bailout plan and a “debt adjustment.”

The new proposal includes moving more items to the 23% tax rate, The Guardian reports. Greeks also agreed to eventually abolish solidarity installments for the poor pensioners by December 2019, a year earlier than planned.

The proposal also includes concessions to raising the retirement age to 67 by 2022, as well as cut military spending by €100m in 2015 and by €200m in 2016.

Athens has also agreed to raise raising corporation tax to 28% and implement more measures to fight tax evasion. The agreement also includes privatization of regional airports and seaports.

Meanwhile, a Reuters source specified that Greece has offered to save 1 percent of GDP “worth of pensions” in 2016.

On Wednesday Greece already asked its creditors for a three-year loan facility from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), promising to present a detailed plan on quick economic reforms no later than on Thursday. Among the prompt reforms Athens named a set of measures including a tax reform and pension cuts which it is ready to implement starting from next week.

“We will also include additional actions that the Republic will undertake to further strengthen and modernize its economy,” the finance minister said in a statement.

“Inability to find agreement may lead to bankruptcy of Greece and insolvency of the banking system. Everyone will lose,” European Council President Donald Tusk said on Wednesday.

After failing to repay €1.6 billion ($1.76 billion) to the IMF by the July 1 deadline, Greece became the first developed country to default on its international obligations.

The post Greece Submits Debt Proposals To Creditors appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Environmental awareness is on the rise. In the United States, for instance, one study found that the number of consumers opting for environmentally friendly products is climbing 30 percent per year — a trend triggering a tidal wave of new green labels. At a global level, the percentage of consumers turning to eco-friendly products grew by 10 percentage points from 2011 to 2014. Within corporations, the number of enterprises establishing environmentally responsible policies speaks to increasing awareness as well.

A report on “greenwashing,” written by Claudia Lucía Alejos and published by the “La Caixa” Chair of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, concludes that this surge of interest also has brought with it questionable behaviors, such as companies portraying themselves or their products as eco-friendly when in fact they are not. The title of the study comes from a play on “whitewashing” in the symbolic color of the environmental movement.

Companies may greenwash their offerings because of growing pressure from society, interest groups and myriad environmental regulations. If governments and other regulatory bodies fail to revise their incentives, the risk of being misled by false claims will continue to run high.

The Possible Faces of Deception

Advertising, labeling and public relations are the three most common conduits for companies to let people know what they are doing for the environment and to try to gain a competitive edge while influencing consumers’ shopping decisions.

In fact, advertising is where one of the most common forms of greenwashing appears: selective misinformation. This practice highlights “green” features of a product while hiding other aspects that may be negative. Consumers may thus be misled, using a product they think helps protect the environment while unaware of the damaging aspects of it.
As for labeling, surging demand for “green” certifications has saturated the market with hundreds of labels that end up confusing consumers and making them wary. Underhanded practices include the use of images and colors related to nature, labels and symbols that look official yet are not, and self-declaratory labels made up by the company.

In public relations, greenwashing can turn up in a variety of ways:

• Business lobbies. Special-interest lobbies may seem to embrace environmental messages while simultaneously joining lobbies that block ecological initiatives.

• Deep greenwashing. Attempts may be made to manipulate public opinion so as to change social value — e.g., spreading the message that technology alone is enough to curb global warming.

• Front groups. Groups of scientists or citizens who are apparently independent may actually be financed in return for their endorsements.

• Occasional side projects for good. A company may work with NGOs and/or universities on occasional projects for good while the rest of its activities continue to disregard the environment.

Rules to Prevent Greenwashing

The European Commission has issued directives to limit “unfair commercial practices” as well as “misleading and comparative advertising” in order to curb such practices as the overstatement of environmental achievements or failure to comply with codes of conduct.

In the realm of labeling, the European Commission has created the European Eco-label (aka, the Flower – see above) to serve as a reliable symbol of environmental care. Displaying the Flower requires products to pass rigorous compliance tests with independent verifications. Meanwhile, there is no specific regulation governing other labels that may be misleading.

Within Spain, there is 1988’s general law on advertising, 2009’s law on unfair commercial practices, and a code on environmental statements in commercial communications — although the code is self-regulatory and not legally binding.

The regulations do not reach all areas, however. Many kinds of conduct fall in the field of ethics or reach beyond the law, with companies asked to voluntarily assume responsibility for their claims.

How to Boost Sustainability

Alejos’ report proposes regulating all advertising with environmental content and encourages a model of advertising oversight similar to Norway’s.

Environmental communications and advertising should be sincere, humble and moderate, according to the report. And it may be useful to highlight ecological side benefits — such as health benefits and cost savings — that come along with greener living.

On labels, the use of a green symbol should always include an explanation of how the product contributes to protecting the environment and what exactly a certification refers to. Third-party certifications should be used, rather than self-declaratory ones. If an agreement with environmental associations is noted, the size of the contribution should be made known.

In addition, those with authority over certifications should not only grant labels for compliance but also impose fines when they are not observed. There should also be warnings attached to the products that are most harmful for the environment.

Companies and their executives should commit to environmental causes. Corporate policies to this end should be specific, sincere and viable. They should also be subject to external audits to avoid disconnect between what a company says and what it does.

Arguments to Avoid Deceit

Acting with the environment in mind should generate short- and long-term benefits by cutting costs, increasing market share, boosting competitiveness and/or improving ties with interest groups and the company’s public image.

And what happens if a company is guilty of greenwashing? In this case, keep in mind that people tend to forgive those who take responsibility for their actions so long as they also implement measures to correct their behavior and repair the damage caused.

The post Greenwashing: Only The Appearance Of Sustainability appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Swadesh Roy*

She is a student of one of the leading private universities in Bangladesh. Her hobby is listening to Western music and dressing up in modern attire. She was passing her early university life cheerfully. Like any other day, she was returning home by her Prado jeep and moving her head to the rhythm of music. But on checking her email on her smartphone she became stiff; she even stopped registering the music. She got a single line email from one of her study group friends. The mail said, “Sister, it is the last for you, come to the way of Dawah”. Dawah are rules in the Islamic lifestyle. In Bangladesh now many sister terrorist organizations of Jamaat–e-Islam Bangladesh (Jamaat) are using the term for spreading their tentacles.

One of the economists in Bangladesh, who was a civil bureaucrat and had served in many top-level positions like chairman of the National Board of Revenue (NBR), is one of the members and mentors of Jamaat. A close source of Jamaat says that he put forth the plan that, now it is tough to make Islamic terrorists in Bangladesh in the name of the political party like Jamaat. And a day is coming when the Sheikh Hasina government will ban Jamaat and all the senior leaders of Jamaat will be hanged for war crimes. Therefore, he proposed a plan that they have to create Islamic terrorists in the name of Dawah and Islamic study groups. The system of Dawah is working under many guises in Bangladesh. In the name of Dawah they are trying to motivate the upper class boys and girls. On the other hand, through study groups they are also trying to motivate the public university students, who come from the middle class and poor economic backgrounds. They never utter that they will overthrow the government of Bangladesh. They try first to motivate the young that it is very necessary to create an Islamic state in the Bangladesh-India region to save Islam. Simultaneously in study groups, they discuss law, economics and lifestyle books, even thrillers, but all are decisive books which are written in favor of an Islamic state. Besides, a huge number of village women are working to propagate the Dawah. They go regularly from home to home to housewives, young girls to motivate that, their lifestyle, garments should not be in Bengali tradition, but like in Islamic state. Their style is very similar to Boko Haram of Nigeria. Sources among government officials and the others say that to continue this programme, they had to spend a lot of money. This money is entering Bangladesh from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. ISI may get its funding partly from international terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, IS etc. It is also true, part of this money is coming from India. Besides, through the past four decades ISI has established many business houses in Bangladesh which are giving this money. Moreover, they are the big stockholders of ISI in Bangladesh and even the main blood of terrorism in Bangladesh.

The roots of ISI in Bangladesh run too deep and well circulated that has no match with other organizations. One of the main war criminals, Shalauddin Quder Chowdhurey, is not only a leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) but is also one of the main pillars of ISI in Bangladesh. He was sentenced to the gallows by the War Crimes Tribunal. But strangely, the paper of his verdict was stolen from the computer of the Justice of the tribunal before it was produced in the court. Now a close source of one of the government bodies says, a family member of this war criminal succeeded to manage a meeting with the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. Shalauddin’s case is now in the appellate division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and the Chief Justice is in Chair of hearing of this case. In this position, how a family member of Shalauddin managed to meet with the Chief Justice personally, is one example of how deep rooted the ISI is in Bangladesh.

Not only in the Judiciary, the ISI’s roots in the administration is very strong too. In the beginning of the write-up there is a sketch of a private university; the same thing is going on in the administration of the education sector also. Terrorist allies are very strong in the education ministry, working always in favor of the extremist putting on the garb of a progressive manner. Besides, Sheikh Hasina is trying her heart and soul to give punishment to the terrorists through the legal process but her misfortune, the administration is not keeping in step with her. Cause is, there is a strong hand of ISI in the administration of Bangladesh.

Interestingly, Khaleda Zia, the leader of BNP, tried as she could to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during the latter’s visit to Bangladesh. India had also a little interest to give her an appointment. On the other hand, the West still thinks that Khaleda is the main opposition in Bangladesh. However, all this useless political or diplomatic thinking is putting all the results in the basket of ISI, because Khaleda is the main pillar of ISI in Bangladesh. At least 128 terrorist organizations are working now under her shade in Bangladesh. They are the tools of ISI.

Pakistan has got the message, Bangladesh is going to make a sub- regional cooperation with India, Nepal and Bhutan. In order to hamper this cooperation, ISI has started more activities in Bangladesh. In the meantime, Bangladesh police and elite police forces have arrested some of the new terrorist organization members and Khaleda has started to stand against India, in the language of Pakistan.

*Swadesh Roy is Executive Editor, The Daily Janakantha, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He can be reached swadeshroy@gmail.com

The post ISI’s Grip Still Strong In Bangladesh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.