Having launched a “hybrid” war giving it plausible deniability for many, Russia now has a “hybrid” army, a development that Moscow may not understand the full implications of and one that should give everyone pause, according to Russian commentator Arkady Babchenko. (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=55AFB6162F549).

Babchenko notes that Moscow has insisted that between two-thirds and three-quarters of those fighting on the Russian side in Ukraine are local people, with the rest being Russian volunteers. Consequently, the Ukrainian conflict is “a civil war,” with “a certain people of the Donbas resisting colonization” by Kyiv (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=55AFB6162F549).

All right, the analyst says, “let’s consider one aspect of this assertion, leaving aside all the rest,” including the fact that Russia has a troop concentration on the Ukrainian border comparable in size to the entire Ukrainian military, that units of that force have gone into Ukraine on occasion, and that they have fired from Russian territory unto Ukrainian land.

And “let’s leave in peace even Crimea,” about which there are really “no more questions” because what is involved there is “annexation and occupation of the purest kind.”

Instead, Babchenko says, “let’s consider a single argument: the existence of a certain mythical ‘people of the Donbas.’” Let’s even allow that “such an ethno-cultural group exists. Let’s not carp: there is a people of the Moscow region, there is a people of Northern Butovo; there is a people of Kuusinen Street, and so there is a people of the Donbas.”

In that event and if we define “a people by its place of residence,” then there is no other possible conclusion except that “this is not a Ukrainian civil war.” Instead, “it is a Buryat-Ukrainian war, and also a Chechen-Ukrainian one, and also an Osetin-Ukrainian conflict; and yet again a Ekaterinburg-Ukrainian war.”

(Those who say that “the people of Ekaterinburg” are too few to count forget that the number of people fighting on Moscow’s side in the Donbas is much smaller than their total, he points out.)

But if one comes to the obvious conclusion that the definition of the sides in the war according to “a mythical people or more precisely the place of the recruiting of the combatants is not possible, then one is driven to the very simple conclusion: “Russian began this war. Russia occupied part of the territory of a neighboring country.”

Moreover, Babchenko continues, “Russia sent in diversionary groups and changed the governments, Russian formed the new institutions of power. Russia supplied arms.” Russia even provided uniforms and badges. Indeed, he writes, “having adopted the strategy of hybrid wars as its main principle, Russia itself has in effect transformed its own army into a hybrid one as well.

“The Donets militia is thus part of the hybrid Russian army which is distinguished from all the other parts of [Russia’s] hybrid army only by the fact that it is recruited on the territory of the Donbas,” something which has “exactly the same significance as if it were recruited in Buryatia or Kamyshlov or South Osetia.”

That is, precisely, “nothing” because the militants recruited on the territory of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are “UNITS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.” And consequently, just as the recruiting of Russian soldiers in Buryatia doesn’t make this war a Buryat-Ukrainian one, so too, recruiting them in the Donbas doesn’t make it a Ukrainian civil war.

Consequently, Babchenko concludes, what is taking place, even if some won’t admit it, is nothing other than “a Russian-Ukrainian war.”

By Maimuna Ashraf*

The stranglehold of Islamic State (ISIS) in Middle Eastern states, expanding tentacles in Eastern Afghanistan and its wildfire movement across borders has lately pulled out several ‘hypothetical scenarios’ involving allegiance of it obtaining the most destructive weapon, the ‘nuclear weapon’. Specifically, given the rising monstrous face of group in Afghanistan, the footprints of IS has not merely alarmed neighboring countries including Russia, Pakistan and Central Asian states but also revived the debate on threats of nuclear terrorism. Recently, several stories emerged with epic claims of IS infinitely closer to buy or steal a nuclear bomb, precisely from Pakistan. Hopping on the bandwagon, Indian officials also recently sparked the likewise fears and supported the feasibility of IS purchasing or stealing a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. So here raises the question, rationally, how real is the threat?

Pragmatically, nuclear analysts believe that the terrorist organization may succeed in conducting a nuclear explosion if they succeed in: 1) Constructing or acquiring a warhead 2) Acquiring delivery means and 3) Having will to use it to a desired target area. Thus, to get successful in acquiring a nuclear weapon or delivery means, terrorists may adopt four ways. First, terrorists may attempt to produce the highly enriched uranium or plutonium to fuel a nuclear bomb. This option is most difficult and less likely to happen because manufacturing fissile material is the most crucial and complicated phase to make a nuclear weapon. Second, the terrorist organization may look for a state-sponsor, already having nuclear weapons so that they can directly acquire nuclear weapon. This option sounds the easiest route to have a nuclear weapon but scholars believe it is not likely to happen, because neither any state will be agreed to share this valuable product with any non-state actor nor any state will take the risk to share nuclear weapon with terrorists which can be used against them.

Even no state, thus far at least, has ever given another state (even friendly allies) a nuclear weapon. For instance, during cold war North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapon from its close allies but was firmly refused. Third, terrorist organization can plan to steal nuclear weapon. This option is also not at all an easy task. Even if terrorists succeed in acquiring a nuclear weapon it would be impossible for them to break the security features of heavily guarded weapons. Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) stressed, “You’d have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions  before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You do not get it off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off.” Conversely, if the terrorists would seek people to help them in unauthorized explosion of a nuclear bomb, then there are only few persons in the world who know the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear bomb.

Every person working with nuclear weapons is trained for only few sets of functions and no one has the complete knowledge about how the weapon works and how to set it off. Fourth, there is a huge possibility that any terrorist group may seek to buy fissile material from black market or may seek to steal it from civilian or military facility to use it in nuclear weapon. Most of the nuclear security analysts are of opinion that terrorist may pursue this option as it appears most suitable to manufacture a nuclear weapon. However, analyst Robin Frost opined “there seems to be no real commercial market for fissile material, each sale would be a one- time affair, not a continue source of profit like drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity”. On the contrary, any of the risks highlighted above, poses threat to all states possessing nuclear technology. Any country having nuclear weapons or running and operating NPPs share the same concerns and vulnerabilities around the world. Pakistan is not an exceptional case.

Notwithstanding the technicalities involved in stealing or unauthorized handling of nuclear weapon, Pakistan is frequently brought up in the context of nuclear sabotage by IS. Generally, the attacks on GHQ, Mehran and Kamra bases are portrayed as vulnerability to nuclear facilities to terrorists, but the physical security of nuclear installations is much stronger than any other area or defense installation. Even under chaotic conditions, nuclear weapon would remain under heavy guarded security. The nuclear installations are protected by multilayered security system and each one is no-fly zone, guarded by special trained forces and intelligence, monitored by most sensitive sensors, cameras and equipments. The impression that few thousands militants, from a distant or backward region can take control over a country with population of 190 million, which also possessed large army, sounds a movie script rather than reality. Any worst terrorist tragedy would require not only a failed state but insider involvedness and anti-state decisions. Such a scenario is less likely to take place.

Significantly, in order to enhance the secrecy and survivability, Pakistan reportedly has not revealed the sensitive information about its nuclear weapons. While, to avoid any escalation, accidental launch or nuclear sabotage, Pakistani nukes are stored in disassemble form and cores of fissile material are placed separate from nuclear weapons. Surely, Pakistan must have installed the coded-secured devices too that demands access by entering a secret code to arm an assembled nuclear warhead, As General Khalid Kidwai explained Pakistan’s nuclear system as ‘functional equivalent’ of permissive action links (PALs). This means that other than coding, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons might also comprised of environmental sensing devices that would assure a specific environment before the warhead can set off.

On the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Shaun Gregory opined “In the fifteen years since Pakistan emerged as an operational nuclear weapons state in 1998 there has been no credible report of a terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material in Pakistan, nor of terrorists penetrating and holding space within a confirmed nuclear weapons facility such as might allow them to gain access to, or otherwise create a threat with, nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons related material. This track-record, and indeed Pakistan’s similarly unblemished history during the decades since the 1950s over which Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has reached maturity, has persuaded many within and outside Pakistan that the risk of a terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is at best overstated and at worst a myth designed to impugn the reputation of Pakistan and its Army”.

To conclude, despite of all the reasoning, Pakistan would be habitually associated to nuclear terrorism and unfavorable options to secure its nuclear program would be persistently presented in broader strategic calculus. Thus the hearsays linking IS with Pakistan servers more the purpose of verbal strokes than addressing validate schema because our nukes are not nuts and not accessible to acquire by any mean.

The writer is a member of an Islamabad based think-tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) and can be reached at maimuna.svi@gmail.com

By David S. Addington

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made an unusual promise to the Islamic Republic of Iran: All senior Obama Administration officials will make every effort to support the Iran deal in their public statements. For any Obama Administration officials who have doubts about all or any part of the Iran deal, or about the likelihood that Iran will actually honor the deal, Kerry’s formal promise to Iran amounts to a gag order. When Congress summons Administration foreign policy and defense experts and other senior officials to testify on the Iran deal, Congress is entitled to the unvarnished, ungagged truth.

Section 28 of Iran Deal: A Promise That Senior U.S. Officials Will Hide the Truth from Congress and the American People?

Section 28 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—better known as “the Iran deal”—says “Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements.”[1] The reference to “E3/EU+3” is diplomat-speak for China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the United States.[2] Thus, the deal contains an odd U.S. promise to Iran that senior government officials of the U.S. will make every effort to support successful implementation of the Iran deal in their public statements. A footnote to that promise further states that “‘Government officials’ for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.”[3]

In plain language, Secretary Kerry has promised Iran that senior Obama Administration officials will make every effort to support the Iran deal, and specifically in their public statements. Given the likely appearance of many senior officials of the Obama Administration before congressional committees for public hearings on the Iran deal,[4] this Kerry promise to Iran is of concern.

The U.S. Constitution Entitles Congress to the Truth

The Constitution vests in the Congress the legislative powers it grants, which includes the power to secure information needed to legislate.[5] The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”[6] Federal law implements the congressional power of inquiry in aid of legislation by providing specifically for process to compel testimony and production of documents and for administration of oaths.[7]

Failure to tell the truth, by any witness summoned before Congress to testify and placed under oath, may constitute the crime of perjury.[8] Failure to tell the truth, by any witness appearing before Congress, whether summoned or appearing voluntarily, and whether placed under oath or not, may constitute the crime of false statement.[9] While the courts have indicated that in certain circumstances an executive branch witness duly summoned by a congressional committee may have a legal privilege to decline to answer a question,[10] there are no circumstances under which the witness may lawfully lie in response to the question.

When the foreign relations, armed services, or other committees of jurisdiction in Congress summon “senior officials of the U.S. Administration” and ask for information or opinions regarding the Iran deal, the officials must tell the truth, without regard to the promise Secretary Kerry made to the Iranians that the officials would make every effort to support the deal. Indeed, federal law explicitly empowers a federal employee in an agency primarily concerned with matters relating to foreign countries to “express his views and opinions, and make recommendations he considers appropriate” when requested by a congressional committee of jurisdiction.[11] Also, a number of senior officials of the U.S. Administration have statutory duties with respect to advising Congress, such as the Chairman or another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who “[a]fter first informing the Secretary of Defense, . . . may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.”[12]

Congressional Actions to Increase Chances Congress Gets the Truth

To encourage senior officials of the Obama Administration to testify to Congress truthfully on their views and concerns about the Iran deal, without feeling pressure to suppress or hedge the truth due to Secretary Kerry’s promise to Iran, Congress can take the following steps:

1. The Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee can write to the President to seek written confirmation that: (a) Secretary Kerry’s promise to Iran that senior officials of the U.S. Administration “will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements” is subordinate to, and shall not interfere with, the duty of those senior officials to tell the truth when testifying on the Iran deal to congressional committees, and (b) the Secretary of State or the heads of the agencies or entities concerned will so instruct, in advance and in writing, U.S. government witnesses appearing before congressional committees on the Iran deal.

2. The chairman of any congressional committee of jurisdiction conducting a public hearing on the Iran deal with U.S. government witnesses can, in accordance with committee procedures:

a.

issue compulsory process to summon government witnesses, thereby making clear the duty of the witnesses to appear and testify;

b.

administer to the witnesses an oath to tell the truth;

c.

remind the witnesses that they have a legal duty to tell the truth, and that Secretary Kerry’s promise to Iran that senior Administration officials will make every effort to support in their public statements the Iran deal’s successful implementation does not provide a legal excuse to tell anything other than the truth to the committee; and

d.

in the case of witnesses from the Department of State or another agency primarily concerned with matters relating to foreign countries or multilateral organizations, request that the witness, in the course of testifying truthfully, express his or her views and opinions and make such recommendations as he or she considers appropriate, noting that the law specifically authorizes doing so.

In future international negotiations, American officials should refrain from promising to any foreign country what the President’s subordinates will say to the American public and in the U.S. domestic legislative processes by which the U.S. may determine whether it will enter into an international agreement or implement a joint comprehensive plan of action. The President and his subordinates are accountable to the American people and their elected representatives for implementation of the U.S. Constitution—not to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran or any other foreign country.

About the author:
*David S. Addington is the Group Vice President for Research at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation

Notes:
[1] Sec. 28, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015 (China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States and Iran), p. 14, available at http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/Latest_Publications/Circulars/2015/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action.pdf (visited July 20, 2015).

[2] Preface, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015, p. 2.

[3] Footnote 2, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015, p. 14.

[4] For example, committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives may hold hearings on the JCPOA in implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17, May 22, 2015) or otherwise in aid of the legislative process.

[5] U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).

[6] McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).

[7] 2 U.S.C. 191 (oaths to witnesses), 192 (refusal of summoned witness to testify or produce papers), and 194 (referral to grand jury for failure to testify or produce). See also Senate Standing Rule XXVI (committee procedure) and House of Representatives Rule XI (114th Cong.)(procedures of committees).

[8] 18 U.S.C. 1621 (perjury).

[9] 18 U.S.C. 1001 (a)(2)(knowing and willful material false statement on matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch).

[10] See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(en banc), and United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

[11] 2 U.S.C. 194a.

[12] 10 U.S.C. 151(f).

“What if” is a fascinating game. It forces you to use your imagination, think round a subject, probe possibilities, consider options.

On July 11, 2000. Israel’s prime minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasser Arafat, met at Camp David under the chairmanship of US president, Bill Clinton. Their declared aim was to reach agreement on all outstanding issues between Israel and the Palestinians – a so-called final status settlement. The summit ended on July 25 without a settlement.

What if the negotiations had proved successful? TV archives would hold pictures of Barak and Arafat shaking hands, backed by a beaming Bill Clinton – and we could be marking July 25, 2015 as the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of an independent, sovereign state of Palestine.

What sort of Palestine would it have been?

No official records exist of the final position of the two parties, and the unofficial accounts differ in important respects. So some guesswork and a little creative imagination are called for.

An agreement would probably have been on the basis of the final set of recommendations (known as the “Clinton Parameters”) formally put to the two principals in January 2001. Israel accepted the plan in principle, the Palestinians did not.

What if they had done so? Well, a sovereign state of Palestine would now control 97 percent of the West Bank plus a Gaza Strip larger by roughly a third, to compensate for the 3 per cent of the West Bank absorbed into Israel. Israel would have withdrawn from 63 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, all of which would have passed into Palestinian hands, and Palestinian territory on the West Bank would be contiguous, with no cantons. The West Bank would be linked with Gaza by both an elevated highway and an elevated railroad running through the Negev.

Sovereign Palestine would have as its capital a new municipality – Al Quds. The boundaries of Jerusalem would have been re-drawn. Al-Quds would incorporate Arab neighbourhoods previously inside Jerusalem’s boundaries, together with adjacent regions such as Abu Dis, el-Azaria, Beit Jala, Anata and A-Ram. In the Old City the Palestinian state would have religious autonomy over the Temple Mount, while the Muslim and Christian quarters, though also autonomous, would remain under formal Israeli sovereignty.

The new Palestine would by now have become home to hundreds of thousands of refugees, all with the right of return to the Palestinian state. Those returning would have received reparations from a $30 billion international fund set up specifically to compensate them.

How different might the events of the past fifteen years have been?

There would, of course, have been no second intifada – which means there would have been no sudden increase in terrorist attacks inside Israel, and therefore no need for Israel’s security fence or wall.

Yasser Arafat maintained a firm grip on Palestinian politics. What he said for Arab consumption differed pretty radically from his public utterances in English, or his stance on the world stage. For example, Arafat had told an Arab audience in Stockholm in 1996, ‘We plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state. We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion… We Palestinians will take over everything, including all of Jerusalem.’

Arafat’s colleague Faisal al-Husseini was even more explicit. He described the Oslo process as a ‘Trojan Horse’ designed to promote the strategic goal of ‘Palestine from the river to the sea’ – in short, replacing Israel with Palestine.
Fully aware of Arafat’s real agenda, Hamas would have had little incentive to oppose a settlement approved by him. So there would have been no take-over of Gaza by Hamas, and therefore no indiscriminate firing of rockets on Israeli citizens and no Israeli response in the form of operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense or Protective Edge. There would have been no naval blockade of Gaza by Israel. Accordingly, there would have been no “freedom flotilla”, and no Mavi Marmara incident – no death of nine Turkish citizens, and perhaps no freezing of Turkish-Israeli relations in consequence.

There would, of course, have been no need for any attempt to secure recognition by the United Nations for a sovereign Palestine, for by now Palestine would have long been a fully-fledged UN member. Palestine would have followed Serbia into membership (they joined in November 2000), and beaten East Timor (September 2002).

Would the new sovereign Palestine have become a base for terrorist attacks on Israel, in pursuit of Arafat’s stated long-term aim – or would shorter-term political and economic realities have exerted their logic? Would self-interest have dictated that the fledgling state co-operate industrially, commercially, economically, militarily, even culturally, with its nearest, flourishing neighbor?

By now, would Palestine be thriving under mutually advantageous treaties not only with Israel, but perhaps also with Jordan and Egypt? In fact, would a sovereign Palestine by now be cultivating a prospering economy and be well on the way to becoming part of the developed world? Who may say? It is certainly a possible scenario.

One school of historical thought tends to reject “what if” hypotheses. It maintains there is a sort of inevitability attached to major historical events regardless of possible minor variations. On this reading, Arafat’s death in 2004 would have resulted in Mahmoud Abbas being elected President of Palestine, but his attempt to form a national unity government would still have foundered on the Fatah-Hamas split. Hamas would still have taken over Gaza, and subsequent events would not have been very different. With the objective of ousting Israel entirely from the Middle East, the rockets would still have been fired, Israel would have had to respond – and we might well have found ourselves pretty much where we stand in July 2015. That is another, if overly pessimistic, possibility.

But only consider the wasted opportunity of that 2000 Camp David negotiation, and all the avoidable death and destruction over the past fifteen years, both Palestinian and Israeli. So felicitous a concatenation of circumstances from the Palestinian point of view is unlikely to present itself again in the foreseeable future. The political wheel has turned.

So we are unable to wish a sovereign Palestine “Happy 15th Anniversary”. Fifteen years ago the Palestinian leadership, not for the first time, signally failed to recognize this truth, expressed so felicitously by William Shakespeare:

“There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.”

By Eliza Davis*

On May 24, Martín Belaunde Lossio, a Peruvian politician and businessman, escaped house arrest in La Paz, Bolivia.[1] Five days later, he was found in a small town about 100 km away from the Brazilian border. Authorities suspect “complicity” involving the police officers that were guarding his house in La Paz.[2] The Bolivian police force, the Policía Nacional de Bolivia, had first arrested Belaunde in January when he fled from Peru to the landlocked nation, after seeking asylum from corruption charges; however, the Bolivian government chose to honor a request from Lima to have him arrested and extradited, rather than granting immunity.[3]

This case has brought international attention to the endemic problem of police corruption in Bolivia, prompting swift action by Bolivian President Evo Morales. In May, shortly after Belaunde’s escape, Morales stated, “Some groups within our institutions, such as the police, are creating a bad image of Bolivia.”[4] His comments were backed by decisive action, as he proceeded to fire the police chief, his interior minister, the police officers guarding Belaunde’s house, and dozens of others suspected of involvement.[5] Furthermore, Morales has promised to take steps to write new laws to tackle corruption in the police force before the end of the year.[6]

While Morales’ expeditious action under the circumstances has been notable, international critics around the world looked beyond this individual case and expressed concerns for the role played by an incompetent police force unable to deal with cocaine trafficking in Bolivia. In recent years, Bolivian traffickers and coca growers have experienced mounting pressure to participate in the drug industry, and the government’s efforts to combat that participation have been only marginally successful. On the one hand, Bolivia has made enormous leaps in data collection, using satellites for agrarian census reports and creating a registry for coca growers; further the UN Crop Monitoring Reports show a steady reduction of coca cultivation in Bolivia since 2010.[7] On the other, in 2013 over half of the coca produced did not go through the legal market, and almost 90 percent from the Chapare, a small coca-growing region that has the most involvement in drug trafficking, was passed to the illicit market.[8] Even though police corruption is extensive, fixing it may not be the solution Morales is looking for. Stricter laws, including harsher punishments, to tackle police corruption are certainly necessary, but this initiative may not offer the complete overhaul that Bolivia’s police force and country as a whole need to combat further difficulties with the drug trade and other forms of transnational crime.

Coca Eradication and Community Control

When Evo Morales, a former cocalero (coca grower), became president in 2006, he initiated a highly visible campaign to abolish illicit coca sale through the formalization of the “cato” program, a policy first created by his predecessor, President Carlos Mesa (2003-2005).[9] Acutely aware of the integral role coca farming plays in local economies and the importance that the plant has had in Bolivian history, the policy allows farmers to grow a subsistence amount—the amount that it takes to make a living on—of the coca leaf on plots ranging from 1,600 to 2,500 square meters.[10] According to the Andean Information Network, an independent news organization based in Cochabamba, Bolivia, the policy focuses on the supply side of coca-growing, pivoting on an “emphasis on community participation and respect for human rights.”[11] Under the policy, the community is required to police themselves, ensuring that individuals do not grow too much coca.[12]

In 2008, Morales expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from Bolivia, claiming that Bolivia did not need the assistance of the United States.[13] He blamed Washington for the growing conflicts in the Chapare region, where forced coca eradication was occurring in greater amounts.[14] Their expulsion precipitated the proliferation of the aforementioned community-based solution. Even though many have criticized Morales for rejecting U.S. support, after over five years of his cato policy, he has actually succeeded in decreasing the volume of coca cultivation in the country. According to a report by Linda Farthing and Kathryn Ledebur for the Open Society Foundationa, coca production decreased by over 7 thousand hectares between 2010 and 2013.[15] While coca eradication has increased, the amount of forced eradication has actually gone down significantly. In 2005, before the cato accord, all 6,000 hectares of coca eradication was forced, while from 2006 to 2014 a vast majority of the coca eradication was cooperative.[16] Community control has given rise to success by cooperative eradication, in spite of the absence of the DEA and its surveillance capacities.

The Cato Model’s Success and Limitations

Success has come about in part because of the country’s indigenous population, who are the primary dwellers in areas of coca cultivation. When Morales became Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2006, indigenous populations that had previously been excluded from political processes finally felt that they, too, could participate in democracy. According to a report by the Woodrow Wilson Center, since Morales’s election, indigenous populations have communicated with the government on issues like “land reform, the nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector, and the implementation of a regional governance structure composed of indigenous autonomies.”[17] Morales’ policy for coca eradication plays directly into their desire for autonomy.

Additionally, the indigenous population’s spiritual connection to the coca leaf, combined with its reliance on outside revenue, provides even more incentive to follow the cato system. In the aforementioned report by the Open Society Foundation, a Bolivian coca grower declared that, “It’s very simple. The cato lets us feed ourselves.”[18] A plot of coca incentivizes following the rules because it provides a livelihood for families. Furthermore, indigenous populations have a profound respect for the coca leaf and consider it sacred. While temptation to sell the product for drugs exists, many in Bolivia use it in the traditional way, as a mild stimulant to help with altitude sickness and as an essential element in religious ceremonies. Even eminent outside visitors to Bolivia have resorted to chewing coca. For example, on his recent visit to Latin America the Pope considered using it during his trip to the landlocked nation.[19] Indigenous growers support Morales’ system because it allows them to continue their cultural traditions. According to Sabino Mendoza, an anti-drug official in Bolivia, “We have the army, we have the police, we have intelligence, but if there was not this consciousness of, and work by, the rural peasant sector not to be a part of transnational organized crime, we [would] be looking at a very different situation in this country.”[20] The determination of the rural population to remain honest is something that Morales has managed to capitalize on with this revolutionary policy.

Morales’ policy has received attention from other countries in Latin America, who have noticed his success. In 2014 the Global Commission on Drug Policy, a group made up of world leaders and intellectuals, issued a report that insisted, “All-out militarized enforcement responses have, counter-intuitively, undermined security in places like Afghanistan, Colombia and Mexico.”[21] This has caused governments in Latin American to question the “war on drugs” approach and consider adapting de-militarized and de-criminalized policies like the cato program instead.[22]

Morales’ plan has managed to decrease the amount of coca grown in the country; however, coca is still being illegally exported from Bolivia to be made into cocaine (the country is the third largest producer of cocaine in the world, after Peru and Colombia). Open Society reports that a black market industry still exists because “continued demand and cocaine profits [compels] intermediaries to divert legal coca to cocaine.”[23] Even though the cato program is novel and has proved successful from the supply-side, it is no match for the massive influence of the drug trade from the demand-side. The latter preeminently contributes to Bolivia’s potential for increased involvement in transnational organized crime.

Bolivia: A Drug Hub?

In the last few years, Bolivia has allegedly become a “hub” for drug trafficking, acting as the middle-man between a few of its neighbors, namely, Peru, Argentina and Brazil.[24] Insight Crime, a news organization that reports on organized crime in the hemisphere, describes Bolivia as a “major supplier” to both Argentina and Brazil. Traffickers provide the cocaine paste to syndicates in the two countries to fuel the growing demand for “basuco” or crack cocaine.[25] While Bolivia does not actually produce the drugs themselves, the country plays an indispensable role in early levels of production and transport.

In March, La Razón, a major Bolivia-based newspaper, reported suspicions of Bolivian traffickers’ involvement in the growing drug markets in Lebanon and Africa, having been tempted by the higher prices to be had in those regions.[26] Just in the last few months there have been a series of successful police busts that demonstrate how Bolivian drugs are making their way to these markets. On March 2, officials in Bolivia’s counter narcotics division discovered a shipment of 27.2 tons of cocaine cargo destined for Lebanon.[27] A few days later, officials found one ton of cocaine hydrochloride hidden in bags of fertilizer on its way to Africa.[28] Prices for coca in Africa and Lebanon are over 1,400 percent greater than those in South American markets, making these new, lucrative areas attractive for traffickers.[29]

Insight Crime worries that Bolivia’s increasing involvement in Latin America, as well as their expansion into other markets, will lead to more “sophisticated” involvement in transnational organized crime.[30] They describe Bolivia’s involvement as an example of the cockroach effect: “When the lights are turned on in a room, the cockroaches scurry to the dark corners.”[31] Recently, officials have cracked down on drug production in Colombia: the lights are on. For example, on June 14, Colombian officials confiscated 214 kilograms of cocaine from an ambulance.[32] In response, drug traffickers have moved their operations to other regional countries like Peru and, now, Bolivia where light has yet to shine—despite the fact that efforts by the Morales Administration to combat aspects of the drug trade, like the eradication of coca, have been successful.

Problems in The Police

One of the reasons that Bolivia is considered a hotbed for transnational organized crime is the corruption and perceived incompetence of the police force.[33] Transparency International’s report on corruption in the Andean nation labels the police as one of the three most corrupt institutions in the country and insists that in 2012 one in three Bolivians admitted to having paid a bribe in the past year.[34] In a country worried about an increase in crime, those numbers are alarming. If Bolivia wants to prevent the transformation of honest coca growers to drug traffickers, they need to make sure to have an effective police force, one that will refuse to accept bribes in exchange for a drug-trafficker’s freedom. Morales’s proposal to rewrite laws to eliminate corruption provides hope.

However, corruption is not the only problem plaguing Bolivia’s police force. In 2010, the U.S. State Department reported an “absence of effective police and judicial presence in many urban and rural areas.”[35] According to the World Bank, in 2014, Bolivia had a population of 10.85 million, and of those, 3.5 million lived in rural areas.[36] With almost a third of the population living out of the cities, law enforcement presence in rural areas becomes extremely important. To aid with rural areas, the Bolivian armed forces participate in joint counter-narcotics operations with the police.[37] Their support is crucial to everyday police operations, however, the Andes, the world’s longest mountain range, cuts directly through the country, making Bolivia’s terrain exceedingly difficult to travel, even for the military. Having police in every rural area would take excessive resources, especially since many areas cannot be accessed by road. In the last year Bolivian police have been trying to upgrade their vehicle fleet. In Cochabamba in June of 2014 the police bought 104 motorcycles with GPS and cameras and 15 patrol cars.[38] Additionally the Bolivian government purchased their first helicopter in August 2014 to try to reach drug traffickers in the mountains without a need for roads.[39] Still, these additions are just small steps forward. Resources to buy more of the necessary equipment are something that the Bolivian government simply does not have. Thus much of the population remains unchecked by the police.

Rewriting Laws Won’t Fix It All

Carlos Romero, the interior minister, has promised that, by the end of 2015, the government will rewrite Ley 101, de Régimen Disciplinario de la Policía Boliviana (Law 101, Disciplinary Code of the Bolivian Police), and modify the Ley Orgánica de la Policía (The Organic Police Law). He claimed that the goal of the changes was to eliminate corrupt police officers by incorporating polygraph tests, amongst other measures.[40] Because it remains unclear how the laws will be re-written, it is impossible to determine, for the time being, how effective the changes will be. Given corruption’s current hold on the Bolivian police force, it is unlikely that the problem will be completely eradicated with the adjustment of two laws, however thorough the changes. Still, the formation of new laws is a step in the right direction. As Morales’s policy for coca eradication has proved remarkably successful, his future legislative changes should not be underestimated.

The bigger concern is that even if the laws are successful and shut down corruption completely (which is an unrealistic scenario in the near future), concerns about a rising drug trade will not abate. Thus far, the most effective policy in regards to the drug trade is the cato program, but it relies on communities for self-regulation, not police officers. Police themselves have little to do with this process, so fixing corruption of the police forces will not have much influence on the policy’s overall effectiveness. Furthermore, the program is limited by constant temptation to growers for the high demand and high prices associated with illicit sale of coca and, since coca must be grown at high altitude, police have no way of intervening. Their lack of presence in rural communities is not a problem that anti-corruption measures will fix – more well-trained law enforcement personnel in addition to more vehicles are needed.

While the international pressure that has come from Belaunde Lossio’s recent arrest has led to positive changes in the Bolivian government, the police still face a lack of resources in a country with difficult terrain and mounting demand from the drug trade. An anti-corruption law must be complemented by holistic social policies to build up policing structure in rural areas. Limitations of the cato program will be a cause for increasing concern if Morales does not move forward on other policies to combat illicit coca sale and cocaine paste production. His new plan to fight police corruption could be successful, but his administration must be wary of the fact that the changes he has proposed will not represent an all-encompassing solution to the problems of the drug trade, illicit coca sale, inadequate resources for technological advancement, and rural law-enforcement.

*Eliza Davis, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/24/us-peru-politics-idUSKBN0O90R520150524

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] http://www.wsj.com/articles/bolivias-president-fires-interior-minister-after-peruvian-escapes-house-arrest-1432657731

[5] http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/29/inenglish/1432898176_271234.html

[6] http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/bolivia-to-launch-police-corruption-law

[7] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/index.html?tag=Bolivia

[8] Ibid, pg 46.

[9] http://ain-bolivia.org/2014/07/to-the-beat-of-a-different-drum-bolivias-community-coca-control/

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/eu-backed-coca-project-success-bolivia

[13] http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/01/bolivia.dea/

[14] Ibid.

[15] http://ain-bolivia.org/wp-content/uploads/Bolivia-Report-Habeas-Coca-US-07-06-2015-corr1-1-1.pdf

[16] Ibid.

[17] http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lap_policy_Bolivia1.pdf

[18] http://ain-bolivia.org/wp-content/uploads/Bolivia-Report-Habeas-Coca-US-07-06-2015-corr1-1-1.pdf

[19] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33312962

[20] http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/bolivia-anti-drug-czar-recognizes-challenges

[21] http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ecb452e4b02047c0779e59/t/540da6ebe4b068678cd46df9/1410180843424/global_commission_EN.pdf pg 23.

[22] http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/South-American-Nations-to-Discuss-Alternative-Drug-Policy—20150203-0032.html

[23] https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Bolivia%20Report-Habeas%20Coca-US-07-06-2015-corr1.pdf, pg 48.

[24] http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/bolivia-the-new-hub-for-drug-trafficking-in-south-america,

[25] Ibid.

[26] http://www.la-razon.com/seguridad_nacional/Precios-Africa-Asia-narcos-bolivianos_0_2229977067.html

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/bolivia-the-new-hub-for-drug-trafficking-in-south-america

[32] http://colombiareports.com/police-seize-ambulance-trafficking-200kg-of-cocaine/

[33] http://www.insightcrime.com/investigations/reasons-why-bolivia-is-a-potential-haven-for-transnational-organized-crime

[34]http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_bolivia

[35] http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154495.htm

[36] http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia

[37] http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20110928/lanzan-operativo-para-erradicar-coca_143526_295798.html

[38] http://www.boliviaentusmanos.com/noticias/bolivia/104581/cochabamba-gestionan-compra-de-15-vehiculos-y-104-motos-con-camaras-y-gps-para-la-policia.html

[39] http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/8/1/entrega-primer-helicoptero-jatun-puma-para-lucha-antidroga-28269.html

[40] http://elmundo.com.bo/elmundo/noticias/ley-para-reforma-policial-se-aprobara-hasta-finales-de-2015

By Rajiva Wijesinha*

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and his new government that will take office next month will need to work swiftly in five priority areas:

1. They must consolidate the victory of 2009. The current government does not seem able or willing to acknowledge the importance of defeating terrorism and of ensuring that it is not revived. In this regard the president, who was in government and part of the determination to prevent the LTTE from recovering, knows he must ensure a shift of perspective.

2. Government must build on that victory for the benefit of all those who suffered, and in particular for the minorities and those in the North and East who felt alienated from the state for so long. In this regard the last government did not do enough, and sadly the present government has not taken swift corrective action. The next government must ensure that all citizens have similar opportunities, and this means ensuring that there are equitable employment opportunities in government service, and in the security establishment, in particular the police.

3. Government must ensure human resources development to much higher levels than our current education system allows. The last government did not work systematically towards this, and the present government continues to see education as a tool of politics, without ensuring that we look at best practice in other countries and adjust our systems to ensure excellence as well as equity.

4. Government must promote equitable development through greater concentration on the regions, with targeted investment based on people’s needs. While the last government did much in infrastructure, and the present government seems at last to have realized the important of this, there has been inadequate attention to setting effective systems in place. For this purpose there must be greater autonomy with regard to decision making as well as better consultation mechanisms.

5. Government must ensure efficient and more responsive government by streamlining decision making and ensuring better coordination. For this purpose there must be coherent sectoral planning, with allocation of clear-cut responsibilities.

In all these areas Sri Lanka can benefit hugely from Indian advice and support. Our victory over terrorism was supported by India, but we failed to convince other countries of the necessity of our actions, and the care we took to avoid excesses. We must therefore ensure that our foreign policy is adjusted so as to deal effectively with unfair criticism while giving constructive criticism a fair hearing, and responding positively to genuine concerns. Winning the confidence of India in this regard will go a long way to ensuring that other countries base their approach on Sri Lankan interests rather than political priorities of their own.

With regard to ensuring that all communities benefit from the victory over terrorism, we must involve India more in the remedial measures we take. While decision making must be the prerogative of this sovereign state, addressing concerns will be easier if there is active consultation with all stakeholders. We cannot ignore the fact that India is a principal stakeholder, given the refugees from this country still in India and the possible implications for internal politics in that country.

With regard to education, we have a good model in the Indian system with regard to providing expertise in fields in which there is much international demand. Though our basic education system is much better than that in India, we have not improved as much as we could have from the base on which we started half a century and more ago. In particular we should learn from the Indian Institutes that have cutting edge capacity, and ensure that we have such centres of excellence in every district in the country.

With regard to the vexed question of devolution, we must accept that centralized decision making is no longer practicable. Unfortunately for too long we have been stuck in the centre/province dichotomy, perhaps because when the 13th amendment was passed, that was the prevailing ethos. However in the ‘90s India developed better local government systems, and we too should now realize that, with increasing populations, we need to establish the Divisional Secretariat as the main unit of administration, as was pledged in the president’s manifesto. We should also look at consultation mechanisms used in India, and build on the start provided by the circular sent out by the secretary of public administration a couple of years back about mandatory consultations at Grama Niladhari Level.

For this purpose though we need better planning and delivery, for which we have to upgrade our public servants. Sadly we have allowed that service to decline, in contrast to India where officials have greater professional competence, with much less dependence on politicians or commitment to political priorities. We will benefit much from developing training mechanisms based on collegiate decision making and problem solving, and getting Indian support for this will be very useful.

The next government must make effective coordination with India a priority, as was indicated in the president’s manifesto. Our friendships with other countries, and in particular Asian ones as noted in the manifesto, must be developed, but we also need to prioritize in terms of our own problems and the most effective solutions for those.

*Rajiva Wijesinha is a former adviser to the Sri Lankan President on reconciliation, and leader, Liberal Party of Ceylon. He was a former Member of Parliament. He can be contacted at editor@spsindia.in

By S. Daultrey*

The visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all five countries in Central Asia is India’s first since those countries gained independence and rivals the 2013 tour by Chinese President Xi Jinping (who visited four), which produced investment and loan agreements on energy, trade and infrastructure. The outcome of the visit for India has been full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and renewed pledges of investments in energy, collaboration on regional security and revitalised trade relations.

Any regional visit of this scale prompts questions about how and where such an itinerary and agenda can produce useful results, in timeframes that are relevant at home and to the citizens of each partner country. The conjoining of a regional tour with attendance at the 15th SCO meeting partially illustrates the rationale: it is well understood that the countries of Central Asia prefer bilateral relations with outsiders (and this is illustrated in the preferences of others towards the region, notably China and the US) but will utilise SCO when convenient.

This feature of regional relationships should figure large in India’s strategic calculus. It is clear India has a larger role to play in and with Central Asia. But how? Should India coordinate a single Central Asia policy, continue to maintain bilateral relations, or some combination thereof?

Founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO has principally functioned as a joint security alliance. Afghanistan, Iran and Mongolia have observer nation status; Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka have dialogue partner status. Former observers India and Pakistan were admitted during the summit as full members.

Russian and Chinese are the official working languages and the secretariat is located in Beijing.

The US has requested observer status to SCO but has been turned down. The SCO is variously seen as an alliance, a regional cooperation organisation, a loose alignment of foreign policies, a platform for a security council and as a trade organisation, with China and Russia commonly perceived as its most powerful members. It may be more accurate to view it as a collective of shared interests based on common challenges and shared cultural heritage. For India, ancient Silk Road connections with the countries of Central Asia offer a clear strategic advantage here over other international actors.

Analysts have argued that SCO has demonstrated real progress in Central Asia only in counter-terrorism and security (particularly since 2006), with economic cooperation more an aspiration than a reality. SCO certainly plays a role in the theatre of China-Russia relations across Central Asia which, as succinctly described by Bobo Lo “eschew formal alliances in favour of more flexible and opportunistic arrangements”. Outsiders (including the US) should not fear China’s utilisation of SCO in its foreign policy strategy: a more nuanced view of how China selectively manages its regional relations bilaterally and collectively, through platforms including the SCO, teaches much about how to ‘do business’ in the region and reveals subtleties about the regional security complex at work in Central Asia, where countries seek to balance internal rivalries with the merits of their collective action while exercising caution about engaging with outsiders.

For India, Central Asia could become a theatre of competition with rivals, or a catalyst for multi-scale collaboration in trade and security. India’s re-engagement with Central Asia is also useful for dealing with concerns in the margins, e.g. energy relationships with Iran (oil and gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and the long-awaited TAPI pipeline, which may perhaps be eased with lifting of sanctions on Iran) and stability in Afghanistan (India has a military base in Tajikistan).

India already cooperates bilaterally with Kazakhstan on nuclear energy, space flight and cyber-security; with Uzbekistan on joint military training exercises and building electricity infrastructure; and with Tajikistan on counter-terrorism and hydropower. The ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy announced in Bishkek in June 2012 added only marginally to the existing menu of activities, but did at least describe the vision in one frame, in terms accessible to would-be investors from India. The policy included ambitions for establishing universities, hospitals and information technology centres, an e-network in telemedicine connecting India to Central Asia (demonstrated in Dushanbe during Prime Minister Modi’s visit), facilitation of joint commercial ventures, improved civilian air connectivity with Delhi to boost trade and tourism, joint scientific research and partnerships in defence and security. To date, direct air links and new commercial ventures illustrate some progress; security and defence partnerships were already established and have continued.

The Modi government could now re-examine the scope of the Connect Central Asia policy in the context of the new strategic environment. Investors and commentators are animated about the opportunities in the energy sector: realising their visions will require a delicate balancing of bilateral relations with Turkmenistan (not party to the SCO) and Kazakhstan. Sectors other than energy must be brought into the mix, to deliver more immediate returns. It is perhaps also the right moment to ‘deal with’ Afghanistan: both India’s role in post-conflict operations and India’s economic interests there (particularly in mining), for which Tajikistan could be an important ally. Membership of SCO may help with India’s participation in regional stability tasks and perhaps even help to draw out a more balanced view of SCO in the international arena.

On the multifaceted ‘security’ agenda, the first questions should be, security for whom? By whom? And where? For ‘security’ encompasses a range of issues on multiple timeframes and scales, including: defence of territory and nation-state; cooperation between countries on issues of shared concern (like drugs trafficking and terrorism); manufacture and movement of defence equipment and personnel; border patrol and customs services; countering financial crime and fraud; and the non-traditional security agenda on issues like assuring clean water and guaranteeing food and energy supplies. For each of these, cross-border exchange of information is essential.

In essence, ‘security’ is a human issue: it is about feeling safe in communities, economies and decisions. It is deeply local. Beyond this month’s landmark tour, how will India engage with countries in Central Asia on ‘security’? Will we see those Tajik border guards who are stationed in facilities built with money from Europe and the US carrying equipment manufactured in Bangalore? Will joint training exercises between Indian and Central Asian militaries, perhaps in collaboration with new education centres, produce trained personnel proficient in local languages who are ready to combat at-source the virus of the narcotics trade? Can Indian scientific expertise contribute to securing water quality in Central Asia’s most fragile mountain ecosystems?

The issues present a menu of options that must be translated into short-term trade, investment and tangible deliverables (probably in energy, mining, space and satellites, possibly in urban infrastructure and education); while managing the tricky, contextual longer-term issue of strong relationships – bilateral and otherwise. In the past, India benefitted from its axis of trust with Russia; now that China has assumed (and is likely to keep) a more dominant role, this strategy needs refreshing.

Some tasks will call for ‘regional’, others may require bilateral or trilateral initiatives. Being flexible and opportunistic is an appropriate approach. Concurrently, a comprehensive Indian policy that is empathetic, nuanced, cool-headed and implemented with precision timing is imperative.

*Sally Daultrey is an Independent Research Analyst based in New Delhi. She works in science diplomacy and researches on networks, borders and boundaries in Central Asia. She can be reached at sdaultrey@cogencyresearch.com

Former independence fighters in Aceh, Indonesia, have begun to express their intentions to join Islamic State (IS) and willingness to support jihadists in Iraq and Syria. This increases the security threat posed by IS to Southeast Asia.

By Jasminder Singh

In the ongoing military conflict in Iraq and Syria, a Malay-based militant outfit has been established to support the transnational militant organisation, Islamic State (IS). The Katibah Nusantara, established in September 2014, largely dominated by fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia, supports IS militarily. Since its proclamation in June 2014, IS, which occupies a large swathe of Iraq and Syria, has become a powerful recruiting magnet for would-be jihadist fighters from Southeast Asia.

It now appears that former fighters of GAM, the Aceh Independence Movement, have begun to respond to the appeal of IS. Although GAM was disbanded following the peace agreement between the separatist movement and the Indonesian government in 2005, ending a 30-year struggle, many former fighters who were not integrated into society felt they did not benefit from the peace.

Former GAM fighters to join IS

While GAM had previously rejected Al Qaeda’s overtures, the rise of IS is beginning to have an impact on many former GAM fighters. This may be appreciated in the context of Indonesian jihadists’ leadership of the Katibah Nusantara and the ability of Indonesian jihadists to reach out to their compatriots in Indonesia.

In July 2015, a leader of a GAM faction that did not benefit from the peace deal, Fakhruddin Bin Kasem @ Din Robot, had expressed his intention to take the pledge of allegiance to Islamic State even though he has yet to do so. He expressed his intention to join along with more than 100 fighters. He stated that the peace deal had not benefited everyone, and many former GAM fighters were worse off and could not provide basic needs of their families.

He cited economic reasons as the main motivation for supporting IS. However, while pledging to die for the Islamic cause, he also desisted from launching a military struggle in Aceh as this would harm local Muslims.

Implications of GAM statement

While Indonesia ended the conflict with GAM in 2005, the post-conflict situation seems to be creating a new breeding ground for extremists and terrorists. GAM was never declared a foreign terrorist organisation. In part this was because GAM did not support Al Qaeda. This situation is about to change with some former GAM members expressing support for IS, with which many governments around the world are at war.

What the GAM statement has indicated is also in line with the general jihadi discourse in Indonesia at present. Indonesian radical ideologues supporting IS have expressed their unwillingness to launch an armed struggle in Indonesia as it is likely to harm Muslim Indonesians more. Hence, their willingness to support a jihad against the ‘far enemy’ as is being undertaken in Iraq and Syria.

The statement by Fakruddin seems to be in line with this general position, signalling that the Acehnese are probably joining IS for economic, political and ideological reasons. These are probably the same drivers that have seen other Indonesian fighters supporting the IS cause.

The establishment of the Katibah Nusantara, its military victory over the Iraqi Kurds in April 2015 and the uploading of a new video showing Indonesian Katibah Nusantara’s fighters en route to a battle in July 2015, would confirm the existence of a successful Indonesian jihadi unit. This shows the effectiveness of IS propaganda in winning new recruits.

The IS magnate and policy implications

While local conditions seem to have driven these Acehnese to support IS, the ideological magnet itself cannot be discounted. With IS looking for Wilayats (provinces) in Southeast Asia other than Poso (in Sulawesi), there is now the possibility of Aceh as another base. If the GAM-Islamic State nexus fails to materialise physically (even as ideologically it supports the Islamic State), there is the possibility of former GAM fighters joining the IS affiliate, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) led by Santoso.

Additionally, just as IS seems to have provided a powerful pull factor for the Acehnese, there is nothing to stop similar jihadists associated with radical groups such as the MILF, MNLF and Abu Sayaf in the Philippines, or PULO in Thailand or even RSO and ARNO in Myanmar becoming the next wave of recruits for IS.

Of greater concern, internally displaced communities or refugees such as the Rohingya could also be motivated to join the recruitment wave, including Rohingya who have been resettled in northern Sumatra. A new wave of foreign fighters from Southeast Asia joining IS cannot be ruled out.

Policy implications

From a policy perspective, the GAM statement has signposted that the challenge posed by Islamic State is bigger than is often assumed. This calls for strong, comprehensive and robust measures to prevent Southeast Asians from making their way to Iraq and Syria. While the Katibah Nusantara may be fighting in Iraq and Syria today, the threat it poses for ASEAN is real.

Not only is there the danger of Katibah Nusantara’s returnees, after having been ideologically fortified and having experienced combat, thus militarily endangering the region, they may also act as motivators for self-radicalised individuals in the region, without their having to make the journey to Iraq and Syria.

Already this seems to be taking place. There is also the danger of disgruntled elements from various peace deals, such as the one between Manila and the MILF, taking the GAM route and hence, posing new security threats to the region.

*Jasminder Singh is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

India’s foreign policy 2004-2014 dismally failed under the stewardship of Congress Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and his selected National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon , (earlier his Foreign Secretary), with its signature note of appeasement of the China-Pakistan strategic duo grossly adversarial against India.

India’s foreign policy 2004-2014 was also a dismal failure when it came to India’s strategic partnership with the United States and Russia, two nations which greatly mattered to India’s security needs in terms of enlisting some semblance of countervailing power against the India-destabilisation strategies of the China-Pakistan Axis, reminiscent of the Germany-Italy Axis of the Second World War.

India’s ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ during 2004-2014 was more than disastrous as India served Nepal and Sri Lanka on a platter to Chinese influence and sway. India was insensitive to Bangladesh’s strategic significance for India. In fact all these three countries matter significantly for Indian security along with Bhutan.

Looking back at this period of complete divorce of India’s national security imperatives as determinants of India’s foreign policy, one wonders what factors or foreign policy ends played on the minds of India’s Congress Prime Minister and his chosen National Security Adviser, otherwise reputed to be an ace diplomat.

In fact, it needs to be noted that there is no such foreign policy precept as “Strategic Non-alignment” which was being espoused during this period.

In fact, when the Congress Party came into power, reflected in my SAAG Papers at that time, were observations that both China and Pakistan were expecting some hardening of India’s stances after BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee’s equally dismal handling of China and Pakistan, with appeasement as the central motive. Regrettably it did not turn out that way.

Such an extended failure of India’s foreign policies towards China and Pakistan raises many disturbing questions. Can this failure be attributed to Indian Prime Ministers’ lack of strategic vision, their insistence on conduct of a personalised foreign policy, and their penchant especially in case of Pakistan to reach a ‘peace deal’ for effect which facilitates the conferring of a Nobel Peace Prize?

Can India’s extended foreign policy failures be attributed to a fact that India’s National Security Advisers do not provide professionally competent foreign policy advice to Indian Prime Ministers arising from their own personal predilections, or are they “situating their advisories” to the Prime Misters, to what the Prime Ministers would like to listen?  Or, could it also be the case where Indian National Security Advisers do give strategically realistic advisories to the Prime Minister of the day, but get over-ruled? If the last be true, then it can be concluded that the National Security Advisers have lacked the moral courage to put in their resignations and fade away. But that would be too much to expect from Indian National Security Advisers, all from Indian bureaucracy, whether from the Foreign Service or Intelligence backgrounds, where the prevailing culture is the security of the sinecures.

Media reports indicated that Congress Prime Minister when not pleased with National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan’s ‘hard-line approaches to China and Pakistan, synchronised his exit to a gubernatorial post with advent of UPA II government and brought in Shiv Shankar Menon , just before the Havana Summit Indian sell-out to Pakistan. Havana Summit, Thimpu and the Sharam-al-Sheikh were all Pakistan appeasement exercises.

Obviously, two things are required to correct the above state of affairs. Firstly, the selection of the National Security Advisers should not be restricted to Foreign Service diplomats. They tend to concentrate India’s entire foreign policy conduct in their own hands, shutting out institutional inputs from the Foreign Office. Prime Ministers should ensure that Foreign Office inputs are also independently taken into account by them.

In 2015, India has a lot of damage-control to be done to retrieve the foreign policy losses of the 2004-2014 period.  The conduct of India’s foreign policy and noticeable thrusts emerging in 2015 can be summed-up as follows:

• India has made noticeable gains in its ‘Neighbourhood Policies” by regaining trust in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Bangladesh. These countries matter to keep them out of Chinese overtures and influence. India’s peripheral diplomacy with these countries have to be of a high order to prevent China gaining predominance in these countries.
• India’s relations with the United States are moving ahead to forge a more substantial Strategic Partnership. However, a word of caution needs to be injected that India needs to demonstrate that in India’s growing proximity with the United States there are no free lunches on either side.
• India’s relations with Russia have downslided from its traditional proximity, with Russia trying to play the ‘Pakistan Card’ against India. This is not a failure of Indian policies but a failure and spin-off from India’s China policy, giving exaggerated importance to China over Russia.
• India’s China and Pakistan policies still continue to be bedevilled by Indian foreign policy mind-sets of abject appeasement of these two nations which figure in India’s threat perceptions as foremost military adversaries.

India’s China Policy in 2015 betray Prime Minister Modi’s personal inclinations to tilt towards China which if persists would then be replicating the Nehruvian syndrome. What impels Prime Minister Modi to willingly join all sorts of China-Centric and China-Controlled organisations ranging from Asian Infrastructure Development Bank to accepting full-membership of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation? Does India need a Chinese Inner Line Permit for access to the Central Asian Republics? By joining various China-Centric organisations, India is sending wrong signals to the United States. This is not India signalling India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ but signalling that India is heading towards becoming a ‘tributary state’ of China. India’s priorities in choosing between China and the United States must be clear.

India’s new Foreign Secretary is equally effusive on China like the previous National Security Adviser. Media reports today quote him saying that Asia’s strategic balance will be determined by the United States-China-Japan. Patently wrong, as neither the United States nor India can adopt co-optive approaches to China for an Asian strategic balance. Asian strategic balance against a disruptive China can only be achieved by the US-Japan-India Troika by additional enlisting of Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia.

The Indian Prime Minister, National Security Adviser and the Foreign Secretary must exercise utmost reticence in their pronouncements on China: there is no strategic space for effusiveness on China.

The Indian Prime Minister needs to be consistent on his Pakistan-policy. When it comes to Pakistan there is no scope for the diplomats-preferred so-called “carrots and stick” strategy.  Earlier, Pakistan was a state-sponsor of terrorism and now in 2015 Pakistan is fast emerging as “proxy war cat’s paw of China” in China’s strategic adversarial games of China against India.

The Indian foreign policy establishment needs to recognise that China and Pakistan are not India’s natural allies like USA, Europe, Japan, Vietnam and Australia. They are India’s military adversaries with no indicators available on the horizon that they will forsake their adversarial stances against India. China and Pakistan are India’s implacable enemies engaged on a daily basis to undermine India’s security and jointly engaged in “Strategic Diminution” of India. Our foreign policy responses need to be therefore crafted accordingly.

In 2015, India’s biggest foreign policy challenges are to cut-short the extended losses right across the board and “Rebalance India’s Foreign Policies”  to give predominance to incorporation of national security imperatives in our foreign policy formulations, implicit in which is the reality that India must strive to strategically rebalance China and Pakistan. Contextually, no scope exists for any Indian foreign policy “game changers” as regards China and Pakistan, as their joint strategy is to restrict India’s strategic space all around; Indian appeasement foreign policies will not induce China and Pakistan to cede strategic space to India in the region or in contiguous regions. On the contrary in the authoritarian mind sets that prevail in China and Pakistan policy establishments, Indian appeasement policies are construed as Indian timidity which is open for exploitation.

By Nicholas Rostow*

Events in the Middle East seem to make some commentators and officials forget the fact that borders matter—everywhere, including the Middle East. Most borders reflect the vagaries and irrationalities of history. Sometimes they look arbitrary—history does not usually produce straight lines. Borders frame states, and states are the constituents of the international system and order. Borders bound sovereignty. Their recognition implies acceptance of power within boundaries. For these reasons alone, governments and commentators should take them seriously and be wary of too-easy calls to change them. Just look at the Balkan bloodbaths of the last 150 years for examples other than those in Iraq and Syria of what can happen when borders are torn up or control of borders becomes a politico-military issue. In short, borders are at the heart of international peace, order, and prosperity.

The successful attack on, and rearrangement of, borders should give every state pause. That is what Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov meant when, in the 1930s, he said that peace was “indivisible.” The UN Charter emphasizes the sovereign equality of states. The corollary is the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Neither of these core principles of our world depends on how the state came to be or how its borders were drawn. If the international boundaries of the Middle East are up for grabs, why shouldn’t the same be true of law-of-the-sea maritime boundaries or long-accepted land boundaries like those of Ukraine, Poland, and African states?

Of course the borders of Iraq, Syria, and other states reflect arbitrary decisions and they may not be immutable. There is no universal norm for how one makes a state be a state. International community acceptance is decisive. So is process. Internationally acceptable process allowed for the emergence of Eritrea and South Sudan as new states in Africa despite the long-standing taboo on tampering with the arbitrary boundaries inherited from colonial days. The Islamic State lacks a claim even as strong as Taiwan’s to international acceptance and has eschewed all non-violent process. Taiwan possesses objective attributes of statehood—territory, people, government, and the ability to conduct foreign relations and implement international agreements—but few recognize it as an independent country. And mere recognition is not enough, as the Palestinian Authority has discovered. The process for establishing the Palestinian Authority as a state is diplomatic. Efforts to circumvent that process may succeed but success is not certain unlike those pursuant to a diplomatic process. Economic and social viability is a practical test. Micro-states, although ethnically homogenous, may meet objective tests of statehood and fail to be other than basket-cases. Most borders that do not reflect geography do, even if the arbitrary decision is the result of war. Now we have the Islamic State claiming to be a new Caliphate and running roughshod over long-standing boundaries it does not like or wants to control. Should those who are inclined to fight the Islamic State accept this point of view? Why? Because civil wars are messy, and it is difficult to put countries back together after internal bloodletting? Those who zero in on the Middle East seem to ignore tensions over borders everywhere else. But those tensions exist, and, therefore, it is timely to recall the importance of borders to international peace and security.

Most important rules of international law—those governing the international use of force and military operations come to mind—are directed at states. Most international law originates in treaties between or among states: international commercial law, international criminal law, international human rights law, and the like. However one understands the function of law in the international system, one role for the law is the definition of a state. Disregard for these realities endangers more than the immediate victim of attack. For example, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and coups de main in Ukraine threaten far more than Ukraine. That is why Moscow has been the most important stimulant for continued belief in the importance of NATO in recent years. China’s assault on the maritime order in the western Pacific is no less significant. Where will island building and claims based on anything but law end? With the biggest bully in a neighborhood getting its way?

We do not want a world in which governments think that sauve qui peut is the order of the day. A coalition based on self-interest in borders could form and address the Islamic State challenge. At the moment, there isn’t enough fear to galvanize such a coalition or to provoke the kind of action that might restore a measure of equilibrium to the Middle East (much less address the human catastrophe unfolding in the region). Similar coalitions in the western Pacific and eastern Europe are equally essential if the world is going to emerge from present tribulations with anything resembling international law and order.

About the author:
*Nicholas Rostow is University Professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

With the long congressional recess in August through Labor Day approaching, “We the People” have the opportunity to do more than complain about the Congress and individual Senators and Representatives.

There are many issues affecting you and your communities that need to be addressed by members of Congress. Over the years, it has become increasingly difficult to reach the legislators in Washington, DC and when they return to their districts and states, they often only attend public events and ceremonies where they do little more than shake hands and smile.

The diminishing number of in-person town meetings by members of Congress are often stacked and controlled. The locations, attendees, and even sometimes pre-screened questions fail to provide citizens an opportunity to make their case to their legislators. Politicians crave predictability; they are control freaks.

Our five hundred and thirty-five Senators and Representatives need to be reminded that they were sent to Washington, DC by voters back home who entrusted them with the well-being of their communities and country. Many of these lawmakers then become indentured to corporate campaign cash that they must constantly beg for, often compromising with what is in the best interest of their constituents. For all this corporate campaign cash, these corporations want something in return – government contracts, giveaways, tax loopholes, weak corporate law enforcement, and other privileges and immunities, especially for giant multinational corporations that have tightened their grips of crony capitalism on Washington.

So what happened to your votes and your trust in your elected representatives? They were nullified and replaced with ungrateful politicians who have forgotten that the authority lies with the people.

It is time, during this August recess, for “We the People” to shake up the Congress and shake up the politics across the land. If anyone is skeptical of this possibility, they should recall August 2009 when the Tea Party noisily filled the seats of some town meetings called by Senators and Representatives in a Congress run by the Democrats. That is how the Tea Party movement came to public visibility, with the daily help of Fox News.

After that experience, many members of Congress were forced to reevaluate the power and influence of Town Meetings.

My proposal of a Citizens Summons can begin the process of showing your elected legislators who is truly in charge, as befits the Preamble to the Constitution – “We the People.” I am including below a draft Citizens Summons to your Senators or Representative. It covers the main derelictions of the Congress, under which you can add more examples of necessary reforms.

Your task is to start collecting signatures of citizens, members of citizen groups, labor unions, and any other associations that want a more deliberative democracy. The ultimate objective is to reduce inequalities of power.

Shifting power from the few to the many prevents the gross distortions of our Constitution and laws, our public budgets, and our commonwealth, that currently favor the burgeoning corporate state.

May you give your lawmakers a memorable August recess; they deserve to be shown the workings of what our founding fathers called “the sovereignty of the people.”

The Citizens Summons to a Member of the Congress

Whereas, the Congress has tolerated the expansion of an electoral process, corrupted by money, that nullifies our votes and commercializes both congressional elections and subsequent legislation, creating a Congress that is chronically for sale;

Whereas, the Congress has repeatedly supported or opposed legislation and diverted the taxpayer dollars to favor the crassest of corporate interests to the serious detriment of the American people, their necessities, and their public facilities – such as access to safer consumer products, health care, and other basic social safety services. It has opposed raising the inflation-ravaged minimum wage and fair taxation, allowed endemic waste, fraud, and abuse by contractors, and authorized massive corporate welfare subsidies and giveaways;

Whereas, the Congress has narrowed or blocked access to justice by millions of Americans, leaving them unprotected and defenseless in many serious ways, while giving business corporations preferential treatments and allowing them full access to influence the three branches of government;

Whereas, the Congress has imposed trade treaty despotisms over our democratic institutions – the courts, legislatures, and executive departments and agencies – subordinating our domestic branches of government’s abilities to preserve and enhance labor, consumer, and environmental standards to the domination of global commerce’s “bottom line” and endorsed the usurpation of our judicial process by secret tribunals under the WTO, and other similar invasions of U.S. sovereignty;

Whereas, the access to members of Congress has increased for corporate lobbyists and decreased for ordinary citizens, Therefore, the citizens of the [INSERT state (for Senators) or the congressional district (for Representatives)] hereby Summon you to a town meeting(s) during the August recess (ending September 7, 2015) at a place of known public convenience. Your constituents will establish an agenda of how Congress should shift long overdue power from the few to the many, both in substantive policy and through the strengthening of government and civic institutions;

We deem this Summons to be taken with the utmost seriousness as we gain grassroots support throughout your congressional district (or state for Senators). We expect to hear from you expeditiously so that the necessary planning for our town meeting can take place. This Peoples’ Town Meeting reflects the Preamble to the Constitution that starts with “We the People” and the supremacy of the sovereignty of the people over elected representatives and corporate entities;

Be advised that this Summons calls for your attendance at a Town Meeting run by, of, and for the People. Please reserve a minimum of two hours for this serious exercise of deliberative democracy.

Sincerely yours,

The names of citizens and citizen groups

(For any additional questions about this proposal, send an email to info@nader.org.)

By Sudip Talukdar*

A hyper excited media went to town hailing the Indian and Pakistan prime ministers’ joint declaration condemning terrorism in Ufa, southern Russia, projecting it as a new breakthrough in ties. But the western neighbour’s past history of abrupt U turns, including outright rejection of the demand for voice samples of 26/11 mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Pakistani envoy Abdul Basit’s defiant invitation to separatists for the Iftar party, just days after the Narendra Modi-Nawaz Sharif handshake, has shattered the misplaced euphoria.

Commentators are already presenting laboured analyses on why India should walk the extra mile to befriend Pakistan, even insisting that all the mayhem, bloodletting and devastation wreaked on its soil, should either be forgotten or forgiven. Pakistan is also a victim of terror, so goes their logic, making it incumbent on India to apply the healing touch. The rationale is specious and infantile, fraught with unthinkable consequences. It amounts to emboldening an entity, described as the global fount of terror, to trample on Indian sensitivities and launch even more devastating attacks on a ‘soft state’, as part of its proxy war.

Pakistan’s so-called victimhood, for all its hype, is actually the unintended fallout of a Frankenstein it had conjured against India, but which turned against its master.

The media seems to have completely missed the point that Prime Minister Modi, left to himself, might have felt extremely disinclined to entertain Pakistan. But the moot question is what factors brought about a sudden change in his outlook? One that is completely at odds with his avowed stand on national interests. Was he arm twisted into accepting a contrived bonhomie with Pakistan by the United States, which remains the rogue state’s biggest patron and protector-in-chief and a permanent fixture in Indo-Pak ties.

Peaceniks and pro-Pakistan sympathizers, with a voice and influence quite disproportionate to their size, wish to stampede India into a spurious friendship with its neighbour at all costs, oblivious of the history of extreme hostility and several wars, besides sponsorship of countless acts of terror from across the border, not to speak of a festering sore like Kashmir. No degree of goodwill can ever erase chapters drenched in decades of bloodshed, bitterness and perfidy on our soil.

Peaceniks also insist that both China and its proxy Pakistan should be humoured for the sake of a peace that ensures India’s marginalization and necessitates its self-abasement. Their blinkered outlook, especially when the government is poised to act firmly against the latter, evokes the story of the boy who cried wolf, but got caught up in the web of his own lies when the danger actually materialized. Nobody responded to his cries for help, even as he lost his life to the predator.

There is enough evidence floating in the public domain and elsewhere about Pakistan’s real intentions, which no amount of sugarcoating by a section of the media will ever camouflage. It is bent on bleeding India by inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’ on its body, as a punishment for the creation of Bangladesh and over ‘Azad Kashmir, destroying its economy through drugs and fake notes, despite periodic professions of peace and amity. It is a different story altogether that the Pakistani Army must bear the responsibility of breaking up the country, besides massacring three million Bengalis in one of the worst ever genocides and saddling India with 10 million refugees.

Former diplomat Hussain Haqqani has unmasked the sinister face of the ‘rogue state’ in his book ‘Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military’. He writes: “Pakistan’s two-track policy – clandestine operations to weaken India while simultaneously appearing to seek a durable peace remained operational throughout the period Zia-ul-Haq was in power as well as in subsequent years.” Nawaz Sharif, like Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, is known to launch tirades against India and inciting fanatical groups. Kargil happened under Sharif’s watch as the prime minister.

Why have successive political dispensations maintained an ominous silence on Pakistan’s blatant occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan, including Chitral, even declaring it as its sixth province, in gross violation of UN Resolution? Modi should ask Pakistan to return nearly 12,000 sq km of Karakoram sub-region it ceded illegally to China in a 99-year lease. The UN Resolution clearly mandates that the Indian Army should look after J&K, which includes Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘Azad Kashmir’. It is rather surprising that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which boasts of pursuing national interests, should abandon its principles so readily and keep mum like other political outfits, governed by matters of mutual interests and divisive vote bank politics.

Islamabad threatens India with exercising its nuclear option, should the latter carry out Myanmar-style military operations across the Line of Control, as if it were a matter of mere rhetoric. It is time India firmly told Pakistan that the consequences would be too catastrophic to contemplate if it attempted anything as juvenile. It may be recalled that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), being extremely canny political players, outsmarted the Sri Lankan government for many years by insisting on ceasefire, especially when they were on the verge of certain defeat.

The pioneers of suicide bombing even roped in their Norwegian mentors to intercede on their behalf, always buying enough time to regroup and counterattack. But waves of bomb blasts, carnage and devastation finally forced then president Mahinda Rajapaksa into calling the LTTE’s bluff. He gave army chief General Sarath Fonseka a free hand to crush the fanatical cadres. His forces decimated the LTTE and eliminated their chief Prabhakaran, ending the reign of violence and mayhem that had wracked the island state for decades.

*Sudip Talukdar is a senior journalist, author and columnist. He can be contacted at editor@spsindia.in

Castro and Obama balance gradual normalization with showing benefits for both US and Cuba.

By Patricia Alejandro*

During the 1990s, the popular assumption was that most Cubans, if they had a choice, would leave their country for the United States in a heartbeat. Today, while many Cubans still try to cross international waters to reach the United States, many more are looking towards developing Cuba, from inside and outside. US tourists are drawn to the mythical colonial Cuba, of antique American cars and fine cigars, and investors hope to rebuild golf courses and resorts. Cubans want to move into the future as quickly as possible, craving electronics, accessible internet and new cars.

Cubans and Americans are equally curious about exploring the other side since December when President Barack Obama and Raúl Castro made the surprise announcement on restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both sides concede the process will be gradual, yet changes in leadership that paved the way for rapprochement are inevitable – Obama leaves office in January 2017, and Castro, now 84, announced intentions to retire in 2018. Normalizing relations ends near six decades of hostility that began in 1956 after Raúl’s older brother, Fidel Castro, led an army of guerrilla fighters into Havana and became prime minister. The United States broke off relations and imposed a trade embargo in 1960 after Cuba nationalized US businesses without compensation.

Cuba has been reluctant to allow foreign direct investment and relinquish control – less than 1 percent of GDP – at 0.1 percent. US businesses are eager to return to the island nation. US congressmen, governors and corporate leaders have traveled to Cuba to discuss trade opportunities. Other countries, such as Canada, have had a head start in doing business in Cuba. China, a leading creditor for Cuba and its second largest trading partner after Venezuela, already invests heavily in the tourism industry and oil drilling.

The United States could benefit from its community of Cuban Americans, more than 1 million in all, connected and aware of Cuban culture and ways of doing business. Despite excitement about the potential for reviving commerce, barriers remain including the US embargo and Cuban’s dual-currency system. The Cuban government plans to unify the system before 2016. Currently, most Cuban wages are paid in pesos, but commerce and tourism rely on convertible pesos, pegged to the US dollar and equal to 24 pesos. Cuban Central Bank officials have told foreign businesses that devaluation of the convertible peso will progress gradually. Meanwhile, tourists currently cannot use credit cards or conduct internet transactions with Cuban vendors. Airbnb, the online service that matches visitors with residents willing to rent out all or parts of their home, opened in Cuba this year and conducts transactions using a middleman agency.

Ditching the dual-currency system will ease tourist transactions, but reduce Cuban salaries, already considerably low. The government still controls most salaries in Cuba, so future raises depend on what the government can afford. Doctors recently had a 150 percent pay raise, from around $25 to more than $60 per month, but the average Cuban continues to earn around $20 per month. Meanwhile, Cuban foreign debt is in the billions, even after Russia forgave $32 billion of Soviet-era debt in 2014.

The UN General Assembly has voted 23 times to end the US embargo, with the United States and Israel typically opposed and a handful abstained. Obama has chipped away at the embargo, contributing to more agricultural trade and people-to-people exchanges. Each year at the Summit of the Americans, members criticized the United States, but only Congress can eliminate the embargo in its entirety. Congressional ranks and Cuban Americans are divided. Demographics have shifted, with most Cuban-American constituents supporting restored relations. Surveys conducted by the Institute of Public Research and the Cuban Research Institute of Florida International University show that 68 percent of Cuban Americans support dialogue with the Cuban government compared with 40 percent in 1991. Groups like Engage Cuba lobby Congress and businesses to support the normalization of relations and reforms in US travel and trade restrictions.

Cuba’s pristine white sand beaches and preserved colonial architecture are already a lively tourism destination, with near 3 million visitors last year, most from Canada and Europe. In the first quarter of 2015, one million tourists visited the island, including more than 50,000 Americans. With Cuba in the news, tourism has surged and the numbers could strain accommodations and services. Since January, Americans no longer need to obtain special permission to travel directly to Cuba and need only declare that they fall into one of 12 special categories including family visits, official government business, journalism, professional research, and education and religious activities.

Self-employed entrepreneurs, or cuentapropistas, have increased since the Cuba government loosened restrictions a few years ago. Still, many struggle to find supplies required to run their businesses. Restaurant owners make do without ingredients as basic as wheat, milk or butter, let alone high-end ingredients expected by tourists. The country still imports more than three quarters of its food, and business owners lack capital, with many relying on remittances and supplies sent by family members abroad.

Only 200 occupations are open for Cuban entrepreneurs, who are barred from opening private retail or imported-clothing stores, private medical practices, or private martial arts studios. Retail stores are government-owned, and US investors will proceed cautiously, assessing the stability of the Cuban market and political risks before opening operations in Havana. The US Department of Commerce is preparing small business owners for the intricacies of global markets with programs like the Presidential Ambassadors for Global Entrepreneurship.

With an entrenched black market and associated corruption, the road is not easy for foreign investors or small businesses in either market.

Most Cubans have never been abroad, with a plane ticket costing more than what the average Cuban earns in a year. In 2013, the Cuban government eased restrictions on Cubans leaving, allowing travel with passport and national identity card and removing the requirement of a re-entry permit. But Cubans must still obtain entry visas from other countries. In 2013, the United States began issuing multiple-entry visas that last five years.

Recently, Cubans have increased educational and professional development trips to Miami, but the government remains concerned with a brain drain and will monitor if economic development and improved relations encourage professionals, particularly health care workers, to remain in Cuba or seek lucrative positions overseas. Notable defectors in recent years include US Major League Baseball’s Yasiel Puig, physician Ramona Rodriguez, and six dancers with the National Ballet of Cuba.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) claim on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ground-breaking visit to Dhaka that it never indulged in anti-India politics surprised many observers in both the countries. This dramatic U-turn of the BNP needs to be analysed in the context of the party’s receding popularity, Bangladesh’s current political dynamics and the history of anti-India politics in the country and India-Bangladesh relations.

The major opposition BNP, which leads an 18-party alliance, is out of power for nearly a decade. Party supremo Begum Khaleda Zia is no longer a popular leader primarily due to her alleged involvement in widespread corruption and for facilitating religious extremism and terrorism while she was premier from 2001 to 2006.

The party in its bid to make a comeback to power, urged the Indian leadership to “restore democratic rule” in Bangladesh. The BNP does not recognise the present Awami League (AL) government that assumed office following the largely boycotted January 2014 parliamentary elections. The BNP leaders expected India to be sympathetic to their long-standing demand of holding midterm elections in Bangladesh.

After meeting Modi, the BNP leaders who had accompanied Khaleda, said the Indian prime minister emphasized that New Delhi seeks to build lasting relations with the people of Bangladesh, not with any particular party or government. Khaleda’s political associates clarified that calling for resolving the outstanding issues between the two countries, including water sharing of Teesta river and condemning killing of Bangladeshis in border areas, did not mean that BNP was anti-India. The BNP leaders said the party wants good neighbourly and “an effective relationship with India”.

It may be added that the BNP did not criticise the AL government for signing connectivity deals with India during Modi’s visit as it did earlier. After the Dhaka bilateral summit of September 6-7, 2011, the party opposed granting of transit facilities to India’s landlocked northeastern states through Bangladesh’s territory on security ground.

The change of government in New Delhi and the new leadership’s focus on productive engagement with India’s immediate neighbours raised hopes for beleaguered Khaleda. The party believes that the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government’s plan for regional development has striking similarities with the concept of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation developed by BNP founder Ziaur Rahman.

It appears that the BNP, which is known for India bashing, had apparently changed its tactics to build a rapport with Modi. Khaleda congratulated him even before the formal announcement of the 2014 Lok Sabha election results. She lauded the NDA government immediately after the Indian parliament unanimously ratified the Land Boundary Agreement. Khaleda was keen to meet Modi ever since he assumed office.

Despite Khaleda’s outreach, New Delhi remains concerned over her party’s hobnobbing with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence and support to northeastern militants as they constitute serious threat to India’s peace and security. The Jamaat-e-Islami-BNP alliance government did patronise Indian separatists and the landmark verdict of the Chittagong Metropolitan Special Tribunal-1 on the April 2004 arms haul case exposed the nefarious designs of the top leaders of the two parties to destabilise India’s northeast.

The Indian prime minister during his meeting with Khaleda reportedly made it clear that New Delhi is opposed to fundamentalism and terrorism. According to the Bangladeshi media reports, Modi told Khaleda that some members of her cabinet were directly involved in arms smuggling to north east via Chittagong port. Modi also raised the issue of BNP’s alliance partner Jamaat’s involvement in the Burdwan blast case.

Reports say Khaleda assured Modi that BNP’s alliance with Jamaat is only an electoral one and that the ideologies of the two parties are different. During the meeting with Modi, the BNP delegation insisted that they believe in democracy and do not support religious fundamentalism and militancy. The party leaders said Khaleda had convinced Modi that she would refrain from doing anything against the interest of India.

But at the same time it cannot be denied that the BNP has always been an India-basher since it was floated by Ziaur Rahman in 1978. Zia’s military regime was desperately looking for a civilian support base and the Islamist political groups that violently resisted Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent nation in 1971, offered much needed support to it. The BNP, which he created with the active assistance of intelligence organisations, was filled with politicians ranging from religious fanatics to pro-Beijing communists. The union of divergent ideological persuasions under one platform was possible due to their common paranoid views about the AL, its secular-nationalist ideology and foreign policy priorities.

Today’s BNP draws its ideological moorings from those formative days. Badroddoza Choudhury, BNP’s founding general secretary, remarked that the opposition party under Khaleda has been pursuing “Jamaat-centric” politics. Many in Bangladesh believe that Khaleda is now driven by Jamaat’s radical ideology.

Recent reports suggest that the BNP has reverted to anti-India politics soon after Modi’s Dhaka visit. Former vice chancellor and an influential leader of BNP, Emajuddin Ahmed, commented that most of the agreements signed during the visit “upheld only India’s interest”. Khaleda and other BNP leaders had reportedly been engaged in misinformation campaigns against India to garner popular support. Khaleda has often dubbed the Sheikh Hasina government as a stooge of India in public gatherings.

Several Bangladeshi political analysts say BNP’s anti-India stance has been one of its “core political philosophies” right from the beginning. The anti-India politics began to rear its head after the violent political changeover of August 1975. The post-1975 Bangladesh polity was rolled back to the Pakistani framework in which neighbouring India was increasingly projected as the country’s number one enemy.

The 25-year India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship was termed as “treaty of slavery”. The BNP relentlessly campaigned against the treaty saying it was detrimental to Bangladesh’s interest. Facing persistent vilification campaigns against the treaty, the AL decided not to renew it after coming to power in 1996. The BNP continued its anti-India rhetoric and opposed the Ganges Water Treaty signed with India in 1996 and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord inked with the indigenous tribal leaders.

Khaleda’s refusal to meet India’s President Pranab Mukherjee, who was on a state visit to Bangladesh in 2013, is another major display of her anti-India position. The Indian National Congress, which maintains historic ties with the AL, was in power then. The BNP accused the Congress-led government of providing “undue support” to the Hasina government.

When the NDA government assumed power, many BNP leaders became happy expecting a change in India’s approach towards the AL government. The BNP’S new found love for the NDA government has to be viewed against the backdrop of the democratic transition of power in India. The BNP perceives that Bangladesh has been deprived of it under Hasina.

India continues to be a key factor in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. It is unfortunate that an element of cynicism still persists in the India-Bangladesh discourse especially among the rightist and religion-based parties despite broadening and deepening of the bilateral ties in the last five years.

India developed a political consensus on its policy towards Bangladesh prior to Modi’s Dhaka visit while the opinion in Bangladesh was divided. The BNP welcomed the visit but remained skeptical about Bangladesh’s gain from it.

Perhaps, time has come for the BNP, a major contender of power in Bangladesh, to initiate introspection. After all, by keeping alive the bogey of perceived “Indian hegemony” is not helping the party’s cause. It is imperative that the party sheds its negative approach towards India as growing number of Bangladeshis have realised the benefits of forging closer ties with their most important neighbour.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at editor@spsindia.in

By Prof. Charles Sarvan:

The web-site tamiltigerwomen.com contains material, both poems and prose-sketches, selected and translated from the original Tamil into English by Dr N. Malathy: my thanks to her for sending me a copy.

The documents are rare in that they are the writings of women (many were teenagers or in their early 20s) who were Tiger combatants. Presumably most, if not all, are now dead, killed in action. I may be mistaken but think their names as given are nom du guerre. Much of the material they left behind was destroyed by the government. Dr. Malathy is owed a debt of gratitude for collecting, translating and making available for posterity these intensely personal perspectives. It is, one hopes, an on-going project to which others will contribute. Eventually, a data or document bank can be established from which those interested can draw.

Our memory and recall are not to be trusted. Memory adjusts and alters the past, and creates something different, that is, something that did not  happen quite the way we remember and believe. But many of the works selected here are not the product of distant recollection but were written as it were in medias res, and so are all the more valuable. I admit: immediacy does not eliminate subjectivity. Reading the fictionalised contributions, one recalls the words of Nadine Gordimer, Nobel-Prize winner for Literature: Nothing factual that I write is as true as my fiction. If there is death and awful injury; great grief and unutterable pain; mutilation, hardship, exhaustion, shortage of food and medicine, there’s also warm camaraderie; brief and in-between moments of teasing, tomfoolery and laughter. Love finds brief expression in ‘Fire within’ by Ampuli.  Neela belongs to a carrier-team tasked with bearing away the dead and the injured, bringing forward food and ammunition. Suddenly, in the midst of the “fire” of battle, she catches sight of Hari, her love. She had believed he was in another theatre of the war, and the fearful thought wells up: will she also carry his dead body?

Even after death, the Tamil Tigers continue to excite sharply contrasting reactions, and those who attempt a balanced approach risk the ire, if not abuse, from both extremes. Some see them as heroes who, inspired by a precious dream, fought for about three decades even though they were internationally isolated (a poem composed by Barathi accuses the United Nations of protecting not the vulnerable but the “vultures”); were massively out-numbered, and didn’t have a single jet-fighter or helicopter: see, Sarvan, ‘A great military victory?’ in the Sunday Leader of 25 October 2009. They fought with courage, often displaying chutzpah as in, for example, their attack on Colombo airport, 24 July 2001.

Others see the Tigers as cruel and foolish: most of us are not immune to the infection of partisanship, though we may not be conscious of carrying the bacillus. The way in which the war ended brings honour neither to the government nor to the Tigers. The latter are accused of using thousands of Tamils, including children, women and the aged as human-shields  – the very people to whom they had sought to bring freedom. In Shakespeare’s Macbeth (Act 1, Scene 4), it is commented of a character facing execution: “Nothing in his life / Became him like the leaving it”.  The same is not said of the Tiger leadership. There are several examples from history of courage to the very end, such as  the Battle of Thermopylae, 480 BCE, where Spartan King Leonidas with 7,000 men faced a Persian army thought to number  about 150, 000. On realizing that he had been betrayed and was trapped, Leonidas released the bulk of his army and remained with a few to fight to the end. “Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here, obedient to their laws, we lie.”

The Tigers were a complex phenomenon: in other words, there were contradictory elements which went to form their make-up. As I have written elsewhere, if there was cruelty in them, there was also discipline and courage; if there was strategic error, there was also tactical brilliance; if there was foolishness, there was also exceptional intelligence; if there was fatal stubbornness, there was also ingenious improvisation; if there was ruthless ambition, there was also pure idealism and the total self-denial and self-sacrifice such idealism can create. (For the last, see my review of the documentary, ‘My Daughter, the Terrorist’ in: www.sangam.org/2008/08/Film_Review.php?print=true)

As far as I know, there are no reports of the Tigers (unlike Sri Lankan government soldiers) indulging in rape, be it of civilians, alleged sympathizers or captured combatants.  Again, unlike with government security personnel, there is no record of the Tigers stripping naked, publicly taunting and humiliating Sinhalese, were they soldiers or civilians. (Gang-rape and rape continue with complete impunity in Tamil areas occupied by the army: see the Human Rights publication of 2013 titled We Will Teach You a Lesson. I have drawn attention to this book in Paper No. 5904, South Asia Analysis Group, 2 April 2015, and in Colombo Telegraph, 3 April 2015.)

In the present ‘blog’, Dr Ms Malathy does not concern herself with politics, with right and wrong, but with the experience of female Tamil Tigers as expressed in their own writing.  War is presented in its detail – and in its terrible waste and tragedy. These poems and prose sketches reveal the individual, sentient, human being behind stereotype labels such as “terrorist”. The contrast between the beauty of nature and the cruelty of human beings has long struck and saddened humanity.

In the words of Bishop Reginald Hebert:  “where every prospect pleases, and man alone is vile”. If Sri Lanka is a “Paradise Isle”, as touted in tourist literature, it is so in terms of its natural beauty and not on political, economic, social or ethical grounds. These last are gifted neither by the gods nor by nature but are the creation of wise and caring, sustained and patient, human endeavour.  In ‘Rise up for the new dawn’, also by Barathy, bird songs welcome a beautiful new dawn and trees shake off their dew. But then the blood of the female comrade next to her “paints new pictures on the soil”; the trees are crushed and birds rendered wingless.

Under the Tamil Tigers, women enjoyed a rare degree of emancipation. They carried out the same duties, did the same work, suffered and died as their male comrades. They saw it as a challenge to prove they were as good, if not better, than the men and so deserved their new status as equals. In Malaimahal’s Puthiya Kathaikal (‘New Stories’), the Indian army for the very first time in its history battles an all-women unit. (Female Tiger units are known to have routed all-male government forces.) It is indeed a new story because it is about a new breed of women freed from the notions and constrains of conservative society. Words from the poem ‘Easter, 1916’ by Yeats come to mind: “All changed, changed utterly: / A terrible beauty is born”. (The Easter uprising was an attempt by the Irish to free themselves from British imperial rule but it couldn’t prevail against superior numbers and fire-power.) A mother is shocked that her daughter who as a child was even afraid to go out in the dark (presumably to the toilet) is now a Sea Tiger, wearing shorts and diving deep into the dark depths of the ocean. Another woman comments that the sea, outraged at this unbecoming behaviour by a woman, will surely storm and rage.

In Pillai’s perceptive and tragic Malayalam novel of the 1950s, Chemmeen, the belief is recounted that the life of a fisherman far out at sea is in the hands of his wife ashore. Should she behave improperly, Kadalamma (literally, sea-mother, meaning the goddess of the sea) would visit vengeance on her husband. Such pseudo-religious beliefs were (are?) used by older folk to control the younger, particularly women. Patriarchy, supported by complicit, conservative and collaborative women, often disguises its drive to domination as religious piety and social propriety. As Louis Althusser showed, state and society maintain themselves through Ideology which includes religious belief. The exploited – in this case, females – are persuaded to believe in and support their own exploitation and subordination.

In ‘What price?’ by Malaimahal, a group of female Tigers is surprised to come across an old man crying on the edge of the frontline. He explains that the land on which they stand was his, intended to meet the dowry required to ‘settle’ his daughter. Now the land is gone; with it the dowry and his daughter’s future. “What is the point in my living when I cannot do anything for my child?”  It is dishonourable for a man to demand a dowry, and an insult to the woman to have one paid, and the pernicious dowry system was rejected by the Tigers. In this sketch, a female Tiger decides to write to her brothers urging that, when they marry, they should not accept a dowry.

Under a ‘Carthaginian peace’, the situation of Tamil women in the occupied areas, now far worse than before the war began, is pitiful. It is not only harassment and humiliation at the hands of soldiers but conservative Tamil society has reasserted itself, and women who were free and enjoyed as much scope as men are now consigned to playing traditional roles. A former fighter cannot even climb onto a low wall to pluck a ripe fruit because that would be un-ladylike: ‘Haunted by her Yesterdays’ at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=nSSv9Kk3tkI

‘Eluthaatha Kavithai’ (‘Unwritten poem’) was composed by one Vaanathi shortly before she was killed in action. Its refrain begs, “Write my unwritten poem / This is my plea to you”. But while others may die with or even for you, each must die her or his own death. So too only Vaanathi can write Vaanathi’s poems, and she is no more. They emerged from her unique inner-being. (Every human being, terrorist or freedom-fighter; however lowly and obscure, is unique.) Dr Malathy has done what’s possible by rescuing these works and making them available to a wider readership. It is for readers to access this ‘site’ and form their own opinion: mine is merely an attempt to draw attention to it.

Finally, there is the aspect of translation. In Shakespeare’s comedy, A Midsummer Night’s Dream (Act 3, Scene 1), when a character is temporarily transformed into an animal, his friends exclaim: You have been translated! A translation is a new avatar in a completely different form. Those who don’t know the original language can form impressions, make judgements, only on the basis of the translation before them:  translators bear a grave responsibility. Secondly, to translate, say, from Italian to French is easier than translating not only from a different language but also from a very different culture: as is the case here. Thirdly, while translation assumes near  native-speaker competence in the target language, to work on literary texts calls, in addition, for heightened sensitivity to language and its nuances. So it is that the same text has been translated into the same language by different individuals, each not quite satisfied with the effort of her or his predecessor. For example, Homer’s Odyssey has been translated into English over the centuries, each version more or less different. Variety of interpretation is enriching and to be welcomed.

The present translation may leave much to be desired but it must be commended for what it does: preserve and disseminate. No doubt, there will be different translations, other versions, of this and other Tamil-Tiger literature.

We want minds to strip away falsity; to nurture empathy and to bury difference.

(Adapted from ‘We want beautiful minds’ by Ampuli,  included in ‘Tamil Tiger Women: Through Selected Writings by Them’)

By Tridivesh Singh Maini*

There have been numerous debates about the need for a major revamp in India’s diplomatic corps, the Indian Foreign Service. It is not just committees set up by the government, including the Pillai Committee (1965) Sen Committee (1983), Satinder Lambah Committee (2002), but even scholars who have suggested the need for bringing about major changes in the Indian foreign service.

Among the key recommendations that committees as well as scholars have made include not just increasing the number of diplomats, which is currently around 900. Daniel Markey in a report article titled, ‘Developing India’s Foreign Policy Software’, (Asia Policy, July 2009) argued that even the diplomatic corps of smaller countries is around this. In fact, even Singapore’s diplomatic corps is nearly 900; as of 2013 it was estimated at 867.

Apart from improving the tally, there has also been a thrust on the need for improving the quality of IFS personnel. For this reason, for over five decades, committees set up by the government have argued in favor of lateral entry in the diplomatic service, and drawing in on the expertise from outside the foreign service, both from the private sector and academia. This recommendation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee headed by Congress MP, Shashi Tharoor was finally accepted, with Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar on June 19, 2015 informing the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs that the government will soon be accepting lateral entrants into the Policy Planning and Research Division of the Indian foreign service. While this is just a start, it is expected that later other diplomatic positions will also be advertised. One of the major positives of this decision will be that it may help in reducing the disconnect between the bureaucracy and academia as well as business.

It would be pertinent to mention, that Tharoor who served as a junior minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, has been batting for reforms to the foreign service not just in his capacity as a parliamentarian, and when he was a minister but also as a PHD student.

Apart from the above reform, in recent years there have been some incremental reforms which have been made to ensure that India’s diplomatic service is in sync with the changing times. For instance in the changing global situation, mid-career IFS officers are supposed to do a course at the Indian School of Business, Hyderabad and write a paper on an issue pertaining to economic diplomacy. This recommendation was made in a report written by the Satinder Lambah committee (2002).

Yet a number of other changes need to be made to ensure that the IFS functions more effectively. The first is coordination between the foreign ministry, and other ministries such as home and commerce. Officers also need to spend more time in India’s states to understand domestic politics. In the US, officials of the State Department get an insight into domestic politics through the Pearson Fellowship according to which officials of the State Department are given an insight into legislative functioning of the Congress. In India, currently there is no such provision; institutionalizing a mechanism whereby foreign service officers work closely with a state government for a short period would be a welcome step seeing the increasing connect between domestic politics and India’s foreign policy given the current prime minister’s emphasis on making states important stakeholders in foreign policy – specifically economic relations – with the outside world.

Beyond foreign service reform:

While the Indian Foreign Service has done well to introspect, it is also time that the strategic community and academics working on foreign policy do some introspection to ensure that they can contribute more to the foreign policy discourse as is done in other countries, especially the US.

If one were to pinpoint some of the drawbacks of think tanks working on foreign policy, they are as follows:

Firstly, most think tanks, especially government ones, and to some extent even private ones, are overstaffed with retired bureaucrats. While it is true that policy makers contribute positively to think tanks with their experience, and India is not the first country where they are given importance, their baggage, some of which is totally out of sync with the current world scenario, is not really helpful, and generating constructive discourse.

Second, most think tanks invest heavily in senior analysts, while not enough importance is given to mentoring juniors, as a result of which most think tanks turn into parking lots for both juniors and retired officials; there is not enough scope for growth, or think tanks as a career. While this is beginning to change due to the growth of private think tanks, such as Observer Research Foundation, which is making efforts to create a class of policy professionals, a lot remains to be done in the context of attracting younger talent.

Third, most experts in these think tanks are not country experts, but instead focus on India’s ties with these countries. There are a large number of so- called Pakistan experts, who themselves have not even visited Pakistan once and do not know the language apart from having an understanding of the domestic politics of those countries. For high quality scholarship, it is essential that there is more investment in country experts rather than those who view ties purely from India’s perspective. That should be the ultimate objective but not the only one.

Fourth, there are only a handful of strategic thinkers who have a mastery of both economics and foreign policy. In the current situation, it is important for foreign policy thinkers to have a sound understanding of not just IR theory, but also complex economic issues. While think tanks do have a number of centers and scholars from disciplines, they need to work together.

Apart from the IFS and think tanks, Indian scholarship on foreign policy itself has failed.

First, with India’s increasing clout it is important to popularize Indian strategic thought and even military history and concepts. If Sun Tzu can be quoted by Western scholars, why not Chanakya’s Arth Shastra? If Deng Xioping’s famous dictums can become popular, there is no reason for the observations of India’s leaders quotes not becoming popular.

With the current prime minister’s thrust on promoting Indian culture and soft power globally, and some of his terms “Sab ka saath, Sab ka vikaas’ being popular even amongst foreign leaders including US Secretary of State, John Kerry, many of the joint statements too have sharp Hindi, such as ‘Saanjha Prayaas’; it is likely that Indian strategic thought may find space in the global discourse on strategic affairs.

Second, with the changing dynamics of Indian politics it is also important to have a sound nuanced understanding of domestic politics. Few scholars, whether in think tanks or universities, have looked at this aspect. This is in stark contrast to other countries, especially China and the US, where foreign policy scholars have a sound understanding of domestic politics, and link it to foreign policy. Apart from spending time overseas for fellowships, it is important for scholars of IR to spend greater time in states, which will have an impact on India’s foreign policy. While IR scholars have started spending time in regions like the northeast and Kashmir, it is also important to spend more time in other states. For instance, those studying the phenomenon of ‘constituent diplomacy’ and participation of state governments in foreign policy would do well to spend more time in states which have been successful in reaching out to the outside world and forging links in the economic and non-economic spheres, such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu

It is encouraging however to see private think tanks setting up centres in important cities outside the national capital

Apart from the above stakeholders, the private sector too needs to invest more in Indian think tanks. While certain groups have taken the initiative, others prefer to set up chairs in foreign think tanks which does no real favour to the development of India’s strategic thought. Private investment in education has helped in the creation of universities with world-class infrastructure, research facilities and a high quality faculty. Greater investment by the private sector in think tanks too is likely to have a positive impact.

In conclusion, it would be fair to say that for a more dynamic foreign policy it is essential not just for the government to introspect, but all stakeholders. One of the necessary pre-requisites for this is that they all work closely and get over the turf mentality.

*Tridivesh Singh Maini is a Senior Research Associate with The Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University. He can be reached at editor@spsindia.in

In the momentum of the recent “protracted” conflicts in the Middle East, several terms have been circulating in the western media discourse attributing to Islam, as a religion, totalitarian and radical shades. This entails that Islam necessarily deprives its believers of freedom and fundamental rights. In other words highlighting an aspect of religion, which limits the freedoms of its believers and neglecting others.

There is a considerable misunderstanding in the international coverage of human rights in Islam, according to Islamic scholars, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948. Islamic scholars claim that human rights are in the heart of Islamic religion. The misunderstanding arises through international conceptualization of human rights in Islam in the sense that human rights declaration should be universal applying to all societies and communities. While this misunderstanding could be intentional or unintentional, the impact of it on Islamic discourse seems to be central.

The concept of having “human rights declaration” as an “international constitution” and demanding its implementation on all societies in the world lacks resilience. It is undeniable that the human rights declaration was a product of a long historical and moral evolution that manifested after the atrocities of the Second World War. It represents a collective understanding of human development.

But what are the arguments Islamists present concerning this declaration – the human rights declaration in 1948? And why do they say no to the universality of such a declaration? The first take of Islamic scholars on this is that human rights declaration is strongly connected to the western secularisation and Westernisation processes. The second take is that the concept of universalism, through which many ideologies were passed along to other societies poses a very important question of who imposed the concept of universalism and its connotations. The term of universalism is strongly connected to the environment, from which it emerged. Therefore it defines other concepts such as among others duties and rights of humans, freedoms, justice etc. And whether they are relative or absolute.

In addition according to Islamists, this concept, the concept of human rights universalism is biased to the European thought. The concept came about as a product of the First and Second World Wars. These two wars happened on the European lands; nevertheless they were described as worldly. Moreover, the body of thought emerged from that time was affected by the events happening in Europe. These two wars had repercussions and implications on the whole world affecting economic, political and social structures, but they are definitely not international.

After the First and the Second “World” Wars, an economic system has emerged building the first blocks of an international system. Many Islamic scholars think that this system, which came about after the Second World War is not meant to be an international system but rather a western one. Some others went to describe it as a new economic and colonial system generated in a western organization of power to control the rest of the world.

According to Islamists, the concept of democracy is not meant to be a universal term either. Rather, it is a western concept for countries lie in what we know now the western hemisphere. It’s obvious that western countries actually enforce and support democracy inside their own borders but neglected it outside. As we see Islamists have been criticising concepts, which in a way or another can be productive and constructive for their own societies.

Islamic scholars also criticise what they call “The Centre”: They criticise the centrality of the centre referring to Geneva’s convention which was produced in Europe, the internationalisation of the First the Second World Wars, which happened in Europe because of European interests and concepts such as globalisation, democracy and ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism socialism etc. Therefore, as Islamic scholars see it, the centre produces concepts, ideologies and frameworks, no matter what they may be, and call them international neglecting the particularities of other societies such as, among others, history, language and culture.

Moreover, Islamic scholars continue making references of the objectives of Theodor Herzl, a founding member of political Zionism, to “establish a home for the Jewish people in EretzIsrael secured under public law,” which was adopted by the American Congress then. Contemplating means to attain the goals of Zionism, the Congress proposed inter alia “The organization and uniting of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.” Although Leo Motzkin, a founding member of the Democratic Faction which called for democratising the Zionist Movement in its early years, failed to include the phrase “by international law” instead of “by public law”, Israel was established in the confines of the international law. According to almost all Islamists, international law is understood as the western law imposed on third parties.

However many non-Islamic scholars responded to Islamists’ arguments that it is not acceptable to refute an international convention of human rights claiming the particularly of Islamic societies. It is no wonder that dictators across the Arab world went to claim the particularity of their societies in an attempt to keep the status quo and crash any dissent because human rights implementation necessitates a democratic form of governance and a democratic body of thought.

Looming still in conceptualisation, Islamic theorisers argue that the definition of “human” is not an abstract concept, as demonstrated in the human rights convention, but rather a realistic one. Humans are inherent to the environments and cultures. The people, who wrote down the human rights declaration, Islamic scholars argue, were influenced by their own realities and environments and this should be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the meaning of human rights is not static and it changes based on the change of variables.

Now far from Islamic scholars’ terms, we witness nowadays that the United Nations Security Council, which is considered a part of an international organisation – the United Nations, is controlled by five permanent members. These permanent members: Russia, France, United Kingdom, United States and China are the only countries in the world to enjoy veto power. Under the Charter, “the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

“The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security,” according to the Security Council website.

The five permanent members are not appointed on the head of the council because of their outstanding records of human rights but because they are the strongest countries in the world economically, militarily and politically. Resolutions of this organisation often serve the interests of the permanent members at the first place and all these resolutions are called “international”. The best way forward in fortifying the international cohesion is to take further steps toward communication, diversity and mutual understanding among different cultures. Engaging in a debate with Islamic scholars, after all, doesn’t seem to undermine the international cohesion but it adds to its diversity.

*Hakim Khatib is a political scientist and analyst works as a lecturer for politics and culture of the Middle East, intercultural communication and journalism at Fulda and Darmstadt Universities of Applied Sciences and Phillips University Marburg. Hakim is a PhD candidate in political science on political instrumentalisation of Islam in the Middle East and its implications on political development at the University of Duisburg-Essen and the editor-in-chief of the Mashreq Politics and Culture Journal (MPC Journal).

Non-Jews who become Jewish do not convert to Judaism because they think they have found the only true religion; or that they will go to heaven faster. People who become Jewish convert because of love.

For some it is love for Jewish concepts of God, or love for the truths they have found for themselves in Judaism; intellectual ideals and a rational certainty.

For most people who become Jewish, the love is more personal. Sometimes it is love for the Jewish People and its culture, history, music or its love for justice and mercy. Sometimes people become Jewish as a result of loving a special Jew, and desiring to live in a Jewish family and community.

In Poland most often, underneath the love of Judaism, there is a hidden, slowly self revealing Jewish identity, of a soul that desires to return home; to where that soul belongs. The Biblical book of Ruth records the vow that Ruth, the great grandmother of King David, made to Naomi, her mother-in-law, as follows: “Where ever you go, I will go. Where ever you live, I will live. Your people will be my people and your God will be my God. Where ever you die, there will I die (even Treblinka or Auschwitz); and there I will be buried.” (Ruth 1:16-17) Everyone who becomes Jewish repeats this vow.

In Poland, almost every person that repeats this pledge already has a Jewish soul (gilgul) inherited from one of their Jewish ancestors; and their souls at last come home to rejoin the rest of the Jewish people.

Of course, thousands of non-Jews become Jewish every year throughout the world. For example, Nelly Altenburger, a non-Jewish 12 year old girl born in Sao Paulo Brazil, reads two books by Nobel Prize Laureate Yiddish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer and feels “I have found my people”.

A few years later Nelly converts to Judaism, goes to a University, majors in Hebrew Language and Literature and becomes a teacher in a Jewish Day School. Now Nelly is the Rabbi of a synagogue in Danbury, Connecticut, USA. A Jewish soul has returned home. There are thousands of biographies like this, but most of them do not end up becoming a rabbi.

If you think you might have an ancestor who was Jewish, but no one in your family seems to know, you can use a introspective personality and character test to give you some hints.

1- Do you like to ask questions especially about religion? But when you asked them as a child, you were told faith is a gift from God and you shouldn’t question it. This never satisfied you, although others didn’t question it.

2- The trinity never made any sense to you even as a young child. You prayed to God the father more easily and more frequently than Jesus, the son of God, even though you were told to pray to Jesus. You never could believe that people who didn’t believe in Jesus couldn’t go to Heaven.

3- On first learning of the Holocaust you reacted more emotionally than your friends or other members of your family. You feel some sense of connection with the Jewish struggle to defend Israel.

4- You have an attraction to Jewish people, or to Judaism and Jewish culture. You have always been more open to people who were culturally, nationally or religiously different from your own family, than your friends or class mates.

If you answer yes to three of these four items you probably have Jewish ancestors. Many, but not all, people who answer yes to all four items will be interested in learning more about their Jewish roots. If you become very interested in studying Judaism you might have a Jewish soul.

According to Jewish mystical teachings (Kabbalah), many (not all) people reincarnate at least once after they die. This is especially true for Jews who died and had no Jewish children who survived them (Sefer HaPliyah).

Their souls reincarnate in one of their non-Jewish descendants who is drawn to: Jewish things, Jewish people and Judaism. If the following item also applies to you, you certainly have a Jewish soul.

5- When you start to learn about Judaism: the ideas and values seem reasonable to you; the traditions and heritage are very attractive to you; and the non-Jews around you as well as you yourself, are surprised when you slowly come to feel that you are coming home.

For most converts to Judaism an attraction to Jews as individuals, as families, or as a historical community that has survived many severe challenges for over 3,000 years, is a more important factor than particular religious beliefs. This is another sign of a Jewish soul returning home.

A US-based Hindu group said it is disheartened at the reported U-turn of Conwy County Borough Council in North Wales (United Kingdom) on the issue of fining people for feeding seagulls.

Earlier, the Conwy Council reportedly shelved the plan to fine people for feeding seagulls, and now the Council is reportedly considering instituting a law by year end banning feeding of the birds.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, who earlier commended the Council for reported shelving of plan to fine people for feeding seagulls respecting the religious sentiments of some communities, in a statement in Nevada (USA) today, said that introducing ban on feeding birds would be blatantly disregarding the sentiments of some communities.

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, asked: Was the universal principle of religious freedom not applicable in the Conwy County?

Rajan Zed urged the Conwy Council to show some maturity and respect to some communities who thought feeding birds was an act of kindness and a religious duty, and not draft the proposed law punishing those who fed the birds.

Zed pointed out that feeding birds was intrinsic to Hinduism and many started their day by feeding them.

Rajan Zed further said that birds played an important role in Hinduism and several Hindu deities had birds as their vahana (mount, vehicle): peacock is the vahana of Karttikeya, owl of Lakshmi, swan of Brahma, Garuda of Vishnu, etc. Jatayu was an ally of Rama who attempted to foil the abduction of Sita. Ancient Shvetashvatara Upanishad identified Self with bird: He is the blue bird, he is the green bird.

Zed also requested other counties, cities and towns in Wales to refrain from legislating penalties for feeding birds; besides urging Swansea Council and other seaside resorts to reconsider their fines for feeding the birds.

The increasing number of recruits from Indonesia and Malaysia to Islamic State reflects the evolving security threat to Southeast Asia. The emerging pattern bears lessons for countries in the region.

By Joseph Chingyong Liow*

The threat of Islamic State (IS) is the latest rendition of extremism to wash up the shores of Southeast Asia. Several Indonesians and Malaysians have migrated to the Middle East to join the ranks of IS in Iraq and Syria, reflecting the new wave of the evolving security threat posed by the militant networks dedicated to the establishment of a pristine Islamic state and the “end-times” apocalyptic battle.

Religiously-inspired extremism, fanned by the Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation, emerged as a matter of concern in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, not so much for the danger it posed to the stability of ruling governments in the region, but because it threatened to coalesce into a region-wide movement. For it was in Afghanistan that Southeast Asians from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar met and trained together, and built an incipient network. This fear became a reality at the turn of the century, when the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah, comprising many Afghan “alumni”, nursed aspirations to establish a regional caliphate with the use of force covering Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, precisely through the mobilisation of these networks.

Present scenario

Fast-forward to the present, the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore consider returnees from the civil wars in Syria and Iraq to be a potential source of insecurity in their respective countries. They have good reason to be concerned. Thus far, the number of Indonesians and Malaysians known to have made their way to join the Iraq and Syrian civil wars are estimated to range from 150-300 in the case of Indonesia and 80-150 in the case of Malaysia. Apart from joining IS, many are known to have linked up with other extremist outfits in the Syrian theatre, including those that have opposed IS such as Al-Nusra Front.

Recent revelations regarding the existence of Katibah Nusantara, the Southeast Asian unit within IS, ostensibly created to improve communication with recruits from Indonesia and Malaysia who are not conversant in Arabic or English, give pause for further thought. Even more alarming perhaps, is the creation of a Malay language school for purposes of educating and indoctrinating the children of these Malay and Indonesian-speaking recruits.

Recruitment patterns themselves have changed. In Malaysia and Singapore, social media has proven to be the primary avenue for recruitment, although in the case of Malaysia, security officials are also believed to have focused attention on a few Islamic schools. In Indonesia, while recruitment for Syria and Iraq-based groups have by and large leveraged on pre-existing extremist networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah (whose members actually joined anti-IS extremist groups), there is evidence that the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state has garnered sympathy from middle-class Indonesians.

These have hitherto been unconnected to any of the pre-existing networks nor in possession of jihadi backgrounds but are drawn to both the humanitarian call for action in support of fellow Muslims in Syria as well as the eschatological discourse of the IS.

There are also disturbing international connections that have been uncovered. In September last year, a total of seven Uighurs were found to be training in a base of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia) in Poso, central Sulawesi, a group that was established by a militant extremist by the name of Santoso. It has been reported that the recruitment of Uighurs took place after Indonesian extremists in Syria had discussed ways to strengthen Santoso’s group with the recruitment of foreign fighters.

Evolving threat and response

What do these patterns tell us about the evolving nature of the threat from IS?

Firstly, while the number of Southeast Asians inspired by IS and who have left for the conflict zones may not be large relative to recruits from other regions, their level of commitment is deep, and the bonds they will inevitably forge difficult to break. The fact that whole family units have embarked to Syria and Iraq is disturbing on several counts. Not only does it mean that as migrants, the circumstances they face would strengthen bonds between these families, much in the same way that migrant families everywhere tend to gravitate towards those of similar nationality or cultural and linguistic background and close ranks, it also means that with children in tow indoctrination now takes place at a younger age and in the conflict zone itself.

In other words, Indonesians and Malaysians are fighting together in a way that is a cause for concern, especially when foreign fighters return to their home countries. For when and if conflict dynamics change, these extremists would have formed deep bonds that could potentially provide a basis for cross-border cooperation among them.

Secondly, the “end-times” narrative of the IS propaganda makes the threat more resilient than previous iterations of religious extremism. Here, what is striking is not so much the deterministic nature of the IS eschatology (which is common in many religions) but the fact that it calls on its supporters to be active participants in the final apocalyptic battle. Hence, although the leadership of IS may be intent on territory and statehood (i.e. creating an actual territorial and administrative Islamic “state”), their brand of eschatology is in fact encouraging a virulent and fanatical form of fundamentalism in which adherents are willing and ready to sacrifice their lives for a cause that transcends this life.

Thirdly, while cooperation between regional states has deepened and will continue to do so, counter-terrorism strategy is still confronted by considerable obstacles rooted in domestic contexts. In Indonesia for instance, corruption in the prison system remains a major Achilles’ heel. Likewise, while there is doubtless also awareness that anti-terrorism legislation needs to be strengthened these efforts have been hampered by inter-agency competition between the police and military.

In Malaysia, decades of anti-Shi’a discourse tolerated, and in many instances sanctioned, by state religious authorities have fanned the flames of resentment against Shi’a Muslims and played into the hands of IS propaganda, in the process posing problems for a Muslim-led government that has always been concerned about its religious credentials.

Finally, the use of information technology by IS, not to mention imagery more commonly associated with the entertainment industry, not only distinguishes it from earlier extremist and terrorist groups, but has also had a profound effect on its audience, especially millenials. Defeating the virtual online army of extremist groups thence, whether it be Islamic State, al-Qaeda or any other such entities, will require attention to be devoted to understanding the aspirations of and appeal to digital natives through the creation and nurturing of engagement programmes specifically targeted at them.

Ultimately, countering the threat posed by Islamic State in Southeast Asia calls for less conventional strategies and a greater degree of cooperation, not only between governments but within governments. The threat of extremism has clearly evolved with new skills, new ideological commitments, and new networks. It is absolutely imperative that strategies to counter this threat evolve as well, and preferably at a faster pace.

*Joseph Chingyong Liow is Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies, Brookings Institution, and Dean and Professor of Comparative and International Politics, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. An earlier version appeared in The Straits Times.