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Ten Points On Importance Of Iran-Russia Relations Subsequent To Nuclear Agreement – OpEd

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By Mehdi Sanaei*

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation have been continuously expanding in the past 25 years. Especially in recent years, high-ranking officials in both countries have shown their firm determination to lay a strong foundation for bilateral dialogue. However, despite all the efforts that have been made so far, the volume of economic relations are not proportionate to capacities of the two neighboring countries.

Following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries, new horizons have been opened for resolving problems facing the international community and a new milieu has been provided for the expansion of international relations by Iran and other world countries. However, during past few weeks, negative remarks have been reflected in various media about the impacts of this agreement on relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation. For a variety of reasons, which are mentioned below, I believe that such remarks cannot be founded on a solid basis and the outlook for bilateral relations between the two countries is quite bright:

1. International sanctions against Iran lowered trade relations between Iran and Russia, especially during 2012 and 2013. In 2014, the downward trend stopped and the volume of trade exchanges between the two countries grew by 5 percent to reach USD 1.7 billion. Of course, experts still believe that the capacity for the expansion of trade exchanges between the two countries is much higher than this figure. During their recent meeting in the Russian city of Ufa, the presidents of the two countries believed that despite all-out expansion of cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, trade exchanges between the two countries fall short of their existing capacities.

The JCPOA can lead to removal of financial and economic sanctions against Iran as a result of which, trade exchanges between Iran and Russia would be facilitated. Quite recently, head of the Iran-Russia Trade Council Victor Melnikov, announced that implementation of agreements concluded between the two countries during past year following the removal of anti-Iran sanctions could boost trade exchanges between the two sides to USD 10 billion in coming years.

2. The conclusion of the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 group has left a positive precedent with regard to the resolution of important international issues through negotiation and diplomatic methods. The Vienna agreement, which was concluded through participation and contribution of Russia, showed that if the language of sanctions and threat is put aside and a win-win approach is adopted with an eye on concerns and national interests of both sides, reaching an agreement is possible. On the other hand, if differences over Iran’s nuclear program intensified and increased the risk of war, the consequences of a possible military action against Iran could have affected Russia’s near abroad as well.

3. The Vienna agreement can change some controversial equations in the Middle East in favor of increased regional and global stability and security. Elimination of misunderstandings surrounding the nuclear dispute will lead to less intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of countries in the Middle East. In addition, with reduction of pressures and sensitivities, cooperation between Iran and Russia can have a more rapid effect on the establishment of stability and security and the anti-terror fight in the region. Therefore, if other countries in the region tread the same path, the existing grounds for the United States’ intervention in the Middle East region will decrease.

A statement released by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the outcomes of the JCPOA for the Middle East had put emphasis on such issues as “the positive impact of the agreement on the overall stability and security in the world and the Middle East,” “provision of important requirements for the promotion of the goal of establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,” and “forming a broad-based anti-terrorist coalition in the region.”

4. Russia has made great efforts to facilitate Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but this goal has not been achieved yet due to imposition of sanctions on Iran. Following the removal of sanctions, there will be no barrier to Iran’s full membership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and after promotion of Iran’s status from observer member to full member, relations between Iran and Russia within framework of this world body will become stronger and more expanded than before.

5. Removal of anti-Iran sanctions can greatly help expansion of cooperation between Iran and Russia in the field of nuclear energy. In November 2014, Iran and Russia signed a new contract for the construction of two more nuclear power plants in the southern Iranian port city of Bushehr in addition to two other important documents. When existing obstacles to financial exchanges between the two countries are removed, the chances of these documents being implemented will greatly increase. In addition, nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia aimed at launching a center for the production of stable isotopes at Fordow nuclear site and exchange of surplus low-enriched uranium with uranium ore will become possible.

6. The idea that the nuclear deal will increase the distance between Iran and Russia and push Tehran toward the West does not conform to reality. The policies of Iran and the United States with regard to regional and global issues do not match and are at odds in many instances. Iran has no decision to negotiate with the United States on bilateral, regional and global issues, and bilateral negotiations were merely focused on Iran’s nuclear program.

On the other hand, however, there are many common interests between Moscow and Tehran with regard to various regional issues, including in Central Asia, Caucasus, Caspian Sea region, Afghanistan and the Middle East. With regard to issues related to the existing transitional international system, Iran and Russia have shared views on the United States’ unilateral policies, restrictions facing the national sovereign states and intervention of Western states in internal affairs of other countries, eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the missile defense shield planned by the United States for Europe. The foreign policy of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s administration considers further deepening and expansion of relations with Russia, China and India as top priorities.

7. Some analysts have noted that increased rivalry between Iran and Russia would be one of the outcomes of Iran’s nuclear agreement with the West. In an interview with Rossiya Segodnya news agency, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov addressed this concern and rightly said, “As a matter of fact, Iranian oil has always been on the market. According to experts, Iranian worldwide oil exports may grow insignificantly in the near future. Iranian gas has never come under any harsh sanctions. For many years, Iranian gas has been sent to Turkey, among other countries.”

In reality, Iran and Russia have common interests in the field of oil and gas, which is reflected in their effort to keep global oil prices stable. Iran and Russia are both members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and can cooperate for the regulation of the gas market. Increasing Iran’s oil export capacity will take time and the international market will adapt to new conditions. In the meantime, policies adopted by other member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC oil exporting countries will play an important role in setting global oil prices.

8. Although removal of some components of the arms embargo against Iran has been deferred to 5-8 years from now, the nuclear agreement can also pave the way for the expansion of technical and defense cooperation between Iran and Russia. Since past years, Tehran and Moscow have been cooperating in this field and that cooperation can be pursued in a broader manner under new conditions. The recent order by Russian President Vladimir Putin to end a ban on the delivery of S-300 missile defense system to Iran has a great step in this regard.

9. Removal of the sanctions can reduce the impact of the third parties on relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation because this factor has so far barred realization of many plans that have been agreed upon by the two countries. Following the nuclear agreement, the Russian presidency issued a statement stressing that the deal gave new impetus to bilateral relations between Russia and Iran and those relations will no more be affected by external factors. Under these conditions, encouraging presence of major Russian companies in Iran’s competitive market and increased export of Iranian products to the Russian market can provide remarkable grounds to increase the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries.

10. Bilateral relations should go way beyond simple trade and economic exchanges. The time is now ripe for more scientific and educational cooperation, expansion of tourism ties, as well as bolstering of regional and international cooperation through new initiatives between Tehran and Moscow. Under these conditions the two countries should focus on ways to promote cooperation between two age-old partners.

* Mehdi Sanaei
Iran’s Ambassador to Russian Federation & President of Iran and Eurasia Research Center (IRAS)


Russian Businessman Retains Amsterdam & Partners And Shutts & Bowen

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Russian businessman Maxim Finskiy has retained international legal counsel to represent him against a fabricated criminal investigation brought by the Russian authorities, according to a press release.

Finskiy, the founder and former Executive Chairman of White Tiger Gold Ltd. (“White Tiger”), was detained and placed under house arrest in Moscow in March 2015, in connection with an official “investigation” into the acquisition of underperforming White Tiger shares by individuals linked to the highest levels of the Russian government.

Facing extortionate demands for staggering sums of money, death threats, and no chance of fair treatment in the Russian judicial system, Finskiy fled Russia after learning that the officers conducting the investigation were acting under instructions from a high-ranking Russian government official who had invested in White Tiger, a BVI company publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Finsky saw no choice but to flee for his life, his lawyers say.

“The process unleashed against Mr. Finskiy has one clear goal: to steal his assets while he rots in jail,” said Robert Amsterdam of Amsterdam & Partners LLP, one of the firms representing Mr. Finskiy. “There was no basis to initiate a criminal investigation or hold him under house arrest over an investment issue, even if the investors were influential Russians. Mr. Finskiy’s case is, unfortunately, one more example of the all-too-familiar pattern under which powerful interests instrumentalize Russia’s criminal justice system for outright theft, and it calls for further strengthening of legislation like the Magnitsky Act to stem the tide of abuse.”

Finskiy is also represented by Harold E. Patricoff, Jr. of Shutts & Bowen LLP in Miami, a Florida-based law firm with approximately 250 attorneys in eight offices. Mr. Patricoff is Chairman of the firm’s International Dispute Resolution Practice Group and a veteran of numerous cross-border disputes around the world. Shutts has also retained attorney and former Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart. Former Congressman Diaz-Balart will advise regarding federal legislation and regulatory matters such as the Magnitsky Act.

Amsterdam & Partners LLP is an international law firm with offices in London and Washington DC, specializing in political advocacy and cross-border disputes. Founded by Robert R. Amsterdam, legal counsel to former Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the firm’s list of client notables includes Russian State Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, and Zambia’s President Rupiah Banda, among others.

Spain: INTERPOL Supports Operation Against Stolen Vehicle Trafficking

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An operation in Spain against the trafficking of stolen vehicles has led to the recovery of some 40 vehicles and 25 arrests, with the support of the INTERPOL Task Force on Stolen Motor Vehicles.

Operation Paso del Estrecho (meaning ‘crossing the straits’) was undertaken by the Spanish National Police from 21 July to 4 August at the ports of Algeciras and Tarifa in southern Spain.

These major gateways between Europe and Africa are also used by organized criminal networks to smuggle cars stolen from across Europe into North Africa.

With the assistance of INTERPOL’s Stolen Motor Vehicles (SMV) unit, police monitored car ferries leaving the ports for Morocco, with some 10,000 vehicles screened against INTERPOL’s SMV database.

With an estimated value of EUR 1 million, most of the 40 vehicles recovered during the operation were detected and seized only few days or weeks after theft had occurred.

Underlining the transnational dimension of stolen vehicle crime, during Operation Paso del Estrecho the INTERPOL task force coordinated the deployment of 30 experts from police and the private sector from Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

This annual initiative conducted by Spanish police to prevent stolen vehicles from leaving the country and to identify and disrupt the criminal groups responsible for the illicit trafficking was also supported by the INTERPOL Integrated Border Management Task Force (IBMTF).

Follow-up investigations initiated in connection to the arrests are being monitored and supported by INTERPOL’s SMV unit.

The INTERPOL SMV database contains almost 7 million records submitted by 127 member countries. In 2014, countries searched the database more than 120 million times, resulting in some 132,000 positive hits.

Malaysia’s Pakatan Rakyat Collapse: Implications For Party Politics – Analysis

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By Mustafa Izzuddin*

Pakatan Rakyat (PR) – a triumvirate coalition of strange bedfellows with differing ideologies – is dead in the water. Formed in 2008, PR was perceived as a viable alternative to the Barisan Nasional (BN) in governing Malaysia. However, it collapsed with the intensification of tensions between the Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) under the leadership of Hadi Awang and the staunchly secularist Democratic Action Party (DAP) over the implementation of hudud (harsh punishments for crimes in congruence with Islamic penal code) in the state of Kelantan.

The writing was on the wall when the PAS leadership was captured by hard-line conservatives at the party’s 61st Annual Muktamar (General Assembly), who subsequently decided to severe ties with the DAP. Soon after, DAP’s Secretary-General Lim Guan Eng declared that PR had collapsed. In Lim’s words, “As Pakatan Rakyat was formed by the three parties based on consensus and bound by the Common Policy Framework, the PAS Muktamar’s motion effectively killed off Pakatan Rakyat.”2 Reaffirming the collapse was the President of the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People’s Justice Party), Wan Azizah who proclaimed that “PR no longer functions formally.”3

The collapse of Pakatan Rakyat (PR) carries great significance for the future of opposition coalition politics in Malaysia. Several attempts are to be expected at regrouping and realignment of existing political parties as well as the formation of new ones, before general elections are called, latest by 2018. While party-political realignments are not alien to Malaysia, the main difference now is that the realignments appear to be more fluid and complex.

QUO VADIS, PAS?

First, PR’s collapse had no bearing on the standing of the hard-line conservatives within PAS. In fact, the politicisation of hudud that led to PR’s disintegration bolstered Hadi Awang’s standing within PAS and revitalised PAS as a party of the ultraconservatives. The pursuit of hudud underlined the message to many PAS’ members and supporters that Hadi was a leader with a plan to refashion an identity not just for himself, but also for the party. This seemed necessary after the passing of Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the eminent guardian of PAS, widened the rift between the conservative ulama faction and the more progressive group within PAS. But while there was a closing of ranks within PAS to defend Hadi against a barrage of criticism on the enactment of hudud in Kelantan4, notably from the DAP, the factionalism within PAS remain unabated. This internal rift came to the fore in the party’s 61st Annual Muktamar whereby the purge of the progressives by the ulamas (clergy class) led to a near-total wipe- out of the progressives within PAS. As many as 22 of the 23 posts contested for PAS’ central working committee were won by the ulamas, with the sole PAS progressive leader stepping down soon after.5 PAS has thus moved further to the right, with the ulamas now singlehandedly calling the shots. One notable illustration was the motion passed for PAS to severe ties with the DAP, effectively ending the coalition pact. These developments were also disconcerting to non-Muslim supporters of PAS who, as a congress, have been rethinking their position within the party and may well end up joining the PAS progressives.6

Second, PR’s demise pushed the progressives within PAS to either form their own party, or join up with an existing party. Central to their thinking is the paramount importance of PR to coalition politics in Malaysia, and as the attendant vehicle to wrest control of Putrajaya from BN. For them, it is only by remaining in PR and working with the other two component parties that they can contribute to a regime change. This line of thinking also guided Nik Aziz’s decision to desist from pressing on with the implementation of hudud, despite him being a conservative Muslim cleric. Nik Aziz’s friendship with Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of the PR coalition, as well his cordial working relationship with DAP’s Lim Kit Siang was crucial in keeping the coalition intact. Hence, when Nik Aziz passed on and Anwar was jailed, PR was thrown into disarray.

In response, PAS progressive leaders started to think of ways to resuscitate PR, or to create some pact resembling PR. For example, they may turn the pro-PR Islamic NGO, Persatuan Ummah Sejahtera Malaysia (PasMa) into a fully-fledged political party, with the aim of replacing the traditional PAS in an all-new opposition pact with DAP and PKR. Another example is the formation of G18, an informal network of PAS progressives defeated by the ulamas during the party elections, which seeks to form a new party to rival the traditional PAS party for voter-support in the Kelantan stronghold. As elucidated by Hatta Ramli, a G18 member, “we do not want to take a confrontational approach, we only want to project an alternative image of an Islamic political party which is inclusive and acceptable within a multiracial setting.”7 Given its vision for the future of PAS as a moderate and inclusive party, PasMa has indicated its willingness to work with the G18 grouping to form a consolidated party to replace PAS in PR. G18 has since morphed into a new movement called ‘Gerakan Harapan Baru (GHB)’, which, in turn, could coalesce into a political party. This party could then work with the two other opposition parties and form what is now commonly described as Pakatan 2.0. However, how this new PAS-alternative party performs in electoral politics is an open question. Historically, breakaway factions from PAS like Hamim and Berjasa tend to perform poorly at the polls. Moreover, newly-formed parties often take time to relate and be amenable to the electorate. So although there is still time before GE14 is held, it would be difficult for PAS splinter groups to get significant support from conservative Malays who prefer the status quo.

Another alternative, as is already evident with a couple of PAS activists joining DAP, is for PAS progressives to defect to one of the two existing opposition parties.

As a counter-move, Hadi’s PAS adopted a carrot-and-stick approach to deal with various splits and defections. Taking a hard-line approach, Nik Abduh Nik Aziz, the PAS Youth Chief, called on PAS’ top brass to “cleanse the party of bad elements”, that is, the “loud mouth” liberals.8 No wonder then that the ex-Deputy President of PAS, Mat Sabu likened PAS’ party elections to “ethnic cleansing.”9

Taking an incentive-based approach, PAS’ leadership invited members from the moderate ‘Erdogan’ faction of PAS like Salahuddin Ayub, Mahfuz Omar and Taufek Ghani to join the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of PAS. It was hoped that by co-opting some progressives into the CEC, Hadi and his ilk could stem the tide of splits and defections since the party’s 61st Annual Muktamar. Ultimately however, Hadi’s PAS feels that the core of the party, held together by the ulamas, is strong enough to withstand any breakaways at the periphery.10 For Hadi’s PAS, the ‘bad elements’ are merely a drop in the ocean.

Third, PR’s rupture revived talk of an alliance between PAS and UMNO. It can be said that the PAS-UMNO alliance has always been on the cards, but it has not progressed in large part because of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad on the one hand, and, on the other, the late-Nik Aziz, who preferred an opposition coalition pact to an alliance with UMNO. That PAS and UMNO had been in coalition before in the early 1970s under the leadership of Asri Muda and Tun Abdul Razak respectively and contested in the 1974 Malaysian GE under a single banner suggests that a potential alliance pact from now to GE14 should not be ruled out. However, the then-marriage of convenience between UMNO and PAS was short-lived, primarily because of the internal strife within PAS. In particular, ‘Young Turks’ in PAS deduced that cooperation with UMNO was an impediment in PAS pushing forward its agenda for the Islamicisation of Malaysia.11 Be that as it may, the potential for a revived UMNO-PAS alliance is contingent on two primary considerations.

The first is the ‘Hadi’ factor. Just as Hadi was willing to work with UMNO to execute his hudud agenda, he was ready to enter into some form of unity pact with UMNO to govern Malaysia so long as the goal for enacting hudud in Kelantan remained a top priority. Tellingly, Hadi and Haron Din, the spiritual leader of PAS, came to the defence of Prime Minister Najib Razak when he was besieged by embezzlement allegations arising from a Wall Street Journal report, although the party did immediately after deny backing Najib.12 The second is the capture of the Malay vote. In the main, the recent hudud controversy sought to make Hadi’s PAS a relevant party for Malay voters.13 As such, there is an element of truth in the claim that PAS’ fixation with hudud was a political ruse to fish for Malay votes.14 This is despite the fact that the historical record shows that the attempt to push for hudud in Terengganu in 2002 did not win the party many Malay votes in the 2004 GE. Moreover, despite the caution issued by the DAP that the hudud agenda would result in PAS losing the support of non-Malay/Muslims and so, losing mixed parliamentary seats, it has in fact not bothered PAS in electoral terms. This could suggest that for the sake of hudud, PAS is still contented with just shoring up its traditional Malay support base. Arguably, the thinking of the pro-Hadi faction within PAS is that if the implementation of hudud enhances PAS’ capacity to govern effectively in Kelantan, Malay support for PAS, chiefly from the northern belt in Malaysia and in particular, the states of Terengganu and Kedah, would follow suit in future Malaysian GEs.

Also, while UMNO has traditionally steadfastly opposed hudud being implemented in Malaysia, especially under Mahathir’s premiership, it seems currently more ambiguous about the matter.15 Not only had 12 Kelantan UMNO lawmakers supported the passing of the hudud bill in the State, but several UMNO Ministers have publicly expressed their support as well.16 Importantly, Prime Minister Najib has been tight-lipped about the hudud issue. Given that Najib won the 13th General Elections (GE13) largely due to the Malay vote, there would be an irresistible temptation for him to augment this support prior to the next elections.17 Crucial in this regard could be the option of UMNO forming a political pact with PAS. But the caveat here is that if Najib chooses to ally with PAS and in so doing, concedes to PAS on the hudud implementation in Kelantan, this could culminate in a pushback by the BN parties from Sabah and Sarawak and the Bumiputera Christians who are against the hudud taking root in Malaysia. Given how incredibly important Sabah and Sarawak had been for BN to retain its grip on Putrajaya in GE13, UMNO cannot be indifferent to anti-hudud voices coming from there. In fact, Sabah and Sarawak may have become even more important for BN in electoral terms than the Malay vote. For BN, losing Sabah and Sarawak is as good as losing Putrajaya. Hence, the litmus test for Najib is how he threads the needle between entering into an alliance with PAS on the one hand, and maintaining the support of the East Malaysian voting bloc on the other. Consider also the dilemma of sharing Malay-majority seats between UMNO and PAS should the two form a coalition. This problem will remain a thorny one. All in all, it remains more UMNO’s decision than PAS’ on whether or not such a pact is to be realised.

DAP GOING IT ALONE?

Fourth, PR’s collapse led to the DAP looking for new alliances. To preserve its political integrity, the party has to be seen to be searching for a coalition that reflected its philosophical values, chief of which is secularism. Just as PAS will probably lose its non- Malay/non-Muslim support in pushing the hudud agenda, DAP accepting PAS’ hudud initiative would have lost it substantial support from the ethnic Chinese and Christian community. History might very well repeat itself. In the 1999 Malaysian Elections, many Chinese voters deserted the DAP because it was in alliance with PAS under the Barisan Alternatif banner. PAS had refused to renounce publicly its goal of transforming Malaysia into an Islamic state, and seeing its chance, BN cautioned the Chinese that “a vote for DAP is a vote for PAS and an Islamic state.”18 Similarly, it could be said that support for DAP is support for PAS and hudud as long as both were in the PR coalition pact. Hence, informal discussions have been held between DAP and like-minded members from PKR and PAS to give birth to Pakatan 2.0, which, at the time of writing, hinges on the framing of the GHB entity.

Fifth, PR’s rupture triggered a rethink in the DAP about going it alone. That is, DAP could well return to the days when it was a standalone party. The clearest evidence of this portrayal came from Penang’s Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng when he proclaimed that Penang is no longer a ‘Pakatan state government’ but rather a ‘Penang state government’ governed by DAP, which controls the Penang State Assembly.19 Presumably annoyed at PKR’s stance on apportioning blame for PR’s collapse to both PAS and DAP, DAP’s leadership made some demands on Azmin Ali, Selangor’s Chief Minister, before the party’s working relationship with PKR could return to normalcy. For instance, Azmin had to declare the demise of PR and pressure PAS’ Selangor state assemblymen to support the state government through a Common Policy Framework reminiscent of the old PR coalition. Azmin flatly rejected those demands, perhaps because he did not want to upset the national PAS leadership. This is because he requires the support of PAS to govern Selangor (PAS has the most seats in the state alongside DAP), his Gombak parliamentary seat being a PAS stronghold, and crucially, it was largely intervention and support from PAS that made Azmin the Chief Minister of Selangor at the expense of Wan Azizah in 2014. To be sure, there is also a sizeable presence of PAS progressives in Selangor so Azmin could hedge his bets by allying, at the state level, with PAS progressives aligned with the GHB.

Given the ambivalence in PKR’s position vis-à-vis PAS, one plausible scenario appears to be for DAP to go it alone as a standalone party. Doing so means that DAP does not need to sacrifice its core philosophical values of secular democracy and meritocracy. Moreover, as a standalone party, DAP can make further electoral inroads, particularly in those constituencies that have a Chinese-majority as was the case in GE13, including in Johor State, an UMNO- led BN stronghold. In fact, Johor is likely to evolve into a racially-polarised battlefield between UMNO and DAP with the former capturing the bulk of the Malay vote while the latter captures the majority of the Chinese vote.20 The downside to going it alone is that DAP is unlikely to secure a majority in the Federal Parliament and by extension, replace the BN regime in Putrajaya because the Malays, particularly the more conservative ones, are unlikely to vote for a Chinese-dominated political party. Therefore, if DAP were to go it alone, the best possible outcome in GE14 would be that the party would continue to rule Penang State, capturing each and every seat with a sizeable Chinese majority, and make further inroads in East Malaysia. Latest developments suggest that DAP will join hands with PKR and GHB to form Pakatan 2.0.

PKR, THE STABILISING PIVOT?

Sixth, PR’s collapse exposed the frailties of PKR as a stabilising pivot for opposition coalition politics in the post-Anwar period. Crucially, PKR can no longer rely on the imprisoned Anwar Ibrahim to provide the necessary statesmanship in mediating between PAS and DAP. As stated earlier, Anwar’s incarceration was a hugely important contributing factor to the collapse of the PR. The role of saving the failing coalition was most likely to fall to Azmin Ali, who as PKR’s Deputy President and Chief Minister of Selangor has the required stature as well as the apparent nod from both the DAP and PAS camps. But discord between the faction loyal to PKR President Wan Azizah, who also happens to Anwar’s wife, and the faction supporting Azmin, made this difficult.

All the more so when Azmin emerged victorious in the leadership struggle for the Chief Ministership of Selangor, much to the chagrin of Wan Azizah, who was the party’s officially preferred choice for that position. Be that as it may, Azmin Ali and Wan Azizah have both attempted to salvage the PR coalition, but have achieved little success thus far. Moreover, Azmin has been caught in the crossfire between DAP and PAS, which have steadfastly refused to work with one another, and have also called on Azmin to choose sides in the conflict as far as governing of the Selangor State is concerned. Quite sensibly, Azmin has dismissed any suggestions of choosing sides. Rather, what is likely to happen and this is already taking place, is that Azmin will adopt a dual-track approach to governing Selangor. On the one hand, PKR works with DAP, and, on the other, PKR works with PAS. Doing so forecloses the need for DAP and PAS to work with one another, with PKR playing the role of a pivot to stabilise the state government.

Seventh, PR’s demise compelled PKR to embark on an exercise of critical self-examination. PKR is a party in search of an identity. What does it stand for, and what is its chosen ideology? PKR has often been accused in more recent times of leaning over backwards for both DAP and PAS just so the PR coalition pact could remain intact. In so doing however, PKR has been losing its credibility. So, in a sense, PR’s collapse allows PKR to either reform or reaffirm its ideological identity of being secularist or Islamist, or being somewhere in between.21

Notably, PKR’s perceived centrist position has not been entirely fruitful, as seen in the collapse of PR. One possibility now is for PKR to redefine itself as a party with ‘secular Islam’ as its ideological identity. 22 Despite being paradoxical, this controversial phrase warrants greater deliberation in light of the evolutionary nature of Malaysia’s political landscape. According to one of the more simplified definitions, secular Islam “means that the collection of beliefs, moral values and teachings which comprise Islam do not confer on Muslims a mission to form a government or state. The idea of establishing an Islamic state based on the Quran and the Sunnah is incorrect, as neither presents a model for such a state.”23 By that definition, secular Islam sets PKR apart from PAS, which, in its puritanical predisposition, considers secularism to be un-Islamic. Concurrently, secular Islam differentiates PKR from DAP because secular Islam appears to present a ‘softer’ form of secularism as compared to the more staunch variant espoused by the DAP. Despite the differences, such projected clarity by PKR about its ideological identity could bolster its bargaining position in the coalition-building process. But while secular Islam can help PKR secure support from the more progressive Malays and Muslims of other races, it alienates the more conservative Malays who would probably find secular Islam abnormal and abhorrent. As such, PKR, as a standalone party, is unlikely to garner the necessary support to secure a simple majority in the Federal Parliament, although the party should be able to retain the more urbanised electoral seats, especially in Selangor.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Taken collectively, the implications from the Pakatan Rakyat collapse presented here suggest that one will see several rounds of regrouping and realignment of existing political parties as well as formation of new ones. All eyes are now on Pakatan 2.0 and in particular on whether it will be PAS or some breakaway faction such as GHB that will be represented in the coalition. Prime Minister Najib Razak may have been under fire over funds allegedly ending up in his personal accounts, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, and suffered other challenges to his political leadership, but he may well ride out the storm, aided by the opposition coalition being in chaos at the same time. The BN is also in disarray, worsened by Najib’s recent removal of his deputy, Muhyiddin Yassin.

According to a Malay proverb, ‘gajah sama gajah berjuang, pelanduk mati di tengah-tengah’, which translated metaphorically means that when leaders fight, it is the people who suffer the most. By the same token, when PR and BN both suffer internal strife, it is the Malaysian people who are the most affected. PR’s collapse left many Malaysians disappointed, including middle-ground voters. For them, the question has to be asked, if PR cannot even stay united as a coalition, how can they be expected to govern the country? It is reasonable to assume that PR parties have lost some middle-ground support to BN. PR’s demise reaffirms BN as the only game in town.

So, all things considered, it is the opinion of the author that despite being ‘under siege’, Najib remains the best bet at the moment to lead Malaysia as Prime Minister. This is because Najib has shown promising signs of reform in the early part of his tenure and continued the work of his predecessors in the conduct of a foreign policy that projects Malaysia as a respectable middle power in international affairs.24 Most of all, Najib retains the majority support of UMNO and BN as a whole.25 Only time will tell what ultimately becomes of Najib, but PR’s collapse has resuscitated, and perhaps even bolstered, the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional, its own internal politicking notwithstanding.

About the author:
*1 Mustafa Izzuddin
is Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). He would like to thank the ISEAS Perspective editors and reviewers for their assistance in editing and improving the content of this article.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective Number 41 (PDF)

Notes:
2 Straits Times, 2015. Malaysian opposition alliance no longer exists, says DAP’s Lim Guan Eng. June 16.
3 The Rakyat Post, 2015. PKR no longer functions formally, says PKR president. June 17.
4 This is not a new bill; rather, this current round of the hudud controversy is about an amendment to the 1993 hudud bill.
5 The Malaysian Insider, 2015. Sole PAS ‘progressive’ leader quits central committee post. June 15.
6 For example, the co-founder of the PAS supporters’ congress for non-Muslims, Hu Pang Chaw has left the party because he felt it had strayed from its path of ‘PAS for All’. Free Malaysia Today, 2015. PAS loses supporters’ wing co-founder. July 18.
7 The Malaysian Insider, 2015. Sole PAS ‘progressive’ leader quits central committee post. June 15.
8 The Sun Daily, 2015. How far can G18 go in the altered political landscape?. July 1.
9 New Straits Times, 2015. Mat Sabu likens Pas muktamar to “ethnic cleansing”. June 20.
10 Free Malaysia Today, 2015. Shahbudin: Ulama in PAS out to divide and rule. June 23.
11 Liow, Joseph Chinyong, 2015. Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 33.
12 The Star Online, 2015. PAS: Our statements are not in support of Najib. July 7.
13 One caveat here is that the contra-Hadi factions (the moderates) within PAS want the party to cater to all races and religions. TODAY, 2015. PAS moderates launch new movement for all races, religious. July 13.
14 Kaos, Joseph, 2015. Tun M: PAS’ hudud is just to fish for votes. The Star Online. April 4.
15 There had been dissension within UMNO ranks in the past, particularly among Ministers overseeing religious affairs at the federal level. They were not opposed to hudud taking root in the country. See Saat, Norshahril, 2014. The Ulama, Thought-Styles, and the Islamic State Debate in Contemporary Malaysia. Studia Islamika, 21 (1), p. 59.
16 Asrul Hadi, Abdullah Sani, 2015. Hudud debate: Pressure mounting on Najib. Straits Times (Singapore). March 23.
17 The UMNO-led BN won also because of support from Sabah and Sarawak, which houses a sizeable Christian bumiputra voting bloc. This bloc is represented by East Malaysian component political parties within BN.
18 Cited in Case, William, 2002. Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less. London: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 140.
19 New Straits Times, 2015. Penang no longer a Pakatan govt, declares Guan Eng. July 2.
20 Mustafa Izzuddin, 2015. A Jewel in the Barisan Nasional Crown: An Electoral Analysis of Four Parliamentary Seats in Johor. In Saravanamuttu, Johan, Lee, Hock Guan, and Nawab, Osman. Coalitions in Collision: Malaysia’s 13th General Elections. Malaysia: SIRD and Singapore: ISEAS, p. 270.
21 See Saat, Norshahril, 2015. With Pakatan dead, it’s time for PKR to reaffirm its ideology. TODAY. June 19.
22 Some analysts would counter-argue that since PKR, even under Anwar Ibrahim, has all along been non-committal to any clearly-defined ideology, why would the party bother with one now?
23 Ganji, Akbar, 2015. Why secularism is compatible with the Quran and Sunnah – And an ‘Islamic State’ is not. The Huffington Post. January 27.
24 Najib Abdul Razak, 2014. 8th Heads of Mission Conference. Speech by Prime Minister of Malaysia, February 24.
25 This support may have moderated somewhat with the recent Cabinet reshuffle, particularly the removal of the Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin.

Why The Delay In The Free(r) Flow Of Skilled Labor In ASEAN? – Analysis

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By Jovito Jose P. Katigbak*

On 31 December 2015, as envisaged in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint, ASEAN will declare itself as a single market characterized by free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and freer flow of capital. But at the sidelines of the 2015 World Economic Forum, Malaysia’s Trade Minister Mustapa Mohamed remarked that the free flow of skilled labor within the region would only come in 2020.

The Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) is the only mechanism covering intra-ASEAN skilled labor mobility, but these MRAs exclusively focus on the movement of highly-skilled workers and professionals leaving the bulk of workers uncovered. With this scenario, the said goal by year-end is least likely attainable; hence, ASEAN decided to delay deeper integration in the area of skilled labor mobility.

Managing intra-ASEAN migration

The United Nations reports that intra-ASEAN migrants increased from 1.5 million to 6.5 million between 1990 and 2013. Of this figure, 87 percent are irregular and unskilled. Despite this large number, ASEAN is yet to enforce mechanisms and policies concerning unskilled, low-skilled and semi-skilled migrants. Thus far, ASEAN has implemented frameworks on the managed mobility of professionals and highly skilled workers within the region.

Article V of the 1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) particularly allows each ASEAN Member State (AMS) to “recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in another AMS.”Paragraphs 33 and 34 of the AEC Blueprint enable ASEAN to manage mobility or facilitate entry for natural persons involved in trade in goods, services, and investments. Most recently, the 2012 Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons covers the temporary movement of persons pursuant to Mode 4 (Presence of Natural Persons) of the AFAS. Mode 4 operates when an ASEAN company sends its personnel temporarily to other AMS to provide service. AMS also enter into bilateral labor agreement and memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on labor market access.

MRAs were introduced to facilitate trade in services and actualize the movement of professionals within the region. ASEAN believes that these MRAs would engender the transfer of new knowledge, skills and capacities, and technologies within the region, thus contributing to the better provision of skilled services and the objective of fostering a highly competitive ASEAN. Through MRAs, AMS can mutually recognize authorization, licensing, or certification of professional service suppliers by other signatory Member States, while considering relevant domestic regulations and market demand conditions. Then again, these MRAs are bilateral in nature.

From 2005 to 2012, AMS concluded MRAs in six occupations: engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, and tourism, and Framework Agreements on two other MRAs: surveying and accounting. An MRA on Accountancy Services has been finalized to replace the framework agreement, but it is yet to be signed by ASEAN Economic Ministers. The signing of the MRA on Tourism Professionals illustrates the 10-nation bloc’s willingness in addressing the issue of mobility of unregulated professions, although it has not yet been implemented. The ASEAN Common Competency Standards for Tourism Professionals (ACCSTP) were formulated to cater to jobs in retail and wholesale travel companies, housekeeping, front office, and food and beverage service.

Progress or lack thereof

The most significant issue seems to be the slow and unequal progress in crafting and implementing MRAs since they enable the flow of professionals within ASEAN. The Association has specifically missed its deadline of completing MRAs for Priority Integration Sectors of e-commerce, air travel, and logistics in 2008, and was also unsuccessful in identifying and developing MRAs for other professions in 2012.

Moreover, progress in implementing MRAs differs across sectors. For instance, implementation of MRAs for architectural and engineering services are regarded as advanced due to the number of ASEAN professionals already registered and certified by ASEAN-level Councils. A different discussion on health care is being undertaken due to the understanding that patient safety is of highest priority. For other MRAs, AMS are still in the process of exchanging information on their respective domestic policies and regulations.

It is likewise important to note that implementing MRAs does not automatically guarantee unrestricted labor market access. Foreign workers are still subject to highly restrictive domestic rules and regulations in many AMS.Particularly, AMS have various requirements for work visas and numerous restrictions that limit non-nationals’ access to labor market. Chia Sow Yue (2011) finds that in Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, foreign workers are obliged to transfer knowledge to the locals and that the latter will eventually replace the former. In the Philippines, the Constitution restricts foreign workers from practicing significant professions including accountancy, medicine, and engineering in the country. Exemptions are provided under foreign reciprocity provisions.

Another problematic area is harmonizing and standardizing core competencies and qualifications across AMS. The ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF) will be launched to allow comparisons of qualifications across participating AMS that are at varying levels of development. Applying the AQRF is voluntary in nature, and the referencing process will commence in 2016 and the latest by 2018. However, AMS still have different levels of competencies due to variations in education curriculum and training across the region. ASEAN’s push to harmonize competencies and qualifications is further complicated by unequal competitiveness of AMS due to the development divide in the region (i.e. ASEAN6 and CLMV).

These challenges are also compounded by administrative and regulatory difficulties in issuing visas and employment passes for ASEAN workers. Many AMS still have high visa costs, complex application procedures, and lengthy processing time.

Looking for a common ground

The delay in the integration of freer skilled labor mobility in AEC only reaffirms the understanding that the establishment of an economic community is a gradual process. Necessary regional policies, strategies, and concrete actions must be undertaken by ASEAN as an organization while taking into consideration the respective domestic policies and regulations of each AMS. One strategy could be the identification, formulation, and implementation of common minimum standards in professional qualifications across ASEAN through various processes which would substantially contribute to the goal of fast-tracking and leveling the implementation of MRAs within the region. Furthermore, these common standards can serve as a baseline in crafting common policies and regulations across ASEAN. The AQRF and the ACCSTP are models which can be adapted by AMS to achieve convergence in qualifications and minimum standards.

More importantly, resolving the current challenges in managing the freer movement of skilled labor within ASEAN requires strong political will from AMS and their sustained commitment and willingness to build an AEC that is founded on stable institutions and well-functioning regulatory mechanisms. To quote Mr. Mohamed, “What’s important is that we’re committed, I’m not saying that we’re backtracking.” Commitment, however, must be coupled with concrete actions and a forward-looking perspective.

*Jovito Jose P. Katigbak is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Katigbak can be reached at jpkatigbak@fsi.gov.ph

The views expressed in this publication are of the authors alone and do not reflect the official position of the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Philippines.

China’s Economic Data Seen Overstated – Analysis

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By Michael Lelyveld

China’s latest energy data has renewed doubts about the government’s economic growth claims, despite statements of confidence in a stable performance this year.

On July 27, the National Energy Administration (NEA) said that China’s total energy consumption in the first half of 2015 rose by only 0.7 percent from a year earlier, dropping from an official 2.2-percent growth rate for all of 2014.

The slack energy numbers contrasted sharply with the government’s estimate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, which held steady at 7 percent for the second quarter and first half, despite widespread concerns of weakening.

But nearly all of China’s recent energy and economic data suggest that the government has overstated the growth of GDP.

“I don’t think the reported energy use growth is consistent with the GDP number of 7 percent for the first half,” said Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

“It’s consistent with maybe 4 percent at best. There’s something wrong here,” Hufbauer said.

Economists often look at electricity consumption as a surrogate measure of real economic activity, but the NEA reports of a nearly negligible 0.6-percent increase in first- half power use have only added to doubts.

The estimate was less than half of the 1.3-percent preliminary figure that the NEA announced earlier last month, and that growth rate was the lowest in 30 years, the China Electricity Council (CEC) said on July 21.

While 19 provinces recorded higher power consumption rates than the national average, usage fell in nine, the official Xinhua news agency reported.

Electricity use also dipped 0.5 percent in secondary industry, or manufacturing, marking the first decline in five years, the CEC said.

Usage rose 2.1 percent in light industry but it fell 0.9 percent in heavy industry, which accounted for nearly 60 percent of China’s total power consumption, according to official figures reported by Reuters.

Official reports cited stronger performance by the tertiary industry, or service sector, where power use climbed 8.8 percent from a year earlier in the first half.

But the service sector used only about 12 percent of China’s electricity.

Despite the small share, the service sector has had an outsized effect on economic growth, according to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, expanding 8.4 percent in the first half and accounting for 49.5 percent of GDP.

But whether the service sector actually generated half of China’s GDP using one-eighth of the electricity remains to be seen.

China’s power data suggests a continued decline in the economy rather than the consistency of the 7-percent GDP growth rate reported for both the first and second quarters.

“Electricity data has long been the barometer of (the) economy,” said Xinhua, quoting experts as saying that the small increase in usage is “the indicator that China has entered a phase of slower economic development.”

China’s power use rose a scant 0.8 percent in the first quarter. That was down from a 3.8-percent increase in all of 2014, when GDP expanded by 7.4 percent at the slowest pace in24 years, according to official reports.

Coal, crude oil and gas

Other energy figures for the first half also suggest lower-than-reported economic growth.

Production of coal, which provides nearly two-thirds of China’s primary energy, was down 5.8 percent, NBS reported, while thermal coal imports plunged 44 percent, Platts energy news service said.

China’s implied demand for crude oil rose 5.7 percent in the first half, Reuters estimated, and imports climbed 7.5 percent, according to Bloomberg News.

But the increase in imports has been linked to enlargement of the country’s strategic oil reserve rather than robust demand.

China’s consumption of refined products increased only 3.2 percent, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reported. Natural gas use rose just 2.1 percent, it said.

The widening gap between growth in energy use and GDP can be explained by ever-improving energy efficiency, the government argues.

Last year, China reduced its “energy intensity” index, which measures energy use per unit of GDP, by a whopping 4.8 percent, exceeding the annual target of 3.9 percent, the NBS said.

In the first quarter, the NBS estimated an even greater efficiency improvement of 5.6 percent as the government pursued its “war against pollution.”

The comparison of first-half energy and GDP growth rates suggests that claims of even greater efficiency gains are in the works.

But Hufbauer said that annual improvements in energy intensity of about 2 percent would be “as good as one could expect.”

“The question is how are they getting these high numbers,” said Hufbauer. “There’s a big question mark here.”

“I’m inclined to think there’s a fair amount of inflation in the GDP statistics,” he said.

Trade figures fall

Declining trade figures also raise suspicions about GDP growth, which has been bolstered for years by double-digit trade gains.

First-half trade fell 6.9 percent from a year earlier, worsening from a 6-percent drop in the first quarter, the General Administration of Customs (GAC) said.

Exports through June edged up only 0.9 percent while imports slid 15.5 percent in another sign of limp domestic demand.

Trade results for July, released over the weekend, have extended the trends.

Exports for the month fell by an unexpected 8.9 percent from a year before, dragging seven-month figures into negative territory with an 0.9-percent decline.

July imports were down 8.6 percent as year-to-date value in yuan terms lost 14.6 percent, GAC reported.

“Exports are no longer an engine for China growth,” Bank of Communications economist Liu Xuezhi told Bloomberg. “No matter what the government does, it’s just impossible to see strong export growth as in the past.”

Reports of lower industrial profits in June and negative purchasing managers’ surveys in July have added to shaky signals from the stock market.

But a larger question may loom over China’s GDP readings.

Unlike many other economies, China has kept GDP growth relatively high while inflation has stayed low in recent years.

In the first half, the increase in the country’s consumer price index (CPI) stood at just 1.3 percent while the producer price index (PPI) dipped 4.6 percent.

Inflation results for July, released Sunday, suggest more of the same in the second half.

While the CPI crept up to 1.6 percent on higher pork prices, the PPI sank 5.4 percent, marking 41 months of decline in a row, the NBS said.

Economists have long cited China’s vast industrial overcapacity for the drops in producer, or wholesale, prices, in spite of economic growth.

But with the weakening of actual production, that argument may be harder to make.

In the first half, China’s industrial value-added output, its measure of production, rose 6.3 percent, down from an 8.3-percent growth rate in 2014.

Production of major construction-related industries like steel and cement fell by margins of 1.3 and 5.3 percent respectively.

While official GDP growth has remained relatively strong and constant at the government’s target level from quarter to quarter, CPI has lagged far below this year’s target of 3 percent.

“It’s very exceptional to have that combination,” Hufbauer said.

“It gets harder and harder to believe the GDP number,” he said.

Egypt Continues Search For Croatian Islamic State Hostage

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By Sven Milekic

Two members of an Egyptian anti-terrorist unit were reported killed in a landmine blast during the search for Croatian citizen Tomislav Salopek, taken hostage by ISIS last month.

Egyptian police, antiterrorist units and secret services are continuing to search for Salopek after a deadline for fulfilling ISIS’s demands passed, the interior ministry in Cairo said on Sunday.

An anti-terrorist unit was searching for Salopek in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula when they drove over a landmine which killed two and wounded three members of the unit.

The Croat was taken hostage by ISIS in Cairo on July 22 and a video showing him reading the militant group’s demands was published online last Wednesday.

In the video, he said that ISIS would kill him within 48 hours – on Friday 5.35 pm Central European Time – if its demands were not fulfilled. ISIS was asking the Egyptian authorities to release imprisoned Muslim women in order to spare Salopek’s life.

But interior ministry said that ISIS has not contacted the Egyptian authorities since Friday.

The Egyptian foreign ministry also said on Sunday that there were some leads about where Salopek could be held.

The Croatian foreign ministry said on Sunday that Zagreb is using all means possible to help resolve the situation, but repeated its plea to the media not to publish unconfirmed information.

Salopek has a wife and two children in Croatia and is employed as a topographer at a French company called Compagnie Générale de Géophysique. The company has confirmed on Wednesday that Salopek is their employee.

France is also following the case and the French ambassador in Zagreb, Michele Boccoz, said on Saturday that the Egyptian authorities have made significant progress in tracking down Salopek.

Salopek was taken hostage in Cairo, while driving to work in a company car, on a road where no similar incidents had been recorded before. Armed men stopped the car and made the driver leave the vehicle.

The Sinai Peninsula in the east of Egypt is a centre of an Islamist insurgency led by a militant group originally called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which then became part of ISIS in 2014.

Defining And Regulating The Weaponization Of Space – Analysis

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By David C. DeFrieze |

Space is a contested, congested, and competitive domain. Each year the international community relies ever more on space-based technology for defense, civil, and commercial purposes. Accordingly, the weaponization of space has increasingly become an issue of concern. Space is an international common and is thus easier to protect through international cooperation. Since the beginnings of humanity’s venture into space, the international community has made attempts to define and regulate the placement and use of weapons there, but with only limited success.

This article discusses the international interest in controlling the weaponization of space and prior attempts to define and regulate it.1 It then offers an approach to better achieve the international cooperation needed to meet global concerns over space weapons.

Increasing Reliance on Space

The international community has a great interest in maintaining space as a peaceful arena and a secure place to conduct international activity. This has been recognized in treaties and policy statements involving almost all countries with an interest in space. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) sets forth as its opening statement, “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”2 Such interest in peaceful uses of space is understandable; it is a fragile environment. Physics dictates that satellite orbits and space launches are easy to observe and understand. Like sand castles, spacecraft are difficult to build but easy to destroy. Yet much of the world increasingly relies on space for such peaceful purposes as communications (cell phones, satellite television and radio, banking transactions), transportation (GPS and air traffic control), environmental management, observations relating to resources, weather analysis and predictions, climate change, surveillance of natural disasters, and minimally invasive verification of international treaties. Furthermore, commercial industry currently has a greater presence in space than state actors, and global economic development is tied to the peaceful space capabilities identified.

The peaceful side of military power is also reliant on space. Self-defense against military buildup, invasion, or missile attack is enhanced by surveillance from space. Such visibility of aggressive military actions can serve as a deterrent against aggression by providing targeted nations time to react and verify their concerns in international discussions. Finally, orderly regulation of space weaponization can help avoid a costly and potentially devastating arms race. Space, after all, is a congested and contested domain. If we do not establish order there, the struggle for availability of limited assets may render it a cause for Earth-bound conflicts. For these and other reasons, the international community has been attempting to regulate the use of space, and specifically to define and regulate the weaponization of space.

Treaties and Proposals

The Outer Space Treaty. In 1966, efforts began in the United Nations (UN) to establish an agreement to regulate activity in space resulting in the Outer Space Treaty being signed in 1967. Relevant provisions included the overarching interest stated in Article I that the use of outer space shall be for the benefit and use of all countries; Article III that activities shall be carried out in accordance with international law; Article IV that no nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in orbit around the Earth or placed on any celestial body; and Articles VI and VII that responsibility and liability shall be placed for damage caused by an object launched or by its components on Earth.3 This treaty laid the foundation for international cooperation and further treaties between states.4 However, the ban on weapons in space was limited to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as these types of weapons were of most concern during the Cold War era when the treaty was created.5 This treaty only addressed weapons that were “placed in orbit” or on a celestial body, and liability was not clearly spelled out. A relevant treaty addressing liabilities for damages caused in space is the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.6

Chinese and Russian Proposal. In February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the UN Conference on Disarmament a draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). This proposal attempted to define and prohibit the proliferation of weapons in space and provided definitions of prohibited weapons. The PPWT defines a weapon in outer space as “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them.”7 The United States rejected the PPWT in 2008, but both China and Russia continue to propose this treaty.8

Countries that signed and ratified Outer Space Treaty as of January 1, 2013, are indicated in green, countries that only signed in yellow, and those that did not sign in grey
Countries that signed and ratified Outer Space Treaty as of January 1, 2013, are indicated in green, countries that only signed in yellow, and those that did not sign in grey

UN Resolution. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a UN resolution seeking a ban on the weaponization of space. It was originally proposed in the 1980s from an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. The proposal was reintroduced in recent years and is voted on annually, with the United States being the only country to oppose it.9

European Union Policy Proposal. In 2008 the European Union proposed a “Space Code of Conduct,” a voluntary set of rules regarding matters such as space debris and operation of crafts or satellites in space. It was rejected by most significant space nations including the United States, China, Russia, and India.10

The international community has rejected all three of these proposals in one form or another. Specific reasons are difficult to assess since security and political issues cloud the true intent. However, it is conjectured that concerns lie in the unknown aspects of space and the desire of countries not to unduly limit themselves on future access, especially considering emerging technologies and defensive needs. Specific definitions of what physical properties or specific functions an object in outer space contains would be too specific considering all the potential technological developments that might arise.

Problems

If the international community were to rely solely on the definition of “weapon” as set forth in the Chinese and Russian proposal, other means of destruction could still be used. We cannot outlaw hammers because they could be used as a blunt instrument to kill, nor can we prevent killing by outlawing only items exclusively designed to kill because those bent on killing will still have hammers. We must therefore outlaw the killing and attempts to kill. Similarly, we cannot punish only the possession of articles designed to kill others as people with hammers could still commit the offense. It is widely recognized that any definition of what constitutes a weapon in outer space must be driven in terms of what the object is used to do (that is, its instrumentality) rather than its physical properties. This makes common sense as one could not define a weapon on Earth by physical properties or what specific functions it is capable of. When discussing weapons and aggression, we need to look at the interests to be protected and find a means of enforcing those interests rather than the means chosen to assault those interests.

According to John Pike, “The profession of arms remains the old art of killing people and breaking their things.”11 A man with a hammer can smash the neighbor’s property or injure the neighbor’s family. In our society, there are civil penalties to compensate the injured person and criminal sanctions to protect society as a whole, including taking away the criminal’s freedom. With the commons of space, there is currently no international “police force” armed with a means to enforce. Similarly, like the argument over gun control, if we outlaw all guns, only criminals will have guns and the rest will be helpless against them. It is therefore impossible to protect vital concerns over defense and security by defining and regulating against a “weapon” in space. Instead we need to define and protect the interests to be achieved and the behavior that is considered unacceptable.

Once interests and behaviors are defined, there must be a mechanism to identify who is responsible when poor behavior is observed, and a tribunal or adjudicator to provide professionalism, credibility, and equity to disputes relating to responsibility. Finally, there must be a means of enforcement; if there is no consequence once responsibility for violations is fixed, the behavior of states will not be molded to foster the cooperation and protections desired.

Regulating Interests and Behaviors. The attempts to outlaw certain types of technology in space are not without value. As identified earlier, the original Outer Space Treaty forbids the placement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space. Like certain U.S. gun control laws, the reasonableness of these prohibitions lies in balancing the potential damage with the peaceful purposes these objects can cause. While an argument can be made that these objects are placed in space for “deterrence or defense,” any aggressive use would create massive destruction or loss of life, and there would be no time to mitigate or halt the damage.

As noted earlier, however, beyond massively destructive technologies, the best approach to controlling the weaponization of space is by regulating and punishing behavior. The Outer Space Treaty initiated this approach by making states liable for damage caused by an object launched.12 This concept was further developed in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space. According to that treaty, the “term ‘damage’ means loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”13 This treaty does well at laying out liabilities for signing states: they are absolutely liable for damage caused on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for other damage only if due to fault. However, it also exonerates a party if the damage is due to “gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents.”14 This provision presumably addresses defensive actions taken to counter aggression.15

While there may be differing opinions as to whether the specific language is adequate to address all concerns, these two treaties alone provide a foundation for allocating responsibility and liability for unnecessary aggression and improper behavior in space. What is currently lacking is a means to monitor, adjudicate, and enforce these responsibilities.

Monitoring, Adjudication, and Enforcement. According to a distinguished speaker on a space law panel, “International disputes on space matters have most often been settled through diplomatic channels rather than by court decisions. Therefore, judicially determined resolutions to many matters of space law have yet to be developed.”16 While such international matters are certainly difficult and complicated, the ability to monitor and adjudicate violations is not without precedent. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently serves similar functions relating to international trade. The WTO got its start in 1945 after World War II in an attempt to reduce the tariffs and nationalist/protectionist practices that had permeated the international community since the Great Depression.17 WTO functions include:

  • facilitating negotiations between nations for development and enhancement of international agreements
  • implementing and monitoring through ensuring visibility, compliance with regulations, and periodic reviews of policies and practices
  • settling disputes as well as interpreting terms and responsibilities of agreements
  • building capacity, that is, assisting developing countries with technology,
  • disputes, establishing standards, and increasing their opportunities in the industry.18

A similar international organization with expertise and credibility in outer space issues could serve a similar role and go a long way toward helping regulate the behavior of states and nonstate actors in space. The most logical organization to take on this mission is the UN, with a standing committee under the Convention on Disarmament, driven by the legal subcommittee of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. As noted by Frans von der Dunk, expert and professor of space law at the University of Nebraska, “Despite its shortcomings, still presents us with the only more or less global organization having considerable experience in such issues.”19 The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has 69 members, and all UN nations can join. However, their authorities and responsibilities would need to be bolstered and resourced, and a more concrete means of enforcement would need to be in place. Over time, the capabilities, credibility, and effectiveness of the UN committee would grow, similar to the WTO.

The Convention on International Liability already provides a basic framework for filing and adjudicating claims for damages caused by objects launched into space. Under Articles IX and XI, states can file a claim either with the launching state or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or they can use the court system of the alleged offending state. Under Articles XIV and XV, if diplomacy does not settle the claim, states can mutually establish a claims commission with a member from each state and a mutually agreed chairman. It is noted, however, that a state can withdraw from the treaty with a year’s notice under Article XXVIII.

This claims adjudication system is similar to a binding arbitration approach. The weakness in this system is enforcement. Currently, a state might refuse to recognize any claim or engage in the UN claims adjudication process. Even if a state agrees to adjudicate a claim for damages, forcing it to pay still rests in diplomatic channels. The more challenging or expensive the issue, the less likely it is that a state will be willing to diplomatically agree to payment and will use politics and arguments of unrelated inequities to justify its nonpayment. Under such circumstances, the fear of retribution for irresponsible or aggressive actions in space is undermined and thus is less likely to create conforming state behavior.20

It is for this reason, and the fact that damages are paid by economic and monetary means, that a solution might be to invoke the enforcement power of the WTO as a last resort forum if valid adjudicated claims go unpaid and diplomatic avenues fail. As all space-capable countries are reliant on world trade to support their economies, and as much of the space arena is morphing into commercial and commercial-like transactions, the WTO would be a familiar forum for imposing measurable economic trade sanctions to punish the liable state, and in part would compensate the damaged state.21 Enforcement under these conditions is not reliant on voluntary payment, but the sum can be extracted by the international community. As in all standing tribunals, precedent would provide clarity of what is considered a violation and what the likely consequences would be for offending actions. Intentional offenses can have a “punitive damages” approach to increase the economic impact to the offending states. Additionally, as expertise and experience grow, the costs for even large egregious actions such as the 2007 China antisatellite missile test debris field might be calculated and placed as an economic threat to any nation contemplating such action.

Conclusion

Nations have gone a long way to identify and deter the weaponization of space. In short, the concerns over weaponization involve the potentially destructive nature of space weapons. It is impossible to define what constitutes a space weapon, and controlling an arms race based on definitions of what constitutes a weapon is doomed to failure with the exception of those weapons clearly posing a substantial risk to humanity, such as nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. For all other concerns, we should attempt to regulate and control the destructive behavior of nations rather than attempting to limit their technology. It is how they use their technology that matters.

We will never completely prevent countries from engaging in war. However, we can bolster peaceful dispute methodologies to prevent escalation of such conflicts and provide deterrence against aggressive or irresponsible behavior. Current international agreements do not offer an enforceable means of addressing claims for destructive activity, for while there is a forum for adjudication, participation and enforcement continue to rely heavily on diplomacy. A standing committee is needed to provide a credible, knowledgeable, and equitable forum for regulating, monitoring, and adjudicating claims and disputes relating to the damage caused by objects launched into space, whether they are designed for destruction or not. A logical place for this committee would be the United Nations. As current deterrence and enforcement of adjudicated claims currently rest solely in diplomatic, or in extreme cases military, channels, a third option is needed such as using the current economic deterrence and enforcement capability of the World Trade Organization to address and collect on unresolved adjudicated state liabilities.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 74 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

  1. The discussion of weaponization of space and the reasons for individual state objections to defining and limiting weapons in space are limited in this article because security and political intent are not publicly discussed and can only be addressed through speculation. As Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner state, “Because the leading edge of technical accomplishment is obscured by security classification, even the most detached public assessment is subject to some uncertainty.” See Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), 33.
  2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” opened for signature January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, available at <www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf>.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Other treaties include the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Resolution 2345 , annex), adopted December 19, 1967, opened for signature April 1968, entered into force December 3, 1968; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Resolution 3235 , annex), adopted November 12, 1974, opened for signature January 14, 1975, and entered into force September 1976; and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Resolution 34/68, annex), adopted December 5, 1979, opened for signature December 18, 1979, and entered into force July 11, 1984, available at <www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf>.
  5. “International Space Law Panel,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer/Fall 2010, available at <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/2012/05/002_Panel_Layout-11a.pdf>.
  6. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Resolution 2777 , annex), adopted November 29, 1971, opened for signature March 29, 1972, entered into force September 1, 1972.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Michael Listner, “An Exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense White Paper, Outer Space, and the PPWT,” The Space Review, April 25, 2011, available at <www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1>.
  9. >Federation of American Scientists, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” November 26, 2012, available at <www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ArmsControl_NEW/nonproliferation/NFZ/NP-NFZ-PAROS.html>.
  10. Michael Listner, “U.S. Rebuffs Current Draft of EU Code of Conduct: Is There Something Waiting in the Wings?” The Space Review, January 16, 2012, available at <http://thespacereview.com/article/2006/1>.
  11. John Pike, “American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium,” Federation of American Scientists, November 1998, available at <www.fas.org/spp/eprint/space9811.htm>.
  12. The Outer Space Treaty, Article VII.
  13. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, available at <www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Conv_International_Liab_Damage.pdf>.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Bob Preston et al., “Space Weapons Earth Wars,” Project Air Force, MR-1209-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 19.
  16. “International Space Law Panel,” 16.
  17. World Trade Organization (WTO), “Understanding the WTO: Basics—The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,” available at <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm>.
  18. WTO, “Understanding the WTO: What We Do,” available at <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm>.
  19. “International Space Law Panel.”
  20. This article deals with acts of aggression typically addressed by diplomatic and economic means. Military deterrence, defense, and response will always be present in the international community.
  21. I do not discuss the liabilities of commercial and nonstate actors since the current treaties make the site-of-launch state responsible, and “o far, the major space-faring powers have developed sophisticated licensing and regulations to insure that private actors in space adhere to the UN treaty principles.” See “International Space Law Panel.”

Sri Lanka: The Importance Of Electing The Best To Our Nation’s Parliament – OpEd

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By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera*

“People who live in Sri Lanka are first and foremost Sri Lankans, then we have our race and religion, which is something given to us at birth.” – Lakshman Kadirgamar

On 17 August, Sri Lankans will elect their new parliamentarians for the next five years. It is important to elect the best candidates to transform this nation towards prosperity. The current situation in the country thrives on fundamental blunders made by some of the nation’s politicians. Today, most parliamentary proceedings have little or no bearing towards the direction and development of the country. The discipline and intellect displayed by some members are heinous. The use of inappropriate language and the conduct are clearly out of character and absurd. It has become a vicious circle of uneducated people elected to lead. Out of 225 parliament members, 192 has failed GCE A/L.

This has resulted in poor policy decisions towards the staggering unemployment rate, the rise in numbers of drug peddlers and barons with powerful connections, the depreciating economy, the brain drain and the spiraling socio-economic status of the country.

Today the people are deceived by the beautifications and development to cityscapes, major infrastructure, highways and buildings that promote development. However, in the midst, the poverty-stricken villagers suffer. Some rural areas are still not equipped with basic facilities such as roads and drinking water. Some children walk for miles over dangerous neglected bridges to receive basic education. Furthermore, now we have nearly 50 per cent students failing the GCE O/L mathematics – which is tragic. This has resulted in mothers, sisters and wives working under inhumane circumstances as housemaids in West Asia. According to recent news, a Sri Lankan maid was advertised in Saudi Arabia for sale at the price of 25,000 Riyals. Producing domestic help to West Asia has become a popular industry within Sri Lanka and also the only option of income for most families.

We need to change the present system and introduce meritocracy to our government institutes. If you assign the suitable person with due respect to their intellectual expertise to govern, it will be a positive step towards increasing the efficiency of the institutions. One cannot dream of a developed nation without strengthening government institutes. The vision for Sri Lanka needs to be followed-up by the development of a national strategic plan, one that doesn’t change from one political party to another.

According to Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, “We have got to live with the consequences of our actions and we are responsible for our own people…When I went to Colombo for the first time in 1956 it was a better city than Singapore.”

We need to focus on moving towards the position Singapore and other such developed nations occupy in the world. It is important to improve investment in education for teachers and student’s classrooms and research. As we move to achieve a knowledge economy, we should develop our most precious resource: our human capital. We underinvest in these important areas and go for quick fixes. STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) needs to be the primary focus to achieve the technological heights we wish to achieve by 2020 and/or beyond.

The development of STEM is a priority in countries such as Singapore that have already developed a world-class education system. Singaporean universities are listed in the top 75 slots of the ‘world’s best’ rankings.

Entrepreneurs, young leaders and innovators are nurtured and facilitated by the country with resources and supporting environments to achieve greatness. Many Sri Lankan youth are sent to foreign countries to study and most are encouraged to stay on and serve those countries.

In the end it is a losing battle. Our country is deprived of talent that could truly make a difference. We need to create an ecosystem for our educated youth to return to their country and include these young professionals in our force for change. According to US President Barack Obama, it is important for us to pave the way for the next generation. He says “I don’t understand this phenomenon of leaders who refuse to step aside when their terms end…No one is above the law, not even the president,” he continued. Similar to any other occupation, it is important to provide an opportunity for the youth to lead the political arena whilst the seniors willingly and peacefully leave office when their terms end. Unfortunately, politicians do not retire in Sri Lanka to pave way to our young leaders.

Sri Lanka is slowly but surely rising from the ashes and into the development of the postwar era. In order to truly reap the benefits and move towards development, the political arena needs to be cleaned up. We need to refrain from pointing fingers at each other and focus on rebuilding the country. We need to gain the strength of the next generation to be the force of change. Beginning from the education system and educating the youth, rebuilding villages and rural areas to creating an innovative culture to sustain development. Furthermore, focus on creating different channels to bring in foreign investments and creating employment within the country will discourage the option of exporting our rich human resource as domestic help. This will result in the development and enrichment of Sri Lanka.

We need to follow examples of great visionaries such as Lakshman Kadirgamar that once spearheaded the direction of the country. 12 August marks the death anniversary of late Lakshman Kadirgamar, a legendary foreign minister who was assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam. We all should remember this remarkable politician who was committed to creating a better nation for all of us. He won the hearts of everyone around the world and was the best foreign minister we ever had. We need dedicated leaders like him for our country; we need to vote as one nation for politicians with the suitable values and intellect to navigate our country to prosperity.

* Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Executive Director, LKIIRSS, Sri Lanka.

Erodoğan And Netanyahu Declare War – OpEd

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The rulers of the two most powerful authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are launching major wars to reconfigure the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared war by proxy on Iran, announcing full-scale military mobilization within Israel (July 27 -29) and organizing the biggest political campaign of ultra Zionist Jews in Washington.

The purpose of this two-pronged propaganda blitz is to defeat the recently signed US-Iranian agreement and start another major Middle East war. Ultimately, Netanyahu intends to take care of his ‘Palestinian Problem’ for good: complete the conquest and occupation of Palestine and expelling the Palestinian people from their homeland – the single most important foreign policy and domestic goal of the Jewish state. In order to do this, Israeli leaders have had to systematically campaign for the destruction of the Palestinians regional supporters and sympathizers – Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Iran.

Erodogan’ s Multiple Wars

At the same time, Turkish Prime Minister Erodogan has launched a major war against the Kurdish people and their aspirations for a Kurdish state. This has followed closely on several recent incidents beginning with the bombing (with cooperation from Turkish intelligence ) of a Kurdish youth camp, killing and wounding scores of young secular activists. Within days of the massacre of Turkish-Kurdish youth, Erodogan ordered his air force to bomb and strafe Kurdish bases within the sovereign territories of Iraq and Syria and Turkish security police have assaulted and arrested thousands of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish leftist sympathizers throughout the country. This has all occurred with the support of the US and NATO who provide cover for Erodogan’s plans to seize Syrian territory, displace Kurdish civilians and fighters and colonize the northern border of Syria – under the pretext of needing a ‘buffer zone’ to protect Turkish sovereignty. Such a massive land grab of hundreds of square kilometers will end the long standing support and interaction among Syrian, Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish populations who have been among the most effective opponents of radical Islamist groups.

Erdogan’s newly declared war on the Kurds has complex domestic and regional components (Financial Times 7/28/15, p 9): Within Turkey, the repression is directed against the emerging electoral-political power of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party. Erodogan plans to discredit or outright ban this political party, which had won a surprising number of seats in the recent parliamentary election, call for new elections, secure a ‘majority’ in Parliament and assume dictatorial ‘executive powers’.

Regionally, Erodogan’s invasion of Syria is part of his strategy to expand Turkey’s borders southward and westward and to provide a platform from which Turkey’s favorite jihadi clients can launch assaults on the secular government in Damascus and Aleppo. The bombing of Kurdish villages and camps in Iraq and Syria are designed to reverse the Kurd’s military victories against ISIS and will justify greater repression of Kurdish activists backing autonomy in southeastern Turkey.

Erodogan is counting on Turkey’s agreements with the US and NATO for overt and covert collaboration against the Kurds and against Syrian national sovereignty.

Netanyahu’s Proxy Wars

Netanyahu’s multifaceted political offensive is designed to drag the US into a war with Iran. His strategy operates at many levels and in complex complimentary ways. The immediate target is the nuclear agreement recently signed between the White House and Iran. Part of longer-term strategy to destroy Iran includes the formation of a coalition of Middle East states, especially Gulf monarchies, to encircle, confront and provoke war with Iran. This political-military strategy is being pushed by leading Zionists within the highest circles of the US Government.

All the major Israeli political parties, and most Israeli voters support this dangerous policy against Iran. The Presidents of the 52 Major American Jewish Organizations in the US have been mobilized to bully, bribe and bludgeon the majority of Congress into following Netanyahu’s dictates. Every US Congressperson is being ‘visited’ and presented with propaganda sheets by leaders, activists and full time functionaries of AIPAC, the Jewish Confederations and their billionaire political donors. All the major US press and TV media parrot Netanyahu’s call for ‘war on the peace accord’ despite massive US public opinion against any escalation of the conflict.

At the highest levels of US Executive decision-making top Zionist officials avoid association with AIPAC’s public polemics and thuggish bluster, all the while promoting their own political-military ‘final solution’ …for eliminating Iran as an adversary to Israeli-Jewish supremacy in the Middle East. In the State Department and Departments of Commerce, Defense and Treasury, US-Israeli agents acting as special Middle East advisers, ambassadors and insiders push Netanyahu’s policies to undermine any normalization of relations between the US and Iran.

A recent proposal written by Professor Phillip Zelikow in the Financial Times (7/23/15, p. 9 ) entitled “To Balance (sic) the Nuclear Deal, Defeat ISIS and Confront Iran” is chilling.

The former ‘Executive Director of the ‘9/11 Commission Investigation Report’, uber-insider Zelikow promotes the formation of an ingenious coalition, in the name of fighting ISIS, but whose real purpose is to “confront Iranian ambitions”. Zelikow’s “coalition” includes Turkey, which will be assigned to attack Iran’s regional allies in Syria and Lebanon (Hezbollah) – all in the name of “fighting ISIS”.

The bland, bespectacled and most respectable Professor Zelikow lays out Netanyahu’s own bloody hit list down to the most minute detail – but tidied up with a thin veneer of ‘confronting ISIS’ to obscure his real agenda. This is no blustering AIPAC thug or open Neo-Con war monger beating the drums…

Zelikow’s ‘anti-ISIS coalition’ will ultimately go after the Iraqi Shia militia and their main supporters among Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – hewing closely to Netanyahu’s strategy!

Zelikow was a major inside advocate of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Twelve years after the US invaded, occupied and destroyed Iraq, Zelikow pops up again to promote a policy of sending US combat troops to serve Israel’s regional interest. He writes, “The military side [of the ‘coalition’] will need more Americans on the ground to offer meaningful combat support among the coalition”. (FT ibid).

Zelikow is clearly aware of US public opinion in favor of diplomacy with Iran and against the US engaging in more ground wars in the Middle East, when he writes that a ‘military effort is not an alternative to diplomacy.” Zelikow and his bosses in the Israeli Foreign Office know any US military intervention with such a “coalition” would lead to the destruction of the US-Iran Agreement and another major ground war with US troops fighting for Israel once again!

Considering his position as a highly connected insider, Zelikow’s attempts to sabotage the Iran-US agreement presents a far greater danger to world peace than all the noisy lobbying by the 52 Zionist organizations active in Congress.

Zelikow has been a highly influential security adviser to the US Executive and State Department since the early 1980’s under Reagan. He was appointed ‘special adviser to the State Department’ in 2007, a position held earlier by Neo-Con operative Wendy Sherman and followed by war-monger, Victoria Nuland. In 2011 President Obama appointed him to the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

He came to national prominence when President Bush appointed him Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission where he directed the highly controversial (and highly censored) 9/11 Commission Report against much public opposition. The appointment was made after Bush first choice of Henry Kissinger had created a media storm – Kissinger was never a serious choice with an insider-gatekeeper like Zelikow waiting in the wings. He was a controversial choice because of his role as intimate advisor to Condaleeza Rice and his authorship of the notorious Bush national security strategy promoting pre-emptive war, published in September 2002.

Phillip Zelikow suppressed any discussion of Israel’s role as a major catalyst for US involvements in the Afghan and Iraq wars. As executive-director of the 9/11 Commission Report, Zelikow assumed the role of editor and censor. He ignored the history of Israeli Mossad operations in the US, especially in the run-up to the attack on September 11, 2001. The report made no mention the fake ‘moving’ van filled with Israeli spies arrested on September 11, 2001 while celebrating and photographing the destruction of the World Trade Center complex. Nor did he discuss the quiet ‘deportation’ of the Israeli agents. The report contains no discussion of the scores of phony Israel “art students” who operated in South Florida around US military installations and in the vicinity of the apartment of the alleged 9-11 hijackers. They too were quietly arrested and deported.

He also suppressed discussion of the Defense Department’s ‘Able Danger Project’, which showed US intelligence awareness of the hijackers presence and activities much earlier dating back to 1997.

In October 2001, the first ‘anthrax attack’ occurred – first sickening and killing a photojournalist at a scandal sheet in Florida. National news programs featured an interview with… the re-packaged ‘al Qaeda’ and ‘bioterrorism’ expert Professor Zelikow (his lack of Arabic and scientific credentials notwithstanding…) who declared the anthrax to be ‘weapons grade’ and ‘definitely from a state sponsored military lab’, implying Iraq. (He was correct in the ‘military lab’ part of his declaration – only the facility was the US Weapons Lab at Fort Detrick. Zelikow’s role in accusing the embargoed and beleaguered regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of the anthrax hysteria was crucial in the public build-up for the case to invade Iraq, echoed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s call for the destruction of Iraq. Master-performance complete, ‘scientist’ Zelikow’s interview (among others) has disappeared from the ‘web’.

Zelikow’s ‘expertise’ (such as it is) and usefulness to Israel derives from his articles on the political usefulness of ‘false flags’ and catastrophes – events concocted or instigated by imperialist powers to push a traumatized public into unpopular wars and draconian domestic police state policies. His work has centered on the manipulation and exploitation of ‘events’ to push public policy – and include the Cuban Missile Crisis, the re-unification of Germany, policing Northern Ireland, (but not Middle East studies or bio-weaponry’). His expertise is in the historical use of the ‘public myth’- whether the Riechstag Fire or Pearl Harbor. In Foreign Affairs, November-December 1998, he co-authored an article with the current US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, entitled Catastrophe Terrorism where a ‘watershed event’ could result in ‘horror and chaos’ pushing the US public to accept the destruction of ‘their civil liberties, wide-spread surveillance, detention and use of deadly force…’

Zelikow continues to push the “false flag” script: In 2001 with the “anthrax hysteria” and now with the “Iran threat hysteria” . . . What is not surprising is that in both instances he hews closely to Israel’s strategic goal of utterly destroying countries, which have opposed Israel’s dispossession, occupation and expulsion of Palestinians – Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and now Iran.

Zelikow is a long-term, major asset for Israel, working quietly and effectively while the AIPAC bullies break down the doors of Congress. He never held a prominent position in the Cabinet or White House post like the brazen Zion-Cons Wolfowitz, Feith, Libby, Perle, Abrams and Levey who aggressively pushed the country into war with Iraq. Wolfowitz and company have scuttle back into obscurity under the cover of lucrative private positions while Zelikow continues to work inside pushing the Iran war agenda out of the limelight.

Zelikow’s role is far more discrete and important to Israel over the long haul than the loudmouths and thugs of AIPAC and other Zionist fronts. On the surface he pursues his academic and university administrative career (an excellent cover) while repeatedly inserting himself into crucial public discussions and quietly assuming strategic positions to advise on events or policies which have ‘turning point’ consequences and where his deep ties to Israel are never discussed.

Zelikow has one asset, which his bullying and blustering Zionist comrades lack and another which he shares with them. Zelikow is a great con-man – claiming knowledge about anthrax, Middle East relations, and military strategy. He spouts …. pure unadulterated rubbish with authoritative finesse!.. Claiming legal and investigative expertise he controlled the 9/11 Commission Report and denied the American people any open and relevant discussion of the event. He even likened the Commission Report skeptics to ‘an infection’ within American public opinion – apparently relying on his ‘expertise’ in biological warfare…

What Zelikow does have in common with the raging bulls of Zionism is his constant resort to vituperation against any country or movement identified as a target by Israel. He consistently refers to the secular government of Syria (under attack by jihadi terrorists) as a “terrorist regime”. He calls the Iraqi militia fighting ISIS “Shia torture squads”. This is part of a build-up to push the US into ground war for Israel against Iran and its allies.

Unlike Turkey’s Erodogan who uses his own armed forces to launch an all-out war to dispossess, terrorize and colonize ethnic Kurdish territories in Syria, Iraq and Turkey, Israel’s Netanyahu relys on his overseas (US) high level operatives to set in motion the wheels of war. Within days of attacks of September 11, 2001, Israel’s leading mouthpiece in the US Senate, Joseph Lieberman presented the roadmap for US wars for the next decade and a half – declaring that “the US must declare war on Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Iran”, despite the complete absence of these countries’ involvement in the event.

Is he a prophet or just a highly successful agent? Zelikow will push for a ‘coalition’ of Middle East dictators and monarchs to fulfill Israel’s dream as dictated by Joseph Lieberman in September 2001. This is a dream of waging devastating war against Iran leading to its partition, similar to the de facto partition of Iraq, Syria and Libya, resulting in a Middle East forever ravaged by sectarian strife, foreign occupations, balkanized and devoid of any possibility of regaining civilized life. Israel can then carry out its brutal final solution: the dispossession and expulsion of all Palestinians and establishment an expanded, purely Jewish state – surrounded by unspeakable destruction and destitution…

Conclusion

Erodogan expands ‘Turkoman frontier’ into Syria and Iraq – despite the fact that Turkey has never shown any interest in the Turkoman minorities. To that end, he allies with ISIS terrorists to uproot Kurds, everywhere extending into Turkey. Erodogan, like, Netanyahu, wants a ‘pure’ ethnic state – one Jewish, the other Turkish! Both brutal leaders have no regard for the sovereignty of neighboring states, let alone the security of their civilian populations. Both depend on the military support of the US. Both are in the process of igniting wider and more destructive wars in the Middle East. Netanyahu and Erodogan want to reconfigure the Middle East: Turkey seizes Kurdistan and Syria; Netanyahu expands military dominance in the Persian Gulf through the destruction of Iran.

These two leaders appear to hate each other because they are so similar in arrogance and action… But according to Professor Zelikow, the US will step in ‘god-like’ to ‘mediate’ the different power grabs among what he mindlessly refers to as the ‘partners of the coalition’.

The Corbyn Factor: The Transformation Of Labour And British Politics – OpEd

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“Whatever happens on 12 September, the cork is out the bottle, the candle is burning bright, the ideas are shining and there is a change in the air.” — Jeremy Corbyn, The Independent, Aug 9, 2015, London.

Skittled at the last elections, Britain’s rattled Labour Party has been on the search for options. This has not taken the usual, management form, where committees prevail over individuals and individuals comply. The satirical magazine, Private Eye, decided to weigh in with a front cover featuring how “Loony Lefty sweeps to Power.” Hence the fixation with Jeremy Corbyn, member of Islington North since 1983, and a figure who is revisiting some of the old, abandoned ground of traditional Labour in an attempt to win the party’s leadership.

On the weekend, Corbyn told The Independent that he was considering “restoring clause IV as it was originally written” – in other words, a return to the public ownership idea deemed crippling and rank by Tony Blair and his gang of Thatcherite modernisers: “I think we should talk about what the objectives of the party are, whether that’s restoring the clause IV as it was originally written or it’s a different one, but I think we shouldn’t shy away from public participation, public investment in industry and public control of the railways.”

A spokesman for Corbyn subsequently came out to dampen the issue, suggesting that the front runner for the Labour leadership did not want “a big ‘moment’ such as that”. A mixed approach to public ownership needed to be placed on the table, rather than a rule of unnerving dogmatism. May such spokesmen be few and far between in suggesting such “moments”.

The original article stems from the 1918 text of the UK Labour party’s written constitution which ostensibly enshrined its official socialist identity. The Manchester Guardian went so far as to deem this “the birth of a socialist party” an article of identifiable faith. It has been the brainchild of the co-founder of the London School of Economics and Fabian, Sidney Webb:

“To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.”

The terms of reference to common ownership has tended to be the sticking point in the cultural and economic battles that have afflicted Britain, and more broadly the Left, for decades. Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell thought of amending the clause after Labour lost the 1959 general election, and failed. The Labour party continued to weather storms and suggestions that the clause be altered till 1995, when Blair won the vote as part of his New Labour project. “Let no one say that radical politics is dead. Today a new Labour party is being born.”

What New Labour entailed was technocratic mania, the commitment to a “dynamic economy” – and the acceptance that the only true radical politics had to incorporate the sting of neo-conservatism. “Labour will work in pursuit of these aims, with trade unions, co-operative societies and other affiliated organisations and also with voluntary organisations, consumer groups and other representative bodies.” The Tories, at least in the market sense, had insinuated themselves into the Labour temple. The gobbledygook of the “Third Way”, with its mystical centrism, was born.

Corbyn’s sentiment is far from remarkable, which is exactly why he is being deemed loony and radical. He is raising a host of unspeakable things: opening up a discussion on crumbling infrastructure, debating the issue of privatisation, long accepted as part of the ideological consensus. The British are famed for lamenting how the trains do not run on time – and Thatcher’s privatisation program simply affirmed the rule, at even higher costs.

The Corbyn drive will send the usual jitters down Blairite spines. Corbyn’s rival Liz Kendall has suggested that Corbyn’s stance is cryogenic, showing “there is nothing new about [his] politics. It is just a throwback to the past, not the change we need for our party or our country.” Such is the babble when management speak pollutes vision.

The Corbyn challenge is a necessary move prompted by what amounts to an emergency in British politics. The Liberal Democrats, with whatever wet policies they might have had, have been well and truly defanged, while Labour comprehensively lost Scotland in what amounted to a northern bloodbath. The Tories, by the usual run of stumbling luck, are running the show with a majority. If Corbyn does nothing else, he will at least push Labour into winning back traditional territory and restoring shredded values. Being electable for Britain will be another issue.

As California Wildfires Burn, Southern Plant Species Shifting Northward

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As California wildfires burn tree canopies and the forest floors they support, the plants that are replacing the understory are increasingly those found in more southern areas of the West, according to a study from the University of California, Davis.

“The plants we’re finding underneath our forests are becoming more like those seen in Mexico and Southern California,” said lead author Jens Stevens, a postdoctoral scholar with the UC Davis John Muir Institute of the Environment. “Under climate change, we’re seeing species from drier, warmer areas increasingly taking over. It’s a long process, but forest disturbance, be it thinning or wildfire, has the potential to hasten those shifts.”

For example, a forest floor strewn with lupine and violets–typically found in places like Northern California and Canada–may be replaced with flowers and shrubs more often seen in drier southern climates, such as manzanita and monkey flower.

However, pockets of cooler microclimates remain in forests that were thinned before a wildfire occurred. These forests burned less hot and therefore left some tree canopy, allowing for both northern and southern plant species to coexist.

“A balance of open, intermediate and closed canopy across the landscape is good,” Stevens said. “If you can increase microclimates, you can increase diversity.”

How To Tell Difference Between Bipolar Disorder And Depression

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Many patients with bipolar disorder, a debilitating mental condition that can take a person from the sluggishness of severe depression to super-human energy levels, are often misdiagnosed as having major depressive disorder, or MDD. But now as an alternative to reliance on patient interviews, scientists are closing in on an objective test that could help clinicians distinguish between the two — and provide better treatment.

Their method appears in ACS’ Journal of Proteome Research.

For many reasons, bipolar disorder is commonly mistaken for MDD. One reason is that the condition often first becomes noticeable when the patient has a bout of depression. And, as bipolar disorder only affects about 1 percent of the population worldwide, clinicians sometimes forget to ask about hypomania, a euphoric, hyperactive state that also characterizes the condition.

Current diagnostic techniques involve structured interviews with patients, but these can be subjective and misleading. An accurate diagnosis, however, is crucial to quickly getting patients the treatment they need. So Peng Xie and colleagues set out to develop an objective way to tell the difference between MDD and bipolar disorder.

The researchers combined a couple of techniques — gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance — to analyze urine metabolites in samples from patients who either had MDD or bipolar disorder. From these results, they identified a panel of six biomarkers with an 89 to 91 percent chance of predicting each disorder.

New Saudi Arabia Plans For Regional Crises – OpEd

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By Osama Al Sharif

There is a new dynamic in the region that could result in a diplomatic breakthrough culminating in a political resolution to two key conflicts: Syria and Yemen. A number of factors have come together to launch a momentum that is picking pace almost every day. The agreement over Iran’s nuclear deal has ushered a new geopolitical reality which resonated in two key regional capitals — Riyadh and Tehran. But it also allowed Washington and Moscow to review positions and attempt a new approach to the four-year Syrian crisis.

The momentum began after a historic visit by Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, minister of defense, to Moscow last June. Apart from signing a number of strategic agreements, the two sides agreed to work together to find a solution to the intractable Syrian conflict. President Vladimir Putin had then suggested that a regional coalition be formed, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and Syria, to confront the rising threat of Daesh.

That suggestion was not embraced by any party but it was not rejected as well.

A series of terrorist attacks on mosques and other targets in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait convinced decision makers in Riyadh, and indeed in the GCC states, of the need to act decisively against the insurgency. Despite conflicting approaches by key regional and international players to the crises gripping Syria, Iraq and Yemen, there is consensus when it comes to dealing with the menace of extremism. Turkey’s decision to join the international coalition fighting Daesh has also galvanized such consensus.

Another factor that helped boost diplomatic momentum is the fast changing military reality on the ground in both Syria and Yemen. In the former, the regime of Bashar Assad has admitted to recent defeats in the north and the south. It was forced to withdraw from strategic areas as opposition forces moved in to secure liberated territories. Damascus allies are coming to the conclusion that the regime is weak and exhausted and that the country was heading toward de facto partition, with Daesh benefitting as well.

In Yemen the Saudi-led coalition and loyalist fighters were able to liberate Aden and recapture other governorates as the Houthi-Saleh alliance was forced to pull back. Riyadh has kept the door open for a political settlement that would restore the legitimate government and implement reconciliation based on the outcome of national dialogue that was reached last year in Sanaa.

These developments paved the way for a number of key public and secret meetings in the past few weeks. The trilateral summit that brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergie Lavrov and Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir in Doha last month focused on a new approach to the crises in both Syria and Yemen as well as adopting a strategy to fight Daesh. That was followed by visits by Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallem to Tehran, Moscow and Muscat, raising hopes that a new plan to end the conflict was being discussed.

But the most interesting development was the revelation that a secret visit was made by a top Syrian regime security official to Jeddah sometime in July. According to a number of news sources Saudi Arabia suggested a plan to end foreign and regional interference in Syrian affairs provided that the regime accepts a wholly Syrian resolution to the conflict that will help prepare the ground for presidential and parliamentary elections in Syria, under UN monitoring.

Meanwhile, Al-Jubeir is in Russia to discuss a number of issues, with the Syrian crisis topping the agenda. The visit comes a week before a delegation of the Syrian National Coalition is expected to arrive at the Russian capital as part of Moscow’s new perspective on the conflict. Tehran, on its part, is said to be ready to unveil a peace initiative on Syria, one that was discussed with a number of regional powers, and which will be delivered to the UN Security Council soon.

The plan proposes a cease-fire, the formation of a national transitional government, a new constitution and internationally monitored elections. The initiative is in sync with the principles of Geneva declaration.

The future of Assad remains a thorny issue, but it is suggested that the new approach by Moscow and Tehran accepts the fact that he will eventually leave office. It will be interesting to see Riyadh’s reaction to this. Meanwhile, recent coalition success in Yemen is also putting pressure on Tehran and on the Houthi-Saleh alliance to accept a political settlement that conforms with the UN Security Council resolution 2216. The Muscat meetings that are taking place will probably deliver some positive news on that front.

Saudi Arabia’s flexibility on both crises underlines a sense of pragmatism and realpolitik that could pave the way for a major geopolitical breakthrough in the coming few days and weeks.

ASEAN’s New Era: Challenges Amid Growing Cooperation – Analysis

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The establishment of the ASEAN Community this year end will usher in a new era of cooperation and stability. However the risk is that its ambitious claims may outstrip its capacity to deliver its objectives.

By Barry Desker*

Southeast Asia is set to usher in a new era of cooperation and stability following last week’s ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They affirmed their commitment to establish the ASEAN Community (AC) by the end of this year, to be formalised by the ASEAN Heads of Government in November. The AC will comprise the three pillars of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the Political-Security Community (APSC) and Social-Cultural Community (ASCC), which were envisaged by the ASEAN Summits of 2003 and 2005.

The ASEAN Community represents the highest form of regional cooperation among the 10 member states of ASEAN that has had a positive impact of good inter-state relations on them the past several decades. That has helped develop rapport and facilitated the habit of cooperation among their leaders and peoples. From fragile beginnings in 1967 ASEAN has become a shining example of regional cooperation worthy of emulation. Credit for this change should be given to President Suharto of Indonesia (1966-1998) and the other ASEAN Leaders who had recognised the need for ASEAN to work together to enhance their capabilities and grow their potential in a rapidly changing globalised world.

Southeast Asia’s transformation

With a combined gross domestic product of US$3 trillion in 2013 ASEAN now has the third largest GDP in Asia after China and Japan. With a population of 600 million ASEAN GDP is projected to grow by more than five percent per annum over the next five years, and intra-ASEAN trade exceeding $1 trillion. With the establishment of the AEC it will aim to create a single production and distribution base where products can be manufactured anywhere in the region and distributed and sold throughout Southeast Asia. The AEC aims to “transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, labour and free movement of capital”.

ASEAN will also enhance connectivity throughout the region. An ASEAN highway network is a priority project while improved maritime links are promoted. Air services are being liberalised and rail connectivity is also planned. China’s initiative in establishing an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is significant as a source of funding for infrastructure throughout the region.

The emergence of the ASEAN Community is a giant leap forward from the 1960s when Southeast Asia was regarded as the Balkans of Asia, riven by inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the region. The cold war was raging and Southeast Asia was a zone of contention. The Vietnam War was at its height following the US intervention and spilled over into Cambodia and Laos. Myanmar was beset with multiple rebellions and Thailand and the Philippines with communist insurgencies. Indonesia was engaged in Konfrontasi, an undeclared war with Malaysia which included Singapore.

The communist insurgencies in the region were supported by post-revolution China, with communist parties and their allies in the region replicating the street struggles of its Cultural Revolution. Malaysia-Philippines relations were ruptured over the Philippine claim to Sabah while Malaysia-Singapore relations were embittered following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965. Southeast Asia’s future looked bleak and uncertain.

The situation in Southeast Asia underwent a dramatic transformation since ASEAN’s formation. Following the end of the Vietnam War and the accompanying conflicts in Cambodia and Laos in 1975, Southeast Asia was divided into two blocs – the non-communist ASEAN and the communist Indo-china with a neutral Burma (now Myanmar). The ASEAN Five (later six with Brunei) responded by intensifying their cooperative efforts in economic and political fields as set out in their Declaration of Bali Concord 1976.

They united in opposing Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979 through the 1980s and, following the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the military takeover in Burma in the 1990s, offered the hand of friendship to the four Indochina states. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. The enlargement of ASEAN encouraged its leaders to make bold plans for the consolidation and development of the regional grouping. They envisioned the three “C’s” – an ASEAN Charter, an ASEAN Community and ASEAN Connectivity – for enhancement of ASEAN’s progress and prosperity.

Challenge for ASEAN: Ambition outstripping capacity

However, the challenge for ASEAN is that the ambitions of its proponents surpass their capacity to deliver. The focus of governments will be on building strong states and maintaining their hold on power. By framing the ASEAN Community, whose three pillars are political-security, economic and socio-cultural, as an objective to be reached by December 2015, ASEAN draws attention to current weaknesses in the level of regional integration.

Like other regional groupings, the reality facing ASEAN is that it is essentially a diplomatic community of policymakers, journalists and academics which has not sunk deep roots. ASEAN has been outstanding in the developing world in promoting regional stability and security, preventing inter-state conflict as well as promoting regional economic cooperation and development. The risk is that the extravagant claims for a Community (with a capital ‘C’) may outstrip their capacity to deliver.

This development is significant as Southeast Asia is at an inflection point in global history. The United States is today the only superpower and has controlled the maritime space of the Indo-Pacific since 1945. A rising China, which has historically been focused westwards towards Central Asia, could emerge as a regional competitor for the US in the decade ahead. As China builds up its naval and air power, China’s presence in the East China Sea and South China Sea will increase. China is already the leading trading partner for states in Southeast Asia and is rapidly emerging as a major source of investment, tourism and business partnerships.

China’s growing influence

China’s rise in the decades ahead will pose challenges for the region even as it creates opportunities. Policymakers in ASEAN states are concerned that China’s capacity to influence regional decisions will increase as China becomes more powerful.

States in the region will develop closer relations with China. While prospects for cooperation are strengthened by China’s enunciation of a Maritime Silk Road as a key objective, with its promise of enhancing mutual prosperity, increasing trade and investment and promoting regional peace and security, China’s extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea highlight the potential for conflict.

China’s unwillingness to turn to international legal adjudication of conflicting maritime territorial claims, current land reclamation which is far greater than that undertaken by any other claimant state and the lack of progress in reaching agreement with ASEAN on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea draw attention that China’s actions could negatively shape the perceptions of states in the Southeast Asian region.

*Barry Desker is Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This appeared earlier in The Straits Times.


Scraps Of Paper – Analysis

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By John R. Haines*

“No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with.”[1] — President Ronald Reagan (1987)

Trust and mistrust can make the difference between war and peace.[2] So writes international security scholar Andrew Kydd, for whom trust as is a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it.[3] Thus to trust someone is to believe it relatively likely that they would prefer to reciprocate cooperation.[4]

So the question is: should we trust—or mistrust—Iran? Will Iran reciprocate—or exploit—our willingness to suspend international sanctions, enable its domestic nuclear energy infrastructure, and to welcome it back to the community of nations?

If we accept the recent assessment by Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institute, then we should not trust Iran. Pollack’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included this observation:

“Ayatollah Khamene’i’s various statements in recent weeks continue to lead me to conclude that he views the JCPOA [the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] in purely transactional terms. It is a straightforward deal for him: sanctions relief for constraints on his nuclear program. Nothing more and nothing less. It seems unlikely he will countenance a wider rapprochement with the United States, although we can all hope that Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and President Hassan Rouhani will be able to convince him otherwise.”[5]

It is worth considering whether the inference about Ayatollah Khamene’i has merit. By any reasonable assessment, the JCPOA is an odd document. Words like “promise” and “agree”—typical cornerstones of any enforceable agreement—appear nowhere in the text. It is usual and customary to structure international agreements as an exchange of promises. The performance of one party is conditioned on the performance of the other. That exchange is nowhere to be found, however: the agreed-to document is not even an agreement but a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The role of a plan of action is to implement promises each party made in some agreement. The JCPOA does no such thing. It is simple tit for tat—Iran postpones certain aspects of its nuclear program, in exchange for broad sanctions relief.

Lest anyone doubt whether this characterization is fair, go immediately to the JCPOA text in which all the subsequently detailed commitments are called “voluntary measures.” The balance of the terms—the so-called “provisional application” (allowing Iran to withdraw during the first eight years and no longer be bound), the flaccid “snapback” (requiring UN Security Council approval and failing to apply with retroactive effect on earlier contracts), and its effective termination in ten years (by which all sanctions on Iran formally terminate along with the limits on its nuclear fuel cycle)—are fully consistent with this reading.

This raises a broader question of verification and assurance. Verification is where one party—say, the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[6]—by its own efforts produces information about the other party’s—say, Iran’s—fulfillment of its promises. Assurance is where a party provides information about itself to the other to demonstrate in a positive way that it is fulfilling its promises, by for example providing confidential documents or physical evidence of compliance. In this sense verification and assurance are complementary. Iran, however, seems intent on perverting assurance to frustrate verification—demanding, for example, that it alone produce environmental samples as the basis of IAEA physical verification.

When President George H.W. Bush submitted the START[7] treaty for ratification by the United States Senate in 1991, he declared it created “the most extensive and intrusive inspection regime ever included in an arms control agreement.”[8] START provided for twelve different types of inspection, including baseline inspections to confirm data provided on signing the agreement, and snap “suspect-site” inspections. The JCPOA does no such thing. It requires little more of Iran than compliance with its existing treaty obligations. START and its contemporary arms control agreements[9] were remarkable for their level of detail, both as to substantive obligations and provisions for verification. The JCPOA, while laboriously prescriptive in some aspects, provides little in the way of positive assurances or confidence-building measures.

The international law scholar Kenneth Abbott wrote that nations understandably are “reluctant to enter into agreements without clearly defined mechanisms for the ongoing production of reasonably timely and reliable information…Such mechanisms (contained either within the agreements themselves or parallel to them) may determine the success of an agreement in practice.”[10] Here again, the JCPOA verification procedures are spelled out in confidential annexes, including the secret “roadmap” agreement on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program—the much-discussed agreement between the IAEA and Iran, to which the United States and the other E3/EU+3[11] states are not privy. It is true the United States has indicated it will undertake, at some level, steps to verify Iranian compliance unilaterally, on the assumption that Iran will, consistent with past practice, engage in purposeful concealment and misdirection. Iran makes no promise not to do so, or to refrain from actively interfering with the United States’ efforts.

This makes likely an effective continuation of the current stalemate, now more than a decade old. “The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).”[12] So concluded the Director of Central Intelligence in a 2003 unclassified “721 Report” to Congress—mandated under a section of the 1997 intelligence authorization law that gave the report its name[13]—summarizing findings by CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC).

Exactly ten years ago this month, the United States State Department reached a similar conclusion:

“The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty].”[14]

The following month, in September 2005, the IAEA “found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement…constitute noncompliance” with the IAEA Statute, an international treaty that Iran ratified in 1958.[15] This includes Iran’s obligations under the aforementioned Article II, which prohibits efforts to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons[16]; and Article III, which requires states (like Iran) that have ratified the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards. The authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in 2006:

“Iran claims it pursued its enrichment programme in secret for 18 years because, under the terms of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was not required to declare facilities until six months before nuclear material is introduced, and it buried the Natanz enrichment plant underground for fear of attack. Iran claims the 14 different ways in which it violated its safeguards agreement were all minor, technical reporting failures. In answer to why it has refused to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve the many unanswered questions about the programme, Iran claims the questions intrude on its rights, commercial secrets and military security requirements…Some of the explanations make a prima facie case. Together, however, the series of justifications do not hold up to scrutiny. The most logical and straightforward explanation is that the programme has a military connection.”[17]

Little seems to have changed over the succeeding decade, save E3/EU+3 inanition with the sanctions regime.

Where does this leave us? The lesson of history is not encouraging. Asking “Will we allow it to happen again?” Harlow Hyde writes:

“A peace…marked by the thinly masked existence of aggressive ideologies or militaristic and expansionist desires, which behind the diplomatic niceties and paper promises are straining at the leash only waiting for moments of opportunity to strike. Under these conditions, peace through disarmament is doomed to failure. Indeed, if the events of the period between the wars give any lesson at all, it is that disarmament under conditions which are lacking in ‘true peace’ will only serve to make war more probable and it will come more quickly.”[18]

JCPOA defenders are fond of the Russian proverb Ronald Reagan adopted as his signature phrase during the December 1987 summit with Mikhail Gorbachev: doveryai no proveryai, the usual idiomatic translation of which is “trust but verify”.[19] That phrase, Kydd writes, “nicely captured the mistrust that plagued the superpower relationship while at the same time suggesting that trust could be rebuilt if words were accompanied by deeds that could be verified.”

The Obama Administration’s enchantment with the JCPOA’s presumptively-transformative effects (on Iran) makes it determined to move the Iran relationship (by force of will, if no other way) from the dictum “Doveryai no proveryai to the Prussian maxim during the reform years of the Napoleonic defeat: Vertrauen adelt (‘Trust ennobles’).”[20] However, Kydd writes, “As if inspired by the proverb, the INF treaty signed at the summit contained verification provisions that were unprecedented in U.S.-Soviet arms control.”[21] The JCPOA does no such thing.

Instead, it opts for the delphic. There is no way—apart from the privileged few (from whose ranks the United States Congress is excluded)—to assess its verification procedures, which for the most part are spelled out in the secret “roadmap” agreement (on Iran disclosing past nuclear weapons activities) and the JCPOA’s “confidential” annexes. If assurance provisions serve as a litmus test—and the JCPOA does not even require Iran to affirm that it possesses no nuclear weapons—then verifying Iranian compliance will be burdensome and difficult game of interpreting shadows on the wall.

Trust may indeed ennoble, as the maxim promises. Then again, it may not. Neville Chamberlain’s biographer David Dilks wrote that Chamberlain believed he could trust and manage Hitler and Mussolini, neither of whom, however, were ennobled in the least by it. That is “trust” of a sort born out of vanity and an overestimation of one’s capacity to read a situation.[22] Simply put, it is self-deception.

That the United States cannot—nor should it—avoid interactions with Iran and like rogue states is axiomatic. The Obama Administration is right to seek accords with such states that further peace and stability. That being said, it would be well advised to heed a warning from the always-quotable Godfather trilogy. To paraphrase, we may do business with the Iranian government; we may respect the Iranian government; but we should never trust the Iranian government.[23]

The essay’s title is taken from Harlow A. Hyde’s 1988 book, Scraps of Paper: The Disarmament Treaties Between the World Wars. (Lincoln, NE: Media Publishing).

About the author:
*John R. Haines
is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Executive Director of FPRI’s Princeton Committee. Much of his current research is focused on Russia and its near abroad, with a special interest in nationalist and separatist movements. As a private investor and entrepreneur, he is currently focused on the question of nuclear smuggling and terrorism, and the development of technologies to discover, detect, and characterize concealed fissile material. He is also a Trustee of FPRI.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] http://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/unil_us.htm. Last accessed 36 August 2015.

[2] Andrew Kydd (2005). Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 3.

[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] Ibid., 9.

[5] Pollack’s full 4 August 2015 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is available here: http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/08/05-us-policy-iran-nu…. Last accessed 6 August 2015.

[6] The International Atomic Energy Agency is an independent organization established in 1957 by the United Nations General Assembly, to which it reports along with the UN Security Council.

[7] Formally, the “Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”.

[8] Letter of Submittal transmitting START from the Department of State to the President, Nov. 20, 1991, S.TREATY Doc. 20, 102d cong. 1st Sess., at vii, xiii. The quoted text appeared in Kenneth W. Abbott (1993). ” Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements .” Cornell International Law Journal. 26:1, 36. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1301&cont…. Last accessed 7 August 2015.

[9] For example, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) treaties.

[10] Abbott (1993), op cit., 4.

[11] Also called the P5-+1, it is comprised of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

[12] Director of Central Intelligence (2003). “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003.” https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2003.htm#…. Last accessed 6 August 2015. In addition to Iran’s suspected violation of its NPT obligations, the DCI concluded that Iran was likely in violation of its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, respectively.

[13] Section 721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act [P.L. 104-293] required the intelligence community to submit a semiannual “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions”. The FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act [P.L. 108-177] changed the Section 721 Report requirement to an annual report.

[14]  United States State Department (2005). “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” 80. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf . Last accessed 6 August 2015. The shorthand “NPT” stands for the 1958 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. Its Article II states that non-nuclear weapon states shall neither “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” nor “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

[15] In the case of Iran, UN Security Council resolutions have been used to make mandatory certain IAEA demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The legal basis for these resolutions is Chapter VII, Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. It states that the Security Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

[16] This would include the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device as well as the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.

[17] Mark Fitzpatrick (2006). “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme.” Survival. 48:3, 6. https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/Survival/2006/Survival–Global-Politi…. Last accessed 6 August 2015.

[18] Hyde (1988), op cit., 337-340. Hyde preceded this paragraph with a reflection on the interregnum of the 1920s and 1930s: “[I]f the history of treaties between the World Wars teaches anything, it is that totalitarian systems uniformly violate treaties. Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union all signed treaties both to limit arms, to refrain from the use of force, and to recognize the territorial integrity of other nations…In contrast to the uniform record of treaty violations by the dictatorships, the democracies were uniform in their strict and scrupulous observance of the treaties…Compliance with the treaties by the United States was absolute to a fault.”

[19] Russian: Доверяй, но проверяй. Lenin’s reputed variation on the proverb is the dictum “Trust is good, but control is better”.

[20] The quoted text is from Daniel Gros & Alfred Steinherr (2004). Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. (New York: Cambridge University Press), 145.

[21] Ibid.

[22] The author credits these categories to Harmonie Toros’ unpublished 2015 paper “Chamberlain, Hitler and the ‘Illusion of Knowledge': Deceptive Quicksands on the Long Road to Trust”.

[23] In The Godfather II, the character Frank Pentangeli says to Michael Corleone, “Your father did business with Hyman Roth, your father respected Hyman Roth, but your father never trusted Hyman Roth!”

Hamiltonian Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense Of Energetic And Limited Government – Analysis

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By Carson Holloway*

An essential part of contemporary American conservatism’s mission is the preservation of the Constitution as a charter of limited government. The Constitution, conservatives emphasize, limits the scope of the national government’s powers even as it grants it those powers. That is, conservatives insist that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers granted to the national government also indicates an outer limit to those very powers.

This insistence differentiates contemporary conservatism from its main ideological rival, contemporary liberalism or progressivism. Progressives, of course, admit that the Constitution establishes a government of limited powers. They emphasize, however, the specific limits imposed by constitutional protections for individuals such as are found in the Bill of Rights. They do not tend to emphasize—and they often react with skepticism or hostility to conservative efforts to emphasize—the idea that the enumeration of powers itself confines the national government to a relatively narrow (although important) set of responsibilities.

Progressives tend to view the Constitution as giving the national government well-nigh comprehensive authority to pursue the national common good, limited only by certain specified exceptions. Conservatives tend to view the Constitution as empowering the national government to act in a few well-defined areas while leaving most of the rest of governing to the state governments.[1]

Conservatives encounter a difficulty, however, in seeking a principle of limitation in the Constitution’s enumeration of powers: These powers are not self-explanatory, and their limits are therefore not self-evident. Conservatives rightly turn to the Constitution for limits on the power of the national government, but those limits cannot always be gleaned directly from the constitutional text. To invoke a famous example from the early republic, does the Constitution permit the federal government to charter a bank? The Constitution neither expressly authorizes nor expressly forbids such an institution. As in many other cases, for the enumeration of powers to function as a limit on the powers of the national government, we must resort to constitutional interpretation.

Here we are faced with a question of approach: How, or with what kind of assumptions in mind, should we interpret the Constitution’s enumeration of national powers? Conservatism has a ready answer to this question: The Constitution should be interpreted according to the original understanding of its ratifiers. Conservatives rightly reject contemporary liberalism’s advocacy of a “living Constitution”—a Constitution that changes its meaning according to the prevailing values of each generation—as incompatible with the rule of law and the maintenance of any stable limits on the government’s power. For conservatives, then, the enumeration of powers and the limits it implies should be understood as they were understood by the founding generation.

At this point, we run into another problem: The Founders themselves did not simply agree on how to interpret the scope of the enumerated powers. On this very question, they split conspicuously into two political parties led by two of the most eminent statesmen of the day. Alexander Hamilton led the forces that favored a broad or liberal interpretation of the powers of the national government, while Thomas Jefferson was the champion of those who called for a strict or narrow interpretation of those powers.

In turning to the constitutional enumeration of powers to limit the scope of the national government, conservatives, it seems, must choose between a Hamiltonian constitutionalism and a Jeffersonian constitutionalism.

Jeffersonian constitutionalism would seem to be the more immediately attractive of these options. For today’s conservatives, the struggle is the struggle to maintain limited government in the face of a powerful adversary—progressivism—that seeks the continual expansion of the national power. In such a struggle, it would appear that Alexander Hamilton can be of little use. In his own day, he was known much more as an advocate of energetic government than of limited government. As a result, some contemporary conservatives are inclined to dismiss Hamilton as “a big government guy,”[2] unlike Jefferson, who was nothing if not an ardent enemy of big government.

First appearances are sometimes deceptive, however, and this is the case in the matter at hand. In the end, despite their initial reservations, contemporary conservatives can be guided by Hamiltonian constitutionalism in their understanding of the powers of the national government. By contrast, Jeffersonian constitutionalism, despite its initial attractiveness, is problematic both because it advocates an interpretation of the national power that, while properly limited, is in fact excessively narrow and because it rests on assumptions that undermine the legitimate sovereignty of the national government. Hamilton’s approach avoids these pitfalls while still providing the materials by which to establish reasonable constitutional limits on the scope of the federal government’s authority.

The Meanings of Strict Construction

The hallmark of Jeffersonian constitutionalism is its commitment to “strict construction.” This commitment makes Jefferson at first glance attractive to contemporary conservatives. In fact, however, Jeffersonian strict construction is deeply problematic.

Before turning to that argument, however, it is necessary to clarify exactly what we mean by strict construction. This expression has a variety of meanings, some of which are perfectly unexceptionable. We need to understand these innocent meanings of strict construction in order to understand the true target of the following argument.

In the first place, people sometimes use the term “strict construction” to refer to something like respect for the Constitution and the laws as having an authoritative meaning independent of the personal opinions of judges. This is a somewhat loose sense of the term, one that would probably not be used by most students of constitutional law but that is often used by ordinary citizens and political leaders when they are trying to articulate their opposition to a willful judicial activism that reads into the Constitution the political and moral opinions of judges.

A good example of this sense of strict construction was provided by President George W. Bush when he was running for re-election in 2004:

I wouldn’t pick a judge who said that the Pledge of Allegiance couldn’t be said in a school because it had the words “under God” in it. I think that’s an example of a judge allowing personal opinion to enter into the decision-making process as opposed to a strict interpretation of the Constitution […] I would pick people that would be strict constructionists.[3]

The idea here conveyed by the term “strict construction” is certainly not objectionable. It is in fact essential to maintaining our nation’s commitment to majority rule under the Constitution. This kind of strict construction would have been accepted by both Hamilton and Jefferson—indeed, by the whole founding generation—and should be accepted by a contemporary conservatism that is serious about preserving the Constitution as a rule of law.

The term “strict construction” can also be used in a second and more precise sense. Where the first sense refers broadly to the proper approach to the Constitution, this second sense refers more narrowly to our approach to the constitutional powers of the national government.

In this case, the term may simply mean that when we interpret the powers of the national government, we should be mindful that those powers are intended by the Constitution to be limited, that we should not read them in an unreasonably expansive way that justifies activities on the part of the national government that go beyond the responsibilities that have really been entrusted to it. This kind of strict construction is also perfectly acceptable and even essential to the preservation of constitutional government.

In his opinion for the Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Chief Justice John Marshall—probably the greatest Hamiltonian constitutionalist after Hamilton himself—helpfully distinguished this second useful meaning of strict construction from another more problematic meaning:

[The Constitution] contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly…. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded.[4]

Thomas Jefferson’s constitutionalism moved beyond the acceptable strict construction that Marshall noted and into the realm of the unacceptable strict construction that Marshall (and the Court) rejected. We need not repudiate strict construction in its unproblematic and even essential meanings. We must certainly not repudiate contemporary conservatism’s insistence on reading the constitutional enumeration of powers in such a way as to respect the limits that it imposes. We must, however, confront the problems presented by a specifically Jeffersonian strict construction—an approach to the powers of the national government that is, as Marshall suggested, unduly narrow and informed by a theory hostile to the effective functioning of the national government.

Jeffersonian Strict Construction and Respect for the Constitution

Embracing a Jeffersonian constitutionalism would involve conservatives in several serious problems. The first of these problems arises from the place of Jeffersonian strict construction in the historical development of American constitutionalism.

Jefferson’s approach to the national power was rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court in its early years. One example of that rejection is found in the aforementioned passage from John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden. Moreover, this passage in which Marshall condemned an unduly narrow reading of the government’s powers did not represent his view alone. His opinion represented the views of a supermajority of the Court (five out of the seven justices) and was joined by both Federalist appointees (like Bushrod Washington) and Jeffersonian-Republican appointees (like Thomas Todd, Gabriel Duvall, and Joseph Story).

Five years earlier, in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the Court had issued an even clearer and more decisive repudiation of Jefferson’s principles of construing the national government’s constitutional powers. In that case, the state of Maryland had challenged the legitimacy of the Second Bank of the United States (1816–1836) on the grounds that Congress had no constitutional power to create such an institution. The argument turned on the correct interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which comes at the end of the Constitution’s list of 17 enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 and authorizes Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”[5]

The bank’s defenders contended that it was “necessary and proper” in relation to the government’s enumerated powers to raise taxes and borrow money (Article I, Section 8, clauses 1 and 2)—in other words, that it was “needful,” “requisite,” or “conducive to” the execution of those powers.[6] Maryland argued for a much narrower construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The clause, it held, authorized only those measures that were necessary in the strict sense of being “indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory.”[7] On this strict test, the bank would have to be held unconstitutional, for while such an institution was certainly useful with a view to managing the nation’s revenues, it could not be said to be indispensably necessary.

These arguments replayed, in almost exactly the same terms, the debate over the constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States (1791–1811) that had taken place between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton during the Administration of President George Washington. Faced with questions about the constitutionality of the law incorporating the bank, Washington wondered whether he should veto it. He sought advice on the question from his principal Cabinet officers, including Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Jefferson, the Secretary of State. Here—as later in McCulloch—the key to the argument was the proper interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Jefferson contended that the bank was not authorized under the clause because “necessary” should be understood in a narrow sense. It did not authorize Congress to do whatever was “convenient” with a view to executing its enumerated powers, but only what was strictly necessary. In other words, it authorized only “those means without which the grant of power would be nugatory.”[8] Hamilton argued that the bank was constitutional because the Necessary and Proper Clause should be interpreted more broadly. It was intended to authorize, he contended, whatever was “needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to” the execution of the enumerated powers.[9]

In this contest, Hamilton’s view prevailed: Washington signed the law, and the First Bank of the United States was chartered by the government.

We can see in view of this history how, paradoxically, embracing Jeffersonian constitutionalism would actually undermine the prospects for maintaining limited government, contrary to the aims of its proponents. The preservation of limited government requires popular respect for the Constitution. Insisting on the correctness of Jeffersonian strict construction, however, would indirectly undermine popular respect for the Constitution.

If we are to claim that Jefferson’s strict approach to the powers of the national government is correct—to hold that his, and not Hamilton’s, is the right reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause—then we are in effect admitting that America has no tradition of fidelity to the constitutional limits imposed by the enumeration of powers. The country, on this view, jettisoned its commitment to observing those limits as early as 1791, when the Second Congress and the first President of the United States acted on Hamilton’s interpretation.

Faced with this version of our history, ordinary citizens would tend to conclude that respect for the constitutional limits on the national power have played no role in our history—that America became a great, powerful, and prosperous nation by disregarding the Constitution. This is not a lesson that conservatives should want to teach.

Defenders of Jeffersonian strict construction might respond that this problem is not inherent in the theory itself and does not prove that it is mistaken. It is possible, after all, that even men as great as Hamilton, Washington, and Marshall erred in rejecting Jefferson’s approach to the national power and that the country made a constitutional wrong turn in following them. If this is the case, constitutional fidelity would require that we try to return to Jefferson’s approach, however challenging such an enterprise might be at this late date.

We need, then, to consider the merits of the theory itself, apart from the problems that might arise from trying to resurrect it so long after its early defeats.

If we consider the merits of Jeffersonian strict construction, we will find that it does indeed suffer from serious intrinsic flaws. The first of these is that it tends—indirectly and unintentionally, but nevertheless inevitably—to undermine popular respect for the Constitution as a rule of law.

This effect is doubtless contrary to Jefferson’s intention. He was certainly sincere in his desire to maintain a strict respect for the limits imposed on the national government by the Constitution. Hence his admonition in his Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank that we must not “take a single step beyond the boundaries” drawn by the Constitution around the powers of Congress, lest we open up a “boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”[10] In the long run, however, despite Jefferson’s sincerity, the way he thought about those limits and the way he taught his fellow citizens to think about them could not help but undermine popular respect for the Constitution by fostering a popular perception that it is routinely disobeyed.

Jefferson’s Opinion, again, contended for the narrowest possible reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. He held that it authorized only those implied powers without which the enumerated powers would turn out to be “nugatory” or would come to nothing. In other words, as Hamilton observed in his own opinion in defense of the bank’s constitutionality, Jefferson read the term “necessary” as if “the word absolutely or indispensably had been prefixed to it.”[11] Hamilton interpreted “necessary” more loosely, as indicating any means that are reasonably related to the enumerated powers. According to Hamilton’s view, then, the question of a measure’s constitutionality depended on a comparatively easy inquiry into whether or not it was genuinely related to the enumerated power in relation to which it was invoked. “The relation between the measure and the end, between the nature of the mean employed toward the execution of a power and the object of that power, must be the criterion of constitutionality.”[12]

Jefferson’s understanding of “necessary,” however, required a more perplexing inquiry. For him, to determine the constitutionality of a law, we have to ask just how necessary it is in relation to the enumerated power it is supposed to serve. Is it merely convenient, in which case it is unconstitutional? Or is it truly indispensable, in which case it is constitutional? In other words, Jeffersonian strict construction makes a measure’s constitutionality depend on a question of the “degree in which” it “is necessary.” For Hamilton, this question of degree—the “more or less of necessity or utility”—could not be a proper test of constitutionality. Such questions were inescapably a “matter of opinion” and could “only be a test” of a measure’s “expediency.”[13]

To put it another way, Jefferson’s approach holds that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes only those laws for which there is no alternative or for which the only alternative is the failure of the government to execute its enumerated powers. This is not, however, an interpretation commanded by the language of the clause, and it again forces us into the kind of inquiry that cannot end in any clear legal answers or answers that can claim to be anything more than one person’s or party’s prudential opinion. This is a problem especially because those measures that are indispensably necessary or for which there is no alternative but failure to execute the government’s powers may vary according to the prevailing circumstances, with the result that what is constitutional varies from year to year and perhaps even from month to month.

Hamilton’s approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause, while it could not assign the kind of strict limits on national power that Jefferson desired, at least had the advantage of making the question of constitutionality a relatively clear and straightforward one. It is easier to tell whether a law has a genuine relationship to a given power than it is to determine whether it is so indispensably necessary that the power could not be executed in its absence. Jefferson, in his effort to make the powers of the national government capable of a clear “definition,” ended up making the question of constitutionality almost practically undefinable by making the constitutional issue depend on a perception of degree that was inevitably a mere matter of opinion. Put another way, Jefferson’s approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause made the constitutionality of laws depend on the kind of question that is endlessly debatable and therefore invited endless controversy over the constitutional legitimacy of practically any measure the government might adopt.

This is not a harmless effect of Jefferson’s strict construction. To be sure, debate over the constitutionality as well as the expediency of government policy is essential to living out and perpetuating the nation’s commitment to limited, constitutional government. Without debate over constitutional limits, we would accustom ourselves to thinking as if constitutional limits were irrelevant, and our determination to live by them would gradually be undermined. Nevertheless, there is a point at which such controversy becomes counterproductive and actually erodes our commitment to constitutional government by creating the impression that the government routinely surpasses the limits imposed by the Constitution.

Jeffersonian constitutionalism fosters this danger by insisting on a test of constitutionality on the basis of which almost any government policy could plausibly be condemned as illegitimate. Government policy will routinely stir up controversy, and sometimes bitter controversy, given the inescapable diversity of opinion about what kind of policy is most expedient for the country. As a result, there commonly will be a substantial body of opinion that is dissatisfied with almost any given law, at least at the time it is passed. Because of our human desire to seize upon the most forceful, most damning argument against anything with which we disagree, citizens of a constitutional government will be constantly tempted to find constitutional fault with anything the government does that they do not like.

Again, this tendency can be helpful to the extent that it imposes the discipline of constitutional argument on our policy deliberations. Jeffersonian strict construction, however, gives dangerous scope to this temptation. It provides a tool by which impassioned partisans can plausibly condemn as unconstitutional much of what the government does. If this goes on long enough, it must inevitably foster in ordinary citizens the belief that the Constitution is routinely violated, from which they are likely to conclude that it is a mere museum piece and unsuitable to the actual operations of government.

At the very least, such endless controversy would lead citizens to think that questions of constitutionality are so perplexing that they can never be resolved satisfactorily. In the long run, either effect would undermine the citizenry’s commitment to respecting constitutional limits.

Jeffersonian Strict Construction as a Threat to Properly Energetic Government

The second—and more directly and immediately dangerous—intrinsic flaw in Jeffersonian strict construction is that it is too strict for the successful operation of the federal government. This problem is vividly illustrated by the issue that first prompted Jefferson to propound his theory: the national bank. Jefferson, as we have noted, opposed the bank as unconstitutional on the grounds that it was not truly necessary in the sense of being indispensable to the execution of the national government’s enumerated powers.

While this might have been true according to the abstract standard of necessity that Jefferson had in mind, Hamilton contended that as a practical matter, the bank was necessary to the effective execution of the government’s powers. The “most incorrigible theorist among” the bank’s “opponents,” Hamilton declared, “would in one month’s experience as head of the Department of the Treasury be compelled to acknowledge that it is an absolutely indispensable engine in the management of finances and would quickly become a convert to its perfect constitutionality.”[14] Two considerations tend to strengthen Hamilton’s claim.

First, if we are tempted to dismiss it as the self-interested rationalization of the man who designed the bank and whose political reputation was therefore bound up with its defense, we should consider that Albert Gallatin—Jefferson’s own Secretary of the Treasury while he was President—defended the Bank of the United States when he was charged with the “management” of the nation’s “finances.”[15]

Second, national political events bore out Hamilton’s claims, first made in his Report on a National Bank, that a public bank was essential for the effective administration of the nation’s money and especially critical to the government’s ability to raise money to wage war. During the War of 1812, President James Madison—Jefferson’s ally in opposition to Hamilton’s bank—vetoed a bill chartering a second national bank after the first bank’s charter had expired. Subsequent experience during the war taught Madison that the government could not execute its functions effectively without such an institution, and he accordingly signed a later bill establishing a second bank.[16]

Other examples serve to show that Jefferson’s approach to the national power was actually debilitating and that it was based not on a reasonable reading of the Constitution, but on Jefferson’s pre-existing desire to confine the national government as much as possible. The Constitution, for example, explicitly empowers Congress to “establish Post Offices and post Roads.”[17] Jefferson, straining to read this passage as imposing limits that the words did not convey, held that Congress had no authority to build post roads, but only authority to choose which existing roads could be used for the post. He also famously doubted the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase because the Constitution confers no explicit power on the national government to acquire new territory, even though such a power would seem to be reasonably implied by the government’s constitutional authority to make treaties.

For many, one of Jefferson’s high points as a defender of the Constitution was his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, which empowered the President to imprison or deport aliens he deemed a threat to the nation’s peace and safety and prohibited speech that libeled the government. Jefferson may well have been correct that the Sedition Act, for example, violated the First Amendment’s prohibition on laws abridging the freedom of speech. Even here, however, he injected into the controversy an interpretation of the Constitution that would be crippling to the government’s rightful power. In his 1798 draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson denounced the Alien and Sedition Acts as unconstitutional because the Constitution conferred on Congress no power to punish any crimes other than those—such as treason and counterfeiting—actually named in the text.[18] As John Marshall suggested in a different context, such an interpretation would leave the government powerless to punish the theft of the mail that the Post Office carried or to punish perjury committed in federal court.[19]

A final example, drawn from the government’s most crucial responsibility, may serve to reveal the full extent of the difficulties that can arise from Jefferson’s approach to the constitutional powers of the national government. In 1793, the Cabinet considered putting forward a proposal to establish a military academy for the United States. Jefferson “objected that none of the specified powers given by the Const[itution] to Congress would authorize this.”[20] The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to “declare war,” to “raise and support armies,” to “provide and maintain a navy,” and to “make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” It also further authorizes Congress to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” these expressly listed powers.[21] It is hard to view as reasonable an interpretation that refuses to admit that a military academy—which is so obviously and directly related to the exercise of several specifically enumerated powers—is “necessary and proper” within the meaning of the Constitution.

Of course, Jefferson’s defenders might reply that a military academy is not in fact “necessary” to the execution of these powers on Jefferson’s understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause. A military academy, while useful and convenient in relation to the government’s war and military powers, is not absolutely indispensable to them. One cannot say that those powers would be “nugatory” or could not be executed in the absence of a military academy.

This observation, however, only serves to highlight the problems with Jefferson’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The country’s dearest interests depend on the government’s effective exercise of its powers to wage war and maintain a military force. The safety and even the very life of the nation may be at stake in their execution. With such things hanging in the balance, no one would truly want these powers to be executed only by the most minimal necessary means, as Jefferson’s interpretation requires. We would not wish the war power to be exercised only by those means without which it would be nugatory, but rather that they be exercised by those means by which it can be exercised successfully.

This is not to say, going to an extreme opposite from the position occupied by Jefferson, that we would wish the government authorized to do every conceivable thing related to the successful prosecution of war. We would rather wish it to be authorized to do everything reasonably related to the successful conduct of war. We would wish, in other words, to see the Necessary and Proper Clause applied to the war power on Hamiltonian and not Jeffersonian principles.

This extreme case, however, also undermines Jeffersonian strict construction as an approach to the interpretation of any of the national government’s powers. There is no principled basis on which to say that some national powers are to be interpreted narrowly and others broadly. Nothing in the language of the Constitution indicates such a distinction, and essential national interests also depend on the successful—not just minimal—execution of the national government’s other powers.

The Founders did not entrust everything to the national government. Much was reserved to the states, as the Tenth Amendment reminds us. Nevertheless, the things the Founders did choose to entrust to the national government relate to important national interests. Externally, these include not only the waging of war and protection of the nation’s security, but also generally the management of America’s relations with foreign countries. Internally, they include the creation of a vibrant capitalist economy through the coining of a national currency and the uniform regulation of commerce among the states.

It is not reasonable to suppose—it is in fact contrary to the obvious meaning of the Constitution—that they intended to vest unlimited power in the national government in relation to those interests. It is, however, equally unreasonable to suppose, with Jefferson, that they wished those important interests to be served only by the most restrictive or most limited means possible.

The Dangers of Jefferson’s Excessive Defense of the States’ Power

Finally, Jeffersonian strict construction is problematic because of the motive that informs it. When Jefferson approached the powers of the national government, the most reasonable reading of the constitutional text establishing them was not foremost in his mind. Nor was the need of the national government to have a broad choice of means with a view to the most effective execution of its responsibilities. Rather, his chief concern was protecting the sphere within which the state powers operate.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with such a concern in proper measure. Jefferson, however, took it too far. Constitutional fidelity requires that we acknowledge the legitimate powers of the states and so recognize that the powers of the national government are limited, but Jefferson did not merely read the national powers with their limits in mind; he read them with a desire to narrow them as much as possible so as to reserve as much power as possible to the states.

Such an approach tends to suggest that the states are somehow primary and the national government merely secondary in our system of government, or that state sovereignty is somehow more important or more fundamental than the sovereignty of the national government. These assumptions carry dangerous consequences. They tend not just to limit the national power, but actually to undermine the Union itself by obscuring the fact that in America, sovereignty ultimately resides in the people and the Constitution they have established, which bestows an independent power on the national government that is not derived from the power of the states.

This problem presents itself at the very outset of Jefferson’s first clash with Hamilton over the scope of the national government’s powers. Jefferson began his Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank by noting a number of ways the proposed bank would violate existing state laws. By authorizing the bank to hold land and by regulating the terms of its ownership and how it would be transferred from one owner to another, Jefferson complained, the bank bill went “against” state laws of mortmain, alienage, descents, forfeiture, escheat, and distribution. Moreover, by giving the bank the sole right to operate under the national authority, the bill was “against” state “laws of monopoly.” Finally, Jefferson objected that the bill implicitly empowered the bank to make bylaws for itself that would be “paramount to the laws of the state: for so they must be construed, to protect the institution from the control of the state legislatures.”[22]

In his own Opinion, Hamilton replied that Jefferson simply had his facts wrong. The bank was not so much a violation of the laws Jefferson had cited as it was an institution—a corporation—to which they did not properly apply. The bill, moreover, created no monopoly because while it chartered only one national bank, it left the states free to charter as many state banks as they wanted. And the bank bill, properly interpreted, actually required the bank’s bylaws to be consistent with state law.

Of far greater importance for the present argument, however, is the unspoken assumption underlying all of Jefferson’s objections: that the national government may not exercise its powers in such a way as to violate the laws of the states. Such a position would permit the states to exercise their powers with a view to defeating the exercise of national powers. After all, if it is improper for the national government to make laws that go “against” state law, then states can effectively hem in the national power by enacting laws for just such a purpose. Jefferson may have aimed only to protect the position of the states, but the tendency of his argument was in fact to subordinate the national government to the states.

Needless to say, this is not what the Constitution intends. The Supremacy Clause provides that the “laws of the United States” made in “pursuance” of the Constitution “shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” It is difficult to conceive a clearer statement of the principle that when a federal law has a right to exist, it also has a right to go against state law. Jefferson, however, began his Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank by arguing as if the Supremacy Clause did not exist.

Moreover, these consequences of Jefferson’s thinking were not confined to the realm of mere theory. Even while he served as a high-ranking officer of the government of the United States, Jefferson urged others to exercise the powers of the state governments with a view to defeating an exercise of the national power. In October 1792, when Jefferson was still Washington’s Secretary of State, he wrote to James Madison to express his disapproval of Virginia Governor Henry Lee’s “plan” to “oppos[e] the federal bank by setting up a state one.” Jefferson objected to such a scheme not as an improper meddling with the execution of a policy of the national government, but instead as too weak a response, a “milk and water measure.” The Virginia legislature “should reason thus,” Jefferson wrote:

The power of erecting banks and corporations was not given to the general government. It remains then with the state itself. For any person to recognize a foreign legislature in a case belonging to the state itself is an act of treason against the state, and whoever shall do any act under color of the authority of a foreign legislature whether by signing notes, issuing or passing them, acting as director, cashier or in any other office relating to it shall be adjudged guilty of high treason and suffer death accordingly, by the judgment of the state courts. This is the only opposition worthy of our state, and the only kind which can be effectual. If N. Carolina could be brought to a like measure, it would bring the General government to respect the counter-rights of the states. The example would probably be followed by some other states. I really wish that this or nothing should be done. A bank of opposition, while it is a recognition of the one opposed, will absolutely fail in Virginia.[23]

Jefferson was here advising the state legislature to make it unlawful—to make it in fact an act of treason punishable by death—for any Virginian to work for or cooperate with the Bank of the United States. This is a radical proposal, only one step removed from using the state’s military force against the operations of the national government. It is all the more striking that Jefferson was moved to make such a suggestion not by a flagrant violation of a constitutional prohibition, but instead by an arguable question like the scope of the national government’s implied powers.

Jefferson’s tendency to subordinate the national government to the states is perhaps illustrated most famously by his 1798 draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, written, again, in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Here Jefferson advanced a “compact theory” according to which the Constitution is to be understood as an agreement among the states—a view that, at least in Jefferson’s hands, tended to foster the idea that the sovereignty of the states is somehow more fundamental than the sovereignty of the national government.

According to Hamilton’s thinking—and the thinking that has generally prevailed—both the national government and the states are sovereign in some respects but not in others. They can share or divide sovereignty between themselves in this way because the ultimate sovereign, the original font of power standing behind them, is the people of the United States. On this view, neither level of government in our federal system depends on the other for its existence or its powers. Rather, each holds an independent existence and authority delegated to it by the people and recognized in the Constitution.

In contrast, Jefferson’s draft of the Kentucky Resolutions held that the national government had been created by the states. The Constitution, Jefferson contended, was a “compact” by which the “several states” had “constituted a general government for special purposes” and had “delegated to” it “certain definite powers.” Elsewhere in the Resolutions, Jefferson even went so far as to say that the states had created the general government for their own “use” and that Congress was no more than a “creature” of the compact to which the states were the parties.[24]

On the basis of this theory, Jefferson contended that each state possessed authority to judge for itself the constitutionality of acts of the national government. Each state party to the compact, he wrote, “has an equal right to judge for itself” both the “infractions” of the Constitution by the national government and “the mode and measure of redress.”[25] Where the national government exercised a power it had not been granted, “a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.” This doctrine would empower each state in the Union to declare void and forbid the enforcement of any federal law that it believed to be unconstitutional. Every state, Jefferson declared, “has a natural right in cases not within the compact…to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power within their limits.”[26]

The position Jefferson took in his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions was not entirely wrong, but he pushed it too far. There was nothing exceptionable, for example, in his claim that a state legislature has a kind of right to judge the constitutionality of acts of the national government. A resolution criticizing a federal law—on constitutional grounds or even simply on policy grounds—is merely an expression of the state legislature’s opinion and therefore clearly within its power.

State legislators, moreover, are not just citizens, but state government officials, in which capacity they have taken an oath to “support” the “Constitution.” To that extent, they have not only a right, but a duty to express opposition to federal laws that they believe violate the Constitution. Such state legislative action can be useful with a view to mobilizing public opinion and citizen action against unconstitutional acts of the national government—the path of constitutional, lawful opposition to which James Madison pointed in his Virginia Resolutions in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts.

Jefferson erred, however, and erred dangerously, in suggesting that the Constitution was a compact among sovereign states and that, accordingly, each state had a right to judge authoritatively both violations of the Constitution by the national government and the proper mode of redress that the state might pursue. By drawing from these premises a state power of “nullification” of acts of the national government, he not only called for organized protest with a view to the repeal of unconstitutional laws, but in fact claimed that each state had a right to prevent the execution of such laws.

This was, in the immediate term, a recipe for anarchy and perhaps even armed conflict between the national government and some state governments. It fostered anarchy because it would result in a situation in which federal law would operate in some states but not in others. It opened the door to the possibility of armed conflict because the national government would surely find such a condition of selective obedience intolerable.

Moreover, Jefferson’s account set the stage for a more radical theory of states’ rights. He had used the language of state sovereignty and nullification that was taken up by a later generation of Southern political leaders who extended it to include a right of secession, which led to disunion and civil war.[27] The later, more radical proponents of states’ rights tried to justify their theories by appealing to both Jefferson’s and Madison’s arguments in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Madison, who was still living, objected that his own arguments of the 1790s provided no support for such claims. Jefferson was no longer living and so could not try to distinguish his own position from that of the new generation of Southern radicals, but given how far he had pressed his claims, he would have had difficulty in doing so with the same degree of success that Madison achieved.

This is not to say that Jefferson was an enemy of the Union. On the contrary, he understood that disunion would be a disaster for America, and he made this clear by his deeds and words both early and late in his life.

When he served as Secretary of State, Jefferson opposed Hamilton’s plan for assumption of the state Revolutionary War debts, but he accepted it because he feared that failure to include assumption would make it impossible for any bill providing for the national government’s debt to pass, which in turn would destroy the government’s credit, render it effectively dead, and thus cause the various states to go their own ways to try to protect their own interests.[28] Much later, as slavery began to threaten the peace of the Union, Jefferson hoped that passions would cool so that his countrymen would realize that their aspirations were “more likely to be effected by union than by scission,” characterizing the latter outcome as “an act of suicide against themselves and of treason against the hopes of the world.”[29]

This is to say, however, that Jefferson allowed his constitutionalism to be influenced by an excessive partisanship on behalf of the states. This led him to put forward a dangerously mistaken theory of the relationship between the states and the national government, one that was later taken up and put to bad use by less responsible leaders.

No doubt Jefferson would not have intended his principles to be pressed this far, and conservatives need not blame him as if he had. Nevertheless, in choosing a founding guide to the interpretation of the national power, we must decide not so much on the basis of Jefferson’s intentions as on the basis of the actual tendencies of his thought. Given the problems noted above, conservatives should eschew a Jeffersonian approach to the powers of the national government.

Hamiltonian Constitutionalism

Fortunately for contemporary conservatives, Jeffersonian constitutionalism is not the only approach to the national government’s powers that the founding offers us. As an alternative, conservatives should look to the constitutionalism of Jefferson’s great Cabinet and party rival, Alexander Hamilton.

Hamilton advocated a broad interpretation of the national government’s powers, an interpretation that he thought was essential to that government’s ability to meet the immediate needs of the young nation as well as the unforeseen crises that it would encounter in the future. But Hamilton’s constitutionalism also acknowledged that there are limits on the national power, and to that extent, his approach is consistent both with the founding insistence on constitutionally limited government and with the needs of contemporary conservatism.

Hamilton derived those limits, however, from the nature of the duties entrusted to the national government, not from a Jeffersonian desire to reserve as much power as possible to the states. Hamilton held that the national government was sovereign in the areas entrusted to it by the Constitution—such as foreign policy, the regulation of foreign and national commerce, and the waging of war—and that it consequently possessed wide-ranging powers to execute its responsibilities in these areas. At the same time, his principles acknowledged that the authority of the national government was limited, both because some things—such as education, local commerce, and generalized poverty relief—were not assigned by the Constitution to the national government and because, even in relation to its enumerated powers, the national government was authorized to do only those things that were reasonably related to the exercise of those powers.

Because Hamiltonian constitutionalism does not involve the manifold difficulties discussed above, it is preferable to the Jeffersonian alternative. In the first place, Hamilton’s approach does not inadvertently foster disrespect for the Constitution as Jefferson’s does. Hamilton’s relatively broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause prevailed early on, both in the Cabinet deliberations on the bank in 1791 and in McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819. As a result, embracing it now does not involve us in the embarrassing dilemma that would be involved in trying to resurrect Jefferson’s rationale for strict construction, with its underlying implication that the government has been routinely operating outside the Constitution almost since its inception.

Similarly, Hamilton’s account of the Necessary and Proper Clause makes the question of a measure’s constitutionality depend on the fairly straightforward question of whether it is reasonably related to the exercise of an enumerated power. It therefore avoids the perplexing and endlessly contentious inquiry that Jefferson’s approach requires: whether the measure in question is indispensably necessary, a question so dependent on differing perceptions that it provides material by which almost every government policy can be publicly condemned as unconstitutional.

In the second place, and more obviously, Hamilton’s broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, unlike Jefferson’s narrowly restrictive reading, does not threaten to impede the national government’s pursuit of the important objects entrusted to it by forbidding the most effective means and permitting only the most minimally essential means. Hamilton, for example, did not oppose the establishment of a military academy on the grounds that it was not indispensably necessary to executing the national powers to make war and raise a military force. On the contrary, he generally favored a broad reading precisely because it would give the national government the latitude it needed to execute its enumerated powers in the most effective way, or the way that best served the public. As he suggested to George Washington in defense of his approach, it favored “an enlarged and liberal construction of the Constitution for the public good and for the maintenance of the due energy of the national authority.”[30]

Finally, Hamilton did not bring a preferential attachment to the state governments to his interpretation of the national powers, nor did he foster an overdone sense of state sovereignty that threatened to undermine the Union. When Jefferson opened his Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank with a complaint about the various ways in which the bank bill went “against” existing state laws, Hamilton replied that his Cabinet colleague was straying into the realm of the irrelevant. Even if the bank were a “direct alteration” of some state laws, Hamilton argued, this fact “would do nothing toward proving that the measure was unconstitutional.”

Jefferson’s implied principle was inadmissible, Hamilton contended, because it would bring the essential operations of the national government to a halt. If the “government of the United States can do no act, which amounts to an alteration of a state law,” then “all its powers are nugatory.” After all, Hamilton reasoned, “almost every new law” will effect some “alteration” in the existing statute or common law of the states.[31]

Moreover, Hamilton warned from the beginning about the dangers of a Jeffersonian presumption that state governments could authoritatively judge the constitutionality of federal laws. Hamilton was unaware of Jefferson’s hand in the preparation of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798–1799, but he knew about them and expressed a negative judgment about them: They had a “tendency,” he wrote, “to destroy the Constitution of the U[nited] States.”[32]

Here, unfortunately, Hamilton was quite prescient. The spirit that these resolutions manifested was eventually killed, but only while it was in the process of trying to kill the government of the United States. That spirit, in other words, contributed to the American Civil War and was suppressed in the end only at great cost to the country in blood and treasure.

Hamiltonian Constitutionalism and Limited Government

Despite these considerations, however, contemporary conservatives might well worry that Hamilton’s constitutionalism goes to the other extreme from Jefferson’s and presents an equal but opposite danger. In other words, if Jefferson’s constitutionalism unduly limits the national power, does Hamilton’s open the door to an unlimited national power? Is it therefore unsuitable to a contemporary conservatism that is tasked with trying to limit the scope of the national government?

In their spirited contests of opinion, Jefferson certainly charged that Hamilton’s principles tended to destroy the Constitution’s limits on the national power. Hamilton denied this strenuously, which at least shows that he did not wish to establish a national government of unlimited powers. Hamilton, moreover, did not just deny the charge but mounted arguments to refute it. Jefferson’s critique, then, pressed Hamilton to identify and defend limits on the constitutional authority of the government. Accordingly, the full statement of Hamilton’s approach to the Constitution defended a broad interpretation of the national government’s powers but also explained the limits on those powers.

In the debate over the constitutionality of the national bank, Jefferson contended that Hamilton’s broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause tended to render the powers of the national government unlimited. Hamilton had defended the bank on the grounds that it would “give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes.” Such a defense depended, as noted, on Hamilton’s comparatively expansive interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, according to which “necessary” meant “convenient” or “useful” in relation to the exercise of the enumerated powers, not in relation to just any power.

Jefferson argued that such an interpretation would lead to unlimited government. There is, he suggested, no power “which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience in some instance or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers” as the Constitution contained. The end result of such a broad reading would be to “swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole” authority of the national government “to one power”: a power to do whatever Congress might happen to think best for the country.[33]

In his own Opinion, Hamilton denied that his principles could reasonably be pressed so far. Hamilton noted that disputes over the exact scope of the national government’s powers were inseparable from America’s form of government. They were “inherent,” he contended, “in the nature of a federal Constitution,” arising “inevitably from a division of the legislative power” between the federal and state legislatures.

This formulation itself, however, acknowledged that the scope of the national legislative power was limited: The national government was entrusted with some things, while others were entrusted to the states. The Constitution entrusted the national government with the power, among other things, to wage war, manage American foreign policy, and regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations; but this limited enumeration left a vast realm to the states that included most of the responsibility for day-to-day government, including the protection of life and property, education, and the regulation of the domestic commerce of each state.

The fact that the constitutionality of many specific measures of the national government would commonly generate disagreement did not detract from the fact that there was indeed an outer limit to the federal power. We should expect, Hamilton contended, that “there will be cases clearly within the power of the national government, others clearly without its power, and a third class, which will leave room for controversy and difference of opinion, and concerning which a reasonable latitude of judgment must be allowed.”[34]

Hamilton contended, moreover, that his approach provided a reasonable principle by which statesmen could weigh the constitutionality of proposed policies. Hamilton’s defense of the national power did “not affirm that the national government is sovereign in all respects” but instead held that it was sovereign only to a “certain” extent—namely, “to the extent of the objects of its specified powers.”

Contrary to Jefferson’s fears, Hamilton’s approach to the Constitution did provide “a criterion of what is constitutional and what is not so”—specifically, “the end to which the measure” in question “relates as a mean.” “If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers” enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, “and if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution,” then we may “safely” conclude that it falls “within the compass of the national authority.”[35] On this view, for example, the national government had no legitimate power to create a corporation to administer the government of the city of Philadelphia, because the national government was not authorized to regulate that city’s government. The government could, however, create a corporation—such as a national bank—“in relation to the collection of taxes, or to the trade with foreign countries, or to the trade between the states, or with the Indian tribes,” because these objects are contained in the constitutional enumeration of powers.[36]

Similarly, if we turn to contemporary questions, we would conclude that Hamilton’s principles admit the constitutionality—although he might have contested the prudence—of many national regulations of interstate commerce, such as those of airlines and railroads. Hamilton’s constitutionalism, however, lends no support to the desires of some contemporary liberals to seek national control of education or to protect endangered species by regulating local farming practices.

To be sure, Hamilton’s mode of interpretation admittedly did not provide the kind of distinct and strict limits that Jefferson desired. At the same time, however, neither could it reasonably be charged with opening up a limitless horizon of national power by offering no intelligible principle of limitation.

As much as Jefferson feared Hamilton’s approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause, he was even more shocked by Hamilton’s interpretation of the General Welfare Clause. In his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton advocated a system of bounties—or payments—to American manufacturers. He believed such government support was necessary to build up an American manufacturing base adequate to sustaining the military power needed to preserve America’s independence. Aware that some might deny the constitutionality of such a program, Hamilton contended that these bounties could be justified under the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to lay taxes “to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.” This language, Hamilton contended, gave Congress a broad authority both to “raise” and to “appropriate” money with a view to the general welfare of the country.[37]

In the spring of 1792, Jefferson argued to President Washington that Hamilton’s account of the General Welfare Clause was even more dangerous than his understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Hamilton had defended the national bank as “an incident to an enumerated power.” Jefferson, as we have seen, had rejected that defense as involving a too expansive interpretation of the national power, but it at least kept the government linked in some way to the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Hamilton’s understanding of the General Welfare Clause, Jefferson believed, went a giant leap further by effectively eliminating the constitutional enumeration as a limit on the national power. As a consequence of Hamilton’s arguments in the Report on Manufactures, the “subsequent enumeration” of congressional “powers was not the description to which resort must be had, and did not at all constitute the limits on” the government’s “authority.” As Jefferson said in even stronger terms in a later letter, Hamilton’s Report “expressly assumed that the general government has a right to exercise all powers which may be for the general welfare.”[38]

Despite Jefferson’s concerns, however, Hamilton did in fact make an effort to identify the principles that limited the scope of the power on which he was relying.

First, Hamilton argued that the General Welfare Clause contained the following “qualification” of its scope: Its language indicated that “the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made” must be “general and not local.” In other words, the Clause did not authorize Congress to spend the public’s money to advance merely provincial or partial interests, but only to promote the good of the whole nation.[39]

Second, contrary to Jefferson’s claims, Hamilton did not understand his interpretation of the General Welfare Clause as implying a power in the national government to do just anything it wanted for the sake of the general welfare. The appropriation of money, Hamilton’s argument implied, was one way to exercise the government’s power, but only one way. His argument that this mode could be exercised with such latitude did not require that the other modes could be exercised with a similar latitude. That Congress could spend money for any purpose that it believed advanced the general welfare did not mean that it could regulate or forbid or punish for any purpose that it thought advanced the general welfare. “A power to appropriate money” with such “latitude” did not “carry a power to do any other thing not authorized in the Constitution, either expressly or by fair implication,” Hamilton contended. Therefore, no one could object to his “construction” on the grounds that it “would imply a power to do whatever else should appear to Congress conducive to the general welfare.”[40]

Moreover, Hamilton’s further argument in his Report on Manufactures shows that he did not regard the limits on the national power as merely theoretical. On the contrary, he noted some policies that he thought would be useful with a view to promoting American manufacturing but that he also thought had to be tabled because they seemed to lack a sufficient constitutional justification.

For example, Hamilton observed that American manufacturing could be promoted by encouraging the importation of technologies that had been developed abroad. He noted that a very effective way to encourage this importation was by giving an exclusive privilege to use the technology to whoever introduced it in America. He admitted, however, that the Constitution did not authorize this: The Copyright and Patent Clause empowers Congress to grant such exclusive privileges only to “authors and inventors” of new things, not to those who introduce into America new things that had already been invented elsewhere. He accordingly suggested that the government would have to use other means to encourage the introduction of foreign technologies in America.[41] Similarly, he later noted that American manufacturing could be aided by a comprehensive plan to improve the nation’s roads and waterways; but he also admitted the “doubt” that Congress was constitutionally authorized to do it.[42]

It is worth noting that Hamilton not only took pains to acknowledge the constitutional limits on the powers of the national government, but also made a point of highlighting important non-constitutional limits as well. He was not, in other words, a legal positivist who believed that the man-made law of the Constitution provided the only principles by which one could judge the actions of the government. For him, as for the other Founders, these extraconstitutional limits on government were rooted in something even more fundamental than the Constitution: the natural rights doctrine that informed the Founders’ understanding of the scope and purposes not just of the government of the United States, but of any legitimate government.

In his Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, Hamilton contended that the powers of the national government must be understood to be sovereign. Sovereignty, however, did not mean unlimited power. Sovereignty included a right in the government to use all means “fairly applicable” to the powers entrusted to it except those that are “precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the constitution,” as well as those that are “immoral” or “contrary to the essential ends of political society.”[43] The limiting principles indicated by the “essential ends of political society,” moreover, amounted to more than a vague sense that there must be some things that the government may not do. Rather, they were part of a well-understood public philosophy: the Lockean conception of government in the service of natural rights, expressed so memorably by Hamilton’s great rival, Thomas Jefferson, in the Declaration of Independence.

Once again, Hamilton acknowledged the importance of these moral limits on the power of government not only in theory, but also in the conduct of his statesmanship. Hamilton’s first major act as Secretary of the Treasury was to propose a plan to service the nation’s huge debts from the Revolutionary War. In crafting and explaining his proposals, Hamilton did not even consider the possibility that the government would refuse to pay any portion of its debts. In addition, he explicitly rejected calls for a policy of “discrimination” between the current and past holders of debt, a policy that would have required the government to violate the terms of the contracts by which the debt had been issued. Hamilton eschewed such expedients because by violating the rights of contract, they violated the right to property—a right that, with the rest of the founding generation, he held to be fundamental and the protection of which he held to be one of the first duties of government.

Finally, while Hamilton favored a broad reading of the national power in order to facilitate the government’s efforts to secure the ends entrusted to it, his conception of those ends was not such as to justify the kind of unlimited government that we face today. The major tasks of the government of the United States, he suggested in Federalist No. 17, were to manage “commerce, finance, negotiation, and war” on behalf of the nation.[44] Today, the expansion of government power is driven not so much by an effort to discharge these duties effectively as by a desire to use the government as a tool of social and economic amelioration—to use it, in other words, in an endless quest to redress inequalities that progressives cannot tolerate. There is no hint in Hamilton’s thought of any interest in dedicating government to such a pursuit.

In sum, conservatives should not fear that by embracing a Hamiltonian constitutionalism, they would also be embracing the cause of unlimited government.

Conclusion

None of this is intended to discredit Jefferson or the Jeffersonian impulse in American politics. Jefferson was undeniably a great man, and his contributions to the founding must be gratefully acknowledged. The point is not even to discredit Jefferson’s concerns about the scope of the federal power and its tendency to expand itself, concerns that are obviously relevant to the mission of contemporary American conservatism. The point is to remind contemporary conservatives both that in their legitimate quest to limit the power of the government, they must choose their arguments with care and that serious problems would accompany any conservative attempt to resurrect Jefferson’s strict construction of the Constitution and of the powers of the national government.

On the other side, we also need not insist that Hamilton’s approach to the Constitution is perfect or the only defensible alternative, but only that it represents a permissible position for contemporary conservatives. Some conservatives may seek an alternative approach in one of the other Founders, such as James Madison. Also, those conservatives who are generally attracted to Hamiltonianism need not accept all of Hamilton’s conclusions. They might embrace his broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, for example, but reject his interpretation of the General Welfare Clause.

Nevertheless, Hamiltonian constitutionalism offers conservatives a founding approach to the national power that avoids the problems associated with Jeffersonian constitutionalism while still sustaining the cause of limited government. A Hamiltonian constitutional conservatism is not an oxymoron but a viable path to harmonizing our commitment to limited government with a proper respect for the powers of the national government and the security of the Union.

About the author:
*Carson Holloway
is a Visiting Fellow in American Political Thought in the B. Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics, of the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] The debate over the Affordable Care Act provides a good illustration of these different tendencies. Liberal proponents of the law tended to assume that the national government must have authority to pursue a national goal like universal health insurance coverage, while conservatives tended to question whether a government program designed to achieve such an end could really be justified under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

[2] Quoted in Mike O’Connor, A Commercial Republic (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014), p. 10. For a defense of Hamilton against the charge that he was a proponent of big government, see also Carson Holloway, “Alexander Hamilton and American Progressivism,” Heritage Foundation First Principles Series Report No. 52, April 20, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/alexander-hamilton-and-american-progressivism.

[3] “George W. Bush on Choosing Strict Constructionists for the Supreme Court in the 2004 Second Presidential Debate,” Georgetown University, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Resources on Faith, Ethics & Public Life, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/george-w-bush-on-choosing-strict-constructionists-for-the-supreme-court-in-the-2004-second-presidential-debate (punctuation as in original).

[4] John Marshall, Writings, ed. Charles Hobson (New York: Library of America, 2010), pp. 608–609.

[5] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.

[6] Marshall, Writings, p. 424.

[7] Ibid., p. 420.

[8] Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), p. 419.

[9] Alexander Hamilton, Writings, ed. Joanne B. Freeman (New York: Library of America, 2001), pp. 618–619.

[10] Jefferson, Writings, p. 416.

[11] Hamilton, Writings, p. 618 (emphasis in original).

[12] Ibid., p. 619.

[13] Ibid.

[14] The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 27 vols., ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961–1987), Vol. 12, p. 251.

[15] Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 293.

[16] Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 647.

[17] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.

[18] Jefferson, Writings, p. 449.

[19] Marshall, Writings, p. 423.

[20] The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 27, ed. John Catanzariti (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 428.

[21] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.

[22] Jefferson, Writings, p. 416.

[23] Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 24, ed. John Catanzariti (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 432–433 (emphasis added).

[24] Jefferson, Writings, pp. 449 and 453. By making this claim, Jefferson overlooked the importance of the difference between the Articles of Confederation, which presents itself as proceeding from “we the undersigned delegates of the states,” and the Constitution, the preamble to which indicates that it is an act of “We the people of the United States.” In other words, one can plausibly claim that the Union under the Articles of Confederation was a compact among the states such as Jefferson describes, because the Articles was the act of a congress of delegates representing the state governments. Such a claim, however, cannot plausibly be made about the Union under the Constitution, which presents itself as an act of “the people.”

[25] Jefferson, Writings, p. 449.

[26] Ibid., p. 453.

[27] Jefferson was joined by his longtime political ally James Madison in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts, with Madison authoring the Virginia Resolutions that denounced those national measures. Madison, however, was characteristically more sober than Jefferson. In the Virginia Resolutions, Madison did not press the compact theory to the same dangerous extent as Jefferson had. Madison, most notably, did not assert a state power of “nullification” and in fact rejected the idea. For a discussion of Madison’s understanding of “interposition” as consistent with proper respect for the national authority and how it differs from nullification, see Christian G. Fritz, “Interposition and the Heresy of Nullification: James Madison and the Exercise of Sovereign Constitutional Powers,” Heritage Foundation First Principles Series Report No. 41, February 21, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/interposition-and-heresy-of-nullification-james-madison-exercise-of-sovereign-constitutional-powers.

[28] Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 16, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 537.

[29] Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820, National Archives, Founders Online, http://founders.archives.gov/?q=Project%3A%22Jefferson%20Papers%22%20%22treason%20against%20the%20hopes%22&s=1511311111&r=2.

[30] Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 12, pp. 229–258.

[31] Hamilton, Writings, p. 623.

[32] Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 22, pp. 452–454.

[33] Jefferson, Writings, p. 419.

[34] Hamilton, Writings, p. 621.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 616.

[37] Ibid., pp. 702–703.

[38] Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 23, ed. Charles T. Cullen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 186–187, and Vol. 24, p. 351.

[39] Hamilton, Writings, p. 703 (emphasis in original).

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., pp. 705–706.

[42] Ibid., p. 707.

[43] Ibid., p. 613.

[44] Federalist No. 17, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 105.

Buzzfeed Editor Finds HuffPost Arabi Too Inclusive – OpEd

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If Buzzfeed’s Tom Gara is to be believed, there’s reason to fear that Huffington Post’s new Arabic site is aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Particularly disturbing (to some readers) is that a site generally known for being progressive, would provide space for the criticism of selfie culture, “a mainstay of the Huffington Post’s English-language sites”.

Unlike Gara, I have no problem with conservative Islamists or anyone else taking issue with selfie culture. Frankly, the idea that it needs defending seems to me quite perverse — especially when it results in arguments like the following.

Casey Miller, for instance, values selfies because she thinks they help maintain “intimate friendship” with long-distance friends without the “commitment of Skype.” (Those, I guess, would be the friendships one hopes to sustain without having to sacrifice time. Why spend 10 minutes talking, instead of 10 seconds taking and sending a selfie?)

Research — and common sense — does however suggest that selfies offer weak bonds. As Time reported in 2013:

“Increased frequency of sharing photographs of the self, regardless of the type of target sharing the photographs, is related to a decrease in intimacy,” concludes the joint study conducted by the University of Birmingham, the University of Edinburgh, and Heriot-Watt University. In other words, people who constantly share photos of themselves generally tend to have more shallow personal relationships.

As Galen Guengerich astutely observes, “the selfie chronicles a counter-Copernican revolution.”

Nicholas Sabloff, the Huffington Post’s executive international editor, sidestepping this particular debate on mobile device-shaped culture, told BuzzFeed News that regarding the anti-selfie post written by an Algerian columnist, “The views on the blog do not reflect HuffPost’s global editorial viewpoint, nor the viewpoint of our HuffPost Arabi editors.”

But that didn’t stop Buzzfeed disingenuously claiming in its headline that Arabi “takes a stand” against selfies.

Gara seems to be especially suspicious of Arabi’s editor-in-chief, Anas Fouda, who previously worked for Al Jazeera and its rival, Al Arabiya.

In signing up with the Huffington Post, he appears to have taken inspiration for the Arabic site from founder Arianna Huffington herself.

The first time the two met and discussed the concept of Huffington Post Arabi, “she spoke to me of the wisdom that is in our region, a region that was once the cradle of civilization and religion,” Fouda wrote in his editor’s note marking the launch of Huffington Post Arabi.

That note, like much of the content on the new site, then took an unexpected twist. “I in turn believe in the positivity of looking for a way out,” he wrote, “and that the inherent wisdom that stems from our history and religious heritage are necessary weapons in this time of #WorldWar3.”

This time of #WorldWar3?

Wow, an “unexpected twist” — but only for those who neglected to read the opening of Fouda’s piece. Which is to say, rather than taking an unexpected twist, his commentary came full circle and ended where it began:

It took several years before people started to realize that Europe’s war of 1914 to 1918 was both big and influential enough to be worthy of being called a “World War.” So they gave it that grand name, and added “First” two decades later when they fought a second war that was not any less vicious or influential.

People fight wars first and come up with names that suit their grandeur and influence later. Years from now, historians will look at what happened in our region and perhaps won’t find a more appropriate name than #WorldWar3, especially since the world will never return to what it once was.

In this region, half of the world is fighting a proxy war against the other half. America, Russia, Israel, international military alliances, old monarchies and dictatorships are all fighting here to preserve or expand their areas of influence. At the same time, armed sectarian, religious, or ethnic groups — ones that have no face other than that of rage — fight to abolish all that is old, to create a new map, and perhaps a new world order.

When newly appointed at Buzzfeed after leaving the Wall Street Journal, Gara said in an interview:

if you’re running a news organization on the assumption people are dumb and deserve to be fed trash, not only are you kind of evil, but you’re missing out on the much bigger opportunity of assuming people want to read great stuff and know what’s really going on in the world.

Arianna Huffington offers Gara the excuse that his post might be a reflection of the August news slump.

That might be true, but equally so, this seems to me like a case of dishing out trash on the assumption that people are dumb.

Start Of The 2016 US Presidential Race: Who Stands Out? – Analysis

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By Mehmet Yegin

Not a lot has been going on for the Democratic Party in the 2016 U.S. presidential election race. Hilary Clinton is, without a doubt, the dominant candidate. Every once in a while, the name of Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders or the possibility of Vice President Joe Biden warming up for the race comes up. Yet, no one seems to have the power to take on Hillary Clinton — there is about a 35-point difference between Clinton and her closest competitor in the opinion polls.

The Republican Party’s situation on the other hand is not as static as that of the Democratic Party. The race for the Republican nomination is in no way limited to a small number of candidates as is the case with the Democrats. In fact, the sheer amount of candidates running for the Republican nomination, 17 in total, makes it difficult to even determine the format of the debates. For this reason, Fox News’ recent Republican presidential primaries debate was separated into two entirely different segments, one of which hosted the top ten highest-polling candidates and the other the lowest seven. Although very talented politicians are running when compared to the 2012 primary elections, the main problem for the Republican Party seems to be businessman Donald Trump’s radical outputs that shift the ground of the discussion.

Not only is Trump ‘trolling’ the debates, but he is also hinting at running as an independent if he is not chosen as the Republican candidate. This causes great concern for the party because it would split the Republican vote, and, in turn, enable the Democratic candidate to most probably win the election.

It is very likely that Trump, a successful businessman with an anti-intellectual approach and straightforward, blunt way of speaking, could win the approval of at least some of the Republican electoral base. Specifically, his sharp remarks, such as those about illegal immigrants, have actually increased his support in the public opinion polls. In this way, Trump, according to RCP poll averages, had been able to put a 12-point difference between himself and his closest competitor, Jeb Bush. However, in the recent debate, the businessman was unable to boast the same performance as he does in his successful personal statements.

Fox News’ first Republican Party presidential primaries debate

The first debate among the Republican Party’s candidates that are hoping to become the Republican nominee for the White house was hosted by the conservative Fox News network and took place in Cleveland, Ohio. While the debate allowed some candidates to get a head start in the race, others quickly fell behind. Yet, no one made a deadly mistake that may result in withdrawing their candidacy as Rick Perry had eventually done in the 2012 race after failing to name three federal agencies.

It can be said that the debate’s most prominent candidate was Florida Senator Marco Rubio, who did not have as strong of a standing before the debate. Exhibiting the strongest performance in the debate, Rubio was commanded the board on nearly every topic topics and was able to give answers that supported his candidacy.

The second most prominent candidate turned out to be Ohio Governor John Kasich, who also enjoyed the home field advantage seeing that the debates were taking place in his state. In this sense, the cheers from the audience underlined his strong statements, yet they also disguised his not so strong statements. It would not be wrong to expect increasing public support for Kasich as a result of his prepared and solid entrance into the race as seen in the debates.

Ostensibly, the loser of the debate was Donald Trump. Despite the additional fact that he could not completely answer some questions, it is still too early to tell whether the debate will push Trump out of the race. Surveys on the debate’s effect on public opinion have yet to be released. It should be mentioned that Trump’s bluntness attracts outraged voters that have not received what they are looking for from the politics of the Republican Party. This anger once surfaced with the Tea Party movement yet it never gained the influence that it hoped for. Thus, Republicans might not be so quick to abandon Trump as a candidate.

After Trump, former Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, received the most scrutiny from the moderators. Jeb Bush is a candidate that not only has to defend himself and his policies like the rest but he also has the additional task of justifying his father and brother’s performances as presidents. Jeb Bush, who constantly receives criticism for attempting to establish a familial dynasty in the White House, has dropped his last name from his campaign, instead focusing on his first name. With his “They Call Me Jeb” slogan, Jeb Bush is attempting to rid himself of the baggage that comes along with being a Bush. Despite his lackluster performance, he was nonetheless able to portray a consistent and stable image of himself as a candidate.

Kentucky Senator Rand Paul also entered the race with the inheritance from his father, former Congressman Ron Paul. Rand Paul has acquired popularity for his libertarian views, and this stance has gained him a limited number of loyal supporters, all the while preventing him from tapping into the mainstream Republican base. To overcome this, Paul is attempting to find a path between libertarianism and the mainstream Republican ideals. However, due to the one-minute time limit allotted to responding to the posed questions, he had trouble explaining his perplexing position. Furthermore, Paul, who assumed a very aggressive attitude towards the other candidates right off the bat in order to improve his own standing and to receive more attention, failed to portray a firm and positive image.

Another interesting candidate in the debate was Texas Senator Ted Cruz. While Cruz attempted to address the Republican audience with a rigid conservative approach, he still remains a marginal option for the general electorate. As for the other candidates, there was nothing outstanding about their performances during the debate. African American neurosurgeon Ben Carson proved unable to display a solid command of the material and the audience at large. Moreover, it seems that a candidate whose name has consistently appeared in recent Republican elections but has never made it past the primaries, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee is far from changing his reoccurring fate in this election cycle.

Baku Paves Bridge To Shanghai – OpEd

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Azerbaijan has applied for observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The announcement was made by SCO Secretary General Dmitry Mezentsev, TASS reported. According to Mezentsev, Syria, Belarus, Armenia and Bangladesh also applied for observer status.

Iran, Pakistan, India and several other countries have expressed interest in cooperating with the SCO and are currently observers of this organisation. In addition, the SCO is already considering the applications of Pakistan and India to become permanent and full members of the organisation.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has not commented on the republic’s intention to become an observer of the SCO. In any case, Azerbaijan’s expression of interest in this organisation is logical, and if anything, it is a surprise why it took this long to submit an application. The key areas of development identified by Azerbaijan and the SCO are practically the same.

According to official information, the priorities of cooperation with the SCO are the development of transportation infrastructure, telecommunications, the oil and gas industry, and agriculture. All these areas are priorities for Azerbaijan, too. The country is the initiator of and an active participant in all regional energy and transportation projects. Moreover, there is a growing emphasis on the development of the non-oil sector of Azerbaijan, especially in information and communications technology and agriculture.

It is important to note that of the potential observer countries, Azerbaijan, in contrast with, for example, Armenia, does not come to the organisation empty-handed. The country brings with it a hefty portfolio of its own projects of global importance, which, of course, are of interest to the organisation’s participating countries.

And it’s not just energy. This year should see the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway – a major transportation project, which in the foreseeable future, could link China and the countries of Central Asia to Europe.

According to experts, this railway will reduce the transportation time of goods from China to Europe by half, and its total length will stretch nearly 7,500 km.

Of no less importance is the fact that Azerbaijan enjoys long-established and strong relations with almost all SCO member states and will not have to develop ties from scratch with any of them. The current members of the SCO are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – that is, the traditional partners of Azerbaijan. Russia is a key trade and economic partner of the republic, and Azerbaijan has had relations with the countries of Central Asia for many years, and as time passes, the two sides continue to build bilateral economic and political relations.

In addition, Chinese officials have repeatedly called Azerbaijan a key partner in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan for its part has shown great interest in the markets of the Asia-Pacific region. We are talking about major investments in Asian stock and currency markets from the assets and foreign exchange reserves of the State Oil Fund (SOFAR) and the Central Bank, and the acquisition of currencies, equities and real estate in the region. Thus, the State Oil Fund alone plans to spend 500m dollars to purchase Chinese currency, and the Central Bank, twice that, i.e. one billion dollars to purchase Chinese currency and bonds in Chinese markets.

In addition, the State Oil Fund has invested 447m dollars in South Korean real estate and is also planning to purchase real estate in other countries in the region. In this regard, Azerbaijan’s presence in the SCO will allow it to take a more active role in these and other large-scale projects.

There is another important political aspect that draws Azerbaijan’s interest to the SCO, which is the extremely pragmatic approach to different formats of economic and political cooperation in the region. From Baku’s point of view, the presence of two SCO regional giants, Russia and China, is a plus. And not just because these countries are among the leading countries in the world with powerful industrial potentials. The absence of the dominance of any one of the participating countries in the SCO makes the organisation a more acceptable format of regional integration for Azerbaijan, than, for example, the Eurasian Union, which is pressing for the country’s accession.

Thus, some have described last week’s visits to Baku in yet another attempt to convince Azerbaijan to join the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich and Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov as a “Russian landing force”. The latter in a conversation with reporters openly expressed hope that Baku would support the “line of integration with the Eurasian Economic Union”. And despite the fact that it was Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev who first proposed the creation of the EAEU many years ago, lately, the words “Russian project” are being applied to this organisation.

It is no secret that the China-Russia tandem is crucial to the development of the SCO. Nicola Contessi, an expert on the SCO from Laval University in Canada, believes that the future of the organisation depends largely on the development of Russian-Chinese relations. According to him, Russia is watching China’s increasing penetration into Central Asia with growing concern, and the SCO’s prospects will largely depend on whether the Celestial Empire is able to show restraint in this matter.

However, despite the Canadian expert’s wariness, Russia has no alternative at a time when Moscow’s relations with the West are going through perhaps their worst phase in history. In addition, China is the leader and the engine of the world economy, which bodes well for the future of any organisation of which this country is a part.

In any case, Azerbaijan’s participation in any project of regional integration promises great benefit to all parties, and especially in the framework of the SCO – the largest Eurasian project.

By the way, as the Russian president’s special envoy the SCO Bakhtiar Khakimov said, Moscow hopes that the decision to expand the SCO will be made at this year’s summit in Ufa on 9-10 July. Approval of the organisation’s development strategy through 2025 is on the agenda for the meeting of the Council of Heads of State, and one of the main points of the document is accepting new members into the SCO.

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