The post The Financial Attack On Greece: Where Do We Go From Here? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

While solar energy is renewable and abundant enough to meet Europe’s growing energy demand, sunny days are not always guaranteed. Finding a cost-effective means of storing solar energy for a ‘rainy day’ would go some way to solving this problem. This was the challenge addressed by the COCHALPEC project, part-funded through an EU Marie-Curie Intra-European Fellowship (IEF) grant, which officially ended in May 2015.

The project’s success could help Member States in their obligations to fulfil the Renewable Energy Directive, which requires the EU to fulfil at least 20 % of its total energy needs with renewables by 2020. The Directive specifies national renewable energy targets for each country, ranging from a low of 10 % in Malta to a high of 49 % in Sweden.

The COCHALPEC (Development of electrodes based on copper chalcogenide nanocrystals for photo-electrochemical energy conversion) project’s starting point was to develop – in an efficient and cost-effective manner – solar panels capable of generating an electrical current to split water molecules into oxygen and hydrogen (hydrogen has been shown to be a viable form of solar fuel). While the concept is simple, the cost of water-splitting technologies has – until now – been too expensive to commercialise.

In response to this challenge, the COCHALPEC team found a way of making efficient, low-cost solar panels that are capable of directly producing solar hydrogen. The key to this solution was the adoption of so-called 2-D materials – sometimes referred to as single layer materials – which consist of a single layer of atoms. Perhaps the best-known 2-D material is graphene, a single-layer of graphite that, like other potential 2-D materials, offers extraordinary electronic properties.

Manufacturing graphene to cover a wide-enough area to harvest usable amounts of solar energy is not cheap. The team therefore developed a new cost-effective manufacturing method using tungsten diselenide. Recent research has suggested that this 2-D material offers conducting properties similar to graphene, and could have potential as an efficient material to convert solar energy directly into hydrogen fuel.

The project team next turned to finding a way of cost-effectively manufacturing these tungsten diselenide-based solar panels. This was achieved by mixing tungsten diselenide powder with a liquid solvent, which turned the material into thin 2-D flakes. These flakes were then spread evenly to produce a high-quality thin film, which was then transferred to a newly designed plastic support panel.

Final testing successfully demonstrated that this cost-effective method could achieve high solar-to-hydrogen conversion efficiency rates. Most promisingly, the team behind the innovation are confident that the new method can be scaled up to a commercial level.

The success of the project underlines the effectiveness of EU Marie-Curie IEF funding, which helps researchers willing to develop their career in Europe outside their home country. In addition to bringing key expertise together to work on specific project – in this case the COCHALPEC project –, the funding also enables European scientists to broaden their horizons and improve their career prospects.

Source: Based on a press release from the COCHALPEC project and CORDIS.

The post Saving Solar Energy For A Rainy Day Through Hydrogen Conversion appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Georgian soldiers along with up to 220 U.S. marines and platoon-size units from Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania launched two-week long joint military exercises at the Vaziani base outside Tbilisi on July 8.

Agile Spirit 2015 drills involve exercises in peacekeeping and support operations.

Service members from the 42nd battalion of the 4th mechanized brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces are participating in the drills.

Representatives from the Armenian and Moldovan armed forces are attending the exercises as “observers”, the Georgian Ministry of Defense said.

Agile Spirit exercises were initially bilateral U.S.-Georgian military drills held annually in Georgia since 2011.

But this year U.S. and Georgia launched separate annual joint drills – Noble Partner – that were held in May, and Agile Sprit has now turned into multinational exercises.

The Georgian Ministry of Defense said that Agile Spirit 2015 “are held in frames of NATO-Georgia substantial package” endorsed by the NATO leaders at the summit in Wales last year.

“One of the priority areas of the package is holding of NATO exercises on the territory of Georgia,” it said.

The post Georgia Holds Joint Military Drills With Five NATO Members In Vaziani appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hackers claiming to be associated with Daesh attacked the website of the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights on Wednesday and threatened its director, AFP reported.

The group, which calls itself Cyber Army of the Khilafah (Caliphate) replaced the front page of the monitor’s site with an altered image of the Observatory’s director with text threatening him.

The Observatory provided a screenshot of the hacked website to AFP that showed an image of director Rami Abdel Rahman’s face photoshopped onto the body of a hostage dressed in a jumpsuit, seemingly about to be beheaded by a knife-wielding militant.

The text in the image claims that the “Cyber Army of the Khilafah broke into the computer systems of SOHR … seized control of its website, destroying it, and wiping out the data.”

Abdel Rahman confirmed to the hackers had destroyed data on the Observatory’s servers, but told AFP “we have a copy of all the information that has been published and until the site is back up, we will publish on our Facebook and Twitter accounts.”

“We will continue to do our work and document what is happening in Syria,” he told AFP.

Original article

The post Islamic State Hackers Attack Syria War Monitor Site, Threaten Director appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sandip Kumar Mishra*

In November 2015, the tenth anniversary of the East Asian Summit (EAS) will be held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The last ten years of the EAS has been less than satisfactory in bringing together the 18 member countries on important issues of regional politics and economics. However, at the same time, it has provided a platform for the top leaders of the region to meet once a year. The survival of the EAS for these ten years could itself be cited as a success in the first phase of existence.

For a round-up of the first phase and to chart out the course of the next, in May 2015, a roundtable was organised in Seoul, South Korea. It was a part of a track-II process in which two representatives from each member country were invited. The platform was important as many high-level diplomats and academicians participated and the report of the roundtable was sent to the EAS for its consideration.

The deliberations at the roundtable were generally positive and underlined the fact that with all its limitations the EAS has been a constructive and productive grouping. Since the region lacks any other formal network, the EAS is a commendable initiative. The discussions also stressed that the Asia-Pacific has been getting increasingly tied up in the rivalries between China, the US and Japan. It is indeed pertinent that a neutral and innovative agenda be articulated by the EAS countries to address the growing tension between the big regional players.

The EAS process, it was agreed, has been an open, transparent and inclusive forum to discuss broad strategic, political and economic issues of common concern, and it aims to promote “peace, stability and economic prosperity in the East Asia.” There may be differences of opinion about the modalities but there cannot be differences on the broad goals that were envisaged by the EAS. Four issues constituted the core of the deliberations about the future of the EAS.

The first issue was whether the EAS would become an all-equal platform or remain primarily an ASEAN-led initiative. Until now the process has been largely dominated by the ASEAN and the EAS needs to decide how it would like to move forward. The centrality of ASEAN has both its pros and cons and it would not be easy to make a choice. Generally, the participants agreed that in the next phase ASEAN should play the key role, without which, great power dynamics may derail the process. The chief of the Indian delegation, Amb Skand R Tayal stressed that the “EAS should continue to be ASEAN-centric. However, all its 18 members should participate equally in its preparatory, organisational and implementation activities.” It was also underlined that as per the 2011 EAS declaration, the EAS would remain an integral part of the evolving regional architecture, which includes other mutually reinforcing processes such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

The second important issue pertained to regional trade. There were appeals to hasten efforts to arrive at the regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), even though it may not happen in the near future. The discussion appreciated bilateral FTAs and CEPAs between the countries of the region and they were considered as launching pads for the CEPEA in the future. The general mood was that sub-regionalism must be promoted to arrive at a broader regional trade regime. There are lots of other areas as well where member countries could cooperate and benefit from such as energy, education, health, disaster management, and connectivity.

The third issue was about the construction of an East Asian community, on which some basic disagreements emerged. The delegates of the ASEAN countries in general thought that with the geographical expansion of the EAS, it is plausible to carve a community from the EAS. However, other participants argued that it is possible to have an East Asian community in the agenda of the EAS. For that, the notion of ‘community’ must be broadened to include people beyond its geographical proximities. As the notion of ‘region’ has transcended geographical distance, the notion of ‘community’ must also. By diluting or giving up the goal of an East Asian community, the EAS would not be able to move beyond political and economic imperatives, and this would not be able to deliver in the quest for peace, stability and prosperity across the region. An East Asian community would mean more people-to-people integration, which could become a driving force for the EAS in the future.

The discussion on the EAS and its future course was held back by the lack of institutionalisation of the EAS process. The leaders of the member countries meet for less than a day in a year and there have not been satisfactory follow-up mechanisms thereafter. There was almost a consensus that the EAS should consider reintroducing leaders’ retreats and organising leaders’ summits via the sherpa system. Unlike the present, a separate EAS administrative unit must be established within the ASEAN Secretariat and staff positions should be open to even non-ASEAN countries. The roundtable demanded that the sequence of meetings be reversed as to an EAS meeting, ASEAN+3 meeting, and then ASEAN+1 meeting. In this way, the EAS would be able to provide a comprehensive agenda in the beginning itself.

There were several other deliberations during the roundtable such as division of issues in the priority and non-priority areas, cap of the new membership, and more importantly, the establishment of track-II networks in the region. Furthermore, a chain of universities, which would be called East Asia Universities in the member countries, was also proposed by one of the participants.

Overall, the EAS must enter a new phase with a modified strategy to realise its alternate vision for the regional political and economic order. It has been able to sustain its existence amidst lots of problems and limitations in the first ten years. However, if it does not reconsider and re-chart its course in the next phase, it would not be easy to sustain its relevance. Any stagnation or decline in the EAS process would not only be detrimental to the efforts to establish a peaceful, stable and prosperous East Asia, but would also invite sharper great power politics in the region. The success or failure of the EAS would not be the success of failure of a process but of all the countries involved. Now, it is to see in which direction the leaders of these member countries are ready to move.

* Sandip Kumar Mishra
Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, Delhi University

The post On The 10th Anniversary Of The East Asian Summit – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Carelessness, corruption, and neglect are “penetrating the most important branches of the Russian economy, a development which entails enormous risks in aviation, energy and highways,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says, and that represents an increasingly serious threat to Russia’s future development.

In a commentary on RBK.ru yesterday, the head of the Moscow Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society, says that these shortcomings affect not only things inherited from Soviet times which the Russian economy continues to depend on but also those built since, whose quality is no better (daily.rbc.ru/opinions/economics/07/07/2015/559a86919a79472ad2d31d2a).

Most of this reflect the efforts of bureaucrats and businesses to boost their own incomes, but it also is a product of the large number of intermediaries who never have to bear responsibility for the shortcomings of what they do, Inozemtsev says. Such problems are endemic in Russia, but recently they have been hitting “ever more dangerous branches.”

Typically, when people speak about Russia’s problems, they mention roads. That is not inappropriate, he says. Russia has to spend far more on maintenance than do European countries and thus has less money available to build new roads. Turkey, for example, spends 9.5 times less on reconstruction than on building new, allowing it to increase its network dramatically.

But Russia is forced to spend more than twice as much on reconstruction as on new roads, because its highway technologies are so backward relative to Europe and because the entities involved in highways make far more money when they are rebuilding old roads than they do when they are constructing new ones.

Many people see this as almost inevitable and ignore its broader consequences. Russia has to spend more than twice as high a percentage of its GDP on transport than does the US, Inozemtsev says, and “about half of the victims” of traffic accidents die precisely because of the “horrible quality of the roads.”

Another critical area concerns space and air transportation, he says. A series of accidents involving Russian rocket motors in 2014-2015 has “attracted attention” to this branch, especially because it is quite clear that the accidents continue to happen because problems already identified have not been corrected.

“The authorities have begun to talk almost about sabotage and wrecking,” but that isn’t where the problem lies, Inozemtsev says. The problem lies with the fact that in that sector, most firms are monopolies which face no competition and less than adequate supervision from the authorities.

One statistic is particularly telling: Russian components form only 30 percent of all those in Russian satellites and rockets, but they are responsible for 95 percent of the problems. There is no way that import substitution will do anything, at least in the short term, other than make the situation worse.

Similar problems infect the aviation sector, he continues. In 2014 alone, there were 22 aircraft accidents. Most were blamed on “the human factor,” the Russian term for “human error.” But that doesn’t explain the problem completely. Many times, planes crash or can’t be used because the parts installed in them don’t work or can’t be readily replaced.

But perhaps the area of “greatest concern” involves the energy sector. Not only does Russia lose 3.4 times as many miners’ lives each year than does the US and 9.7 times more than the EU, but today “more than 80 percent of the capacity” of hydro-electric and steam-powered power plans are using turbines built “before 1980.”

Many are inadequately serviced, and that has led to disasters which have in some cases cost lives. The situation with regard to atomic power plants is no better, especially because there are so many different firms involved that no one of them is likely to be held responsible when problems arise.

The country’s electric power grid is aging and collapsing. Seventy-percent of the power lines are now older than their projected lifespan, and in some regions, that figure is “much higher,” Inozemtsev says. In Kaliningrad, for example, the power grid is in such bad shape that a planned atomic power station won’t be able to connect with it without a major upgrade.

In all these cases, and others besides, Inozemtsev says, “the bureaucrats have an answer: extend the life of the resource.” But one can do that only so long as everything wears out. “Under conditions of Western technology sanctions, a weak ruble, and limited credit resources, it is naïve to hope” that this situation will be corrected anytime soon.

But even within those constraints, Moscow is failing to block “the creation of artificial problems which are capable of stopping the development of entire branches” of the economy. Unless it does so, the future of Russia will remain dire indeed.

The post Infrastructure, Soviet And Post-Soviet, Falling Apart, Threatening Russia’s Future, Inozemtsev Says – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

If a Grexit proves unavoidable, it will require expert management, writes Andrew Duff. The ex-MEP explains how it should be negotiated, if Athens is forced to leave the eurozone.

By Andrew Duff*

(EurActiv) — There is much speculation, some of it silly, about how to leave the euro if you want to. Among the more barmy ideas is for the Eurogroup to follow the precedent of King Henry VIII who, if you remember, divorced the first of six wives by claiming that his marriage to Catherine of Aragon had been null and void in the first place. This turned out to be quite a historic decision. Relations between England and the rest of Europe have never been quite the same since.

In similar fashion, it is argued today that as Greece was admitted originally to the eurozone under false accounting pretences, its membership of the single currency has been a living lie and therefore could be annulled.

Another line, taken by some Greek nationalists, is that Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) should be used to relieve Greece of the euro on the grounds that the values and principles of the European Union (as laid down in Article 2 TEU), which include respect for ‘human dignity’, ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’, have been abused by the imposition of cruel debt conditions. Conversely, other commentators, some German, have wondered whether an Article 7 procedure could be triggered against Greece for a treacherous breach of its commitment to other values and principles of the European Union (also found in Article 2), notably ‘democracy’ and ‘the rule of law’.

Avoiding madness

Both such lines of enquiry, in my view, indicate madness. Yet it remains the case that it is difficult to leave the single currency, whose establishment was deemed to be irrevocable (Article 140(3) in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), in an orderly manner. There is no provision in the treaties to ditch the euro, although thanks to the Lisbon treaty a state can negotiate to secede from membership of the European Union as a whole (Article 50 TEU).

A decision to extricate Greece from membership of the euro while remaining a member state of the EU could possibly be engineered under Article 352 TFEU. This legal base is the famous ‘flexibility clause’ that allows ‘appropriate measures’ to be taken to attain the EU’s objectives in cases where ‘the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers’. The frustrated objective here would be the consolidation of ‘an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro’ (Article 3 TEU), on the assumption that Grexit would help things along.

There are two big problems, however, with the use of Article 352. The first is that unanimity is required in the Council, so Greece (or anyone else) could veto the plan. The second is that several national parliaments now insist on taking a vote on all Article 352 legislation. Needless to say, those national parliaments include the House of Commons whose members are probably in no mood to agree to any fix on Grexit independently of a decision on Brexit. But David Cameron will not be the only EU leader desperate to avoid being held hostage on this critical matter by his or her own parliament.

Avoiding unanimity

So is there a way for Greece to exit the euro by qualified majority voting? Here, the logical thing to do is turn to the decision-making process that applies to joining the euro, and reverse the thrust.

When a state joins the currency, a decision is taken by the full Council of Ministers by qualified majority voting according to the provisions of Article 140(2) TFEU. Because all member states (except the UK) are presumed to join the euro once they have fulfilled the Maastricht convergence criteria, admission to membership is technically the abrogation of the transitional derogation from membership. The Council decides on the basis of a proposal of the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament, after instigating a discussion in the European Council ‑ and after having received a recommendation from 55% of the eurozone states (that is 11), representing 65% of the population of the eurozone.

On the basis of such a Council decision, Greece would be relegated to the status of a state ‘with a derogation’ as laid down in Article 139. Relegation would liberate Greece from the coercive disciplines of the broad economic policy guidelines, the excessive deficit procedure (no more Troika!), the macro-economic imbalances procedures, and the governance of the European Central Bank. Of course Greek banks would lose the possibility of being bailed out by the ESM and of receiving liquidity assistance from the ECB, but the Greek state would be liable to receive EU ‘mutual assistance’ (Article 143) and to take ‘protective measures’ (Article 144).

Would this reverse procedure be acceptable to the European Court of Justice in the very probable instance that it had to address the constitutional issue? Precedent suggests that the Luxembourg Court is fully capable of tolerating unorthodox measures of the EU institutions when taken by way of expedient crisis management ‑ as long as the proper democratic procedures have been observed, and so long as the wider and essential interests of the Union are protected. Doubtless, the judicial eyebrow would be raised and a stern admonition would be added to the effect that the position of an errant state leaving the currency under the pressure of force majeure should be rectified in primary law at the time of the next treaty revision.

So be it. If continued Greek membership of the euro proves to be impossible, a managed exit from the euro could and should be done this way.

*Andrew Duff is a visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre.

The post How To Leave The Euro, More Or Less Legally – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The United States and the United Arab Emirates launched The Sawab Center on Wednesday, the first-ever multinational online messaging and engagement program, in support of the Global Coalition Against Daesh (Islamic State). The Arabic word “sawab,” means “right” or “correct” as in “the right path.”

According to the US State Department, US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel and UAE Minister of State Anwar Gargash participated in the launch event in support of the millions of people in the region and around the world that oppose Daesh.

The State Department said The Sawab Center will use direct online engagement to counter terrorist propaganda rapidly and effectively, including messages used to recruit foreign fighters, fundraise for illicit activities, and intimidate and terrorize local populations. The Sawab Center will increase the intensity of online debate by presenting moderate and tolerant voices from across the region and amplifying inclusive and constructive narratives.

Co-founded by the United States and the UAE, the Sawab Center will expand to welcome other partners in the 63 country Coalition and with people, organizations and businesses throughout the world to challenge Daesh’s doctrines of hate and intolerance, the State Department said. The Center will also engage and expand the network of people willing to speak out against the terrorist group’s propaganda, recruitment and fundraising efforts.

The post US, UAE Launch Sawab Center To Counter Islamic State’s Online Propaganda appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Denis Dzidic

Russia voted down a UN Security Council resolution marking the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacres, calling it anti-Serb and saying it would increase tensions in Bosnia.

The resolution condemning the 1995 Srebrenica massacres as genocide failed to pass on Wednesday after Serbia’s ally Russia, which has a Security Council veto, voted against it.

The Russian ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, said the resolution was “confrontational and politically motivated”.

Churkin said that it only blamed the Serbs for atrocities during the 1992-95 war and would cause more divisions in Bosnian society.

“Given that there is no consensus on this issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina… adopting this resolution would be counterproductive and lead to greater tension in the region,” he said.

Both Serbia and Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity Republika Srpska deny that the killing of 7,000 men and boys from Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces 20 years ago was genocide, despite the rulings of several international and Bosnian courts.

But Matthew Rycroft, the UN ambassador from Britain, which proposed the resolution, insisted that it “does not accuse the Serbs as a people, instead it calls for reconciliation”.

“The problem in our difference of opinion is whether this crime amounted to genocide. That is not a verdict of the Security Council, but a definition from judgements from both the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” said Rycroft.

“To call it anything else would hinder not help reconciliation,” he added.

China, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela abstained in the vote and the remaining 10 members of the Security Council voted for the resolution.

After the vote, the US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, who was a reporter in Bosnia at the time of the massacres, called Russia’s veto “heartbreaking” for the families of those who were killed.

“When I heard about the crimes I said: ‘No.’ When I heard of Russia’s plan to veto this, I had the same reaction. Why would Russia vote to deny recognition of the Srebrenica genocide?” she asked.

But Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic said in a statement that this was an important day for Serbs.

“Not only because it prevented a stain being put on the whole Serbian nation in an attempt to declare a genocide, but because today Russia has shown and proved that it is a true and honest friend,” Nikolic said.

The resolution has sparked weeks of political recriminations ahead of the Srebrenica anniversary.

Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said on Tuesday that he had “personally received guarantees” from Russia that the text condemning the genocide of Bosniaks would not be adopted.

Russia, which is currently locked in conflict with the West over Ukraine, had proposed an alternative resolution which did not mention genocide or Srebrenica, but instead condemned crimes committed during the 1992-95 Bosnian war in general.

Despite the row over the resolution however, Vucic has said that “if conditions are met”, he will represent Serbia in Srebrenica on July 11 at the 20th anniversary commemoration of the massacres.

The post Russia Vetoes UN Srebrenica Genocide Resolution appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In the event the Oklahoma Constitution section that formed the basis for the Ten Commandments Monument ruling is removed in the future, a Hindu group said Wednesday it will re-pursue their interest to install Lord Hanuman statue in Oklahoma Capitol grounds in Oklahoma City.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, in Prescott v. Oklahoma Capitol Preservation Commission decision on June 30, held that the Ten Commandments Monument violates Article 2, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution, is enjoined, and shall be removed.

Section 5 (Public money or property – Use for sectarian purposes) of Article II (Bill of Rights) of Oklahoma Constitution, states: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.

Oklahoma House of Representatives member John Paul Jordan has filed a constitutional amendment for the 2016 legislative session to remove the language that formed the basis for the Ten Commandments monument ruling (cited portion of the Oklahoma Constitution – Article II, Section 5).

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, in a statement in Nevada today, said that if and when Oklahoma State Capitol became open again in the future to different monuments and space was available in the statehouse grounds, Hindus would love to request placing a statue of Lord Hanuman, which would be the first Hindu religious monument on public land in USA.

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, had written to the Oklahoma State Capitol Preservation Commission (OSCPC) officials in the past showing interest in erecting the Lord Hanuman statue, which they planned to make big and weather-proof. OSCPC, created in 1982 to plan and supervise the preservation and restoration of the interior and exterior of the Oklahoma State Capitol building, also controls the display of objects in public areas of the State Capitol building.

Rajan Zed pointed out that besides honoring the Hindus living in Oklahoma, this Lord Hanuman statue would raise awareness of Oklahomans about Hinduism, oldest and third largest religion of the world with about one billion adherents and a rich philosophical thought.

Zed further said that some Christian, Buddhist and Jewish leaders had already backed in the past the proposed bid of Hindus of erecting a statue of Lord Hanuman in Oklahoma State Capitol grounds.

Lord Hanuman is greatly revered and worshipped in Hinduism and is known for incredible strength and was a perfect grammarian. There are about three million Hindus in USA.

The post Hindus To Re-Pursue Oklahoma Capitol Hanuman Statue If Constitution Amended appeared first on Eurasia Review.

According to American scholar Robert D. Kaplan, the South China Sea (SCS) has become “Asia’s Cauldron”. Some refer to the SCS as “unchartered waters”. All recent developments clearly indicate that the SCS has transformed into a dangerous playing field for global powers.

During the 1970s, Southeast Asia was considered a“troubled” region as a result of the Vietnam War. Now the SCS issue risks bringing an end to four decades of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Once again, the region is on the verge of becoming “troubled”.

The Sydney-based Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) mentioned in its recent annual 2015 Global Peace Index about the rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. “The South China Sea remains a potential area for conflict, with countries involved in the dispute (China, Vietnam and the Philippines) all showing a worsening of their scores in the 2015 index,” the IEP said.

China was ranked at 126 out of 162 countries surveyed in the Global Peace Index, while the Philippines stood at 141st and Vietnam at 56th.

What is at stake in the South China Sea?

Before the 1970s, no countries were particularly interested in the South China Sea, even if one country occupied a rock or reef or constructed something on an islet.

“The rapid economic development of the countries around the SCS, particularly China, led to a scramble for the natural resources of the SCS, both living and non-living,” says Indonesian maritime expert Prof. Hasjim Djalal.

The SCS — known in China as the South Sea, in Vietnam as the East Sea and in the Philippines as the West Philippines Sea — is a region rich in fisheries and hydrocarbon reserves, and also provides the shortest route between the Indian and Western Pacific oceans. More than US$5 trillion worth of global trade flows through its waters.

The problem with the claims of China and Taiwan — both of which are based on the countries’ so-called “indisputable sovereignty” according to the 1947 nine-dash line map, the mother of all disputes — is that the claims are not clear, and the countries also never clarified with other claimant countries what that sovereignty covers. The legality and the precise locations indicated by the nine dashes are not clear.

“Both Beijing and Taipei have declined to explain what the nine bars signify, whether they are meant to claim sovereignty or some kind of maritime jurisdiction over the entire expanse of water that the lines encompass or only over the land features within the interrupted line,” Rodolfo C. Severino, an expert on ASEAN affairs, wrote in a recently published book titled Entering Uncharted Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea.

There was no definition of that nine-dashed line, nor were any coordinates stated.

China never showed its so-called historical evidence to anybody. In simple terms, based on the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), each country has jurisdiction over 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) of territory from its coast line and may also claim an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles from the coast line, where it has fishing and mining rights.

If all six claimant countries abided by UNCLOS, there would be no dispute in the SCS. China, based on its nine-dash line map, claims more than 80 percent of 3.5 million kilometers of area in the SCS, leaving only 12 nautical miles each to four claimant countries – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Taiwan makes a similar claim to China.

As a result, even Indonesia, which is not a claimant country, is affected by China’s claim.

What is going on?

Recently, hundreds of sailors and marines from the Philippines, the US and Japan held joint military exercises in the SCS. At the same time, China has been giving finishing touches to its land reclamation work in the Spratly Islands in the SCS.

China has built several installations, including military ones. Many fear that China will establish military and naval bases on the illegally reclaimed islands in the disputed waters. It may deploy a full fleet of nuclear armed submarines around the islands.

For its part, the sole superpower, the US, has insisted loudly that China has no sovereignty over the waters. Building artificial islands, it says, does not entail sovereignty. Washington has asked Beijing to cease building islands in the SCS immediately, but the latter has bluntly refused, calling the US an “outside power”.

As part of its strategic pivot to Asia, the US is determined to remain in the region and help its allies and friends, who are claimant countries in the SCS dispute.

“The United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows. We will remain the principal security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come,” The Week reported US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter as saying recently.

Until recently, Chinese leaders used to assure the world that China’s rise would be a peaceful one and would pose no threat to its neighbors or challenge the existing regional security architecture or the existing world order. Beijing has little desire to internationalize the SCS disputes, preferring to present them as bilateral disputes with individual claimant nations.

With its remarkable economic rise in recent times and fast -growing military might, China, especially under President Xi Jinping, has become assertive in pressing its territorial claims to the point of being a regional bully. Apparently, it is no longer worried about protests from neighbors and ASEAN countries or shy to face international condemnation.

Let’s look at how China seized control of a large chunk of the SCS over a period of time. In 1974, China seized control of the Paracel Islands from the then South Vietnam by deadly force. Again in 1988, China annexed a major portion of the Spratlys, including Johnson South Reef, in a war with Vietnam in which 70 Vietnamese troops were killed.

China captured Mischief Reef, a large reef in the Spratly Islands, in 1995. The reef, which is 250 kilometers from the Philippine coast, is also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. In 2013, China took control of Scarborough shoal, a triangular reef.

In 2014, China established a huge oil rig in the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone in the Paracel Islands for exploration, igniting violent protests in Vietnam. The international community condemned China strongly. Surprisingly, China pulled out its rig unilaterally.

China — the world’s second-largest economy after the US— has already aroused deep suspicions among its neighbors by increasing its defense budget to $141.45 billion in 2015, a double-digit increase from $132 billion in 2014, making it second in the world only to the US’s defense spending of $610 billion in 2015. Unofficial figures put the Chinese defense budget at more than $216 billion.

China is now convinced that the US is a declining power. In March 2010, China declared that the South China Sea was its “core interest”. In Chinese diplomatic parlance, “core interest” means no room for compromise.

China’s recent “Big Brother” behavior and unilateral military measures, including naval blockades (around Second Thomas Shoal, known in China as the Ren’ai Reef and in the Philippines as Ayungin), ramming of ships, arrest of fishermen and xenophobic rhetoric have all given the impression that an overconfident Beijing is increasingly shedding its soft-power image in resolving both the East China Sea and SCS disputes.

This major shift in Beijing’s behavior is evident in recent statements from Chinese officials.

“On issues of territory and sovereignty, China’s position is firm and clear. We will not take anything that is not ours, but we will defend every inch of territory that belongs to us,” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told media last year in Beijing.

In November 2012, China established the controversial Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, near the disputed islands of Senkaku (in Japanese) or Diaoyu (in Chinese), raising the ire of Japan. It may impose similar an ADIZ zone in the SCS.

What can ASEAN and Indonesia do?

China’s unilateral claims and its intentions to use hard power to pursue its geostrategic ambitions threaten Southeast Asia’s stability and security.

The recent upsurge in tensions between China and claimant countries in Southeast Asia – Vietnam and the Philippines — over islands in South China Sea, combined with the entry of outside players like the US and India into the fray, threatens to cause deep divisions among ASEAN members and diminish the association’s status as an influential regional organization.

ASEAN’s policy is very clear that the SCS disputes must be solved through peaceful negotiations among claimant countries. There should be a legally binding code of conduct in the SCS to prevent potential conflicts.

The SCS disputes are also threatening the 10-member ASEAN’s unity.

In July 2012, for the first time in the organization’s 45-year history, ASEAN foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communiqué in Phnom Penh during their annual meeting as a result of deep divisions between ASEAN’s then chair Cambodia — a close economic partner of China — and claimant country the Philippines on the issue of the Scarborough Shoal and details on claims of other members in the South China Sea.

Geographically, the disputed shoal, known in Chinese as Huangyan Island, is located a little more than 160 kilometers from the Philippines and 800 kilometers from China.

It was then Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa’s “shuttle diplomacy” that saved ASEAN’s image after the Phnom Penh fiasco.

Indonesia, which is not a claimant country, is increasingly worried about China’s unilateral claims, reclamation work and assertiveness, which could threaten peace and stability in Southeast Asia as well as the unity of ASEAN.

More alarmingly, China, according to an Indonesian defense official, has now included part of Natuna Islands waters — within Indonesia’s Riau Islands province — in its territorial map based on the nine-dash line, which could be a serious threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The new map has even been included in new passports issued to Chinese citizens.

Adding fuel to the fire, China recently published a new map strengthening its claim to the SCS.

Indonesia wants a code of conduct (CoC) drawn up immediately to prevent further tensions, and welcomes outside powers like the US, Japan, India and Britain to play a role in contributing to regional peace and security.

China, however, is in no hurry to conclude a CoC, and may stymy attempts to establish one.

Relations between ASEAN and China are in fact in excellent shape. But China’s attitude and actions related to the SCS claims are working like drops of poison.

In the meantime, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou has made an interesting proposal, known as the South China Sea Peace Initiative. According to Ma, all claimants should shelve disputes, pursue peace and promote joint development of natural resources in the SCS area.

Since all claimants are sticking to their guns, ASEAN must play a key role in easing the tensions. A solution will be difficult in the near future. The important thing is to manage the conflict.

The ball is in China’s court. It has to prove that it is a friend of ASEAN, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines by stopping all unilateral and provocative actions. Once and for all, China has to make it clear that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia and shelve all claims to the waters.

SCS claimant countries need to develop maritime confidence-building measures and explore ways to build trust and confidence based on equality and mutual respect. The involvement of non-regional powers should be made through, and in support of, ASEAN.

Given the tense situation and lack of convincing evidence from both China and other claimant countries, it would be better if all parties involved adhered to the path of a peaceful resolution to the SCS conflict.

Vietnam, the second-biggest claimant, is also calling for peaceful negotiations among claimants. It seeks strategic trust among claimant countries. Rule of law and a legally binding CoC are essential for resolving the issue and managing the conflict.

For the time being, until a final solution to the impasse is reached (which is unlikely for a long time), there is a need for a mechanism to prevent conflict and promote cooperation among disagreeing parties. ASEAN must push for the immediate conclusion of a CoC in the South China Sea. Dialogue is still the best way to solve these long-term maritime disputes.

A recent maritime agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines after decades of tough dialogue has become a template for solving SCS disputes and received praise from the international community.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe praised Indonesia and the Philippines for resolving their own long-standing maritime dispute through peaceful negotiations. He called on China and other South China Sea claimants to follow suit.

If claimant countries fail to solve the SCS conundrum, the best fall-back solution is an international tribunal. The Philippines has already gone down that route, and Vietnam is considering doing so. Currently, the Permanent of Court in The Hague is holding hearings on the SCS issue. In order to avoid conflict and reduce tensions, peaceful negotiations and legal means are the best options for all claimants.

*Veeramalla Anjaiah is an author and a senior journalist living in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The post South China Sea Conundrum Serious Threat To Peace In Southeast Asia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Jonathan Cook

The Israeli government believes it is locked in an epic struggle to save Israel from the growing movement calling for an international boycott. Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns that Israel must quickly “rebrand” itself to avoid pariah status.

Ordinary Israelis are therefore being conscripted into an army of spin-doctors in a campaign termed “hasbara” – Hebrew for “public diplomacy”, or more literally “propaganda”.

In the latest offensive, the education ministry has launched a compulsory hasbara course for Israeli students travelling abroad. All youth delegations are now required to learn how to justify to outsiders Israel’s policies in the occupied territories. According to officials, the students must challenge those who “seek to delegitimize Israel”.

It is yet more evidence that hasbara has become a national obsession in Israel – and that the line between support for one’s country and support for the subjugation of another people has been erased. Some 85 per cent of Israelis tell pollsters they are keen to become hasbara ambassadors for the Netanyahu government.

A hasbara ministry already targets the international media with good news, while cultural events from food fairs to Israeli entries at film festivals are designed to prove that Israel has another, hidden side.

For years the Israeli government has relied on paid workers – and thousands of volunteers in Israel and abroad – to surf the net posting pro-Israel comments.

At Israel’s international airport, Israeli holidaymakers are offered brochures explaining the importance of persuading those they meet that Israel is misunderstood. Advice suggests emphasising successes such as Israel’s invention of drip irrigation and popular varieties of the cherry tomato.

And yet the latest hasbara drive is as unlikely to reverse Israel’s slow slide into ignominy as its predecessors.

But rapid developments in information technology mean Israel has less control over its image than ever before.

First it was 24-hour rolling news, then the internet. Now cheap smartphones make every Palestinian a potential documentary-maker, ensuring that moments of cruelty and oppression are captured and available for anyone who cares to look.

Palestinians post online videos of their everyday abuse: from demolition of homes to stone-throwers being shot with live ammunition; from settlers burning crops to children being dragged by soldiers from their beds in the middle of the night.

Last week 56-year-old Zaki Sabah, a familiar cake vendor in Jerusalem’s Old City, starred in one such video. Bystanders filmed him being savagely beaten by Israeli police on a busy road. Denied a permit for many years by the occupation authorities, Sabah has been repeatedly fined and jailed.

Meanwhile, another video exposed Israel’s deceitful account of its supposedly peaceful interception of a boat trying to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza. As more than a dozen passengers were held captive over the weekend, footage was smuggled out showing that Israeli commandos had electrocuted some of them with tasers during the takeover.

Troubling imagery is not restricted to the occupied territories. Film of the charred interior of a historic church next to the Sea of Galilee highlighted last month the latest hate crime by Jewish extremists against Israel’s large Palestinian minority.

The futility of trying to staunch the tide of evidence damning Israel on media old and new was exemplified last week by Moshe Yaalon, the defence minister.

“There is no humanitarian distress in Gaza,” he averred, while the media illustrated reports of his speech with pictures of mountains of rubble and children still homeless a year after Israel’s massive assault on the besieged enclave.

Yaalon’s sophistry may placate Israel’s diehard supporters but the rest of us are more often incensed by such insults to our intelligence.

The hasbara offensive is doomed for another reason.

With the Palestinians’ case substantiated by evidence, rather than Israel’s, the evangelists of hasbara have only one recourse: to blame the messenger.

Critics of Israel, it is implied, are either inveterate dupes or unabashed anti-semites. Either they have been deceived by the Israel-haters, or they are haters themselves.

As the hasbara industry moves into overdrive, such slurs are becoming all too common – including against those Israel most urgently needs to cultivate as allies.

Judith Nir Mozes, the wife of interior minister Silvan Shalom, a Netanyahu confidant, possibly reflected high-level thinking in Israel when she tweeted last month a racist “joke” about President Barack Obama. “Do u know what Obama Coffee is? Black and weak,” she wrote, ridiculing the leader of Israel’s most important ally.

Similarly, the Israeli foreign ministry hurried to mock foreign journalists, even though they are hasbara’s target audience.

In a short animated video, a naïve reporter is shown claiming that the people of Gaza simply want peace as militants fire rockets just behind him. Next the reporter misidentifies Hamas’ tunnelling as the “first Palestinian subway system”. The video ends with a warning: “Open your eyes, terror rules Gaza.”

Michael Oren, Israel’s recently departed ambassador to the US, has joined the fray too, castigating American Jewish journalists as “self-haters” for their critical coverage of the Israeli prime minister.

Hasbara’s cartoon version of reality is not only unconvincing but, in alienating friends as much as foes, self-defeating. Netanyahu may hope to repackage Israel, but his product – ongoing oppression of Palestinians – is one few can be persuaded to buy.

*Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books). He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visti: www.jonathan-cook.net. (A version of this article first appeared in the National, Abu Dhabi.)

The post Israel’s Army Of Spin-Doctors Is Doomed To Defeat – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amalia Perez*

“¡Nicaragua no se vende!” protesters in the central city of Juigalpa exclaimed during the most recent demonstration opposing the proposed Nicaraguan Canal.[1] This rallying cry, Nicaragua is not for sale, reverberates throughout the country in momentous opposition to the construction of the canal—a $50 billion USD project spearheaded by Chinese venture capitalist billionaire, Wang Jing, and enthusiastically approved by the Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega.[2] The pair intend to slice Central America’s largest country in half with a canal three times the size of Panama’s, displaced communities and environmental degradation be damned.

A SECRET DEAL; A PUBLIC OUTCRY

In a characteristically clandestine arrangement, the Ortega administration approved the operation during a seven-day Congressional session in 2013, without parliamentary debate, public consultation, or prior feasibility/environmental impact studies.[3] The approval granted a 100-year concession to Wang Jing’s Cayman Island-based firm, the Hong Kong Nicaraguan Canal Development Investment Company (HKND). The parameters expropriated land rights to the 172 miles long by an average 1,000 feet wide stretch of Nicaraguan land on which the proposed project will be built, giving HKND carte blanche authority, without having to pay taxes, for the ensuing century.[4] Subsequently, the concession goes so far as to grant HKND the unqualified rights to construct “two deep sea ports, a free trade zone, an airport, cement and explosive factories, an electricity plant and upmarket hotels,” the Daily Beast reports, at the expense of land-owning Nicaraguans.[5]

The Interoceanic Grand Canal—as Ortega’s administration and HKND maintain it—will require twice as much concrete than is currently manufactured in all of Central America. This renders it the most ambitious infrastructural attempt to date. Intended to accommodate ships with the capacity for 12,000 tractor-trailers, the canal would traverse Lake Nicaragua, a 500,000 thousand year old bastion of ecological biodiversity.[6] The lake is at once of critical importance to the Nicaraguan historical memory as well as Central America’s bio-economy and inhabitants, as it is the largest water source in the region. The project would excavate land home to twenty-two endangered species, while simultaneously displacing as many as 28,000 Nicaraguans.[7] It is no wonder, then, that Ortega’s enthusiasm has mobilized opposition from indigenous campesino communities, urban constituencies, and high-level political opposition alike.

A FAR CRY FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY PAST

Contrary to the current protests against the president’s canal enthusiasm, which punctuate the Nicaraguan countryside, campesino support was once Ortega’s most formidable base. In 1979, Ortega arose to become a celebrated hero as a result of the bloody guerilla war against the authoritarian Somoza dynasty, championing the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s (FSLN, or Sandinistas) transition from revolutionary actor to coherent political party. The FSLN, under Ortega’s guidance as the Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction (1979-1985), organized a country previously besieged by a violent civil war into an emblem of leftist victory in Latin America.

This new order, however, was spearheaded by a hegemonic political order. Ortega was elected president from 1985 to 1990, during which Nicaragua was violently targeted by the U.S.-backed, trained, and armed anti-communist campaigns of the Contra rebels. Concurrently, FSLN’s internal structure was deteriorating as competing officials disagreed on how the conflict should be resolved. The amalgamation of these internal and external forces cost Ortega, and the FSLN, the presidential elections in 1990, reflecting the already waning popular support for Ortega. These elections precipitated the FSLN’s rapid devolvement into malfeasance and their consequent public demise, as news of their various corrupt, chaotic, and sometimes abusive efforts to expropriate goods, properties and businesses into their own hands during Ortega’s final few weeks in office elicited national notoriety as the Piñata scandal.[8] Ortega and the Sandinista’s diminishing popular support during the tumult of the late twentieth century foreshadows the contemporary chasms between Ortega—who, despite his tangible policy distance from original Sandinista politics, maintains the title of Sandinista—and the people.

Ortega and the FSLN reemerged anew in 2006—although present within a series of ad hoc governments, systematically gaining control of the National Assembly and judiciary—to win the presidency with only 38.07 percent of the popular vote.[9] The new face of the party, characterized by “Danielismo,”—the conspicuous concentration of wealth and power into the hands of Daniel Ortega and his inner circle, most notably his wife, First Lady Rosario Murillo—rendered the FSLN nearly unrecognizable to its former self. Granted, a few other Latin American leaders, most notably Brazil’s Lula da Silva, have followed a similar trajectory, conceding a once radicalized agenda for a capitalist economic structure in order to assimilate into the morphing of a global economy devoid of the Soviet Union.[10] However, Ortega’s Nicaragua is largely deprived of democracy, with Ortega employing an iron fist to orient the Supreme Court and other electoral authorities into “Orteguista” institutions, as well as to restrict the access to government programs and state jobs to card-carrying Sandinista party members.[11]

THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF DANIELISMO

Along with an authoritarian streak, Ortega’s term has been characterized by an escalating dichotomy. In the public sphere, he has re-branded himself as a devoted socialist, staunchly opposing U.S. imperialism by invoking the Sandinista rhetoric reminiscent of his civil-war days—decrying U.S.’s yanqui-dollar, for example. His policy platform upon entering office promised to abolish education matriculation fees while also launching a Zero Hunger program, which distributed one pig, 10 hens, a rooster and seeds to 15,000 families during his first year.[12] Yet, he has increasingly opened his country to foreign, free trade partnerships, forging business relationships with major economic superpowers, most notably corporations from the United States and China.

His diplomatic and economic alliance with the late former socialist president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, was critical to Nicaragua’s growth and development, as Nicaragua reportedly enjoyed $500 million USD a year from the Chávez regime. However, although he echoed much of Chávez’s condemnation of U.S. bred capitalism, Ortega’s economic policy has consistently diverged from this rhetoric. Since 2006, he has forged numerous bilateral trade agreements to establish Free Trade Zones in Nicaragua, while systematically incorporating domestic big business into the governmental sphere. While Chávez and Venezuela’s support is estimated to have added an entire percentage point to Nicaragua’s GDP growth rate between 2010-11,[13] Nicaragua has simultaneously been the country to benefit the most from the Dominican Republic-United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). An American University report cited that, in granting COSEP—Nicaragua’s premier alliance of business elites—more influence, “the business sector [now has] a seat at the table for board meetings of the central bank, the banking system oversight board, and the newly created state development bank, Banco Produzcamos, as well as an array of institutes governing social security, technical education, tourism, and competitiveness.”[14]

On the one hand, his economic decisions have proved fruitful relative to the rest of Central America’s economic development: Nicaragua’s GDP growth steadily rose over the course of his tenure—experiencing a brief dip during the financial crisis of 2009—whilst leading the region in double-digit investment and export growth.[15] On the other hand, however, the eclectic trade alliances forged by Ortega—and subsequent inconsistencies in his revolutionary principles and his contemporary policies—have put the Nicaraguan economy in a precarious, perpetually dependent position. The loss of aid from Venezuela following Chávez’s death has transferred economic influence over Nicaragua to the United States, given the U.S.’s veto powers within international aid agencies—which all too frequently exercise leverage over Nicaragua and other Central American nations—as well as Nicaragua’s reliance on exports to the U.S. via their engagement with CAFTA-DR.

Most notably consequent to the discrepancies between Ortega’s political rhetoric and economic action is the domestic condemnation it has earned his administration from opponents and those who once supported him alike. This odium has markedly escalated in the wake of the Canal controversy. After the announcement of the canal’s construction, Confidencial, one of Nicaragua’s few independent media outlets, reminded the public that in 2007, Ortega promised to not put Lake Nicaragua’s fresh water at risk with a canal project for “all the gold in the world.”[16] This statement was made right before the formative years of the Ortega-Chávez alliance, begging the question of what Chávez would think—and how Ortega would subsequently act—in the face of Wang Jing’s proposals.

Former, especially disgruntled factions of the FSLN have revolted against these contradictions, accusing Ortega of selling Nicaraguan sovereignty to the highest bidder. Swaths of former FSLN members have systematically broken off into several dissident organizations over the course of Ortega’s term, forming the Sandinista Renovation Movement and the Movement for the Rescue of Sandinismo, to name a few. They commit themselves to the deserving, founding principles of the FSLN as an alternative to the contemporary corruption and economic idiosyncrasies manifest in Ortega’s version of Sandinismo. After drafting a scathing dissent to the canal with prominent Nicaraguan signatories, Ortega’s former Vice President, Sergio Ramirez, declared via Twitter that, “With the Chinese canal, [Nicaragua’s] sovereignty is once again surrendered to a foreign power.”[17] His arguments underscore the popular disillusionment with Ortega; the frustration that he has betrayed his revolutionary principles for a project wildly incongruent with a socialist economy and democracy. María Duarte, a 72-year old former Sandinista combatant, sums up the sentiment with fervor, telling the Daily Beast, “He was like a son to us but he’s betrayed us, sold us out to the Chinese!”[18]

Thus, Ortega’s Canal deal is the culmination of decades of idiosyncratic governance, and represents the climatic deterioration of what Confidencial once summarized as a government that is “authoritarian in politics, pro-business in the economy, and populist in the social sphere.”[19] If Ortega follows through with the project, no longer will he be toeing the dubious line between capitalist and socialist. Rather, by granting a Chinese billionaire the ability to circumvent the Nicaraguan legal system and carte blanche to bisect the country with a canal dwarfing Panama’s, he is decisively favoring a capitalist reform agenda at the expense of his already precarious socialist populism.

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM NICARAGUA’S NEIGHBOR TO THE SOUTH

The slogans and anti-canal manifestos hint to a plethora of reasons why the canal would ultimately prove detrimental for Nicaragua, rather than “eradicate poverty,” as Ortega once declared.[20] Panama serves as an emblem of the corruption and inequality inextricable with such a project. Granted, the Panama Canal has injected astronomic amounts of capital into Panama’s economy, reigning in $1.91 billion USD in toll revenues during the 2014 fiscal year.[21] Skyscrapers and high-rises punctuate the capital city’s coveted waterfront property, which, despite having its property value nearly cut in half in 2008, has since bounced back as the government has expanded the canal. The large majority of these edifices are empty, though, towering as conspicuous echo chambers for the money laundering syndicates that built them.

Panama’s glorification as the “Latin American Singapore” comes at an immense price: social and income inequality have been markedly exacerbated since the United States handed over control of the canal to Panama in 2000.[22] The chasms that separate the educated, urban elite and the rural populations have widened, crystallizing what National Public Radio has dubbed a country of “have’s and have not’s.”[23] According to the World Bank, Panama’s poorest 20 percent of the population controls a dismal 3.2 percent of the country’s wealth, dwarfed in comparison to the 56.3 percent of the country’s wealth controlled by the richest 20 percent.[24] This has confined nearly 60 percent of rural residents to living below the poverty line.[25]

Along with the tangible inequality that has persisted in Panama as a result of the canal, Ortega’s decision to expose his country and constituents to a megaproject would perpetuate the notorious corruption that has proliferated in Panama, slapping hefty bond payments on the Panamanian people in the process. Transparency International ranks the Nicaraguan government as being markedly more corrupt than that of Panama, with Panama being the 94th least corrupt out of 175 countries in terms of “perceived level of public sector corruption in the country,” compared to Nicaragua’s rank of 138.[26] Moreover, the proposed Nicaraguan canal is three times the size of Panama’s. Not only is the proposed Nicaraguan canal being inserted into a more politically volatile environment than Panama, but the project itself is on an astronomically grander scale, inevitably subjecting the country to unimaginable levels of corruption, impunity and socio-financial inequality. The constituents would be forced to bear the brunt of such, as per the Panamanian model, wherein taxes will be levied on individuals in order to pay back $50 billion USD of bond payments.

THE NICARAGUAN ECONOMY NEEDS HELP, BUT IS A CANAL THE ANSWER?

Despite positive economic growth over the course of the 21st century, peaking in 2011 with a GDP growth rate of 5.4 percent, Nicaragua remains the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.[27] A staggering 42.5 percent of its population lives below the poverty line, and 80 percent in rural, infrastructurally impoverished regions.[28] Acutely aware of these realities, and his country’s dismal underemployment rate of 46.5 percent, Ortega initially heralded the canal project as being able to introduce one million jobs to the Nicaraguan economy.[29] This claim was quickly modified, with Ortega most recently declaring that it will provide the country with 250,000 jobs and will pronounce Nicaragua as the maritime capital of the world.[30] However, Nicaraguan economist Julio Francisco Báez notes that a project of this magnanimity is inherently transitory, thus so are the jobs it introduces.[31]

Báez emphasizes that the only effective way of transitioning from a developing to a developed country—a process that Ortega heralds the Canal as breaking ground for—is through a “deliberate, sustained, and persistent effort of structural change, maintained over time.”[32] Nicaragua’s current model, an economically and environmentally unsustainable megaproject, is the antithesis of this argument. Granted, the canal will ameliorate the country’s economic woes for a brief period. However, the temporary boom is not forecasted to benefit unemployed Nicaraguans as much as HKND and Ortega have promised. The outsourcing of jobs to Chinese workers will eclipse the political promises made by the Canal’s proponents. Moreover, the economic model of mega-infrastructure projects is such that the local economy is entirely excluded from the long-term benefits of a “private canal enclave”—evidenced by Panama’s Canal Zone—as the Canal will become self-sustaining and thus purely an obstruction of land from the perspective of local landowners, without the benefit of jobs, once built.[33] In its wake, Nicaragua’s localized, tradable activities such as agriculture, cattle raising, and the agro industry will be left uncompetitive within the global market, thus exacerbating the income inequalities between the elites benefiting from a privatized project and the largely indigenous local economies excluded from access to Nicaragua’s wealth.

More worrisome, the canal may not even benefit the Nicaraguan government or business elites. It could solely benefit Wang Jing and his company, given that, under the parameters of the concession, Nicaragua will receive a miniscule $10 million annually for the first decade without ownership.[34] Following the first decade of operation, Nicaragua will be granted a 10 percent increase in ownership stake every 10 years. Consequently, the Nicaraguan economy and the Nicaraguan canal will be rendered quasi-separate entities, relegated to adversarial spheres of influence, with the latter superseding the former in it’s economic power.

Along with the Canal fundamentally contradicting Ortega’s rhetoric, as well the principles of his allegedly Sandinista allegiance, the environmental degradation is staggering, as it will cleave Central America’s most important freshwater reservoir, Lake Nicaragua. A scientific report from Nature Magazine warns that the Nicaraguan “carve-up” would “splinter the…most fragile, pristine and scientifically important ecosystems in Central America.”[35] Ortega merely circumvented the charges, saying that Lake Nicaragua is “already contaminated.”

With no imminent end in sight for Ortega’s reign, and a lack of a clear plan by HKND for how to relocate the displaced indigenous and farmer families, the protests are escalating, but with little avail. Ortega and his cadre continue to wholly ignore the irrefutable environmental and economic warnings of the Canal project. Consequently, the once celebrated war-hero and self-proclaimed populist leader has been dubbed a “vendepatria”—a sellout—by many of his own people.

*Amalia Perez, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/06/14/thousands-protest-nicaraguan-canal

[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/can-a-chinese-billionaire-build-a-canal-across-nicaragua/2015/02/03/e9cf3482-9aa5-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html

[3] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/should-the-us-worry-about-chinas-canal-in-nicaragua/

[4] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/30/china-s-nicaragua-canal-could-spark-a-new-central-america-revolution.html

[5] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/30/china-s-nicaragua-canal-could-spark-a-new-central-america-revolution.html

[6] http://projects.aljazeera.com/2015/04/nicaragua-canal/displaced.html

[7] http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-america-nicaragua-canal-threatens-livelihoods-lives-villages

[8]http://www.academia.edu/2586719/The_Adaptation_of_the_FSLN_Daniel_Ortegas_Leadership_and_Democracy_in_Nicaragua

[9]http://www.academia.edu/2586719/The_Adaptation_of_the_FSLN_Daniel_Ortegas_Leadership_and_Democracy_in_Nicaragua

[10] http://www.coha.org/the-many-political-faces-of-daniel-ortega/

[11] http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047235,00.html

[12] https://nacla.org/article/et-tu-daniel-sandinista-revolution-betrayed

[13] http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/10/daniel-ortegas-reality-check/

[14]https://www.american.edu/clals/upload/Spalding_Business_and_State_in_Nicaragua.pdf

[15] http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047235,00.html

[16] http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/breaking-ground-nicaragua-canal

[17] http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/breaking-ground-nicaragua-canal

[18] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/30/china-s-nicaragua-canal-could-spark-a-new-central-america-revolution.html

[19] http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4904/la-paradoja-del-ldquo-capitalismo-revolucionario-rdquo

[20] http://thecostaricanews.com/national/work-continues-on-china-backed-nicaragua-canal-amid-serious-opposition/

[21] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/us-panama-canal-idUSKCN0I301H20141014

[22] http://www.economist.com/node/18959000

[23] http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/05/30/317394468/panamas-canal-divides-a-country-into-haves-and-have-nots

[24] http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/LAC

[25] Ibid.

[26] https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic/regional/americas

[27] http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/nicaragua/nicaragua_economy.html

[28] http://data.worldbank.org/country/nicaragua

[29] http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2013/06/19/politica/151455-canal-traera-un-millon-de-empleos-segun-secretario-presidencial

[30] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/30/china-s-nicaragua-canal-could-spark-a-new-central-america-revolution.html

[31] http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4736

[32] http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4736

[33] Ibid.

[34] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/should-the-us-worry-about-chinas-canal-in-nicaragua/

[35] http://www.nature.com/news/conservation-nicaragua-canal-could-wreak-environmental-ruin-1.14721#/map

The post Nicaragua Is Not For Sale: The Culmination Of President Ortega’s Inconsistent Presidency – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Uma Purushothaman*

In the congested Republican Presidential nominee field, Rand Paul stands apart. Most polls show him as being the third favourite Republican nominee behind Jeb Bush and Ben Carson.

The son of Ron Paul, the Presidential nominee of the Libertarian Party in 1988, Rand Paul is currently a senator from Kentucky. What makes Rand Paul stand apart from the rest of the Republican field is his Libertarianism. Libertarianism is a political philosophy which holds that any person is free to live his/her life in the way he/she chooses to so long as they respect equally together people’s rights to do so as well. Libertarians believe in maximising individual rights while minimising the role of the state. The Libertarian Party in the US has not been able to make real inroads into American politics because of the nature of the electoral system.

But now thanks partly to Paul’s bid for the Republican nomination, Libertarianism has become popular in American politics again. Tens of millions of Americans today are fiscally conservative, socially tolerant and sceptical of American military intervention abroad. David Boaz attributes the spread of Libertarianism to two factors: the spread of Libertarian ideas and sentiments and the expansion of government during the Bush and Obama administrations, particularly the civil liberties abuses after 9/11 and the bailouts and out-of-control spending after the financial crisis. Paul also is a supporter of the Tea Party, which propagates minimum role for the government.

Paul has similar positions with the rest of the Republicans on economic issues and most social issues, advocating lower taxes and decreasing government spending. He is against abortion, except in cases where the woman’s health is at stake. He is not in favour of same sex marriage, preferring instead a marriage contract between same sex couples. He is against Affordable Care Act , suggesting that it has made insurance expensive and is taking away choice. But in contrast to many Republicans, he has been supportive of moderating the marijuana laws.

He opposes all gun control. Unlike some Republicans, he is openly critical of racial discrimination by law enforcement authorities and supports demilitarising the police. Writing on the Ferguson unrest for Time magazine, Paul said: “Anyone who thinks that race does not still, even if inadvertently, skew the application of criminal justice in this country is just not paying close enough attention. Our prisons are full of black and brown men and women who are serving inappropriately long and harsh sentences for non-violent mistakes in their youth.” He also launched his campaign, talking at length about inner city poverty and pledging to repeal any law that disproportionately incarcerates people of colour”. This is a refreshing change from most establishment Republicans.

Rand Paul is in favour of immigration reform so long as it is coupled with increased border security. He is also against the deportation of immigrants who are not criminals.

He is a vehement critic of the Patriot Act. In fact, he has worked and campaigned against the NSA’s surveillance of telephone records, even carrying out a filibuster-like speech against it recently.

On foreign policy, Paul has a non interventionist stance, quite unlike that of the rest of the Republican field. He is not in favour of the US getting involved in any war unless as a last resort and then only if there is a credible and imminent threat. Also, he believes that as mandated by the US Constitution, wars must be authorised by the Congress.

Paul has strongly criticised the Iraq War describing it as a mistake and saying that if he had been a Senator when the war was voted on, he would have voted against it. Talking about the invasion of Iraq, he has said that “Each time we topple a secular dictator, I think we wind up with chaos, and radical Islam seems to rise.” He has blamed his own party for contributing to the rise of the ISIS by providing arms indiscriminately. He is against US troops on the ground against the ISS and wants Arab troops to take the lead in fighting it. Paul had also opposed US action in Syria even before the ISIS created its Caliphate. Though he supported US airstrikes against the ISIS, he was unhappy that Obama had gone ahead without a Congressional mandate on this. On US-Israel ties, he believes that it should be Israel’s prerogative to decide on how it defends itself and the US should not be advising Israel on this. He has been critical of Obama’s efforts to keep Iraq unified and has supported a separate homeland for the Kurds. He has been supportive of negotiations with Iran, unlike many Republicans, though he wants the deal to be approved by Congress.

He has called for reducing foreign aid, saying that the US should not donate to countries which are unfriendly to it and burn American flags. He has supported President Obama’s outreach towards Cuba. On the TPP and granting Obama the Trade Promotion Authority, which most Republicans have supported, Rand Paul voted against it citing lack of access to Congress of the full text of the mega Free Trade Agreement.

As he runs for the nomination, Paul has moderated some of his positions so that he is not branded an isolationist. He no longer wants steep cuts to the Pentagon’s budget or complete elimination of foreign aid.

As Paul fights for the nomination, his biggest weakness may well be his Libertarianism—the perception that he is weak on national security. But with the growing Libertarian constituency and undecided voters, he might have more than a fair shot at securing the nomination. In any case, his refreshing, if unorthodox views, views have made the battle for the Republocan nomination much more interesting.

*Uma Purushothaman is a Research Fellow at Observer research Foundation, Delhi

The post Rand Paul’s Libertarian View Of World – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

What is democracy? Millions of people around the world think that they live in democratic nations, but facts belie the dearly held mythology. We certainly have opportunities to vote and a plethora of legislative bodies ranging from city councils to congress to parliaments. What we don’t have is a seat at the table when decisions are made which impact our very lives. Those rights are reserved for the lords of capital and the people they choose to do their dirty work.

The Greek people used an opportunity to make their voices heard, but it isn’t clear that they will have the ultimate say in the decisions that determine their fate. Greeks have already lost jobs, pensions, and medical care to the meet the demands of the people who ruined their economy. They voted for the Syriza party in hopes of extricating themselves from the hell created by banksters and corrupt politicians. In a July 5, 2015 referendum they voted against the most recent demands for austerity from the troika comprised of the European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Commission.

It was vitally important that the Greeks voted no and by such a large margin, but that is not the end of the story by any means. Other countries have been placed in the same position of agreeing to onerous austerity terms in order to make good on the corrupt bets that started at the top. Ireland and Spain were victimized by the 2008 bursting of the housing bubble, Greece went into a tailspin because of machinations from politicians and big banks like Goldman Sachs. The governor of the United States commonwealth/colony Puerto Rico recently declared that $72 billion in debt created by predatory lending is “unpayable.” The people didn’t create these crises but they are the ones who suffered in the aftermath.

While people all over the world rejoiced vicariously through the Greek voters’ fearless choice, they too are subjected to the same wrong doing. Residents of Detroit, Michigan are living with the derivatives schemes which pushed that city into bankruptcy. Michigan residents had in fact voted against the emergency manager laws which made bankruptcy possible but they lived under a decidedly undemocratic regime. It nullified their political rights and stole their public assets while rewarding the banks who committed the crime. The Puerto Rican government recently hired as a consultant the same bankruptcy judge who oversaw the looting of Detroit. The lords of capital ignore the sovereignty of national governments like Greece or cities like Detroit. We are seeing how much or rather how little democracy we actually have.

The term Pyrrhic victory is a reference to Greek ancient history. Now in the 21^st century they are living with the reality of those words. The day after what seemed to be a tremendous triumph, finance minister Yanis Varoufakis resigned with this explanation. “Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement.” Capitalism is nothing if not resilient and its enforcers won’t give up without a fight. The Greek politicians and the people they represent are already being punished for speaking up against their masters.

For the next year Americans will be assaulted with endless news stories about the November 2016 presidential election. What we won’t have are discussions about the lack of choices we are presented with. Neither democrats nor republicans question bailing out the financial institutions which call the shots for individuals and for governments. No one gets to be president without first performing for the rich donor casting call and getting their seal of approval. Like clairvoyants we can already predict that the winner in November 2016 will be someone who repeats the mantra that banks are too big to fail and must be bailed out indefinitely with public money.

Greeks are being asked to choose whether they would rather be shot or hanged. They should be able to leave the eurozone and once again have their own currency but the road to freedom will come at a high price. Already they can’t access their own bank accounts. Already they have seen their political leaders forced to walk back from their pledge to represent their citizens. If they declare their freedom unilaterally they will pay a very high price.

Fictitious capital is the culprit of the Greece crisis and the warnings about it from 2008 must not be forgotten today. The beast is known by many names. Derivatives schemes killed Detroit. The Eurozone killed Greece. The housing bubble still haunts Americans, Irish and Spanish citizens. Puerto Rico is planning to cut public employment and its minimum wage. In ringing the alarm in 2008 former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt said, “When everything is for sale social cohesion disintegrates and the system collapses.” That is a perfect description for our lives today.

The struggle for freedom continues and it will exact a huge toll on all of us. We must know that we are all Greek, no matter where we live in the world. At any time the plug can be pulled and we can be told to pay for the wrong doing of others. The capital may be fictitious but the suffering it causes is all too real.

The post Greece, Debt And Democracy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Michael Lelyveld

China’s foreign trade has sagged far below government targets as the country’s traditional engine of growth begins to drag on the economy.

The country is struggling to meet the government’s goal of 6-percent trade growth for 2015 after total imports and exports fell 7.8 percent in the first five months, according to General Administration of Customs (GAC) figures.

The problems for trade are an underlying concern for China’s once-booming economy as growth rates fade and investors struggle to digest a 12-percent loss in the country’s key stock market last week.

On Friday, the Shanghai Composite Index dropped 5.7 percent, contributing to a slide of over 28 percent from a high recorded just three weeks before. On Monday, the index rebounded slightly with a 2.4-percent gain after a series of supportive measures over the weekend.

But the negative turn in trade suggests longer-term trouble for the economy following a trend of weakening growth over several years.

In 2014, total trade rose 3.4 percent in U.S. dollar terms, less than half the government target of 7.5 percent. In 2013, trade increased 7.6 percent, falling short of an 8-percent growth goal, GAC data showed.

In 2012, trade gained 6.2 percent against a 10-percent target. The last year of double-digit growth was 2011, when trade soared 22.5 percent as both imports and exports surged by over 20 percent.

The downturn deepened in May, when exports declined 2.8 percent and imports dropped 18.1 percent from the year-earlier period in yuan terms.

While exports have posted a string of monthly losses, the import slide has been particularly steep.

“The data shows the Chinese economy is still in the process of seeking a bottom,” said Liu Yaxin, macro strategist at China Merchants Securities in Shenzhen, as cited by Reuters.

Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, said the slippage in imports is a sign of slower expansion and consumer demand at a time when China has promoted a shift to a consumption-led economy.

Although official first-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7 percent was the lowest since 1999, the 17.2-percent dip in five-month imports suggests that real growth may be worse.

“The economy is underperforming,” said Hufbauer. “The government is probably topping up the statistics to portray a better picture than in fact exists. I think Chinese consumers as well as industries are pulling back.”

Export issues

On the export side, several factors have contributed to the tough times for trade.

China’s key foreign markets have recovered only slowly from the global financial crisis, creating less demand for its products abroad.

“The lethargic world economy is the main reason,” said Hufbauer. “The markets are not growing for the kinds of things that China typically sells.”

Through April, for example, the value of exported garments and clothing accessories fell 4.6 percent. Rare earth exports, used in cellphones and electronics, lost over 30 percent. In the broad category of high-tech products, exports rose a scant 0.5 percent.

Higher labor costs have also made China less competitive with lower-cost or closer suppliers like Vietnam and Mexico.

In a sense, weaker export growth has been a sign of transition in China, although change has come at a cost.

In its current Five-Year Plan through 2015, the central government targeted annual minimum wage increases of 13 percent, and while wages are set locally, the gains have been largely achieved.

In the manufacturing center of coastal Guangdong province, average minimum wages rose 19 percent in May after a previous hike two years earlier, Xinhua reported.

Monthly pay in the capital Guangzhou increased 22.2 percent to 1,895 yuan (U.S. $305), the official news agency said.

But higher wages have added to China’s manufacturing costs.

As of last year, costs of labor and social insurance in Vietnam were less than half of those in China. In India, the costs were 22 percent of China’s, consultants Dezan Shira & Associates in Hong Kong said.

Exchange rates and regional tension

While cost comparisons are pushing low-wage exporting to other countries, exchange rates have also been playing a part.

China’s yuan has been virtually pegged to the U.S. currency all year, trading in a narrow range of around 6.2 to the dollar. But as the greenback has strengthened, so has the yuan against other currencies, making China’s goods less competitive in many markets.

Through April, China’s exports to the United States were up 9 percent in dollar value, but exports to the European Union were down 1 percent.

Regional tensions with Japan have also hurt China’s trade. Imports from and exports to Japan have been falling since 2013.

In the first four months of this year, imports and exports were both down by over 12 percent, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) said.

Ironically, China’s trade growth was stronger when the world economy was weaker during the global downturn of 2008-2010.

Hufbauer said that may have been due to longer-term supply contracts and investments that kept exports flowing. Lower wage costs and weaker currency may also have played a part.

But clearer readings of China’s trade data may be clouded by past inflows of “hot money.” The illicit moves by currency speculators, disguised as payments for phantom exports with fake invoices, have skewed official growth rates for years.

Interpretations of the import slide are also complicated by commodities like crude oil and iron ore that have risen in volume but fallen in value as prices have plunged.

As of April, oil imports have climbed 7.8 percent by volume this year, but the U.S. dollar value has dropped by over 43 percent, driving trade totals down.

Government response

China’s government has promoted several remedies for the declining trade trends, including its “belt and road” initiatives to establish modern versions of historic Silk Road trade routes.

Premier Li Keqiang has pushed innovation, high-tech exports and services to reduce reliance on traditional manufacturing and assembly operations, where China has lost competitive ground.

“Previously known as the low-cost factory of the world, China is no longer satisfied with low-value manufacturing,” Xinhua said in May.

Li has sought a solution in “international industrial capacity cooperation,” a plan to transplant the surplus manufacturing of entire industries like steel overseas.

What this will do for China’s economy in the long term remains to be seen, but the trade benefits appear doubtful.

In recent weeks, China has also reached significant free trade agreements with South Korea and Australia, which are more likely to spur trade growth over time.

Free trade agreements have the potential to boost bilateral trade by 50 percent or more after phase-in periods that can last years, but near-term effects are usually “quite small,” Hufbauer said.

In the case of China’s agreement with South Korea, tariffs on over 90 percent of products on both sides will be abolished within 20 years, Xinhua reported.

In the deal with Australia, tariffs will drop to zero “immediately” on 85.4 percent of traded goods, while full implementation will take 11 years, state media said.

The post China Trade Growth Tumbles Amid Weakened Demand – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Monish Tourangbam*

There are no elections without campaigns, and there are no campaigns without money. However, the amount of money which are expected to be raised and spent in the campaigns leading to the US Presidential elections of 2016 are being seen as unprecedented. At the centre of this complex cycle between big money and US election campaigns are the new breed of organisations called the Super PACs (Political Action Committees) with the ability to raise and spend unlimited amount of money for any candidate, outside the official and traditional campaign of the candidate. So, how did these organisations emerge? What is the political philosophy guiding the Super PACs’ ‘sky is the limit’ approach towards fundraising and campaign expenditure?

Super PACs came to the political scene as a result of the US Supreme Court ruling in 2010 in the Citizens United Case that considered monetary contributions as a form of protected speech. Rules also allow candidates to raise funds for their super PACs as long as they have not formally announced their candidature. Some analysts see this prospect as the probable reason behind some of the Republican candidates including former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker delaying their official entry into the laundry list of Republican candidates for the primary season. This luxury is not accorded to federal officials such as sitting senators who are restricted by federal fundraising limits in a presidential run: $5,400 per maximum per donor, for the primary and general election combined. Thus, senators like Ted Cruz, Rand Paul and Marco Rubio announced their candidacies earlier.

Sources have pointed out that big donors often contribute large sums through shell corporations that appear in the Super PACs filing, but scant information is usually available about the owner. Compared to the Democratic camp which anyway seems to be overshadowed by Hillary Clinton’s candidature, an army of Super PACs supporting their preferred candidates are seen in the Republican Party. Obscene amount of money have and are being amassed for the campaigns and this is just mid-2015, early days in the trail leading to the big day towards the end of 2016. Jeb Bush’s Super PAC ‘Right to Rise’ is being seen as one of the most prominent ones in the campaign fray, with Bush’s networks of supporters, thanks to years of campaign experience in the family and their reach into the deep pockets of the Republican donor world. In fact, many other camps setting their sights on the crowded Republican primaries sense a fear of onslaught from the pro-Bush ‘Right to Rise’. However, other candidates in the fray including Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Texas Senator Ted Cruz also have powerful and wealthy Super PACs backing their candidatures.

The group of Super PACs formed to support Cruz, have been reportedly using an innovative way of diversifying the donor base. All the Super PACs constituting the network namely- Keep the Promise PAC, Keep the Promise PAC I, Keep the Promise PAC II and Keep the Promise PAC III-all support Cruz’s candidature but with different points of focus or methods, allowing donors to have more control over how their money is used. Elections are run and won on the basis of potent messages, but it also matters how those messages are relayed and replayed in the voters’ imaginations. As Republican strategist Warren Tompkins who is running the pro-Rubio Super PAC Conservative Solutions said, “This race will be won by the candidate with the best vision for where to take this nation and the resources to ensure that message is heard.””…we’re going to spend the next two years ensuring that the resources are there and used to effectively share that vision with voters,” Tompkins added.

Many with experience in campaign works have contended that support from a Super PAC has become inevitable to win elections. Although liberal Democratshave expressed uneasiness over Hillary’s growing affinity to Super PACs like Priorities USA Action, Clinton’s campaign have defended it as a pragmatic move on her part.The Democratic Party has had a complex love-hate relationship with Super PACs, with their candidates including Hillary often employing rhetoric against big money in politics. Although Democrats initially opposed the decision of the Supreme Court in the Citizens United case, political exigency paved the way for President Obama ending his distance from Priorities USA Action during his 2012 re-election campaign. Officials of the Clinton campaign asserted that it would beunwise on the part of Hillary to stay away from Super PACs, while the Republican candidates had super wealthy Super PACs on their side. Former Vermont governor and Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean said, “Unfortunately, if you don’t play by the same rules everybody else does, you end up losing elections.””The key is to change the rules, and I think we have a much better chance of doing that with her as president than we do with one of the Republicans,” Dean argued.

In a matter of few years, Super PACs have moved to the centre-stage of the US political system. A new trend has started whereby most of the close advisers of the Presidential candidates, who usually would have been expected to join the official campaign are either joining or are expected to join the super PACs supporting the candidates. This questions the very presumption that by law, the candidates and their super PACs are not supposed to be coordinating directly. These include poll strategists and campaign advisers like Jesse Benton for Rand Paul, Mike Murphy for Jeb Bush, Keith Gilkes for Scott Walker among others. With close aides moving to the Super PACs, the clout of these organisations are bound to increase, and theiractivities diversified perhaps moving from mostly TV attack ads as were seen during 2012, to more traditional campaign roles ranging from field organizing and voter turnout to direct mail and digital micro-targeting. Despite rules denying direct coordination between candidates and Super PACs, the presidential candidates can attend Super PAC fundraisers as long as they do not ask for donations directly.

Need for campaign finance regulations are regularly espoused by campaign watchdog groups like Democracy 21 but the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has been found seriously wanting in its ability to rein in the extent to which big money is involved and loopholes in legalities are being used by candidates and Super PACs.And as the election fever heats up in America, more mudslinging and more negative ads should be expected during the campaign. Besides the Super PACs, there are non-profit groups also in the game that can raise unlimited sums without disclosing the source of their funding. Election watchers and activists in the United States seem to be clearly worried with the rise of the Super PACs, and the way candidates are redrawing the red lines of campaign finance regulations. However, reading the trends of campaign fundraising and spending in the United States, one can only say-when the genie is out of the bottle, it is hard to put it back.

*Dr. Monish Tourangbam is Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka

The post Super PACs And US Campaign Fundraising: Sky Is The Limit – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Leo Suryadinata*

Golkar, the second largest party in Indonesia, has split into two—the Aburizal Bakrie faction and the Agung Laksono faction.

The first faction held the national congress (Munas) in Bali between 30 November and 4 December 2014, at which Aburizal Bakrie (known as Ical) was re-elected general chairman, and the second held its own national congress in Jakarta on 6-8 December 2014 at which Agung Laksono (known as Agung) was elected general chairman. Both claim to be the genuine representative of Golkar and submitted their individual case to the Golkar Party Court for official recognition.

On 3 March 2015, after two months of deliberation, the four-judge court announced an ambiguous verdict. Since the Ical faction had submitted its case to the State Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara or PTUN), two of the judges (Muladi and HAS Natabaya) wished to wait for the State Court’s decision before taking a stand. The other two (Djasri Marin and Andi Mattalatta) favoured the Agung faction on the grounds that the Jakarta congress was “more open, transparent and democratic.”1 The latter two judges nevertheless stated that the Agung faction should hold a Golkar national congress (Munas) by October 2016 at the latest. The Court’s decision was expectedly taken by the Agung faction as a legal victory. In Agung’s words: “We accept the verdict of the Partai Golkar Court that the Jakarta congress is a legal one, at least this is the view of the two judges of the Party Court, and no judge ever said that the Jakarta congress is illegal.”2

The Ical faction, however, considered the verdict a split decision.3

Soon after the Party Court announced its verdict, Yasonna Laoly, the Law and Human Rights Minister, issued a statement on 10 March saying that he accepted Golkar Party Court’s decision and recognized Agung as the rightful general chairman of the Golkar Party. He also stated that Agung should set up the Central Board (DPP) and also absorb members of the Ical faction for the sake of reconciliation. The Minister further noted that the position that Agung held would be valid for a year (until October 2016) when the party’s National Congress would be held again.4 His recommendations coincided with those of the two judges of the Golkar Party Court that favoured Agung.

The Ical faction protested against the Minister for siding with Agung and sued him at the State Administrative Court.

As soon as Agung received the verdict from the Golkar Party Court, he proclaimed that he would withdraw Golkar from the oppositional Red and White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih) and join the ruling “Outstanding Indonesia Coalition” (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat). Jusuf Kalla, the Vice-President of Indonesia and former general chairman of Golkar, welcomed Golkar’s move to join the government party coalition. Surya Paloh, chairman of Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem Party) and Wiranto, chairman of Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura Party), both former leaders of Golkar, met with Agung and also welcomed his decision. In fact, it was Jusuf Kalla and Surya Paloh who had helped Agung in his endeavor to become general chairman of Golkar. It was also the two of them who lobbied Megawati (chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle, PDI-P) to get the Minister of Law and Human Rights (who is from the PDIP) to issue a statement recognizing Agung as the rightful general chairman of Golkar.5

Golkar joining the ruling coalition would give the coalition a majority in parliament. This would definitely benefit the Jokowi government. At the moment, the coalition government has 246 seats in parliament, making up 43.9% of the seats. With the Golkar Party in its ranks, the coalition government would have 337 seats. i.e. 60.2% of the seats in parliament.

THE VICISSITUDES OF JAVANESE INFLUENCE IN GOLKAR

However, will the Agung faction be able to curtail or co-opt members of the Ical faction and consolidate its own power? Let us look at a brief history of Golkar in order to gain a possible answer.

Partai Golkar was called Sekber Golkar (abbreviated as Golkar) during the Suharto era and was first organized in 1964 as a loose federation of anti-communist socio-political groups. Many of these were linked to the military. When General Suharto came to power after the 1965 coup, this organization was reorganized and turned into an electoral machine in order to legitimize the military regime of Suharto. Between 1971 and 1998 six general elections were held, and Golkar, which aimed at defending the interests of the New Order regime and the Suharto family, won between 62% and 74% of the votes in these elections.6

Suharto was the chief Pembina (“Mentor”) of Golkar. In reality, he controlled the organization. He was solely responsible for policy making and for the selection of top leaders in Golkar. In his 32-year rule, Golkar had six general chairmen, the majority of whom came from the Javanese ethnic group and five out of six of these were military men. The only civilian general chairman was the last one, Harmoko, an ex-journalist who created his own newspaper empire who was also a Javanese. Due to the Javanese domination and the image of Suharto—he was often seen by outsiders as a “Javanese king”—Golkar was also perceived as a “Javanese-based political party”.

Suharto thus had absolute control over Golkar. Nevertheless, towards the end of his rule, his control over the military began to weaken and he had to rely on civilians, especially those with Islamic background, to strengthen his grip. One could begin to see the emerging struggle between the military faction and the non-military faction within Golkar, but there was no open conflict while Suharto was still at the helm. However, the moment Suharto stepped down, the struggle for power came into the open. The civilian faction in Golkar gradually succeeded in curtailing the power of the military faction.

In July 1998, a few months after Suharto’s downfall, Golkar officially became Partai Golkar or the Golkar Party; and the military faction and non-military faction competed for the top leadership of the party. The military faction was represented by the retired general, Edi Sudradjat, while the other was represented by Akbar Tanjung, a former leader of the Muslim Student’s Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI). Akbar eventually won and became the party’s general chairman. From this time onward, Golkar was never again led by an ex-military man or ethnic Javanese.

GOLKAR AND THE GOVERNMENT

Being a Batak, Akbar appeared to be a transitional figure. He soon lost his position to another Muslim businessman, the Buginese Jusuf Kalla. Apparently, Jusuf Kalla, then Vice-President of Indonesia, had the full support of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and the party saw the advantages of having the Vice-President as its general chairman. Nevertheless, SBY in running for a second term as president in 2009 did not select Jusuf Kalla as his partner. Jusuf Kalla decided to run for president as well but was defeated.

He also lost the Golkar general chairmanship to the wealthy Sumatran businessman Aburizal Bakrie (Ical). Ical had supported SBY, who, in being re-elected rewarded Ical with the position of Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. However, during the 2014 presidential elections, Ical supported Prabowo who lost his bid for the presidency, and Golkar became part of the opposition camp.

With the downfall of Suharto, Golkar saw dissatisfied key members leaving to establish their own parties. If we don’t include SBY, who was not an office bearer anyway, there were at least three such leaders: General Wiranto who set up Hanura Party in 2006, General Prabowo Subianto who established Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) in 2008 and Surya Paloh who founded the NasDem party in 2010.

AGUNG FACES CHALLENGES

The parliamentary elections were held in April 2014, in which Golkar lost ground. It only obtained 91 seats, 15 fewer than in 2009. Many in the party blamed Ical for this. At the same time, he was unable to gain support from other parties to be nominated as presidential candidate. In fact, his nomination faced opposition within his own party, where Agung refused to endorse Ical because his electability was in question, due to his business firm’s involvement in a scandalous industrial disaster in Sidoarjo (East Java).

By October 2014, the differences between Ical and Agung had divided Golkar into two factions. The Ical faction supported Prabowo while the Agung faction sided with Jokowi. Ical hastily planned the IX Golkar National Congress to be held in Bali between 30 November and 4 December 2014. The spokesman of the Ical faction, Theo Sambuaga, made the announcement only on 24 November 2014. In response, Agung held the Central Board meeting at Golkar headquarters and set up the “Save Golkar Presidium” (Presidium Penyelamat Golkar), as part of his plan to oust Ical.7

Those who did not support Ical were barred from attending the Bali congress, and it was reported that those involved in the “Save Golkar Presidium” were expelled from the party. As the sole candidate at the Bali congress, Ical was elected general chairman, and by acclamation, not by secret ballot. The congress also nominated the Golkar Central Board, which included many better-known figures linked to the New Order. Veteran politician Akbar Tanjung was made the Assessment Board Chairman, but this was more in recognition of his seniority and offered no real power. The nine deputy general chairpersons included Fadel Muhammad, a businessman who was former leader of the HMI, and Siti Hedianti Harijadi, the daughter of Suharto and ex-wife of Prabowo. (For the list, see Appendix 1).

The Agung faction had initially planned to hold the party congress in January 2015 but was forced to hold it in Jakarta on 6 December 2014, two days after the Bali congress ended. Three candidates were proposed, and Agung was elected general chairman. His Golkar Central Board members appear to be younger and less established. (For the list, see Appendix 2).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Partai Golkar has developed into a formal political party after the end of the New Order. Its support came more strongly from the Outer Islands, making it a multi-ethnic party that is now led by non-Javanese. It is not yet clear if Agung will succeed in becoming the sole legitimate leader of Golkar by garnering majority support and defeating the Ical faction. The composition of Agung’s Central Board has yet to be accepted by the government and many of Golkar’s members in parliament remain supportive of Ical. Moreover, on 1 April, the State Administrative Court temporarily suspended the Law and Human Rights Minister’s decision to endorse the Agung faction.

Will the support of the government for the Agung faction be enough for him to gain the upper hand? It is still too early to tell. Nevertheless, the victory or failure of Agung will have a big impact on the parliamentary strength of the Jokowi government.

About the author:
* Leo Suryadinata is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective Number 34 (PDF)

Appendix:

1. Golkar Central Board: The Aburizal Bakrie (Ical) Version
Chairman of Assessment Board: Akbar Tanjung General Chairman: Aburizal Bakrie
Deputy General Chairmen (9 persons): Theo Sambuaga
Nurdin Halid
Setya Novanto
Sjarif Cicip Sutardjo
Fadel Muhammad
Siti Hediati Harijadi (Titiek Soeharto) Ahmadi Noor Supit
Ade Komaruddin
Aziz Syamsuddin
Chairmen of Various fields (Ketua Bidang, 36 persons) Ketua Harian: Moh. Sulaeman Hidajat
Secretary-General: Idrus Marham Deputy secretaries (36 persons) Treasurer-General: Bambang Soesatyo Deputy Treasurers (34 persons)
(Source: “Inilah Pengurus DPP Partai Golkar Hasil Munas Bali”, Tempo.Co., 4 December 2014)
2. Golkar Central Board: The Agung Laksono Version
General Chairman: Agung Laksono
Deputy General Chairmen (3 persons): Priyo Budi Santoso
Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita
Yorrys Raweyai
Chairmen of various fields (Ketua, 22 persons)
Secretary-General: Zainuddin Amali Deputy secretaries (19 persons)
Treasurer-General: Sari Yuliati Deputy Treasurers (18 persons)
(Source: “Ini susunan pengurus Golkar Munas di Ancol”, Kompas.com 8 December 2014)

Notes:
1. See “ Makalah Partai Golkar Putuskan Manerima Munas versi Agung Laksono “, Kompas.Com 3 March 2015 (Accessed 12/5/2015).
2. Ibid., See also “Hasil keputusan hakim makamah Golkar: Kubu Agung dinyatakan sah.” Metrobali 3/3/2015, accessed 29/4/2015.
3. Ranny Virginia Utami, “Gugatan baru kubu Ical untuk kepastian hokum”, CNN Indonesia, 6 March 2015 (Accessed 12/5/2015).
4. “Menkumham: Kepengurusan Golkar Kubu Agung Hanya 2016, Kompas.com 12 March 2015 (Accessed 29/4/2015)
5. “Tangan Daeng di Rumah Beringin”, Tempo, 29 March 2015, pp.38-39.
6 .Leo Suryadinata, “The Decline of the Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, (vol. 29, no.2) August 2007, p.336.
7. Elvan Dany Sutrisno , “Golkar pecah, ini peta pertarungan kubu Ical vs Agung Laksono Cs”, Detiknews, 26/11/2014

The post Indonesia’s Golkar Splits: But Who Will Emerge The Winner? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The California state legislature recently announced that it will postpone a vote on the proposal to remove the statue of Fr. Serra from the U.S. Capitol. California State Senator Ricardo Lara is responsible for both authoring the proposal and requesting that the vote be postponed. Lara cited Pope Francis’ upcoming visit as the reason for the postponement.

California Assemblyman William P. Brough and Sen. Pat Bates welcomed the good news. According to a joint statement released by Brough and Bates, “Debating such a bill just before the pope’s visit would have conveyed a terrible message to him and millions of Catholics around the world, contradicting California’s reputation as a tolerant and welcoming place for all people.”

Now that the California legislature has agreed to a delay, perhaps they can take this opportunity to reconsider the proposal and drop the matter entirely. The Catholic League has contended that the opposition to Fr. Serra’s statue rises out of misunderstandings of his work and legacy. It was to correct such misunderstandings that I published the booklet, The Noble Legacy of Fr. Serra; it was distributed to interested parties in California and beyond.

John Liston, executive director of Serra International, expressed his gratitude for my effort. “I think it went a long way in assisting the California legislature to suspend the vote to remove the statue of Fr. Serra from Statuary Hall,” he said.

The Catholic League applauds the California state legislature for postponing the vote to remove Fr. Serra’s statue. It should now reconsider the entire issue.

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The display of political bonhomie, evident during the latest visit to Dhaka by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and a sense of finality over the Indo-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, have injected a new dynamic in the interactions between these two South Asian countries. However, other crucial issues, in particular, the sharing of river waters, remain to be solved. These will require the continuation of the good neighbourly spirit.

By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury*

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to like travelling. None of his predecessors had packed so many trips into his or her first year in office. Of course all these have been undertaken in the furtherance of his foreign policy goals. Some, such as those to the United States, China and Japan have been perceived by analysts to be more successful. Others, like those to Mongolia, Fiji and Mauritius, less so – arguably at least. No matter, for such an outcome was to be expected in terms of logic.

Many of Mr Modi’s foreign sojourns have been targeted at the expatriate non-resident Indians (NRIs) and foreign nationals of Indian origin. Their numbers and clout are growing. They cannot as yet vote in India. But they have money, and no politician can afford to discount its value in electoral politics. Neither does Mr Modi. The massive endorsement, bordering on adulation, he receives from the crowds seems to buttress his sense of satisfaction. Indians abroad sometimes suffer from perceptions, rightly or wrongly, of marginalisation in their host communities. Mr Modi’s international stature, representing an India on the rise, has been an awesome morale-booster.

His aim in choosing Dhaka in Bangladesh as his nineteenth foreign destination was different. It was at the core of his South Asian policy. Currying favours with NRIs formed no part of it. The purpose was to try and win the hearts and minds of a people and government, with whom India’s relationship has been legendarily fraught with bitter-sweet complexities. Its path has been marked by petulance and pitfalls. This is why Mr Modi took his time to go. Much homework had to be done both at home, and also with Bangladesh. Chief Ministers of States bordering Bangladesh had to be brought in line with Delhi’s purposes. Mr Modi’s comfort levels with foreign dignitaries have often been higher than those with his compatriot leadership.

The relationship between Bangladesh and India has been tricky from the start. This, despite the fact that Bangladesh’s nascence as a sovereign nation-state in 1971 would not have been possible without Indian military and political support. But the history of the Indian subcontinent, dating back to pre-colonial times, has been replete with examples of Bengal standing up to Delhi. At independence Bangladesh found itself geographically ‘India-locked’. In order to consolidate its identity, it sought to follow a policy of living ‘in concord with’, but ‘distinct from’ its larger and more powerful neighbour. On occasions, it tended to follow the ‘pilot-fish’ behaviour pattern, that is ‘tacking close to the shark’ (or a larger fish) in order to avoid being eaten. At other times, Bangladesh wanted to expand its room for manoeuvre. This included the creation of external linkages (such as with China) to reduce the power-gap with, or at least dependence upon the neighbour. India saw itself as the pre-eminent regional actor and, at times, behaved accordingly. This was, at times, frowned upon by its smaller neighbours.

For instance, Bangladesh’s demands for an equitable share of the common rivers, or the exchange of tiny enclaves (an issue that was a left-over from the past), were often seen by Dhaka to have been ignored. Bangladesh was also accused of providing a safe haven to India’s insurgents, among other things. From time to time it created bad blood.

Nuances of Bangladeshi Identity

Sometimes, the nature of this relationship depended on who were in power in Dhaka and in Delhi. Broadly speaking, there are two constituent elements in the Bangladeshi national identity: ‘Bengaliness’ and ‘Muslimness’. The Awami League, headed by the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, with its secularist tendencies, represents the former; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, with its right-of-centre predilections, the latter. The dichotomy is not a happy one. It has spawned a kind of chaotic democracy, often marred by extreme violence. The Awami League was often seen as leaning towards the India’s Congress Party, and vice-versa. The BNP, some have assessed, is being ambivalent towards India in general and the Congress in particular, precisely because of the perceived Congress-League linkages. When Mr Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) swept to power in the Indian elections in May 2014, both sides in Bangladesh sent feelers. Mr Modi chose neither, wisely preferring non-commitment. Eventually, when he came to Dhaka, Mr Modi’s interactions of necessity were those with Ms Hasina. Undoubtedly, she was in control. Nonetheless, Mr Modi endeavoured to underscore his political neutrality towards the two ladies, by meeting Ms Khaleda too. This involved some tight-rope walking, but it is a measure of Mr Modi’s political prowess that he appears to have succeeded. At least for now, till one or the other is disappointed with him. As of now, at least, that point in time seems well beyond the rim of the saucer.

There is, however, a perceptible transformation coming over Bangladesh. This includes how India is viewed. The changes in Bangladesh are also in keeping with those in the rest of the world. While its economic growth is slower than that of India’s, it is comparatively more equitable. Its successes in the social sectors, including in women’s empowerment, are more remarkable. It has a more vibrant civil society that sets the tune to much of the developing world to march to. Micro-credit, poverty graduation models, and non-formal education are examples. Bangladesh is responding to an increasing globalisation with burgeoning contacts with the rest of the world. Garments, its key export, link it to Europe and America. Its migrant workers, largely in the Middle East, transmit home ever-growing amounts of remittances. As a result, ‘Indo-centrism’ is no longer that much of a factor in Bangladesh’s politics or economics. Being ‘for’ or ‘against’ India can only be used – increasingly less frequently – as a rallying cry by the Bangladeshi political parties. Indeed most of Bangladesh’s 160 million people are young, and anxious to be rid of the past political baggage. Many of them, as also the rapidly growing middle-class or bhadralok, see their future linked to the rest of the world, including India. Needless quibbles with Delhi do not interest them.

It was against such a backdrop that the Modi visit to Bangladesh took place. His predecessor, Manmohan Singh, had also visited Bangladesh in September 2011. During that visit the foreign ministers of the two countries had inked a Protocol to the 1974 Mujib-Indira Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) concerning the demarcation of the border between these two neighbours, involving the adversely-possessed lands and enclaves. Dr Singh’s visit failed due to a last-minute refusal by Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal (an Indian state that borders Bangladesh), to accord her assent to an agreement that had been finalised on the distribution of the waters of the Teesta River, and also to accompany Dr Singh during his visit to Dhaka. Furthermore, the LBA Protocol was not ratified by the Indian Parliament until a massive effort towards that end was successfully coordinated by Mr Modi more recently. This paved the groundwork for his visit to Dhaka.

The disputes over the demarcation of 4,000-km or so of the Indo-Bangladesh land boundary, and the enclaves (106 Indian ones in Bangladesh and 92 Bangladeshi ones in India, totalling a population of 52,000), originally arose out of the quirks of irrational territorial apportionments between princely states, and the anomalies of the Radcliffe Award in 1947. In 1958 Pakistan and India reached the Noon-Nehru Agreement that provided for “exchange on the basis of enclaves for enclaves without any consideration for territorial loss or gain”. Bangladesh inherited the unresolved problem in 1971. The Indira-Mujib Agreement of 1974 laid down the groundwork for demarcation of the unidentified portions of the border, and the settlement of issues relating to the enclaves. However the issues became hostage to other Indo-Bangladesh problems, and were not settled, until now.

The Teesta and Trade Issues

The Dhaka visit enabled Mr Modi to pick up some additional mileage, and this in his domestic politics. Ms Banerjee had agreed to be in Dhaka for some time during his visit, and the two were said to have had amicable meetings prior to that. Their relations were sour at first, even before the BJP stalwart Amit Shah had, in the harsh terms one is sadly wont to use in South Asian politics, reportedly vowed to eliminate the Trinamool Congress (Ms Mamata’s party) from West Bengal. (How he had planned to carry out the threat, he did not elaborate). Ms Banerjee’s latest trip to Dhaka was partly to mollify Ms Hasina by reiterating assurances about the sharing of the Teesta waters, though no substantive progress was made on the issue during Mr Modi’s talks with Ms Hasina on this occasion.

The Teesta originates in So Lomo Lake in Sikkim, and flows through the northern regions of West Bengal before entering Bangladesh. An arrangement already in place (agreed upon in 1983) allows India and Bangladesh to share 75% of its waters, giving the former the right to use 39% and the latter 36%. There is need for an agreement between India and Bangladesh as to how to divide the balance 25%. Ostensibly the reason for Ms Banerjee’s obduracy is that the previously-negotiated agreement was detrimental to the interests of West Bengal’s northern districts. Reportedly, she objects to giving Bangladesh 50,000 cusecs of water, as mentioned in the final draft of the interim treaty, instead of the 33,000 cusecs as in the initial draft. She clearly has the 2016 state elections in West Bengal in mind, as also the political risks she might face as a result of any understanding on the issue. In total, 22 agreements and Memoranda of Understanding were signed between the two governments during Mr Modi’s Dhaka visit. These covered a wide range of subjects. Of major importance was one on coastal shipping. It was designed to ease the congestion at the Indian Land Customs Stations, seen as an impediment to border trade.

Also, to contribute to the growth of shipping industry in Bangladesh as well as the ancillary services sector. The coastal shipping agreement could also be critical to drawing the land-locked countries of Bhutan and Nepal into the India- Bangladesh growth-and-development story. This could provide an impetus to the emerging concept of BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal), a sub-regional developmental initiative within the eight-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

A slew of investment and trade agreements were also signed. India announced a new line of credit of US$ 2-billion, in addition to the earlier one amounting to US$ 1-billion in 2011. This was to be used for infrastructural development in Bangladesh. Many of the firms now coming to the fore in the Indian economic scene jumped on to the investment band-wagon. The Adani Group and Reliance signed deals worth over US$ 4.5-billion with the state-run Bangladesh Power Development Board to develop six power plants, meant to produce 4,600 MW of electricity. Reliance would generate 3000 MW, with an investment of US$ 3-billion, and Adani 1,600 MW in two coal-fired plants, with US$ 1.5-billion. (At present, the cumulative Indian investments stand at US$ 2.5-billion).

As for the current trade figures, they stood at US$ 6.9-billion in 2014-2015. It is heavily tilted in India’s favour, with the Bangladeshi export numbers barely touching US$ 500-million. India accorded Bangladesh the status of zero-tariff imports for all but 25 tariff-lines. It was stated by Mr Modi that India would invest more, now that Bangladesh had offered it an exclusive economic zone, which would help narrow the existing trade gap.

About the author:
*Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He was formerly Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh. He can be contacted at isasiac@nus.edu.sg. Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief Number 376 (PDF)

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