WHEN THE State of Israel was founded, the new foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, did something that seemed quite natural. He sold his private apartment.

In his new function, he was accorded an official residence. A modest one, needless to say.

Sharett thought that it was unseemly for a public official to retain a private apartment when he was living at the public expense.

He did not keep the money he received for his private apartment. Rather, he donated it to several human rights associations – the very same that are now under fierce government attack and labeled “leftists”, a label only slightly less negative than “treasonous”.

Today, such an act would be considered insane. Why, the present Prime Minister lives in an official residence and keeps two more houses, one of which is a luxury villa in a colony of the very rich.

In many respects, Sharett was an exception. He was born in Ukraine as Moshe Shertok, came to Palestine when he was 10 years old, lived for some years in Arab neighborhoods where he learned Arabic, served during World War I in the Ottoman army and became the Zionist expert on foreign relations. All this was quite unusual: almost all Zionist leaders neither knew Arabs nor liked them, they did not understand Arabic and saw the Arabs right from the beginning as enemies.

Lest this be understood as flattery by an admirer, I must add that he did not like me at all and said some very unkind things about me, which I countered with some quite unkind remarks of my own.

Yet I could not refrain from remembering his decency this week, on the day on which the highest court in Israel sent a former Prime Minister to prison for bribery.

WHEN THIS happened, the accused, Ehud Olmert, was almost jubilant.

A lower court had found him guilty of a much more serious bribery accusation and condemned him to a much longer prison term. The Supreme Court, after dragging his case out for as long as possible, reduced the offense and the prison term from 6 years to a mere year and a half. As usual in Israel, a third will be remitted for good behavior in prison, so he will probably “sit” for one year only.

Hallelujah. The former Prime Minister will spend only one year in prison, where he will join a former President of Israel who has been sent there for rape.

The present Prime Minister and his wife are under investigation for using government funds to pay the expenses of their two private homes. The present attorney of the Netanyahus has asked the Attorney General for a private conversation, in which he was going to ask him (according to a written note) to quash the investigation, hinting that Sara Netanyahu was mentally unstable. The Attorney General refused to see him, but the matter is dragging on.

By the way, the all-powerful Attorney General (known in Israel as the “Legal Advisor to the Government”), was, before his appointment, the private attorney of the Netanyahu family. He will finish his term in a month, when he will be replaced by the present Cabinet Secretary, a person even closer to Netanyahu.

Several other leading political luminaries are under criminal investigation for this and that. One of them is Sylvan Shalom, the former Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who had to resign last week after being suspected of raping or molesting six women who were working under him (no pun intended).

The police officer in charge of the department responsible for all these investigations has just been reinstated, after being suspended on suspicion of sexually molesting female officers.

Which reminds me of an anecdote I heard many decades ago. A politician approached the then education minister, a member of the Labor party: “Congratulate me! I have just been acquitted!” to which the minister replied dryly: “Curious. I have never been acquitted!”

SINCE THEN, Israel’s public morality has changed radically. Ehud Olmert is, perhaps, its most typical representative.

His father was an Irgun underground fighter and when Menachem Begin founded his political party, Herut (“freedom”) in the new state, the father was elected to the Knesset.

Ehud was born a few days after the end of World War II and grew up in neighborhoods founded by ex-Irgun members near Haifa. All these neighborhoods were quite poor, which perhaps explains Ehud’s lifelong craving for money and precious objects. The fact that he never served in any war perhaps explains his light finger on the trigger.

He joined, of course, Begin’s party but when a new star appeared, he saw a chance for speedy advance. The star was Shmuel Tamir, also a former Irgun member, who had studied law when exiled by the British to Africa. Tamir was extremely ambitious, and when he thought he saw a chance to overthrow and replace Begin as the party’s leader, he executed a putsch at the party’s conference. The much younger Olmert joined him immediately.

Both had misjudged. The benign-looking Begin bared his teeth, the putsch collapsed, Tamir and his adherents were thrown out. They founded a small new party, called “Free Center”. “Center” because they attacked the nationalist right-wing ideology of Begin and positioned themselves in the moderate center.

Soon after, the Six-day War broke out and Israel became an empire with huge occupied territories. And, lo and behold, literally overnight the Free Center became the most extreme right-wing party, preaching annexation and accusing Begin of softness and moderation.

I WAS a member of the Knesset at the time, and saw Olmert for the first time when he was a junior assistant of Tamir. He was always walking behind him, carrying his files and books.

But Tamir underrated this ambitious young man. When he preferred another young assistant, Olmert split the small party into two even smaller, under another veteran leader. Then he split this party too, threw its leader out, and took over. Realizing that this would lead to nothing, he rejoined Begin and was put on the candidates list.

He could have advanced slowly in the ranks, but he was impatient. So he jumped from the Knesset to the Jerusalem municipality and attacked the legendary, but aging, Teddy Kollek. He was elected mayor of Jerusalem, a prominent and very visible position.

Kollek, a Labor man, was an aggressive nationalist. Immediately after the 6-Day War he destroyed the Arab neighborhoods near the Western Wall in order to create the huge piazza. He created Jewish neighborhoods in the newly annexed East Jerusalem. Fortunately, he did not implement the idea of his old mentor, David Ben-Gurion, to raze the ancient Ottoman-built wall of Jerusalem, a symbol of the city. Ben-Gurion, already a bit senile, insisted that it was not Jewish enough.

Olmert, the centrist who became radical, then centrist again, became radical again. He founded more Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, including the highly controversial Har Homa settlement. My friends and I organized a long but in the end unsuccessful struggle against it. Now the atrocious settlement overlooks Bethlehem.

It was not the only architectural atrocity of Olmert’s rule in Jerusalem. Another, even worse, has helped to bring about his eventual downfall this week.

IN THE center of West Jerusalem there was a hilly rise coveted by builders. A group of developers spread large bribes right and left to obtain the license to build a huge housing project there called “Holyland”.

This atrocity was indeed built. It consists of a group of high-rise buildings and an even more atrocious many-storied tower which overlooks all of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The mayor, Olmert, among others, was accused of receiving a large bribe.

But by this time, Olmert had already advanced. He left the municipality, returned to Begin’s party, became again a Knesset member, helped Ariel Sharon to split the party (now called Likud) and create a new party (“Kadima”, Forwards.)

When Sharon assumed power, Olmert expected to take hold of the important Treasury Ministry, but Sharon was compelled to turn it over to Binyamin Netanyahu. Olmert had to be satisfied with the much less important Trade Ministry. As a consolation prize, Sharon conferred on Olmert the title of Deputy Prime Minister.

That was an empty title, and Olmert’s colleagues laughed behind his back. Not for long. Sharon suddenly fell into a lasting coma, and before anyone could move, Olmert assumed power as the deputy, and then as the next Prime Minister. He had arrived.

But his misdeeds caught up with him. A heap of corruption scandals compelled him in the end to resign. At the last moment, he offered the Palestinian leadership tempting concessions, but it was too late. The Palestinians decided that his political end was near, and waited to deal with his successor.

By that time, a dozen corruption allegations were hovering in the air. He defended himself by always accusing his underlings, always asserting that he knew nothing about anything, that it had all happened behind his back.

But in the end, he went too far. When he forsook his loyal (female) secretary in order to save himself, she opened her mouth. That was too much.

After a very long judicial battle, the final decision was made this week by the Supreme Court: Olmert was found guilty of one of the many bribery cases he was suspected of, and sent to prison.

I never liked the man very much, neither politically nor personally. Yet I must confess that at this moment, I feel neither joy nor satisfaction. I rather pity him.

By K.N. Pandita

On his flight back home from Kabul, Prime Minister Modi broke the journey at Lahore. This unusual drop off has become a subject for speculation. A Congress spokesman has said that the Indian nation will have to pay heavily for the tea Modi had with Pakistan premier Nawaz Sharif at his family residence in Raiwaind.

Some have called the visit “sudden”; yet it doesn’t seem to be sudden. High-level visits, even if for a couple of hours only, are neither sudden nor unscheduled. And of course, the nature of the mission demanded secrecy.

Bitter and entrenched acrimony has bedeviled relations between the two countries for the last seven decades. A quick change of heart seems somewhat unrealistic. Nevertheless, human ingenuity has no limits. Wonders happen in the affairs of nations: the Berlin Wall was demolished, the Soviet Union imploded, the Irish problem was resolved, and more recently Iran-US relations have come back online after a long hiatus.

The real source of the Indo-Pak logjam is Pakistan’s army, which, in turn, is a beneficiary of the Pentagon’s patronage and material support. Patronizing Pak Army serves two broad purposes of Pentagon: (a) it is a bulwark against Russia’s lengthening shadow over the Central and South Asian region, and (b) it secures the Saudi monarchy against internal and external threats, Iran in particular, right or wrong.

Pakistan army has its own well laid out agenda as well. It has somehow convinced the Pentagon that its anti-terror policy is flexible and region-specific. We can substantiate this viewpoint: The US closed its eye to Pakistan clandestinely building a nuclear arsenal. But it destroyed Saddam and his Iraq for the alleged possession of a nuclear bomb, which never was there in the first place.

In the United States’ calculus, the ‘military-dominated’ elected government in Pakistan is not really distasteful to her people. That appears to be a contradiction in terms to foreigners but not to locals.

How does Pak Army rationalize its extra-constitutional supremacy in running the affairs of the country? Kashmir comes handy. Any elected or officially installed government in Islamabad attempting to make even the slightest deviation from the army’s patent Kashmir policy is shown the exit door. Ali Muhammad Bogra, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and others stand testimony to this reality.

This is why resolution of the Kashmir imbroglio defied even the sharpest of minds of Z.A. Bhutto and Sardar Swaran Singh.

The crucial question arising from Modi’s puzzling move is this: If Nawaz Sharif has decided to walk an extra mile with Modi, has he taken his army chief on board? If not, then he is riding a tiger. If yes, that speaks to the role of Pentagon.

Ordinarily, the army chief is answerable to his corps commanders and not either to the government or the parliament, let alone civil society. However, in the overall spectrum of regional strategies, Pak Army has to be on the same page as the Pentagon.

What actually transpired between Obama and Nawaz Sharif at the White House during latter’s October visit is not known to us. Nevertheless, in all probability it was germane to what followed next. Within two weeks, General Raheel made his appearance at the Pentagon. It must have been an unsavory decision for the Pentagon hawks.

The Obama administration has begun to feel that American lawmakers are somewhat skeptic about US’ handling of Afghan situation. They are concerned about the fall (and subsequent recapture) of Kunduz, the northeastern province of Afghanistan. Russia’s strafing of Daesh bases on one hand and ISIS attacks in Paris on the other, add to the complexity with which Obama administration is beset.

In response to the State Department’s demand, Nawaz Sharif would not hesitate to impose a ban on the Haqqani terrorist network – an armed group active against the US in Afghanistan – with bases in Quetta in Baluchistan. His problem is that the Haqqani group enjoys the patronage of ISI and Pak Army, which only the Pentagon can call a halt to.

Apart from this, the US intelligence sleuths talk a good deal about the danger of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, particularly the China-borrowed short-range localized nuclear bombs technology, as a major threat to peace in South and Central Asia as well as the oil-rich Gulf where the U.S. and developed countries have a significant stake.

General Raheel harped on the army’s old tune – the Kashmir issue. Linking Kashmir to Afghan and Taliban elements, General Raheel remained true to the army’s patent stand on Kashmir and the clue to the army’s enduring supremacy.

This is where the State Department and the Pentagon realized that the Indo-Pak logjam needed to ease bottlenecks in its defensive-offensive tactics in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Gulf region.

For Pak Army, a climb down is not that simple. It means overhauling regional strategy in a big way. But if that is what we try to infer from these Modi-Sharif antics, the army will demand its pound of flesh. Thus a deal between Islamabad government and GHQ becomes a corollary to the entire gamut of the Indo-Pak thaw.

General Raheel was given a red carpet reception in Washington. He was allowed to address two Congressional committees, met with Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Kerry besides top brass of US military. Apparently all this was done to convey to him US’ thankfulness for his role in fighting the jihadis in North Waziristan. However, behind all these sweet gestures was a terse message also. Home-made jihadis were to be demobilized. He has been promised the release of 300 million US dollars by way of support to Pak Army’s North Waziristan military operations, besides a hefty package of sophisticated military hardware. US planners are adepts at blowing hot and cold.

A State Department spokesman has welcomed Modi’s Lahore jaunt. So has Ban-ki Moon, UN Secretary General. There are a host of issues remaining between the two countries. A step-by-step approach to their solution is just common sense. However, Kashmir outstrips all of them. Any formula agreed upon by the two sides on Kashmir will obliquely take into consideration the ground situation in the state on both sides of the LoC. Any redrawing of the dividing line is out of the question, but facilitating people to people interaction and an expansion of trade is possible. Once a final agreement is reached, re-organization of the state can be facilitated along with blunting the teeth of insurgency and separatism. From the Indian side, Pakistan has to address three main issues: dismantling terror structures, stopping infiltration and firing and shelling across the border, and bringing the Mumbai culprits to book. On the Pakistani side two issues are on their priority list: demilitarizing Siachin and guaranteeing the security of Pakistan’s border with India. Obviously, third-party intervention to break the logjam remains a well-guarded secret, though its role becomes more perceptible now than ever before.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

The high amounts of dietary sugar in the typical Western diet may increase the risk of breast cancer and metastasis to the lungs, according to a study at The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center.

The findings, published in the Jan. 1, 2016 online issue of Cancer Research, demonstrated dietary sugar’s effect on an enzymatic signaling pathway known as 12-LOX (12-lipoxygenase).

“We found that sucrose intake in mice comparable to levels of Western diets led to increased tumor growth and metastasis, when compared to a non-sugar starch diet,” said Peiying Yang, Ph.D., assistant professor of Palliative, Rehabilitation, and Integrative Medicine. “This was due, in part, to increased expression of 12-LOX and a related fatty acid called 12-HETE.”

Previous epidemiological studies have shown that dietary sugar intake has an impact on breast cancer development, with inflammation thought to play a role.

“The current study investigated the impact of dietary sugar on mammary gland tumor development in multiple mouse models, along with mechanisms that may be involved,” said co-author Lorenzo Cohen, Ph.D., professor of Palliative, Rehabilitation, and Integrative Medicine. “We determined that it was specifically fructose, in table sugar and high-fructose corn syrup, ubiquitous within our food system, which was responsible for facilitating lung metastasis and 12-HETE production in breast tumors.”

Cohen added that the data suggested that dietary sugar induces 12-LOX signaling to increase risks for breast cancer development and metastasis.

Identifying risk factors for breast cancer is a public health priority, say the authors. The researchers state that moderate sugar consumption is critical, given that the per capita consumption of sugar in the U.S. has surged to over 100 lbs. per year and an increase in consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages has been identified as a significant contributor to an epidemic of obesity, heart disease and cancer worldwide.

“Prior research has examined the role of sugar, especially glucose, and energy-based metabolic pathways in cancer development,” said Yang. “However, the inflammatory cascade may be an alternative route of studying sugar-driven carcinogenesis that warrants further study.”

No previous studies have investigated the direct effect of sugar consumption on the development of breast cancer using breast cancer animal models or examined specific mechanisms, she added.

The MD Anderson team conducted four different studies in which mice were randomized to different diet groups and fed one of four diets. At six months of age, 30 percent of mice on a starch-control diet had measurable tumors, whereas 50 to 58 percent of the mice on sucrose-enriched diets had developed mammary tumors. The study also showed that numbers of lung metastases were significantly higher in mice on a sucrose- or a fructose-enriched diet, versus mice on a starch-control diet.

“This study suggests that dietary sucrose or fructose induced 12-LOX and 12-HETE production in breast tumor cells in vivo,” said Cohen. “This indicates a possible signaling pathway responsible for sugar-promoted tumor growth in mice. How dietary sucrose and fructose induces 12-HETE and whether it has a direct or indirect effect remains in question.”

The study team believes that the mechanism by which dietary sucrose or fructose affects breast tumor growth and metastasis, especially through the 12-LOX pathways, warrants further investigation.

A new way to test one of the basic principles underlying Einstein’s theory of General Relativity using brief blasts of rare radio signals from space called Fast Radio Bursts is ten times, to one-hundred times better than previous testing methods that used gamma-ray bursts, according to a paper just published in the journal Physical Review Letters. The paper received additional highlighting as an “Editor’s Suggestion” due to “its particular importance, innovation, and broad appeal,” according to the journal’s editors.

The new method is considered to be a significant tribute to Einstein on the 100th anniversary of his first formulation of the Equivalence Principle, which is a key component of Einstein’s theory of General Relativity. More broadly, it also is a key component of the concept that the geometry of spacetime is curved by the mass density of individual galaxies, stars, planets, and other objects.

Fast Radio Bursts are super-brief blasts of energy — lasting just a few milliseconds. Until now, only about a dozen Fast Radio Bursts have been detected on Earth. They appear to be caused by mysterious events beyond our Milky Way Galaxy, and possibly even beyond the Local Group of galaxies that includes the Milky Way. The new technique will be important for analyzing the abundance of observations of Fast Radio Bursts that advanced radio-signal observatories, now being planned, are expected to detect.

“With abundant observational information in the future, we can gain a better understanding of the physical nature of Fast Radio Bursts,” said Peter Mészáros, Holder of the Eberly Family Chair in Astronomy and Astrophysics and Professor of Physics at Penn State, the senior author of the research paper. Like all other forms of electromagnetic radiation including visible light, Fast Radio Bursts travel through space as waves of photon particles. The number of wave crests arriving from Fast Radio Bursts per second — their “frequency” — is in the same range as that of radio signals. “When more-powerful detectors provide us with more observations,” Mészáros said, “we also will be able to use Fast Radio Bursts as a probe of their host galaxies, of the space between galaxies, of the cosmic-web structure of the universe, and as a test of fundamental physics.”

The impact of the new method using Fast Radio Bursts is expected to increase significantly as more of the bursts are observed, and if their origin can be established more firmly. “If Fast Radio Bursts are proven to originate outside the Milky Way Galaxy, and if their distances can be measured accurately, they will be a new powerful tool for testing Einstein’s Equivalence Principle and for extending the tested energy range down to radio-band frequencies,” Mészáros said.

Einstein’s Equivalence Principle requires that any two photons of different frequencies, emitted at the same time from the same source and traveling through the same gravitational fields, should arrive at Earth at exactly the same time. “If Einstein’s Equivalence Principle is correct, any time delay that might occur between these two photons should not be due to the gravitational fields they experienced during their travels, but should be due only to other physical effects,” Mészáros said. “By measuring how closely in time the two different-frequency photons arrive, we can test how closely they obey Einstein’s Equivalence Principle.”

More specifically, Mészáros said the test that he and his coauthors developed involves an analysis of how much space curvature the photons experienced due to massive objects along or near their path through space. He said, “Our test of Einstein’s Equivalence Principle using Fast Radio Bursts consists of checking by how much does a parameter — the gamma parameter — differ for the two photons with different frequencies.”

Mészáros said his research team’s analysis of the less-than-a-dozen recently detected Fast Radio Bursts “supersedes by one to two orders of magnitude the previous best limits on the accuracy of the Einstein Equivalence Principle,” which were based on gamma rays and other energies from a 1987 supernova explosion, supernova 1987A. “Our analysis using radio frequencies shows that the Einstein Equivalence Principle is obeyed to one part in a hundred million,” Mészáros said. “This result is a significant tribute to Einstein’s theory, on the hundredth anniversary of its first formulation.”

The Islamic State (Daesh) terrorist group in Iraq is threatening to kill Saudi nationals disillusioned with its actions and who want to return home.

This is the reason no Saudis have yet surrendered to the authorities in the country, an online publication quoted Thamer Al-Sabhan, Saudi ambassador to Iraq, as saying.

The reopening of the Saudi embassy in Baghdad will allow Saudi Arabia and Iraq to cooperate on security and the fight against extremism, said the envoy.

The Saudi government is still inviting Saudis who had joined Daesh and others such as Al-Nusra Front, to turn themselves over to the authorities, said the envoy.

He said citizens who willingly surrender are treated differently compared to those who are arrested, with their trials taking into account this as a mitigating factor, in line with announcements made by the Saudi Interior Ministry in 2014.

The embassy provides all services needed to ensure they return home, he said.

Al-Sabhan’s comments come in the wake of the Iraqi military managing to recapture several cities from Daesh recently including Diyala Province and Ramadi in Anbar Province.

Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Baghdad, after a 25-year shutdown, which will allow the two countries to cooperate more closely against terrorism, Al-Arabiya TV reported.

The Sakinah Campaign, meanwhile, stated that it now appears that Daesh terrorists and their leader Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi  are losing ground among Saudi youth because of their recent intellectual and military setbacks, including the defeats inflicted on Houthis in Yemen.

An hours-long gun battle raged at India’s Pathankot Air Base in the northern Punjab state after four to five armed men stormed the facility. Two Indian troops were confirmed dead, and four terrorists were killed in the shootout with Indian security forces.

The gun battle between security forces and the terrorists ended only several hours after the attack began. Four of the attackers were shot dead, Times of India reported.

It has been confirmed that two Indian Air Force personnel were killed in the attack, and six more soldiers injured.

The armed assault was launched at 3:30 am local time (22 pm Friday GMT), according to the NDTV agency, citing local authorities. The assailants reportedly used a stolen vehicle and military uniforms to get into the base.

The attack resulted in a fierce gun battle with Indian security forces, which blocked the gunmen in an area inside the base. Although there are Indian MiG-29 fighter jets and helicopters stationed at the location, none of them could be reached by the attackers, according to officials quoted by NDTV.

Up to five terrorists stormed the facility, local news agency Asian News International (ANI) reported. According to ANI, the Indian troops sent for reinforcements, including helicopters.

Meanwhile, the assault has been linked to an earlier attack in Punjab on Friday, in which five armed men with “heavy weapons” ambushed the SUV of the local police chief. According to The Indian Express, three people, including the policeman, were kidnapped at gunpoint but later released. An apparent murder of a taxi driver in the area has also been linked to the attackers.

While no group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, similar attacks have been carried out in the northern Indian state by militants crossing into India from Pakistan. In July, three terrorists armed with AK-47s and grenades attacked a bus and a police station in Gurdaspur district. Three civilians and all of the attackers were killed after a 12-hour shootout with the police.

The attack comes days after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore, Pakistan on December 25. The move was warmly welcomed by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and has been viewed as an attempt to mend ties between the two historic rivals. The territorial dispute over the northern region of Kashmir has resulted in three major conflicts between India and Pakistan since the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

In this week’s address, US President Barack Obama reflected on the progress of the past year, and looked forward to working on unfinished business in the coming year, particularly when it comes to the epidemic of gun violence. As he has many times before, the President reminded us that Congress has repeatedly failed to take action and pass laws that would reduce gun violence. That’s why the President a few months ago tasked his White House team with identifying new actions he can take to help reduce gun violence, and on Monday will meet with the Attorney General to discuss the options. In his address, the President called on everyone to join him in the fight to reduce gun violence, because it’s going to take all of us to make America safer for our children.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
January 1, 2016

Happy New Year, everybody. I am fired up for the year that stretches out before us. That’s because of what we’ve accomplished together over the past seven.

Seven years ago, our businesses were losing 800,000 jobs a month. They’ve now created jobs for 69 straight months, driving the unemployment rate from a high of 10% down to 5%.

Seven years ago, too many Americans went without health insurance. We’ve now covered more than 17 million people, dropping the rate of the uninsured below 10% for the very first time.

Seven years ago, we were addicted to foreign oil. Now our oil imports have plummeted, our clean energy industry is booming, and America is a global leader in the fight against climate change.

Seven years ago, there were only two states in America with marriage equality. And now there are 50.

All of this progress is because of you. And we’ve got so much more to do. So my New Year’s resolution is to move forward on our unfinished business as much as I can. And I’ll be more frequently asking for your help. That’s what this American project is all about.

That’s especially true for one piece of unfinished business, that’s our epidemic of gun violence.

Last month, we remembered the third anniversary of Newtown. This Friday, I’ll be thinking about my friend Gabby Giffords, five years into her recovery from the shooting in Tucson. And all across America, survivors of gun violence and those who lost a child, a parent, a spouse to gun violence are forced to mark such awful anniversaries every single day.

And yet Congress still hasn’t done anything to prevent what happened to them from happening to other families. Three years ago, a bipartisan, commonsense bill would have required background checks for virtually everyone who buys a gun. Keep in mind, this policy was supported by some 90% of the American people. It was supported by a majority of NRA households. But the gun lobby mobilized against it. And the Senate blocked it.

Since then, tens of thousands of our fellow Americans have been mowed down by gun violence. Tens of thousands. Each time, we’re told that commonsense reforms like background checks might not have stopped the last massacre, or the one before that, so we shouldn’t do anything.

We know that we can’t stop every act of violence. But what if we tried to stop even one? What if Congress did something – anything – to protect our kids from gun violence?

A few months ago, I directed my team at the White House to look into any new actions I can take to help reduce gun violence. And on Monday, I’ll meet with our Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, to discuss our options. Because I get too many letters from parents, and teachers, and kids, to sit around and do nothing. I get letters from responsible gun owners who grieve with us every time these tragedies happen; who share my belief that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to bear arms; and who share my belief we can protect that right while keeping an irresponsible, dangerous few from inflicting harm on a massive scale.

The United Nations top official on human rights recently told the U.N. Security Council that the U.S.-supported, Saudi Arabian-led coalition of Sunni nations fighting Shi’ite Houthi rebels in Yemen bore a disproportionate responsibility for attacks on civilians. Since the civil war in Yemen began in March 2015, more than 2,700 civilians have been killed and dozens of hospitals and schools have been attacked, leading the United Nations to warn of violations of international law.

The problem is that the United States is supporting the Saudi-led coalition’s air strikes by providing intelligence for targeting and also by refueling coalition’s war planes, thus extending the range of their bombing. Domestically, Saudi Arabia has a horrendous record on human rights that it is exporting to Yemen via bombing civilians there. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein exacerbated the Sunni-Shi’ite division throughout the Islamic world, and the war in Yemen is actually a joust for influence in the Persian Gulf between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran, which are bitter regional rivals. Saudi Arabia does have substantial interests at stake in Yemen, which borders the autocratic kingdom, but the United States does not and should cease providing weapons and the aforementioned support, which is tainting the U.S. with support for a country that very well may be committing war crimes.

Yemen is a small, poor, and insignificant (from the perspective of U.S. vital interests) country just South of Saudi Arabia. It doesn’t even produce much oil; but of course Saudi Arabia does—and that’s why the Saudis are getting so much U.S. support, despite Saudi Arabia’s despicable foreign and domestic policies. The U.S. government ousts dictators in Iraq and Libya and loudly criticizes Iran’s bad human rights policies; in contrast, the United States mutes its criticism of Saudi Arabia’s atrocious human rights record, sweeps under the under the rug that the 9/11 attackers were mostly Saudi nationals, and ignores that Saudi Arabia is the biggest exporter of militant Sunni Islamism by its support for radical schools around the Islamic world. Why does the world’s only superpower tolerate a major ally supporting potential U.S. enemies (the U.S. has the same toleration for Pakistan doing a similar thing)?

The reason dates back to World War II, when Saudi King Abdel Aziz bin Saud traded U.S. access to Saudi oil for U.S. protection of that oil. Yet although Saudi Arabia is the anchor of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil cartel, the country does not have the control over the world’s oil market that both policy makers and the public believe. OPEC, like most cartels, has failed to achieve long-term control over the price of its commodity. For example, right now, world oil supply exceeds demand—because of new non-OPEC sources of supply, such as from new fracking technology in the United States and because of slack demand due to sluggish economies around the world—thus driving the price down. In fact, Saudi Arabia has even given up trying prop up the price by reducing production. The Saudis, who produce oil very inexpensively compared to other producers, are afraid of losing market share to those exporters and so are keeping production high, despite the low world price. And forecasts for the oil market estimate that such factors—including increased Iranian oil output into the world market due to the lifting of international sanctions against that country because of its nuclear agreement with the great powers—will continue for some time.

But once upon a time—in 1973—didn’t Arab oil producers launch an embargo and production cutback that brought U.S. economic ruin and lines at gas stations? No, subsequent economic studies of the 1970s have shown that U.S. stagflation (inflation plus slow economic growth) was caused by poor U.S. government economic polices rather than by the Arab oil embargo and production limits. Gas lines in the United States were caused because the U.S. government still had price controls on oil. (Japan had no price controls, thus allowing price rises to naturally curtail demand., and thus no gas lines.)

Moreover, if the oil embargo and production cutback were so successful, why haven’t the Arab countries ever tried it again during other wars in the Middle East. Similar to what brought about the fracking technology recently, higher oil prices in the 1970s just increased supplies—non-OPEC sources of energy were found and conservation practices became more prevalent. Finally, industrial economies are much more resilient to oil price hikes than is commonly perceived and have become even more so since the 1970s, because oil consumption accounts for a smaller percentage of developed nations’ GDP.

Contrary to official and popular belief, oil is only strategic when needed to power military forces in a war. Fortunately, as I note in my book No War for Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East, the United States produces enough oil domestically to supply its military in a fairly large war several times over; this ability is rising as the U.S. substantially increases oil production via fracking. As for getting oil supplies to the United States during a war somewhere in the Middle East, if oil production is reduced from one or more countries in conflict, increased prices will cause non-affected producers to produce more oil. Moreover, in the past, valuable oil exports have traveled around and even through wars.

If the United States had a truly vital interest in holding its nose and supporting an autocracy like Saudi Arabia, that would be one thing. However, ignoring the despotic kingdom’s domestic oppression and likely international war crimes—in the erroneous belief that Saudi Arabia can successfully trump global market forces to manipulate long-run oil prices—is unnecessary, ethically questionable, and only increases the likelihood of blowback terrorism against the United States from the victims of Saudi aggression.

This article appeared at The Huffington Post and is reprinted with permission.

Despite repeated optimistic forecasts about the economy, the Iranian government has failed to balance the budget and says it is facing a shortage of funds to pay the salaries of public employees.

Mosalreza Servati, a member of Parliament’s planning and budget commission, reported on Wednesday December 30: “In recent months, the salaries of government employees have not been paid on time and there is concern that the same trend will prevail in the next three months.”

The Tasnim News Agency reports that according to Servati, a number of development projects approved by the government have not received the funds to get started.

He explained that only 70 percent of expected tax revenues has so far been collected, adding that the anticipated oil revenues have been correct.

There have been some contradictory reports about the effect of falling oil prices on the government budget. While the spokesman for the government announced earlier that the government is able to run the administration on revenue from oil selling at 40 dollars per barrel, the vice president has been quoted as saying that they had not prepared for oil prices below 60 dollars a barrel.

Another problem the government has faced is the payment of monthly benefits set up during the former administration as a means of cushioning households from the scrapping of government subsidies for energy and food staples. Servati said the government does not dare cut off the benefits being paid to about three million recipients who are in fact ineligible to receive them due to high incomes.

Reports indicate the government will have a budget shortfall of 51 trillion toumans at the end of the Iranian calendar year in March.

The Saudi-led coalition fighting to defend the embattled President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has announced the end to a ceasefire that began on December 15 citing violations by the Houthi militants.

In a statement carried by the Saudi state news agency SPA, the command of the coalition said, “The command of the coalition supporting legitimacy in Yemen announces the end of the truce in Yemen beginning at 1400 hours local time on Saturday.”

“The command of the coalition has always took great interest in looking to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen and empower the legitimate Yemeni government to restore security and stability to the country. That is why it had agreed to the truce, requested by Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi which was extended. It has always been violated by Al Houthi-Saleh militias,” the statement said.

It added, “Al Houthi-Saleh militias repeatedly violated the truce by launching ballistic missiles towards Saudi cities and border guard centres, blocking relief and medical aid from reaching Yemenis, seizing food and medical aid shipments, shelling residential areas and arresting Yemeni citizens in cities under their control.”

“These acts prove that these militias and their affiliates are not serious and continue to be unconcerned about the lives of civilians, which clearly shows their continuous attempts to take advantage of the truce to make gains.”

On Friday, the Royal Saudi Air Defence destroyed a Scud-type ballistic missile fired from Yemen toward the City of Abha, southwest Saudi Arabia, according to the Saudi-led coalition command.

Meanwhile, an official source at the Yemeni Higher Committee for Relief accused United Nations humanitarian agencies of not doing enough to address the humanitarian disaster in Yemen. It said that more attention must be given to the siege imposed by Houthi militants and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in Taiz.

Original article

Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who was fired from his post as head of the synod’s department for church relations with society, has launched a campaign for the wholesale reform of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate with a fall for the election of priests and bishops.

Chaplin’s appeal which challenges the power verticals of both Patriarch Kirill and Vladimir Putin is unlikely to be accepted, but it is important because it is certain to trigger a discussion about the relations between the clergy and the laity and the ways in which the Church might recover from Kirill’s corrupt and heavy-handed rule.

In a December 31^st post on his website, Chaplin is extremely specific in laying out his ideas about “how to restore the links between local communities and the process of the selection of priests and bishops.” But perhaps most intriguingly, he urges Orthodox believers to use Internet petitions to press for these changes (http://pravoslav-pol.livejournal.com/35567.html).

Specifically, he says that only members of a parish can propose candidates for priests and other clergy. If they don’t have one, they can turn to neighboring parishes or “in an extreme case, to others in the bishopric.” But they cannot have candidates who are parachuted in from far away as is often the case now.

Moreover, Chaplin argues, while “the educational level should be considered, that should be done flexibly because a mature man having sufficiently broad knowledge is much better than a 23-year-old graduate of a seminary.” At present, the former almost always would be preferred by Kirill’s patriarchate.

The selection of a clergyman “should proceed at a parish assembly, one open to all Orthodox Christians. The ruling bishop should have the right to remove a candidate exclusively on the basis of canon law, which he must present to the parish assembly. Moreover, he must do this personally, without delegating it even to the vicar.”

Candidates for bishops or others in the hierarchy should be proposed only by people from the bishopric involved. “If there are no candidates, the bishopric cannot be considered vital as a local church. The selection of a bishop must take place at a bishopric assembly with the participation of the entire clergy and also two lay members from each parish.”

No change can be made except on the basis of canon law. And Chaplin says, no one can be removed as a priest or a bishop except on the basis of a similar process.

“Such ideas about an elected clergy were periodically raised” in church meetings, “but they were blocked without sufficient discussion.” Chaplin says he is absolutely convinced that church law must establish that no priest or bishop can be appointed from outside a community or a bishopric without the consent of that community or bishopric.

As to how this can be achieved, Chaplin acknowledges that it won’t be easy given that it will require changing the statue of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a first step, he urges an online petition drive, possibly on change.org, as a way to force the hierarchy to take note.

If even 20 or 30 priests sign it, he says, the current system won’t stand despite the repressions it will bring against them. He adds that “authoritative and well-known” members of the laity should also sign. And he promises to give more advice in the future on what should be done next.

There is no question the Saudis are the perfect nation to lead the UN Panel on Human Rights! The Saudi King showed his compassion once again after he ordered the beheading of 47 people, none of which had a trial and were convicted for various “insults” toward the King.

Among the beheaded was a teen blogger and a popular Shiite cleric.

Police used tear gas in Tehran after a crowd of angry protesters broke into the Saudi embassy, ravaging its offices and throwing Molotov cocktails at the building. The mayhem broke out at a rally set off by Riyadh’s execution of a prominent Shiite cleric.

Footage uploaded on Twitter showed angry Iranian protesters pillaging the ground floor of the Saudi embassy, tearing apart furniture, flags, and documents. It was then engulfed in one big blaze, seemingly after the angry mob, outraged over the Saudi execution of prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh al-Nimr, threw Molotov cocktails at the building.

Police eventually resorted to tear gas to scatter the protesters and managed to force the crowd out of the building and cordon it off again.

There were no immediate reports of casualties or injuries due to the violence. Photos from inside the ravaged ground floor appear to show it is now empty.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement early on Sunday calling for calm and asking protesters to respect the property of diplomatic premises, the Entekhab news website reported.

Earlier, images of fire breaking out at the embassy building were shared on Twitter. A Mehr editor has reported a gas explosion, while photos from the scene show the building engulfed in flames.

Iran’s security forces had cordoned off the area around the embassy. Photos from the scene showed a heavy police presence.

Protesters gathered in several cities across Iran on Saturday angered by the Gulf kingdom’s execution of al-Nimr, who was put to death along with 46 other “prisoners”.

Nimr had been the most vocal critic of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family prior to mass protests that erupted in 2011. He called for regular demonstrations against the ruling elite. Shiites have long complained that they are victims of discrimination in the Sunni powerhouse. Nimr had often called for better protection for the country’s Shiite minority which essentually cost him his life.

The predominately Shiite Iran has bashed Riyadh, accusing the Kingdom of supporting terrorism and executing its opponents. Iran said it has summoned the Saudi charge d’affaires in Tehran.

“The Saudi government supports terrorists and takfiri [heretic] extremists, while executing and suppressing critics inside the country,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaber Ansari said, as cited by state news agency IRNA.

The Iranian Government warned Riyad will pay a heavy price for the beheadings.

The 20,000 vacancies in Sri Lanka’s education sector will be filled within the next three months, Education Minister Akila Viraj Kariyawasam said.

According to the Education Minister, 15,000 teachers, 4,431 principals and 852 Education Administrative Service Officers will be recruited within this period

The education sector has been affected up to a certain extent by the scarcity of teachers, principals and Education Administrative Service officers.

“Therefore, all these vacancies will be filled with suitable persons with immediate effect,” Minister Kariyawasam said.

Under this process, 431 new teachers were appointed to the teacher service recently by the Minister. Of this number, 200 are Information Technology, 70 Western Music and 161 teachers for various subjects passed out from the Colleges of Education.

By Altay Atli*

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is territorially the largest administrative unit of China1, covering around one sixth of the country’s total area, and neighboring eight independent countries (Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan). The region was under the spotlight of the world during the summer of 2009 when clashes between the two major ethnic groups, Uyghurs and the Han Chinese, left around 200 people dead in Urumqi. In their attempts to explain the violence in Xinjiang, most analysts overplayed the ethnic factor, largely ignoring the socio-economic context within which the ethnic structure of the region should be evaluated. Evidence suggests that the leading cause of the instability in Xinjiang is not the failure of different ethnic groups to coexist, but mainly the relative economic backwardness of the region, which results in large income disparities between these groups, creating a fertile ground for unrest, one that is further worsened by the ethnic policies adopted by the central government in Beijing.
At the same time, it has to be admitted that the central government has been heavily investing in Xinjiang’s development over the past decade. There are continued economic reforms accompanied by limited cultural and political openings, and as David Gosset argues, “in a fragile macro-region, Xinjiang stands, by sharp contrast, as a pole of stability and economic development.”2

The main question addressed in this article is why the economic development of Xinjiang is a priority for the Beijing government. As will be discussed below, most scholars and China-watchers approach this issue by emphasizing the intention of Beijing to keep ethnic separatism at bay. The situation is often portrayed as a Faustian bargain, in which Beijing provides the ethnic groups with greater welfare, asking them in return to give up their demands for political freedom. However, this line of reasoning leads to a serious dilemma: If this is the primary motivation of the government, how can we explain the fact that Beijing’s investment in Xinjiang is much higher than its investment in other regions populated by predominantly non- Han Chinese population?3

In order to understand Beijing’s determination in economically developing Xinjiang, we need to go beyond the ethnic issues and consider the case of Xinjiang within the larger framework of China’s economic security. The Chinese economy is growing rapidly and so are its requirements and needs, including but not limited to raw materials and resources. Xinjiang’s geographical position as China’s gateway to Central Asia and its endowment of natural resources make it an important actor in this respect. In order to illustrate this argument, this article will first discuss what economic security means in the Chinese context, provide brief background information on Xinjiang’s economic development, and then proceed to evaluate the region within the Chinese context in order to assess to what extent Xinjiang contributes to the overall economic security of China. In this way, this article hopes to shed light on the motivation behind the Chinese government’s intensive efforts for developing this region.

• The question is, why does Beijing invest in Xinjiang?
• Is it because Beijing wants to improve the living standards of the people living in Xinjiang?
• Is it because Beijing wants to prevent ethnic separatism in Xinjiang?
• Is it because Beijing wants to establish a buffer against Central Asia?
• Is it because Beijing wants to source raw materials from Xinjiang for the rest of the country?

Whereas all of these questions can be responded to in the affirmative, Beijing’s motivation for investing in Xinjiang should be evaluated within the larger framework of the “economic security” concept. This paper argues that Xinjiang’s development is of vital importance for the central government because this region is playing a key role vis-à-vis the economic security of China. Before moving to elucidate this argument, we will first discuss what economic security means in the Chinese context.

1. China and the Concept of Economic Security

The current era of globalization, marked by growing economic interdependence among countries, has given rise to the necessity of redefining the concept of “security”. As greater openness and interconnectedness brought about higher degrees of economic volatility, uncertainty, and vulnerability, traditional security perceptions such as interstate military conflict came to be replaced by not only non-conventional forms of violence such as global terrorism, but also by economic security concerns. As a result, scholars began to pay greater attention on issues related to economic security. In one of the groundbreaking studies in this field, Barry Buzan looked at the main features of new patterns of global security relations. Accordingly, the changes in security relations between the center and the periphery were happening in five sectors: political, military, economic, societal and environmental.4 Buzan defined economic security as being “about access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.”5

Another development with regard to the literature on economic security was the diversification of regions analyzed. Whereas in past decades scholars mostly dealt with developed countries and particularly the United States, there emerged lately a greater interest in the developing parts of the world, where globalization and the challenges it brought led to a redefinition of the economic security concept in an on-going process. China is one of the countries where this redefinition has been most dramatic, since in China globalization has coincided with the opening up of a socialist economy and the consequent rapid growth. China’s economic growth is remarkably impressive by any measure and it is fair to say that China’s growth is one of the most important factors shaping today’s global economy. However, on the other side of the coin, the issue of economic security raised by China’s rapid growth remains as a major concern, both for the government and the academia.

Several scholars have discussed the economic security dimension of China’s rapid growth. Wang Zhengyi, for one, argued that the evolution of the relationship between economic growth and national security since the opening up of China in 1978 can be divided in two stages. They were first regarded to as two separate logics; however from the mid-1990s on, especially after the Asian financial crisis and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), they came to be viewed as constituting one single domain.6 According to Zhenyi, three features of the economic growth in China, i.e. incomplete transformation of the economic structure, increasing dependence on the world economy and intensifying socio- economic polarization, led to this reconceptualization of the linkage between economic growth and security.7 Zhenyi further stated that the economic insecurities resulting from the above mentioned features of Chinese economic growth are:

i) Rising unemployment;

ii) Severe economic disparities between coastal and interior regions, as well as between urban and rural areas;

iii) Decentralization of authority in the Chinese economy and society.8

Similarly, in a volume of essays edited by Werner Draguhn and Robert Ash, the following were addressed as the most crucial determinants of China’s economic insecurity: regional disparities, rural-urban migration, unemployment, food supply, energy supply and environmental protection.9

Another scholar from China, Jiang Yong, evaluated economic security in the Chinese context as “the ability to provide a steady increase in the standard of living for the whole population through national economic development while maintaining economic independence.”10 Accordingly, in order to ensure economic security, China should adopt a policy of “balanced opening”, i.e. while increasing its competitiveness, it should also safeguard the independence of sovereignty over the economy, particularly against foreign capital.11

A remarkable point related to the literature on Chinese economic security is that a significant portion of it is dealing empirically with what Vincent Cable labeled as “security of supply”.12 Economic interdependence is inescapable in the era of globalization, and depending on other countries for means of supply. Cable saw two separate problems here: First, interruptions in import supply can severely disrupt the national economy, and second, overseas suppliers can acquire a monopoly position turning the terms of trade against the importer. Cable argues that these two arguments usually went together, and they were especially evident in the areas of food, strategic minerals (those used in industries regarded as strategic such as aircraft manufacture), energy (esp. oil and gas) and advanced technology.13 In China’s case, since its rapid growth requires a constant supply of raw materials of which the prices are on the rise in the world markets, security of supply and especially the security of energy supply began to top the agenda. For instance, Linda Jakobson and Zha Daojiong, in their study of the motivations behind China’s pursuit of offshore oil supplies, defined the concept of security of supply as the “availability of oil, reliability in delivery and reasonability in prices.”14 The authors suggested that under current circumstances, it would be in the interest of China as well as the established economies to collaborate with rather than confront each other in shaping a new global structure for oil trade.15 Within this framework of collaboration in oil trade, one of the most important aspects is the pipeline transportation, which was examined in the Chinese context by Pak K. Lee, who drew a rather pessimistic picture arguing that possibilities of bilateral or multilateral energy cooperation were rather remote.16

In sum, it can be argued that for China and its rapidly growing economy, economic security means sustaining its growth rate, welfare, and economic power. This is to be achieved by ensuring access to export markets, securing sources of raw materials, especially strategic minerals and hydrocarbons, keeping the import routes open, and preserving macroeconomic stability. The question is then to what extent Xinjiang contributes to this picture, however, before dealing with this question this region’s economic development needs to be evaluated within a historical perspective.

2. Economic Development of Xinjiang in Historical Context

Throughout history, Xinjiang’s economic development has been shaped by a strong confluence of environmental and socio-political factors.17 On the environmental side, the remote and land-locked position of Xinjiang and its inhospitable environmental features emerged as significant obstacles against the economic development of the region.18 However, offsetting these disadvantages, the region is rich in natural resources, including hydrocarbons. The socio-political side, on the other hand, is more complex, and it is related to the complex ethnic composition of Xinjiang. The single largest ethnic group in Xinjiang is the Uyghurs whereas other major non-Han ethnic groups include the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks, all of whom have kinsmen in the neighboring Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.19 As a matter of fact, economic development of Xinjiang cannot be evaluated separately from the ethnic issues involved.

The discussion of economic development in Xinjiang should begin with the Qing Dynasty period. After incorporating Xinjiang as a province into the Chinese empire in 1884, the Qing Dynasty embarked upon an aggressive program of economic development. Agriculture began to be commercialized with a significant expansion of cultivation throughout the region, and there was also progress in other areas of the economy, such as the rise of handicrafts, coal and oil extraction (with Russian assistance) and flourishing foreign trade, which also benefited from the British-Russian imperial rivalry in Central Asia.

The political and social turmoil that followed the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 negatively influenced the economy of Xinjiang. Carla Wiemer distinguishes four different periods of volatility associated with four consecutive warlords who governed Xinjiang during the republican era. Accordingly, the reign of Yang Zengxin (1911-1928) was a period of “healthy recovery” during which agricultural development was prioritized and Xinjiang exported agricultural commodities in return for imports of industrial products. This was followed by the reign of Jin Shuren (1928-1933) marked by corruption and economic slowdown. Sheng Shicai (1933-1942) brought back recovery to the economy of Xinjiang through liberal reforms and the assistance of the Soviet Union, which was particularly crucial in the revival of extractive industries. The period after Shicai, under the leadership of Zhang Zhizong (1942-1949), was influenced by the civil war and the world war in China, as well as by souring of relations with the Soviet Union, resulting in an economic decline.20

In the 1940s, Uyghurs and other non-Han Chinese in certain parts of Xinjiang experienced a brief period of independence. In what the Chinese official histories call “Three Districts Revolution”, as an uprising against the nationalist central government, the Eastern Turkistan Republic was founded in 1944 with Soviet backing,.21 However, after the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, Xinjiang had to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Eastern Turkistan Republic was absorbed into the communist rule through what Chinese official histories call, the “peaceful liberation”.22

Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic, the central government in Beijing launched two initiatives to consolidate its control over the economy of Xinjiang. The first was the settlement of Han Chinese to the region in order to strengthen the links between the region and the central government. This was important, because the Muslim Uyghur population’s loyalty to the new regime in Beijing was highly suspicious since they were neither pro-Chinese nor pro- Communist.23 Whereas in 1952 only 7.1% of Xinjiang’s population were Han Chinese, this ratio rose to 40.1% as of 1971 and remained almost unchanged ever since. Second was the establishment of the centrally managed Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. This enterprise was composed of demobilized PLA soldiers, and had a significant economic presence in several fields, such as agriculture, steel, minerals, electricity, water, education, etc. Its share in Xinjiang’s GDP reached a peak level of 31.3% in 1971, later gradually fading down to 16.6% as of 2000.24

The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution periods under Mao Zedong were marked by what Michael Clarke called a “contradiction created by the policy directives from Beijing and what was actually practicable in Xinjiang’s conditions”.25 Policies were implemented and targets were set without regard for the local conditions of Xinjiang and they were characterized by ideological influence that took mainly anti-Islam and anti-Soviet forms in Xinjiang. There was, however, some economic progress, albeit limited. In 1977, Jack Chen argued that China was industrializing without an exodus from the farms to big cities. He compared the rural population ratio of 87% in the unindustrialized China of 1949 with 80% in 1977. Chen was also pointing of a modernization of the economy, stating that the share of modern industry in the total value of industrial production in Xinjiang had risen from 2.9% in 1949 to 78% in 1977.26 As Chen was writing these lines, Deng Xiaoping rose as the leader of the post-Mao China, bringing greater liberalization to Xinjiang. What was remarkable in this period was China embarked on a series of market-oriented economic reforms within the framework of what is called the “socialist market economy”, a system where the state owns a large part of the economy and at the same time allows all entities to participate within a market economy.

At the outset of the reforms, Chinese authorities in Beijing concentrated on the development of the eastern parts of the country, hoping that the positive effects of the development would spill over to the rest of China. However, this plan turned out to be miscalculated, and the outcome was a rapid widening of regional disparities, with the western part of the country significantly remaining behind the eastern belt, and, in contrast with what Chen had written, a massive exodus occurring from rural China to metropolitan areas.27

The central government’s response to the growing disparities during the 1990s took the form of “preferential policies”, a series of privileges and incentives provided for western regions, such as economic zones and tax-sharing arrangements. However, while doing this, Beijing has also recentralized fiscal and decision making powers, keeping much of Xinjiang’s economy under the control of the state.28 There were disparities not only between Xinjiang (or the western part of China in general) and the coastal belt of the country, but also within Xinjiang itself, since the government was investing more in the northern part of Xinjiang, which was heavily colonized by Han Chinese. This was a major reason behind the rise of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese control of Xinjiang and unrest in the region during the 1990s.29

It has also to be remarked that during the 1990s, the central government’s economic strategy for Xinjiang was based on two pillars, “one black, one white”, referring to the priority given to oil extraction and cotton cultivation. While oil was seen as an important source of revenue for the region, the ultimate justification of the emphasis on cotton was the opening up of new land through reclamation, a key element in bringing in large numbers of Han settlers.30 Beijing’s overriding aim in Xinjiang during the decade was to integrate Xinjiang to the rest of China, and this was to be achieved not only by speeding up Han migration, but also by developing communication links, reinforcing military presence in Xinjiang and neutralizing the impact of the neighboring Central Asian states.31

The latter element deserves greater attention here. It was not Deng’s reforms per se that triggered Xinjiang’s opening up to the rest of the world in the economic and commercial sense, but rather the fact these reforms coincided with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resulting emergence of independent Central Asian republics neighboring Xinjiang. This opening up brought risks and benefits at the same time. There were risks, because Beijing feared that these republics, whose people share a common heritage and same ethnic roots with the non-Han in Xinjiang, would support the then emerging reassertions of the ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule within the region. On the other hand, there were the economic prospects as well. Already before the Soviet collapse, Deng had initiated the “double opening” policy, implying the simultaneous orientation of the region’s economy towards both China and the then Soviet Central Asia.32

After 1991, liberalization of China’s foreign trade regime that coincided with the independence of the Central Asian republics led to a rapid growth in trade between China and Central Asia. This growth was not limited to the bilateral state level, but there was also growth in local trade between Xinjiang and the Central Asian republics in the form of border trade, border residents markets and tourist purchases.33 In sum, China’s strategy was to establish a buffer, while at the same time to benefit from larger amounts of cross border commerce.

As the 1990s were coming to a close, regional income disparities that arose as a result of China’s uneven growth remained a concern for the Beijing government. The most profound policy response came in the form of the “Great Western Development Strategy” launched in January 2000 as an attempt to alleviate the obstacles to development in the western regions of China34, by channeling China’s government spending from the coastal provinces to the west. The strategy focused on the following areas:

• Infrastructure development (focusing on expanding the highway network and building more railway tracks, airports, gas pipelines, power grids, telecommunications networks).
• Environment (projects to protect natural forests along the upper Yangtze River and the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River).
• Local industry (encouraging different regions to develop industries that maximize local comparative advantages in geography, climate, resources and other conditions; capitalizing on high-tech industries).
• Investment environment (taking steps to attract more foreign investment, capital, technology and managerial expertise by improving industrial structure and reforming state-owned enterprises).
• Science, technology and education.35

Within the framework of this strategy, cumulative fixed investments in Xinjiang totaled 1.4 trillion yuan36 over the period between 2000 and 2009, more than 80% of which coming from the central government.37 During this period, Xinjiang received four times as much investment as it had during the 1990’s, and investments were mainly made in infrastructure projects in agriculture, forestry, energy and transportation sectors.

Recently the central government has adopted the idea of focusing on Xinjiang’s development in order to deepen the Great Western Development Strategy. This approach was explicitly declared when, on 17-19 May 2010, the government held a central work conference on Xinjiang’s development, the first of its kind in the history of the People’s Republic. At this conference, President Hu Jintao announced the goals of the new approach, which are establishing a basic public health system by 2012; leveling the region’s per capita income with the Chinese average by 2015; and eliminating absolute poverty and achieving a “moderately prosperous” society by 2020. In order to attain these goals, fixed assets investment in Xinjiang over the period 2011-2015 will double that of the previous five-year period, income tax levels will be reduced, undeveloped land will be made available for construction, and access requirements to industries related to resources and/or those with high market demand will be relaxed.38

Although the central government is heavily funding the Great Western Development Strategy, and several important projects have already been brought to life in the region, there are two crucial points that have to be made. First, the western regions of China (including Xinjiang) exhibit a great diversity in terms of ethnic composition and despite denials by the Chinese government, there is an almost consensus among scholars that the Great Western Development Strategy is aimed at increasing material wealth of the people in order to ensure greater minority cooperation, which would lead to their integration with the Han Chinese and help silence the separatist movements. As Michael Clarke argues, the Great Western Development Strategy suggested that “while the state continues to stress the need to address the problems of uneven development in ethnic minority regions, it nonetheless maintains that this will be done on the basis of preserving ‘national unity’ and ‘social stability’ with the dominant ethnic group –the Han– as the leading agents of modernization”.39 Second, there is another influential opinion among scholars that the richer eastern parts of China are benefiting more from the Great Western Development Strategy than the western regions, because this strategy focuses on infrastructure, energy and natural resource extraction, instead of directly addressing the social issues in the western regions. It is argued that the western regions would have benefited more if the campaign had focused more on poverty relief, improvement in education and health care.40

Despite its problems and setbacks, Xinjiang is currently on a development path. The next section of the article will examine what this development means for China’s economic security.

3. The Role of Xinjiang in China’s Economic Security

Given its radical transformation and rapid growth rate, China is obliged to take the necessary measures to deal with collateral macroeconomic disturbances (such as unemployment, income equality, etc), and to ensure its continued access to world markets where it can sell its products. Since it relies to a great extent on imports of raw materials to fuel its economic growth, China has to ensure continued inflow of such supplies as well, while at the same time maintaining its economic independence, which is achieved by avoiding excessive reliance on a single source of imports and diversifying the sources instead. In this part of the article, we will discuss to what extent Xinjiang contributes to China’s economic security in the each of the areas mentioned above.

3.1. Macroeconomic Indicators

Macroeconomic disturbances threaten a country’s economic security. In China’s case, such disturbances emerge as a result of the country’s rapid growth and transformation, and appear in the form of rising unemployment; severe economic disparities between coastal and interior regions, as well as between urban and rural areas; and decentralization of authority in the Chinese economy and society. In order to deal with these insecurities, China has embarked on a series of adjustments since the mid-1990s, especially gradual institutional adjustments, establishing a social security system and coordinating the development of the regional economy.41

Xinjiang remains far behind the eastern provinces of China in terms of average incomes. In 2009, when Chinese GDP grew by 8.7% and most central and western provinces of the country achieved double-digit growth rates thanks to the stimulus package launched by the government as a measure against the effects of the global crisis, Xinjiang’s GDP rose by only 8.1%.

During the same year, average annual disposable income was 12,258 yuan for urban households, and 4,005 yuan for rural households in Xinjiang.42 Both figures were below the national averages, which are 17,175 yuan and 5,153 yuan, for urban and rural households respectively However, it has to be noted that the income gap between Xinjiang and the rest of China has begun to narrow, mainly because of rising employment in the region. Until 2008, Xinjiang’s employment rate was increasing slower than the China average. In 2009, however, total employment rose by 0.7% in China, whereas the increase in Xinjiang was 2.3%.43

On the negative side, however, inflation is rising faster in Xinjiang compared to the rest of China. In August 2010, while the consumer price index (CPI) increased by 2.8% on a year-on-year basis in China, this increase was 3.8% in Xinjiang, which is influenced by high levels of rural inflation.44
In sum, from a macroeconomic perspective, Xinjiang has a negative yet improving position as far as China’s economic security is concerned. Its economic backwardness relative to the more developed provinces can be regarded as major concern, whereas unemployment and rising inflation continue to pose a problem.

3.2. Security of Supply

Economic interdependence means that all countries are dependent on others to some extent for one kind of supplies or another. This implies that interruptions in imports of the supply can severely disrupt the national economy and also overseas suppliers can acquire a monopoly position turning the terms of trade against the importer. Vincent Cable argues that these two arguments usually go together and they are especially evident in the areas of food, strategic minerals (those used in industries regarded strategic such as aircraft production), energy (esp. oil and gas) and advanced technology.45 Food supply and energy supply are often defined as the most crucial determinants of China’s economic security, together with the macroeconomic disturbances discussed above. As the economy of China grows, so does its need for supplies of raw materials and resources, and security of supply becomes an increasing concern for the decision makers in Beijing. This part of the article will start with two areas of supply security, namely energy security and food security, the first associated with the needs of a growing economy and the latter with the needs of a growing population. Additionally, a third area will be discussed, which is of vital importance for China’s textile industry, namely cotton.

Energy. Due to the high rate of economic growth in China, demand for energy outstrips local supply and there is an increasing reliance on imports, although China is the world’s fifth largest oil producer with a production volume of 189 million tons in 2009.46 After 1978, as the oil consumption of the major economic powerhouses in the world (United States, Europe and Japan) almost remained constant, China’s consumption nearly quadrupled.

Dependence on imports is by itself an economic security concern, which is further heightened by the volatilities in global energy markets and political instability in the world’s energy producing regions. China is currently dependent on imported oil. Until 1993, it had been self-sufficient in this respect, even producing a surplus. However, after this year consumption increased faster than local production and the resulting gap is widening every year. The local production/consumption ratio, which was 120.8% in 1992, declined below the self- sufficiency line in 1993 with 98.8% and continued to decrease, to 72.7% in 2000 and to 46.7% in 2009.47 This means that today China is producing less than half of the oil it consumes and for the rest it depends on imports.48 As this ratio falls, imports increase (in 2009, China’s imports of crude oil rose by 13.8%), and so do the economic security concerns.

China’s approach to energy security is “evolving from a vision of tight government control and self-reliance to a more liberal outlook that accepts market forces and diversified energy types and sources”.49 Within this framework, China is establishing energy supply relations with countries all around the world. In 2009, the Middle East supplied 50.7% of China’s total oil imports, Africa 20.5%, Southeast Asia 13.5% and Russia 13.1%.50 Furthermore, in another attempt to ensure its economic security, China is purchasing stakes in foreign oil companies. For instance, the acquisition of PetroKazakhstan by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in October 2005 is considered a landmark in China’s overseas oil development.51

There is, however, a different picture as far as other energy sources, i.e. natural gas and coal, are concerned. China consumes gas and coal as much as it produces them, not more. In other words, China is self-sufficient in gas and coal.

As a region within China, Xinjiang’s contribution to the country’s energy supply security takes two forms; first as a producer of energy resources, and second as a transit route of energy resources imported from abroad.

Xinjiang is a part of China’s quest to diversify its oil resources and this can be traced back to 1991 when the Chinese government granted the development rights of the Tarim Basin to Japan National Oil Corporation. Following this initial opening, Xinjiang’s oil output gradually increased. In 2009, Xinjiang produced 25.1 million tons of crude oil52, and, as seen in Table 1, Xinjiang is the third largest oil-producing region in the country. Yet the region can be expected to climb to higher ranks in the near future. Only 33% of China’s oil reserves are estimated to have been discovered so far and Xinjiang hosts large amounts of undiscovered oil reserves, particularly in Tarim Basin53, which is estimated to contain 10 billion tons of oil. CNPC is known to have plans to develop Xinjiang as a major oil and production center. Having invested over 300 billion yuan in the region so far, the company aims to increase annual production to 50 million tons by 2015, and to 60 million tons by 2020.54

Xinjiang has a key position in China’s oil supply security, not only because it is the third largest producer of oil among China’s provinces, but also because it functions as a transit route. Due to its strategic concerns over relying too heavily on maritime imports of oil, China has a significant interest in securing oil supplies through pipelines from Central Asia. Since Xinjiang is the only region in China that is neighboring the Central Asian republics, Central Asian oil (and a large proportion of Russian oil) has to enter the Chinese pipeline network from Xinjiang. The first transnational oil pipeline built for this purpose was that of the Sino-Kazakh Oil Pipeline Co. Ltd.55 which began pumping oil in July 2006. This pipeline starts in Atasu in northwestern Kazakhstan, enters Xinjiang territory at Alashankou on the Kazakh-Chinese border, and terminates at PetroChina Dushanzi Petrochemical Company. Half of the oil transported through this pipeline is Kazakh oil and the other half is Russian oil. When this pipeline reaches its full capacity of 20 million tones per year, it will account for around 15% of China’s oil imports. In the mean time, the oil extracted in or imported through Xinjiang is distributed to the rest of China through the Urumqi-Lanzhou oil product pipeline and the Shanshan-Lanzhou crude oil pipeline.

As far as the supplies of natural gas are concerned, Xinjiang is singled out as the largest producer region in China (see Table 2). Xinjiang’s gas output has been growing rapidly since the West-East Gas Pipeline started operation in December 2004. In 2005, the region produced 10.6 billion cubic meters of gas, and this figure rose to 24.5 billion cubic meters in 2009.56 According to the calculations of CNPC, Xinjiang holds 490 billion cubic meters of proven gas reserves, about 20% of the Chinese total.57

Although China is to a great extent self-sufficient in terms of natural gas, the government is planning to import Central Asian gas in order to ensure long term economic security and meet the rapidly increasing demand for cleaner burning fuel.

To that end, China inked a 30-year deal with Turkmenistan in 2006 for 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, rising to 30 billion by 2012. The Kazakh part of the pipeline, which will carry the gas coming from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan will link Shymkent on Uzbek-Kazakh border to Khorgos in Xinjiang, and will have a capacity of 40 billion cubic meters per year.

The gas arriving in Xinjiang will be distributed to the rest of China through the 4,200-kilometer West-East Pipeline linking Xinjiang to Shanghai in the east and a second line of 4,843 kilometers that connects Xinjiang with Guangzhou in the southeast.

Gas is important for China’s economic security, because abundant supplies of natural gas will help to overcome China’s dependence on coal. Coal is a basic energy source in China making up 70% of the country’s total primary energy consumption,58 and as discussed above, China is self-sufficient in terms of coal supplies. China is the largest coal producer in the world, with a share of 45.6% in the world’s total production as of 2009, and at the same also the largest consumer, with 46.9%.59 In other words, almost the half of the world’s coal is produced and consumed in China.

Although Xinjiang is not one of the major coal producing regions in China (see Table 3), it is rapidly growing its coal industry and making preparations for exploration of large- scaled coalmines.

Currently, coal resources already utilized only account for 13% of total deposits. An important portion of the unutilized resources is to be found in Xinjiang.

Whereas Xinjiang’s annual coal output amounts for the time being to around 50 million tons, the region’s coal production is expected to rise to 1 billion tones and account for more than 20% of the total output in China until 2020.60

Food. Food security should be dealt with within the larger framework of agriculture in Xinjiang. Stockbreeding and pastoralism dominate the region’s economy, however it is not possible to argue that agriculture is well developed in Xinjiang, mainly due to climatic and geographical problems.

There are severe irrigation problems in grasslands and deserts, as well as occasional droughts, which seriously undermine the agricultural output.

As a result, although its economy is dominated by agriculture, Xinjiang is not one of the leading producers in China, and therefore its contribution to China’s food security is minimal.

In 2007, the total value of China’s farming output was 2.15 trillion yuan, whereas Xinjiang share in this was 2.97% with 63.9 billion yuan.

Similarly, in China’s total animal husbandry output value of 1.36 trillion yuan, Xinjiang’s share was only 1.39% with 18.9 billion yuan (See Tables 4 and 5).

Fruit, especially melons and grapes, are often regarded as the most important farming product in Xinjiang.

A closer look at production levels of various farming products reveals that although this is true, Xinjiang is still not one of the major producers of fruit in China.

The data in Table 6 suggests that Xinjiang’s share in China’s production of farming commodities exceeded 3% only in fruit and sugar crops.

Cotton. Another agricultural product, which is not related to food security but still important in terms of China’s security of supply, is cotton.

The textile industry is one of the major engines of China’s export growth and until recently it has been growing at a rate that exceeded the overall economic growth of China. The recent global economic downturn has negatively affected the Chinese textile industry and in 2009, and the industry experienced its largest decline in exports volume over the past three decades.61 Despite this drawback, China’s textile industry continues to increase its output. In 2009, China produced about 24 million tons of yarn, an increase of 12.7% year on year, and the amount of clothes produced was up from 6.9% to 23.75 billion units.62

China’s competitiveness in the textile industry is derived from its low cost base. While labor costs are crucial in this respect, there is also the need for low-cost raw materials, in this case cotton. As discussed earlier, cotton is one of the two pillars on which the Xinjiang economy is based. Indeed, Xinjiang is the leading cotton producer in China on a regional basis, accounting to around 40% of the total output (see Table 7). In 2009, the region produced 2.5 million tons of cotton, ensuring the supply security of China’s rapidly growing textile industry.

3.3. Access to Markets

In an age of growing economic interdependence, security in the economic realm is ensured not only by securing the supplies to be used for production, but also by ensuring access to markets where the output is to be sold. Export growth is an important engine of economic growth and increasing the exports requires access to markets in a sustainable manner. In our case, China can be said to capitalize on a significant level of market access and therefore economic security. This argument is supported by the fact that China’s export growth goes parallel to the growth in output, meaning that as China produces more, it also exports more, because it has sufficient access to markets. Moreover, China’s market access was consolidated after it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which eliminated certain barriers to trade for China.

Market access can take two forms. The first is related to the level of trade barriers such as quotas and tariffs a country is facing. The second form is the physical one, which refers to logistical and geographical issues. Since the unit of analysis of this article is the regional level, this section will be only dealing with the latter, by analyzing Xinjiang’s place in China’s foreign trade, both in terms of volume and logistics.

Xinjiang has only a minimal share in China’s total foreign trade. In 2009, while China’s foreign trade totaled US$ 2.21 trillion (exports US$ 1.20 trillion, imports US$ 1.01 trillion), Xinjiang’s foreign trade volume was only US$ 13.8 billion (exports US$ 10.8 billion, imports US$ 3.0 billion). This is not surprising, because, as seen in Table 8, coastal provinces of China are accounting for the bulk of China’s foreign trade.63 However, two points should be made here. First, Xinjiang has by far the largest foreign trade volume among the western provinces of China (almost 50 times greater than Tibet’s trading volume).

Second, and more importantly, until the recent global economic crisis, Xinjiang has been rapidly increasing its foreign trade volume. Xinjiang’s foreign trade expanded by 50.7% in 2007 and by a massive 62% in 2008, before declining by 37.8% in 2009.64 A rapid recovery is on the way in Xinjiang, and it is safe to argue that Xinjiang is increasingly getting more assertive in foreign trade.

This increasing role of Xinjiang within China’s foreign trade is a result of the government’s policies to diversify China’s trading partners and there are several factors behind this. There is the intention to increase cost efficiency. Currently, China executes a substantial portion of its foreign trade through maritime routes.65 Although this is a natural result of China’s geographic position, it also leads to high logistics costs. Chinese logistics costs are already at 18.5% of the GDP, nearly double that of more developed countries, and this is a threat against Chinese exports’ competitiveness.66

Land transportation to and/or through Central Asian republics neighboring Xinjiang offers low-cost trading opportunities and this is why the Chinese government is heavily investing in the linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asian republics with the aim of turning the region into a transport and trading hub. For this purpose, the current railroad network, connecting Xinjiang with Kazakhstan, will be increased from 3,600 kilometers to 12,000 kilometers by 2020, with the addition of new lines linking Xinjiang with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, 12 new highway projects with a total length of 7,155 kilometers are included in the development plans.67

Greater trade with Central Asian republics brings about significant prospects for China. Trade between China and Central Asian republics has advantages, not only due to geographical proximity, but also due to the common cultural values of Xinjiang and these republics, which make it easier to establish communication, mutual understanding and trust, as well as the complementary nature of the economies of Xinjiang and Central Asian republics.68 In the meantime, trade opportunities are not limited to bilateral trade with Central Asian republics, but also include trade with Europe. Railway transportation through Xinjiang and Central Asia to Europe is a cost-efficient alternative for maritime transportation, which halves current traveling time.69 In sum, Xinjiang is on its way to become China’s gateway opening to the west, first to Central Asia and then to Europe. Railways, highways, pipelines and trade routes are passing through Xinjiang and connecting China to the rest of the world in a more time and cost efficient manner
than the traditional maritime routes departing from the country’s east coast.

CONCLUSION

The empirical evidence analyzed in this paper suggests that Xinjiang is playing a vital and strategic role in China’s economic security, because:

It is the single largest contributor to China’s self-sufficiency in natural gas. It is also a major domestic producer of oil, while production of coal is expected to increase drastically in a decade. Furthermore, it is the transit route of energy resources imported from abroad, which will play an increasingly crucial role in China’s supply security.

As China’s gateway to Central Asia and beyond, its strategic importance vis-à- vis China’s foreign trade is rising. It is becoming the largest hub for foreign trade with reduced logistics costs. It is the single largest raw material supplier of China’s booming textile industry.

Although Xinjiang is behind most of the rest of China in terms of its share from the national income (and likely to remain so for years to come) the rest of China owes a great deal for its economic growth to Xinjiang. Apparently, Xinjiang’s economic structure fits the picture of the periphery, of which the main function is to provide the core with energy supplies and raw materials. This is precisely why the Chinese government focuses on the economic development of the region. A developed and stable Xinjiang is one of the keys of ensuring China’s economic security in the long term. Beijing cannot take the risk of instability in a region, which produces its energy supplies and cotton, serves as a major foreign trade hub, and hosts important transportation routes connecting China with the rest of the world are passing.

Beijing’s reliance on economic development as a strategy to deal with ethnic problems cannot be denied. However, the ethnic issue is rapidly becoming a sub- component of the economic security issue in this high-growth opening-up era of the Chinese economy. In other words, Beijing wants ethnic stability in Xinjiang not only for political reasons, but mainly for a stable, and problem-free Xinjiang that is required for China’s economic security. As economic pragmatism undermines all kinds of political ideologies in today’s globalizing world, ethnic issues such as those in Xinjiang cannot be understood without incorporating the matter of economy in the larger picture.

About the author:
*Altay Atli, PhD Candidate, Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. E- mail: altay.atli@boun.edu.tr..

Source:
This article was published by JTW, OAKA, Cilt: 6, Sayı: 11, ss. 111-133, 2011
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Notes:
1. In this article, the term “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China.
2. David Gosset, “The Xinjiang Factor in the New Silk Road”, Asia Times Online, 22 May 2007, (www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IE22Ag01.html).
3. For instance, as of August 2010, the cumulative amount of investment channeled by the central
government to Xinjiang was 7.4 times larger than the investment stock in Tibet Autonomous Region. “Gediqu chengzhen touzi qingkuang (2010 nian 1-8 yue)”, China National Bureau of Statistics, (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/jdsj/t20100921_402673820.htm).
4. Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991, pp. 431-451.
5. Ibid, p. 445.
6. Wang Zhenyi, “Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts
Globalization”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004, p. 524.
7. Ibid, pp. 527-8.
8. Ibid, p. 529.
9. Werner Draguhn & Robert Ash (Ed.), China’s Economic Security, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon
Press, 1999).
10. Jiang Yong, “Economic Security: Redressing Imbalance”, China Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, p.
66.
11. Ibid, p. 76.
12. Vincent Cable, “What is International Economic Security?”, International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2,
1995, pp. 305-324.
13. Ibid, pp. 313-319.
14. Linda Jakobson and Zha Daojiong, “China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security”, Asia-Pacific
Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, p. 62.
15. Ibid, pp. 68-70.
16. Pak K. Lee, “China’s Quest for Oil Security: Oil (Wars) in the Pipeline?”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005, p. 289.
17. Carla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang”, S. Frederick Starr (Ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2004), p.163.
18. Xinjiang lies on the northwestern frontier of China and is divided by the great range of mountains, the Tianshan. The Zhungar Basin lies to the north and the Tarim Basin, which is largely occupied by the Taklamakan Desert, lies to the south.
19. According to the most recent census (2000), major nationalities in Xinjiang are: Uyghur 45%, Han 41%, Kazakh 7%, Hui 5%, Kyrgyz 0.9%, Mongol 0.8%, Dongxiang 0.3%, Tajik 0.2%. At the same census, Han Chinese made up 91.6% of China’s total population. “Country Profile China”, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2009, p.15.
20. Carla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang”, pp. 164-8.
21. This was the Second Eastern Turkistan Republic. The first one was founded in Khotan in November 1933, as a result of the Islamist and nationalist aspirations of the Uyghur people there. However, it lasted only until February 1934 when the city of Kashgar was taken by the warlord Ma Zhongying as a part of his campaign against his rival Sheng Shicai.
22. Michael Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest, (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.32-6.
23. June Teufel Dreyer, “The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty: A Report Card”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 26, No. 7, 1981, pp. 722–723.
24. Carla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang”, p. 169.
25. Michael Clarke, “Xinjiang and China’s Relations with Central Asia, 1991-2001: Across the
‘Domestic-Foreign Frontier’?”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003, pp. 207-224.
26. Jack Chen, The Sinkiang Story, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co Inc, 1977), p. 294.
27. There emerged a “floating population” of migrants from rural areas to cities, of which the number was 40 million in 1985, increasing to 140 million as of 2003. About 20 million people are added to this population every year. Consequently the level of urbanization in China began to increase, from 27% in 1990 to 36% in 2000, and to 43% in 2005. This figure is estimated to rise to 65% by 2020. Kam-Wing Chan, “Internal Labor Migration in China: Trends, Geographical Distribution and Policies”, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and Development Conference Proceedings, 2008, p. 93.
28. Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties”, The China Journal, No. 44, 2000, pp. 71-2.
29. Michael Clarke, “Xinjiang and China’s Relations with Central Asia, 1991-2001: Across the
‘Domestic-Foreign Frontier’?”, p. 212.
30. Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties”, p.83.
31. Ibid, p.67.
32. Gaye Christofferson, “Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: the Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning”, China Quarterly, No. 133, 1993, p. 136.
33. Liu Qingjian, “Sino-Central Asian Trade and Economic Relations: Progress, Problems and Prospects”, Zhang Yongjin and Rouben Azizian (Ed.), Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 182.
34. The “western regions” as covered by the plan included six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan), three autonomous regions (Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing).
35. These major objectives of the plan were laid out by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the March 2000 session of the National People’s Congress.
36. In this article, “yuan” denotes the principal unit of renminbi, which is the official currency of China. As of 1 December 2010, one US dollar is equal to 6.68 yuan, and one euro is equal to 8.67 yuan (official rates announced by the Bank of China).
37. “Xinjiang Development at the New Starting Point”, People’s Daily Online, 7 July 2010, (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7055962.html).
38. Yu Shujun, “Blueprint for a Properous Xinjiang”, Beijing Review, No. 23, 10 June 2010.
39. Michael Clarke, “China’s Internal Security Dilemma and the ‘Great Western Development’: The Dynamics of Integration, Ethnic Nationalism and Terrorism in Xinjiang”, Asian Studies Review,
Vol. 31, No. 3, 2007, p. 339.
40. Rui Xia, “Asphalt Net Covers China’s West”, Asia Times Online, 15 September 2005, (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/GI15Cb01.html).
41. Wang Zhengyi, “Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts Globalization”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004, p. 536.
42. “Quanguo niandu tongji gongbao – Xinjiang (2009 nian)”, China National Bureau of Statistics, (http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?channelid=4362&record=7).
43. Ibid.
44. “Gediqu jumin xiaofei jiage zhishu (2010 nian 8 yue)”, China National Bureau of Statistics,
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/jdsj/t20100919_402673826.htm).
45. Vincent Cable, “What is International Economic Security?”, pp. 313-319.
46. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, p .9.
47. Calculated using the data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy, p. 9 and 12.
48. As of 2009, China is the second largest oil importer and consumer in the world after the United States
49. “China’s Thirst for Oil”, ICG Asia Report, No.153, 9 June 2008, p. 4.
50. Calculated using the data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy, p. 21.
51. “China Energy: Petroleum Demand”, EIU Industry Wire, 7 February 2008.
52. China National Bureau of Statistics.
53. Other basins in Xinjiang that contain oil reserves are Junggar and Turpan-Hami basins.
54. Wan Zhigong, “CNPC has Huge Plans for Xinjiang”, China Daily Online, 20 July 2010,
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7072547.html).
55. This company is a 50:50 joint venture between CNPC and Kazakhstan’s KazTransOil.
56. China National Bureau of Statistics.
57. Robert M. Cutler, “Xinjiang – China’s Energy Gateway”, Asia Times Online, 10 July 2009,
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KG10Cb01.html).
58. “Country Analysis Briefs: China”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 2009, (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Full.html).
59. BP Statistical Yearbook of Energy.
60. “China’s Xinjiang Coal Reserves Adds 18.98 Billion Tons”, China Mining Federation, 8 May 2008, (http://www.chinamining.org/News/2008-05-08/1210233199d13585.html).
61. “Textile, Garment Exports to Suffer Largest Drop in 30 Years”, China Daily Online, 21 October 2009, (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-10/21/content_8827056.htm).
62. “China’s Textile Industry Output Rises 10%”, China Daily Online, 3 February 2010, (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-02/03/content_9423379.htm).
63. In 2007, the eastern part of the country contributed to 91.2% of the total trade volume, where as this figure was 4.89% for central China and 3.94% for western China (Calculated using data from China Monthly Statistics, 3 February 2008).
64. China National Bureau of Statistics.
65. In 2007, 63.9% of China’s foreign trade was transported through waterways, whereas this ratio was 24.4% for railways and 11.6% for highways (Calculated using data from China Monthly Statistics 3 February 2008).
66. “Rising Logistics Costs Threaten Chinese Competitiveness”, CER-China Logistics News, 30 April 2008.
67. “China Builds New Silk Roads to Revive Fortunes of Xinjiang”, Xinhua News Agency, 2 July 2010, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-07/02/c_13380771_2.htm).
68. Liu, 1998, pp. 192-3.
69. On 9 January 2008, China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany signed an agreement,
according to which a scheduled container train (the Trans-Eurasian Express) would be shuttling between China and Germany in a year’s time. In September 2008, the train made its maiden voyage, carrying 50 containers of high-tech products from Xiangtang in China to Hamburg in Germany, a distance of 12,000 kilometers, in 17 days. In comparison, goods delivered by sea from China to Germany need around 35 days to reach their destination. Introduction of regular services by the Trans-Eurasian Express has been postponed by the German side due to the global economic crisis. “Güterzüge nach China”, N-Tv Online, 20 September 2008, (http://www.n- tv.de/wirtschaft/meldungen/Gueterzuege-nach-China-article24327.html); “Deutsche Bahn stoppt Güterzug-Verbindung nach China”, Verkehrsrundschau, 25 June 2009, (http://www.verkehrsrunds chau.de/deutsche-bahn-stoppt-gueterzug-verbindung-nach-china-852879.html).

There is so much to talk about the horrible state of Malaysian politics one does not know where to begin to analyze it.

We leave 2015 with a stronger government with all the tools and instruments of repression it needs, a nation almost bankrupt, a helpless populace drowned in their daily struggle amid the rising cost of living, reading stories upon stories of massive corruption among the leaders of the ruling party, increasing violence on the streets, rising tension between youth of different ethnic groups, talk of Johor, Sabah, and Sarawak leaving Malaysia, a broken-down-opposition coalition, a still unresolved issue of the 1MDB, and a range of other issues that will usher our beloved nation into yet another hateful year.

One issue that caught my attention, as it relates to the relationship between the ruler and the ruled or between the rakyat and the those who elected them, is the increasing sense of arrogance politician are imbued with.

While the talk today is for the rakyat to save money, be prudent, and be thrifty in spending, and to even use second-hand stuff to survive in these harsh economic conditions, one advice given by a minister is to get us to work two to three jobs to make ends meet.

For politicians to be telling the people to take up two, three, four jobs to survive in this cut-throat, dog-eat-dog Malaysian economy, is not just being arrogant, heartless, and ruthless but to also a way to give them permission to urinate on the rakyat and tell them to go to hell with their problems.

These kinds of statement usually come from politicians who not only have 10 or nine jobs themselves, sitting on board of directorships of companies paying them perhaps a hundred thousand ringgit per seat. This is the kind of statement made by those whose lives are filled with filth and do not see that for the poor to take up two, three, four jobs would mean drawing up a plan to destroy the family.

We have come to a point of “no return” in the way we have allowed the politicians – those sweet-talking jive-talking vote beggars at every election – to get the rakyat to vote them into power, only to be betrayed by the ‘Yang Berhormat’ urinating on the rice bowl of families who are now having problems not only buying pens and pencils, and schoolbooks, but also putting food on their table.

What is there to worry about?

The politicians, be they from the ruling party or the opposition, have always been fed well. This goes the same to the CEOs of government-linked companies (GLCs) and corporations, and of course the royal families. What is there to worry about except to choose what rhetoric to use, what promise to make, and what bread and circuses to make and give the poor in order for the many to still keep the few in power.

What me, worry? as the MAD magazine character Alfred E Neuman would say.

Let the poor suffer, their children go the worst schools, young girls and women salivate watching those televised weddings of Malaysia’s rich and famous, and let the men and women work 10 jobs till they drop dead before the time comes for them to retire gracefully. Let them die a slow death under the weight of these political rhetoric while the a million-ringgit-a-month rakyat-paid politicians pee and defecate on the food of the poor.

Is this not insanity of the society we have created?

Who cares for the poor?
Who cares for those dying, breathing poison in Kuantan?
Who cares about the hills being shaved bald in Kelantan flooding away the lives of the poor who are now still rendered homeless?
Who cares about the increasing number of cases in which the poor had to steal food or money to buy food?
Who cares about the growing number of population of the homeless?
Who cares if that handbag made of the crocodile that died in the Straits of Malacca during the times of Parameswara is worth as much as the cost of stopping the poor from marching to the walls of the Bastille, because they are hungry?Who cares about the anger between the poor of the different races – anger fuelled as a strategy to keep the nation divided, conquered, and clobbered – after the Oppressed have become the Oppressor, little brown brothers become emperors?

Who cares? Who cares? Who cares?

Let the poor eat not just cake, but their own vomit…for this is all the rich care about the poor!

Is this what Malaysia is all about? A society of master and slaves? Where is compassion – even in the words politicians use to talk about the “poor” of all races?

What are our elected representatives going to tell us in 2016 – in order for us to not drop dead working three jobs? What are they going to lecture us about in an economy destroyed by those who not only are robbing the nation dry, but also plans to sell the country to foreign investors? How are we to believe that those who begged for our votes, being put into power, are doing these in the name of patriotism and national development, as they say?

Should we even bother to wish each other Happy New Year?

What then must Malaysians do?

The combination of human and computer intelligence might be just what we need to solve the “wicked” problems of the world, such as climate change and geopolitical conflict, say researchers from the Human Computation Institute (HCI) and Cornell University.

In an article published in the journal Science, the authors present a new vision of human computation (the science of crowd-powered systems), which pushes beyond traditional limits, and takes on hard problems that until recently have remained out of reach.

Humans surpass machines at many things, ranging from simple pattern recognition to creative abstraction. With the help of computers, these cognitive abilities can be effectively combined into multidimensional collaborative networks that achieve what traditional problem-solving cannot.

Most of today’s human computation systems rely on sending bite-sized ‘micro-tasks’ to many individuals and then stitching together the results. For example, 165,000 volunteers in EyeWire have analyzed thousands of images online to help build the world’s most complete map of human retinal neurons.

This microtasking approach alone cannot address the tough challenges we face today, say the authors. A radically new approach is needed to solve “wicked problems” – those that involve many interacting systems that are constantly changing, and whose solutions have unforeseen consequences (e.g., corruption resulting from financial aid given in response to a natural disaster).

New human computation technologies can help. Recent techniques provide real-time access to crowd-based inputs, where individual contributions can be processed by a computer and sent to the next person for improvement or analysis of a different kind. This enables the construction of more flexible collaborative environments that can better address the most challenging issues.

This idea is already taking shape in several human computation projects, including YardMap.org, which was launched by the Cornell in 2012 to map global conservation efforts one parcel at a time.

“By sharing and observing practices in a map-based social network, people can begin to relate their individual efforts to the global conservation potential of living and working landscapes,” said Janis Dickinson, Professor and Director of Citizen Science at the Cornell Lab of Ornithology.

YardMap allows participants to interact and build on each other’s work – something that crowdsourcing alone cannot achieve. The project serves as an important model for how such bottom-up, socially networked systems can bring about scalable changes how we manage residential landscapes.

HCI has recently set out to use crowd-power to accelerate Cornell-based Alzheimer’s disease research. WeCureAlz.com combines two successful microtasking systems into an interactive analytic pipeline that builds blood flow models of mouse brains. The stardust@home system, which was used to search for comet dust in one million images of aerogel, is being adapted to identify stalled blood vessels, which will then be pinpointed in the brain by a modified version of the EyeWire system.

“By enabling members of the general public to play some simple online game, we expect to reduce the time to treatment discovery from decades to just a few years”, said HCI director and lead author, Dr. Pietro Michelucci. “This gives an opportunity for anyone, including the tech-savvy generation of caregivers and early stage AD patients, to take the matter into their own hands.”

Tropical Depression 9C formed in the Central Pacific, 30 days after the official end to the Central Pacific Hurricane Season. An image from NOAA’s GOES-West satellite revealed the late-season tropical depression was still struggling to organize.

Tropical Depression 9C (TD9C) formed at 0300 UTC on Dec. 31 (10 p.m. EST on Dec. 30) in the Central Pacific, just north of the Equator and far to the southwest of the Johnston Atoll.

NOAA’s Central Pacific Hurricane Center (CPHC) said that TD9C is the sixteenth tropical system of the year to either form within or pass through the central north pacific basin.

An image from NOAA’s GOES-West satellite on Dec. 31 at 1200 UTC (7 a.m. EST) showed that newly formed Tropical Depression 9C appeared elongated. Tropical cyclones strengthen as their structure becomes more circular. An elongated system is a weaker system. The image was created by the NASA/NOAA GOES Project at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.

NOAA’s Central Pacific Hurricane Center (CPHC) noted that TD9C’s structure continues to suggest an elongated east to west oriented system. That indicates there likely is still a low-level trough-like (elongated area of low pressure) feature associated with the depression. The CPHC discussion on Dec. 31 said that the trough-like feature is “not unexpected when examining the unusual belt of strong westerly winds south of the equator…as well as the extensive area of 30 knot easterly winds to the north of TD9C.”

By 0900 UTC (4 a.m. EST) on Dec. 31, the center of TD9C was located near latitude 2.5 degrees north and longitude 175.8 degrees west. That’s about 1,070 miles (1,720 km) south-southwest of Johnston Island and about 1,770 miles (2,850 km) southwest of Honolulu Hawaii. TD9C was moving toward the northwest near 3 mph (6 kph) and that general motion is expected to continue through Friday, Jan. 1. The estimated minimum central pressure is 1001 millibars.

Maximum sustained winds are near 35 mph (55 kph) with higher gusts. Little change in intensity is expected during the next couple of days, because of strong easterly vertical wind shear in the area as shown by data from ships. NOAA’s Central Pacific Hurricane Center noted that if TD9C avoids dissipation, it could reach tropical storm strength by Monday, January 4, 2016 as it crosses the International Date Line and moves into the Northwestern Pacific Ocean basin.

Locked in their deadliest violence in two decades, the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) should urgently resume peace talks. The return to a military-based approach to the conflict and domestic political polarisation, fuelled by a spillover of the Syrian conflict, have dismantled the achievements of peace talks undertaken during the 2.5-year ceasefire which collapsed in July 2015.

Bloody urban battles in the south east have since then given the conflict a new, unpredictable momentum. The failure to secure peace has cost more than 550 lives – up to 150 of them civilian, including that of the well-known human rights lawyer and Diyarbakır bar association head Tahir Elçi on 28 November. Turkey faces a critical choice: to advance its military strategy against the PKK in a fight that is bound to be protracted and inconclusive, or to resume peace talks. Whichever course it chooses, however, a comprehensive solution to the Kurdish issue will necessitate addressing long­standing Kurdish rights demands.

With a new government in place after the 1 November election, now is the time to reverse the spiral of mistrust between Ankara and the disparate Kurdish movement, represented, at times interchangeably and without clear mandates, by the legal Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), now in the parliament, as well as the outlawed PKK and its jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

The resumption of violence between the Turkish state and the PKK benefits the violently extremist Islamic State (IS). In Syria, Ankara worries that the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, will transform its gains against IS into a contiguous land corridor along Turkey’s southern border. This perceived threat has at times overshadowed Ankara’s focus on the fight against IS. Since May, four alleged-IS attacks targeting pro-Kurdish activists in Turkey – including the country’s deadliest ever bombing, on a peace rally in Ankara – have strengthened the perception among Kurds that the state does not protect them. The debate on these incidents underscores the need for Ankara to widen its domestic crackdown against IS. It also reflects deepening social cleavages not only between Turkish and Kurdish communities, but also along other sectarian and cultural fault lines. If left unbridged, these may undermine Turkey’s fragile social cohesion.

The new government has declared that it will not restart talks with Öcalan. Its strategy is instead centred on fighting the PKK, particularly until its recently empowered urban structures are eradicated, while pursuing a unilateral, vaguely defined, reform agenda pertaining to Kurdish rights that minimises engagement with the Kurdish movement and its main legal political actor, the HDP. An approach that marginalises the HDP and its reform-minded constituency with an interest in resolving the Kurdish issue by legal means risks further channelling Kurdish nationalism into armed struggle.

After three decades of fitful deadly conflict, both sides understand a military confrontation will not secure victory but believe themselves in a strengthened position to maximise gains. They are focused on weakening the other as much as possible, while waiting for the Syria quagmire to settle before considering a return to a ceasefire and peace talks. Under pressure from the spillover of the protracted Syrian conflict, as well as the IS threat, they should urgently end violence in the country’s population centres and agree on ceasefire conditions.

Free from electoral pressures for four years, the new government needs to formulate a concrete reform agenda to address Kurdish rights demands – including decentralisation and mother-tongue education – that can be advanced within legal structures, political parties and parliament. To restore trust, it must also ensure the effective investigation of past and present human rights abuses and prevent recurrence. The PKK and Kurdish local authorities should cease making declarations of autonomy that only alarm Turkish public opinion and harden Turkish politicians.

Talks with the PKK should resume in parallel, with a view to obtaining the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkey and agreement on mechanisms for amnesty and reintegration of those who, without arms, would like to stay or return. Öcalan has underlined the need for a more structured format for the peace talks that would also bring in other PKK figures and the HDP, as well as a monitoring mechanism. To achieve a mutually agreed roadmap and timeline, the government needs to clarify its position on institutionalising the process so that the cyclical effort to resolve the conflict does not resemble the mythical endless attempt of Sisyphus to roll a boulder to the top of the hill.

Turkey’s allies in the West, who remain primarily focused on the Syrian crisis and its regional security and refugee consequences, should not dismiss the risks posed by a swiftly deteriorating conflict in Turkey. In their own interests, they should encourage Ankara to reassess its approach to the Kurdish issue.

Their November summit, which was primarily geared to the migration crisis, committed Turkey and the European Union (EU) to re-energise their relationship and enhance political and financial engagement. It created momentum to follow through on difficult deliverables, including reducing the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe, progress toward visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals wishing to enter the EU and opening of new chapters in the negotiations for Turkey’s EU accession. At the same time, the flare up in the PKK-Turkey conflict has complicated the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against IS, especially because Turkey refuses to collaborate with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the military wing of the PYD. Ankara-PKK peace talks could create parameters for a more constructive relationship between Ankara and the PYD, enhancing the international anti-IS efforts.

To read the full report, click here (PDF)

By Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi*

As has been seen in the past that terrorism or any kind of uncontrolled violence perpetrated upon innocents for long have always resulted into large scale migrations from their homes to other safer places in the world, thereby affecting geopolitics – a branch of study which deals with relations between geography and politics.

With almost sudden spurt of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) led terror activities particularly in Iraq and Syria in the recent past, though the entire West Asia has become a burning cauldron of terror for the last many decades thereby turning the region into a virtual war zone, a new dimension in the phenomenon of terrorism is being seen in the world where hapless innocents are being butchered or shot dead in their forehead or back, or being burnt alive in a cage, or hanged upside down ultimately for killing and several hitherto unknown inhuman ways and these cruelties are being recorded to make viral on internet so that entire population upon earth may watch to their utter dismay and disgust. Besides causing several adverse indelible impacts upon the normal human psyche, the continuing ghastly massacre by the ISIS in the region has resulted into an uncontrolled mammoth flow of migrants/ refugees from West Asia into Europe thereby raising the issue of geopolitics, a study which deals with relations between geography and politics.

Unlike Al-Qaida, the ISIS has never been a hit-and-run jihadist group as its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has had his political ambitions very clear since 2013, when he fought for territories in Syria and Iraq and steadily expanded its reach, capitalizing on the power vacuum created in these two countries by the wars led and sponsored by the West and their regional allies. The ISIS now controls territories as large as Great Britain and comprising some 10 million people. But of late, under counter-attack from different militia groups such the Peshmerga, Hezbollah and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the ISIS’ expansionary project has come under enormous pressure. Meanwhile, an entire continent has developed a siege mentality and European countries are being compelled to review and change their laissez-faire procedures and security doctrines under the huge pressure of uncontrolled flow of refugees from West Asia and other regions, besides terrorism.

Obviously, terrorism or any kind of uncontrolled violence perpetrated upon innocents for long in the past had resulted into large scale displacement of communities all over the world as everybody wants safety and protection of one’s life and person. But that raises many demographic as well as economic and political issues as huge influx of refugees tends to change the composition of existing native population as happened in India’s Pak-occupied Kashmir (POK) in the state of Jammu and Kashmir immediately after independence where thousands of Pakistani tribal population, under instigation of Pakistan’s government, intruded into valley and settled down there and that has fundamentally changed the demographic character of the valley today.

The same had also happened in Palestine’s Gaza strip where native Palestinians were uprooted from soil by Israeli army and Jews population were brought to settle down there during long course of past decades in the previous century. Earlier, the long course of World War II saw the division of Germany into East and West thereby weakening its position as a powerful nation. Even much earlier, the painful Thirty-Years War causing ‘Balkanization of Europe’ during 17th century brought to close by the famous Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 had traumatized the consolidated power of Europe and that fear again looms large due to continuing civil wars in Syria and Iraq which has now metastasized into Lebanon, Jordon, Turkey and now into Europe. Thus terrorism or war has its marked impact upon geopolitics of a country or a continent.

Thus the present phase of continuing terrorism, particularly by the ISIS, has already caused the large scale migrations from West Asia and Africa into Europe. The ISIS has its hidden agenda of forming a global caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as supreme Caliph which shall reshape the political geography of the region and also impact the nature of politics therein. That will propel a fresh wave of terror in the name of Islam or jihad in the region and also in the world which will adversely impact the on-going course of democratization and liberalization of international politics in the present age of globalization. In fact, mounting terrorism and counter terror operations will result into excessive use of fire weapons, polluting the environment and endangering the human health and settlements. This is exactly going on there. As the entire region is oil and gas rich and the dependence of many of even highly industrialized and advanced countries on these is not going to lessen in near future, the pre-eminence of the region will remain same for their energy security reasons and it will remain a fierce battle-field for all powers of the world, as it continues to be since decades.

As a matter of fact, the on-going wave of terrorism and religious fundamentalism presents many unique challenges before humanity. The absence of a bi-polar world combined with increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has given individual terrorists enormous ability to wreak havoc on an unprecedented scale. The phenomenon of globalization has increasingly tightened the connectivity of nations in the developed regions of the world while at the same time widening the gulf between the developed and the developing nations. This division between the two must be narrowed if the war on terror is to be won and the geopolitical status-quo is to be maintained for ensuring permanent peace and security in West Asia and also in the whole world, as nothing is beyond human endeavor.

*Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi, Associate Professor, Political Science, M. D. P. G. College, Pratapgarh (UP)

The New York Times revealed that a new book, “Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich” by Peter Schweizer, should have shaken up things within the Hillary Clinton for President campaign, but there was almost a total media blackout when it was released in May 2015.

The scuttlebutt within political circles is that the book expand the narrative about numerous cash donations made by foreign donors to the money-sucking Clinton Foundation.

According to reports already known, foreign individuals and organizations donated million of dollars to the foundation and gave former President Bill Clinton high-dollar speaking fees while his wife served as President Barack Obama’s Secretary of State. She in turn is accused of granting favors from her State Department, all the while transacting business using a private email account and a Clinton owned and controlled Internet server.

Schweizer’s book is expected to uncover a pattern of financial contributions to the Clintons that ended up giving the contributors access to policy decisions benefiting those donors, while the Clintons built up a personal mega-fortune. Already the Clintons’ trusty team of liars, smear-merchants and goon-squad members are out in full force — with the help of their news media sycophants — attacking the messenger and attacking the motives of anyone who dares to investigate these allegations.

However, truth be told, neither Bill nor Hillary Clinton is a hero of the middle-class. Historically — going back to their early days in Arkansas — at best they are narcissistic opportunists, and at worst they are criminals masterminds who run an alleged criminal enterprise with minions such as Lanny Davis, John Podesta, David Kendall and numerous others. And this behavior and these accusations are nothing new. In fact, the media was so captivated by Bill Clinton’s sexual proclivities that it intentionally or unintentionally ignored news stories that should have outraged the American population.

For example, President Bill Clinton’s FBI director, Louis Freeh — in his book titled, “My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror” — revealed that Clinton kicked to the side of the road the American people and the families of victims of the Khobar Towers terror attack in Saudi Arabia. Clinton had promised America that he would do everything in his power to bring those responsible for the bombing that killed 19 and injured hundreds to face U.S. justice.

But Freeh became angry when Clinton refused to personally ask then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to allow the FBI to place boots on the ground to question the terrorism suspects the kingdom had arrested and to at least visit the crime scene where Americans died horrible deaths. Freeh wrote in his book, “Bill Clinton raised the subject only to tell the crown prince that he understood [Abdullah’s] reluctance to cooperate and then he hit Abdullah up for a contribution to the Clinton Presidential Library.” Freeh said, “That’s a fact that I am reporting.”

Freeh told anyone in the news media who would listen that he wished to leave his post but decided to remain the FBI director until President Clinton left hillary-clinton-email-what-we-know-graphic-weboffice in 2001. He feared the future of the FBI if Clinton could appoint his successor. “I was concerned about who he would put in there as FBI director because he had expressed antipathy for the FBI [and] for the director,” he told 60 Minutes anchor Mike Wallace. “[So] I was going to stay there and make sure he couldn’t replace me.”

In 1996, President Bill Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and assigned it three specific mandates: to look at the security threat to the airline industry, and how the US could address it; to examine how government should adapt its security regulations for aviation; and to look at the technological changes coming to air traffic control.

In the aftermath of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 terrorist bombing and facing voters in a reelection campaign that year, President Clinton asked his commission to focus its attention first and foremost on the issue of airline security. He ordered his minions to submit an initial report within 45 days, including an action plan to deploy new high technology machines to detect the most sophisticated explosives.

The Commission held six public meetings, and heard from scores of witnesses representing the aviation industry, law enforcement and security, and the public, including the loved ones of victims of air disasters.

Eventually the Commission, whose commissioners included family members of the victims of Flight 800, released a number recommendations including several measures to improve screening and create a national structure for airport screeners/security officers. It also called for airlines to hire security companies on the basis of performance, not the lowest bidder.

When the airline industry became nervous over the costs of implementing the Commission’s recommendations, the White House sent a letter to Air Transport Association saying there were no mandates only suggestions being offered for the benefit of the airlines and airports.

The day after letter to the Air Transport Association was received, Trans World Airlines donated $40,000 to the Democrat National Committee. By the time of the Clinton’s presidential re-election, other airlines had given large donations to Democrat Party committees: $265,000 from American Airlines, $120,000 from Delta Air Lines, $115,000 from United Air Lines, $87,000 from Northwest Airlines. According to an analysis done for the Boston Globe by the Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks donations, a total of $627,000 was donated to the Democrats by major airlines right after the Clinton administration shelved the Commission report and recommendations.

“There were other accusations of misconduct during the Clinton dynasty and there will no doubt be more new allegations against Hillary Clinton in the coming months. The facts should appall any clear-thinking American, but alas, when it comes to the Clintons few things are clear and most voters gave up on “thinking” when they realized they could depend on Clintonian politicians to provide them with unearned largesse.