Macedonian Human Rights Movement International and the Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee said Tuesday that as a result of funding from their organizations, the newspaper of the Macedonian Association Ilinden Tirana, has resumed publication and distribution throughout Albania.

“MHRMI and AMHRC will ensure the success of this crucial voice in the ongoing struggle to protect and advocate for human rights for oppressed Macedonians in Albania,” the organizations said in a press statement.

Macedonian Human Rights Movement International (MHRMI) describes itself as being active on human and national rights issues for Macedonians and other oppressed peoples since 1986. For its part, established in 1984 the Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee (AMHRC) is a non-governmental organization that advocates before governments, international institutions and broader communities about combating discrimination and promoting basic human rights.

By John Zaw

A new report investigating the rape and murder in northern Shan State of two Kachin Christian teachers alleges that a high-ranking military officer was involved in the cover-up of the crime carried out by soldiers.

The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand and the Legal Aid Network released the report “Justice delayed, justice denied” on Jan. 19, which coincided with the one-year anniversary of the two teachers’ deaths.

The report makes claims to expose an alleged cover-up of the military’s involvement in the case. The report also states that the investigation into the murders has been one-sided, which led to delays and a denial of justice.

The report analyzes witness testimony that identifies as a key suspect the commanding officer from Myanmar’s army, which was camped in the village.

“The government’s priorities were clear in the Kaung Kha case — protect the military at all costs,” Moon Nay Li, the association’s general secretary, said in a Jan. 19 statement.

Two ethnic Kachin teachers — Maran Lu Ra, 20, and Tangbau Hkawn Na Tsin, 21 — were living in Kaung Kha village in northern Shan State, sent as volunteers by the Kachin Baptist Convention, where they were raped and murdered on Jan. 19, 2015.

In a video seen by ucanews.com last March, the two women’s bloody and battered bodies were seen lying side-by-side on a bamboo bed, their pajamas pulled down.

The Baptist convention conducted its own investigation into the two teachers’ murders. The Kachin community believes that none of the local villagers were responsible for the crime.

The Rev. Samson Hkalam, the convention’s secretary, said that police inconsistencies hindered the official investigation.

“Police can’t bring the soldiers, who were camped in the village, in for questioning. This kind of case can be solved easily but it raises questions on why this case … fails to bring the perpetrators to justice,” the Rev. Samson told ucanews.com on Jan 19.

The Myanmar army has been accused of using rape as a weapon in its decade-long wars with ethnic minorities. The Women’s League of Burma, an umbrella organization of women’s groups in the country, collected more than 100 allegations of rape against Myanmar army soldiers between 2010 and 2014.

But the military publicly issued a threat last January to local media not to implicate soldiers in the Kaung Kha crime, and police have reportedly dismissed the possibility that troops could be responsible.

By Felix Corley

The criminal trial of five Sunni Muslims to punish them for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief is due to begin in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana on the morning of 22 January, court officials told Forum 18 News Service. The five prisoners of conscience, for one of whom there are health concerns, have been detained since September 2015 and are facing punishment of up to six years’ imprisonment for alleged membership of Islamic missionary movement Tabligh Jamaat. This movement has been banned in Kazakhstan as “extremist”.

Another alleged member is awaiting criminal trial in Astana, but his trial date is not known. Criminal cases against three more have been handed to court in Karaganda [Qaraghandy] and are expected to be heard later in January (see below).

Four more alleged Tabligh Jamaat members were fined and sentenced to one year’s restricted freedom each in the southern Zhambyl Region in December 2015. Their “crime” was talking about their faith at home amongst themselves (see below).

28 Tabligh Jamaat criminal cases since December 2014

The Zhambyl Region sentences brought to 19 the number of Sunni Muslims known to have been convicted since December 2014 on criminal charges of alleged Tabligh Jamaat membership. Eight of these were given prison terms as prisoners of conscience, the other 11 Muslims being given sentences of restricted freedom. A further nine Muslims are known to be in pre-trial detention. Full lists of these cases are given at the end of this article.

All 28 Muslim men faced or are facing prosecution under Criminal Code Article 405. Part 1 punishes “organising the activity of a social or religious association or other organisation after a court decision banning their activity or their liquidation in connection with extremism or terrorism they have carried out” with a fine or up to six years’ imprisonment. Part 2 punishes participation in such activity with a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment.

KNB secret police involvement, Christian prisoner of conscience

In all these prosecutions – and in that of Astana Seventh-day Adventist prisoner of conscience Yklas Kabduakasov, now serving a two-year prison term for talking about his faith with others – the National Security Committee (KNB) secret police played a key role.

Prisoner of conscience Kabduakasov is considering whether to challenge his two-year prison term at the Supreme Court (see forthcoming F18News article). Astana City Court increased his sentence to two years’ imprisonment in an ordinary regime labour camp on 28 December 2015.

Suspicion enough to trigger questionable criminal prosecution

Tabligh Jamaat was banned as “extremist” in Kazakhstan by an Astana court in February 2013. Until the movement was banned, it used to send members on short-term missions to other towns and villages where they slept in mosques and addressed local Muslims, both door to door and in the mosque, a close observer of the movement in Central Asia told Forum 18. Male adherents are often identified by their beards and wearing of South Asian clothing. If Muslims are thought by the authorities to agree with some of Tabligh Jamaat’s teachings or practices, possess religious books often used in the movement, or meet others close to the movement, this can be enough to trigger a criminal prosecution.

As was the case with prisoner of conscience Saken Tulbayev, there can be violations of legal procedure and credible claims of planted evidence during these criminal trials. Tulbayev was sentenced on 2 July 2015 to four years eight months’ imprisonment for alleged Tabligh Jamaat membership. He was also banned from exercising freedom of religion or belief, including praying with others and reading the Koran, until the end of 2022.

Astana trial due to begin 22 January

The KNB secret police arrested 38-year-old Bolatbek Kozhageldinov, 31-year-old Khalambakhi Khalym, 33-year-old Nurzhan Nuradilov, 44-year-old Erbolat Omarbekov and 54-year-old Kubaidolla Tyulyubayev in late September 2015. Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2 ordered their pre-trial detention. All five prisoners of conscience are being held in Astana’s KNB secret police Investigation Prison.

A criminal case was launched against the five prisoners of conscience under Criminal Code Article 405, Part 1. The case was prepared by KNB secret police Investigator Nurlan Belesov before being handed to prosecutors to bring to court.

The cases were handed to Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2, where they were assigned to Judge Umisan Mukhangaliyeva, her assistant told Forum 18 from the court on 11 January. The trial is due to begin at 10 am on 22 January.

“Confess and be freed”

KNB secret police Investigator Belesov told at least one of the defendants, prisoner of conscience Tyulyubayev, that if he confessed he would be freed, those close to the case told Forum 18.

The telephones of KNB secret police Investigator Belesov went unanswered each time Forum 18 called on 11 and 12 January.

Search, poetry confiscated, wife had to be hospitalised

At the time of the prisoners of consciences’ arrests in September 2015, police searched their homes looking for incriminating material. Among the homes searched was that of Tyulyubayev in Karaganda, relatives told Forum 18. He was not at home but his wife and adult daughter were. “Officers took books, a dictaphone and cassettes from the dictaphone,” one relative told Forum 18. “His books were ordinary religious books – there was nothing evil there. They also took copies of his religious poetry.”

Following the police raid, Tyulyubayev’s wife suffered from stress and had to be taken several times to hospital, relatives added.

Concern for prisoner of conscience’s health

Prisoner of conscience Tyulyubayev – a retired police officer – was arrested on 28 September 2015 while he was visiting the southern city of Taldykorgan. Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2 ordered his pre-trial imprisonment the following day. Tyulyubayev’s son applied to be his defender, but the application was rejected.

Tyulyubayev’s family is concerned about his health. In December 2014 he underwent a serious operation in hospital and nearly died, relatives told Forum 18. Ever since, he has been required to live on a special diet.

Sixth Astana pre-trial prisoner of conscience

A sixth Sunni Muslim prisoner of conscience, Murat Takaumov, was arrested on 18 November 2015, just days after his 31st birthday. He too is awaiting trial in Astana under Criminal Code Article 405, Part 2. Like the other five Muslim prisoners of conscience, he is currently in detention at Astana’s KNB secret police Investigation Prison.

In December 2015, Takaumov failed to overturn the court order to hold him in pre-trial detention.

Prisoner of conscience Takaumov’s two-month pre-trial detention – handed down by Judge Nabi Pazylov (who has since retired) of Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2 on 20 November 2015 – expires on 18 January 2016. Prosecutors have not yet lodged any application to extend this period, court officials told Forum 18 on 12 January.

The pre-trial detention order had been lodged by KNB secret police investigator Belesov, who had brought the criminal cases against the other five Sunni Muslim prisoners of conscience, as well as against Christian prisoner of conscience Kabduakasov. Takaumov’s case was then handed over by Belesov to Kanatzhan Kamalbek of Astana City Prosecutor’s Office, to take to court.

The telephone of Prosecutor Kamalbek went unanswered each time Forum 18 called on 11 January.

The lawyer who represented prisoner of conscience Takaumov in the court challenge, Daulet Erzhumanov, told Forum 18 from Astana on 12 January that he is no longer representing him.

Karaganda prisoners of conscience’s criminal cases handed to court

Three more Sunni Muslim prisoners of conscience – who have already spent more than three months in pre-trial imprisonment – are facing imminent criminal trial in the northern city of Karaganda for alleged Tabligh Jamaat membership. The three prisoners of conscience – Bauyrzhan Serikov, Aidin Shakentayev and Murat Shopenov – were arrested on 7 October 2015 and ordered held in pre-trial imprisonment at Karaganda’s Kazybek Bi District Court two days later.

All three prisoners of conscience tried to challenge the pre-trial detention orders, but in separate hearings on 16 October 2015 Judge Kairken Tuleuov of Karaganda Regional Court rejected these suits, according to the decisions seen by Forum 18. He agreed with the Investigator that, given the “socially dangerous nature of the actions”, the men could go into hiding if they were transferred to house arrest.

At the Regional Court hearing, Shopenov’s mother Chumadayeva insisted that her son had done nothing wrong and had worked hard to support his family.

Kazybek Bi District Court most recently extended the three men’s pre-trial detention in late December 2015, taking the period of possible detention up to 7 February 2016.

The cases against all three prisoners of conscience under Criminal Code Article 405, Part 1 were launched by Investigator Alisher Sattar of the KNB secret police’s Karaganda Region 9th Department (which oversees investigations), according to case documents. The cases were then handed to Sarzhan Sabyr of Karaganda Region Prosecutor’s Office to bring to court.

The cases reached Karaganda’s Kazybek Bi District Court on 11 January, a court official told Forum 18 the same day. They are yet to be allocated to a Judge and only then will a trial start date be set. Several people close to the cases told Forum 18 that they expect the trial to begin later in January.

Prisoner of conscience Serikov’s lawyer, Mukhamed Akhmetov, told Forum 18 from Karaganda on 8 January that his client would be denying the accusations against him.

Pressure, no answers

Since the three men’s arrests, their relatives and friends have been subjected to pressure from the authorities, friends of the accused complained to Forum 18.

Despite repeated calls to Prosecutor Sabyr on 11 and 12 January, his telephone went unanswered. On 11 January, the duty officer at the KNB secret police for Karaganda Region refused to put Forum 18 through to Investigator Sattar. After consulting with the 9th Department, the duty officer said the Department Head had passed on the response that any questions should be submitted in writing. Asked why Forum 18 could not put its questions directly to the Investigator who had initiated the criminal case against the three Muslims, the duty officer responded: “We are a closed organisation.”

All three male prisoners of conscience are married. Serikov has five children, Shakentayev two and Shopenov three.

The three men have been held since their arrests in the KNB secret police Investigation Prison in Karaganda. Serikov’s lawyer Akhmetov told Forum 18 that “all conditions have been provided” for the men to read the Koran and pray while in the Investigation Prison.

Zhambyl Muslims sentenced for talking about faith

Four Sunni Muslims have been convicted of alleged Tabligh Jamaat membership in the southern Zhambyl Region. Cases were prepared against Rashid Erimbetov, Ruslan Abirov, Toktasyn Artykbayev and Erbol Sharipov under Criminal Code Article 405, Part 2 after their detention at a meeting to discuss their faith in a home in Shu.

Their trial began on 11 November 2015 under Judge Chokan Kenzhekhanov of Shu District Court. At the tenth hearing in the case on 10 December 2015, Judge Kenzhekhanov found all four guilty and punished each with a sentence of one year’s restricted freedom, according to the decision seen by Forum 18. Each was also required to pay a court fee of 90,527.15 Tenge (2,300 Norwegian Kroner, 240 Euros or 260 US Dollars).

None of the four Muslims appears to have appealed against the sentences to Zhambyl Regional Court.

Surveillance

All four Muslims had earlier been warned that if they continued exercising their freedom of religion or belief they would face criminal prosecution. The prosecution made use of recordings of religious meetings secretly made by the KNB secret police.

All religious or belief communities are thought to be under surveillance by the ordinary police and KNB secret police. For example, several prominent leaders of registered Protestant churches have been placed on an official “signal register” (signalny uchet in Russian) which prevents them from changing their officially-registered place of residence, selling a legally-owned car, or gaining state child benefit for newly-born children. Individuals under state surveillance are also subject to close scrutiny and questioning when leaving Kazakhstan.

“No right to answer your questions”

Mukhtar Uderbayev of Shu Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office, who led the prosecution in court, told Forum 18 on 12 January that he had “no right to answer your questions”. He said an instruction from the General Prosecutor’s Office banned prosecutors from answering questions.

One of those sentenced, Abirov, had been fined 50 Monthly Financial Indicators – 92,600 Tenge – under the Code of Administrative Offences in 2014. Forum 18 was unable to find out if this fine was to punish him for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief.

Eight known Tabligh Jamaat prisoners of conscience

Eight known alleged members of Tabligh Jamaat (all men) have been jailed as prisoners of conscience for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief since December 2014 and are listed below. The list gives their: name; date of birth; sentence date and court; Criminal Code Article they were sentenced under; and sentence.

1. Mamurzhan Rashidovich Turashov; born c. 1973; sentenced 2 December 2014 Sairam District Court, South Kazakhstan Region; Article 337-1, Part 1 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 3 years’ imprisonment.

2. Bakyt Narimanovich Nurmanbetov; born 10 November 1974; sentenced 14 January 2015 Taldykorgan City Court, Almaty Region; Article 337-1, Part 2 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 20 months’ imprisonment (reduced to one year on appeal, freed in August 2015 on completion of sentence).

3. Aykhan Samarkanovich Kurmangaliyev; born 7 November 1976; sentenced 14 January 2015 Taldykorgan City Court, Almaty Region; Article 337-1, Part 2 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 20 months’ imprisonment (reduced to one year on appeal).

4. Sagyndyk Mazhenovich Tatubayev; born 21 October 1978; sentenced 14 January 2015 Taldykorgan City Court, Almaty Region; Article 337-1, Part 2 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 20 months’ imprisonment (reduced to one year on appeal, freed in August 2015 on completion of sentence).

5. Kairat Amangeldinovich Esmukhambetov; born 19 November 1966; sentenced 14 January 2015 Taldykorgan City Court, Almaty Region; Article 337-1, Part 2 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 20 months’ imprisonment (reduced to one year on appeal, freed in August 2015 on completion of sentence).

6. Ruslan Sadvakasovich Kairanov; born 14 August 1980; sentenced 14 January 2015 Taldykorgan City Court, Almaty Region; Article 337-1, Part 2 of old Criminal Code (equivalent of Article 405 of current Criminal Code); 18 months’ imprisonment (reduced to one year on appeal).

7. Saken Peisenovich Tulbayev; born 16 June 1969; sentenced 2 July 2015 Almaty’s Bostandyk Court No. 2; Article 174, Part 1 and Article 405, Part 2; 4 years 8 months’ imprisonment and banned from exercising freedom of religion or belief until the end of 2022, three years after his release (see above).

8. Orazbek Kabdrashovich Apakashev; born 3 November 1971; sentenced 29 September 2015 Temirtau City Court, Karaganda Region; Article 405, Part 1; 3 years’ imprisonment.

Eleven known Tabligh Jamaat restricted freedom sentences

Eleven known alleged members of Tabligh Jamaat (all men) given terms of restricted freedom for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief since December 2014 are listed below. The list gives their: name; date of birth; sentence date and court; Criminal Code Article they were sentenced under; and sentence.

1. Bakitkali Urazovich Konirbayev; born 2 October 1966; sentenced 29 April 2015 Aktobe City Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 2; 2 years’ restricted freedom.

2. Samat Koishykulovich Shadmanov; born 24 August 1975; sentenced 29 April 2015 Aktobe City Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 2; 2 years’ restricted freedom.

3. Adi Bakytovich Bakyt; born 7 November 1978; sentenced 29 April 2015 Aktobe City Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 2; 2 years’ restricted freedom.

4. Nurulan Mukhanbetrakhimuli Koyshybai; born 10 June 1975; sentenced 29 April 2015 Aktobe City Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 2; 1 year’s restricted freedom.

5. Bakytzhan Zhasuzakovich Nuskabayev; born 14 April 1966; sentenced 16 September 2015 Shymkent’s Al-Farabi District Court; Article 405, Part 2; 1 year’s restricted freedom.

6. Yerbol Nurzhigituli Zhaylymysov; born 19 May 1980; sentenced 16 September 2015 Shymkent’s Al-Farabi District Court; Article 405, Part 2; 1 year’s restricted freedom.

7. Serik Baimanovich Otynshyn; born 17 August 1971; sentenced 16 September 2015 Shymkent’s Al-Farabi District Court; Article 405, Part 2; 1 year’s restricted freedom.

8. Rashid Mubarakovich Erimbetov; born 11 June 1970; sentenced 10 December 2015 Shu District Court, Zhambyl Region; Article 405, Part 2; fined court fee and given 1 year’s restricted freedom (see above).

9. Ruslan Sirgebayevich Abirov; born 12 December 1988; sentenced 10 December 2015 Shu District Court, Zhambyl Region; Article 405, Part 2; fined court fee and given 1 year’s restricted freedom (see above).

10. Toktasyn Narikbayevich Artykbayev; born 20 July 1963; sentenced 10 December 2015 Shu District Court, Zhambyl Region; Article 405, Part 2; fined court fee and given 1 year’s restricted freedom (see above).

11. Erbol Seidybekovich Sharipov; born 4 October 1969; sentenced 10 December 2015 Shu District Court, Zhambyl Region; Article 405, Part 2; fined court fee and given 1 year’s restricted freedom (see above).

Nine alleged Tabligh Jamaat members known to be jailed awaiting trial

Nine alleged members of Tabligh Jamaat (all men) are detained as prisoners of conscience awaiting criminal trial for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief. The list of known prisoners of conscience in this category since December 2014 gives their: name; date of birth; first pre-trial detention order date and court; Criminal Code Article they are being investigated under; initial pre-trial detention period; and place of pre-trial detention.

1. Erbolat Kabzakievich Omarbekov; born 10 July 1971; first ordered detained 25 September 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

2. Bolatbek Kambarovich Kozhageldinov; born 1977; first ordered detained 25 September 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

3. Khalambakhi Khalym; born 12 August 1984; first ordered detained 25 September 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

4. Nurzhan Beisembayevich Nuradilov; born c. 1982; first ordered detained 25 September 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

5. Kubaidolla Abishevich Tyulyubayev; born 8 August 1961; first ordered detained 29 September 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison.

6. Bauyrzhan Omirzhanovich Serikov; born 20 November 1977; first ordered detained 9 November 2015 Karaganda’s Kazybek Bi District Court; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Karaganda KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

7. Aidin Zulfukarovich Shakentayev; born 15 August 1982; first ordered detained 9 November 2015 Karaganda’s Kazybek Bi District Court ; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Karaganda KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

8. Murat Askarovich Shopenov; born 15 November 1982; first ordered detained 9 November 2015 Karaganda’s Kazybek Bi District Court; Article 405, Part 1; 2 months’ initial detention; Karaganda KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

9. Murat Kazbekovich Takaumov; born 14 November 1984; first ordered detained 20 November 2015 Astana’s Saryarka District Court No. 2; Article 405, Part 2; 2 months’ initial detention; Astana KNB Investigation Prison (see above).

By Paul Schuler and Kai Ostwald*

On January 20th, more than a thousand party members will gather in Hanoi for the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Congress, as they do roughly every five years. The congress directly selects the general secretary and indirectly determines who will be president, prime minister, and national assembly chair. The general secretary is widely seen as the most important position. This year, in contrast with most previous congresses where reports suggest that the top four leaders had been decided internally well before the meeting, reports suggest that the party remains divided on whom to select for the top post. What is holding up the works?

In past congresses, most commentators have focused on whether reformists or conservatives win promotions. This year, the primary question is whether or not the party will break with the recent past and select a general secretary with a strong political support base instead of a compromise candidate who rules by consensus, as has been the typical outcome. The selection of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, which many have predicted, would signal the selection of a strong candidate. Other candidates, such as President Truong Tan Sang, Hanoi Party Secretary Pham Quang Nghi, or even incumbent Nguyen Phu Trong represent compromise choices. Choosing Dung is a riskier strategy. While centralizing power under Dung could help break logjams within the party and allow for greater economic and political reforms, it could also reduce the checks on the leadership and lead to greater mismanagement and corruption. Dung’s track record suggests that either direction is possible.

In this piece, we provide an argument for why Dung – considered a frontrunner by many Vietnam watchers – has struggled to win the Central Committee’s support for the top position. While Dung is clearly the most visible of the candidates, reports suggest that the party still has not united around a candidate at this very late date. Furthermore, a widely read Vietnamese website recently published a letter supposedly penned by Dung himself, in which he countered a wide number of criticisms that have been leveled against him within the party.2 The reason commentators have predicted a Dung victory is based on the assumption that past support from the party against his rivals will translate into support for his promotion. By contrast, we argue that Dung’s demonstrated political savvy may represent a threat to many in the VCP; centralizing leadership under Dung would mean a diminished role for the provincial officials, government ministers, and party functionaries in the Central Committee. For this reason, convincing the committee to break with precedent means convincing them either that the party is doomed without strong and centralized leadership or that he will personally deliver resources for them. So far, it would appear, that this case has not been convincingly made.

The Stakes

Analyzing Vietnamese politics means relying on non-traditional sources such as Hanoi coffee shop chatter, anonymous insider commentary, and websites run by political activists. What is certain is that Dung, now 66, has served as prime minister for two terms, and is thus ineligible for a third term. The identities of his contenders are not clear, but some names that have been raised include President Sang, Hanoi Party Secretary Nghi, or perhaps Trong himself.3 Much is made of the fact that party rules require that candidates for the Politburo be 65 or younger, which would disqualify all of these candidates. However, given Trong’s selection at the age of 66 in the previous congress, BBC Vietnam quite rightly notes that such rules hardly constitute a firm constraint: “The retirement age issue… shows one important factor in the Vietnam Communist Party: all the decisions and statutes are open to bargaining between different forces and factions…” 4 As such, while age may be a factor, it does not preclude any of these candidates from taking the post.

For at least a year, commentators have speculated that Dung is the frontrunner. Hong Kong City University professor Jonathan London suggested in January of last year that Dung was the “odds on favorite” for the post.5 In June, Le Hong Hiep, a visiting fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), wrote that “… with his current wealth of power and influence over the Central Committee, it is highly likely that… Dung will emerge as the strongest candidate…”6 This confidence is largely borne out of Dung’s proven ability to marshal the support of loosely organized lower ranking party members in the Central Committee against his rivals in the Politburo.

However, despite early confidence in his candidacy, the prelude to this congress has proven more divisive than in previous congresses. Former Central Committee member Vu Mao said that in contrast to previous congresses, where the leadership selections have been made well in advance, this one will go right up until the final meeting in early January.7 Furthermore, leaked documents suggest that Dung’s candidacy is running into stiff resistance. In particular, the widely read website Anh Ba Sam published a letter supposedly penned by Dung to the party defending his track record. Such a letter would surely be unnecessary if victory was assured.

Nguyen Tan Dung

Before detailing our argument, it is worth reviewing what we know about Dung. Compared with other contenders, Dung’s profile towers over his rivals. A national annual survey conducted by the UNDP shows that while 90 percent of citizens could correctly identify Dung as the prime minister, only 70 percent could identify the current general secretary or the president.8 Internet search trends back up these figures. Analysis of Google Trends over the past eight years shows the other top leaders averaged less than 25% of his searches.
In terms of his reputation, whether deserved or not, he is seen in some quarters as a reformer. This stems in part from his ostensible orientation towards the West: his children were educated in the United States and Switzerland, while his son-in-law is a Vietnamese- American who opened the first McDonalds in Vietnam. He is also from the southern province of Ca Mau, and thus assumed—again, accurately or not—to be more market- oriented than his rivals from the north of the country.

Some policy decisions have helped reinforce this image. Dung was reportedly instrumental in pushing a divided party leadership to accept the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States in 2001.9 He also instituted Project 30 in 2007, intended to cut red tape in business. On the thorny issue of Vietnam’s relationship with China, he has carefully maneuvered himself as a strong supporter of Vietnamese sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, for example by issuing a statement condemning China for placing an oil exploration rig in disputed waters near the Vietnamese coast in 2014.

His more media-friendly political style also signaled a break from the dour politics of previous leaders, who rarely engaged the public directly. In 2007 he conducted an unprecedented live web chat in which he fielded several sensitive questions, spurring several other politicians to follow suit.10

Dung’s Strength In The Party

While Dung is well known publicly, it is perhaps more important in a Leninist system like Vietnam’s that he has also demonstrated his ability to marshal support from the 175-member VCP Central Committee. Earlier in 2015, for example, the Central Committee was reported to have held a vote of confidence among the sitting members of the politburo. Though it occurred behind closed doors, the blog “Portraits of Power” published results showing that the Dung had the highest level of support.11

More dramatically, Dung was apparently able to mobilize the Central Committee in rebuffing an attempt by his Politburo rivals to unseat him. In early 2012, the general secretary initiated a self-criticism campaign, largely perceived as an effort to oust Dung. In October of that year, the campaign culminated in a contentious central committee meeting where reports suggest that the Central Committee rejected a recommendation by the Politburo to censure Dung. This incident is particularly telling because it shows that in contrast to China, a united Central Committee is able to successfully challenge the Politburo. Indeed, Dung’s demonstrated support within the Central Committee is one of the main reasons commentators have provided in arguing that he is the frontrunner.12

Dung’s Delayed Promotion

If Dung has support within the party and among the public, why has his candidacy for the general secretary position been so divisive? Given the Central Committee’s past support, it seems unlikely that there is some hardened “conservative” bloc irreconcilably aligned against him. The resistance may stem from the fact that the party does not buy Dung’s reformist image. Indeed, as his purported letter suggests, Dung’s record is not peerless. On state-sector reform, his policy of consolidating state-run industries into large, chaebol-like conglomerates backfired in 2010 when Vinashin, a major state-run shipping company, was found to be $4.4 billion in debt. On the China relationship, it was reported that Dung also tacitly endorsed the operation of a controversial Chinese state-run aluminum mine in Vietnam’s Central Highlands.13 Finally, despite his economic reforms, critics allege that he has used his position to enrich his family, leading some to suggest that he is a “leading rent seeker” in the party.14 Others have lamented his role in perpetuating nepotism in the VCP by elevating “princelings”—children of well-positioned party officials—into key roles.15

While these issues have not helped Dung, we suggest that the problem for Dung is due to the party’s institutional structure rather than his performance. While concerns over his performance are valid, these issues were known in 2012 when he avoided censure. Inflation peaked in 2007 and 2008, the Vinashin scandal emerged in 2010, and the business interests of his family members are relatively old news. If these issues were central to his problems now, they should have doomed him before.

We argue that the reason for Dung’s surprising difficulty lies in the assumption among Vietnam watchers that his past support from the Central Committee should logically extend to his candidacy for the general secretary position. We suggest that this assumption is not likely to hold for the simple fact that selecting a strong leader in the congress would come at the expense of the Central Committee’s power, while its past support merely preserved a division of power at the top. Compared with China, Vietnam’s central committee is a critically important institution. It meets more often, impacts policy more deeply, and rejects Politburo decisions more frequently than its northern neighbour.16 This greater influence is due in part to the fragmented nature of Vietnam’s leadership, where executive power is effectively divided between the VCP general secretary and the prime minister.17 Precisely because the institutional structure does not grant any one executive position commanding power, lower level bodies such as the central committee enjoy relatively greater autonomy and consequently greater influence.18

One potential safeguard of this power is to ensure that the general secretary remains weak, which creates a bias against selecting a strong leader. This bias bears out in the data. US- based academics Paul Schuler and Dimitar Gueorguiev have shown that in contrast to developed democracies, in single-party systems visible public profiles can negatively impact promotion prospects.19

It could be argued that the Central Committee would still be able to check Dung if he were selected. However, as political theorists have observed, single-party regimes are prone to personalization of power at the expense of elite institutions such as the Central Committee. This can happen when the paramount leader slowly chips away at the authority of subordinate institutions by creating alternative institutions, appointing allies in sensitive posts, or bypassing subordinate institutions altogether.20 In short, it is much easier for the Central Committee to check Dung now than it will be to check any incremental centralization of power once he takes office.

Xi Jinping—who many commentators have called the country’s strongest leader since Mao—is a case in point.21 His ascension to power in China has led to a massive anti- corruption campaign that has ensnared a large number of high-ranking officials. Had his intentions and potential to consolidate power been clear earlier, it is debatable whether China would have ultimately consented to his selection. After his selection, those on the wrong side of the campaign have been unable to dislodge him.

In Dung’s case, there is nothing to suggest that he would engage in the same type of campaign if selected. It is clear, however, that his unique profile puts him in a far greater position than any of his rivals to centralize power. Perhaps, for example, he could attempt to merge the positions of the general secretary and presidency, as is the case in China. For those in the Central Committee who are not part of his inner circle, this increased power could well come at their expense.

Conclusion

Our argument is that unless Dung can make a compelling case that the party faces an existential threat without strong leadership, lower level party officials will be unlikely to side with him against his rivals in the Politburo. It is difficult to know what Vietnam may be missing out on if it does not select Dung. London calls Dung “an enigma,” which seems an accurate assessment, given the prime minister’s track record.22

While it is less clear what Dung would do if selected, it is clear that Vietnam is likely to continue along its present trajectory of consensus-based politics if one of his rivals assumes the general secretary position. This does not necessarily mean the country will be deadlocked on all issues. Vietnam’s leadership has managed to unite in a strategy of closer relations with the United States in order to hedge against China’s economic and military influence in the region. Furthermore, Vietnam has surprised with its apparent broad consensus on participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The visits to the United States by Trong, Sang, and Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang in the past two years show that this strategy of engagement has widespread support in the party regardless of who wins.

At the same time, the lack of a centralized leader means that Vietnam will also be forced to reform its domestic politics at an incremental rate. State-run industries are unlikely to be made completely private or forced into greater efficiency. More importantly, neither the government nor the party will likely be strong enough to substantially reduce corruption within the public sector. This does not necessarily imply that these reforms would proceed more quickly or more comprehensively under Dung’s leadership, but the more decisive government that he would lead makes those outcomes more of a possibility.

*About the authors:
1. Paul Schuler is Assistant Professor at the University of Arizona and former postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He specializes in political institutions and Southeast Asian politics. Kai Ostwald, a former visiting associate at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, is now Assistant Professor in the Institute of Asian Research and Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. He is also the director of the Centre for Southeast Asia Research at UBC.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective 2, 2016 (PDF).

Notes:
2. https://anhbasam.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/6194-thu-cua-tt-nguyen-tan-dung-gui-tbt-nguyen- phu-trong-va-bo-chinh-tri/
3. Thayer floats this possibility: Thayer, Carlyle. “Vietnam is Changing… And so is the Balance of Power in Asia.” The Diplomat. October 2, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/vietnam-is- changing-and-so-is-the-balance-of-power-in-asia/
4. Lê Quỳnh. “Hội nghị 14 và tuổi của Tứ trụ.” BBC Vietnam. Jan 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2016/01/160107_du_doan_hoi_nghi_14
5. London, Jonathan. 2015. “Vietnam: Open Secrets on the Road to Succession.” cogitASIA. January 20, 2015. http://cogitasia.com/vietnam-open-secrets-on-the-road-to-succession/
6. Page 10: Le Hong Hiep. 2015. “Vietnam’s Leadership Transition in 2016: A Preliminary Analysis.” ISEAS Perspective. #24.
7. Cấn Cường and Quang Phong. “Chúng tà đòi hỏi và đặt niềm về việc chọn nhân sự chủ chốt của Đảng.” Dantri. December 25, 2015. http://dantri.com.vn/chinh-tri/chung-ta-doi-hoi-va-dat-niem- tin-ve-viec-chon-nhan-su-chu-chot-cua-dang-20151225112425063.htm . Also see BBC Tiếng Việt. “Tôi đồng ý với Lê Kiên Thành.” December 30, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2015/12/151230_vucaophan_on_lekienthanh
8. The Provincial Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) forthcoming in April 2016.
9. Schwarz, Matthew. 2010. “Project 30: A Revolution in Vietnamese Governance?” Brookings East Asia Commentary. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/09/vietnam-schwarz
10. Page 382: Vuving, Alexander. 2008. “Arriving in the World – and at a Crossroads.” Southeast Asian Affairs. 375-393.
11. http://chandungquyenluc.blogspot.com/2015/01/ket-qua-bo-phieu-tin-nhiem-bo-chinh-tri.html
12. Hiep. “Vietnam’s Leadership Transition”
13. Page 177. Fforde, Adam. 2012. “Questions of Domestic Sovereignty.” Asian Survey. January/February. 176-185.
14. Page 326. Vuving, Alexander. 2013. “Vietnam in 2012: A Rent-Seeking State on the Verge of a Crisis.” Southeast Asian Affairs. 343-347.
15. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/08/mcdonalds-vietnam
16. Malesky, Edmund, Regina Abrami, Yu Zheng. 2011. “Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.” Comparative Politics. 409-427.
17. As a reviewer for this piece rightly notes, the general secretary does not officially have executive power. However, through his ability to impose discipline within the party, he can check the prime ministers.
18. Malesky, Abrami, Zheng. “Institutions and Inequality.”
19. Gueorguiev, Dimitar and Paul Schuler. Forthcoming. “Keeping your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy.” Journal of East Asian Studies.
20. See Svolik, Milan. 2013. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
21. Fenby, Jonathan. “What the West should Know about Xi Jinping, China’s most Powerful Leader Since Mao.” The New Statesmen. June 23, 2015. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/06/what-west-should-know-about-xi-jinping-china-s- most-powerful-leader-mao
22. London. “Vietnam: Open Secrets.”

By Rodney Reynolds

For over 70 years since the disastrous bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, peace activists have continued their relentless global campaign for a world without nuclear weapons.

The United Nations, which has remained engaged in a longstanding debate, continues to adopt scores of resolutions every year on nuclear disarmament.

And in December, not surprisingly, the 193-member General Assembly wrapped up its 2015 sessions adopting 57 draft resolutions on arms control and disarmament – 23 of which were on nuclear weapons.

Still the goal of a nuclear-free world is a distance political mirage – at least for the present generation.

A new study released last week by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a Washington-based think tank, has attempted to reframe the narrative on nuclear weapons.

How is nuclear disarmament being viewed by the next generation of policy makers who will inherit thousands of nuclear weapons – particularly when the policy on nuclear weapons is all-too-often constrained by the legacy of past generations?

The study, which sums up the findings from a 14-month long project, is expected “to serve as a point of departure in developing innovative ideas and engaging more people within the next generation of policy shapers in the interests of furthering nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”

“Innovative thinking is needed to overcome deeply entrenched attitudes and slow progress in the shared responsibility to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation measures and achieve global security through nuclear disarmament,” the Report argues.

The project explored three questions: First, what are the biggest influences in the cycle of nuclear weapons decision-making and where might we be able to shift the conversation?

Second, where and how might the nuclear debate be more closely integrated with other policy issues and movements that attract attention?

Third, how and why might nuclear weapons issues resonate more strongly with emerging policy makers, the public and media?

The study was the result of a series of workshops in the U.S. and UK with next generation participants aimed at mapping the challenges, mechanisms for engagement, potential new dimensions in the debate and its relationship to other issues, including the relationships between nuclear weapons and climate change.

When the issue comes out in the public, it rarely involves considered arguments, but rather features as a shallow, symbolic proxy to label particular positions as naïve or hawkish.

The study calls for new voices into the discussion, and test out the means to inspire the next generation of policy makers.

Tariq Rauf, Director, Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IDN the BASIC Report highlights how thinking and discourse on nuclear weapons have morphed into the mundane over the years, and has fallen off the list of principal dangers to the world.

Driven by the need to go beyond the deeply entrenched attitudes and stasis in achieving global security through nuclear disarmament, the Report was motivated by trying to make future nuclear weapons policy more relevant to the security and concerns of the next generation that will inherit thousands of nuclear weapons and thousands of tonnes of nuclear weapon-usable materials, he noted.

Rauf said one significant finding of the Report is that the younger people in the UK and the U.S. are not overly concerned by the nuclear weapons of their respective countries, but are worried about further nuclear proliferation and to terrorist groups.

“This new generation is blissfully unaware and thus unconcerned about nuclear weapon arsenals – as nuclear weapons have no relevance to their make-believe worlds of Twitter or Facebook – but they will be in for a rude awakening, should unfortunately, a nuclear detonation occur whether by accident or by non-Sate actor actions,” said Rauf, a former Senior Adviser to the chair of the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

He also pointed out that whatever little discourse there is on nuclear weapons in the mainstream media, is driven by fear mongering about adversaries but ignores the nuclear weapons, policies and spending at home.

An important recommendation of the Report is to bring education and information about nuclear weapons early in the education of youngsters, starting in school, he added.

In this regard, said Rauf, it is useful to pay attention to the views of those with firsthand experience with nuclear weapons policy, such as William J. Perry, former US Defence Secretary, as recounted in his recent memoir, “My Journey at the Nuclear Brink”, and movies such as “Dr Strangelove”, “Fail Safe” and “The Man Who Saved the World”.

“The BASIC Report is an important contribution to finding ways to engage the new generation on issues of nuclear weapons and existential global security,” said Rauf, a former head (2002-2011) of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

The methods used in the BASIC project included the participation of focus groups; roundtable events and expert dialogues; polling of European youth aged 14-30 about their attitudes towards nuclear weapons; digital engagement; and face-to-face networking with members of the next generation.

Some of the important findings of the study include: nuclear weapons are not seen as strongly relevant to the (U.S./UK) next generation – except in terms of an uncertain future caused by the leakage of nuclear weapons to revisionist states and non-state actors.

“Not only are they out of sight and mind, divorced from human interest stories, difficult to relate to every-day experience but also they are not seen as particularly influential even in the political and military spheres.”

When previous generations would have attached great utility and fear to these weapons — establishing elaborate deterrence relationships based on fear — the next generation sees them as largely irrelevant to outcomes, the study concludes.

The Iran nuclear deal was supposed to ease tensions, but Saudi Arabia seems frantic to antagonize its rival.

By Mohammed Ayoob*

Just as it seemed that tensions in the Persian Gulf might be easing with the signing of the nuclear deal, aimed at effectively curbing Iran’s capacity to weaponize, the political temperature in the energy-rich region has risen to unprecedented heights. Paradoxically, the very success of the deal contributes to escalating tensions.  Iran’s Arab adversaries in the Persian Gulf, above all Saudi Arabia, prefer an ostracized nuclear Iran over a competitive oil producer and responsible regional power, and now try a series of policies forcing the United States to take sides. Ironically, anti-American hardliners in Iran have proved to be their unintended allies.

By all accounts Iran has implemented its part of the deal, including decommissioning the Arak plutonium facility by removing the reactor core, shipping most of its low-enriched uranium to Russia and reducing the number of centrifuges installed at the Fordow and Natanz sites. These actions foreclose any possibility of Iran taking either the uranium or the plutonium route towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the near future.

Furthermore, Iran has taken these steps in far less time than expected in the hope that sanctions would be removed speedily. The International Atomic Energy Agency announced on Saturday its verification that Iran has met all obligations under the nuclear agreement. Following this announcement, the European Union and the United States declared that nuclear-related economic sanctions imposed on Iran will be removed. This allows Iran to access approximately $100 billion dollars of frozen assets, sell oil freely on the international market, and use the international banking system for financial transactions – in short, to act as a normal member of the international economic system.

These proximate consequences apart, the most important outcome of the nuclear agreement and its quick implementation is likely to be rapprochement between the United States and Iran on mutually beneficial terms. This possible scenario has alarmed Iran’s Arab adversaries.

Having failed to derail the nuclear deal, Riyadh has taken recourse in policies that increase tensions with Iran, anticipating that in a showdown between the two regional powers Washington will choose a longstanding ally over a newfound partner. If this turns out to be the case, it would scuttle any possibility of a wide-ranging understanding between the US and Iran on broader regional issues such as the Islamic State, Syria and Yemen where both sides have overlapping interests.

Saudi Arabia’s brazen intervention in Yemen against the Houthis in the form of air attacks in particular was undertaken with this goal in mind. Washington had grave reservations about such a move both because it forced the Houthis to move closer to Iran and pushed Riyadh into a de facto alliance with Al Qaeda in Yemen, which also opposes the Zaidi Houthis.

The execution in early January of outspoken Saudi Shia cleric and political activist Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr prompted a predictable Shia reaction, providing Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies an excuse to cut off diplomatic relations with Iran and escalate the war of words. Once again, this put the United States, which had earlier warned Riyadh on the negative repercussions of Nimr’s execution, in a tough spot.

The drama surrounding the execution helped consolidate Sunni support for Riyadh in the Gulf and wider Middle East by portraying its rivalry with Iran in sectarian terms. However, this Saudi action was taken in utter disregard of American interests in the Middle East. The negative fallout has been particularly acute in Iraq, where the United States is engaged in a delicate balancing act between the two sects. Sectarian strife strengthens the appeal of extremism among Sunni Arabs with damaging consequences for the US-led war against the Islamic State while making a negotiated settlement in Syria more difficult to achieve.

Saudi policymakers are so fixated on Iran that negative effects of their policies do not seem to worry them much. Negative external consequences notwithstanding a major reason for such policy choices is the attempt to consolidate domestic support for the Saudi regime during a difficult power transition and severe economic downturn. The former is the result of power passed on to a generation of younger princes handpicked by the new King Salman and his coterie. A key member of the inner circle is his 30-year-old son Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is simultaneously defense minister and economic czar of the kingdom.

The domestic economic dimension weighs more heavily than politics. The precipitous decline in oil prices from $110 a barrel in 2014 to less than $30 today has forced the Saudi regime to cut longstanding subsidies for citizens thus eroding the legitimacy of absolutist rule. Simultaneously, defense and security spending has grown from 7 percent of GDP in 2012 to 10 percent in 2015 and is expected to rise further this year primarily because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen. Moreover, the budget deficit is around 15 percent of GDP; foreign reserves have fallen by $100 billion to $650 billion.

Rivalry: Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran vye for influence in the Middle East (Data: World Bank, Global Firepower, CIA World Factbook)

These economic travails have led some in the regime, especially the deputy crown prince, to openly contemplate the unthinkable: namely, gradual privatization of Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest producer of oil.

As the economy falters, the Saudi regime seems to take aggressive stances in the foreign-policy arena in order to impress its domestic constituency, relying on sectarian rhetoric to justify policies and expenditures. Iran is a convenient whipping boy for this strategy. In the long run such a policy is likely to be counterproductive, but more alarming for the short run is a conflagration in the Gulf that may spiral out of control.

Iran’s government has tried to avoid stoking the fires in the Persian Gulf, though some elements within the Iranian polity have taken to aggravating tensions.  The burning of the Saudi embassy’s annex in Tehran in retaliation for Nimr’s execution, presumably by hardliners interested in discrediting President Rouhani, is a case in point. Anti-Saudi rhetoric periodically emanating out of Tehran, as that following the Haj stampede in September 2015 and deaths of more than 400 Iranian pilgrims, demonstrates the visceral anti-Saudi feelings harbored by a segment of the Iranian populace. Above all, conservative hard-liners who could not derail the nuclear deal because of the Supreme Leader’s backing of President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif find the current tensions with Saudi Arabia a convenient way to vent their anger as well as delay if not prevent the impending rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.

However, the difference between the two countries is that the mainstream elements in power in Tehran are not interested in escalating tensions however much they may condemn the recent turn in Saudi policy. In Saudi Arabia, those who hold the reins of power find it profitable to demonize Iran and escalate tensions to serve their own short-term ends.

The difference can be best explained by the fact that Iran is a rising power that perceives historical trends going in its favor. The country can, therefore, adopt a prudent wait-and-see policy.  Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, sees time running out as Iran consolidates its position in the region and vis-à-vis the United States and is tempted to  adopt reckless policies with damaging effects on the energy-rich region as well as on American interests in the wider Middle East. Policymakers in Washington must keep this difference in mind when formulating strategies – and must find a way to tamp down tensions by counseling Riyadh against rash actions. Failure to do so could lead to a regional catastrophe.

*Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Michigan State University, and author most recently of Will the Middle East Implode? (Polity, 2014).

Ever since King Salman came to power in early 2015 and brought about sweeping changes in the hierarchy within the monarchy, the administration has been pursuing a more vigorous foreign policy than the one followed by the previous regime of King Abdullah. The focused objective has been to limit to the barest minimum, the influence within the Saudi kingdom of the social and political fallouts of the events in the region. Along with this, Saudi Arabia is also acutely aware of Iran’s increasing regional influence, which it wants to curtail in order to ensure regional hegemony.

Towards this end a number of strategies have been put in place by the Saudi monarchy. The war in Yemen that was initiated in March 2015 is an example of the Saudi strategy to dilute the Iranian influence in that country. The Arab coalition conducting the war against the Houthis blame Iran of supporting the rebel forces in Yemen and believe that a defeat would be a setback for Iran.

The latest part of the strategy was the execution of the Shiite cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr on 2 January along with another 46 convicts, mostly Sunnis accused of links with al Qaeda. Al-Nimr was arrested in July 2012 for inciting Shiite activists when the Arab Spring in neighbouring countries was not completely dead—the smoke of the fire that had burned was still easily visible. At this stage, Saudi Arabia had militarily intervened in Bahrain, a Shia majority country ruled by a Sunni royal house, to put down a populist uprising. Al-Nimr was an adherent to religious politics who is on public record as being against any kind of violence to resolve sectarian issues. He opposed the marginalisation of the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province and suggested an alternative structure for the religious governance of the kingdom. This would have meant replacing the house of Saud, which was not a welcome situation for the Saudi monarchy. The cleric remained an enigma till the end.

Al-Nimr was sentenced only in October 2014 and one year later, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the death sentence. The slow progress of the trail and appeal process was essentially meant to minimise the chances of Sunni-Shia unrest taking place. Iran had repeatedly told Saudi officials that al-Nimr should not be executed and it is felt that under the old regime, he certainly would not have faced execution. So what changed?

The Aftermath of the Execution

There was an almost immediate backlash to the execution—the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran was ransacked and some parts burned. It also enraged the Shiite community in the region and antagonised them. It is certain that Saudi Arabia would have anticipated such a reaction. Two issues come out of this situation. First, the cleric was already in custody for close to four years and did not have any tangible influence on any events outside the walls of the prison.

Therefore, what was the point in executing him, other than to consciously create a sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites? Second, if the backlash was anticipated, then it is certain that Saudi Arabia would not have gone ahead with the execution if they were not sure of controlling it within the country, especially in the critical Eastern Province, which is vital to the Saudi oil industry. This fact indicates that the execution was a part of a well-thought-through strategy in order to facilitate the government tightening its grips on power through cracking down on dissent. In addition, a show of force would also increase their influence over the smaller Sunni monarchies in the neighbourhood.

The security forces were generally successful in keeping down low-level activities such as street protests, but Saudi Arabia can anticipate an increase in suicide bombings in both the Sunni and Shiite areas of the country, which will be harder to counter. In this case, the soft targets will be sectarian such as Shiite mosques in order to goad them to retaliate and also security forces at the lower levels.

The attack on the Saudi embassy prompted an immediate reaction—Riyadh cut diplomatic ties with Iran, closely followed by Bahrain, the UAE and Sudan. The promptness of the action indicates that the Iranian reaction was also correctly anticipated. However, the actions of other Arab nations are worth monitoring. Kuwait with a sizeable Shiite minority of its own only condemned the attack. Egypt was even more circumspect in its reaction, even though Saudi Arabia was to sign loans and grants worth $ 3 billion on 5 January, three days after the execution and subsequent events. It is clear that while accepting the financial largesse of Saudi Arabia, Egypt will be more balanced in voicing its opinion regarding contentious sectarian conflicts in the region. The al-Nimr execution remains only one part of a much larger geo-political competition for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran that has been brewing for some time now.

Even if Saudi Arabia is aware of the precariousness of its position, it has adopted an attitude that indicates its almost complete disdain for external opinion. This could be the result of a long-standing sense of impunity that has been granted for decades to the Saudi royal family by the US and its allies. However, there is also a different play in place here. King Salman, 80, has suffered a stroke and has delegated powers to the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, 55, who effectively rules supported by the even younger Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman who also doubles as the hard-line Defence Minister. Both these rulers cannot, and will not, accept the rise of Iran as a regional power. They support the claim that the Shiites pose a threat to Sunnis. Considering this, it can be anticipated that the anti-Iranian rhetoric will only rise further in the coming days. The current actions by Saudi Arabia are by far the most aggressive against Iran and goes beyond any other initiatives taken since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 that removed the Shah from power. In this scenario, Saudi Arabia will look for support within its Arab and other allies, although most of them will try and keep a distance from the confrontation. There is no unanimity in the support that is coming from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that Riyadh heads by de fault, and outside support by smaller nations are not consequential enough to matter. The US is in damage control mode. It looks as if Saudi Arabia is about to find out who their real friends are.

A New Saudi Arabian Initiative

Saudi Arabia created an Arab Military Alliance on 14 December, ostensibly to fight the Islamic State (IS). The objective and its employment was explained in vague terms as dependent on needs and requests, although the alliance can be seen as the embryo of an interventionist force. If the primary objective is indeed to fight the IS, it is difficult to understand the reasons for not including Iraq and Syria in the coalition, since the IS is most active in these two nations.

The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is on record questioning the intentions of the alliance since the coalition members have so far not provided any assistance to Iraq to fight the IS. There is no denying that the coalition has a sectarian bias, since no Shiite forces have been invited to join. Therefore, this is an Arab ‘Sunni’ Military coalition that will be called in to assist and support Saudi Arabia in the on-going stand-off with Iran, on an as required basis. However, the coalition is unlikely to gain much traction on the ground since all members have their own internal domestic issues to counter and the coalition itself consists of small and insignificant countries almost coerced to join. At least for now, the coalition does not hold any real power or influence.

A Reality Check

Saudi Arabia is under great political and economic stress, whether the ruling coterie accepts it or not. It faces a major financial crisis of a shrinking budget for 2016 and has already indicated that certain welfare programs would be curtailed. This will lead to public resentment from a population that has been bought off in a number of previous crisis situations by the petro-dollars that the ruling dynasty was able to spread across the nation. There is internal dissent at various levels of society and even within the house of Saud itself, where there are dissatisfied and marginalised princes who are not above public criticism of the current regime. The Saudi society is built on traditional beliefs regarding tribal loyalties that have gradually become a bit archaic. The current crop of urban middle class groups have distanced themselves from the traditional tribal source of power and are also more experienced with the external world. They demand more freedoms and a move towards democracy. The monarchy is unable to accommodate these demands within the current model of governance and has tried to trivialise them by equating the serious demands with the demand to permit women to drive cars. There is also an attempt at channelling away the legitimate demands as a Shiite rebellion. Societal dissonance is not far away.

One of the real aims of the execution of al-Nimr was to bolster the regime’s Wahabi credentials in the domestic arena and use it as an example to shut down dissidence from the more fundamental fringes of Islam. There is a viewpoint that the attack on the embassy in Teheran and the consulate in Mashshad could have been state-sponsored. This gains acceptance especially since Iran has demonstrated adequate infrastructure to stop street mobs from getting out of control, in a number of earlier occasions. There is no doubt that letting the mob run riot, even if it was for only a brief period of time, has damaged Iran’s reputation and diminished its position on the issue of the execution. From a purely legal point of view, the actions are being seen as interfering in the judicial process of another nation. However, it has to be accepted that in the current imbroglio in the Middle-East, there was no doubt that sectarian violence was bound to follow the execution.

An opposing viewpoint is that Saudi Arabia has long been the fundamental entity in creating regional instability based on sectarianism. It has supported extremist organisations across the region in order to keep its own backyard clean; it has always assumed an anti-democratic stance and used force to dismantle any democratic movements that have taken root in the region; and it has intervened militarily in other nations, violating sovereign borders at will. Saudi Arabia’s actions in the recent past, culminating in the current execution and the backlash, has had the unintended consequence of making it isolated from its traditional allies. The counter strategy that it has concocted is aimed at creating a new ‘monster’, a common enemy that will unite all the Sunni nations under an anti-Shiite umbrella. Towards this end, it is endeavouring to make Iran take a clear anti-Saudi Arabia position in the belief that such a situation could then be turned to a Sunni-Shia standoff. If this can be pulled off, then Saudi Arabia believes that it will be able to use its considerable regional political influence and financial clout to isolate Iran. Anticipated result—victory in the regional race will then automatically fall to Riyadh.

The reality, however, is slightly different. The policies being enshrined by the new regime in Saudi Arabia are short-sighted and unlikely to yield the desired results. Therefore, they will not gather the necessary momentum and will remain unsustainable. Viewing the current situation it would seem that Saudi Arabia has painted itself into a corner. It has four major challenges to face and ameliorate. First, the fall in oil prices has created budgetary woes that can only be dealt with by cutting down on welfare activities, primarily health and housing subsidies, free education and cheap fuel. Unfortunately these are the measures that have ensured ‘popular’ support for the monarchy. The probable reaction to welfare cuts has still not been ascertained. Second, the open-ended war in Yemen that could be termed Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam. A graceful, face-saving exit from the quagmire seems a far-fetched proposition. More importantly, if the Yemen War is seen as a failure or defeat, the current Crown Prince and the Defence Minister will face open revolt from within the royal family. Such a situation would be the first crack in the foundation of the house of Saud.

Third, after the executions of 47 ‘terrorists’ most of whom were Sunnis with actual or perceived alliances with al Qaeda, the kingdom becomes a more focused target for IS and al Qaeda terrorist activities. The ability of the security apparatus to rein in a dedicated campaign of suicide bombings has not yet been proven. Given the nature of such attacks, it is highly possible to escalate them at will. Fourth, the intensifying rivalry for regional influence with Iran that cannot be won. Saudi Arabia cannot wish away the fact that Iran is part of the region and emerging as an alternative centre of power with great influence in some parts of the region, and also across the widely spread Shiite population. Most of the Gulf States want to find common ground with Iran, although the expanse of common ground available seems to be rapidly reducing. The US and its Western allies have accepted this fact and are not pursuing any anti-Iran policies, at least for the time being. On the other hand, the effort is to bring Iran back into the fold of the international community. Russia has indicated its willingness to mediate between the two nations, again confirming Iran as an indelible entity in the region.

The Saudi monarchy is beleaguered and in Riyadh there seems to be a sense of being besieged. The financial reforms being instituted are necessary to bring the economy back on an even keel. However, far-reaching reform and change are always accompanied by social and political consequences, which in this case is not easy to predict. Containing them is an exercise that can only be undertaken after the consequences are known. The looming question is the future viability of Saudi Arabia itself since a volatile combination of these factors have the power to make the desert kingdom implode.

Iran, the other party in the tug-of-war, is also not without its own problems, although its political cohesion is almost fully guaranteed. It has so far been focused on getting the international sanctions lifted and is unlikely to interfere with the free flow of oil, unlike in earlier times of heightened tensions. Internally, the current moderate Iranian government faces a hard-line group that had always seen the nuclear program as a symbol of Iran’s resistance to the West. These hard-liners are not happy with the nuclear deal and the direction of the current foreign policy. They want to derail the process for normalisation of relations and the attack on the Saudi embassy could well have been orchestrated by them.

The attack was an Iranian ‘own goal’ that led to international condemnation and the subsequent intensification of regional tensions could have stalled the normalisation process. Fortunately the more mature response subsequently from the official Iranian sources was able to somewhat contain the challenge and institute the lifting of sanctions a couple of weeks later. However, the ruling regime in Iran was weakened by the attacks on the embassy and Saudi Arabia was able to convert a bilateral tension into a diplomatic crisis to their benefit. The hard-liners need to be curbed if Iran is to take its place as a regional power.

Iran has been steadfast in its objective of fighting the IS, Russia being the only other participant clearly pursuing the same objective. Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies have been supporting extremists of all hue and the US-led coalition has been changing its partners on the ground almost at the whim and fancy of its more ‘important’ allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. At this juncture, Iran will be well-advised not to over react and to bide its time with patience. In the meantime, public diplomacy to highlight the activities of Saudi Arabia and its direct support for violent religious extremism will likely pay rich dividends, especially at a time when the European nations are already sceptical of Saudi intentions.

Implications – What Next?

Saudi Arabia and Iran are the only two nations in the region that continue to be stable and both are equally important and integral to regional security—and regional security is fundamentally aligned to defeating the IS and then denying it an afterlife. The US and its allies will therefore want to ensure the viability of both the countries. A direct confrontation will politically weaken both Saudi Arabia and Iran. While an actual war between the two is highly unlikely, intensification of the on-going proxy wars between them is almost a certainty. At the moment, the Saudi-Iranian confrontation has not yet reached its high-point and therefore, ratcheting up the rhetoric and indirect actions will take place. In this context it is highly probable that the War in Yemen would assume the guise of a proxy war and become much more pronounced. Only after reaching a plateau of heightened tensions can de-escalation take place.

Bahrain could become a flash point in the proxy war. In 1981, Iran supported an attempt in Bahrain aimed at installing a Shiite clerical theocracy that did not come to fruition. In 2011, Saudi Arabia used its military to put down an Arab Spring inspired Shiite protest. The fact is that Bahrain is contested space between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the sectarian chasm in the small country is clearly visible. Intensification of the proxy war could engulf Bahrain and blow out of control, irrespective of the Saudi Arabian military presence there.

The most important fallout from the stand-off is the impact that it has on the peace negotiations in the Syrian Civil War. In fact the negotiations could be the first casualty and become confirmed as a non-starter, since Iran-Saudi Arabia cooperation is a pre-requisite for any meaningful progress to take place. The UN Security Council resolution 2254 of 18 December 2015 authorised the Secretary General to assume the lead in negotiating a political resolution to the Syrian Civil War. However, events seem to have overtaken the good intentions apparent in the resolution. There is a dichotomy in the Saudi Arabian approach to Iran vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict. Saudi Arabia openly calls Iran a sponsor of terrorism, while in the UN it maintains that it is willing to work with Iran to achieve a settlement in Syria.

The incoherence of this strategy is apparent.

The other notable casualty is the creation of a coordinated strategy to fight the IS. In the current climate of heightened tensions, such a strategy cannot be formulated or implemented. The Gulf Arab states, under Saudi Arabian leadership, now consider Iran a bigger threat than even the IS. However, such a turn of events will be a strategic blunder of enormous proportions that will in the future affect the Sunni states more than Iran, because the IS will be let off the hook and may even garner support from these nations in their misguided efforts to defeat Iran. By the same token, Sunni extremism in Iraq can be expected to increase and become even more virulent with the covert support of the Arab Sunni states. Irrespective of the implications, it seems for now that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to change its current strategy or alter course to contain emerging events.

Conclusion

The new Saudi Arabian leadership is inexperienced in matters of global real politic and impetuous in their decisions, emphasising and exposing the more fundamental aspects of Saudi policies, rather than displaying practical prudence, even it is cloaked in pretence. This will be detrimental, in the long-term, to Saudi Arabia’s position in the region. Even so, these actions have the advantage of creating a sense of unpredictability in the decision-making process and marks a clear break from the staid approach to foreign policy that has been the Saudi Arabian trade mark so far. The US faces a stark choice in the Middle-East—stand in unison with its ally Saudi Arabia, who has disregarded its advice not to execute al-Nimr or take a balanced view of the situation and fight to put out the current bushfire while continuing to engage with Iran. The US actions in the past few days indicate that it has opted for the second choice. The battlelines between the two regional powers are being drawn.

Many pillars of stability have already collapsed in the Middle-East and the region has for the past few years been a powder keg with a burning fuse. With the Saudi Arabia-Iran stand-off the fuse has just become that much shorter.

First published in at www.sanukay.com

By Andreas Michalopoulos

With the world contemplating another year of geopolitical uncertainty and the international security landscape in flux, urgent action to improve governance at the international and national levels and the involvement of a wider cross-section of stakeholders could prevent the international security landscape from taking a dystopian turn in the next 15 years.

Without improved governance at the global and national levels, the world risks sleepwalking into widespread chaos or major war, warns the Security Outlook 2030 and presents three scenarios of how the international security landscape could look in 2030:

The Walled Cities scenario foresees widening inequalities continuing to pull communities apart, with the wealthy retreating to privately-secured gated communities as public services fracture and chaos and lawlessness spread.

Strong Regions paints a picture of stable geopolitics with several seats of power. Mutual respect among strong leaders holds the system together, which emphasizes the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests over global commons.

War and Peace envisages two powers drifting into major conflict as they dispute responsibility for a devastating cyberattack on critical infrastructure, ultimately resulting in a reworking of a stripped-down global system and greater agency of more sectors in international security.

The report describes these potential evolutions of the international security landscape to 2030 as a call to action for the development of more adaptable and resilient response systems.

Two main phenomena characterizing the current international security landscape: strategic competition among strong states and an increasing number of weak states. The weakness of some states has left a governance vacuum that is being filled by armed non-state actors, from violent extremist groups such as ISIS to organized criminal gangs. Meanwhile, after 25 years of relative tranquillity following the end of the Cold War, strategic competition among the great powers is again on the rise, from Eastern Ukraine to the Middle East to the South China Sea.

Looking ahead over the next 15 years, the international security landscape is likely to be profoundly affected by increasing competition for resources, such as water and land, due to climate change. Likewise, technological innovations could revolutionize the nature of conflict, from autonomous weapons systems to 3D-printed weaponry to genetically engineered biological weapons. Understanding these changes and formulating responses to the risks they represent will be essential for leaders when contemplating the years ahead.

The report argues for action to manage evolving international security risks, from rethinking social contracts and global governance mechanisms to finding new ways of engaging the private sector. We cannot afford to wait for crises to shock us into action. We need to identify potential inflection points and focus on finding solutions rather than just containing problems.

About the author:
*Andreas Michalopoulos is a journalist.

Source:
This article was published at Modern Diplomacy.

Undernutrition (nutrient-deficient and underweight) and overnutrition (overweight and obesity) rates are rising alarmingly in Asia. According to a 2013 report by the Food and Agriculture Organization and a global study on obesity published in 2014 by medical journal The Lancet, 65 million people in Southeast Asia are undernourished and 22 percent of men and 28 percent of women over age 20 are overweight or obese.

This dual burden of malnutrition places immense stress on public health systems and endangers the development of the young growing population and national economies.

Economic and Health Impacts of Malnutrition

Many low-income communities are struggling to afford safe and nutritious food and continue to suffer the devastating impacts of nutrient deficiencies which lead to high infant mortality, stunting and wasting, and delayed development and impaired cognition. Concurrently, rising urbanization and per capita income in developing cities have caused a shift from traditional diets to an increased consumption of processed foods and ‘fast food’. This change in diet is accompanied by a higher predisposition to lifestyle-related diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, cardio-vascular diseases and certain cancers.

The dual burden of malnutrition places additional stress on national health systems and increases medical costs for governments and communities. Wider reverberating effects may be felt by national and regional economies in terms of lost productivity and higher business costs, and ultimately, a hit on regional economic momentum. Between 2000 and 2009, undernutrition alone resulted in a loss of gross national product across Asia of up to 11 percent.

Funding and Knowledge Gaps

Nutrition practitioners who participated in a workshop on nutrition finance organized by the Milken Institute in 2015 acknowledged that the enormity of the challenge requires scaling up existing nutrition interventions. Governments, NGOs, philanthropic organizations, and private companies have invested in nutrition-specific interventions, and improved sanitation and access to fresh and healthy foods.

In spite of this, the same study by The Lancet estimates that Southeast Asia requires additional funding of $6 billion a year for nutrition interventions. Among others, the injections will be expected to fund: clinical trials to substantiate investments in food and nutrition, which includes research of plant-based proteins and alternative foods; data collection and analysis of local and regional contexts to better-inform nutrition investments and advocacy programs; and nutrition interventions in countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and India, which have seen declining overseas development assistance and institutional funding since progressing from the low-income category to middle-income.

Potential Sources of New Funding to Bridge the Gap

Given the acute funding gap and limited funding sources, the Milken Institute Asia Center is examining ways to engage new forms of capital that could broaden and diversify the pool of investors willing to support high-impact programs like malnutrition intervention. Innovative financing options such as volume guarantees, the social impact bond model, and the small and medium businesses/impact investing fund may be applicable. How will these options work?

A volume guarantee ensures purchase of nutrition products at a pre-determined quantity and price to encourage investment in production. As profit margins for food companies are generally low, profits diminish further when selling to low-income communities. The guarantee, usually from a donor organization such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, can help local producers manage business risks and generate more attractive profits. This could, in turn, appeal to investors and provide growth capital to reach more markets. The challenge of applying a volume guarantee lies in accurately mapping market demand and identifying suitable interventions and marketplaces that will benefit from this type of funding incentive.

Social impact bonds can be useful to reach new investors and new sources of funding, but tend to be less popular in Asia as these new instruments are perceived to be extremely risky. The model is dependent on data that articulates a link between a nutrition intervention and its cost-savings to a government or donor. Unfortunately, insufficient data exists to prove a direct causal relationship to justify the structure of a social impact bond. A reduction in stunting rates, for instance, may be a result of several interventions such as improved nutrition, education and sanitation. This model may be useful in cases where intervention has direct measurable impact, such as school feeding programs in Cambodia or shorter hospital stays due to improved nutrition.

Impact investment or small and medium enterprises (SME) funds are seeded by institutional investors, development finance institutions, and banks to provide growth capital for social enterprises or companies with both a financial and social mission. A nutrition-focused investment fund could help to catalyze investment into nutrition projects that run for a minimum of five years or typically longer, and generate below market or near market returns for investors. Currently, SME funds have yet to be effectively targeted towards nutrition partly due to the lack of investable companies, which are either too small or not adequately profitable. To create a more robust pipeline, an incubator or acceleration program could be created to provide technical assistance to entrepreneurs and existing companies working in nutrition.

Taking Action, Sooner than Later

Malnutrition threatens the development of individuals and limits their means to a secure and stable livelihood. The debilitating effects may be lifelong and puts a strain on national health budgets and labor productivity. Increasing the momentum to address malnutrition will largely depend on the availability of additional funding, which goes beyond the budgets of traditional funders such as governments and donor agencies. As philanthropic activity grows in Asia, local and regional foundations and philanthropists could provide a much needed boost to the nutrition agenda. A concerted effort to demonstrate the inter-linkages of nutrition with child and maternal health, education, food security, gender and health promotion, will also be helpful to achieve greater alignment with investors, donor agencies and governments.

*About the Authors
Belinda Chng is Associate Director of Innovative Finance and Program Development at the Milken Institute Asia Center and Caitlin MacLean is Director of Innovative Finance at the Milken Institute. This piece is adapted from the forthcoming Milken Institute’s Financial Innovation Lab report on “Innovative Finance to Address Nutrition in Southeast Asia”. The authors can be reached at bchng@milkeninstitute.org and cmaclean@milkeninstitute.org

Dr. Michael Izady Interviewed by Russell Whitehouse

Dr. Michael Izady has been a professor of history and political science since 1991 at various European and Ivy League universities, and has provided in-depth lectures on the Middle East for NATO and US military and policy planners. He received his PhD from the Dept. of Middle Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Columbia University.

RW: How do you think a Donald Trump presidency would affect America’s relationships in the Middle East?

MI: It won’t, in any substantive way. Our presidents are not emperors. They execute what the legislature ordains. A president’s freedom of action is basically cosmetic and vastly domestic in its liberty of action. Comparing the policies of presidents GW Bush and B. Obama makes that point clear. US has national interests in its security and economic welfare around the world. That point remains constant while the style of implementation varies from administration to administration. It was GOP president & five-star general Eisenhower under who tenure the invasion of Cuba was planned and nurtured. But he left, leaving the Democratic president and bon vivant, Kennedy to implement it with no change.

RW: Donald Trump has not only made controversial statements about Muslims, but Jews and the state of Israel as well. How do you think Netanyahu would interact with a Trump administration, especially considering the loveless marriage that Bibi’s had with Obama these past several years?

MI: Trump many have a brash personality and a loud mouth. But that will change once he is in office and realizes his limitation of action and responsibility of his pronouncements. Pres. Obama’s a good example. He promised much and spoke valiantly about social entitlements and “change that we can believe in.” Once in office, it instantly became the “same old, same old” with very few notable changes of any type. Harry Truman once observed so pithily about the office of the presidency, “This office make a man out of every boy.” It does in fact, when reality kicks in.

RW: Do you think carpet-bombing proponent Ted Cruz would just carbon copy the Bush Doctrine when in the Situation Room, or do you think he has notable Middle East policy differences with Dubya?

MI: President GW Bush’s doctrine involved no “carpet bombing.” We have not had that since the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. If you mean a direct invention into internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries, well, since 1990 to the present day, that has been the policy of this country under 12 years of Republican and 15 years of Democratic presidency. Plus ça change, plus c’est la mâme chose! If you mean general engagement in wars; well as the military strategist Von Clausewitz put it long ago, “War is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Pres. Reagan fought two wars (Lebanon and Grenada, while concluding the Cold War); GH Bush fought two in Iraq and Panama; WJ Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, GW Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Pres. B. Obama continues GW Bushes wars plus engaging in two new proxy wars in Libya and Syria. None of these presidents could or did start those wars without a full approval of Congress that sanctioned and financed them. And we the people elect the members of Congress to the last man and woman.

RW: A lot of people label Hillary Clinton a war hawk. Do you think this characterization of her is accurate? If so, how does she differ from the war hawks in the GOP primary race?

MI: I am not sure what a “war hawk” means in the context of the American political system where the executive branch is informed by the Legislature, the cabinet (that is likewise answerable only to the Legislature), and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have the heaviest weight in making military decisions, not the president? And of course, there is the State Dept. and various intelligence services (all 16 of them) that determine what course of diplomatic and political action is prudent in achieving the national interests of these United States. Then of course is the political philosophy and platform of the given political party that any president represents which also must be adhered to and fostered by him. How exactly a president would have a freedom of action given these obstacles over which he/she has to jump to do anything? “This office makes a man out of every boy” for sure.

RW: Hillary and some GOP candidates have pledged to establish a no-fly zone over Syria. Would you recommend this anti-Russian hardline approach or do you think the next US President must engage in serious diplomacy with Putin that will entail making real concessions?

MI: Russia got involved in Syria due to inaction of the West and the 5 years of stalemate. A “safe haven” (not just a no-fly zone: Syrian government can hardly “fly” anywhere without any air force to speak of) could have been created in Syria to prevent the mass of refugees. G.H. Bush did that for Iraq of 1991, saving the Kurds in the north. A safe haven, however, would sow the seed of possible dismemberment of Syria (which we do not approve of in the US). The safe haven in Iraq basically gave the Kurds an independence short of a declaration. It lasts to the present day. So we could and can declare a safe haven in portions of Syria where millions of refugees could go and stay. But is it prudent vis a vis our general policy in Middle East?

RW: Bernie Sanders has rarely broached foreign policy and when questioned on it, he usually just shifts his answers back to his pet issue of economic reform. Given that he appears to have little knowledge of or appreciation for geopolitics, do you think that a Sanders presidency would be a serious threat to Middle Eastern stability?

MI: Bernie Sanders is wise not to broach that which he shall have little say in it as a president. Read above. So it is the domestic policy that presidents along with their Party can have major influence. Being aware of that, he concentrates on domestic issues. But THAT may actually hurt him: No one wants a president who tells the truth about limitation of his powers and authority.

RW: How should the next US President tackle ISIS, both abroad and at home?

MI: It has been very difficult throughout history to tackle such amorphous, non-state violent entities as ISIS. How did we—or the rest of the West—deal with the Anarchists? Or the Communist insurgents around the world? Or Al-Qaeda? All that can be done is to limit their damage and capabilities to hurt civilians. In time, they all go away due to their own excesses, which turn the common people against them, drying up the sources of their recruits.

RW: What’s the strategy you’d recommend for negotiating continued compliance with Iran on the nuclear deal? Can the next President even trust Iran to keep up its side of the deal?

MI: Far more than producing nuclear weapons, Iran wants to develop the knowledge and infrastructure to produce them quickly once she feels threatened or attacked. Just remember, when Iran was being lavishly gassed by the Iraqis from 1985 to 1988, not even the UN condemned Iraq for such a totally illegal and immoral act. The New York Times had an OpEd by William Sapphire stating that it was the best scenario for the West if “Iran and Iraq could simmer in their own perverted juices forever”… Well, Iran does not want to be in that position again. So it wants to have the nuclear option this time around. She does now. That is why she is negotiating. Do not forget, Iran’s neighbor Pakistan is nuclear, so are India and Russia (both in the vicinity of Iran) & of course Israel and her nuclear capabilities. So, if we have reached a modus operandi with Iran, it is because it is a done deal and we find it prudent to bring Iran into the fold rather then keep it out any longer. Iran is too important, powerful and influence for keeping it on the outside.

RW: How should the future Commander-in-Chief try to steer Turkish President Erdogan, in terms of the NATO ally’s dangerous relations with Kurdistan and Russia?

MI: Turkey is an evolving democracy, a trustworthy ally of the US and a dedicated member of the NATO. They should never be forced to move too far from their national interests and social stability. For that same aim, we could and should encourage her to treat its own citizens equally with the same human and cultural rights as the majority. It only benefits Turkey and make her an even more valuable and stable ally than before.

RW: How do you think that increasing American energy independence will affect Middle East politics, particularly when it comes to US-Saudi relations?

MI: We do not want to abandon our friends, and oil is not an issue. Neither Turkey, Egypt nor Israel has any oil or gas to speak of. And yet, their prominence in American policy in Middle East is paramount. Oil is just a common commodity that can be had everywhere. Why do you think a gallon of gasoline is at the same price as bottled water or orange juice? Because there is so much of it. Canada and the US have more oil than the Saudis, albeit “hard to produce” oil. We can always bank on those local resources. But why should we if the Mid Eastern states are in need of selling theirs to the American and Western oil companies who find it, extract it, export it, refine it and sell it? The Western oil companies are the ones who make the money, not the ones who have it beneath their soil.

In a message read by Cardinal Peter Turkson, President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, to participants gathered at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Pope Francis urged leaders “not to forget the poor” and to see the creation of jobs as an essential part of business leaders’ service to the common good alongside producing wealth and improving the world.

“The present moment offers the world a precious opportunity to guide and govern the transformations associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution in a way that builds inclusive societies. However, it brings diminished opportunities for employment that also brings with it a responsibility among leaders to create jobs, tackle inequality and help solve society’s complex crisis,” said Pope Francis in his message.

On the risk that the Fourth Industrial revolution poses to labor markets, Pope Francis said: “Clearly there is a need to create new models of doing business that, while promoting the development of advanced technologies, are also capable of using them to create dignified work for all.”

The Pope encouraged leaders to seize the opportunities that the Fourth Industrial Revolution presents:

“The World Economic Forum can become a platform for the defence and protection of creation and for the achievement of a progress which is healthier, more human, more social and more integral.”

Following is the complete text of Pope Francis’ message:

*****

To Professor Klaus Schwab, Executive President of the World Economic Forum

Before all else, I would like to thank you for your gracious invitation to address the annual gathering of the World Economic Forum in Davos-Klosters at the end of January on the theme: “Mastering the Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

I offer you my cordial good wishes for the fruitfulness of this meeting, which seeks to encourage continuing social and environmental responsibility through a constructive dialogue on the part of government, business and civic leaders, as well as distinguished representatives of the political, financial and cultural sectors.

The dawn of the so-called “fourth industrial revolution” has been accompanied by a growing sense of the inevitability of a drastic reduction in the number of jobs. The latest studies conducted by the International Labour Organization indicate that unemployment presently affects hundreds of millions of people. The financialization and technologization of national and global economies have produced far-reaching changes in the field of labour.

Diminished opportunities for useful and dignified employment, combined with a reduction in social security, are causing a disturbing rise in inequality and poverty in different countries. Clearly there is a need to create new models of doing business which, while promoting the development of advanced technologies, are also capable of using them to create dignified work for all, to uphold and consolidate social rights, and to protect the environment. Man must guide technological development, without letting himself be dominated by it!

To all of you I appeal once more: “Do not forget the poor!” This is the primary challenge before you as leaders in the business world. “Those who have the means to enjoy a decent life, rather than being concerned with privileges, must seek to help those poorer than themselves to attain dignified living conditions, particularly through the development of their human, cultural, economic and social potential” (Address to Civic and Business Leaders and the Diplomatic Corps, Bangui, 29 November 2015).

We must never allow the culture of prosperity to deaden us, to make us incapable of “feeling compassion at the outcry of the poor, weeping for other people’s pain, and sensing the need to help them, as though all this were someone else’s responsibility and not our own” (Evangelii Gaudium, 54).

Weeping for other people’s pain does not only mean sharing in their sufferings, but also and above all realizing that our own actions are a cause of injustice and inequality. “Let us open our eyes, then, and see the misery of the world, the wounds of our brothers and sisters who are denied their dignity, and let us recognize that we are compelled to heed their cry for help! May we reach out to them and support them so they can feel the warmth of our presence, our friendship, and our fraternity! May their cry become our own, and together may we break down the barriers of indifference that too often reign supreme and mask our hypocrisy and egoism!” (Bull of Indiction of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy, Misericordiae Vultus, 15).

Once we realize this, we become more fully human, since responsibility for our brothers and sisters is an essential part of our common humanity. Do not be afraid to open your minds and hearts to the poor. In this way, you will give free rein to your economic and technical talents, and discover the happiness of a full life, which consumerism of itself cannot provide.

In the face of profound and epochal changes, world leaders are challenged to ensure that the coming “fourth industrial revolution”, the result of robotics and scientific and technological innovations, does not lead to the destruction of the human person – to be replaced by a soulless machine – or to the transformation of our planet into an empty garden for the enjoyment of a chosen few.

On the contrary, the present moment offers a precious opportunity to guide and govern the processes now under way, and to build inclusive societies based on respect for human dignity, tolerance, compassion and mercy. I urge you, then, to take up anew your conversation on how to build the future of the planet, “our common home”, and I ask you to make a united effort to pursue a sustainable and integral development.

As I have often said, and now willingly reiterate, business is “a noble vocation, directed to producing wealth and improving our world”, especially “if it sees the creation of jobs as an essential part of its service to the common good” (Laudato Si’, 129). As such, it has a responsibility to help overcome the complex crisis of society and the environment, and to fight poverty. This will make it possible to improve the precarious living conditions of millions of people and bridge the social gap which gives rise to numerous injustices and erodes fundamental values of society, including equality, justice and solidarity.

In this way, through the preferred means of dialogue, the World Economic Forum can become a platform for the defence and protection of creation and for the achievement of a progress which is “healthier, more human, more social, more integral” (Laudato Si’, 112), with due regard also for environmental goals and the need to maximize efforts to eradicate poverty as set forth in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Mr President, with renewed good wishes for the success of the forthcoming meeting in Davos, I invoke upon you and upon all taking part in the Forum, together with your families, God’s abundant blessings.

From the Vatican, 30 December 2015

By KP Fabian*

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Syria, Walid Mohi Edine al Muallem, visited India from 11 to 14 January 2016. Foreign Minister since 2006, he became Deputy Prime Minister in June 2012, approximately year after troubles began. Since joining the Syrian diplomatic service in 1964, he has had a meteoric rise, which included his tenure as Syria’s ambassador to the US from 1990-2000 In 2006, he succeeded Farouk al Sharaa, who was the country’s foreign minister since 1984. It is important to note that Walid Muallem is a Sunni Muslim who holds such an important position in Syria, where the minority Alawites (a Shia sect), dominate the higher echelons in the government.

It is rare that a foreign minister from an Arab country in deep turmoil visits India. This is because India does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries by sending weapons or otherwise assisting either the government or its opponents militarily. India believes that Syrians should be left alone to sort their problems out through negotiations, and that externally propelled ‘regime change’ is not acceptable. However, the Syrians are not going to be left alone to make their choices.

Before the visit, the Indian media speculated on what Syria might ask India. Will Syria ask India to join the bombing campaign against the Islamic State (IS)? Will Syria ask India to send troops to Syria to fight the IS? Will Syria ask India to join the Friends of Syria meetings in Vienna, New York and elsewhere to find a negotiated solution to put an end to the multitudinous armed conflicts in the country? As a matter of fact, all such speculations only showed that the Indian media, by and large, have been out of touch with the ground realities. There was no briefing of the media from Ministry of External Affairs either.

During this visit, Syria did not ask India to join the bombing campaign against the IS, or for troops, or to participate in the political process recommended by the UNSC Resolution 2254. The Syrian foreign minister met his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj and the Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval, and mainly talked about economic cooperation and intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism.

Syria is keen that two stalled projects take off once the ground situation improves. In 2009, the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) won a 300 million Euros worth contract to build a 400 MW (2×200 MW) power plant. The project should have been completed by the mid-2012. Although the BHEL had sent the equipment, the political tsunami, otherwise known as the Arab Spring, came in the way. Another Indian company, Apollo International, which won a contract for putting up an iron and steel plant at Hama is in the same boat. Additionally, Syria is keen on getting medical aid, especially medicines and instruments, for tending to the injured. India has promised medical aid worth $ 1 million and it is understood that tenders have been floated. India asked whether Syria could help in locating the 39 Indian workers who went missing when the IS took over Mosul, Iraq. The reply was that Syria did not have any means of helping if the missing ones are with the IS.

With the NSA, intelligence cooperation was discussed. He was told that there are four young Indian men who had tried to join the IS who are currently in detention in Syria. India is keen on getting them back to the country. As India is engaged in stopping Indians from leaving India to join the IS, cooperation with Syria, where the terrorist group has its capital at Al-Raqqa, is of some importance to New Delhi. However, the Syrian assertion that the young men in question were in Syria with the intention of joining the IS will need to be verified after they return. Some time back the Indian Ministry of External Affairs had expressed displeasure over Syrian embassy in New Delhi’s statements to the press about Indians fighting for the IS.

When the Muallem was in India, the plight of the 40,000 Syrians in Madaya, a town 25 kilometres from Damascus, deprived of the basic daily necessities due to the economic blockade imposed by the Syrian government, was highlighted by the international media. There are approximately 400,000 Syrians in 15 different locations suffering from such blockades, imposed by the government or its opponents. We do not know whether the Indian side showed any interest in knowing more about this issue. Muallem’s statement during his 13 January 2016 press conference, that his discussion focussed on the “decades-long relations between the two countries,” may be a hint that the past took precedence over the present. India should have asked the visitor to give an in-depth briefing on what is happening in Syria.

At the press conference, Muallem also praised Russia for bombing the IS and dispraised Turkey for its support to the terrorist group and other terrorists. In Syria’s view, all those engaged in armed conflict with the government are terrorists. This is not a sustainable view as the external powers will not agree to their Syrian clients as being treated as ‘terrorists’. Serious disagreements have already cropped up over who among Assad’s opponents are to be invited for the peace process.

The moot question is about the extent to which India is seriously interested in what is happening elsewhere in the world. Any discussion in India on the turmoil in the Arab world invariably brings out the point that owing to the presence of over 7 million Indians in the Gulf and the deep energy relationship, India wants stability in the region. Is it that the post-Nehru India has turned inward and gotten progressively disinterested in the world outside? This is a matter worth examining.

It will be easier to take care of India’s interests if she takes proper interest in what is happening in the world.

*KP Fabian
Former Indian diplomat, & Professor, Indian Society of International Law

Donald Trump went on a tear at Liberty University this week.

“We’re going to protect Christianity,” he said. This needs to be done because “Christianity is under siege.” He noted that in Syria, “if you’re Christian, they’re chopping heads, they’re under siege!”

Aside from addressing the “War on Christmas,” all of Trump’s references to protecting Christianity were to conditions in the Middle East. He could have said more about threats to Christianity at home, beginning with the Obama administration’s Health and Human Services mandate. Attempts by the federal government to redefine what constitutes a Catholic entity are pernicious, and so are efforts to force them to assent to healthcare plans that fund abortion-inducing drugs.

Virtually all the presidential candidates understand that Christianity is endangered in the Middle East, but few have noted that it is being trashed at home. In the schools, the multicultural curriculum frequently shines a negative light on Christianity (while elevating Islam). On television and in the movies, Christianity is more often denigrated than respected. In the arts, depictions of Christianity are too often crude and morally debased. Moreover, radical secularism is in high gear among activist organizations seeking to neuter Christianity’s influence on our culture. Regrettably, the courts have shown a propensity to favor establishment clause considerations over religious liberty interests. And so on.

Is Trump serious about his commitment to religious liberty? Who knows? He can survive criticism over his Corinthians misstatement (it’s Second Corinthians, not Two Corinthians), but his comments on forgiveness are more important. NPR reports that last year Trump told Iowa evangelicals “he had never asked God for forgiveness…and he repeated that Sunday on CNN.” Wrong. He said on CNN, “I don’t like to have to ask for forgiveness.” This is profoundly different from what NPR said. In fact, even last year he commented, “I am not sure I have” asked God for forgiveness. In short, more spin from a hostile media

The Guardian reports: The US State Department has moved to back America’s ambassador to Israel in a febrile and escalating row over his remarks on Monday that Israel applied law in the occupied West Bank differently to Palestinians and Israelis.

Ambassador Daniel Shapiro’s unusually critical comments drew harsh criticism from ministers in Israel’s rightwing government – including from the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu.

Shapiro was also publicly lambasted on Israeli television on Tuesday by a former aide to Netanyahu who used the deeply offensive Hebrew word “yehudon” – which translates as “little Jew boy” – to disparage the ambassador. The term is used by rightwing Israelis against other Jews – particularly those in the diaspora – whom they regard as not being sufficiently Jewish or pro-Israel. [Continue reading…]

The remarks by Aviv Bushinsky, who served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff when he was finance minister in Ariel Sharon’s governmen, are reminiscent of an incident reported by the Washington Post in 1997.

U.S. Ambassador Martin Indyk, still seething at a two-week-old slur, ran into his accuser Thursday and fixed him with a glare. According to Ephraim Sneh, a Labor Party member of Israel’s legislature, this is what happened next:

“The last time someone called me a Jew boy,” Indyk said, harking back to school days in Australia, “I was 15 years old and he got a punch in the face.”

A right-wing legislator, Rehavam Zeevi, had indeed called Indyk a yehudon — Hebrew invective translated variously as “Jew boy,” “yid,” or “kike” — at a parliamentary caucus late last month. He looked up from his seat at a memorial service for the late Yitzhak Rabin and glared back at Indyk. “Try me,” Zeevi replied. Then, taunting Indyk, he added distinctly: “yehudon, yehudon.”

Zeevi, a retired general who is chief of the ultranationalist Moledet (Homeland) party, apparently meant to say that Indyk, the first Jewish U.S. ambassador here, betrayed his coreligionists by pressuring the Israeli government for concessions in peace talks with the Palestinian Authority. Zeevi’s political platform, the most extreme of any party in the parliament, calls for expulsion of Arabs from the West Bank to make room for Jews.

A.B. Yehoshua, one of Israel’s most famous novelists, has for many years been among the most vocal in promoting this view that Jews who remain living outside Israel are only, as he says, “partial Jews.”

But instead of being preoccupied with where Jews plant their bodies, he and those who share his views, might consider where the Jewish conscience may better thrive.

In 2003, Avraham Burg, former member of the Knesset, a chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel and a Speaker of the Knesset, who was born in Jerusalem, wrote:

It turns out that the 2,000-year struggle for Jewish survival comes down to a state of settlements, run by an amoral clique of corrupt lawbreakers who are deaf both to their citizens and to their enemies. A state lacking justice cannot survive. More and more Israelis are coming to understand this as they ask their children where they expect to live in 25 years. Children who are honest admit, to their parents’ shock, that they do not know. The countdown to the end of Israeli society has begun.

It is very comfortable to be a Zionist in West Bank settlements such as Beit El and Ofra. The biblical landscape is charming. From the window you can gaze through the geraniums and bougainvilleas and not see the occupation. Traveling on the fast highway that takes you from Ramot on Jerusalem’s northern edge to Gilo on the southern edge, a 12-minute trip that skirts barely a half-mile west of the Palestinian roadblocks, it’s hard to comprehend the humiliating experience of the despised Arab who must creep for hours along the pocked, blockaded roads assigned to him. One road for the occupier, one road for the occupied.

This cannot work. Even if the Arabs lower their heads and swallow their shame and anger forever, it won’t work. A structure built on human callousness will inevitably collapse in on itself. Note this moment well: Zionism’s superstructure is already collapsing like a cheap Jerusalem wedding hall. Only madmen continue dancing on the top floor while the pillars below are collapsing.

As much as all of this might sound purely like a struggle over Jewish identity, it mirrors an affliction in which people across the globe withdraw into their various ethnic, religious, or ideological ghettos of identification and their cherished definitions of my people.

The testing ground for challenging this trend is now Europe.

Last year, Burg wrote:

In a generation in which we Israelis have forgotten how to be sensitive and empathetic to minorities, to those who are different, to the persecuted, and many American Jews are swallowed up in their comfort zones of white society and are abandoning their partnership with the “others,” in America, the “United States of Europe” is presenting a new model of identity – a union between those who are different, and the “other.” It’s a model no different from the American one which seeks to assimilate all into a monochromatic American democracy.

Further, Europe is the current meeting point between Islam and the West. Some of that encounter involves clashes, and some involves learning. The Christian continent is learning to make space for other, rich and varied identities. My friends, Ziya from Bangladesh, Shaida whose family is from Turkey and Rob from Jamaica, are impressive Europeans, and Europe is better off with them. Just like Shaul from Venice, Yoop from Amsterdam and Brian from London – there is no dissonance between their Jewish heritage and their European identity. The discourse between white, Christian Europe and those who are different is fascinating. More important is the dialogue between Western Europe and the Muslim forces in its midst.

The Muslim world and some of its members are embarking on a long journey toward the Western values of freedom, equality and brotherhood. The institutionalization of Western Islam in the heart of Europe – that which is absorbing values of democracy while remaining true to Muslim tradition – is where the strategic potential exists for bridging the gaps peacefully in the generations to come. It’s not happening in the Middle East or North America, but only in Europe. That is where the vanguard of humanity and humaneness is to be found.

Since Burg wrote this, the vision of Europe has become profoundly challenged by an expanding refugee crisis, acts of terrorism, growing nationalism, cultural protectionism, and the drumbeats of xenophobia and Islamophobia.

Both in Europe and the U.S., it often seems like the political momentum favors those who promote retreat in its various forms — through strengthening borders, heightened national security, and disengagement from foreign affairs.

At the same time, the inexorable global trends point in the opposite direction as populations expand and people choose or are compelled to cross borders.

In such a world, the task of building more inclusive societies is not an idealistic goal; it has become an urgent necessity.

By Atul Mishra and Jason Miklian*

India’s landmark 2014 election brought Prime Minister Narendra Modi to power with a broad mandate to reshape the country’s foreign policy. His sophistication in this realm has surprised many, but current Indian foreign policy is also influenced by both structural domestic factors that pre-date his term and new actors who seek to gain influence or expand their roles. This report explores the effect of domestic influence on Indian foreign policy by outlining the growing links between domestic dynamics and India’s international aspirations. It highlights five new domestic determinants of foreign policy decision-making in light of the BJP election victory in 2014. It also discusses five significant challenges that domestic factors pose to India’s ability to turn its international aspirations into reality. These factors indicate that even Modi’s historic mandate may not be enough to insulate his government from domestic forces – both allies and antagonists – that wish to shape foreign policy. The report concludes with thoughts on how these aspirations and challenges influence the playing field on which foreign policy decisions are currently made in India and may manifest themselves in the policy realm.

“India is not just Delhi. Foreign policy should be decided by the people and not by some politicians sitting in Delhi.” — Narendra Modi (Press Trust of India, 2013)

Introduction

India’s landmark 2014 elections promised to herald a new era in the country’s foreign policy, sweeping the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi to power with one of the largest mandates in decades. And in terms of both discourse and substance on foreign affairs Modi has surprised the pundits. Predictions of foreign policy directions under the new prime minister were based on extrapolations from perceptions of his time as Gujarat chief minister, a belief that his simplistic foreign policy statements on the campaign trail would manifest in policy1 and assumptions that he would be beholden to the centre-right forces he principally represents. While perhaps not the paradigm shift that some claim,2 India’s institutions, centre-state relations, party system and political culture have all been markedly influenced over the past 18 months.

And even though the “Modi Mandate” has appeared to reconsolidate power in the Office of the Prime Minister, those political and business actors who have gained foreign policy influence over the previous decade intend to retain and expand their power.

While it is tempting to view foreign policy through the lens of Modi alone, several slowly evolving structural factors have also deeply influenced India’s foreign policy landscape. Despite the strong historical prime ministerial imprint on India’s foreign policy, due as much to the country’s constitution as to precedents set by leaders starting with Jawaharlal Nehru, domestic forces are finding new areas in which to operate in this realm. As the national narrative formed by combining anti-colonial and post-colonial nationalisms – also known as the “Nehruvian Consensus” – began unravelling in the 1970s, domestic actors gradually gained influence over foreign affairs, particularly in terms of the challenges of economic development, social change and regional disparities. Currently domestic forces are able to exert significant influence on India’s external relations, and domestic politics frequently contradicts what policymakers consider to be India’s core strategic and security interests.

This report explores domestic influence over Indian foreign policy in three sections. The first offers a concise outline of the growing links between domestic dynamics and India’s international aspirations over the past decade, showing how the structure of Indian politics over the previous two decades has created space for domestic actors to exert considerable influence on the foreign policy sphere. The second section highlights five new domestic determinants of foreign policy decision-making in light of the BJP election victory in 2014, while the third section presents five significant challenges that domestic factors pose to India’s ability to turn its international aspirations into reality. The report concludes with thoughts on how these aspirations and challenges may manifest in policy in the future, and – perhaps more importantly – how they influence the playing field on which decisions are made in contemporary India.

The rise of domestic influences on Indian foreign policy

Few aspects of contemporary India are as central to understanding how the country is currently poised internationally, and where it is likely to head in the near future, as the domestic forces that shape its foreign policy. Yet within the scores of publications that map India’s relations with the world, only a handful of accounts discuss the role of domestic forces, and most study these drivers only superficially.3 The complexities of Indian politics are treated in a top-down way and the focus remains on New Delhi-centred variables – the prime minister himself, the Prime Minister’s Office, the ruling party at the centre, the ministries involved in foreign policy issues, the elite, and opinion-making individuals and institutions. This approach fails to appreciate the immense influence that domestic forces have on India’s foreign affairs and concepts of the “national interest”.

Good reasons can be found for this gap. As is the case with many developing states, for decades after independence India’s foreign policy had remained remarkably contained in the capital, New Delhi. Analysts thus saw the country’s foreign policy and international relations as both Delhi-centric and South Asia-focused (Buzan, 2011; Acharya, 2014; Naik, 2014; Sahni, 2007). But despite India’s immense cultural diversity and social ties to its regional neighbours in particular, domestic factors – ranging from public opinion and developmental needs to competing ideologies and visions – were historically de-emphasised where foreign policy was concerned in favour of realpolitik- style actions.

Over the last decade domestic actors4 – and regional political elites in particular – began to demonstrate how other forces can determine (and perhaps even dictate) selected foreign policies.5 Three brief examples illustrate this.

Probably the best-known recent case is that of the India- U.S. nuclear negotiations. In 2005, as India was actively seeking a dramatic turnaround in its relations with the U.S. through an agreement on civil nuclear energy, it experienced strong U.S. pressure to condemn Iran’s nuclear programme. Its votes at the UN against Iran in 2005 and 2006 were criticised by the then-United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s major allies on the left, who saw in these votes the curbing of India’s foreign policy autonomy. As the complex multi-staged nuclear deal progressed, the Left Front first protested and then eventually withdrew its support entirely in July 2008. Although the government survived and continued to make progress on the deal with the U.S., this was a major domestic blow to an aspirational foreign policy and arguably the first time since 1962 that foreign policy became a central issue in domestic politics.

Also, during the UPA’s second term it encountered several situations where coalition politics thwarted international negotiations. In Bangladesh-bordering West Bengal, the Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress supported a range of bilateral agreements on river-water sharing, trade, transit rights for India through Bangladesh and border settlements. However, Banerjee protested the river-water-sharing agreement due to local interest group lobbying and withdrew her support just as then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was about to make a historic trip to Bangladesh to sign the agreements. Embarrassed, the UPA ultimately failed to sign the treaties and in September 2012 the Trinamool Congress walked out of the alliance in an action perceived to be deeply damaging to foreign policy (Stratfor, 2013). A similar process occurred in Tamil Nadu, where the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was a UPA ally. Between 2012 and 2013 DMK pressure caused India to censure Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council (an action that contradicted India’s long-standing principle of not voting for country-specific resolutions) and boycott a

Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.

Thirdly, the UPA government’s dual-power structure hampered foreign policy aspirations during the final years of the coalition’s second term in office. Under this model, one power node belonged to alliance chairperson and Congress president Sonia Gandhi and another to Prime Minister Singh. Singh had a vision for India as a liberal democracy with a strong, vibrant economy that worked towards a rule-based, liberal international order, while the Gandhis prioritised domestic issues supporting the socially and economically marginalised. But because Singh derived his power from Gandhi, his ability to initiate policies that disagreed with her views or those of Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi was in fact even more limited than a conventional power-sharing framework might be assumed to permit.

Moreover, Singh’s model of development was designed to attract foreign investments for industry, infrastructure and economic growth. But to become investment friendly, India needed a welcoming legislative framework and state support for foreign capital investments. Here the contradictions surfaced very starkly during the second half of the second edition of the UPA government: whenever a major conflict developed between a large investment proposal and the social groups likely to be affected by it, the party’s top leadership often publicly supported regional issues over policy prescriptions from its own government in New Delhi. For example, Rahul Gandhi supported opposition to multibillion dollar investment projects by metals majors such as South Korea’s POSCO and the UK-based Vedanta Resources in Odisha.6 The growing perception in Delhi was that the UPA’s two power centres were oriented in different directions and the leadership of the governing party was undermining the government’s foreign policy aimed at increasing domestic economic growth.

The combination of coalition compulsions and a dual-power-centre arrangement undermined the prime minister and riddled the government with incoherence and contradictions. This crisis of governance came to be described as the UPA’s “policy paralysis”. India’s foreign policy became beholden to the domestic constituency, coalition politics intensified, and the fallout affected both politics and policy (Schaffer, 2013). Apart from setbacks on the Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi fronts, the government could make little progress on relations with Pakistan, despite Singh’s deep personal interest in resolving the conflict between the two countries. The sense of drift was palpable in India’s regional security policy, with “ad hocism” defining relations with China and Pakistan in particular. This dysfunctional scenario emboldened both the BJP on the right and NGOs and civil society groups representing marginalised communities on the left that were opposed to a foreign economic policy that they saw as causing dislocation, suffering for the poor and environmental harm.

So dire was the domestic situation that commentators frantically reminded the UPA of the harm being done to the “national interest”. Sceptics chided Singh, arguing that “When a government yields to every pressure group at home, its capacity to pursue national interests abroad inevitably erodes” (Mohan, 2013). But the “national interest” – that perpetually ambiguous concept – had ceased to be the prerogative and preserve of the prime minister and the ministries directly associated with foreign policy development and conduct. This enabled regional parties, national opposition parties, states with stakes in neigh- bouring countries and social movements representing a range of social forces to become new participants in the debate over the meaning of India’s national interest, opening space for new conceptualisations, but also feeding the growing perception of a crisis in Delhi.

These actions are part of a broader movement that has seen deeper engagement by peripheral actors in Indian foreign policy. Over the previous two decades, social movements, regional political parties, states that share international boundaries, and ethnic groups with trans- national or international linkages (e.g. people from Tamil Nadu or Kerala) have all attempted to influence foreign policy concerns from local state settings, testing the centre’s claim over the definition and pursuit of national interest through foreign policy. Some have argued that this challenges the traditional Indian top-down model of foreign policymaking (Brass, 1994; Kaviraj, 1988; Maini, 2012) and the quirks of federal democracy, heralding the emergence of local forces and coalition politics attempting to accommodate regional, subnational and caste identities (Miklian, 2011). The long-dominant Indian National Congress Party has been losing support over the past 30 years and thus has had to form ever-larger coalitions in order to stay in power. More partners have meant more interests to reconcile, and these dynamics increasingly encouraged junior partners to become more aggressive vis-à-vis the centre in terms of local and regional claims in the international arena.

In India, two competing visions of this change are emerging. The first is the traditionalist response. Its proponents express great scepticism over the desirability of allowing the country’s constituent parts, sectional interests and regional forces any substantive say in foreign policy. They feel that these forces do not understand foreign policy or national interests and tend to jeopardise non-negotiable national interests for short-term parochial or in-group gain. The constitution guarantees foreign affairs as the exclusive domain of the centre, and this monopoly, they say, must not be allowed to be encroached on. Traditionalists7 feel that Indian national interests are determined by virtue of the country’s history, location, capabilities and international factors. They worry that relinquishing control over foreign policy or involving more players makes India slow to react, seemingly confused and lacking in credibility internationally.

The second vision is the accommodationist or federalist response. Those associated with this view explore why actors outside Delhi demand a say in Indian foreign policy and why their voices should be heard. The fact that only four states – Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand – do not share borders with either a country or international waters means that states must be consulted by the centre and their concerns addressed (Chatterji, 2014; Sreenivasan, 2014; Joshi, 2013). This model, which Indian leaders proposed in earlier decades of independent India, was endorsed by Narendra Modi himself when he was campaigning as a federalist champion (Iyer, 2013). At the same time federalists agree that regional elites should not be allowed to arm-twist or blackmail the centre, in order to avoid policy confusion or paralysis. One analyst has even proposed an institutional mechanism – a subcontinental relations council comprising the external affairs minister and the chief ministers of the states that share external borders – to facilitate coordination between the two units of the Indian polity (Pai, 2013).

The 2014 election appeared to upend these calculations. Despite Modi’s previous stance supporting regionalism in foreign policy (in light of his words quoted at the start of this report), a perception has emerged that he controls – or even micro manages – most foreign policy decisions. The largest political mandate in three decades combined with Modi’s populist draw (and reputation for top-down leader- ship) presents a dilemma: does the current landscape represent merely an exception that will revert to fragmentation and political turmoil in the next general election, thus further empowering regional and state-level actors in India’s international policy arena? Or does it spell the beginning of something structurally distinct and enduring, a return to the foreign policy coherence of decades past?

Five new determinants of domestic influence on India’s foreign policy

To inform answers to these questions, five broad categories of domestic influence that currently influence evolving Indian foreign policy decision-making processes are explored below: simple majority politics, the symbolism of Indian aspirations, the factor of Modi’s personality, regional states’ influence and business interests.

Firstly and most simplistically, the BJP’s simple majority means a government that in theory is less constrained by regional political forces or alliance partners that can bring coalition politics to a grinding halt. Policy is then by definition allowed to be more rational and predictable in both the domestic and international environments. A related factor is that few in the BJP are seen to be able to challenge either Modi or BJP president Amit Shah. Like any other party in India, the BJP has disgruntled elements, but they are unlikely to cause serious foreign policy disruptions in the short term.8 As a result, the party’s projection of corporate unity and its marginalising of rebellious leaders can be expected to continue, especially given India’s need for sustained economic growth and social development. This basic current political reality has set the stage for confronting the issues that the Modi government was elected to deal with.

Secondly, the symbolism of aspiration has acquired great substance through Modi. There has been a long-standing practice of paying occasional lip service to traditional Indian principles of foreign policy such as non-alignment, morality and human rights. But under Modi the hesitancy about India projecting itself as an aspirational and even aggressive international power is disappearing. For example, the BJP has sought to replace the five traditional international principles of panchsheel (a term associated with Buddhism) with the five new pillars of panchamrit or “five nectars” (a term unambiguously associated with Hinduism). These are: dignity, dialogue, security, shared prosperity and culture.9 While panchsheel sought to combine and balance the values of India and those of the West, panchamrit calls to mind the emphasis on non-Western, “Asian values” that do not necessarily fit well with the values of open, searching and public criticism, social equality, and radical dissent in politics. Further, Modi promises that India will now be guided by the “Three Cs” in its international relations: culture, commerce and connectivity (Economic Times, 2014). This is typified by the govern- ment’s unapologetic use of its religious and cultural resources – primarily Hinduism – as elements of soft power on the international stage.10 The declaration that June 21st would be International Yoga Day and Modi’s numerous religious/cultural gestures during his overseas visits support this perspective.

Thirdly, the personality factor has returned to the centre of Indian diplomacy. Modi has recast Indian foreign policy in a vigorous and purposive – and above all personal – light. His image is that of a simple and hardworking man who is clearheaded, decisive, and incorruptible. Like neoliberal leaders of China (primarily the late Deng Xiaoping) and Singapore (the late Lee Kuan Yew), he has been described as a pragmatist. Although the term is ephemeral and something of a misfit (principally because Modi is economically and politically ideological), it has been used to positively describe his business-like attitude to foreign affairs. He lends a personal touch to relations with powers greater than India, as was evident in the way India hosted U.S. president Barack Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping,11 giving the impression that all the parties involved are at the same level and thus hiding power disparities. Modi breaks protocol, becomes informal when the occasion demands, and ably sells India as an investment and cultural destination. Although previous Indian leaders have historically promoted business with “strong” leaders whose democratic credentials are suspected by the international community, Modi has prioritised economic interests rather than democratic ideals and is at ease with such leaders. Finally, unlike other Indian leaders who conducted themselves in deference to established Indian traditions on international conduct built over decades, Modi comes across as unburdened by this legacy. He is neither understated nor regards himself as the leader of a post- colonial country who is conscious of his country’s lack of international clout. He has positioned himself as the leader of a young, aspiring country that has much to offer in terms of culture and human potential.

Fourthly, the influence of India’s states on foreign policy has continued to rise, but in new ways. Structurally, the country’s increasing interest in economic interconnectedness dictates that the centre must involve states more deeply in economic policy, and much of India’s foreign policy is economic. This reality has underpinned Modi’s political promise to include states in foreign policymaking, and he has indeed taken states on board to project them as investment and culture destinations during his overseas tours. This is in many ways the opposite of the regional relationships that the UPA failed to secure during its foreign policy negotiations, as Modi looks to offer regional carrots that are not necessarily tied to regional relations as such. Or, in other words, Modi wishes to be a federalist, but in traditionalist terms.

Two regions in particular – the eastern belt of India comprising eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal, and Northeast India comprising the states of Sikkim, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya Tripura and Nagaland – have taken centre stage. Unsurprisingly, these two regions are central to India’s new policy of subregionalism both within and outside the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation framework. The two regions are also the least developed in terms of basic infrastructure such as roads, ports and regular electricity supply. In an attempt to overcome these challenges the government has commercialised Hindu and Buddhist tourist circuits comprising holy sites in these regions and sought to popularise them in East and South-east Asia. In the Northeast the elevation of the Look East Policy into the Act East Policy recognises the geopolitical and economic reasons for augmenting the North- east’s capacity for trade and transport with South-east Asia and China, reiterated by Modi’s federalist stand that the region cannot be developed from New Delhi (NDTV, 2015).12 The August 2014 agreement with Japan on upgrading Varanasi to a “smart city” and the proposal to build another smart city near Allahabad with U.S. help are also illustrative. In the run-up to Bihar elections (October-November 2015), which the BJP lost, a prominent party campaign theme was that it was ideally poised to develop Bihar via foreign investments if it won, because coordination between the state and the centre would be easy. This plank is likely to continue in the crucial upcoming elections in the states of Assam, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. And should the BJP succeed in these states, more foreign investments would be directed towards these regions as carrots both to local elites and international investment partners.

Fifthly, the fact that business interests have been increasing their influence on Indian foreign policy is not new. But Modi’s rise has supported a much larger umbrella of business interests that are driven by two expectations of the government: promoting their overseas operations and inviting foreign businesses to partner in expanding locally through joint ventures. These overtures are also aimed at restoring India’s image as a legitimate place to invest in, reflecting the withdrawal of corporate India’s confidence in the UPA government during its second term and the resultant skittishness on the part of international firms. The lurking concern is of over-expectations leading to foreign policies that promote corporate interests over national ones (or corporate interests as national interests). Modi came to power with the overwhelming confidence of the corporate sector, and his challenge is to sustain this confidence through policies that encourage inclusive growth and reduce bureaucracy – two major stumbling blocks of the past year. The effect of corporate lobbying in New Delhi on both elections and policymaking is still deeply understudied,13 but anecdotal evidence suggests that both national and multinational firms have a greater degree of access to and influence over Indian foreign policy than ever before.

Five domestic challenges to foreign policy coherence

The evolving Indian domestic landscape also brings a set of growing challenges: the gap between India’s aspirations and capabilities, the demands of the new Indian electorate, the role of the opposition, local tensions regarding regional initiatives and the international perception of Hindu nationalist policy.

Firstly, a wide gap remains between India’s rapidly growing aspirations at the international level and its capabilities to support them. The country is not yet invited to great-power diplomacy on many top-level international issues, such as negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme or a political solution to the Syrian crisis. Many Indians increasingly consider these exclusions as slights that show where the country actually stands in terms of power attributes. But as has been noted (e.g. Markey, 2009; Tharoor, 2012), two major problems characterise the current domestic institutional structure responsible for foreign policy: it is understaffed and resistant to initiatives that would scale up India’s global activities. Many Indian Foreign Service officers struggle to grapple with complex, technical issue areas like climate change, but this is less an issue of sophistication than of capacity. While a number of talented individuals are working on trade and negotiations, their capacity is currently far outstripped by India’s rapidly expanding interest in participating in multilateral forums, and further hampered by issues of institutional culture and centralised bureaucracy across the Indian government. Another problem is that of pace: at the top a strong leader can jet-set the world announcing initiatives. On the lower rungs of power his deputies must ensure execution and follow-up. If the volume of work exceeds staff capacity to deliver, the dynamics between the two levels could be marked by friction and other malaises that often plague institutional hierarchies.

The second major challenge of the new domestic landscape is the new Indian electorate. Not much about this evolving social force can be said with any degree of certainty, principally because it is amorphous, but those who claim to have their finger on its pulse figure prominently in political discourse.14 The new Indian electorate is said to be largely young, aspirational, and proud of India’s cultural traditions (especially Hinduism); is to be found in several tiers of upwardly mobile urban India; and is eager to see less politics (read: bureaucracy and corruption) and more governance (read: efficiency). It eschews ascriptive identities such as those of caste and region, and believes instead in a more aggressive nationalism that is consistent with India’s growing economic and cultural stature. While it is unclear to what extent this is a social reality and to what a creation of political discourse, this social force is important because policymakers’ belief in its existence can determine the kinds of moves India makes on the world stage. Perhaps more importantly, it is exactly this group to which Modi’s most ambitious promises are aimed, and if tensions in Ahmedabad among educated middle-class Hindus in the summer of 2015 over a lack of economic and employment opportunities are any indication, it may be the quickest group to turn on Modi, regardless of any cultural promise of a “Power Hinduism” that he offers to demonstrate to the world.

Thirdly, the BJP’s emphatic election victory, its successes in several state elections and its quest for hegemony over Indian politics have alarmed political competitors, includ- ing national parties like the Indian National Congress and regional/state-level parties like the Samajwadi Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Janata Dal (United). From a federalist perspective many avenues are available for resistance, and the experience of the BJP’s first year in office has shown that these parties have both the capacity and the willingness to make relentless attacks on Modi’s foreign policy initiatives, regardless of their individual merits. As in many other countries, the “glass wall” insulating India’s foreign policy decision-making political leadership from its domestically oriented houses of Parliament (the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) has long since shattered and is unlikely to return. Despite minority parties’ small numbers in Parliament, especially in the lower house, their resistance can be effective because these parties can also influence large social forces. As a result, any foreign policy initiative that requires legislative approval – as key economic and strategic proposals do – has been, and will likely continue to be, strongly resisted. Indeed, the government’s ability to initiate reforms at the pace it set for itself has already derailed because of the successful opposition it has faced to, among others, a proposed law on acquiring land for development purposes.

Fourthly and relatedly, the two regions at the centre of Modi’s most ambitious subregional initiatives face numer- ous local challenges. Corruption, warped governance systems favouring local strongmen with little concern for the “national interest” and law-and-order issues all factor into the difficulty of foreign policymaking, regardless of a Delhi mandate. To use the example of the Northeast, entrenched corruption and forbidding distance from Delhi (in both real and conceptual terms) have delayed connectivity projects such as the Imphal-Mandalay bus service, the trilateral highway connecting India and Thailand through Myanmar, and the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project – all highlighted as key regional initiatives to bring trade and development to the area (Downie, 2015). Political rivalries among Northeast states, local resistance to development projects, violent transnational actors operating through Myanmar and Bangladesh, and the more general concern of the securitisation of space in these sensitive areas all restrict the implementation of the Act East policy. Modi was elected as a living example of how one individual can seemingly cut through India’s pervasive bureaucracy and corruption, but it is unlikely that his skills will carry over to other parts of the country while he is prime minister, thus jeopardising the effectiveness of such large-scale initiatives with regional implications.

Finally, while Hindu nationalist elements may not influence particular Indian foreign policy initiatives to a great degree,15 their influence on Indian domestic policies that have international implications may lead to tensions. A growing perception that the government is uncomfortable with leftists of all stripes has been buttressed by action against hundreds of civil society activists and international NGOs that are seen to be opposed to or critical of the government’’s energy, security, development and/or economic policies. This resistance is often couched in terms of these policies’ alleged disrespect for tradition or India’s cultural heritage – as defined by the Modi administration – and has created a limited (but real) chilling effect on some state-state exchanges. For example, a major latent factor in India’s relations with the Islamic world – i.e. India’s Muslim population – has all but disappeared. Opposed to what it calls the politics of appeasement, the BJP is pursuing a politics that is effectively blind to the presence of minorities of any sort, but particularly religious minorities. The implication of this is that the sentiments of India’s vast Muslim population no longer matter in the same way as they once did. The openness with which India has moved on its relations with Israel, with Modi likely to be the first Indian prime minister to visit that country, illustrates how this approach manifests internationally (Roche, 2015). A major challenge for Indian policymakers remains how to accommodate Hindu nationalist actors in foreign policy decision-making and – perhaps more importantly – knowing which sectors are most vulnerable to pressure in this regard. The crackdown on international NGO activities surprised many, and an atmosphere of continued surprises in this regard may continue in the near future. Finally, social and communal relations in India have come under strain in recent months due to acts of violence against minorities and the marginalised by what are called “fringe elements” associated with the regime in New Delhi. While intellectuals and artists have protested against growing violence and intolerance, both they and ordinary critics of the Modi government have been subjected to unsavoury comments from BJP legislators and government ministers. A new low in public discourse and international concern over events in India have caused the image- conscious government in New Delhi to attempt damage control lest these issues drive potential investors away. But given the contradictions within the ruling regime, with one side focused on making the country a Hindu majoritarian polity and the other on economic development through foreign investment, this challenge to India’s foreign policy is likely to remain salient in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

India’s core friction between domestic factors and foreign policy – one representing realities on the ground, the other marked by aspirations to achieving a specifically Indian form of international respect for the country – illustrates the uniqueness of the country’s current foreign policy atmosphere. It is simply a matter of time before this tension is broken by a major crisis of foreign policy, but to predict the nature of such a crisis or the ultimate victors in such a scenario would be presumptive. The report’s intent in offering five new determinants and five future challenges is intended to be more illustrative than comprehensive in scope. What can be stated with certainty is that in light of the greater number of powerful actors looking to influence Indian foreign policy, even Modi’s historic mandate may not be enough to insulate his National Democratic Alliance government from domestic forces – both allies and antagonists – that wish to shape policy. Like the process seen in developed federal democracies such as the U.S., India is transiting to a domestic playing field where even the most minute foreign policy decisions are increasingly on the parliamentary table and groups focusing on particu- lar issues have disproportionate influence on topics that are not of much concern to the general public. The battle between coherence and fragmentation will be an existential challenge to Indian prime ministers both current and future, and domestic actor interest in foreign policy in the future is likely to strongly correlate with India’s growing importance on the international political and economic stages.

*About the authors:
Jason Miklian (PhD, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo specialising in South Asian conflict resolution and regional security, and has published on the media and foreign policy, the Maoist insurgency in India and Nepal, and the political ecologies of war and conflict minerals in South Asia. He has conducted extensive fieldwork in South Asia since 2005, and has written for or been cited in an expert capacity by The New York Times, the BBC, The Economist, Agence France-Presse, Foreign Policy, NRK and The Hindu, among various media outlets.

Atul Mishra (PhD, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) is an assistant professor of international politics at the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India. His work links theory, history, and policy in the context of Indian and South Asian international relations. His writings on state formation in South Asia and aspects of India’s contemporary foreign policy have been published in The Economic and Political Weekly, Studies in Indian Politics, South Asian Survey and Strategic Analysis, while he co-authored the book Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts (Routledge, 2014).

Source:
This article was published by NOREF (PDF)

The content of this publication is presented as is. The stated points of view are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the organisations for which they work or NOREF. NOREF does not
give any warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the content.

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Notes:
1 Most notably Modi’s often-suggested idea that India’s South Asia foreign policy decision-making process be divested to the chief ministerships of those states that physically border each of India’s neighbours.
2 One leading foreign policy analyst sees in the BJP’s victory the beginning of India’s “Third Republic” (Mohan, 2015). For a host of commentators it marks the end of what the influential columnist Shekhar Gupta (2011) would call the “politics of grievances” and the start of the “politics of aspirations”.
3 Appadorai (1981) remains the pioneering work on the subject. See also Andersen (1983) and Varghese (2013).
4 This admittedly vague term encapsulates a wide range of individuals, interest groups, and business and political forces (among others) that attempt to influence
foreign policy decision-making. Unfortunately, this report is unable to undertake a systemic typology of such actors, but instead highlights many that have made
concrete overtures in this space.
5 The authors of course recognise the monumental roles that the rise of coalition politics and economic liberalisation have played as macro shocks affecting Indian
foreign policymaking. However, it is beyond the scope of this report to analyse in depth the specific points of these two well-researched streams.
6 The story of POSCO’s proposed investment demonstrates the challenges that foreign economic policy faces on the Indian domestic front. In 2005 POSCO signed an agreement for a $12 billion steel plant in Odisha. This was to be the largest single foreign direct investment in India and a showpiece for the country’s upscaling vision. The project has been delayed by a decade because of the maze of India’s complex and erratic regulatory framework, environmental concerns, litigation, protests, and competitive politics. At the time of writing the future of the project remains unclear (see also Singh, 2015).
7 For a representative view, see Mohan (2013).
8 This is not to say that the BJP does not experience internal challenges, as the summer 2015 middle-class riots in Ahmedabad illustrated. Ultimately, it is likely that if there is a domestic schism in the BJP that influences foreign policy, it will be related to Modi’s aspirational economic model.
9 BJP (2015). The new term was coined in the BJP’s foreign policy resolution adopted at its Bengaluru National Executive meeting in 2015. That fact that this was its first-ever separate foreign policy resolution attests the importance the party – and by extension the government – attaches to foreign policy.
10 Some have explored Modi’s previous tenure as chief minister of Gujarat as a potential window into how as prime minister he would negotiate the interaction effects that link the local, regional and global, such as the role of prioritising Hinduism in an era of globalisation, urbanisation and liberalisation (Bobbio, 2015; Chatterjee, 2009; 2011), but findings in this regard are still inconclusive and contradictory.
11 In terms of U.S.-Indian relations in particular, Modi also enjoyed the tactical advantage of working with a U.S. administration that was forced to de facto apologise for banning him due to his earlier reported ties to deadly riots while he was chief minister of Gujarat in 2002.
12 However, one could argue that in all other matters (particularly security) New Delhi wishes to maintain a considerable degree of control, particularly with regard to ongoing tensions, riots, and curfews in the region and a number of militant groups still active there.
13 Kochanek (1996) is one of the few resources available, although it is rather dated.
14 The authors argue that this social force overlaps quite substantially with the aspirational “neo-middle class” that the BJP mentioned in its 2014 election manifesto. Also, a virtual sea of books and articles on this topic are likely to appear in short order, in addition to the rich material available from Indian pundits.
15 Although analysts argue that these elements do enjoy disproportionate influence over neighbourhood policy, pointing to India’s inconsistent policies on Nepal and Pakistan as illustrations.

With the recent revelations that a youth was picked up and arrested on the way to a suicide bombing, hundreds of arrests of suspected terrorists have been made, and security is being drastically tightened across Malaysia. What is happening?

In the aftermath of the recent suicide bombing, blamed on ISIS in Jakarta last week, Malaysia is in a panic. Reports are coming out in the media that hundreds of Malaysians are joining the jihad in Syria and Iraq, and the elaborate means through social media young people are being recruited to the cause of Islamic State.

According to a report by the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, there are about 450 Indonesians and Malaysians, including women and children in Iraq and Syria today. Islamic State has a special unit in Syria called Katibah Nusantara that is made up of Indonesian and Malay speaking fighters and their families. There are great fears that members of this group will return to Malaysia to carry out jihadist activities at home within the near future.

This should not be a surprise, as the Islamic narrative within Malaysia has been edging towards a more fundamentalist stance over the last two decades, since UMNO and PAS began competing against each other to show the Malay heartland that they are more Islamic than the other.

According to a recent Pew Research Centre study on attitudes towards ISIS, 12% of Malaysia’s Muslims are supportive of the group.

Islamic State formed out of the remnants of Al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq during the Maliki regime as a consequence of his persecution of the Sunni population. Baathists quickly joined the ranks of ISIS, along with a number of local tribes. Sunnis within Iraq saw ISIS as the lesser of two evils and reluctantly supported them. The leader is ISIS Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi last September gave a sermon in the Great mosque in Mosul declaring a Caliphate across parts of Iraq and Syria, which has been inspiring to many Muslims around the world.

Malaysia had experience with a group with similar aspirations to develop a caliphate back in the 1980s. Al-Arqam was founded by the charismatic Ashaari Mohammad with a vision of developing small village economy and trade. Ashaari advocated a strict but simple sustainable community lifestyle, following the Syariah codes. Instead of blood and warfare Al-Arqam saw trade and Daqwah (spreading the message), as the future of Islam, where the group started a conglomerate of enterprises all over Malaysia, the region, and even in Europe, US, and Australia.

At the time, the Al-Arqam movement had the sympathy and respect of many Malays within the community, including civil servants, members of the armed forces, police, professional people, academics, and even politicians.

However in the early 1990s, Al-Arqam ran afoul of the authorities when Ashaari was rumoured to claim that he could mystically communicate with the Prophet. There was also a rumour that Al-Arqam was planning to topple the Malaysian Government and replace it with a Caliphate, with Ashaari as the Caliph. Rumours also existed that Al-Arqam had a commando training camp in Thailand, although this was denied by the Thai Government at the time.

In September 1994, the former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir banned Al-Arqam and arrested many of the leading group, putting them under ISA. Most went underground and kept their sympathies to themselves. Even up to the Badawi era, there have been attempts by Al-Arqam to make a re-emergence.

In the absence of Al-Arqam, there has been a vacuum in ‘revolutionary’ Islam, to topple existing governments and establish a utopian Islamic state. Al-Arqam had a vision of an Islamic life under a caliphate and now Islamic State has filled this vacuum.

The moderate Malay Muslim demeanour that Malaysia once grounded Malays into the social status quo has long disappeared. There is now outcry about how Malaysian Airlines stewardesses are dressed. The slapstick comical P Ramlee films of yesteryear that reflected Malay society at the time would probably not even pass the Censorship Board today.

Malaysia has become a religiously compliant society, very ritualistic, where non-adherence is frowned upon. Arabness is replacing Malay culture under the assumption that one would be a better Muslim under such a persona. Islam Hadhari was pronounced ‘dead and buried’ along with the demise of former Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and replaced with a look-alike Taliban blend of Islam that wants HUDUD without the Tawhid.

Islam in Malaysia is evolving into a religion of exclusion. Biro Tata Negara (BTN) dogma preached to civil servants and students on scholarship has extended this concept of exclusion, into an ‘us and them’ paradigm, depicted by the concept of ‘Ketuanan Melayu’, which assumes Muslim and non-Muslim are adversaries.

Consequently, Muslims now mix much less with non-Muslims, where joint celebration of non-Muslim festivals like Christmas is frowned upon by authorities. Malay Muslims now believe it is wrong to ‘Salam’ non-Muslims in Arabic. In Kelantan, cashier lines in shops are gender segregated, and halal trolleys proposed in national supermarkets.

We have seen protests against Hindus where cow heads have been displayed, and churches burnt down, without authorities taking much action against the culprits. Authorities have ordered the demolition of a surau because it was used for purposes other than praying in a resort complex. Authorities try to remove anything that may look like a cross, even though there are not religious connections to the structure. Women are being blamed for rape by ‘exposing and flaunting’ their bodies in front of men.

This is a perfect environment for Islamic State philosophy and dogma to breed and fester, rekindling new visions for the Muslim youth of Malaysia.

The strengths of Islamic State lie at multiple levels. First there is the Caliphate, the first in many years, something that many Muslims aspire to. The Caliphate is about living a life within Islam, something extremely important to many Muslims. Then there is the political Islamic State which is repelling the evilness of the world away, which includes all the enemies of Islam. Then there is the Jihadist Islamic State which encapsulates both Islam and bloodthirstiness, a mixture that appeals to many marginalized people, unemployed, lacking self-esteem, and under achieving, become the targets of Islamic State social media.

Islamic State has both a utopian appeal to Muslims and a deranged Jihadist appeal to those who want to achieve martyrdom in a Holy war.

Islamic State’s messages through social media are powerful. They show starving children as victims of war, and the results of US drone strikes, which are designed to form outrage and anger within impressionable young people.
Islam in Malaysia no longer carries the moderation and tolerance it once was. This encourages serious consideration of the Islamic State message.

Malaysia has become institutionally hard-line as well.

This is reflected at an international level as well. Just recently two Israeli participants were banned from competing in an international sporting competition because they were Jews. Hate for the Jewish state Israel has been built up over the Palestinian issue for the last few years. Socially it has been considered a noble thing to go to Gaza and assist the situation by giving humanitarian assistance there. However Hamas is a group that still uses militancy to pursue its ends.

The Malaysian Prime Minister Najib’s trip to the Gaza strip in 2013 was denounced by the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas who said that it “enhances division and does not serve the Palestinian interests”.

The implicit support for Hamas, doesn’t seem any different to supporting Islamic State at the domestic audience level. Young Muslims had been led to believe through Malaysian Government actions and dogma that it is noble to fight for such causes.

So are there any solutions?

Unfortunately for non-Muslim liberals, the solution to the problem is not about advocating a moderate Islam. The remedy can only be seen through Muslim eyes. Non-Muslim concepts of progressive or moderate Islam will be seen as an attempt to ‘Christianize’ Islam, and fall on death ears. Such an approach may even encourage more sympathy for Islamic State. US President Barak Obama himself, with a Muslim father may be seen as an apostate, with no moral authority to talk about Islam.

Malay society needs to follow the expectations that Islam has created within the youth of the country. The authoritarian, feudalistic, corruption, gangsterism, and elite’s hypocrisy to Islam need to be eradicated from Malaysian society. This environment, where the youth are being grounded in Islam is turning them towards other alternatives.

With a weak and unappealing opposition in Malaysia, many have become apathetic of politics and are looking for religious solutions.

There needs to be a national vision for a virtuous society based upon Tawhidic principles, something inclusive for all.
This has to happen for the youth of Malaysia to respect the government and institutions of the country, making the appeal of undertaking jihad to serve Islam less appealing, especially if there are duties of jihad at home to be undertaken.

This doesn’t need any reinterpretation of the Qur’an. The concept of a peaceful Islamic society already exists within the Qur’an and needs to come out without changing the meaning, only the methods. Lectures to school children and university students won’t work if respect for authority is not there. Instead the orthodox Islam that Malaysians are taking up, the message of Islam needs to be framed inward upon the self and then onto what type of society that Malaysians can create here at home.

This is the challenge to the Ulama of today to take up.

It would be easy to speculate here, that the situation should any terrorist acts occur, will lead to the activation of the National Security Council (NSC). This would greatly advantage Prime Minister Najib’s grip on power. False flag operations are a possibility here.

However the situation may be evidently more serious. Anymore overt repression by the government could open a “Pandora’s box” of jihad within Malaysia. These jihadist actions don’t need direction from the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria. They will be domestically inspired and generated.

Until today, most terrorism within the South East Asian Region has been domestically generated, sometimes inspired by movements far away. From this point of view Islamic State is a big wake up call to Malaysia.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 550 points before a surge in buying recovered over half of those losses, ending in a 1.56 percent loss. Meanwhile, oil prices fell to a low not seen since May 2003, with US crude dipping to $27 per barrel.

From an opening of 15,989.45, the Dow never went higher, then closed at 15,766.74, down some 223 points after rallying back from a low of 15,450.

The S&P 500 lost 14 points (0.7 percent) to end at 1,867 after recovering from its lowest level, 1,812.22, since February 2014. The worst performing sector during the day was the energy industry, which fell 4.4 percent, meaning a loss of 14.7 percent since the start of 2016.

The Nasdaq closed at 4,471.69, a drop of just 0.1 percent, after beating back a 145-point loss during the day to end up down just 5.26 points.

The early sell-offs were triggered by record-low oil prices dropping by a further 4 percent, sinking below $27 per barrel, its lowest price since September 2003. Crude oil has become so cheap after the lifting of UN sanctions against Iran because investors expect Iran’s oil exports to add to the current supply glut.

Lower prices for goods may be helpful for some businesses and individuals, but if a drop in overall demand is another factor in prices dropping, then investments will be negatively impacted, further slowing the economy.

Foreign markets had a bad day as well. The Japanese Nikkei index closed at 20 percent lower than its highest point from the past summer, dropping 3.71 percent to 16,416.19.

Drops in both foreign and domestic stock markets are at least partially being blamed on fears over China’s economy.

“The frailty in the Chinese growth remain the core problem for investors and the spotlights are not moving away from it anytime soon,” Naeem Aslam, chief market analyst for the online foreign exchange company Avatrade, said in a statement.

On Tuesday, China showed its lowest rate of growth in a quarter century, posting a Gross Domestic Product of only 6.9 percent growth in 2015.

“This is a serious selloff that is in large part driven by the 70 percent decline in oil prices and concern over the slowing Chinese economy,” said Edward Harrison of RT’s Boom Bust. “The question now is whether a liquidity crisis develops unexpectedly as a result of this and whether there are serious real economy effects. We won’t know for some time. However, we should expect the US Federal Reserve to push back its rate hike stance at a minimum, effectively taking a hike in March off the table.”

Anti-government insurgency groups should immediately stop intentionally targeting civilians, Human Rights Watch said today. The January 20 suicide attack on a minibus in Kabul transporting journalists affiliated with Tolo TV, Afghanistan’s 24-hour news channel, was an atrocity designed to undermine Afghanistan’s still-fragile media freedom.

Both the Taliban and an individual who claims to represent a group that affiliates with the Islamic State have claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed seven journalists from the entertainment channel Tolo TV and its production wing, and injured 25 others, including bystanders. Human Rights Watch is not able to independently corroborate these claims. A Pashto-language Taliban statement described the bombing as “revenge” for alleged “false allegations” against the insurgency group. The statement explicitly listed both Tolo TV and its news channel rival 1TV as “military targets” for allegedly serving as “informational warfare tools of the American and Crusading forces.”

“The targeting of journalists reflects a depraved strategy to make media freedom a casualty of the ongoing conflict,” said Patricia Gossman, senior Afghanistan researcher. “Designating journalists and other civilians as ‘military targets’ does not make them so, and deliberately attacking them constitutes a war crime.”

Tolo TV and 1TV are among the most-watched networks in Afghanistan. They often broadcast heated talk shows, hard-hitting investigative reports, and breaking news from the front lines of the conflict. They are part of a media expansion in Afghanistan that many consider among the country’s major recent achievements. In a December 2014 statement, the Taliban explicitly threatened to attack any journalists seen as supporting “Western values.” That same month, Afghanistan’s chief executive officer, Abdullah Abdullah, pledged decisive action to protect journalists from attack and to prosecute those responsible for such abuses.

Afghan journalists have faced increasing intimidation and violence from both state and non-state figures in recent years. Journalists are vulnerable to threats, intimidation, and violence, particularly in relation to reporting on sensitive issues – including corruption, land grabbing, violence against women, and human rights abuses. Journalists working outside the country’s main cities are especially vulnerable to reprisals from powerful individuals and groups because they lack the protection provided by larger Afghan media organizations and international presence.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups have also used the media as a propaganda platform, and actively court the media in their campaign against the government, including pressuring reporters to cover their statements or not to write articles deemed critical.

“Afghan insurgents should respect the right for journalists to operate without fear for their lives from deliberate targeted attacks,” Gossman said. “So long as insurgents falsely categorize journalists as ‘military targets,’ media freedom in Afghanistan is in peril.”

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

Ever since the Awami League (AL) government of Sheikh Hasina restarted the war crimes trial in Bangladesh as part of its electoral pledges after it assumed power in 2009, most of the top leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami have been convicted, threatening the very survival of the country’s largest Islamist party. In a significant development on January 6, the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty given to Jamaat chief Matiur Rahman Nizami by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)-1 in 2014 for committing heinous crimes, including genocide, rape and orchestrating the killing of leading intellectuals during Bangladesh’s war of independence against Pakistan.

The apex court’s Appellate Division dismissed the 73 year-old fundamentalist leader’s appeal against the ICT-1 judgment. Nizami was sentenced to death by the tribunal on October 29, 2014 for his direct involvement in the killings of 450 people and rapes of at least 30 women in four villages of his native Pabna district during the 1971 war. The ICT-1 noted in its verdict that death would be “the only fitting punishment” for the horrendous crimes he had committed.

The misdeeds of notorious war criminal Nizami are known across Bangladesh and the confirmation of his death penalty triggered jubilation among the people. Attorney General Mahbubey Alam expressed satisfaction with the verdict, while the Jamaat reacted strongly to the judgment calling a nationwide strike the next day. The Jamaat, a key ally of major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has slammed the war crimes tribunal as a politically-designed campaign to destroy the party leadership through farce trials. The Jamaat violently resisted the Bengali’s struggle for independence and dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 but the party denies committing atrocities.

It may be added that Nizami is already on the death row for his dubious role as industries minister in the 2004 Chittagong arms haul case. On January 30, 2014, Chittagong’s Metropolitan Special Tribunal-1 awarded death penalty to 14 people, including Nizami for trying to facilitate smuggling in arms across the border. On April 2, 2004, the Bangladesh security forces seized huge arms and ammunition from two vessels at the jetty of Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Ltd. under the Ministry of Industries headed by Nizami. The seizure generated furore in Bangladesh and neighbouring India when it was discovered that the weapons were meant for the separatist United Liberation Front of Asom active in North Eastern state of Assam.

After Ghulam Azam, Jamaat’s prime ideologue in erstwhile East Pakistan, Nizami was one of the most important leaders of the anti-liberation forces that had unleashed a reign of terror throughout the country to prevent Pakistan’s break up. According to the prosecution, Nizami as the supreme commander of the ruthless pro-Pakistani militia- Al-Badr – had been engaged in the planning and execution of the murders of hundreds of freedom fighters, including students, teachers, journalists, cultural activists and other professionals during the nine month-long Liberation War in 1971.

The tribunal held Al-Badr responsible for abduction, torture and killing of about 200 intellectuals who had supported the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971. Many of martyred intellectuals constituted the bedrock of Bengali nationalism which emphasised secular values and ideas over rigid interpretation of Islam. The Pakistani collaborators launched the extermination campaigns at the fag end of the war in their attempts to make the new Bengali nation brainless. The irreparable loss of the leading intellectuals in 1971 still torments the Bangladeshis.
In 1971, Nizami was the president of the Islami Chhatro Shongho, the then student wing of Jamaat that mainly provided cadres to the armed groups opposed to the liberation of Bangladesh. The tribunal verdict mentioned that Nizami had also played pivotal roles in forming and running anti-liberation forces like Razakar Bahini and Peace Committee—both trained and armed by the Pakistan Army to suppress the Bengali rebellion.

Many top Jamaat leaders are subject to public derision for their treacherous acts in Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. The trial of the collaborators and war criminals has always been a popular demand in the country. So far, more than 10 leaders of the Jamaat have either been convicted or lodged in jail facing trial. Among them, three leaders— assistant secretary general Abdul Quader Mollah, Central Executive Council (CEC) member Qamaruzzaman and secretary general Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojahid were executed.

Mollah was the first war crimes convict to be executed on December 12, 2013 and thereafter Qamaruzzaman was hanged on April 11, 2015. Mojahid, a close political associate of Nizami, was executed along with former BNP minister Salauddin Quader Choudhury on November 22, 2015. Former Jamaat chief Ghulam Azam, was given life term considering his old age and ill health, subsequently died in prison on October 23, 2014. Earlier on February 9 in the same year, senior Jamaat leader AKM Yusuf, the alleged founder of the Razakar and architect of the infamous Dakra massacre, died in the prison before the conclusion of his trial.

Another CEC member of Jamaat and a prominent business tycoon of Bangladesh, Mir Quasem Ali appealed in the Supreme Court challenging the death sentence awarded to him by the ICT-2 on November 2, 2014. The court set February 2 as the date for ruling on this influential fundamentalist leader. Nizami’s was the sixth appeal in the war crimes cases to witness final verdict. Except in the case of Sayedee, whose death penalty was commuted to life sentence, the apex court rejected all other previous review petitions of the war crimes convicts paving way for their execution.

The government could hang Nizami within months unless the apex court reviews its own ruling, or he gets presidential pardon which is unlikely. Bangladesh’s Law Minster Anisul Huq assured of quick disposal of Nizami’s review petition—the only legal barrier for sending him to the gallows. Nizami fled Bangladesh immediately after Pakistan’s ignominious defeat in the 1971 war and returned to the country only after Ziaur Rahman’s military junta decided to rehabilitate the anti-liberation groups in the polity to consolidate his position.

Nizami is a major beneficiary of the prolonged military rule and had a smooth political career after his return to Bangladesh. He was made Jamaat’s assistant secretary general in 1983 and then elevated to secretary general in 1988. He was elected to the Parliament twice—1991 and 2001. Nizami succeeded Azam as the party chief in 2000. He also served as the agriculture minister from 2001 to 2003 and then as the industries minister until 2006 in the BNP-Jamaat coalition government headed by Khaleda Zia.

However, making noted war criminal-turned politician like Nizami a cabinet minister and his movement across the country in government cars sporting the national flag of Bangladesh, whose emergence as an independent Bengali nation he had opposed vehemently more than four decades back, infuriated the people further. The ICT-1 observed in its verdict that Nizami’s appointment as minister was “disgraceful for the nation as a whole”.

The country’s highest court delivered the verdict against the backdrop of growing Islamist violence and religious intolerance in Bangladesh in the last few months. The court ruling on Nizami and the recent executions of Salauddin and Mojahid are likely to aggravate the hostility between the secular-nationalist groups and the religious fanatics and sharpen the ideological cleavage in otherwise a homogenous nation. The international community expressed concern over the trial process which has resulted in further polarisation of the Bangladeshi society and resurgence of religious extremism.

The AL government insists that the trial of war criminals is a historic necessity to bring justice to the three million martyrs and two lakh (200,000) women who sacrificed their chastity for the liberation of the Bangladesh. The Hasina government’s firm resolve to continue the war crimes trial even in the face of international criticism could change the political dynamics of Bangladesh in the coming days.

The Jamaat, which has already been deregistered as political party by the Election Commission, will be more marginalised in the polity once the court rulings are implemented. In such a likely scenario, the party leadership may vent its frustration by patronising the jihadi elements that are determined to annihilate all the liberal and rationalist thinkers of Bangladesh. It remains to be seen how Prime Minister Hasina steers the country out of trouble in 2016.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent political analyst with a specific focus on Bangladesh. He can be reached at: editor@spsindia.in

Caltech researchers have found evidence of a giant planet tracing a bizarre, highly elongated orbit in the outer solar system. The object, which the researchers have nicknamed Planet Nine, has a mass about 10 times that of Earth and orbits about 20 times farther from the sun on average than does Neptune (which orbits the sun at an average distance of 2.8 billion miles). In fact, it would take this new planet between 10,000 and 20,000 years to make just one full orbit around the sun.

The researchers, Konstantin Batygin and Mike Brown, discovered the planet’s existence through mathematical modeling and computer simulations but have not yet observed the object directly.

“This would be a real ninth planet,” said Brown, the Richard and Barbara Rosenberg Professor of Planetary Astronomy. “There have only been two true planets discovered since ancient times, and this would be a third. It’s a pretty substantial chunk of our solar system that’s still out there to be found, which is pretty exciting.”

Brown notes that the putative ninth planet–at 5,000 times the mass of Pluto–is sufficiently large that there should be no debate about whether it is a true planet. Unlike the class of smaller objects now known as dwarf planets, Planet Nine gravitationally dominates its neighborhood of the solar system. In fact, it dominates a region larger than any of the other known planets–a fact that Brown said makes it “the most planet-y of the planets in the whole solar system.”

Batygin and Brown describe their work in the current issue of the Astronomical Journal and show how Planet Nine helps explain a number of mysterious features of the field of icy objects and debris beyond Neptune known as the Kuiper Belt.

“Although we were initially quite skeptical that this planet could exist, as we continued to investigate its orbit and what it would mean for the outer solar system, we become increasingly convinced that it is out there,” said Batygin, an assistant professor of planetary science. “For the first time in over 150 years, there is solid evidence that the solar system’s planetary census is incomplete.”

The road to the theoretical discovery was not straightforward. In 2014, a former postdoc of Brown’s, Chad Trujillo, and his colleague Scott Sheppard published a paper noting that 13 of the most distant objects in the Kuiper Belt are similar with respect to an obscure orbital feature. To explain that similarity, they suggested the possible presence of a small planet. Brown thought the planet solution was unlikely, but his interest was piqued.

He took the problem down the hall to Batygin, and the two started what became a year-and-a-half-long collaboration to investigate the distant objects. As an observer and a theorist, respectively, the researchers approached the work from very different perspectives–Brown as someone who looks at the sky and tries to anchor everything in the context of what can be seen, and Batygin as someone who puts himself within the context of dynamics, considering how things might work from a physics standpoint. Those differences allowed the researchers to challenge each other’s ideas and to consider new possibilities.

“I would bring in some of these observational aspects; he would come back with arguments from theory, and we would push each other. I don’t think the discovery would have happened without that back and forth,” said Brown. ” It was perhaps the most fun year of working on a problem in the solar system that I’ve ever had.”

Fairly quickly Batygin and Brown realized that the six most distant objects from Trujillo and Shepherd’s original collection all follow elliptical orbits that point in the same direction in physical space. That is particularly surprising because the outermost points of their orbits move around the solar system, and they travel at different rates.

“It’s almost like having six hands on a clock all moving at different rates, and when you happen to look up, they’re all in exactly the same place,” said Brown. The odds of having that happen are something like 1 in 100, he says. But on top of that, the orbits of the six objects are also all tilted in the same way–pointing about 30 degrees downward in the same direction relative to the plane of the eight known planets. The probability of that happening is about 0.007 percent. “Basically it shouldn’t happen randomly,” Brown said. “So we thought something else must be shaping these orbits.”

The first possibility they investigated was that perhaps there are enough distant Kuiper Belt objects–some of which have not yet been discovered–to exert the gravity needed to keep that subpopulation clustered together. The researchers quickly ruled this out when it turned out that such a scenario would require the Kuiper Belt to have about 100 times the mass it has today.

That left them with the idea of a planet. Their first instinct was to run simulations involving a planet in a distant orbit that encircled the orbits of the six Kuiper Belt objects, acting like a giant lasso to wrangle them into their alignment. Batygin says that almost works but does not provide the observed eccentricities precisely. “Close, but no cigar,” he says.

Then, effectively by accident, Batygin and Brown noticed that if they ran their simulations with a massive planet in an anti-aligned orbit–an orbit in which the planet’s closest approach to the sun, or perihelion, is 180 degrees across from the perihelion of all the other objects and known planets–the distant Kuiper Belt objects in the simulation assumed the alignment that is actually observed.

“Your natural response is ‘This orbital geometry can’t be right. This can’t be stable over the long term because, after all, this would cause the planet and these objects to meet and eventually collide,'” says Batygin. But through a mechanism known as mean-motion resonance, the anti-aligned orbit of the ninth planet actually prevents the Kuiper Belt objects from colliding with it and keeps them aligned. As orbiting objects approach each other they exchange energy. So, for example, for every four orbits Planet Nine makes, a distant Kuiper Belt object might complete nine orbits. They never collide. Instead, like a parent maintaining the arc of a child on a swing with periodic pushes, Planet Nine nudges the orbits of distant Kuiper Belt objects such that their configuration with relation to the planet is preserved.

“Still, I was very skeptical,” said Batygin. “I had never seen anything like this in celestial mechanics.”

But little by little, as the researchers investigated additional features and consequences of the model, they became persuaded. “A good theory should not only explain things that you set out to explain. It should hopefully explain things that you didn’t set out to explain and make predictions that are testable,” said Batygin.

And indeed Planet Nine’s existence helps explain more than just the alignment of the distant Kuiper Belt objects. It also provides an explanation for the mysterious orbits that two of them trace. The first of those objects, dubbed Sedna, was discovered by Brown in 2003. Unlike standard-variety Kuiper Belt objects, which get gravitationally “kicked out” by Neptune and then return back to it, Sedna never gets very close to Neptune. A second object like Sedna, known as 2012 VP113, was announced by Trujillo and Shepherd in 2014. Batygin and Brown found that the presence of Planet Nine in its proposed orbit naturally produces Sedna-like objects by taking a standard Kuiper Belt object and slowly pulling it away into an orbit less connected to Neptune.

But the real kicker for the researchers was the fact that their simulations also predicted that there would be objects in the Kuiper Belt on orbits inclined perpendicularly to the plane of the planets. Batygin kept finding evidence for these in his simulations and took them to Brown.

“Suddenly I realized there are objects like that,” recalled Brown. In the last three years, observers have identified four objects tracing orbits roughly along one perpendicular line from Neptune and one object along another. “We plotted up the positions of those objects and their orbits, and they matched the simulations exactly,” said Brown. “When we found that, my jaw sort of hit the floor.”

“When the simulation aligned the distant Kuiper Belt objects and created objects like Sedna, we thought this is kind of awesome–you kill two birds with one stone,” said Batygin. “But with the existence of the planet also explaining these perpendicular orbits, not only do you kill two birds, you also take down a bird that you didn’t realize was sitting in a nearby tree.”

Where did Planet Nine come from and how did it end up in the outer solar system? Scientists have long believed that the early solar system began with four planetary cores that went on to grab all of the gas around them, forming the four gas planets–Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. Over time, collisions and ejections shaped them and moved them out to their present locations. “But there is no reason that there could not have been five cores, rather than four,” said Brown. Planet Nine could represent that fifth core, and if it got too close to Jupiter or Saturn, it could have been ejected into its distant, eccentric orbit.

Batygin and Brown continue to refine their simulations and learn more about the planet’s orbit and its influence on the distant solar system. Meanwhile, Brown and other colleagues have begun searching the skies for Planet Nine. Only the planet’s rough orbit is known, not the precise location of the planet on that elliptical path. If the planet happens to be close to its perihelion, Brown says, astronomers should be able to spot it in images captured by previous surveys. If it is in the most distant part of its orbit, the world’s largest telescopes–such as the twin 10-meter telescopes at the W. M. Keck Observatory and the Subaru Telescope, all on Mauna Kea in Hawaii–will be needed to see it. If, however, Planet Nine is now located anywhere in between, many telescopes have a shot at finding it.

“I would love to find it,” said Brown. “But I’d also be perfectly happy if someone else found it. That is why we’re publishing this paper. We hope that other people are going to get inspired and start searching.”

In terms of understanding more about the solar system’s context in the rest of the universe, Batygin says that in a couple of ways, this ninth planet that seems like such an oddball to us would actually make our solar system more similar to the other planetary systems that astronomers are finding around other stars. First, most of the planets around other sunlike stars have no single orbital range–that is, some orbit extremely close to their host stars while others follow exceptionally distant orbits. Second, the most common planets around other stars range between 1 and 10 Earth-masses.

“One of the most startling discoveries about other planetary systems has been that the most common type of planet out there has a mass between that of Earth and that of Neptune,” said Batygin. “Until now, we’ve thought that the solar system was lacking in this most common type of planet. Maybe we’re more normal after all.”

Brown, well known for the significant role he played in the demotion of Pluto from a planet to a dwarf planet adds, “All those people who are mad that Pluto is no longer a planet can be thrilled to know that there is a real planet out there still to be found,” he said. “Now we can go and find this planet and make the solar system have nine planets once again.”