Karma for United Airlines – share prices down and down and down, from US$700 million loss in a day to US$1.4 billion the next. This will continue. But there is a lesson here. Capitalism and its arrogance. Corporate capitalism and its treatment towards customers, in a cut-throat airline competition.

And the good Vietnamese-born doctor dragged away bloodied will sue big-time. Bravo. The world is cheering. The Internet has won again. A General Lafayette aiding George Washington in that Revolutionary War.

In the United Airlines Corporate Bulls**t and Karma story, there is a lesson for Malaysia as well. This country is known for its politeness but of late corporate and political culture is evolving towards bulls**t.

Malaysian customers too can do it, too. Whether you’re an airline or a cable TV company or a cellular communications company, you do the dance of your corporate bulls**t, public anger, with the help of social media can bring you down.

Whether you are giants like Malaysia Airlines, AirAsia, or any new airlines with strange and humiliating interview techniques, or whether you’re Astro or Celcom or Maxis or any company that takes people’s money and do not deliver quality, public anger can imitate the global reaction we are seeing with United Airlines. I hope these Malaysian companies are doing the right thing in keeping the customers happy.

So, companies must behave and refrain from exercising policies amounting to corporate bulls**t. I hope Malaysian companies such as those continue to behave well while laughing their way daily to the bank.

Even companies allying themselves with allegedly lousy and money-laundering politicians ought to be shamed and exposed of their unholy alliances, so that it is easy for the public, local and global, to also punish them for their corporate bullshit. Let the public decide the nature of karma. Corporate karma.

Lessons for politicians as well

Though BS is your ammo, the public must be appeased, especially in the age of trolls and anyone with a cellphone is a citizen journalist. It’s the age of boycotts going viral and corporations that BS should be careful with their ethics of enterprise-sustainability.

Politicians are always a target of citizen anger, because they had promised to deliver when they were begging for votes. Yet when they have won and have held power for endless number of years, they become arrogant and thieves, suing race and religion to rationalise their moves and motives.

And herein lie the power of the Internet trollers. The storm-bringers of the political world. The case of the leader of a major Islamic party getting trolled, and cartoonised, and humiliated in cyberspace is an example of public anger over a religious issue that is plagued with arrogance. The case of the tabling of the amendments to Act 355.

The case of unholy alliances that is framed in the language of religion and the need to have an Islamic state even though Islam does not require nations to have such a state. Islam is a personal religion that help develop the self into a kingdom of peace – not a cultural-religious ideology used by a party to insist on a system of demagoguery that belittles other religious beliefs. That is not Islam. That is a grand slam of a medieval ideology.

In the end, what Malaysia is seeing is a state of chaos and of double-dealings and triple lyings of Malay-Muslim political parties playing up each other. In the end the game is all the same – political bulls**t to the max.

The Internet as monster

The cybernetic world is precarious and brutal when it comes to addressing public anger. And no one controls the Internet. Technology will always be the winner. We have been seeing numerous cases in Malaysia wherein companies are brought down, politicians shredded to pieces, and issues of human right violations exposed for the world to see – all these by the power of the Internet and the ease of employment and deployment of social media.

Karl Marx, the social historian, said whoever owns the means of production, owns the means of changing social relations of production and consciousness as well. Today we are all owners of the means of production called free speech enabled by our personalising and ‘personacratic technology’ called the cellphone.

We are all part of the whole. In the case of fighting against corporate bulls**t and politicians with BS attitude, we are all members of the new resistance movement – the army of that is also raging. Rage against the machine, A new Luddite. A new force. To bring down capitalism’s glorified bullsh**ters.

And the biggest winner, still is the Internet. That Frankenstein of a monster roaming in cyberspace.

I hope the good doctor David Dao is feeling better. I hope it is not a case of racial profiling at the height of Trumpism. But fly not United Airlines until its corporate bullshit is grounded and buried!

Notwithstanding fierce challenges made by world’s top two economic leaders, the Trump – Xi Jinping summit has set the dust of uncertainty and agreed to handle the wide differences between the two economic superpowers through dialogue time to time. This qualified for a good beginning. While Trump was seen exasperated with wide trade deficit, Xi Jinping acted as settler, agreeing to 100-day plan for trade negotiations to increase US export to China. Little parleys were made on Trump’s protectionism and Xi Jinping’s new leadership for globalization, challenging protectionism.

For India, the summit was much ado than imparting impact. At dinner in Mar-a-Lago, Trump joked, he had “ gotten nothing” from the talks with Xi. The only important outcome of the talks was a proposal from China on how to restructure high level dialogue. Till the formula for high dialogue is made, it is naïve to assess the impact on India. However, it is unlikely that a dramatic outcome will stem from the future dialogue between the two countries.

Given the two global leader’s opposite approach to the global economic development , it is important to analyze the impact on India in terms of trade and investment relations between India and the two countries and the repercussion of the relations between USA and China.

While Trump’s penchant towards protectionism will impart a different types of impact on India, given the nature of economic relation between the two countries, the impact of Chinese globalization approach will have different riders on Indian economy. While India’s economic relation with USA is polarized on trade, investment and export of Indian IT talents, economic relation with China is more linked to trade only.

It is unlikely that bilaterally the new trade deal between USA and China will have major impact on the economic relations. China is unlikely to open its door for USA goods benevolently and Trump’s threat to impose higher duty on Chinese goods (45 percent poll commitment) will remain a distant bully in the wake of WTO violation. Presumably, the new trade talks will find some palatable recourse to dilute the tension over wide trade deficit between the two countries.

China has been loosing the power of low cost global workshop in the wake of Yuan appreciation. This means an automatic curb on import of Chinese goods. This will help in counter-balancing the trade deficit. In addition, China has been losing the potential for foreign investment because of high cost manufacturing. This will mount up curb on imports of Chinese goods , manufactured by American investors in China.

Given the absence of any hyper US – China new trade talks, which means a marked deviation from Obama administration, impact on India will be minimal. India’s model of growth is a mix of protectionism and globalization. It is neither export base economy, nor susceptible to globalization. Its growth is polarized on domestic demand and domestic resources.

Owing to these, India’s growth is insulated from US protectionism and China’s reining global economic power.

Protectionism presumably means inclusive growth. Modi’s Make in India is a fine tune of inclusive growth. His main aim for Make in India initiative is to increase employment opportunities with widespread manufacturing activities in the country and alleviate poverty. Therefore, any major attempt by Trump to infuse protectionism may have slender impact on India.

To propel up America First, Trump pledged slashing of corporate tax to 15-20 percent from 35 percent and lure the American investors to come back to USA. To fuel up America’s manufacturing muscles, President Trump went one step ahead of Modi to propel up inclusive growth . He scrapped TPP and discouraged free trade deals. He followed carrot and stick policies to bring back American investment in USA. He warned for border tax on cheap American products made in Mexico.

Therefore, while Trump is on the move to make America great by pursuing inclusive growth through protectionism, Modi orchestrated Make in India initiative, reposing confidence on big domestic demand. In these perspectives, there are little chances for India to be impacted by Trump protectionism.

China plans OBOR ( One Belt One Road) to regain its export base economic power through globalization. With the world export slumped, China’s manufacturing sectors have been facing over-capacity since 2006. OBOR is the new initiative of Chinese leaders to find new markets in Central Europe, South Asia and its neighboring countries. It includes two components – Silk Road Economic Component and 21 Century Maritime Link, covering 55 percent of global GDP, 70 percent of global population and 75 percent of energy . The investments will include 300 projects, extending from Singapore to Turkmenistan.

With Trump abandoning USA’s participation in TPP, which means downfall of world’s biggest trade block in terms of value, China holds the advantages to be the leader for globalization.

India is wary on China’s OBOR. Its concern is China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor, which is a part of OBOR. Given the China’s closeness to Pakistan and its attempt to win the global leadership through OBOR, which will influence India’s neighbor, challenges are thrown to India to increase hobnob with Bangladesh and Myanmar – a new shift to India’s foreign policy with its neighbor after Modi-led BJP government came in power in 2014.

India will be cautious to join OBOR, as this can help China only for its globalization. In this perspectives, China’s attempt for globalization may prove bane to India.

The truth of the matter is that Trump’s protectionism may prove boon to India. Scrapping of USA’s membership of TPP is a case in point. India is not a member of TPP. Concerns were looming large over India’s trade with USA , since USA accounts for a big share of India’s global export ( 14 percent). Textile was the biggest threat for India’s trade diversion. It is the single major item of India’s world export and USA accounts for 40 percent of India’s total export of textiles. Vietnam would have been the most beneficiary and unleashed tough competition to India’s export of textiles in USA in TPP. With USA leaving TPP, a new lease of life was given to India’s trade with USA.

The charm for growth by globalization has ebbed. The Economist said “the world is loosing the taste of global business”. Success of growth based on inclusive growth usher in a new role for India in global growth. In other words, India is to reap the benefits in the vortex of protectionism and globalization.

( Views are personal)

By Deepak Sinha

There has been a substantial amount of heat and dust raised over the intemperate actions of the Chinese in the South China Sea and President Trump’s aggressive posturing prior to President Xi Jinping visit to America including the threat of unilateral action against North Korea.

Despite this, one thing is fairly obvious that there is little likelihood of any military confrontation in the region involving either the United States or China. Posturing is all that the United States can afford to indulge in and the reasons for that are obvious. For one, whether the Pentagon admits it or not, the US Military is war- weary having been continuously engaged in conflict for over a decade and a half, in the Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan with little to show for its efforts and every likelihood of being unable to fully disengage because of the continuing instability in those regions.

There is an apparent confluence of interests discernable in the Indo-US relationship as India finds itself increasingly restricted to its own neighbourhood by the stranglehold that China has been able to fashion.

Added to this is the aggressive intent shown by Russia to change the existing status quo in the geo-political scheme of things, both in Europe and the Middle East, which is keeping the Western Powers on tenterhooks and looks to be heading towards Cold War 2.0. Finally, as important a factor, if not more so, is the necessity for America and China to work in closely in tandem given the manner in which their economies are so tightly entwined.

A Brexit like situation is the last thing either of these nations need at this stage just as they have started to tentatively recover following the economic downturn of the very recent past.

It stands to reason then that the United States, while conceding space to China in Asia, will attempt to protect its core interests and contain China in the region through proxies, mainly with the assistance of its Allies there, among which India is emerging as an extremely important one.

There is an apparent confluence of interests discernable in the Indo-US relationship as India finds itself increasingly restricted to its own neighbourhood by the stranglehold that China has been able to fashion. Examples of this are its unequivocal opposition to India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the assistance it is providing Pakistan in enhancing its military capabilities, including the very real possibility of leasing it a nuclear powered submarine in the not too distant future. Its commitment to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that passes through parts of “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” that India claims as its own integral territory and the development of a strategic naval facility at Gwadar where it will station 3000 Marines also cannot but add to Indian insecurities.

The Sino-Indian relationship is marred to a large extent by China’s inability to accept the rise of another power in Asia.

In addition, even within the Indian Ocean Region, which India considers its backyard, it finds itself hemmed in by the “string of pearls” and the Maritime Silk Road policies that China is so aggressively and adeptly pursuing in an attempt to woo Myanmar, Bangladesh, Srilanka and the Maldives by providing them vast amounts of economic aid.

The Sino-Indian relationship is marred to a large extent by China’s inability to accept the rise of another power in Asia. From Confucian times they have always believed that no legitimate international order can rest on the formal co-equality of sovereigns and therefore refuse to accept any other nation as an equal and will do all in their power, preferably without having to resort to violent conflict, to become the dominant power in that region. While they may be ambitious enough to want to pull down the United States from its position of the sole super power, they are hard headed enough to realize that is beyond their capability for the next few decades. However, they are unwilling to countenance the rise of any other power in Asia.

There is also a competitive facet to this relationship as both countries compete to corner natural resources and markets in their attempts to pull their vast populations out of poverty and join the developed world.

Finally, the relationship has been greatly aggravated by the on- going border dispute that has remained unresolved ever since the occupation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China in 1949-50. It resulted in the border war of 1962 that India lost, consequences of which continue to haunt the Indian psyche and the security establishment even to this day.

It is China’s inherent fear of losing control over Tibet. Their occupation of Tibet is questionable given the levels of protests by the ethnic Tibetans in the region over the years, even to this day.

However, despite lack of any apparent progress in talks that have lasted over three decades, regular cross-border intrusions and even the odd confrontation, the border continues to remain relatively quiet and peaceful. This is a far cry from the situation that India faces along its disputed boundary with Pakistan in Kashmir, where cross-border artillery duels, terrorist infiltrations into Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan and attacks on Border Posts are a routine feature.

While all these factors are a cause for worry, they can be mitigated or resolved if suitable impetus and focus is given to the subject by the political leadership on either side. The real flashpoint that may lead to another conflict and is the probable reason for Chinese antipathy towards India, however, is an issue that continues to be shrouded in the background. It is its inherent fear of losing control over Tibet. Their occupation of Tibet is questionable given the levels of protests by the ethnic Tibetans in the region over the years, even to this day.

The Chinese Government insists that they do not accept the McMahon Line as the Sino-Indian border and continue to stake their claim line in Arunachal Pradesh…

The civil disturbances of 2008, which required the induction of two divisions to pacify the restive population of just Lhasa and its environs, are still quite fresh in the minds of the Chinese leadership. That they have been unable to pacify Tibet despite more than 75 years of punitive action against them, involving torture and murder of protestors as well as an ongoing attempt to transform the demography of the region by pushing in millions of Han settlers.

The governing elite is firmly of the opinion that Tibetan opposition to Chinese occupation has been sustained through the overwhelming influence that His Holiness, The Dalai Lama, continues to wield despite living in exile in India for nearly six decades. This they believe would not have been possible without complicity on the part of the Indian Government.

Recently, in an unprecedented move, Mr. Dai Bingguo, a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China and State Councilor, who had represented China in 15 rounds of talks with India on the border question till his retirement in 2013, has suggested a methodology to resolve the border issue. In an interview to a Chinese magazine he has suggested that if India ceded the Tawang region in Arunachal Pradesh, China would reciprocate by giving up its claim over Aksai Chin to solve the border dispute between both countries. For such a statement to be made by an experienced diplomat and politician of his stature, without official patronage is improbable and unlikely and thus needs to be given serious consideration, especially given its timing.

This commentary originally appeared in Indian Defence Review.

Some 5,000 EU nationals are currently fighting in Syria among the ranks of Islamic State and other jihadist groups, according to a senior Syrian official, who warns it’ll be a disaster for European security if these militants are allowed to return, RT reports.

“We have statistics that about five thousand terrorists fighting in Syria have come from the EU countries,” Syria’s Deputy Minister of Expatriates and Foreign Affairs Ayman Susan told Sputnik on Thursday.

“Imagine that these 5,000 terrorists will return to Europe … they can do it,” the diplomat warned. “This will be a disaster for the security and stability of European countries and their populations.”

The EU has for years been well aware of the threat posed by European Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) fighters and others who are returning from combat zones of the so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

Ever since the outbreak of the Syrian war, European capitals have tried to curb domestic extremists from going into the conflict zones and have applied pressure on transit countries, particularly Turkey, to stop the traffic.

Just on Wednesday, April 12, Turkey managed to detain 43 foreign nationals who reportedly tried to illegally cross the border into Syria, Anadolu reported. The group, which included 23 minors, was detained by security forces in Turkey’s southern Kilis province.

Most of the foreign nationals who arrive to fight for the extremists are lured through carefully designed social media campaigns and attractive financial benefits that the terrorists promise their recruits. The majority of EU nationals fighting in Syria and Iraq come from immigrant backgrounds in their respective EU countries who find it difficult to assimilate into European society.

“The main concern reported by EU Member States continues to be jihadist terrorism and the closely related phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, traveling to and from conflict zones,” Europol noted.

A growing number of those who join the jihadist cause are women, while some European capitals have raised concerns about fighters making it back into Europe disguised as refugees.

“A significant percentage of all foreign terrorist travelers in Syria/ Iraq are now female,” Europol said in their European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016.

Europol also warned that as foreign fighters continue to return so is the threat of the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.

“The phenomenon of individuals travelling for terrorist purposes to conflict zones increases the risk that expertise in the use of chemical weapons can be transferred to the European Union by returning foreign terrorist fighters,” the agency said.

While it is believed that the number of foreign fighters diminished throughout the course of Russian and American anti-ISIS campaigns, the US-based Soufan Group analytical center indicates that around 1,800 individuals had left France to join the fighting as of October 2015.

Another 760 fighters traveled to IS battlegrounds from the United Kingdom and 760 from Germany. At least 470 fighters came from Belgium. When the contribution from other EU states is considered, the total number of EU jihadist soldiers is way over 5,000.

The Dutch-based International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), said in their last year’s report that more than 4,200 foreign fighters from EU Member States are now fighting in Syria and Iraq. The NGO believes that around 30 percent have returned to their home countries.

Rise of right-wing populism in Europe, fear of refugees, Erdoğan’s post-coup embrace raise Putin’s international standing.

By Dilip Hiro*

Political and economic developments in the European Union, Turkey and Russia are cumulatively aiding Russian President Vladimir Putin to become an ascending star in the international firmament. In an unexpected twist, the supporting actor in this dramatic ascent is Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a former staunch critic of the Kremlin in the Syrian civil war who is now aligned with Putin in hostility towards the EU.

The rise of rightwing populism in the EU – Brexit, improved performance by Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the 15 March Dutch general election, and the lead position of the National Front’s Marine Le Pen in French opinion polls – is a contributory element. Another is the refugee crisis which has widened the base of Europe’s rightwing parties. Though less severe now than in 2015, the present quiescent state of the refugee crisis depends on Erdoğan’s good will. By closing Turkish borders with neighboring Greece, he drastically reduced the refugee influx into the EU. Equally, he could reverse his decision and revive the crisis.

At home, Erdoğan is keen to turn himself into a modern-day sultan. After aborting an attempted military coup on 15 July, he declared a state of emergency and unleashed a massive crackdown on political opponents. This led to the purging of almost 100,000 employees in state institutions and the arrest of 40,000, including judges, senior civil servants, academics, journalists, and police and military officers.

After corralling the parliament to amend the constitution to replace parliamentary democracy with an executive presidency, he has urged voters to endorse the radical change in the April 16 referendum, arguing it is needed to avoid fragile coalition governments of the past and to give Turkey stability in order to meet security challenges in the future. His opponents fear an authoritarian, one-man rule by Erdoğan.

His actions have unnerved Western leaders.  By contrast, the Kremlin welcomes these in the context of an astonishing turnaround in relations with Ankara.

Following Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet fighter in its airspace on November 15, 2015, Moscow imposed stiff economic sanctions on Ankara. As a result, annual bilateral trade plummeted from $38 billion to about $17 billion.

But in the aftermath of the attempted coup, Putin made a congratulatory call to Erdoğan. Three weeks later, Erdoğan met Putin in St. Petersburg and thanked him publicly, saying that his call “meant a lot psychologically.” Putin announced that Russian trade sanctions on Turkey would be lifted step by step.

On the other side, Erdoğan was angered by EU and US criticism over his crackdown on educational institutions, the judiciary and the media, including the jailing of 152 journalists. His Russia visit in August alarmed Western capitals. Since then, from the Western viewpoint, a stream of negative news, including two more meetings for the Turkish and Russian presidents, has continued.

After his talks with Putin in the Kremlin on March 10, Erdoğan declared that alliances like NATO or allies that ignore Turkey’s interests did not have the right to question what Turkey does to protect itself. He added that no one has the right to object to Ankara’s measures in Syria or current negotiations with Russia on the purchase of an advanced S-400 anti-missile defense system. Erdoğan indicated that his latest meeting with Putin had created an environment for facilitating further security cooperation with Moscow as well as in economic and military sectors.

During his first presidency, 2000 to 2004, Putin urged the United States and other leading Western nations not to expand NATO eastward. His plea fell on deaf ears. In March 2004, NATO membership increased by seven, including the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which abut the Russian border. In contrast, during the Cold War, a wide belt of socialist republics of Eastern and Central Europe existed between NATO and the Soviet Union.

Having regained the presidency in 2012, Putin embarked on a dual policy of active resistance to NATO expansion and weakening the alliance. Given this, Erdoğan’s defiant tone would have been music to his ears. With 620,500 strong armed forces, Turkey ranks second in NATO after the Pentagon’s 1.379 million armed personnel.

On October 10, 2016, on the sidelines of a global energy conference in Istanbul, Erdoğan advised Putin to resubmit a Russian bid long-range air missile defense systems for which Ankara had received bids from the United States and Europe. An earlier Russian bid had been rejected as too expensive. But after his March visit to Moscow, Erdoğan revealed that Russia was offering a considerable discount.

The latest development disappointed Ankara’s NATO allies, intent on containing the Kremlin’s influence. But Turkey was unmoved. “In this field we have three criteria which are price, technology transfer and time of delivery,” explained Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Işık. “As a sovereign state, we can cooperate with any country that fulfills these requirements.”

It was his emphasis on Turkey’s sovereignty that led Erdoğan to cooperate with Putin to help consolidate a January ceasefire in Syria. The subsequent conference in the Kazakh capital of Astana saw Turkey abandoning the United States and bonding with Russia diplomatically to end the Syrian conflict.

This event enabled Putin, a proud nationalist, to rebut robustly US President Barack Obama’s disdain for Russia voiced after Moscow’s February 2014 annexation of Crimea: “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness.” By taking center stage at the Astana conference, with a NATO member as its ally, Russia showed that it was a superpower. Putin’s popularity at home soared to 82 percent in September even though the economy was expected to shrink by 1 percent in 2016 due to continued low prices for oil and gas, Russia’s main exports.

Erdoğan’s recent spats with Germany and the Netherlands on the issue of Turkish ministers being allowed to persuade gatherings of Turkish voters settled in these countries to vote “yes” in the referendum have gone down well with the Kremlin.

The Turkish president continues to highlight his republic’s sovereignty if only to bolster his chance of winning the referendum. Opinion polls in Turkey are on the razor’s edge, with aye and nay voters tied at 43 percent. Hence, each of the EU’s nearly 3 million Turkish voters counts.

By accusing German and Dutch governments of acting like Nazis by banning Turkish ministers’ addresses to fellow Turks in their cities on the grounds of security, Erdoğan has destroyed much of the goodwill needed for Ankara’s successful application to become a full EU member.

In 1963 Turkey became an associate member of the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the EU. Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 and four years later was recognized as a candidate for full EU membership. Subsequent negotiations had run into periodic roadblocks even before Ankara’s latest tensions with Berlin and Amsterdam.

An adversary of EU expansion, Putin is pleased to see Turkey’s chance of acquiring full EU membership rapidly diminish.

A lot depends on the result of the 16 April referendum. A yes vote would put 63-year-old Erdoğan in virtual control of Turkish politics for the next decade or longer. Conversely, a no vote would be the most serious setback to his authority since he took power in 2003 and could trigger political rebellion against him – thus abruptly ending the recent Russian-Turkish honeymoon.

Dilip Hiro is the author of After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World (Nation Books, New York and London). His latest book is The Age of Aspiration: Power, Wealth, and Conflict in Globalizing India (The New Press, New York). Read an excerpt.

With Russia, the West must avoid the pitfalls of underestimating a rival’s capabilities and then overreacting.

By Thomas Graham*

Russia is neither as strong as it seems nor as weak as we think. That aphorism has been attributed to the great French diplomat of the early 19th century, Prince Talleyrand, and numerous other European statesmen thereafter who have dealt with the puzzle of Russia. It encapsulates the flawed assumptions behind America’s Russia policy since Putin rose to power in 1999. As the temperature rises in Washington with three investigations and revelations about Russia’s role in the US election, it may be useful to review the reasons for America’s bumpy relations with Moscow.

The George W. Bush administration operated on the assumption of Russia’s weakness, ignoring its expressed concerns and fueling resentment. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 devoted three short paragraphs to Russia, which focused on the possibilities of strategic partnership, but made a point of Russia’s weakness. That assumption did little immediate harm. Confident that Russia’s ability to resist was minimal, the administration abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and expanded NATO in 2003 over Russia’s strong objections. Convinced that Russia had little to offer, the US ignored Russian entreaties for more active roles in post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq. Russian resentment boiled over as the administration pushed for Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in NATO, blithely asserting that Russia had no veto. In fact, Russia did, in the guise of the use of force against Georgian in 2008, which devastated an American client state but underscored Russia’s determination to assert its prerogatives in what it considers its historically justified sphere of influence, the former Soviet space.

Even then, the poor performance of the Russian military – it lost four advanced aircraft in a short five-day war against a minor military power – and the subsequent global financial crisis that hit Russia hardest among G20 members helped revive the narrative of Russian weakness as the Obama administration took office. In 2012, Obama curtly dismissed Mitt Romney’s contention that Russia was America’s top geopolitical foe, certain that Russia was in decline and a new cold war impossible. Once again the United States underestimated Russia. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea and instigated a separatist rebellion in Eastern Ukraine in response to what it saw as a blatant American effort to rip Ukraine away from its sphere of influence. The Obama administration’s Ukraine policy lay in tatters.

The Ukraine crisis marked a shift in narrative that grew more pronounced as Russia flexed its muscles. Russia’s incursion into Syria to shore up the Assad regime defied American assessments of Russian capabilities and made Russia the key outside power there. Washington is now enveloped in an anti-Russian hysteria. Many are convinced that Russian interference last year was instrumental to Donald Trump’s victory and fear that Russia will pull off similar upsets in critical elections in Europe this year, notably in France and Germany. That Russia adeptly used cyber tools to exploit American vulnerabilities only adds to the alarm. In a few short years, Russia has been transformed in the American mind from a weak, declining power we could safely ignore into the main adversary, setting the agenda in the Middle East and determining the course of electoral politics in long-established democracies in the West.

This much inflated view of Russian power risks provoking the United States to overreact at home and abroad.

Why has it proven so hard to assess Russian power correctly? The task is admittedly complex, combining objective and subjective factors in a shifting geopolitical context. But the US must master this assessment for its own security and well-being.

A good starting point is Russia’s own assessment of its geopolitical predicament. Throughout history, Russian leaders have insisted that Russia is a great power. Yet they have been acutely aware of their country’s vulnerabilities – how to defend a vast, sparsely-populated country with long borders with powerful or unstable neighbors located on a broad plain with few physical barriers to foreign invasion? How to advance one’s interests when typically poorer and more backward technologically than rivals?

Today, Putin has tried to solve this dilemma by acting like a 19th-century great power, seizing territory and displaying military might. But his seeming successes have increased the risk of parlous overstretch. Eighteen months after the Syrian incursion, which Putin promised would be short, Russia remains deeply engaged with no exit in sight. Considerable forces are tied down along the border with Ukraine to deal with various contingencies arising from Russian actions in the Donbas. Provocative Russian behavior in Europe has revitalized NATO, which Russia has always seen as a threat. Meanwhile, the melting Arctic ice is compelling Russia to take defense of its northern border seriously for the first time in history. Troubles in Afghanistan threaten to exacerbate conditions in the poor, fragile states of Central Asia and in Russia itself. And, despite the talk of strategic partnership, Moscow casts a wary eye toward its newly assertive neighbor, China, with which it has a long history of uneasy relations.

Professor Paul Pillar, who was CIA intelligence analyst for 28 years, says Saudi Arabia has been eager to keep pace with Iran in developing nuclear program.

“The Saudis have been interested all along in developing a nuclear program, and keeping pace with Iran involves part of their motivations,” Pillar says in an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times.

Following is the text of the interview.

Q: The Institute for Science and International Security has said that the Saudi government has accelerated research into nuclear programs to counter Iran. What is your analysis of this move?

A: The Saudis have been interested all along in developing a nuclear program, and keeping pace with Iran involves part of their motivations.  It would be difficult to attribute any change in the pace of Saudi research, one way or another, to conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear agreement with Iran.  There are too many other variables, and not enough time yet gone by since conclusion of the JCPOA, to reach that kind of judgment.

Q: What will be the reaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to this news?

A: The IAEA merely monitors compliance with whatever treaties and agreements others have negotiated.  Its role regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran is one of monitoring compliance with the nuclear provisions in the agreement; it was not up to the IAEA to determine what those terms should be.  The agency’s current responsibilities regarding Saudi nuclear activities have to do with any international agreements to which Saudi Arabia is already a party, especially the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  If there were to be a JCPOA-like agreement ever negotiated with Saudi Arabia, then the IAEA would have the responsibility to monitor compliance with that agreement.

Q: How the West would react to such a policy by Saudi Arabia?

A: There does not appear to be any inclination among Western governments to make an issue of Saudi nuclear activities.  That situation might change if the Saudi program were to get well beyond the very preliminary stage it is in now, and especially if there were indications of any Saudi moves to acquire nuclear weapons.

Q: Some Saudi and Western experts argued Iran is gifted with abundant oil and gas reserves and it did not need nuclear energy. Will they make such argument about Saudi Arabia?

A: Although that argument did come up in debates about the agreement with Iran, it ultimately played a lesser part in the debate than did other arguments.  Obviously the argument about having oil and gas would apply to Saudi Arabia just as much as to Iran.  But there is a legitimate case to be made, in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, for developing nuclear power for domestic use of energy while saving more of the oil and gas for export.
*Source: Tehran-Times

Back in the 18th century, there was an unwritten understanding in the conduct of warfare that one didn’t kill the generals in battle. This wasn’t about protecting the elite while the “grunts” of the day slaughtered each other. It was a matter of common sense: If you killed the general, there was no one in a position to order a withdrawal or to surrender, once it became clear that one side was winning. With no general in command, things could become chaotic, leading to more bloodshed than necessary.

In the US, ever since the brief presidency of Gerald Ford, and in the wake of the Senate’s Church Committee hearings into the nefarious activities of the CIA and other secret agencies during the Nixon administration and earlier — particularly efforts to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro and some other national leaders — it has been US policy not to kill heads of state. In fact, a Ford executive order, number 12333, signed by President Ford in the mid 1970s, specifically bans the killing of government leaders, however brutish.

If one wants to see an example of why this is a logical policy, just look at what happened during the Obama administration, when Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafy was murdered by his US-backed captors (with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s enthusiastic support), leaving Libya in a state of total chaos from which it has never really recovered.

Yet now there is talk by President Trump and his increasingly neoconservative- dominated National Security and Pentagon team of advisors of “taking out” North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, even as an aircraft carrier attack group steams towards the Korean peninsula.

Getting rid of Ford Executive Order 12333 would be no difficult hurdle for President Trump, who has been “governing” the country through ill-though-out executive order issuance — most of them written by his political strategist Stephen Bannon, since he assumed office Jan. 20. Bannon, now being sidelined by more traditional cold war neo- cons, may not be writing those orders for his boss now, but someone else could easily do it, erasing E.O 12333 with the stroke of a pen.

What would such a change mean?

In the case of North Korea, it could mean a quick “decapitation” strike by US aircraft from the USS Carl Vinson — one which would presumably destroy North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapon-making capability, and killing Kim and the country’s top military leadership around him.

But what would the result of such a strike be?

For one thing, almost certainly it would mean the contamination of part or even much of the country in North Korea with nuclear fallout and radiation. For another it — given the long history of US “precision” targeting going terribly wrong — it would mean much death and destruction for the long-suffering North Korean people. It would also mean chaos in a country that for nearly three-quarters of a century has been ruled by one absolute tyrant or another, in which there is simply no organized system of governance at lower levels to handle anything, from delivery of health services to distribution of food. If you think the chaos that followed the US invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist leadership of Iraq was bad, or that the chaos of the US overthrow of Gaddafy in Libya was bad, you ain’t seen nothing yet if North Korea’s leader gets offed in a US strike.

In theory, China, South Korea or Japan could step in with troops, money and civilian personnel to help reestablish some kind of order and peace, while preventing the rise of yet another tyrannical government, but none of that is likely. The Chinese would probably not want to take it on, the Japanese are viewed negatively as a former colonial power, and South Korea may not want the financial burden of rescuing the North, which would be staggering. Meanwhile, while the US could relatively easily, and at minimal cost, “take out” North Korea’s missiles, nukes and leadership, especially in the case of the Trump administration, there is absolutely no interest in taking on the costs of occupying and subsidizing the rebuilding North Korea following such an ill-conceived attack.

Will that deter the US from ending the ban on killing national leaders and launching an attack on North Korea aimed at “taking out” Kim?

It’s hard to say, but with Trump abandoning his domestic campaign promises left and right, turning domestic policy into a giant give-away to the rich and the Wall Street banksters, and in the process alienating most of his political base, he seems hell-bent on

diverting attention abroad by taking dramatic military actions that make him appear decisive and powerful.

In Syria, that is amping up the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia’s air force and a potential World War III. In North Korea, it risks creation of yet another Libya, this time in Asia, complete with a flood of desperate refugees and another flood of unaccountable and uncontrollable weapons, possibly including nukes, or nuclear materials.

One thing is clear: If Donald Trump actually gave a damn about “beautiful little babies,” he would not be contemplating an aerial assault on North Korea, the bombing of its nuclear facilities and the decapitation of its top leadership.

By Ronald J. Granieri*

(FPRI) — While watching President Trump’s April 12 press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, I was reminded of a famous quotation often (thought probably erroneously) attributed to Mark Twain:

When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.

That quote maintains its popularity despite its dubious provenance because of its deft jab at the arrogance and solipsism of youth, but it can also be used as a metaphor for “outsider” presidential candidates. When one is relatively innocent of specific knowledge, it is easy to imagine that those with whom one disagrees are either ignorant or malevolent. Only as one grows in wisdom through experience can one begin to understand the reasoning behind decisions, and to see that those allegedly ignorant oldsters or insiders may actually be more sensible than one thought.

Thus has it been with Donald Trump and NATO. During the presidential campaign, Candidate Trump repeatedly denounced NATO as “obsolete” and attacked our European allies for failing to “pay their fair share” for their defense by meeting NATO’s defense budget target of two percent of GDP. After about three months in office, and a morning’s discussion with the alliance’s suave Norwegian civilian leader, President Trump declared, “I said it was obsolete; it’s no longer obsolete.”

What changed? According to President Trump, the alliance responded to his criticisms by devoting more attention to fighting terrorism and by discussing ways they could live up to their budgetary responsibilities, and thus (re-)gained his confidence. Secretary General Stoltenberg, like other European leaders, was polite enough not to quibble, preferring to welcome the president’s new sentiments rather than question his motivations. That’s the kind of tact that has allowed Stoltenberg to have such a successful career in international relations.

Policy analysts (and bloggers, of course) are less constrained by diplomatic niceties. So, it has to be said that President Trump’s praise of NATO’s alleged maturation is on par with Twain’s praise of his old man. Even while President Trump was demanding that NATO pay more attention to terrorism over the past year, people with actual knowledge of NATO operations had been discussing the alliance’s declarations and practical steps in that direction for over a decade. Stoltenberg himself had described those efforts in January 2016, and the alliance has been involved in combating extremism in Afghanistan since 2002. NATO has not changed overnight, but the president’s level of knowledge about the alliance’s work, and its importance to the United States’s global strategy, certainly has.

The last few weeks have seen President Trump make many discoveries about how much more complex the world is than he imagined during the campaign—from China’s currency policies to the proper responses to Syria and North Korea; from health care to the interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve. On China’s role in North Korea, the president declared that it only took a ten-minute discussion with Xi Jinping to make him realize his previous lack of understanding. It may have taken Jens Stoltenberg longer. Further reassessments of campaign assertions are no doubt on the horizon as the president settles into the responsibilities of governing.

This is not to say that NATO is perfect, nor even to say that Trump’s criticisms of the alliance were baseless, even if they were expressed in unusually hostile terms. Europeans and Americans have debated the proper sharing of strategic, budgetary, and leadership burdens for about as long as the alliance has existed, and with greater intensity since the end of the Cold War appeared to remove the alliance’s original raison d’être. Presidents and Secretaries of State and Defense have hectored NATO allies for years to be more active in advancing the alliance’s strategic goals and to be less parsimonious with their defense spending. Those debates will and should continue, just as we should hope that the president’s recognition of NATO’s value will lead to better intra-alliance negotiations about future alliance goals and policies.

A president being forced by circumstance to walk back confident campaign declarations is not unprecedented—consider Bill Clinton’s denunciations of the “Butchers of Beijing,” George W. Bush’s disdain for nation building, or even Barack Obama’s rejection of the individual mandate for health insurance. In the case of President Trump, the phenomenon is so notable both because the original statements were so categorical and because the pirouettes have come in such rapid succession so early in his term.

Being willing to learn and change positions based on new information is certainly better than closing one’s eyes to reality. The challenge comes when the president has to stop swinging between extremes and settle down to the steady realities of governing. Then, we will see whether the new positions are built on a firmer foundation of understanding than the old.

About the author:
*Ron Granieri is the Executive Director of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West, Editor of the Center’s E-publication The American Review of Books, Blogs, and Bull, and Host of Geopolitics with Granieri, a monthly series of events for FPRI Members.  He is a specialist in Contemporary German and International History with degrees from both Harvard and the University of Chicago.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

In 2016 Donald Trump turned the political world upside down, and not just because his victory prevailed against conventional wisdom. Trump claimed to want a new direction in foreign policy. Gone would be the trade deals that sent American workers on a race to an endless bottom. He said that he wanted a new relationship with Russia and felt that the two countries might become partners in a war against terrorism. This terrorism resulted from the United States reliance on jihadists in order to effect regime change. While Hillary Clinton was an openly provocative war hawk, Trump gave an impression of wanting change.

But his attack on a Syrian airfield shows adherence to the worst of United States foreign policy tradition. In less than one week the Trump administration went from saying that “Assad’s fate will be decided by the Syrian people,” and “Our priority is no longer to sit and focus on getting Assad out” to parroting Obama’s mantra that “Assad must go.” Vladimir Putin had already dispensed with calling the United States “our American partners.” He suspended Russia’s participation in an air safety agreement between the two countries. The likelihood of unintended consequence is now higher.

Trump was accused of being under Russian influence throughout the campaign and after his inauguration. Democrats used the charge to divert attention from their electoral failures, weaken the new president and force him to join the war party. They were determined to maintain foreign policy continuity and crush any nation that insisted on exercising sovereignty in the face of American attempts at full hegemony. They were also determined to crush Trump if he didn’t go along with their plans for a new American century.

The attack on the new president was unprecedented. After less than three months in office he was threatened with a severely damaged administration or impeachment. The Democrat’s vitriol had nothing to do with judicial appointments, deregulation of environmental protections or civil rights retreats back to the days of Jim Crow segregation. None of the issues which concern their base of supporters are the cause of their opposition. The fight was all about his willingness to carry on the drive for imperialism and the attempt to bring about regime change in Syria and in Russia too.

Years of demonizing Russia and president Vladimir Putin have had the desired impact. Democrats began by invoking the language of right wing discourse and endlessly repeated assertions of intelligence agencies. They are now praising him for bringing the world to the brink. Only one Democratic member of congress, Tulsi Gabbard, has dared to question the veracity of claims that the Syrian government used chemical weapons. The rest either heartily commend Trump or waffle by asking whether he should have asked for permission that they would surely have given.

The anti-war movement is weak, nearly killed off by the marketing that made Barack Obama look like a peace candidate. The U.S. Navy heads to Korea to threaten the DPRK which correctly points out that America’s aggressions force them to seek nuclear capability as a means of self-defense.

Syria is a living hell for millions of people because Obama and his secretary of state Hillary Clinton wanted another notch on their regime change guns. Refugees flee from Libya and Syria because of their state sponsored terrorism. Trump is now making good on what his predecessors thought they could get away with easily when they began their plot in 2011.

In attacking Syria Trump upped the ante, bringing the world closer to war than even Obama did, and Democrats are praising him for it. The New York Times and the Washington Post both repeat lies about Assad and Putin and laud the man they disregarded just two weeks ago.

Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders both support his actions in Syria. Sanders says, “We must get rid of Assad.” He proves himself to be a phony progressive, supporting the empire while claiming there is some difference between himself and his once and future rival.

Trump is still bringing out all of the contradictions in America at this stage of disintegration and crisis. He is certainly no match for the neo-cons, who had no intention of moving backwards from their Obama glory days. Republicans like Lindsay Graham and John McCain talk of “boots on the ground” and corporate media talking head Brian Williams says that deadly bombs are “beautiful.”

And what of the resistance? The pink pussy hat wearers and their ilk? They too approve of an American hegemon willing to kill at the first sign of a propaganda lie. They aren’t resisting anything at all. Angela Merkel and Justin Trudeau have backed Trump too. If we didn’t know before we now know who the imperialists are in this country and around the world.

The peace movement has an uphill climb. The demonization of Russia and Syria and the skillful manipulation of public opinion will make the work difficult. But someone must be willing to resist Trump and the Democrats too. Hillary Clinton was a threat to world peace but her electoral defeat did not mean the end of neocon dreams perpetrated by Democrats, Republicans and the corporate media.

The struggle is always the same. Presidents may be Democrats or Republicans. They may say they want to change foreign policy. But bloodshed persists. The fights against it must be equally relentless.

Combat-ready F-35A Lightning II multi-role fighter aircraft arrived Saturday at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, demonstrating U.S. commitment to NATO allies and European territorial integrity.

“The forward presence of F-35s support my priority of having ready and postured forces here in Europe,” said Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe. “These aircraft, plus more importantly, the men and women who operate them, fortifies the capacity and capability of our NATO Alliance.”

The aircraft are deployed from the 388th and 419th Fighter Wings at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and will train with European-based allies.

This long-planned deployment continues to galvanize the U.S. commitment to security and stability throughout Europe. The aircraft and personnel will remain in Europe for several weeks. The F-35A will also forward deploy to maximize training opportunities, strengthen the NATO alliance and gain a broad familiarity of Europe’s diverse operating conditions.

Fifth-Generation Fighter

“This is an incredible opportunity for [U.S. Air Forces in Europe] airmen and our NATO allies to host this first overseas training deployment of the F-35A aircraft,” said Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters, commander of USAFE and Air Forces Africa. “As we and our joint F-35 partners bring this aircraft into our inventories, it’s important that we train together to integrate into a seamless team capable of defending the sovereignty of allied nations.

The introduction of the premier fifth-generation fighter to Europe brings state-of-the-art sensors, interoperability and a vast array of advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions that will help maintain the fundamental territorial and air sovereignty rights of all nations. The fighter provides unprecedented precision-attack capability against current and emerging threats with unmatched lethality, survivability and interoperability.

The deployment was supported by the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command. Multiple refueling aircraft from four different bases provided more than 400,000 pounds of fuel during the “tanker bridge” from the United States to Europe. Additionally, C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy aircraft transported maintenance equipment and personnel to England.

North Korea has tried, but allegedly failed, to conduct a new missile launch, according to South Korea’s Joint Chief of Staff and US Pacific Command. The alleged botched launch comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and a day after Pyongyang showcased its new sea based and intercontinental missiles.

“The communist state attempted to launch an unidentified missile from the port city of Sinpo on its east coast in the morning and the launch is presumed to have failed,” the South Korean military said, according to Yonhap news.

The attempted missile launch has also been detected by the US military, which said it “blew up almost immediately” after the launch at 9:21pm GMT.

“US Pacific Command detected and tracked what we assess was a North Korean missile launch at 11:21 a.m. Hawaii time April 15. The launch of the ballistic missile occurred near Sinpo,” US Pacific Command spokesman Commander David Benham said. “The missile blew up almost immediately. The type of missile is still being assessed.”

Meanwhile, Seoul officials told Yonhap that the failed missile launched on Sunday resembled the type of a projectile the North fired earlier this month. On April 5, Pyongyang triggered what is believed to be a KN-15 medium-range ballistic missile. Also fired from the Sinpo area, it flew some 60 kilometers before falling into the Sea of Japan.

Reports of the failed launch came just hours before US Vice-President Mike Pence’s scheduled arrival in South Korea; to begin his Asian tour offering security reassurances to its allies in the region.

On Saturday, as North Korea marked the 105th birth anniversary of its founding leader Kim Il-sung with a military parade in Pyongyang, the North for the first time publicly showcased its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as what appears to be a new type of ICBM.

“It’s presumed to be a new ICBM. It seems longer than the existing KN-08 or KN-14 ICBMs,” a South Korean military official told Yonhap, after the intercontinental ballistic missiles along with the Pukkuksong-2 SLBMs were paraded in front of the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un.

Choe Ryong Hae – a close aide to Kim Jung-un, during his address to the soldiers – warned against any US provocations on the Peninsula, after US President Donald Trump repeatedly promised to “take care” of the North Korean issue over the past weeks.

“If the United States wages reckless provocation against us, our revolutionary power will instantly counter with annihilating strike, and we will respond to full-out war with full-out war and to nuclear war with our style of nuclear strike warfare,” Choe said.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula has reached worrying heights amid concerns, fueled by media reports, that Pyongyang might be preparing new nuclear and ballistic missile tests – and that the US might decide to act unilaterally and conduct a pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes, just as it did against Syria on April 7.

Pyongyang has urged Washington to stop its “military hysteria” and come to its “senses” – or otherwise face a merciless response in case of “provocations” against North Korea. Washington sent the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier group and other military hardware to the region in an apparent show of force and in preparation for “any possible scenarios.”

Trump, however, has also been engaging with China, seeking its help to solve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, warned that confrontation between the US and North Korea had escalated to such a point that “a military conflict may start at any moment.”

South Africa’s Public Works Minister Nkosinathi Nhleko says he is confident his department will accelerate the fight against poverty and unemployment through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP).

Minister Nhleko and his deputy Jeremy Cronin have recently been briefed by senior managers in the department on progress being made in the fight against poverty and youth unemployment, particular through the EPWP.

Since 2014, EPWP has created over two million work opportunities, with over a million South African youths being major beneficiaries.

The Department of Public Works wants to create over 1.4 million work opportunities under the same programme.

“I am confident that we are on our way towards meeting the target of having created six million work opportunities by the end of March 2019. The task of tackling youth unemployment and unemployment generally requires not just government, but the collective will and innovation of the private sector as well.

“I therefore urge corporate South Africa to fully embrace and play their part by joining hands with us to help secure our future through creating more opportunities for the skilling and employment of our people. So much is possible if we work towards common and lasting solutions,” Minister Nhleko said.

He also urged senior managers in his department to work harder at driving initiatives to empower young graduates and new entrants in the built environment sector.

“For radical socio-economic transformation to be meaningful, the construction and entire built environment sector must take a lead, especially through skills training for the youth and advancing broad-based black economic empowerment,” he said.

On May 16, Minister Nkosinathi Nhleko will deliver his maiden Budget Vote in his new portfolio.

A rubbish dump landslide in the Sri Lankan capital Colombo killed at least 16 and injured over a dozen, military spokesman and hospital officials said on Saturday, April 15, as emergency workers dug into the mountain of trash in search of survivors, Reuters reports.

The estimated 300-foot (91 meter) dump collapsed after flames engulfed it late on Friday, the island nation’s traditional new year’s day, and witnesses said around 100 houses could have been buried.

The death toll rose to 16 as more bodies were discovered on Saturday, army spokesman Roshan Senivirathna said. At least four teenagers were among the dead, a nurse at the main Colombo hospital told Reuters.

“We heard a massive sound. It was like thunder. Tiles in our house got cracked. Black water started coming in,” said Kularathna, who lives near the dump.

“We tried to get out but we were trapped inside. We shouted for help and were rescued later.”

Another resident, Mohamed, said three of his neighbors were missing and estimated that more than 100 people could have been buried.

Rescue operations continued for a second day on Saturday with soldiers using heavy equipment to remove the garbage.

Police said about 145 houses had been damaged, but they did not say how many had been buried.

Residents of the area, mostly living in shanties, have been demanding the removal of the dump saying it was causing health issues. The government had planned to remove it soon under an infrastructure plan.

A Florida Museum of Natural History study provides new insights into the complex, shared history between blood-sucking lice and the vitamin-producing bacterial sidekicks that enable them to parasitize mammals, including primates and humans.

Lice depend on bacteria to supply essential vitamins missing from blood, their only food source. These bacterial partners live in specialized cells inside their insect hosts and pass from a female louse to her offspring. Lice could not survive without their symbiotic bacteria, and the bacteria, in turn, cannot live outside their insect hosts.

When their partnership began, however, and how it has evolved over time has been unclear. Previous studies suggested lice acquired and replaced their bacterial symbionts multiple times over their evolutionary history.

But a study by Florida Museum researchers Bret Boyd and David Reed found that lice that parasitize primates and humans have hosted their endosymbionts continuously for at least 20 to 25 million years, aligning with the time period during which great apes and old world monkeys shared a common ancestor.

As primates evolved, so did lice, and the evolution of their bacterial partners stayed closely in step.

The data provide a new perspective on the evolutionary tree of these symbiotic bacteria, said Boyd, who conducted the research as a doctoral student at the museum.

“While lice are highly maligned, they provide a wealth of scientific information,” said Boyd, now a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Georgia and the study’s first author. “Because these symbiotic bacteria are tied to a known evolutionary history between lice and primates, this is an ideal system for studying bacterial genome evolution.”

Many species of blood-sucking lice only parasitize one species of host, a specificity that can offer glimpses into primate and human evolution, said Reed, curator of mammals and associate director of research and collections at the Florida Museum.

“Certain parts of our history are murky and hard to reconstruct,” he said. “The evolution of lice and their symbiotic bacteria helps shed light on human and primate evolutionary history, providing new clues to our past.”

To gain a more complete picture of how lice and their bacterial symbionts have coevolved, the researchers sequenced and assembled genomes of endosymbionts from human, chimpanzee, gorilla and red colobus monkey lice.

They found that the bacteria’s genomes are tiny, hovering between 530,000 and 570,000 base pairs — E. coli’s genome, by comparison, is about 4.6 million base pairs.

Small genomes are a typical feature of insect symbionts, which lose much of their genome over the course of their relationships with their hosts.

Comparing different symbiont genomes, the researchers discovered evidence of extensive genome remodeling during the last 25 million years that has resulted in genes critical to louse-symbiont symbiosis being close to one another in the bacterial genome. This arrangement likely proved advantageous, as it persists in many louse symbionts today, Boyd said.

The study also showed that much of the symbiont genome is devoted to vitamin synthesis. In lice that parasitize humans, gorillas, chimpanzees and monkeys, symbionts make B-vitamins crucial for basic cellular processes

How symbiont genomes shrank over time and which genes remain are key research questions in basic and applied sciences, Boyd said.

“The process by which symbiont genomes change is important to understanding how insects and bacteria form mutualistic relationships that can persist for tens to hundreds of millions of years,” he said. “The genes that are retained in the tiny genome provide insights into which genes are essential to maintain bacterial life.”

Heavy drinkers develop behavioral tolerance to alcohol over time on some fine motor tasks, but not on more complex tasks, according to a study led by a Veterans Affairs San Diego Healthcare System researcher. While heavy drinkers showed less impairment than light drinkers on a rote fine motor test over time, they did not perform better on a test involving more short-term memory, motor speed, and more complex cognitive processing.

The study offers new insight into the changes and problems that accompany excessive drinking. As the researchers explained, “The results have implications for our understanding of alcohol-induced impairments across neurobehavioral processes in heavy drinkers and their ongoing risks for alcohol-related consequences over time.”

Lead researcher Dr. Ty Brumback added, “The most important thing about the study is that despite heavy drinkers’ extensive experience with alcohol, increased speed of metabolism, and lower self-perceived impairment, we show that on a more demanding task they are just as impaired as light drinkers.”

Brumback is a postdoctoral fellow in addiction treatment with VA and the University of California, San Diego.

The study results were published in a March 2017 issue of the journal Psychopharmacology.

Many studies have measured how consuming alcohol impairs both cognitive function and motor coordination. Researchers have also observed that people with histories of heavier prolonged drinking often show greater tolerance to alcohol than lighter drinkers. While research has shown that more experienced drinkers are less impaired by alcohol on some performance measures, the degree to which this tolerance changes over time has not been clearly shown.

This study sought to answer this question as part of the Chicago Social Drinking Project, led by Dr. Andrea King at the University of Chicago. One-hundred fifty-five young adult volunteers were tested on two cognitive and motor coordination tests at the beginning of the study and again five years later.

The study defined a heavy drinker as a person who drank between 10 and 40 alcoholic drinks per week for at least the past two years at the initial testing. This involved consuming more than five drinks at one time for men and more than four for women. Light drinkers were those who had fewer than six drinks per week. Participants maintained these drinking habits across the five years between initial testing and follow-up.

Participants completed two psychomotor tasks. In the Grooved Pegboard Test, they were timed moving, inserting, and rotating pegs into slotted holes on a board. This test measures fine motor skills. In the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST), participants were given a legend with different symbols corresponding to numbers. They then had 90 seconds to fill in the correct symbols on a sheet with numbers. The test is designed to assess not only fine motor skills, but also short-term memory and cognitive processing.

Brumback explained that a real-world activity such as using keys to unlock a door is similar to manipulating a peg on the Pegboard Test. The DSST is akin to more complex tasks such as remembering directions to a novel location or driving a car.

Before each test, participants were given a dose of alcohol that was calculated based on their body weight to bring them to a specific breath alcohol concentration. They were then tested at 30, 60, 120, and 180 minutes after the drink.

As expected, all the participants performed worse on both tests when impaired by alcohol. In a prior report, the authors showed that light and heavy drinkers showed similar levels of impairment on both tasks during the initial testing. At the five-year follow-up, both groups showed improvement on both tasks compared with how they had done when tested years earlier, which the authors attribute primarily to practice effects.

Heavy drinkers also showed evidence of chemical tolerance to alcohol. Their breath alcohol concentrations decreased faster after drinking at the five-year retest versus the initial test. The result lends support to the idea that heavy drinkers absorb and metabolize alcohol faster than light drinkers.

While both groups did better at the follow-up, heavy drinkers showed less impairment on the pegboard than light drinkers relative to their initial testing scores. This did not hold true on the DSST, however. Both heavy and light drinkers showed similar levels of impairment during the follow-up testing.

All in all, the results show that sustained heavier drinking may lead to less impairment in simpler fine motor skills relative to lighter drinking, but this tolerance does not help performance on tasks involving more complex motor processing and short-term memory. Thus, faster metabolization of alcohol in heavy drinkers did not lead to better performance on the more complex task.

Heavier drinkers may develop behavioral tolerance for several reasons, say the researchers. Repeatedly drinking to intoxication leads to cellular adaptation within the brain, changing the sensitivity to alcohol. Contextual factors also play a part: When people learn a task while drunk, they adapt to performing that task while under the influence.

A key point the researchers highlight is that heavy drinkers reported lower self-perceived impairment than light drinkers. They suggest that, for heavy drinkers, lower perceived impairment and higher sensitivity to the stimulating and rewarding effects of alcohol could make the habit more dangerous for them. They may engage in more potentially risky behaviors while drunk because they see their impairment level as lower.

Brumback provided an example of how this could play out in the real world:

“Say a heavy drinker is out at a restaurant and becomes intoxicated. When it comes time to leave, this person has only internal and external cues to help make the decision whether to drive home or call a cab. So, if this person tends to perceive herself as less impaired, she gets up from the table and walks to the door, pushes the door open, and walks to her car. These simple motor functions may not provide sufficient feedback for her to decide she is too drunk to drive. Furthermore, when she gets to her car and unlocks the door and even puts the car in gear, she may not be perceiving impairment in these simple tasks. However, once she begins to drive, the cognitive and psychomotor demands increase significantly but the decision to drive has already been made based on the earlier simple tasks.”

In scenarios such as this, alcohol tolerance may in fact lead heavy drinkers to judge that they are not impaired and attempt more difficult tasks.

“Overall, there is a common belief among heavy drinkers that they can ‘handle their alcohol’ and that many common daily tasks may not be affected by their alcohol use,” said Brumback. “The take-home message here is that tolerance to alcohol is not equal across all tasks and is not ‘protective’ against accidents or injuries while intoxicated, because it may in fact lead the heavy drinker to judge that they are not impaired and attempt more difficult tasks. Making such decisions in the moment is highly risky, because it is based on faulty information.”

Government restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion increased in 2015 for the first time in three years, according to Pew Research Center’s latest annual study on global restrictions on religion.

According to the Pew Research Center study, the share of countries with “high” or “very high” levels of government restrictions – i.e., laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs and practices – ticked up from 24% in 2014 to 25% in 2015. Meanwhile, the percentage of countries with high or very high levels of social hostilities – i.e., acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations or groups in society – increased in 2015, from 23% to 27%. Both of these increases follow two years of declines in the percentage of countries with high levels of restrictions on religion by these measures.

When looking at overall levels of restrictions in 2015 – whether resulting from government policies and actions or from hostile acts by private individuals, organizations or social groups – the new study finds that 40% of countries had high or very high levels of restrictions, up from 34% in 2014, the Pew Research Center study noted.

According to the study, the global rise in social hostilities reflected a number of factors, including increases in mob violence related to religion, individuals being assaulted or displaced due to their faith, and incidents where violence was used to enforce religious norms. In Europe, for instance, there were 17 countries where incidents of religion-related mob violence were reported in 2015, up from nine the previous year. And sub-Saharan Africa saw a spread in violence used to enforce religious norms, such as the targeting of people with albinism for rituals by witch doctors. This type of hostility was reported in 25 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015, up from nine countries in 2014.

Whether one believes they were the long-overdue response to the Syrian regime’s brutality, a one-off event that will not affect the conflict’s trajectory, a risky step that could prompt military escalation or all of the above, the 7 April U.S. missile strikes on Syria’s Shayrat air base in response to the regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons should be seized upon as an opportunity to jumpstart diplomatic efforts. The strikes have heightened tension between Moscow and Washington. Yet, this added volatility and the risks attached to it could and should prompt more serious pursuit by the two countries of their purportedly common interest: de-escalating violence sufficiently to establish a meaningful political track. This can be best achieved by deepening rather than breaking off U.S.-Russian cooperation.

The Trump administration framed its strikes, involving 59 Tomahawk missiles fired from two U.S. Navy destroyers in the Mediterranean, as a proportional response to what both the U.S. and such independent on-the-ground observers as the group Médecins sans Frontières concluded was a sarin attack near the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun on the Damascus-Aleppo highway on 4 April. It identified the target as the air base from which it said the aircraft that carried out the attack had taken off. It highlighted efforts to alert Moscow beforehand and avoid casualties among both Russian and Syrian personnel. And it noted that while the decision to punish the regime militarily for chemical attacks was new, its broader policy of prioritising the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and pinning the hoped-for departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on the results of a political process remains in place. In other words, the military action appeared intended to be narrow in scope, an attempt at limiting risk but offering correspondingly relatively modest rewards: deterrence of further chemical attacks.

In the U.S. and Europe, as well as in many Middle East countries, the Trump administration’s decision brought relief to those who had bemoaned President Obama’s reluctance to order more forceful U.S. military action to protect Syrian civilians from regime atrocities and, for some, even oust the regime. Others deemed it a risky gambit, taken impulsively and outside the framework of a forward-looking strategy, that would not change the fundamental course of the war and inadvertently could trigger an escalation, if not a direct military confrontation, with Russia or Iran. Some saw it as a bit of both: a welcome response that only would make sense – and avoid unintended consequences – if immediately accompanied by efforts to put Syria’s collapsed ceasefire and faltering political talks back on track.

The risks are indeed significant. If, for example, regime chemical attacks were to continue (perhaps employing chlorine instead of the much deadlier nerve agent sarin), the U.S. might find itself compelled to launch additional, more significant strikes and accept the increased risks, or forfeit whatever deterrent effect and credibility boost it had hoped to achieve. High-casualty regime attacks employing other weapons, such as barrel bombs, likewise may generate pressure on Washington to decide whether to expand its deterrence or be seen as signalling that atrocities that do not involve poison gas are tolerable. There also is the related challenge of managing U.S. allies in Syria and the broader region, whose expectations may now rise disproportionately to what the White House is willing to do in their support.

The biggest risk, direct escalation with the regime’s principal backers, Russia and Iran, can be expected to grow in the event of additional U.S. strikes. Iran’s militia network has the capacity to retaliate against U.S. interests throughout the region. Moscow presents an even bigger and more immediate concern: Russian and U.S. jets share the Syrian skies, and Russian personnel and equipment are integral components of the regime’s air-defence systems. This means not only that Moscow can severely constrain Washington’s capacity to carry out airstrikes crucial to its efforts against ISIS in eastern Syria, but also that an accident or miscommunication involving aircraft or ground personnel could set off an extremely dangerous escalatory spiral. Underlining this concern is the fact that Moscow has already announced its intentions to suspend participation in the de-confliction channel its forces and those of the U.S. use and beef up the regime’s air defences. It also has dispatched a frigate carrying cruise missiles to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Now that both sides have made their largely symbolic moves, the moment has arrived to return to diplomacy and de-escalate tensions, lest an opportunity be wasted and the situation spin out of control. Despite the brief display of U.S. military muscle, Russia remains in the driver’s seat in the Syrian conflict, given its assets on the ground and in the air, as well as its alliance with the regime, Iran, Hizbollah and associated militias. While Washington can hope to influence Moscow’s behaviour, Russia doubtless will take the lead in shaping the course of events.

During a visit to Moscow that coincided with the Khan Sheikhoun attack and the U.S. missile strike, Crisis Group encountered deep frustration about the presumed lack of U.S. appreciation for what Moscow considers to be its constructive effort to end the war and prevent the country’s dissolution. Despite the public bluster, Russia is also clearly weary of further escalation and a complete unravelling of its diplomatic efforts at effecting a ceasefire and jumpstarting political talks, and apprehensive about the soundness of its Syrian ally. Some Russian analysts also expressed concern about the damage Russia’s reputation might suffer from what they considered the regime’s graphic and blatant breach of an agreement on the regime’s chemical arsenal and chemical weapons use that Moscow itself initiated. (This is the 2013 U.S.-Russian agreement to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons program, and UN Security Council Resolution 2118 endorsing that agreement.)

Whatever wisdom one might assign to the latest U.S.-Russian tit-for-tat, it has potential to advance a better way forward. Rather than merely seeking to restore the pre-2013 status quo concerning non-use of chemical weapons, the U.S. and Russia should take steps jointly to prevent a direct confrontation and pursue what both have identified as an immediate interest: reducing violence between the regime and its non-jihadist opponents. This is essential to save lives but also could enable a shift of resources toward the fight against ISIS; obstruct efforts by Tahrir al-Sham (a jihadist coalition led by a former al-Qaeda affiliate previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra) to assert hegemony over the opposition’s non-jihadist factions; and, over time, pave the way for a credible political process.

The first step should be to define the terms of a viable ceasefire between the regime and non-jihadist opposition. Elements of truces attempted in 2016 and early 2017 could provide starting points. Trading U.S. counter-terror coordination with Moscow in exchange for an end to regime air attacks outside ISIS-held areas merits renewed discussion. Including Turkey, Iran and Jordan as co-guarantors alongside Moscow and Washington would be necessary to achieve a critical mass of leverage over the warring Syrian parties. Recognising spheres of influence held by the conflict’s many players is nobody’s idea of a perfect peace, but currently it offers the most realistic path to a sustained de-escalation that could create space for a political process addressing Syria’s governance and geopolitical dilemmas.

For a new ceasefire to succeed where others have failed, however, Russia, the U.S. and their regional partners will have to be more realistic in addressing the challenges posed by Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates much of the rebel-held north west and holds territory close to non-jihadist forces. Its exclusion from previous truces has increased its incentives to act as a spoiler and provided a loophole through which the regime and its allies have continued to pummel opposition-held areas (using its presence, real or fabricated, as a pretext). To have any chance of success, a ceasefire must include – at least for a defined period – areas in which Tahrir al-Sham is present but does not exert unilateral control. This would provide time, space and political capital for the U.S. and Turkey to work with rebel allies to address the Tahrir al-Sham problem before it strangles them.

Though they support opposing sides, Washington and Moscow appear more realistic about the need for eventual compromise than their respective Syrian and regional allies. Russia is pinched between an unreliable ally in the Assad regime, which, for all its brutality, is incapable of winning the war; an all too capable ally in Iran, able to defend its interests in Syria even when they diverge from Moscow’s; an adversary in Turkey which, nominal rapprochement notwithstanding, has little incentive at present to do Moscow favours; a formidable military power across the occupied Golan in Israel, which is sceptical of Russia’s intentions and ability to rein in Hizbollah and acts against it even in proximity to Russian forces; and an unpredictable rival in the Trump administration, which, for all its professed desire to avoid foreign entanglements, may find stoking crisis to its political benefit. Russia for the most part has successfully balanced among these competing forces, but it cannot do so forever. The chemical weapon attack and U.S. response are examples of destabilising events that are bound to increase and at some point slip out of Moscow’s control.

Ultimately, U.S. and Russian realism will be needed to seriously begin a process that could lead to an end of the conflict. What happened in Khan Sheikhoun points to the horrors ahead and of their dangerous regional and perhaps even wider international ramifications if the situation is left adrift. Whether the U.S. attack on 7 April was prudent or reckless is beside the point: what matters now is to turn it into an opportunity to initiate steps that reduce the violence in Syria, so that the unspeakable civilian suffering eases and a political process finally has a chance.

Source: International Crisis Group

By Alexander Murray*

Having almost never mentioned Afghanistan during his United States presidential campaign as well as over the first three months of his presidency, on 13 April US President Trump shocked the world by authorizing the use of the US military’s largest non-nuclear bomb, the GBU-43/B, in eastern Nangarhar claiming to be bringing the fight to Daesh. Though it can be argued that any and all means to combat Daesh in Afghanistan are welcome, this recent action by the US hardly stands up to scrutiny.

Upon further examination, the efficacy and long term strategy employed by the dropping of the GBU-43/B indicate limited results, at best. Thus far, military officials have confirmed the death of around three dozen Daesh militants as a result of the blast. Given that the per unit cost of the bomb is roughly $16 million, the cost effectiveness of utilizing this weapon is roughly $500 thousand for each militant casualty.

Approximately two hours earlier, the Afghan Ministry of Defense reported a similar number of militants killed in Achin District, the same locale in which the GBU-43/B was dropped. Though the US military may claim that the bomb provided structural damage to the Daesh holdout, justifying this cost becomes very difficult to do when realizing the military forces which were already engaged had accomplished nearly same results.

Media outlets continue to utilize the phrase “in the loop” when describing the position of the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG), thus indicating at minimum a tacit support or ineffective objection. All of this begs the question as to what then were the desired results of Washington and Kabul, assuming the US President has included this case within a larger strategy concerning Afghanistan. Given the limited physical effects, the ramifications will primarily be of a political nature.

Most likely, Kabul and Washington desired to show force not only to other rogue regimes as many analysts quickly assume, but rather to Russia as well as Pakistan. Less than two weeks ago, a high level Russian military delegation traversed the border regions with its Pakistani counterparts under the auspices of greater cooperation and Russian involvement in the region. In December 2016, Russia hosted the first in a series of its recent meetings on Daesh in Afghanistan. Kabul was not included in the first, attended the second, and was present at the meeting yesterday. With the dropping of the GBU-43/B occurring less than twenty-four hours prior, the US-Afghanistan alliance was clearly desired to be the primary topic of conversation.

This may have been the allegiance’s desired result, although it must not be forgotten that the US president suffers from a rather fragile ego. His summit meeting with the Chinese presidentwas immediately overshadowed by chemical attacks in Syria where Russia is highly involved, most likely disturbing a great deal of their predetermined meetings. Though extremely costly, at minimum it may be an attempt by Washington to ruffle the feathers of President Putin.

All of this points to a strangely enacted political reaffirmation of US involvement in Afghanistan and Kabul’s willingness remains unobjectionable. This first postulate supposes that the US bombing in Nangarhar was initiated by Washington. Conversely, it may be possible that the bombing occurred at the behest of Kabul.

Had Kabul been an active initiator of the bombing, in all likelihood this was intended to be a show of force regarding the NUG. Currently, the NUG of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah is believed to control less than sixty-percent of the country. Having not been included in the first round of Moscow discussions in December and only invited belatedly to the second, Kabul may have been attempting to up its stature at the third Moscow meeting of regional actors

concerning Daesh in Afghanistan on 14 April. Regardless of who initiated the strike, Kabul will be utilizing this to reenforce the NUG control of the country and its ability to project and/or limit power within its territory. Sovereignty was an enormous concern of Ghani’s predecessor, former Afghan President Kharzai. Expectedly, he has recently taken to the airwaves to raise this issue once again.

The time is now ripe for Kabul to truly begin leading security within Afghanistan’s borders and the activities of the last seventy-two hours should reaffirm this. Clearly, means of extreme power projection are willing to be employed within Afghanistan’s borders. Though this type of power may be ineffective in tangible results, it must be utilized to its fullest extent politically. Kabul should take credit for this strike and emphasize its ability to utilize all means available to secure the country, eliminate non-state militant groups (including the Taliban), and commit to real development of fragile areas.

As America’s role in the region remains questionable and Russian involvement continues to escalate, Kabul must find a common thread between the two in order to utilize the majority of the benefits offered by each. India should be seen as a preferred go between and primary supporter in a restructured coalition. As personalities and economies continue to drive Washington and Moscow, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi should be utilized to the fullest in this endeavor.

Delhi has numerous long-term strategic investments in Afghanistan, and shares a uniquely positive relationship with Washington and Moscow alike. Having had a close recent history with the Russian Federation, and its predecessor the Soviet Union, Delhi should leverage this position to advance security and development within Afghanistan in a supporting role to the NUG government in Kabul.

To do so would allow Kabul numerous benefits. Kabul currently lacks a partner with a vested interest in the region. Upon dismantling the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the early years of the American occupation, America has struggled to substantively commit to real nation building. Its only concern has pertained to eliminating terrorist strongholds and minimally ensuring Afghanistan’s ability to do so. Delhi has a vested interest in the area which could serve both Afghanistan and India for generations to come. As allegations of Pakistani state actions to undermine the NUG in Kabul continue to surface, a closer relationship with the Indian security apparatus may ensure a more unified effort to accomplish Kabul’s real goals within Afghanistan. Export opportunities to India may also be more readily realized thus bringing Iran more honestly into the Afghan fold.

A greater security presence by Delhi in Afghanistan would also serve the interests of the Russia as well as the United States. While strong in its capacity potential, India would be viewed by the greater Islamic community of nations as a lesser evil when compared to the present situation led by the US. Though certainly not ideal, this would provide less rhetorical fuel to the engine which propels Daesh’s worldwide following. This most readily serves Moscow’s vocalized goal of neutralizing Daesh in Central Asia.

By allowing Delhi a larger security capacity in Afghanistan, Washington would also be relieved of many of its concerns as its sixteen year presence in the country continues to tax American public opinion. This would also satisfy President Trump’s campaign promises to focus on “America first.”

Both the United States and Russia would have a means to support and communicate with one another regarding Afghan security objectives via Delhi while also reducing the prospects of direct confrontation with one another, as is the current concern in Syria.

This proposed shift to an Indian led security presence in Afghanistan, subordinate to Kabul’s supreme leadership, would most of all serve Delhi’s regional interests. Concerning threats of asymmetrical terrorism emanating from the region, Delhi would be in a prime position to secure its neighborhood from Pakistani coordinated militant groups existing beyond Pakistan’s borders. To do so would thus contain threats to India posed by the Pakistani state. It would also provide Delhi with the means to effectively trade with Afghanistan and other central asian states, providing the energy resources India’s economy so desperately needs. Infrastructure lines may then begin fully operating not just between Chabahar and Zaranj, but from there to Ashgabat, Tashkent, and Dushanbe.

All of this supposes a lack of Pakistani opposition. Obviously, this would hardly be the case, however such an opposition should not be prohibitive to India’s accession in Afghanistan. The key regional player most closely aligned to Pakistani interests is China. Islamabad for all intents and purposes has drifted from Washington’s favor and most readily curries that of Beijing. All the while China promotes its CPEC initiatives in Pakistan and projects in Afghanistan’s east, Delhi, Washington, and Moscow are pushed beyond the growing sphere of Chinese influence. Regardless of Pakistani opposition, every actor involved should understand this proposed shift as a balance of Chinese power.

Kabul has grown weary of its American benefactor. As former President Kharzai condemned US involvement in the later years of his administration, President Ghani is now in a position to restructure its reliance on the tired American public (and the thus far volatile leader in Washington). A closer move toward Delhi, with the support of Moscow and Washington, should be welcomed. Should Prime Minister Modi seek to lead India toward greater involvement in Afghanistan, the results would certainly move beyond the Afghan devolution of the recent past. With the proper capacity and direction from Kabul, it could do much to develop the entire region.

*The author is a political analyst from the University of Chicago. He can be reached at e-mail murray.analysis@gmail.com

By A. Vinod Kumar*