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Rare Cause Of Anemia In Newborns Often Overlooked

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Some babies diagnosed with and treated for a bone marrow failure disorder, called Diamond Blackfan Anemia, may actually be affected by a very rare anemia syndrome that has a different disease course and treatment, say scientists from Dana-Farber/Boston Children’s Cancer and Blood Disorders Center.

Genetic analysis of DNA from 175 patients believed to have Diamond Blackfan Anemia, identified eight that showed hallmarks of Pearson Marrow Pancreas syndrome, according to research presented at the 55th annual meeting of the American Society of Hematology.

The treatment choices are difficult in both syndromes, but getting the diagnosis correct is crucial, said Suneet Agarwal, MD, PhD, a pediatric hematologist/oncologist at Dana-Farber/Boston Children’s. “Some patients with Diamond Blackfan will respond to steroids, but there’s no reason to give steroids to someone with Pearson Syndrome — and they could make things worse,” he said.

Diagnosing Pearson Marrow Pancreas syndrome (PS) is not simple, but a specific laboratory test can spot a characteristic abnormality in the infant’s DNA that carries blueprints for making proteins in the cells’ energy-producing mitochondria.

The test “should be performed in the initial genetic evaluation of all patients with congenital anemia,” said Agarwal, who is also affiliated with the Manton Center for Orphan Disease Research at Boston Children’s Hospital.

The two disorders are caused by genetic abnormalities that impair production of blood cells by the bone marrow, causing severe anemia usually diagnosed in the first year of life. Diamond Blackfan Anemia affects approximately one in 100,000 infants and can vary widely in its severity. About 50 percent of patients have physical abnormalities affecting different parts of the body.

Because Diamond Blackfan Anemia is typically inherited from parents in an autosomal dominant fashion, with only one parent carrying the abnormal gene, each pregnancy carries a 50 percent risk of resulting in an affected child.

Pearson Marrow Pancreas syndrome is so rare that fewer than 100 patients have been reported in the literature in the past 25 years, said Agarwal. The genetic defect usually occurs sporadically, he explained, so parents can be counseled that there should be little or no risk of passing along the disease in subsequent pregnancies.

Infants with PS also have anemia and growth defects. They are deficient in pancreatic function and can have muscle and neurologic impairments. Agarwal says it isn’t always diagnosed in infancy, because the anemia may not be severe and can even improve without treatment. That’s because the patient’s cells carry a mixture of normal and mutant mitochondrial DNA. Over time, the proportion of mutant mitochondrial DNA in the blood cells may lessen and the anemia becomes less severe.

Both conditions can be treated with bone marrow transplants, he said, but the risk-benefit calculation is different. “Most patients with Diamond Blackfan Anemia require blood transfusions into adulthood. If you’re going to do a transplant in a patient with Diamond Blackfan, outcomes are better if you do it early,” Agarwal said.

“Because patients with Pearson Syndrome can get over their blood defect as young children, and because bone marrow transplantation does not cure the other problems in their bodies, the decision to proceed with transplant is more difficult,” he added.

The article Rare Cause Of Anemia In Newborns Often Overlooked appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Volocopter Start-Up Raises €1.2M, Breaks European Crowdfunding Record

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The EU-supported Volocopter start-up E-volo has raised €1.2 million in a recent crowdfunding campaign, surpassing the €500,000 mark after only two and a half hours.

E-volo’s Volocopter – supported by Climate-KIC, the EU’s main climate innovation initiative – is safer, simpler, and cleaner than normal helicopters. After successfully completing its first test flight last month, it is has now raised enough funding to turn from prototype to production.

The Volocopter is an environmentally friendly and emission-free private helicopter. Instead of one combustion engine, eighteen electrically driven rotors propel it.

The maiden flight and first test flights were conducted in the dm-arena in Karlsruhe with the prototype of the 2-person VC200 on 17 November 2013.

“There are already numerous requests for the Volocopter from around the world,“ said Alexander Zosel, managing director of E-volo.

The developing team of E-volo knew from the onset that the Volocopter was very easy to fly. Due to elaborate simulations at the Stuttgart University, they already knew that it was much more quiet than a helicopter. However, the pleasant low, rich sound and the lower-than-expected noise level caused great cheering among the E-volo team during the first flights.

Carbon lightweight design

People were eager to know whether there would be disturbing or even dangerous vibrations in the mechanic structure of the rotor plane.

“Such vibrations are a large problem for normal helicopters,“ stated E-volo managing director Stephan Wolf, adding that “there, the vibrations together with the deafening noise have lead to much discomfort on passenger flights in helicopters.“

Due to the complex structure of the Volocopter in carbon lightweight design, it was not possible to simulate the expected vibrations in the laboratory.

“The result of the first flight created a euphoria among the entire project team.“ Wolf and Zosel further stated that “not even the HD video cameras secured to the exterior carbon ring of the rotor plane captured the least vibrations.“

The article Volocopter Start-Up Raises €1.2M, Breaks European Crowdfunding Record appeared first on Eurasia Review.

What We Need As A Movement – OpEd

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Talk about a no-brainer!

The $2.5-trillion Social Security Trust Fund, which current workers, including the much-maligned Baby Boom generation, have been bulking up with our 6.2% payroll tax and the 6.2% that our employers have to pay, is slated to be exhausted by 2036-8. Unless more money is injected into the system to cover the tsunami of retirees born between 1946 and 1964, the program, if it were just running on current payroll taxes, would only be able to cover 75% of promised benefits to current retirees.

At the same time, the rich are getting richer every year, and the rest of us poorer.
Income tax rates for the rich are far lower now than they were in the 1990s, ‘80s or in any prior decade. Meanwhile loopholes and deductions and exemptions for the wealthy keep getting added to the tax code to help make them richer. (Those rich enough to be able to use the Schedule A tax form get to claim all mortgage interest, including for vacation homes. They get to deduct the cost of fancy insurance plans and pricy medical care, they get to deduct their state and local taxes, and they get taxed much less than even a low-income wage-earner on income they earn from investments.)

Everyone, except the rich themselves of course, agrees that the widening wealth gap in the US (now about the same as in Jamaica and Argentina) is a terrible thing, and everyone agrees that something needs to be done to keep Social Security well-funded.

What isn’t being said is that the two problems are linked and can be at least partially solved simultaneously.

Think about it: As things stand, only the first $113,400 of wage income is subject to the Social Security tax — the so-called FICA tax. Even if you earn $2 million or $200 million a year, you still only pay that 6.2% FICA tax on the first $113,400 of it–a maximum tax of $7,030.80 per person or $14,061.60 for employee and employer.

If the cap were eliminated, as was done long ago for the Medicare tax, so that the rich and their employers — or rich people themselves if they are self-employed — had to pay the full 12.4% tax on their income, almost all of the shortfall in the Social Security Trust Fund’s ability to pay for the retirement benefits of the Baby Boomers and subsequent retirees would be eliminated. If, beyond that, investment income was also made subject to the Social Security tax, either as a straight percentage of profits, or as a small 0.25% to 0.5% tax on stock and bond transactions, not only would the entire shortfall be gone, but there would be money to do what an increasing number of Americans are saying must be done:increase retirement benefits.

(As I wrote recently, Social Security in the US only provides for about 30% of the living expenses of average retirees, leaving them on their own to figure out to pay for the rest, while in most of the rest of the developed world, retirement programs provide close to 100% of living expenses. In Finland, for example, the fully state-run pension system is designed to allow virtually everyone to receive in retirement an income that enables them to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living.)

Having the wealthy pay the FICA tax on all their income, including investment income, would significantly reduce the wealth gap in the country, both by at least slightly reducing wealthy incomes, and by dramatically improving the retirement living standards of the majority of Americans.

Incredibly, almost nobody is suggesting this approach in Congress, where a disproportionate percentage of senators and representatives are millionaires and multi-millionaires. Even among the public, there is little understanding about how Social Security works, and how easy it would be to solve its funding problem.

Instead of talking about collecting more in taxes from the wealthy to adequately fund retirement and disability programs for all Americans, we have Republicans and most Democrats alike talking about ways of cutting Social Security benefits to future retirees. For example we have President Obama’s proposal to adopt a different method for adjusting benefits for inflation. This idea of adopting what is called a “chained Consumer Price Index,” would take the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly “market basket” of goods and services used to calculate the inflation rate, and would substitute cheaper items for things that rise significantly in price. For example, if beef prices suddenly spiked, the Chained-CPI “market basket” would substitute chicken. If chicken went up too, it would substitute beans. The assumption, based upon no scientific data, is that retirees and the disabled would make these substitutions in their spending. There is no scientific basis for switching from the CPI to the chained-CPI, though. In fact, the elderly and disabled, as a rule, have a hardertime changing their behavior, eating habits, or living quarters to adjust for price spikes than do younger workers. No matter though. The heartless hacks in government, mostly beholden to large campaign donors and Wall Street investment houses, all of whom want to gut Social Security, rather than save or fix it, want it cut. And because that is what the corporate media are reporting, even many people who could end up having tens of thousands of dollars stolen from their retirement benefits by this accounting sleight-of-hand think it is a necessary “reform” needed to “save” Social Security.

It’s not.

If anything, even the CPI currently in use understates that impact of inflation on Social Security benefits.

The beauty of viewing Social Security not as some costly “entitlement” that needs to be cut, as conservatives portray it, but rather as a necessary program that insures that the country takes adequate care of its elderly and infirm, and that can be securely, and even better funded than it is now by raising the taxes paid into the program by the currently coddled rich, is that it offers a pain-free way to eliminate the looming Social Security funding shortfall while, at the same time, shrinking society’s burgeoning wage gap.

I say pain-free because when the rich and their employers (or the companies they own), have to pay a combined 12.4% tax on the full amount of their annual incomes, instead of just on the first $113,400 of it, there is no pain involved — unless it’s just the psychological pain of having to give money to the government that they didn’t have to fork over before. They don’t have to turn down the thermostat, or skip a meal, or stop buying prime rib and lobster. They don’t have to worry about meeting the rent payment or the mortgage.

If we could get a movement going around such a real reform of Social Security, we might be able to build on it, and start going after the rest of the tax breaks that the wealthy have been piling up. Take the mortgage tax deduction. Why should it be limitless? If there is an argument for having society subsidize home ownership, then make it fair: let’s offer all taxpayers who have to take out a mortgage to buy their home the same limited interest payment deduction — say a $1000 tax credit (that would be the equivalent of limiting the interest rate deduction on the Schedule A form to about $5000, which is about the typical interest rate paid on a $100,000 mortgage, except that it would be available to all — not just those who are able to use the Schedule A deduction form. The same kind of limit could be placed on the amount of state and local taxes that could be deducted from income.

The possibilities for progressive reform are limitless, once Social Security is successfully tackled.

To borrow and adapt a line or two from Arlo Guthrie’s famous song “Alice’s Restaurant”:

“One reform, just one reform to make Social Security solvent into the indefinite future, and we’d have a progressive success. And if we had two reforms, one of Social Security and a tax on stock and bond transactions (in harmony), they may think we’re radicals. But if we had three progressive reforms. Three, can you imagine? Three progressive reforms like applying the FICA Tax to all income, taxing stock and bond transactions, and eliminating unlimited mortgage interest deductions and deductions for mortgage interest on vacation homes. Why they may think it’s an organization. And can you, can you imagine fifty people a day, I said Fifty people a day walking in to the Capitol demanding improved retirement benefits? Friends they may thinks it’s a movement.”

And like Arlo said, with reference to ending the Vietnam War, that’s what we need. A movement to take government back from the oligarchs and the coddled rich, and return it to just average working people.

Social Security is the key. Every American depends upon it, for her or himself, for parents and grandparents, and for our children. If we can’t unite around a movement to demand that Social Security be made into a well-funded system that provides a decent retirement for all, we might as well hang it up when it comes to trying to achieve other progressive goals.

The article What We Need As A Movement – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Will Gulf Investment Return To Egypt? – OpEd

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By Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

I write this week from Cairo, where the Egypt-Gulf Investment Forum was held to discuss investment opportunities in Egypt. The meeting was timely, because Egypt has suffered greatly over the past two years as investment flows slowed down and investors became apprehensive about returning to Egypt waiting for the dust to settle.

Given those circumstances, it was surprising to see how well attended the forum was. Organizers estimated that 1,400 businesspeople took part, including about 400 from the GCC countries. Egypt’s Prime Minister Hazem Al-Biblawi and most of his cabinet members were also in attendance.

There was an upbeat mood at the forum, which was held in a resort just outside the hustle and bustle (and daily demonstrations) of Cairo. The conclusion of the constitutional conference, known as the “Committee of 50,” the day before the forum opened buoyed the mood. The committee agreed to a draft constitution, which will be put for referendum in coming weeks. Its chairman was at the forum to celebrate that milestone.

Officials in particular were sanguine about the prospects for the Egyptian economy, promising wide-ranging changes in investment rules and regulations to attract investors and stimulate the economy. The investment minister optimistically expected foreign investment to reach $25 billion by mid-2014, an increase during the next six months of $3 billion from its current level. By contrast, FDI flows during 2012 totaled only $2.2 billion. About 50 percent of foreign investment in Egypt comes from the GCC countries, according to officials addressing the forum.

Al-Biblawi, who was a well-known economist in his own right before becoming prime minister earlier this year, was more realistic about the pace of those promised reforms. He said, only partly in jest I thought, that we had to keep in mind that we were talking about the oldest bureaucracy in the world. It has not experienced a strong appetite for quick change in the past.

Trade and cultural relations between Egypt and Arabia (including the Gulf) go back thousands of years. As a result, the two sides of the Red Sea are almost indistinguishable from each other, physically and culturally. Even 2,500 years ago, the ancient Greek historian Herodotus found it hard to delineate the borders between Arabia and Egypt proper.

However, intimate and close relations are between the two sides of the Red Sea, and no matter how much political will and goodwill exist, trade and investment have logics of their own. The secret lies in matching the needs of the host country with those of private investors and traders. The host government is naturally interested in investments that create jobs, contribute to the GDP growth, and help in the transfer of technologies and best practices. On the other hand, investors are interested in safety of their capital and getting the highest returns to their investment. Gulf investors are no different in this regard from Egyptians or other international investors. In addition, Gulf investors, many of whom live and work in Egypt, are genuinely interested in contributing to Egypt’s prosperity.

Before delivering my keynote address at the forum, I spoke with businessmen from the GCC countries, some of whom had been investing in Egypt for many years. Some were new to the scene and keen to explore new opportunities in Egypt, but had questions about its economic prospects, as well as concerns about stability, security and investment risks.

I tried to highlight some of those concerns in the following points:

First, Egypt needs to restore security and political stability as soon as possible, and project a new image to investors. Faithfully implementing the declared “roadmap” and the just-concluded constitutional conference are key elements toward that goal.

Second, promote investment opportunities that fulfill government policy objectives, while providing safe and profitable returns. Directly engaging investors will help.

Third, reform the business legal environment, including reform of the foreign investment law, the conclusion of more double-taxation agreements, and establishment of clear legal dispute-resolution mechanisms. It was encouraging that several officials indicated that reforms in this area were already under way.

Fourth, offer investment guarantees. While legal assurances are important, financial guarantees will reassure investors more. Those guarantees can be obtained from banks and financial markets, as well as regional and international organizations.

Fifth, provide economic incentives, including easing export and import procedures, reducing or removing tariffs on investment-relevant imports, and maintaining stability of the foreign exchange rate.

Sixth, develop infrastructure. While slowly improving, Egypt is still straddled with an outdated infrastructure that reduces its pull for investors. Roads, ports and communication have a long way to become world class. Fortunately, GCC companies have developed a niche in this area and can help.

Some of those developers were at the forum, bullish on Egypt’s future.

By the end of the two-day forum, it was encouraging to note that officials and investors were on the same page. Both agreed that Egypt possesses huge untapped potential. It has more university-educated people than any other country in the Arab region. All of these factors should make Egypt a logical destination for investment, local and international.

At the same time, while promoting some 60 major investment projects throughout Egypt, officials announced that they were ready to offer assurances and guarantees to reduce risk. They also announced improved dispute-resolution procedures that have resulted in settling 19 cases involving Gulf investors, with more on the way.

Email: aluwaisheg@gmail.com

The article Will Gulf Investment Return To Egypt? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Why Do They Hate Us? – OpEd

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By Abdulrahman Al-Zuhayyan

Referring to foreigners, a Saudi journalist recently wrote an article for a leading Arabic newspaper titled “Why do they hate us?,” in which she put the onus on the local population. I could not agree more. However, the article did not spell out the development of the main reasons that caused this sentiment. Always, an image embodies either negative or positive meaning, and ultimately flares up a corresponding sentiment, for instance, like/hate, friend/foe, etc. Thus, behind any sentiment lies an image.

Accordingly, one may conclude that because Saudi Arabia has a negative image across the globe, people around the world actually hold corresponding sentiments toward Saudi nationals. By all means, this image has a lasting detrimental effect on the entire historical records of the country.
The two primary intertwining reasons, in my view, that have led to that unfavorable image and consequently the unpleasant sentiment s are: Saudis themselves, and the lack of enforcement of laws by relevant government agencies. Like other Gulf countries, Saudis’ outlook on life is trapped between the Islamic worldview and the modern global one.

The enculturation process administered by various social institutions had instilled in the majority of Saudis the Islamic values, such as unity, fairness, equality, compassion and other humanistic values. Practically, they are indoctrinated to believe in the possibility of either Islamic brotherhood or pan-Arabism, or both. That explains why Saudis rush to help Muslims suffering injustices and human or natural crises no matter where. Unquestionably, they sacrifice their lives and wealth for Islamic causes. In the real world, few people can actually be so benevolent.

On the other hand, the modern global worldview of life emphasizes individualism and materialism. Clearly, the first worldview puts the group first (collectivism).

Whereas the later, which is largely adopted by the rest of the world, puts the individual first.

Definitely, the two are differing worldviews about the role of a person in this life.

Therefore, in human interactions between Saudis and other people belonging to a divergent worldview, majority of Saudis look upon others from an empathetic vantage point, while the others are most likely to look upon Saudis as an easy source of wealth. This is a disadvantageous relationship to Saudis, with serious ramifications. It impacts the shaping of their image relating to the substance of their character and their perceived traits, and it subsequently affects the nature of their interaction with others in every aspect of life whether inside or outside the country.

Having said that, the Islamic worldview with its aforementioned ramifications pervades Saudi life, which can be observed in local media outlets and the enforcement of laws by government agencies. With respect to media, many Saudi journalists purport freedom of the press and its role in the betterment of society by exposing irregularities and behavioral misconducts that may occur in the communities. However, practicing journalism without objectivity can inadvertently demoralize society.

For many decades, both the local Arabic and non-Arabic press have covered some social issues and exposed behavioral misconduct, for instance, wrong practices of the religious police, women driving and conditions of expat workers. In the long run, the extensive coverage of these issues — especially expat workers — damaged the image and reputation of Saudi Arabia in the world. The first two cases (religious police and women driving) are internal issues, and they are up to the Saudis to resolve them according to their laws and traditions. However, the issue of foreign workers is the most important one. There are approximately nine million workers belonging to various nationalities in the country. And they have diplomatic missions representing their interests in the country.

As a common practice by any state including Saudi Arabia, diplomatic missions and international organizations monitor the local press and other media outlets. The Saudi press, on the other hand, covers extensively isolated appalling wrongdoings conducted by nationals against some foreign workers, with the good intention of preventing their reoccurrence.

In contrast, the local press rarely covers the exploitative practices of domestic workers; their horrendous crimes against Saudi families; in addition to the overt violation of many foreigners of the local laws and traditions in the plain view of the public. Most Saudis consider these acts as apparent demonstration of utter contempt to Saudi authorities, people and their traditions, and are constant aggravations that they have to deal with on a daily basis.

Diplomatic missions and international organizations take those isolated incidents as credible anecdotes, because none other than the Saudi press publish them. At the same time, these entities only know one side of the story, because the flipside of it is not reported by the local press. Also they are not probably motivated to know because they do not conceive the idea that many foreign workers are really hurting Saudi citizens.

In the end, Saudis appear as inhumane oppressors and the entire foreign workforce as helpless victims. Worse yet, the electronic versions of the local newspapers publish these stories of perceived oppression of the expatriates, and subsequently the readers post them on social media, and many of them go viral on these outlets.

Unfortunately, those who are planning on visiting or working in Saudi Arabia for the first time and seeking about the country and its people online, they will instantly find these stories in both Arabic and English. As a result, the newcomers will be preconditioned to hold negative views of what they have to deal with before even they land in the Kingdom.

Email: Al_Zuhayyan@Yahoo.com

The article Why Do They Hate Us? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Cause And Effect Of The ADIZ Over East China Sea – Analysis

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By Naval Jagota

China’s recent establishment of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed island (Senkaku/Diaoyu) in the East China Sea has raised deep concern in the neighbourhood and beyond with worrying strategic escalation. This is the first time that the Chinese have designated an ADIZ off its territory, which overlap with the three neighbours –Japna, South Korea and Taiwan.

ADIZ is established in an area from which an aerial threat is expected to originate. The designated zone is a finite area on the ground extending vertically upwards within the territory and may extend contiguously to littoral areas under state control. The established zone is then covered within the operational envelope of the Air Defence systems such as radars, interceptor aircraft, command and control and surface to air missiles. The objective is to ensure better control and knowledge of the aircraft entering and departing its area of concern. The primary aim of the ADIZ is to provide a lead time to the air force, in case of hostile aircraft intruding, and take appropriate actions to counter them. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have an ADIZ. The Japanese ADIZ was issued in 1969 and thereafter revised in 1972 and 2010. South Korea established its ADIZ in 1951. It is interesting to note that the US interpretation on what constitutes infringement of the ADIZ is stated in the code of federal regulations, which broadly states that as long as the aircraft has no intent to enter the territorial waters or air space of the country then they have no issues and the aircraft would not be subjected to the rules of the ADIZ. By this definition, the US would reciprocate similarly with other countries ADIZ.

A critical question that arises is who makes and regulates the ADIZ? The answer is not complicated. The ADIZ is designated individually by the country depending on its threat perception. The establishment of this zone is not regulated by any global/regional regime. Since there is no defined or accepted method for delineating ADIZ, some countries adopt the procedure of territorial airspace till 12 nautical miles off their coast. Some countries may want to extend it to their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is 200 nautical miles from their coast. However the logical basis for the establishment of ADIZ is for early warning so as to enable the country to take appropriate counter measures.

On the face of it, China’s sudden announcement to establish the ADIZ in the East China Sea to include the disputed island is not just a matter of perceiving a threat from this area but a signal of assertiveness and authority over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island and probably a readiness to escalate it. Japan, in order to protect its right over the islands, has been scrambling fighters to guard the airspace around these islands and in its ADIZ. The face-off is unnerving and a cat and mouse game between the Chinese coast guard and the Japanese SDF is underway with a possibility of an all-out hot war. South Korea is equally rattled by these developments as the newly drawn ADIZ encroaches on the airspace west of Jeju Island and over the Ieodo Ocean Research Center, an unmanned station built atop a outcropping of rock 149 kilometres South of Mara Island. Although its reaction has been muted so far, South Korea has already flown a recce aircraft over the area without notifying the Chinese authorities.

China is within its right to designate such a zone, just like Japan has done, but the timing as well as the lack of consultation has raised the hackles. Further, with both the countries ADIZ overlapping, a challenging and conflicting situation arises over the non-scheduled flights and duality of control for the scheduled civil aircraft as well. With the Chinese zone becoming effective from 10 am on 23 November 2013, the Americans, the South Koreans as well as the Japanese, as defiance, have flown through this zone without informing the Chinese control. The Chinese have shown restrained response abiding by the rules of its ADIZ which states: “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions”. There is, ofcourse, a thin line existing and could lead to snowballing into a major international incident.

The international community hopes that China and Japan exercise restraint. However, China’s unilateral action is definitely a provocation and has increased the chances for miscalculation and accidental air engagement. If escalation is the game then one can expect China to next establish an ADIZ over most of the South China Sea. At the very least, China has demonstrated its seriousness about pressing its claim over the disputed islands but by asserting itself it also testing the resolve of Japan and its allies.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/CauseandEffectoftheADIZover_NavalJagota_061213

The article Cause And Effect Of The ADIZ Over East China Sea – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts – Analysis

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By Rachel Irwin, Dzenana Halimovic, Maja Bjelajac, Dražen Huterer and Mladen Lakić

When Mirjana Tesanovic, a 49-year-old lawyer from Banja Luka, was asked to select her “ethnic/national affiliation” during the first census held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in over 20 years, she did something extraordinary.

Instead of telling the census-taker to mark the box for “Serb” on the form, she decided to describe herself simply as “Bosnian”. This word denotes an affiliation to the state, not membership of one of the three main ethnicities – Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), Serb and Croat.

Tesanovic says her choice was highly unusual, not only for the predominantly Serb city of Banja Luka, but for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In a country where war in the early 1990s killed some 100,000 people and left more than a million displaced, the Bosniak-Serb-Croat dividing lines still run deep.

“Anyone who doesn’t belong to one of the three constituent peoples is either an ‘enemy’ or excluded, unwanted, and considered weird, to say the least,” Tesanovic said.

Explaining her decision, she said, “I was born in Yugoslavia, which does not exist any more, but as long as I lived in that country, I was a Yugoslav.

“Now I live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and I’m a citizen of that country. I chose ‘Bosnian’ in the census form because that’s how I feel.”

The 2013 census took place in BiH’s two entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS). The population of the Federation is mainly but not exclusively Bosniak and Croat, while RS is predominantly Serb, but again not wholly so.

As well as detailing where individuals were resident, the census form also invited them to say which ethnic group they identified with. It also quizzed them on the closely-related questions of mother tongue and religion.

ADDING UP NUMBERS FOR POLITICAL GAIN

The choice Tesanovic and others made is one that politicians and their supporters from each of the three main ethnic groups worked hard to prevent. In the run-up to the census, some public figures pushed the idea that one group would end up dominating the others if citizens failed to declare themselves along ethnic lines.

Although specific data from the census will only start being released in July 2014, politicians on all sides rushed to claim a demographic triumph for their own particular group.

In fact, even when the results are known, they will have no direct effect on the delicate power-sharing mechanism laid down in the Dayton Accords which ended the conflict in 1995.

Nonetheless, analysts say that thus far at least, the exercise has mainly served to stir up ethnic tensions.

From the beginning, the census was “an exclusively political question, not a statistical one,” said Azra Hadziahmetovic, professor of economics at the University of Sarajevo and also a member of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.

Hadziahmetovic said the inclusion of three questions on the census form – on ethnicity/nationality, religion and mother tongue – completely overshadowed other crucial issues, like BiH’s “human and educational potential”.

Dr Valery Perry is chief of party of the Public International Law and Policy Group project in BiH (PILPG), a global pro bono law firm that provides legal assistance on peace agreements.

Perry notes that a census in Bosnia is “all about the war and who moved where, it’s all about who is ‘in control’ of a certain territory, and who can confirm the impact of the ethnic cleansing and the demographic shifts that happened.

“I think it also indicates an interest by some of the parties to confirm power-sharing principles that are based on narrow, tripartite, ethno-national labels, as opposed to any notion of accountability to all citizens.”

Other analysts echoed that view.

“There’s a bitter taste left in my mouth because this census has been approached with the question that dominates our daily politics, rather than in the way such an important task should be tackled, one that could provide a basis for future policies which could help us build a normal life here,” said Miodrag Zivanovic, a philosophy professor at the University of Banja Luka.

Long before any preliminary census results were released, politicians were quick to put their own spin on them, claiming they already knew the outcome.

Shortly after the census was completed, Sejfudin Tokic, head of the Bosniak Movement for Equality of People, said that “according to the preliminary findings we obtained from more than 2,000 observers of the census, we’re already able to say that 3.8 million people now live in BiH. Of that number, around 54 per cent are Bosniaks, while the percentage of Bosniaks in RS is around 17 per cent”.

Around the same time, the president of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), Dragan Covic, said that “the preliminary data suggest that the overall number of Croats in BiH is today about 570,000”.

But Damir Hadzic, from BiH’s ministry of communications, said that the data presented by political leaders was incorrect and that their sole goal was to “compromise the results of the census”.

“Adding up the percentages which political leaders from our country talked about, we might conclude that around 136 per cent of people live in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Hadzic said.

Because of the political posturing that was going on, the state agency for statistics released some preliminary results ahead of schedule – though none related to the controversial ethnicity and religion questions on the census form.

The numbers released show that 3,791,622 people were recorded in the census. They break down as 2,371,603 in the Federation (62.55 per cent), and 1,326,991 (35 per cent) in RS. About 2.5 per cent live in the self-governing Brcko district.

The number of those recorded in the census does not necessarily correspond exactly to the number of inhabitants of the country, but when compared with the last census of 1991, the figures show a decline of 580,000 people.

The full results will be announced in stages as the data is processed, beginning in July 2014 and continuing until July 2016.

The census had to be conducted in order for BiH to be considered for accession to the European Union, which will not accept a new member state without knowing how many people live there. It was the politicians, however, who pushed for questions about ethnicity and nationality to be included on the form.

“The insistence on the ethnic component being incorporated into the census enabled some to strengthen their ethnic base and others to generate fear,” said Martin Raguz of the Commission for the Law on the Census.

Serb politicians insisted on an entry on “entity citizenship”, and although this was an optional question, the media campaign run by politicians made some people think they were obliged to answer it.

RS president Milorad Dodik was quoted as saying that the entity citizenship question was a “crucial” and that his citizens “should not miss the chance to state they were citizens of Republika Srpska on the census form”.

Elsewhere, Bosnian Serb officials in Srebrenica and Bratunac urged people from those municipalities who currently reside in Serbia to return for the census, so that there would not be a fall in the number of Serbs.

And Mile Lasic, head of the Croatian Intellectual Assembly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, warned in a statement ahead of the census that fellow-Croats faced discrimination.

“It’s very important that as many Croats as possible get registered in the census, because this is a serious matter that requires engagement in order to stop Croats in BiH being deprived of their rights,” Lasic said.

Other politicians openly suggested what people should say on the census form so they that would not end up boosting the number of those registered as minorities rather than as one of the “constituent peoples”.

They also argued that if large numbers of Bosniaks put themselves down as “Bosnians”, this could reduce their numbers relative to the Serbs. One video campaign contained the slogan, “Be Bosniak so you won’t be an ‘other’.”

The term “other” has especially negative connotations in BiH, because the peace agreement that ended the war in 1995 divided certain top posts among the three “constituent peoples” – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

The constitution explicitly restricts membership of two elected institutions to “constituent” groups. These are the three-person presidency – conceived in Dayton as a Bosniak-Serb-Croat triumvirate – and the House of Peoples, a senate-style upper chamber with 15 seats divided equally among the three main groups, with no opportunity for others, like Roma or Jews, to enter it.

In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that these exclusive provisions were discriminatory. Politicians have yet to agree on a way to act on that decision, although BiH is under considerable of pressure to do so if it wants to continue negotiating for EU membership, especially since general elections are slated for 2014.

HOW WILL ETHNICITY INFORMATION BE USED?

The way the data gathered in the census will be used is still unclear, and this has led to concerns about possible abuse.

“People are afraid that if they declare themselves as Bosnian… or ‘others’, they will have a hard time getting a job in public administration,” Sarajevo filmmaker Ena Bavcic told IWPR. “People are not familiar with their basic human rights. A census should be anonymous; names should not be used in analysis of data. We don’t know what will happen in our case, since the statistics agency has retained the names but is guaranteeing protection of the data. I think fear of manipulation in the future makes people feel insecure.

One of Bavcic’s films is a short documentary called “Others”.

Census data is supposed to be disaggregated from the names of those who supply it, and this is the general standard worldwide.

But Perry, of PILPG, said that people did not have confidence that this will happen since no one knew exactly how the data would be used, or how the forms would be anonymised.

The situation is extremely frustrating for people like Vehid Sehic, head of the Forum of Citizens in Tuzla.

Sehic refused to define himself along ethnic lines on the census form. Instead, he regards himself as a “former Yugoslav” who lost his state. He says people like him practically “don’t exist” in the eyes of most politicians.

“It should be clear that minorities live in this country, as well as a group of people who refuse to declare their ethnicity. We shall certainly pursue equality [with] all other groups in BiH,” he told IWPR.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The census has given rise to fears that if its results show a radical change, this could affect the delicate power-sharing arrangements established under the Dayton agreement, which were premised on the 1991 census. While posts in two top-level structures – the three-person presidency and the House of Peoples – are fixed in an equal division among the constituent peoples – there might be scope for adjusting ethnic quotas in the two entities.

The 1991 census show that 43.47 per cent of the population was Bosniak, 31.21 per cent Serb and 17.38 per cent Croat. Just over five per cent declared themselves “Yugoslav” or something else.

Using formulae derived from the 1991 results, the government of the Federation has eight Bosniak ministers, five Croats and three Serbs. These proportions are based on the census returns from the territory that comprises the Federation as it was in 1991. The same goes for RS, where the entity government has 16 ministries, eight of them headed by Serbs, five by Bosniaks and three by Croats. Once again, the number of ministerial positions is derived from 1991 population figures for the area subsequently delineated as an entity.

The 1991 census results do not just affect the two entity governments. The proportions are mirrored in state institutions like the Central Bank and dozens of other agencies, in which quotas are based on the ethnic composition set out in the 1991 census. The same applies to ambassadors who are sent to represent BiH abroad.

Analysts say the census results on ethnicity could have a real impact on these arrangements, assuming that different political groups were able to agree on any changes. The individual constitutions of the Federation and RS were not determined by the Dayton agreement, which leaves them open to change.

The RS government, for example, would benefit from a change in arrangement, as this would almost certainly tilt the balance further towards Serb representatives.

For the moment, it remains an open question whether such a shift in ethnic representation will ever come about, and whether the census findings will be used in any way.

“Potentially, yes, [the census] could have a big impact on power-sharing structures, particularly if the results are used to inform public policy, either in terms of allocation of resources or in terms of positive discrimination measures that were put in place to ensure the participation of all three ethnic groups according to pre-war 1991 census data,” Perry said.

Although a major change in the power sharing structure seems a remote possibility, it explains the jockeying for power among various interest groups in the immediate aftermath of the census.

“Everyone wants to create the conditions for future talks on possible constitutional changes that would alter the share of power,” said Darko Brkan from the NGO Zašto Ne (“Why Not”).

Another potential complication is the fact that some legislation, including the election law, refers variously to “the 1991 census” and, more vaguely, “the last census”.

“So in these cases you could have very differing interpretations on how the 2013 data should be used,” Perry said.

She added that based on an initial review of state and entity laws, RS legislation tends to reference “the last census” while the Federation more often cites “the 1991 census.”

“This is not a minor distinction,” she said.

FAITH IN CENSUS INTEGRITY DENTED

The census was conducted by 19,000 workers who visited households in October to collect data, a process marked by a variety of controversies.

Dalio Sijah is an activist with Popis Monitor, a body set up by local NGOs to observe the process.

“Most of the objections coming from our citizens had to do with political manipulation,” Sijah said. “Citizens claimed that census workers suggested to them how to declare themselves in a national and ethnic sense.”

Popis Monitor received over 1,000 calls during the census, as well as 250 reports of irregularities submitted through its website. Over 100 alleged that census-takers prompted answers on how respondents should identify themselves.

In RS, two census workers were found trying to take completed forms across the border into Serbia, and another was caught filling out forms in a restaurant.

The census commission confirmed that three workers were suspended because of irregularities, and that all the census materials in their possession had been confiscated.

The census in five areas of the Srebrenica municipality is to be repeated because of problems that arose there.

Radomir Pavlovic, a politician from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, a Bosnian Serb party, and chairman of the municipal assembly in Srebrenica, said that he had seen unofficial information indicating that the number of people registered in Srebrenica during the census was twice as high as the number actually living there.

Dragan Cavic, the leader of the another party, the National Democratic Movement, has asked for an investigation into cases in Kotor Varos, where 20 to 30 people were registered as living in one household.

The Popis Monitor group pointed to numerous incidents where households were simply not included on the census in bigger towns like Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Bihac.

The Catholic archbishop of Upper Bosnia, Cardinal Vinko Puljic, raised similar concerns the day the preliminary results were published. He said he had evidence that census-takers refused to record some people in Sarajevo and in towns in RS, even though they lived there and owned property.

“There was a case in Derventa where a census worker told a man, ‘We chased you away from here once, and now you want us to register you again?’” the archbishop said.

Radmila Cickovic, director of the RS’s office of statistics, acknowledges that “there were many challenges related to organisation and logistics” during the census.

“There were some misunderstandings regarding certain census methodologies. People sometimes didn’t understand questions, and certain procedures were violated, but we reacted and suspended the census workers in question,” Cickovic said. “All in all, we can say we are satisfied.”

Perry warned that the controversies and irregularities reported during the census were likely to affect public confidence in the results.

“Because of significant misinformation, and because of the near laser-like focus on only the divisive identity-based questions, I think there’s going to be a real lack of confidence in the results of the sensitive questions, no matter what happens. That could trickle into other questions, because people don’t have faith or confidence in the process,” Perry said.

WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

About 20 million euro (27 million US dollars) was spent carrying out the census in BiH. Given the problems and controversies that have arisen, some wonder if it was money well spent.

Aside from the much-publicised questions about ethnic identity and religion, others left people baffled. For example, they were asked what kind of heating they had in their home, whether the bathroom was inside or outside the house, and the measurements of their kitchen.

Yet other indicators are not reflected. “We’re not going to know how many households in this country have a computer [or] car, we’re not going to know the average commute time for someone to get to their job, we’re not going to know how far the average household is from a health clinic or school,” Perry said. “There’s so much information that we’re not going to know, after an expensive exercise that massively undercut social confidence by including three questions that were not in fact required by any European [guidelines]. I think that’s unfortunate.”

Perry noted that the census only asked the “politically loaded question” about mother tongue, and not more generally about what languages people knew.

“How many people here speak English? Or German? I mean, that’s the type of information you would think that a country with a struggling economy and with a huge number of people who were displaced and acquired second or third languages [would want to know] in order to make wise economic decisions. But apparently not,” she said.

Other observers were even more critical.

“It’s clear from the form that the state does not care about the number of employed, about the income of a household, or absolute or relative poverty,” said Enver Kazaz, a political analyst and philosophy professor at the University of Sarajevo.

Many young people interviewed for this article were angry that the politics surrounding the census detracted attention from the issues that immediately concerned them – the struggle to find a decent job and pursue an independent, successful life.

As 24-year-old Milos Sarenac, who is currently out of work, put it, “We’ve been dealing with who belongs to which religion and nation for too long now, while living in a country that’s becoming poorer and poorer. I would like politicians to work on strengthening the economy, and to leave private matters like religion to their citizens.”

Boban Mitrovic, a 26-year-old from Foca in RS, is also unemployed.

“We are surviving, not living,” he said. “Only politicians and criminals are well off in this country. The rest of us are tired of all this. I don’t care whether Serbs outnumber others, or vice versa. What do bigger numbers mean to us when half of us aren’t working, or work for very little pay that’s barely enough to provide a minimum standard of living?“

Others interviewees expressed cynicism about the whole process.

“I don’t trust either this census or the government,“ said Tea Glizijan, a 23-year-old student in Banja Luka. “I believe the results will be faked as well.“

In the Federation, attitudes were similarly bleak.

“We live in a country in which the international community doesn’t negotiate with citizens, presidents or parliament, but with the heads of the six political parties. No census will change that,” said Bavcic, the filmmaker in Sarajevo.

Jasminka Hamza, an unemployed student in Sarajevo, said she had been disturbed by the political campaigning and the use of nationalist formulas during the census.

“Nationalism is the strongest weapon in a generation of fear, because if you mention the war to people, they will choose anything, just so they never have to live through it again,” she said.

Rachel Irwin is IWPR’s Senior Reporter in The Hague. Dzenana Halimovic and Drazen Huterer are IWPR reporters in Sarajevo. Maja Bjelajac and Mladen Lakic are IWPR reporters in Banja Luka and Eastern Sarajevo, respectively. This article was published at IWPR’s  TRI Issue 816.

The article Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bengal Under The English Rule (1757-1905) – Analysis

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When Bengal was colonized by the East India Company in the second half of the 18th century, it was the richest jewel on the British crown. Bengal by then had been ruled under Muslim rule for nearly six centuries. During this long period from 1203 to 1757, as the rulers of the territory of Bangalah (Bengal), Muslims held the administrative positions. And yet, when the territory was divided in 1905 – less than 150 years of English colonization – into East Bengal, which was to later become the province of East Pakistan in 1947 and subsequently the independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh in 1971, and West Bengal, which was to later become a state within the Republic of India – the Muslims of Bengal lagged behind their Hindu counterparts economically and politically. Why?

To understand the causes, it is necessary that we have a fairly good grasp of the political, economic and social landscape of the territory, at least dating back to the time of the fall of the last independent Nawab of Bengal – Siraj-ud-Dowla in 1757.

The Hindu ascendancy in Bengal was not entirely a British phenomenon. As a matter of fact, a section of Hindu community had prospered beyond measures during the Muslim, i.e., pre-1757 English, rule of Bengal. Many of them held important positions as ministers and generals during the Sultanate period of Ilyas Shah, before the Mughals came in the political scene of India. (Dr. Abdul Karim, Banglar Etihash, tr. History of Bengal: the Sultani Period, Dhaka (1998), p. 413) Many Hindus became filthy rich through such positions, and others through money lending to actually become the bankers (like the Rothschild family of our time) to the Nawab, and regrettably played the devious role which facilitated the downfall of the Nawabi rule.

During the Mughal period, Bengal existed mostly as one of its outlying provinces or Diwans and was locally administered by a Subedar (provincial governor), who acted as the representative of the Emperor. The Subedar was responsible for collecting taxes and revenues from subjects, a portion of which had to be sent to the Emperor and the remainder kept for meeting expenses for welfare of the province. He also maintained a standing army and police force to protect the territory against any potential attack from outside and preserve law and order. Land tax collection (usually a fifth of the agricultural produce) was done through the zamindars. (Ibid., p. 411) [In rare cases, e.g., in Benapole and Ghoraghat, feudal lords existed who instead of collecting taxes from the peasants paid an agreed upon sum of money as tax to the Muslim sultan to show his subservience to the higher authority. (ibid., p. 418)]

In Bengal, which was a Muslim majority territory, most of the zamindars were Muslims during the greater part of Sultani and Mughal rule (until 1717). But things started changing drastically from 1717 onward when Murshid Kuli Khan became the Subedar of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa (today’s Odissa and Jharkhand states of India). He held the position for ten years until 1727. During his rule, the Izaradar system emerged in which instead of the zamindars this new group became tax and revenue collectors. (Jadunath Sarkar, History of Bengal, 2nd vol., Dacca, 1948, p. 409) Within just two to three generations they were able to replace the zamindars and came to be known as not only zamindars but also in places as Rajas and Maharajas.

All the chosen Izaradars during Murshid Kuli Khan’s tenure were Hindus. He did this in order to avoid competition from fellow Muslim nobles who might vie for his high position. Before him, as noted by renowned historians in their vast works, all the top administrative positions were held by Muslims, esp. from the Uttar Pradesh. (Salimullah, Tarikh-e-Bangalah, pp. 403-4, 454)

The latter Nawabs of Bengal simply followed the precedence of keeping Hindu Izaradars, established by Murshid Kuli Khan. By 1757, when Nawab Siraj-ud-Dowla became the ruler of Bengal, these Hindu administrators have become strong enough to conspire and bring about his downfall. But there were some exceptions, as much as some of the Muslim nobles betrayed the Nawab during the fateful Battle of Plassey (1757) and sided with the forces of the East India Company that was led by Robert Clive.

One such betrayer, Mir Jafar, who came to be known as Lord Clive’s Donkey, became the next Nawab and his reign lasted only 3 years (1757-60). In a revolving door politics, he was replaced by Mir Kasim who tried to go against the wishes of the East India Company. He, too, was dethroned in 1763, and Mir Jafar was put back to power for the second time. After his death in 1765, his inept son Najm-ud-Dowla (1765-66) and younger brother Saif-ud-Dowla (1766), followed by son Mubarak-ud-Dowla ruled in succession.

By 1765, after the victory at the Battle of Buxar, the East India Company had won the Diwani (representation) from the Mughal Emperor, becoming the virtual ruler of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Those Nawabs since the fall of Siraj-ud-Dowla were merely title-holders by name only, and nothing else, for which they earned a pension out of the share of the collected revenue.

During Robert Clive’s dual rule, until 1774, the task of revenue collection was still at the hands of the puppet Nawabs who collected the same through their Hindu representatives – the nayeb-diwans (tax collectors/Izaradars). His EIC did not have the wherewithal to collect such taxes through its English employees and thus relied upon already existing system.

As to the share of the collected taxes, here is a breakdown: the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II in Delhi earned 2.6 million taka, the Nawab of Bengal 3.2 million taka and the East India Company (EIC) the rest of the collected revenue. (Anisuzzaman, Muslim Manosh o Bangla Shahitya (tr. Muslim Mindset and Bengali Literature), 1757-1918, Dhaka (1964), p. 6) [Note: Before Sultan Bahadur Shah Jafar was dethroned in the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny, he used to get a pension of 100,000 taka per month. Similar to Bengal, although the official date for downfall of the Mughal Empire is noted as 1857, the actual fall happened much earlier in 14 September, 1803, when General Lake of the EIC moved into Delhi with his British troops after capturing Aligarh. Since then Mughal rulers were drawing pension money from the EIC. (Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India, Partition and Independence)] Under the EIC administration, taxes multiplied exponentially and consequently, people suffered miserably.

Muslim peasants (i.e., the Rayats) who were at the bottom of the economic pyramid were the worst sufferers in this revenue collection system. It is worthwhile sharing here a letter from Lord Clive, dated 30 September, 1765, published in the Court of Directors of the EIC. He wrote: “The source of tyranny and suppression opened by the European agents acting under the authority of the Company’s servants and the numberless black agents and sub-agents acting also under them, will, I fear, be a lasting reproach to the English name in this country.” (Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India under early British Rule, 3rd ed., London (1908), p. 37) As already hinted, those so-called black agents were local Hindu tax collectors.

It should be also noted here that before the Battle of Plassey, Bengal was a very rich, prosperous province with enough for everyone to live a very decent life. As a matter of fact, the inhabitants of Bengal had a much better standard of living compared to most Europeans living at the time. But under the British rule, the tax burden became simply unbearable rising fivefold (from 10% to 50% of the value of the agricultural product) within a very short period of time. The agriculture sector was ruined by a faulty system, which encouraged cotton, opium poppy and indigo production over rice cultivation. Moreover, the EIC cared only about tax/revenue collection and nothing else. They did not do anything to improve the irrigation system.

To make things worse, the EIC imported products enjoyed duty-free entry into the local market while the reverse was not true for local made products, e.g., muslin, into the European market. The entire internal and external trade was monopolized by the EIC. The weavers were forced to weave cotton yarns beyond their capacity. Even under such savage, brutal, inhuman and ruthless work environment and tiring and back-breaking workdays, they would be paid so little that they could ill-afford having a full meal at the end of the day. Hunger and starvation was their lot. Many cut their own thumbs to avoid being put to this kind of forced labor, others sold everything including even their children to escape being punished by the revenue collectors, and many fled the country. (Ibid., Dutt, pp. 23-27)

In 1769 the EIC directors issued the new directives stipulating that the peasants should be forced to produce raw material and not finished cotton or silk (resham in Bangla) products, and that such activities could only be done in company owned properties (and not at farmer’s cottage). (Ibid., p. 45) Due to unfair trade practices, soon the entire cotton, muslin and silk industry got ruined. With one-way of flow of money out to the Great Britain, while nothing spent for the good of the farmers and the local people, it was only a question of time when a great famine would ravage the country.

That ominous event came in 1770 when a third of the population, nearly ten million people, starved to death what has been called the Great Famine of Bengal even though that year the EIC had the highest collection of revenue ever from the land. (ibid., pp. 52-53)

The EIC also came up with a new system for revenue collection. It is called the Sunset Law in which if either a revenue collector (i.e., zamindar) or a rayat (land holder) had failed to pay the previously decreed revenue by a certain sunset time, his territory would be auctioned off to the highest bidder. Almost all of these bidders were Hindu administrative officials, previously employed by Muslim zamindars. Many of them deliberately faulted upon payment on behalf of the Muslim zamindar so that later he could bid for the same territory using zamindar’s money. Many of the new zamindars were Hindu officials employed within the EIC’s government. These bureaucrats were ideally placed to bid for lands that they knew to be under-assessed and thereby profitable. In addition, their position allowed them to quickly acquire wealth through corruption and bribery. They could also manipulate the system to possess the land that they targeted.

So by 1790 all on a sudden most of the zamindars or revenue collectors happen to come from the Hindu community who were mostly absentee landlords that managed their newly acquired zamindary through local managers. Those new zamindars virtually became the oppressive hands of the EIC imposing heavy taxes on the peasants. The situation of Muslims simply worsened after the Permanent Settlement Act, concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1793, was enacted. Not only did the Muslim nobility, including the zamindars lost their properties, even the well-off farmers started losing their farmland as a result of company policy of high taxes, high usury rates charged by Hindu mahajons (moneylenders) and oppression of the new Hindu zamindars.

The EIC’s policy virtually ruined not only the agricultural sector in Bengal but destroyed its rural cottage industry. Consider, e.g., the case of Muslin – the finest fabric ever woven in the world, which weighed less than 10 grams per square yard. Till 1813, Dhaka muslin continued to sell in London with 75 per cent profit and was cheaper than the local British make fabrics. Alarmed at this competition, the British imposed 80 per cent duty on the imported Bengali product. But more than the duty, the EIC was bent on ruining the muslin trade by introducing machine-made yarn, which was introduced in Dhaka by 1817 at one-fourth the price of the Dhaka yarn. The Muslin weavers were also paid so little that their families remained hungry. Another unsavory fact associated with the destruction of this Dhaka Muslin industry was that the thumbs and index fingers of many yarn makers were chopped off by the British in order to prevent them from twisting the finer yarns required for the muslins, which would reduce the competitive edge that Muslin had enjoyed thus far over its counterpart fabrics made in Europe. While the machine generated British yarn was uniform in quality, something which could no longer be maintained by skilled weavers under inhuman company policy and practices, in 1840, Dr Taylor, a British textile expert, admitted: “Even in the present day, notwithstanding the great perfection which the mills have attained, the Dhaka fabrics are unrivalled in transparency, beauty and delicacy of texture.” The count for the best variety of Dhaka muslin was 1800 threads per inch, while the lesser varieties had about 1400 threads per inch.

With the destruction of the Muslin industry, in Dhaka alone, the population reduced from 150,000 to nearly 30,000. (Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age, 3rd ed., London (1908), p. 105)

Next consider the case of rice cultivators who were forced to grow indigo in their fields. The indigo planters who were Europeans left no stones unturned to make money. They mercilessly pursued the peasants to plant indigo instead of food grains. They provided loans, called dadon at a very high interest rate. Once a farmer took such loans he remained in debt for whole of his life before passing it to his successors. The price paid by the planters was meager, only 2.5% of the market price. So the farmers could make no profit by growing indigo. The farmers were totally unprotected from the brutal indigo planters, who resorted to mortgage or destruction of their property if they were unwilling to obey them. Government rules favored the planters who owned some 400 plantation sites in Bengal in the early 19th century. (Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India under early British Rule, 3rd ed., London (1908), p. 270)

By an Act in 1833, the planters were granted a free hand in oppression of the peasants. Even the Hindu zamindars, money lenders and other influential persons like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Darokanath Thakur sided with those oppressive planters. Sadly, the latter two Hindu intellectuals, both then die-hard supporters of the EIC rule in Bengal, propagated the myth that peasants were living happily under the Indigo Plantations. (A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism, 2nd ed., Bombay (1954), p. 113) Most of the oppressed peasants were Muslims. Facing severe oppression unleashed on them the farmers resorted to revolt against the joint forces of Indigo planters, EIC and the local Hindu zamindars, mahajons and their agents. But their resistance did not succeed against the superior and more lethal weapons used by the opposing side. After the failure of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, as a matter of fact, the oppression of the Indigo planters increased dramatically against the Muslim peasants, which in turn resulted in several protests across East Bengal.

In 1860 the British Raj was forced to investigate the matter and come up with new laws to curtail the oppression of the Indigo planters. A year earlier, in 1859, likewise the Bengal Rent Act allowed certain allowances to peasants against the zamindars and money-lenders. (Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age, p. 263)

Many of the Hindu zamindars were outright bigots and would penalize Muslim men heavily for keeping beard. In Sarfarazpur when the Muslim rayats declared not to pay such fines, they were attacked by Hindu vandals and their mosques were burned down. When their complaints were unheard in the police thana, the matter was brought to the notice of the Magistrate who also did nothing against the offenders. Then the matter was eventually brought to the notice of Calcutta Commissioner. When he, too, did nothing to redress the matter, Muslim peasants revolted under the leadership of Titu Mir. In Laoghata the oppressive Hindu zamindar Debnath Roy was killed. Muslim peasants also attacked Indigo plantations. But their resistance against the joint forces of the EIC, Hindu zamindars and mahajons could not last long against heavy weapons used by the English magistrates Alexander and Scott. Titu Mir and many of his gallant revolutionaries died in the battle field, and many were taken prisoners to serve long terms.

Hindu zamindars also imposed several types of taxes on Muslim peasants for Hindu festivals like the Durga puja. When Muslim peasants refused to pay such taxes they were beaten and their properties grabbed by Hindu zamindars. Dudu Mia (d. 1860), son of Haji Shariatullah, led a peasant’s revolt against such practices in Faridpur. To discourage such revolts, the Hindu zamindars filed false cases against Dudu Mia and his lieutenants. Dudu Mia was imprisoned and died in Alipur Prison in 1860.

[Interestingly, in Sheikh Mujib’s Incomplete Memoirs (published in Bangla by the University Press, Dhaka) he also mentions how the Hindu zamindars and landlords were adept in making those false cases against Muslim peasants in the early 20th century.]

An analysis of the post-Nawabi period in Bengal, thus, shows the very dismal state of Muslims. They had not only lost the political leadership at the top but had also fallen behind in all other counts.
As William Hunter’s report showed, Muslim upper and educated class before the EIC rule held mostly four important positions – defense, tax and revenue collection (which, as we have already noted, was transferred to Hindus by the time Nawab Murshid Kuli Khan), judicial and political administration. (W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musulmans, 3rd ed. London (1876)) With the replacement of the Muslim local nawabs and zamindars by the Hindu new masters, many Muslims started losing their jobs, and their economic conditions suffered miserably. With the EIC acquisition of Muslim Waqf properties through a series of laws enacted between 1793 and 1828, Muslim education, social and cultural institutions started suffering also. (A. R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims of Bengal, Dacca (1961), p. 32-3)

When English eventually replaced Farsi as the official language, Muslims found themselves in much disadvantage in the government employment sector, and they were no match against better educated and prepared Hindus. Between 1793 and 1814, the task of English education was essentially led by Christian missionaries, who with their too obvious aggressive missionary zeal and anti-Muslim bias helped further to discourage Muslim parents from sending their children to such English institutes. Many conservative Hindus, too, did not like to send their children to those Christian missionary schools.
For educated Hindus replacing Farsi with English was, however, not as emotionally challenging as it was for most Muslims, who resisted the change for a plethora of reasons. It is always difficult for the vanquished to adore anything from the victor. The Hindus, on the other hand, who were, politically speaking, second-class during the Muslim rule of India, saw the emerging opportunity with the old order being replaced with the new, and grabbed it faster and strongly. To further accelerate their climb up on the new ladder, set by the EIC, and later the British Raj, some of the Hindus did not mind even converting to Christianity.
In his doctoral work Professor Anisuzzaman challenged the notion that Muslims lagged behind Hindus in picking up English education on grounds of religion. With the closure of Islamic endowments and institutions, and lack of funding from the top, especially the EIC, the number of Muslim students declined. (Anisuzzaman, op. cit., pp. 28-36)

But more importantly, it was the poor economic condition of the Muslim peasants overall which did not allow them to send their children to modern English schools. For them to have some rudimentary Islamic education in the madrasa and then help out in the agricultural sector was considered more fruitful. Most of the schools where English was initially taught in the early 19th century were also located in and around Calcutta, and not around northern and eastern parts of Bengal where Muslims comprised a solid majority. As Professor A.R. Mallick argued, the EIC educational policy favored the Hindus rather than the Muslims. (Op. cit., pp. 189-93) Even when in 1833, English was included as a subject within the madrasa curriculum it did not help much in improving literacy rate amongst Muslims of Bengal, again because of poverty.

Economically, the Hindu community was better off during the EIC rule and could, therefore, afford to send its children to schools to get better educated, which helped them to get employed easily. These educated Hindus also favored their own community in every field further narrowing down the scope for upward mobility amongst the already disadvantaged Muslim community. A Hindu zamindar would often discourage Muslim education in his territory and would rather force a brilliant Muslim student who was desirous of attending college to become Magistrate one day to work in his office as a clerk or an attendant. If the Muslim father resisted such suggestions, often times he would be punished and his properties grabbed by the zamindar.

By 1851 only two Muslim students appeared in the Junior Scholarship Examinations from Kolkata Madrasa (one was Abdool Luteef). In the same period, likewise, only two Muslim students appeared in the same exam from Hooghly College, established by philanthropist Haji Mohsin. (Bimanbehari Majumdar, History of Political Thought, Calcutta (1934), vol. 1, p. 392) It is also worth noting here that tuition fees charged in madrasas were less than a quarter compared to Hindu schools where English was taught. But English was not introduced in Calcutta Madrasa until 1854. By 1856, the Muslim students comprised only about ten percent of the entire student population of Bengal – e.g., 731 out of a total of 7216. (Mallick, op. cit., pp. 277-8) In the school year of 1856-57 a total of 158 Muslim students took the English education and 7 passed the Junior Scholarship Exam in 1856. (ibid., pp. 253-5)

The Hindu community also had community leaders like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Ishwar Chandra who not only approved the British policy in Bengal, but also encouraged its folks to quickly adopt the English education which would benefit them in every aspect, and this their community did almost religiously. In 1816, Ram Mohan Roy collaborated with English educationists to establish the Hindu College. The graduates of this college played a vital role later. In 1824 the Sanskrit College was established to preserve and educate on Hindu culture.

Under British patronage, the history of India started to be rewritten distorting facts, periodizing her history along religious lines, showing that the majority Hindus were better off under British rule compared to under Muslim rule. Many of the educated Hindus enthusiastically participated in this divide-and-rule game, seeding the ground for partition of India in 1947. The poisonous role of Bengali Hindu writers like Bankim Chandra was highly problematic who helped to further widen the religious divide. The middle-class Hindus created social clubs, exclusively for Hindus, to propagate Hindutvadi philosophy, towards a future Hindu (Ram) Raj. Even the latter-formed so-called revolutionary, essentially terrorist, cells suffered from distinct anti-Muslim bias and Hindutvadi ideas. (Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Calcutta (1959), pp. 4-5) In 1882, Dayanand Saraswati organized a movement to ban slaughter of cows in India. And then in 1885 when Bal Gangadhar Tilak introduced Shivaji festival probably the death-bell for a united India was rung. As many of the Hindu extremists, Hindutvadis, became important party members within the Indian National Congress, it was not a question of if but when the country would be sliced along religious lines.

In contrast, Muslims were disorganized centrally and their struggles were mostly economic-centric and local, which were directed against oppressive British Raj and their planters, traders and agents – the zamindars and the mahajons. Although the local agents were all Hindus, the revolt movement was never anti-Hindu by any definition. Many Muslim leaders, especially the religious ones, did not call for or dream about the partition of India, and surely not Bengal, along religious lines, and as a matter of fact opposed it wholeheartedly almost to the bitter end.

Muslim community could not compete with and, thus, lagged behind the Hindu community without a modern, savvy intelligentsia, an educated middle class that has learned English and a bourgeoisie, on a substantial scale. What they needed was an intellectual uprising. And this was provided by a very unlikely character – a non-Bengali from Delhi by the name of Sir Syed Ahmed (1817-1898), who in so many ways was what Raja Ram Mohan Roy was for the Hindus of the early 19th century. He, too, like Roy, was a great admirer of the British Raj, and felt that salvation of Muslims lied in English education and cooperation, and not resistance or revolt.

In 1858, Sir Syed Ahmed founded a modern school in Muradabad. In 1864 he established the Translation Society. In 1869 he published a newspaper – Mohamedan Social Reformer. In 1873, he founded the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, which was to become later Aligarh University and to breed scores of luminous leaders who led the cause of Muslim subjects under the British Raj.
Not to be overlooked here is also the role of Nawab Bahadur Abdool Luteef Khan (1828-93) of Faridpur who was the first Bengali Muslim to have founded in 1866 the Mohamedan Literary Society in Calcutta, which had dual objectives: discussion around western (European) culture so as to encourage and reform Muslim thinking along that line, and to advise the British Raj through its advisory committees on matters pertaining to Muslims. It was the first of its kind in entire India for the Muslim community. Within four years its membership grew to 500. (Anisuzzaman, op. cit., p. 85)
The titles of Nawab and later Nawab Bahadur were bestowed on Abdool Luteef in 1880 and 1887, respectively, by the British Raj. He, too, like Sir Syed felt that English education was a must for Muslims for moving up the social and economic ladder. He vigorously campaigned for higher education of Muslims, and as a result of his work, the famous all-exclusive Hindu College in Calcutta was renamed Presidency College in which for the first time Muslims could enter.

As noted above, Sir Syed’s Translation Society was contemporary to Luteef’s Literary Society, which enjoyed some financial benefits from the government, usually from the office of the Lt. Governor of Bengal. Many English men of high rank within the British Raj used to join in its meetings. Many Muslim dignitaries like the Sultan of Mysore, Nawab of Oudh (Ajodhya), Nizams of Hyderabad and Murshidabad were its active members. Many of the Literary Society’s pro-British Raj activities ran opposite to those propagated by more conservative elements within the Muslim society which advocated self-rule and resistance and not subjugation and collaboration. It also opposed views of Justice Syed Ameer Ali who had founded the National Mohamedan Association in 1877 and was highly critical of educational policy of the British Raj on matters pertaining to Muslims.

It is obvious that there were serious divisions and disagreements within the Muslim community – from top to bottom. Many of the pro-British Muslim subjects like Sir Syed did not want to join in the national convention for Indian Muslims in 1882 that was called by the National Mohamedan Association.

Nevertheless, the efforts of pro-British pioneers within the Muslim community paid off to better the dismal economic condition of their lot. The awareness level about the benefit of English education under the Raj was much higher, and there were more educated people within the community. With better economy, esp. in the late 18th century, as a result of growing demand of jute and rice, which were mostly produced in Muslim-majority East Bengal, the overall condition of Muslims started taking an upturn. Many of the previously poor Muslim peasants now for the first time could afford to send their children for higher education. Hunter’s report also provided the necessary background for the British Raj to establish madrasas in Chittagong, Rajshahi and Dhaka where English was taught. (Anisuzzaman, op. cit., p. 89) The inclusion of Bengali, Farsi and Arabic subjects as part of the optional curriculum for the bachelor’s degree in Calcutta University and appointment of Muslim teachers for teaching English at the high school level greatly reduced the educational backwardness of Muslims. The scholarship from the Haji Mohammad Mohsin Fund also helped greatly to spread education amongst poor Muslims who previously could not afford paying the tuition and boarding bills.

As a result, in 1871, 14.7% of the Muslim population in Bengal had education at school and college levels. This number rose up to 23.8% by 1881-2. But such advances in literacy rate did not necessarily translate into higher percentage of government jobs since there was no quota system for Muslims in the employment sector, and they had to compete with Hindus for such jobs.

With competition in jobs came rivalry – social and political, and the short-lived division of Bengal in 1905, which was popular amongst most Muslims but unpopular with Hindus who felt that their monopoly in Calcutta-based trading and commerce was now threatened by raw material producing East Bengal. This rivalry would lead to the foundation of the All India Muslim League in 1906 as a counter weight to the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, which was formed much earlier, and eventually to the emergence of a truncated Pakistan with two wings – East Pakistan (formed mostly out of East Bengal) and West Pakistan (which comprised parts of the territories of Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan) separated by India in the middle.

The article Bengal Under The English Rule (1757-1905) – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


CHAN To Build On South Africa’s 2010 World Cup legacy

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The third Orange African Nations Champions (CHAN), to be played early next year, will allow South Africa to build on the positive legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the 2013 Africa Cup of Nations.

Briefing the media following the national executive’s last meeting for the year on Thursday, Acting Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Minister Angie Motshekga said Cabinet welcomes the 16 African nations and their supporters, who will be participating in the third CHAN tournament in January next year.

The tournament for home-based footballers will be staged between January 11 and February 1 in South Africa.

“The tournament also presents an opportunity for South Africans to showcase our country as a vibrant tourism, trade and investment destination and it will further help to entrench social cohesion and national pride,” she said.

South Africa, who has been drawn alongside Nigeria, Mali and Mozambique, will be competing at the CHAN for the second time with a makeshift team losing to Algeria in the 2011 quarter-finals in Sudan.

The article CHAN To Build On South Africa’s 2010 World Cup legacy appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The People’s Sanctions – OpEd

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How Nelson Mandela and ordinary citizens from all over the world strong-armed corporations, changed U.S. foreign policy, and ended apartheid in South Africa.

By Francis Njubi Nesbitt

A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. —Woodrow Wilson, 1919  

Are economic sanctions an effective alternative to the use of force in international relations? Scholars are divided on the issue. Many have questioned Wilson’s judgment.

Yet the passing of Nelson Mandela brings to mind one grassroots campaign for economic sanctions that brought down a ruthless racial minority government: The campaign for sanctions against South Africa.

The anti-apartheid movement was one of the first grassroots campaigns to use economic sanctions to depose a government. It is a remarkable example of how a small group of activists helped change the course of history.

Citizens all over the world—from employees of transnational corporations and account-holders in major banks to consumers, cities, states, colleges, and universities—divested funds from companies that did business with South Africa. The goal was to cut apartheid South Africa off from the rest of the world.

By the 1980s, most of the world’s countries had imposed political, economic, and military sanctions on the South African regime. The exceptions were South Africa’s major trading partners: the United States and Britain. These countries disingenuously argued that sanctions would hurt black Africans most.

In the United States, however, a vigorous grassroots movement demanded that cities, states, pension funds, banks, and universities divest their resources from companies doing business in South Africa, making it a liability for anyone to do business in the racially segregated state. Eventually, international corporations pulled out in a massive exodus that helped to bring down the apartheid system.

Civil Disobedience

This movement used nonviolent direct action tactics to pressure corporations, universities, and eventually Congress to impose sanctions on South Africa for its apartheid policies. It was launched on November 21, 1984, when four African-American leaders entered the South African embassy in Washington, DC and refused to leave until the South African regime dismantled apartheid and released all political prisoners.

TransAfrica founder Randall Robinson, U.S. Congressman Walter Fauntroy, U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner Mary Frances Berry, and law professor Eleanor Holmes Norton had been invited to discuss U.S.-South African relations with South African ambassador Bernadus G. Fourie. But the conversation they helped to launch reverberated far beyond the embassy walls.

After spending a night in jail, the four announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) and began daily demonstrations outside the embassy. “Ours was an act of conscience in response to the repressive action of the South African government with respect to the noble, nonviolent protests of black South Africans over the last few months,” Fauntroy told reporters after the anti-apartheid activists were released on November 22.

Fauntroy said the FSAM would appeal to the conscience of grassroots Americans and move the struggle to “a new level.” He said this shift in strategy was necessary because efforts to persuade Congress to impose sanctions had failed. He called for demonstrations to be held daily outside the embassy and at South African consulates throughout the country.

The sit-ins took hold in more than two dozen other cities, including Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, New York, San Francisco, and Cleveland, with weekly demonstrations at South African consulates, federal buildings, coin shops that dealt in gold Krugerrand coins, and businesses with South African interests. Meanwhile, hundreds of public figures, including Gloria Steinem, Harry Belafonte, Amy Carter, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, Coretta Scott King, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and at least 22 members of Congress were arrested outside the embassy in Washington.

Soon, reporters began to compare the sit-ins to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Eight days after the first sit-ins, The Washington Post reported: “The anti-apartheid movement, in the space of a few weeks, appears to have galvanized black support like no other social issue since the civil rights movement of 20 years ago.”

“It could have been a scene from the civil rights movement of the 1960s,” Time magazine added: “a large crowd of demonstrators, most of them black, marching in peaceful protest down an avenue in Washington, chanting slogans and carrying signs. But the series of rallies that have been taking place on Embassy Row during the past two weeks are against racism in another country; the apartheid government of South Africa.”

The movement was a coalition of religious, student, civil rights, and women’s groups. It spread quickly to hundreds of college campuses across the country, where rallies and sit-ins questioned the investment of university pension funds in companies doing business with South Africa. Hundreds of students were arrested at institutions like Harvard, Columbia, the University of California, the University of Wisconsin, Northwestern University, and the University of Illinois. Over 5,000 people were arrested across the country in a 12-month period.

In 1985, Citibank announced that it would no longer provide South Africa with loans. Later that year, Chase Manhattan refused to roll over short-term credit and demanded that South Africa repay its debts in full. Other banks followed suit. These financial sanctions had a devastating effect on South Africa’s economy. But activists still needed Congress to impose comprehensive sanctions.

Sanctions

The movement was finally vindicated in October 1986, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act over President Reagan’s veto. The Act was a major success for the Congressional Black Caucus, the Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica, and other organizations and activists who had worked for decades to get Congress to pass a sanctions bill.

In 1988, Congress strengthened sanctions against South Africa, banning all trade, investment, and bank loans. It prohibited intelligence and military cooperation between Washington and Cape Town, cut air links, banned all exports and imports, and prohibited U.S. ships from carrying oil destined for the country, leading almost immediately to a 50-percent drop in trade with South Africa. The European Parliament followed suit soon after.

These sanctions meant total isolation for the apartheid regime. Within months, the country’s economy was on the verge of collapse. It was clear that it could not survive without sustaining its trade and financial ties to the West. Liberals and business leaders in the country demanded reforms.

The crisis forced South African President F.W. de Klerk to the negotiating table. On February 11, 1990, he announced the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. The pressure continued to come from the left and right, eventually forcing de Klerk to announce multiracial elections in 1994.

Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president in April 1994 after South Africa’s first free election. He formed a National Unity government that included de Klerk as one of the deputy presidents. Mandela also convened the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate and report on crimes committed by the state and other groups between 1948 and 1994. The TRC held its first hearings in 1996.

The greatest accomplishment of the Government of National Unity was the adoption of a new constitution in 1996. The constitution included a bill of rights that guaranteed equality and prohibited the state from discriminating against individuals for any reason, including race, sex, gender, or racial and ethnic origin. It prohibited such apartheid-era abuses as detention without trial, torture, and the limitation of movement.

Despite the political demise of apartheid, its effects are still evident in the economic sphere. Nearly two decades later, South Africa’s white minority still owns over 80 percent of agricultural land and remains in control of the economy. Recent reports indicate that racial inequality has actually grown since 1994. The ANC’s neo-liberal policies have not redistributed resources or reduced poverty to any significant degree.

But the challenges that remain are precisely what make the lessons learned so far valuable. The successful use of sanctions to bring down the apartheid regime is one of the more obscure lessons of the anti-apartheid movement led by Nelson Mandela, but it was an early and integral part of it: The liberation movement called for international sanctions as early as 1952, and the ANC in exile led the sanctions movement around the world.

This was a remarkable movement that mobilized millions of ordinary people to express their opposition to apartheid by withdrawing their support from companies that insisted on doing business with South Africa. This people’s movement eventually forced these corporations to withdraw from South Africa and even changed U.S. foreign policy, a remarkable feat by any measure. This is a lesson that contemporary social movements would do well to study and emulate.

Foreign Policy in Focus contributor Francis Njubi Nesbitt is a professor of Africana Studies at San Diego State University. He is the author of Race for Sanctions and has published numerous book chapters and articles in academic journals.

The article The People’s Sanctions – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Al-Qaeda’s Governance Strategy In Raqqa, Syria – Analysis

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By Chris Looney for Syria Comment

  • “Every 15 minutes someone poured water on me, electrocuted me, kicked me, and then walked out,” says one activist in an interview with CNN.
  • “They beat me with a rifle and with their hands when they arrested me,” says another in a conversation with BBC. “And they threw a wheel on my back so I couldn’t move.

Such is the situation in Raqqa, a city in northeastern Syria with approximately one million inhabitants now under control of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the most powerful Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliate currently operating in Syria.

Since ISIS came to power in May, its abuse of Raqqa’s citizens has been well documented. It has begun to enforce its extreme interpretation of Islam upon the city’s residents, forcing women to “cover their beauty,” banning tobacco products, and brutally repressing dissident voices.

On the surface, this violence appears to be indiscriminate and irrational. Yet, it is also organized and tactical. For a group that has never before fully controlled a large city, the transition from insurgent to administrator has hardly been smooth. Still, ISIS has managed to develop a robust, systemic strategy of governance for Raqqa that links the city to sister strongholds in Iraq. Through the control of goods and services, ISIS has made the city’s residents dependent on it. As intricate as it is oppressive, this strategy is serving ISIS well; ISIS has consolidated its authority in Raqqa as it expands its reach over much of eastern Syria and Iraq.

ISIS Gains Control

Ar-Raqqah, Syria

Ar-Raqqah, Syria

Raqqa remained relatively calm throughout the first two years of the revolution. A city with roughly 240,000 residents before the war, the population quickly swelled to one million as refugees fled the escalating conflict. Still, strong ties between local tribal leaders and the regime ensured stability in the province, allowing Assad to retain control despite committing minimal forces to the region. Thus, as support for Damascus eroded and rebel forces began to move in towards Raqqa in late February, they were able to take the city with relative ease.

As the first provincial capital to fall fully into rebel hands, the March 4 takeover of Raqqa was a significant step forward for the opposition. The victors were a contingent of rebel battalions that included Ahfad al-Rasul, a moderate Islamist group with strong ties to the Western-backed Supreme Military Council (SMC), Jabhat al-Wahdet al-Tahrir al-Islamiyya, a small regiment of local militias, and Ahrar al-Sham, a powerful Salafist brigade.

Looming among them was another group active in the campaign to liberate Raqqa that was perhaps more formidable than the other three combined. Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), at the time the only AQ affiliate fighting in Syria, would soon exert its authority in the city.

Bolstered by deep pockets and a strong alliance with Ahrar al-Sham, JN pushed forth a strict Islamic agenda. Despite this and its subsequent record of civil and human rights abuses, the group at least managed to avoid alienating the entire community. Speaking to The Telegraph, one storeowner put it simply. “I like Jabhat,” he said. “They are better than the regime at any rate.

A big reason for this was JN’s deep local ties. Even with its links to AQ, which were not made public until April, many of the group’s fighters were still Syrian, some even from Raqqa province. Thus, they were able to forge more intimate connections among the community. “They don’t wear face masks,” said one resident while speaking with Syria Deeply. “People have friends who are in al-Nusra.”

Yet Nusra’s rule in Raqqa would be short lived. In April, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, head of what was then known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), announced that JN would be merged with ISI to form ISIS.

JN’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Golani, rejected this union, asserting his group’s independence and, for the first time publicly, swearing allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of AQ. Despite al-Zawahiri’s June order that the two remain separate, al-Baghdadi forged ahead in his attempt to integrate the groups.

In Raqqa he was particularly successful. JN had been formed with strong support from ISI, and a significant number of its fighters had fought in Iraq and remained loyal to al-Baghdadi.

By May, ISIS had lured away many of JN’s forces in Raqqa. This, combined with an influx of foreigners as ISIS made its way into Syria, cemented al-Baghdadi’s takeover. The group celebrated its victory with the execution of three Alawites in a town square on May 14.

As ISIS solidified its authority, the violence only increased. Protests became a nightly ritual throughout the summer, reaching a crescendo in mid-August when ISIS responded to a gathering by firing rocket-propelled grenades into the crowd. While JN had clashed with the more moderate brigades in Raqqa, ISIS turned these disputes into a verifiable war. The group used a series of four suicide car bombings to take out the leadership of Ahfad al-Rasul, a battalion that enjoyed strong support from the local population. It even squabbled with JN in an attempt to assert itself as the sole legitimate AQ affiliate in the city.

By late September, many battalions had resorted to an alliance with JN, believing it to be the only force left in the city still capable of countering ISIS. But this had little effect, as ISIS retained control and by November had received pledges from 14 local tribes, presumably out of fear. As one activist glumly put it in an interview with Syria Deeply – “We have a saying in Arabic. The hand that you cannot beat: kiss it, and pray that it breaks.”

The Governance Strategy of ISIS

ISIS shows no signs of weakening in Northern and Eastern Syria. On the contrary, because of its strategy of governing ISIS has grown stronger in the face of increased opposition to its rule.

ISIS placed greater importance on asserting full control over the city than on winning the goodwill of the populace. It solidified its rule through intimidation, rather than the more diplomatic means that Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) had employed. This strategy was evident by the public executions of May 14 that the group used to announce its presence. From that day, ISIS began to arrest dissidents. It currently holds approximately 1,500 prisoners in Raqqa, often mistreating and torturing them.

A pillar of this crackdown has been the Islamification of the city. Christians, who have a long history in Raqqa and who made up 10% of its population before the war, were not aggressively persecuted under JN. Though churches were closed and services suspended, families were able to remain and continue their lives unmolested.

Yet as ISIS gained control, violence against Christians increased. The group held public bible burnings, destroyed churches, and kidnapped priests, causing most of the city’s Christians to flee.

Despite the ensuing backlash, these actions did achieve a significant strategic objective for ISIS, an organization that makes no pretense about preserving minority rights. By expelling Christians, it has paved the way for a series of indoctrination programs that aim to promote both religious purity and the AQ principles through youth reeducation and a careful manipulation of civil society.

For ISIS, this is a long term strategy. The group seems confident in its ability to maintain power for an extended period of time, and while it is comfortable sustaining its rule through coercion in the short term, ISIS has also engineered a series of initiatives aimed at rebuilding its reputation among the community.

In addition to writing textbooks for schools, ISIS has sought to reframe itself as part of the mainstream revolution, countering the widely held belief among locals that it either collaborates with the regime or is made up primarily of foreigners who have no connection to Syria. Many of its prisoners are labeled as regime sympathizers, and the Alawite population has been driven from the city.

In addition, it has targeted media outlets in an attempt to control the flow of information. In early November, the Raqqa Information Center (RIC) shut its doors after one of its correspondents was beaten and “accused of treason and espionage.” In casting the RIC as hostile towards the revolution and implying a connection with the regime, ISIS has continued in its bid to reposition itself as liberators moving the city forward into the post-Assad era rather than as an occupying force regressing to autocracy.

The shutdown of the RIC and other media outlets has also served to somewhat isolate Raqqa from the rest of Syria. Though residents still have many other ways to access information, the media blackouts have been reinforced by other actions designed to create an environment where Raqqans are increasingly dependent on ISIS for basic goods and services. In September, ISIS closed the only remaining foreign exchange office in Raqqa, which had allowed money to be sent into the province from abroad. The group also controls the majority of wheat and oil coming into the city and provides food relief packages to families throughout the region. As this dependence increases, ISIS undoubtedly hopes it can transform it into loyalty and gain popularity among the community.

In implementing this strategy of dependence, ISIS has also expanded the connection between the territory it controls in eastern Syria and its strongholds in Iraq. For an organization that does not recognize colonial borders, fusing the two regions is of key strategic importance as it works towards the establishment of an Islamic emirate. The flow of funding from Iraq into Syria has been a source of strength for ISIS, allowing it to outpace rival opposition groups. Through extortion and other criminal techniques, ISIS is able to raise an estimated $8 million a month in Mosul alone.

By using this funding to take advantage of poorly governed territories in Raqqa, eastern Syria, and Anbar province, ISIS has carved out a safe haven from which it has the ability to conduct external operations. Although ISIS may be focused on consolidating its rule locally and expanding its sway within Syria and Iraq for the time being, attacking the West remains a long term strategic objective.

Conclusion

Since its takeover of Raqqa in May, ISIS has employed a governance strategy that has focused on solidifying its rule through intimidation, creating an economy of dependence, and seeking to integrate eastern Syria with its strongholds in Iraq

In this regard it has been highly successful. Yet its hostility towards minority groups, draconian legal system, and brutal repression of dissidents has generated a significant backlash, severely undermining the group’s credibility and keeping it from being seen as a legitimate part of the opposition. Because of this, ISIS’ current governance strategy is likely unsustainable.

Still, ISIS thrives on instability, and as the Syrian war reaches its 1,000th day with no end in sight, the group is likely to be able to maintain its hold in Raqqa. Whether it can learn from its mistakes remains to be seen, but absent a dramatic shift in the trajectory of the conflict, ISIS is here to stay.

Chris Looney, Syria analyst working in DC: clooney@colgate.edu – twitter @looney_89.

The article Al-Qaeda’s Governance Strategy In Raqqa, Syria – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lanka Regime Change Not A Viable Solution – OpEd

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By S. V. Kirubaharan

The 1987 Indo- Lanka accord recognized the North East of the island of Sri Lanka as the hereditary land of the Tamil people. Under this internationally agreed arrangement, the North and Eastern provinces were merged as one administrative unit.

Unfortunately less than a year after Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as President, the merger of the North and Eastern provinces was brought to an end on 16 October 2006, after systematic manipulation. The President’s voice, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna – JVP and then Chief Justice, Sarath N. Silva played an important role in this.

The President who ordered the National anthem to be sung only in Singhalese and who scrapped the Ministry which handled human rights, continues to cheat the International community by chanting the sweet word, “reconciliation”. What is lacking for Mahinda Rajapaksa to implement a viable political solution for the people who have demanded their fundamental rights for more than six decades?

The excuse given by the government is that a problem which lasted three decades cannot be solved in two or three years. So, why did they assure the international community that as soon as terrorism was wiped out, the ethnic problem would be settled?

As far as the realities, experience and history are concerned, regime change in Sri Lanka is not a viable solution for accountability and reconciliation. It is a myth created by some stooges who see benefit in it for themselves. As far as the ethnic conflict is concerned, every government in power has wanted to find a pretext to justify not solving the ethnic problem, rather than find a solution. A few examples follow:

Two third majority

In 1970, Srimavo Bandaranayke had a two third majority in the parliament. She used that to strip away the minimum political safeguards that the Tamils had under the Soulbury constitution.

Ceylon became a “Republic” on 22 May 1972, ushering in a Sinhala-Supremacist Republican Constitution, which made Buddhism the state religion.

The leftist parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party – LSSP and the Communist Party – CP who were for equal rights and were in coalition with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party – SLFP, drafted the new constitution, and gave a prominent place for Buddhism and the Singhalese. They not only ignored the ethnic issue, they also removed the minimum protection provided in the Soulbury constitution . It is true that not all members of the LSSP and CP supported this view, but it cannot be denied that the leaders fully endorsed it.

In 1977, J.R. Jeyawardena of the United National Party – UNP became the Prime Minister, with a five-sixths majority in Parliament. He enacted a new constitution that made him the 1st Executive President of Sri Lanka. The Republic of Sri Lanka was renamed as the “Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka”. Using the same majority in Parliament, J. R. Jeyawardena introduced the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979, banning the Tamil militant organisations. The militancy had started only after three previous decades of non-violent protests had failed.

Then again on 8 August 1983, J. R. Jeyawardena enacted the sixth amendment to the constitution and rejected any demand for external right to self-determination for the Tamils.

The Sixth amendment, the PTA and the Emergency Law provisions became the instruments through which severe repression was unleashed on the Tamil people.

In 1989 R. Premadasa, in 1993 D. B. Wijetunga and in 1994 Chandrika Kumaratunga became the Presidents of Sri Lanka. Unlike Srimavo Bandaranayke and J. R. Jeyawardena, they had a simple majority in parliament. This was a good excuse for the three of them to continue the war saying that they were unable to bring any political solution without a two third majority in parliament. Like J. R. Jeyawardena they carried out indiscriminate bombings, killings, massacres etc in the North and East.

In fact, government propagandists are diplomatically admitting that from 1948 to 1983 mistakes were made because it was the period when the Tamils demanded their political rights, only through non-violent methods. During this period two pacts signed between the Tamil leaders and Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka (always Singhalese) were arbitrarily broken by the government. The unarmed Tamils were massacred, burned to death, raped and their properties were looted and destroyed in all parts of the island by the Sri Lankan security forces and Sinhala thugs. There were six anti-Tamil pogroms unleashed – 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983.

How many Tamil MPs in Colombo?

Presently Mahinda Rajapaksa has a two third majority in the parliament. He uses this majority only for his own benefit – removing the obstacles for him to stand in the Presidential elections any number of times in future. He also uses his two third majority to take revenge on whoever is not obedient to him and his family.

This is Sri Lankan politics and attitude. In other words, whether it is UNP or SLFP or any other party in power, there has never been any commitment to devolution of powers to the Tamils even at a minimum level.

In fact the total opposite is true. Recent statements and speeches show obvious commitment to rampant colonising of the Tamil regions! They say that if 60% of the Colombo population are Tamils, why can the Singhalese not live in the North and East?

If this statistic of 60% of the Colombo population being Tamil is correct, then how many Tamil parliamentarians are elected in Colombo? Those who talk about such figures should be able to explain why no Tamil parliamentarians are elected from Colombo.

Truly speaking, mistrust has taken very deep root among the majority of the people in each community in Sri Lanka. The moderates are minorities within their own community and have no voice.

Extra-judicial killing of Rohana Wijeweera

Look at the attitude of the extreme political party, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna – JVP. They are not worried about what happened to their members who were affected in their armed struggle against the state in 1971 and 87 to 89. On 13 November 1989, Rohana Wijeweera was captured alive. Without any inquiry or legal process, he was killed on the following morning and the security forces cremated his body. This extra-judicial killing committed by the Sri Lankan security forces is ignored by the JVP. If anyone is interested to know more about this story, read the book, “A soldier’s version”, written by Rtd Major General Sarath Munasinghe.

On 10 November, 2004, BBC Sinhala service, “Wijeweera murder investigation not priority – JVP”

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2004/11/041110_wijeweera.shtml

Since the killing of Rohana Wijeweera, his wife widow Srimathi, four daughters and two sons were taken in to ‘government care’ and now their house is located inside the Welisara Navy Camp. Why has their freedom been denied by every government? Are any members or the Minister of the JVP concerned about them? No.

But when it comes to the Tamil people, the JVP was in the forefront to file a case on the merger of the North East. Who motivated them? Some say Indian decision makers motivated Mahinda Rajapaksa and then he used the JVP and Sarath N. Silva to achieve his goal. In other words, the advice for the demerger of the North Eastern provinces was a gift given by India, in return for Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bogus promises. India trusted Rajapaksa too much, overlooking the fact that the North and East are predominantly Tamil-Speaking and the historical habitation of the Tamil People.

Demerger of North and East

The bench of five judges of the Supreme Court on the demerger of the North East were all Singhalese: Sarath N. Silva Chief Justice; Nihal Jayasinghe; N. K. Udalagama; A.R.N. Fernando Judge; R.A.N.G. Amaratunga. They unanimously declared that the merger of the Northern Province with the Eastern Province was unconstitutional, illegal and invalid.

The interesting news is that the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, Mr Wigneswaran is a person equal to these five, he too was a Chief Justice. He said during his campaign in the Provincial council election that the North and East should be merged together. This is the position of the TNA manifesto as well.

At the beginning of the Supreme Court order President Rajapaksa said that he would make a careful study of the decision of the Supreme Court. (BBC Sinhala, 16 Oct 2006)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2006/10/061016_northeast.shtml

On 6 January 2010, President Rajapaksa stressed that he would never merge the North and the East under his administration. http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201001/20100106i_will_never_merge_north_east.htm

Is the Sri Lankan judiciary independent from the President? If so, how come the President called the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to meet him to discuss its functions? The JSC refused and they faced the consequences.

Then what is happening to the criminal charges faced by Douglas Devananda and Rishard Bathurdeen who are Ministers in the present government. What action the Sri Lankan Judiciary was able to take against these Ministers? I can quote a few other examples.

Oslo declaration

What is happening to the highly controversial “Oslo Declaration” of 5 December 2002? Introduced at the conclusion of the 3rd session of peace talks between Sri Lanka government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – LTTE, the “Oslo Declaration” stated that “the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self determination in areas of historical Tamil habitation of the Tamil speaking peoples based on a federal structure within a federal framework within a united Sri Lanka.”

In fact the Norwegian government, the Co-chairs and Sri Lanka owe an explanation to Tamils as to why the “Oslo Declaration” was ignored, even after Sri Lanka eliminated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – LTTE. The donor countries, European Union; Japan; Norway; and the United States known as Co-chairs, met in Oslo on 25 November 2002 and laid a foundation for lasting peace in Sri Lanka.

The man who represented the government of Sri Lanka during the peace talks was Prof G. L. Peiris. He is the present Minister of External Affairs and travels the world, justifying Sri Lanka. Like Chandrika Kumaratunga did before him, he pleads with countries, complaining that Sri Lanka is a developing country and not to support any resolution against it.

Statistics

During the merger of the North Eastern provinces the statistics of the population in the area was 65% Tamil; 18% Tamil speaking Muslim and 13% Singhalese. When the Eastern province is considered as a single unit, according to 1981 statistics, the population was 40% Tamil; 32% Tamil speaking Muslim and 26% Singhalese. These figures speak volumes.

What does development in a country mean? The continuous improvement in standard of living and quality of life of the citizens are known as development. However, Human rights and security are also part of development. The promotion and protection of human rights, guarantees against oppression and discrimination; stability for investment and growth all count very much on security for the people.

In the North an East – reconstruction of roads, buildings, bridges, villages which were destroyed in bombing and shelling does not necessarily contribute to development. Of course, what is happening in the down South of Sri Lanka is development – New airport, new harbour, extension of railway track, new highways, etc. The question posed is – why all these happening only in the South but not in other parts of Sri Lanka? Is it to re-establish the Kotte Kingdom in the future?

Chandrika Kumaratunga

Those who are in favour of regime change in Sri Lanka should go through the interviews and statements of Chandrika Kumaratunga who was the President from November 1994 to November 2005. For example, listen to Chandrika Kumaratunga’s BBC HardTalk interview of 31 October 2001. It is well known that she is the only person who can defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa in the next Presidential election. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ByE3W4NKMA

President Chandrika Kumaratunga told South African television that Tamils were not the “original” people of Sri Lanka. “They are wanting a separate state, a minority community which is not the original people of the country,” she said in the interview. (Excerpt)http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981117/32150274.html

In fact Tamils lived in this island for more than 3000 years and there are historical evidence for it.

General Sarath Fonseka

General Sarath Fonseka who contested the last Presidential election said the following : “…thirteenth amendment is now out dated. It was dated 20 years ago, during the war. Now we have better understanding within the communities. We have better respect towards communities. There is no mistrust…all the communities to live together, like take example from America, how blacks and the white live together. They live like one country one nation…Still live together as one Nation…” (Excerpt –http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NY3C-Lwb3k

On 23 September 2008, General Sarath Fonseka said to Stewart Bell of National Post – Canada, that – “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people,” he says. We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country. We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.” (Excerpt) http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=832374

Opposition UNP and TNA

President D. B. Wijetunga from May 1993 to November 1994 of the UNP said, “minorities are like creepers clinging to the Sinhala tree.” (Excerpt) http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981117/32150274.html

President J.R. Jeyawardena from February 1978 to January 1989 of the UNP said, “I am not worried about the opinion of the Tamil people. Now we cannot think of them, not about their lives or their opinion. The more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala people will be here. Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people will be happy.” Daily Telegraph, UK 11th July 1983

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/03/commentary-plucked-peace-flower/

Regarding the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s purported future visit to war torn Northern province, the chief opposition UNP Whip ,John Amaratunga said last week in Parliament that, “if the Indian PM arrives in Sri Lanka without an invitation from the Sri Lankan President, he should not be allowed to come here. John Amaratunga further said that ‘they suspect that this move is an attempt to separate the country’.

I think these few examples are enough for the International community and the local polity to understand that regime change in Sri Lanka is not a viable solution for the ethnic question or for accountability. Those who are for regime change either want to let Rajapaksa(s) off the hook, or they expect their favourites to form a new government where they can have their shares!

Regime change in Sri Lanka will only pave the way for an excuse from the international community that, a new regime needs time and space for its transitional period. By that time Tamil people would be completely wiped out from the North and East. It is obvious that a new regime will not accommodate anything new on accountability and reconciliation. This unchallengeable fact has to be understood by the international community.

Albeit this is my point of view, I am not advocating anyone to vote for Rajapaksa or his political party. It is a fact that voters from the North and East are the deciding factor, especially in a Presidential election. Therefore if the Tamil National Alliance – TNA wishes to collaborate with any common candidate, they must sign an accord for political solution and accountability before the election rather than be fooled after the election. This is the experience of the Tamils since 1948 or even before.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

The article Sri Lanka Regime Change Not A Viable Solution – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Hijacking Of Mandela’s Legacy – OpEd

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By Pepe Escobar

Beware of strangers bearing gifts. The “gift” is the ongoing, frantic canonization of Nelson Mandela. The “strangers” are the 0.0001 percent, that fraction of the global elite that’s really in control (media naturally included).

It’s a Tower of Babel of tributes piled up in layer upon layer of hypocrisy – from the US to Israel and from France to Britain.

What must absolutely be buried under the tower is that the apartheid regime in South Africa was sponsored and avidly defended by the West until, literally, it was about to crumble under the weight of its own contradictions. The only thing that had really mattered was South Africa’s capitalist economy and immense resources, and the role of Pretoria in fighting “communism.” Apartheid was, at best, a nuisance.

Mandela is being allowed sainthood by the 0.0001% because he extended a hand to the white oppressor who kept him in jail for 27 years. And because he accepted – in the name of “national reconciliation” – that no apartheid killers would be tried, unlike the Nazis.

Among the cataracts of emotional tributes and the crass marketization of the icon, there’s barely a peep in Western corporate media about Mandela’s firm refusal to ditch armed struggle against apartheid (if he had done so, he would not have been jailed for 27 years); his gratitude towards Fidel Castro’s Cuba – which always supported the people of Angola, Namibia and South Africa fighting apartheid; and his perennial support for the liberation struggle in Palestine.

Young generations, especially, must be made aware that during the Cold War, any organization fighting for the freedom of the oppressed in the developing world was dubbed “terrorist”; that was the Cold War version of the “war on terror”. Only at the end of the 20th century was the fight against apartheid accepted as a supreme moral cause; and Mandela, of course, rightfully became the universal face of the cause.

It’s easy to forget that conservative messiah Ronald Reagan – who enthusiastically hailed the precursors of al-Qaeda as “freedom fighters” – fiercely opposed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act because, what else, the African National Congress (ANC) was considered a “terrorist organization” (on top of Washington branding the ANC as “communists”).

The same applied to a then-Republican Congressman from Wyoming who later would turn into a Darth Vader replicant, Dick Cheney. As for Israel, it even offered one of its nuclear weapons to the Afrikaners in Pretoria – presumably to wipe assorted African commies off the map.

In his notorious 1990 visit to the US, now as a free man, Mandela duly praised Fidel, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and Col. Gaddafi as his “comrades in arms”: “There is no reason whatsoever why we should have any hesitation about hailing their commitment to human rights.” Washington/Wall Street was livid.

And this was Mandela’s take, in early 2003, on the by then inevitable invasion of Iraq and the wider war on terror; “If there is a country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the world, it is the United States of America.” No wonder he was kept on the US government terrorist list until as late as 2008.

From terrorism to sainthood

In the early 1960s – when, by the way, the US itself was practicing apartheid in the South – it would be hard to predict to what extent “Madiba” (his clan name), the dandy lawyer and lover of boxing with an authoritarian character streak, would adopt Gandhi’s non-violence strategy to end up forging an exceptional destiny graphically embodying the political will to transform society. Yet the seeds of “Invictus” were already there.

The fascinating complexity of Mandela is that he was essentially a democratic socialist. Certainly not a capitalist. And not a pacifist either; on the contrary, he would accept violence as a means to an end. In his books and countless speeches, he always admitted his flaws. His soul must be smirking now at all the adulation.

Arguably, without Mandela, Barack Obama would never have reached the White House; he admitted on the record that his first political act was at an anti-apartheid demonstration. But let’s make it clear: Mr. Obama, you’re no Nelson Mandela.

To summarize an extremely complex process, in the “death throes” of apartheid, the regime was mired in massive corruption, hardcore military spending and with the townships about to explode. Mix Fidel’s Cuban fighters kicking the butt of South Africans (supported by the US) in Angola and Namibia with the inability to even repay Western loans, and you have a recipe for bankruptcy.

The best and the brightest in the revolutionary struggle – like Mandela – were either in jail, in exile, assassinated (like Steve Biko) or “disappeared”, Latin American death squad-style. The actual freedom struggle was mostly outside South Africa – in Angola, Namibia and the newly liberated Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Once again, make no mistake; without Cuba – as Mandela amply stressed writing from jail in March 1988 – there would be “no liberation of our continent, and my people, from the scourge of apartheid”. Now get one of those 0.0001% to admit it.

In spite of the debacle the regime – supported by the West – sensed an opening. Why not negotiate with a man who had been isolated from the outside world since 1962? No more waves and waves of Third World liberation struggles; Africa was now mired in war, and all sorts of socialist revolutions had been smashed, from Che Guevara killed in Bolivia in 1967 to Allende killed in the 1973 coup in Chile.

Mandela had to catch up with all this and also come to grips with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of what European intellectuals called “real socialism.” And then he would need to try to prevent a civil war and the total economic collapse of South Africa.

The apartheid regime was wily enough to secure control of the Central Bank – with crucial IMF help – and South Africa’s trade policy. Mandela secured only a (very significant) political victory. The ANC only found out it had been conned when it took power. Forget about its socialist idea of nationalizing the mining and banking industries – owned by Western capital, and distribute the benefits to the indigenous population. The West would never allow it. And to make matters worse, the ANC was literally hijacked by a sorry, greedy bunch.

Follow the roadmap

John Pilger is spot on pointing to economic apartheid in South Africa now with a new face.

Patrick Bond has written arguably the best expose anywhere of the Mandela years – and their legacy.

And Ronnie Kasrils does a courageous mea culpa dissecting how Mandela and the ANC accepted a devil’s pact with the usual suspects.

The bottom line: Mandela defeated apartheid but was defeated by neoliberalism. And that’s the dirty secret of him being allowed sainthood.

Now for the future. Cameroonian Achille Mbembe, historian and political science professor, is one of Africa’s foremost intellectuals. In his book Critique of Black Reason, recently published in France (not yet in English), Mbembe praises Mandela and stresses that Africans must imperatively invent new forms of leadership, the essential precondition to lift themselves in the world. All-too-human “Madiba” has provided the roadmap. May Africa unleash one, two, a thousand Mandelas.

 

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

The article The Hijacking Of Mandela’s Legacy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

What Is The Purpose Of An African Union Memorial? – OpEd

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By Rachel Ibreck

This initiative is particularly remarkable at a time when the AU is in the headlines for its confrontation with the International Criminal Court, an institution that represents a step forward for international justice – albeit currently compromised and partial. In contrast, the African Union Human Rights Memorial (AUHRM) project shows the AU in a precedent-setting role, both in its establishment of a continental memorial and in its engagement in a consultation process with various civil society groups and memorialisation experts to inform the content and form of the memorial.

No memorial can respond to the immediate needs of those Africans who are fleeing to churches for sanctuary again and United Nations officials are warn of a risk of mass atrocities in the Central African Republic (CAR). As in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), military force is an essential component in any effort to halt the massacres. The African Union may authorise an intervention force, as required by the principles of its Constitutive Act; it has committed to protect civilians in grave circumstances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. But if the lessons of the DRC tell us anything it is that peacekeepers, however robust, are not sufficient to resolve conflicts. Even as the M23 are defeated, but some wonder whether a new M24 will emerge.[1]

If it were true, as some scholars argue, that conflict in Africa is rooted in contestation over scarce resources or is a response to collapsing ‘weak’ corrupt states, then rapid external interventions and post-conflict ‘statebuilding’ projects might succeed. But too often peace operations don’t work, or broker unstable, partial settlements. This reinforces the evidence that the origins of conflict lie in complex socio-political logics and processes. Perpetrators are not simply driven by greed or grievance; understanding and ending conflict depends on changing the ideas and social practices that organise conflicts and on promoting existing cultures of peace.[2] Notably, African communities are bound by commitments to honour their dead; intra-communal and regional solidarities can also be forged through practices and symbols which uphold human dignity.

The AUHRM project represents Africa’s recognition of this need to go beyond conflict resolution and engage in transformation. The project has been in the making since 2003. The proposal for a memorial began as an expression of moral regret for its history as a bystander to atrocities: the OAU failed to intervene to protect Rwandans from genocide and it failed to denounce the Red Terror in Ethiopia in the 1970s—an atrocity carried out on its very doorstep in Addis Ababa. On the tenth anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the AU stated: ‘the need to restore the dignity of the victims through acknowledgement and commemoration of their suffering in order to… prevent further violations of this magnitude.’

The annual commemoration of the genocide in Rwanda became the basis for a commitment to commemorate the Red Terror at the AU headquarters, in recognition of the unique history of its location. By this time, the AU had inherited the neighbouring compound, the land formerly of the former Kerchele prison, known as ‘Alem Bekagn’ (farewell to the world), a site of massacre, torture and abuse, which was due to become the site of the AU conference centre and headquarters building. In January 2012, the new building was inaugurated with a vast continental gathering. As part of the ceremony three African leaders, Presidents Paul Kagame, Jacob Zuma and Yayi Boni, laid a foundation stone for the AUHRM at the site.

As indicated by the small gathering which attended the unveiling of the AUHRM foundation stone, some leaders have yet to embrace the initiative – even if none has yet openly opposed it. Indeed, the project is better off without the support of some, for instance the AU narrowly avoided the prospect of a notorious human rights abuser President Theodoro Obiang Nguema unveiling the stone. But certain AU representatives have been firm supporters of the project, among them the Rwandan, Ethiopian and South African ambassadors. Their commitment originates in the experience of particular national atrocities, but they have now become champions for the victims of violations elsewhere. As such, the AUHRM project has the potential to encourage leaders to challenge violations and honour all victims; it is not simply a means for the construction of legitimacy as some might have envisaged.

The project is still in its early stages. At the AU, the foundation stone is the only physical marker. But questions are already being asked its future merit, as one blogger recently commented: ‘What is the purpose of having exhibits of mass atrocities such as “The African Union Human Rights Memorial Project” when you are not doing much to abate future crimes against humanity?’[3] This reminds us that the premise that public remembrance is a means to ensure ‘never again’ has already been shown to be false. Memorialisation is not equivalent to peacebuilding, on the contrary, it can become a means to mobilise for war and strengthen exclusionary notions of community, making outsiders vulnerable or targets. Nor can public remembrance offer a panacea for loss and suffering; often it is painful and it may revive trauma. We may deem a monument to be a symbolic form of ‘reparation’ but it does not replace the moral duty to care for survivors and address their economic and social losses.

A memorial that takes elite, selective and static forms will not prevent future violence and might even contribute to the consolidation of certain forms of selective memory and associated political repression. And yet genocide remembrance fuelled the spread of international human rights norms, while public forgetting constitutes a form of denial. The answer to this dilemma lies in the processes through which memory are made. Indeed a dialogue about how past atrocities are remembered may even have more impact than the forms and content of a particular memorial. In this regard we should welcome the AU’s launch in 2010 of a series of three consultative meetings at its headquarters in Addis Ababa with survivors, memorialisation experts, scholars and human rights groups to gather recommendations for an AUHRM; its outcomes included the formation of an AUHRM network. In 2013, the AUHRM Interim Board and the Department of Political Affairs at the AU, with which the ownership of the physical memorial lies, extended the consultation process, authorising six ‘in-country’ consultations to be coordinated by civil society groups in the AUHRM network.

Justice Africa has worked in partnership with local memorial museums and human rights groups to support the AUHRM process. Over the past year, we have co-convened memory forums in Kigali on the genocide in Rwanda, in Addis Ababa on the Red Terror and Graziani massacres (perpetrated by the Italian Fascist regime in 1937), and in Dakar on slavery; in each, survivors, scholars and memory practitioners have shared and examined the histories of violence, or spoken of their personal suffering and loss and the ways in which they remember, as well as of the challenges of memorialisation. Tutsi survivors in Rwanda spoke of commemoration as a means to overcome divisions, and of how they also remember the Hutus who were killed in the genocide and ‘reading loudly their names and acts’. Ethiopians told private stories of the Red Terror and expressed concern at the limits on access to documentation of the killings, despite public trials and convictions. Activists combatting contemporary slavery in Mauritania described how women and children remain in bondage while there is an imposed silence about both these and the historical injustices of the slave trade: ‘We are forbidden to memorialise slavery and we are forbidden to fight slavery’. Throughout these consultations we have been inspired the memory work going on around the continent and its association with human rights education, with examples from District Six (South Africa), La Maison des Esclaves (Senegal), the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre (Rwanda), Constitution Hill (South Africa) and the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience among others.

The wrongs to be memorialized at the AUHRM include slavery, apartheid and genocide, described by Professor Andreas Eshete of the AUHRM Interim board as ‘practices which are paradigms of public evil, for they exclude an entire people from the equal title of belonging to a common humanity.’ But already the scope and reach of the project is growing and consultations on the memories of civil war in South Sudan and prison massacres in Libya will take place in the months ahead. Such dialogues among concerned citizens should continue. In the words of the Professor Eshete: ‘the AU Memorial should become an enduring, generative source of Pan-African solidarity’. We need a continental ‘citizen-led movement’ to promote dignity, rights and an end to atrocities in Africa.

Rachel Ibreck is Acting Director, Justice Africa

* THE VIEWS OF THE ABOVE ARTICLE ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR/S AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PAMBAZUKA NEWS EDITORIAL TEAM

REFERENCES

1. Martyn Davis of Frontier Advisory, in David Pratt (2013) ‘Doubts remain over Congo despite surrender of rebels’, The Herald, Friday 8 November, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/world-news/doubts-remain-over-congo-despite-surrender-of-rebels.22634080 accessed 19 November 2013
2. See Paul Richards (2005) ‘New War, An Ethnographic Approach’, No Peace No War, An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Oxford, James Currey, pp 1-21
3. Daniel Kawuma (2013) ‘Open Letter from Massacred Africans to the African Union’, African on the Blog, 30 October, http://www.africaontheblog.com/open-letter-from-massacred-africans-to-the-african-union/, accessed 19 November 2013

The article What Is The Purpose Of An African Union Memorial? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China’s First Stealth Drone – Analysis

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By Angana Guha Roy

The test flight of China’s first stealth drone, in November 2013, makes China leap from drones to combat drones. It demonstrates China’s enormous military expenditure towards building a world class level of military power. Lijian’s successful test flight has made China the fourth country, after the US (X-47B), France (Dassault nEUROn) and Britain (Taranis), to have independently developed a UCAV. The stealth drone, Lijan or Sharp Sword can be used for electronic surveillance and air-to-ground strikes. Its potential and technological capability makes it a suitable choice for the navy as it may also function as an unmanned combat platform for its aircraft carrier. It is capable of flying undetected at high altitudes, providing intelligence information supported by high resolution video.

Talking about the technicalities, one of the most important things about Lijat is that it is equipped with the Russian made RD-93 turbofan engine. RD-93 is a fighter jet engine used in Pakistan and China’s joint fighter jet project. Using it to equip Lijan would also mean that this latest stealth drone will have an extended flight range. This would mean that China will have a larger reconnaissance capability in the region.

Is China trying to narrow down its airpower disparity with western nations? Or does it have a far bigger objective of strengthening its regional sphere of influence?

Regional Implications

Lijan’s test flight is important in the light of the intensifying island dispute between Beijing and Tokyo in East China Sea. To put it in perspective, UAVs demonstrates a country’s prominence in a disputed zone. China has converted a number of out-of-date J-6 fighters into UAVs in recent years, to monitor the Southwest Islands in East China Sea. In the backdrop of this development, Japan recently came up with a plan of action to strengthen its defence capabilities in East China Sea and surprisingly increased its military expenditure index against its conventional defence guidelines.

Weeks after this, China came up with the multi-capacity Lijan. It will let the maritime departments of China be updated about developments in the East and South China Seas, thereby helping Beijing take accurate decisions. Some analysts have suggested, as National Post reports, “…the drone might someday be launched from China’s sole aircraft carrier, possibly to fly missions around China’s East China Sea and South China Sea Island claims.” A day after China test flew Lijan, the Chinese Defence Ministry announced the creation of an ‘air defence identification zone’ (ADIZ), that overlaps Japan’s own ADIZ covering much of the East China Sea, including the disputed islands. China’s Defence Ministry, as reports suggest, said that aircraft entering the zone must obey its rules or face ‘emergency defensive measures’.

Air Power Disparity with the West

Following what China Daily has quoted: “The successful flight shows the nation has again narrowed the air-power disparity between itself and Western nations,’’ many predictions emphasise that the launch of Lijan was a conscious effort to match up to Western air power. The US has conducted test flying of about five UCAVs since the late 1990s. Europe is not far behind in this respect. Currently it is developing the Neuron and Taranis models. In the meanwhile, Russia is working on a version of the MiG Skat. The reports suggest Beijing has developed different kind of UAVs that matches almost all the categories deployed by the US that range from tactical drones of partial endurance to larger structures that look remarkably familiar to US Predator or Reaper models. Another point of similarity is that these Chinese drones, like their US counterparts, are equipped with hard points on their wings to carry armaments. The delta wing Lijan has has been compared to US’ Northrop Grumman X-47 series and the European Neuron stealth drones. It has also been referred to as a reverse-engineered copy of Russia’s Mikoyan Skat.

Sun Tzu’s quote looks very relevant to China’s Stealth Drone strategy. He famously said, “Subdue the enemy without any battle”. It implicates China’s policy of invoking threat perception among its neighbours strengthening its military capability from time to time.

Despite drawing so much attention for its modern technology and features, this multi functional stealth drone, developed by two subsidiaries of Aviation Industry Corp of China, has been criticised as ‘a little bit naïve’ by Hong Kong-based military expert Andrei Chang. He thinks the design of the engine that appears to be exposed would reduce its stealth capabilities. It shows China as not having ‘enough experience’ in the field. Commenting on the use of RD-93 turbofan engine, Wang Ya’nan, deputy editor-in-chief at Aerospace Knowledge magazine, said, ‘Using the RD-93 compromises the stealth capability of the Sharp Sword, but the situation will be changed after our domestically developed engine that is specifically designed for drones enters production’. Commenting on the criticism would be difficult at this juncture as it requires taking account more expert opinion. In the end, whether Lijan would be a game changer is too early to predict.

Angana Guha Roy
Research Intern, IPCS
Email: anganaguharoy@gmail.com

The article China’s First Stealth Drone – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


NSA, GCHQ ‘Planted Agents’ In World Of Warcraft, Second Life To Spy On Gamers

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The NSA and the UK’s GCHQ spying agencies have collected players’ charts and deployed real-life agents into online World of Warcraft and Second Life games, a new leak by whistleblower Edward Snowden has revealed.

An NSA document from 2008, titled “Exploiting Terrorist Use of Games & Virtual Environments,” was published Monday by The Guardian in partnership with The New York Times and ProPublica.

In the report, the agency warned of the risk of leaving games communities under-monitored and described them as a “target-rich communications network” where intelligence targets could “hide in plain sight.”

The document showed that the US and UK spy agencies were collecting large amounts of data in the Xbox Live console network, which has more than 48 million players.

Real-life agents have been deployed into the World of Warcraft multiplayer online role-playing game and the virtual world of Second Life, in which people interact with each other through avatars.

The NSA and GCHQ also tried to recruit potential informants among the gamers, the report said.

The NSA had so many agents inside the games that a special “de-confliction” group was set up to make sure they wouldn’t hamper each other’s operations.

If analyzed properly, the online games can become a major source of intelligence data, the unnamed author of the paper stressed.

They could be used to build pictures of the players’ social networks, obtain their photos and geographical locations, as well as gather their communications. The games were also a convenient window for hacking attacks, the report said.

However, the document provided no information about terrorist plots uncovered via online games surveillance, or any proof of terrorist organizations using them for communication.

The document only stated that: “Al-Qaeda terrorist target selectors… have been found associated with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft, and other GVEs [Games and Virtual Environments].”

Other NSA targets mentioned in the report include “Chinese hackers, an Iranian nuclear scientist, Hezbollah and Hamas members.”

The paper provides only one example when spying in online games managed to produce a piece of usable intelligence data.

After the closure of a website, which sold stolen credit cards details, GCHQ managed to follow and establish contact with the swindlers, as they moved their business to Second Life.

The World of Warcraft creators from Blizzard Entertainment said that they had not given permission to NSA or GCHQ to gather intelligence inside the game, and were “unaware of any surveillance taking place.”

Microsoft and Linden Lab, the company behind Second Life, declined to comment on the issue when approached by Guardian journalists.

According to the document, the NSA bosses took some persuading to launch the surveillance program in XboxLive, Second Life and World of Warcraft amid concerns that those behind the program only wanted to play games at their desks during working hours.

Concerns that the games could be used to “reinforce prejudices and cultural stereotypes” were also expressed in the Snowden-leaked document.

It mentioned the ‘Special Forces 2’ game, which was developed by the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, and was used as a “radicalizing medium” to recruit and train “suicide martyrs.”

But the document acknowledged that Hezbollah had only taken a leaf out of the book of the US Army, which produced a free-to-download game for its recruitment page.

The surveillance operations raise concerns about gamers’ privacy, as the ways used to access people’s data and how much communications data is harvested are unspecified, the Guardian said.

It was not clear how the NSA could avoid spying on innocent American citizens, whose nationality and identity were hidden behind their virtual avatars.

Snowden’s revelations of vast domestic and international surveillance and data collection by the US and the UK have been making headlines since June.

For nearly a decade, the NSA used a warrantless web surveillance system with a near-limitless ability to spy on anyone’s phone calls, e-mails, search history and more, obtaining information from major Internet giants like Google, Apple and Facebook.

The leaks about the American intelligence services spying on emails and tapping phones of world leaders has provoked scandals between Washington and a number of countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia.

The article NSA, GCHQ ‘Planted Agents’ In World Of Warcraft, Second Life To Spy On Gamers appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Putin Issues Decree To Reorganize Voice Of Russia, RIA Novosti To Rossia Segodnya News Wire

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President Vladimir Putin has ordered the merger of the RIA Novosti news agency and the Voice of Russia broadcasting company to set up Rossia Segodnya (Russia Today) international news agency. The reorganization aims to ensure cost-effectiveness of the agencies, the head of the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov said.

The relevant decree, entitled “On certain measures to raise the operational effectiveness of state-owned mass media” is posted on the presidential website.

In line with the decree, as of the moment of the liquidation of RIA Novosti, the rights of its founder will be transferred to the “Rossia Segodnya” agency.

Pursuant to the decree, the news agency will manage the property, including foreign property, used by RIA Novosti for reporting Russian government policies and Russian public life abroad.

The “Rossia Segodnya” news agency will have its headquarters at 4 Zubovsky Boulevard in Moscow.

The core business of “Rossia Segodnya” will be “the coverage of Russian state policy and public life in the Russian Federation” for foreign audiences, the decree says.

The same decree liquidates the Voice of Russia state-owned broadcasting corporation. Its property will be placed under the management of “Rossia Segodnya” news agency.

Dmitry Kiselyov was appointed General Director of the new “Rossia Segodnya” news agency.

The reorganization of the Voice of Russia, RIA Novosti and some other state-run media outlets is aimed at cost-effectiveness and efficiency, Presidential Administration Head Sergei Ivanov told reporters on Monday.

“The decree has two main purposes,” he said. The first task is to ensure “the more rational use of budget money allotted to state-run information resources,” he said. “This is the question of reducing [the funds needed] rather than their enlargement,” he stressed, adding that budget spending in this sphere of activity has already been cut for next year.

The second task “is to improve the efficiency of operations of the state-run media,” he said.

“Russia is holding an independent policy and unwaveringly protects its national interests. It is not easy to explain that to the world, but it can and must be done. We have achieved certain successes in this field and, on the other hand, have had some problems. I am confident we can overcome them,” Ivanov said.

“We must tell the truth, make it accessible to the most people possible and use modern language and the best available technologies in doing so,” said the Kremlin administration head.

The article Putin Issues Decree To Reorganize Voice Of Russia, RIA Novosti To Rossia Segodnya News Wire appeared first on Eurasia Review.

RIA Novosti To Be Liquidated In State-Owned Media Overhaul

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The Kremlin announced Monday the dissolution of RIA Novosti, the country’s major state-run news agency, amid a significant reorganization of state-owned media assets.

News agency RIA Novosti and the state-owned Voice of Russia radio will be scrapped and absorbed into a new media conglomerate called Rossiya Segodnya, according to a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin.

The move is the latest in a series of shifts in Russia’s news landscape, which appear to point toward a tightening of state control in the already heavily regulated media sector.

In a separate decree published Monday, the Kremlin appointed Dmitry Kiselyov, a prominent Russian television presenter and media manager recently embroiled in a scandal over anti-gay remarks, to head Rossiya Segodnya.

Head of the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov said the changes were about saving money and making state media more effective.

“Russia has its own independent politics and strongly defends its national interests: it’s difficult to explain this to the world but we can do this, and we must do this,” Ivanov told reporters.

The direct translation of Rossiya Segodnya is Russia Today, but the new body will apparently be separate from RT, the Kremlin-funded English-language television channel originally known as Russia Today.

RT head Margarita Simonyan told Russian news website Lenta.ru on Monday that she only found out about the decree from news reports.

The changes, including legislative amendments, must be carried out by the government within three months, according to the Kremlin. Rossiya Segodnya will be located in the current RIA Novosti building in downtown Moscow, the decree said.

RIA Novosti was set up in 1941, two days after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Information Bureau, and now has reporters in over 45 countries providing news in 14 languages.

Last month Gazprom-Media, which is closely linked to state-run gas giant Gazprom, bought control of Russian media company Profmedia from Russian billionaire Vladimir Potanin. In October, Mikhail Lesin, a former Kremlin advisor, was appointed to head Gazprom-Media.

The article RIA Novosti To Be Liquidated In State-Owned Media Overhaul appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Unionization Yields Significant Gains In Pay And Benefits For Women Workers

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A new issue brief from the Center for Economic and Policy Research examines the most recent data available to investigate the impact that being in, or represented by, a union has on the wages and benefits of women in the paid workforce.

The issue brief, “Women Workers and Unions,” shows that even after controlling for factors such as age, race, industry, educational attainment and state of residence, women in unions receive a substantial boost in pay and benefits relative to their non-union counterparts. Unionized women workers on average make 12.9 percent more than their non-union counterparts, are 36.8 percent more likely to have employer-provided health insurance and 53.4 percent more likely to have participated in an employer-sponsored retirement plan.

At every education level, unionized women are more likely to have employee benefits than their non-union counterparts, but the effect is largest for women who have less formal education. In fact, for a woman with a high school degree, being in or represented by a union raises her likelihood of having health insurance or a retirement plan by more than earning a four-year college degree would.

“Women are on track to become the majority of the union workforce in 10 years, but their rate of unionization is dropping, along with that of men. Considering the great boost to pay and benefits that unions bring, it’s important that anyone who cares about the well-being of women workers also care about unions,” stated Nicole Woo, co-author of the brief.

Coming fifty years after the release of “American Women: Report of the Commission on the Status of Women.” The commission, which was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt and whose members included then attorney general Robert F. Kennedy, attorney Marguerite Rawalt, and economist Richard Lester, was given “the responsibility for developing recommendations for overcoming discriminations in government and private employment on the basis of sex and for developing recommendations for services which will enable women to continue their role as wives and mothers while making a maximum contribution to the world around them.” Woo will be speaking on Tuesday, December 10, at a Department of Labor event commemorating the release of the commission’s report.

The article Unionization Yields Significant Gains In Pay And Benefits For Women Workers appeared first on Eurasia Review.

PLO Official: Kerry And His pro-Israeli Security Proposals Will Cause ‘Total Failure’ Of Peace Talks

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U.S.-led proposals on security, presented by Secretary of State John Kerry, will result in the “total failure” of the peace talks with Israel, a senior Palestinian official said on Monday.

Speaking to Agence France Presse, Palestine Liberation Organisation official Yasser Abed Rabbo said: “These ideas will drive Kerry’s efforts to an impasse and to total failure because he is treating our issues with a high degree of indifference,” referencing Kerry’s proposals on future security deals in the Jordan Valley.

Rabbo made his comments just days after Kerry ended his latest visit to the Middle East, in a trip that focused solely on Israel’s security needs in any future peace deal, AFP reported.

Security proposals made to the Israelis by Kerry and his security adviser General John Allen were reportedly well recieved, but were “coldly dismissed” by the Palestinians, AFP said, who slammed them as “very bad ideas which we cannot accept.”

Critics said that the U.S.’ proposals would give Israel the ability to maintain a military presence in the Jordan Valley, which runs to the east of the West Bank, in a move that was rejected outright by the Palestinians, who argued that “it would make a mockery of their sovereignty and merely perpetuate the occupation,” AFP reported.

“[Kerry] only wants to win over the Israelis and (allow) settlement expansion at our expense,” Abed Rabbo charged, according to AFP.

Original article

The article PLO Official: Kerry And His pro-Israeli Security Proposals Will Cause ‘Total Failure’ Of Peace Talks appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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