By Finn Andreen
Of the many activities of the modern state, geopolitics lies perhaps furthest away from the interests of the general public. The reasons for this have to do with the nature of geopolitics. As an example in order to illustrate these reasons, it seems fitting to select one of the most important geopolitical concepts, namely “Eurasia.” As Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power.”1 Eurasia is a good geopolitical concept to choose in this case because it encapsulates all the problematic aspects of geopolitics, seen from the point of view of the individual. For instance, the fact that “Eurasia” is a portmanteau word with a slightly artificial ring to it, that somewhat clumsily combines the words “Europe” and “Asia,” hints at the importance of semantics in geopolitics.
Before discussing “Eurasia” any further however, some general points about the nature of geopolitics must be first made. It might not have escaped those with a keen interest in the subject, that geopolitical discourse usually conflates considerations that should be kept separated. There are two ways this happens: first, in the lack of distinction between means and ends, and second, in the lack of distinction between state and people. As a result of these two all-too-common amalgamations, geopolitical analysis often lacks the right perspective.
The first point relates to the fact that geopolitics is concerned not only with the strategic interests of nations but also with the ways in which these interests can be tactically achieved. There is seldom enough appreciation in geopolitical thinking, for the fundamental differences between strategy and tactics; that is, between geopolitical interests and the realisation of these geopolitical interests. Questions related to “what?” and questions related to “how?” require two different approaches in geopolitics; not least since the latter, not the former, can lead to government action.
Though it is true that to some extent ends and means cannot be entirely separated from each other because they influence one another, this distinction between the interests themselves and their realisation should still be made in geopolitics. Semantics are of course very important in this regard. For instance, the use of the terms “goals” and “objectives” in connection with a geopolitical strategy should perhaps be avoided because these terms already contain a certain idea of execution. A better term to use is “interests,” which has a more passive connotation; it does not imply any form of action.
The second point is that geopolitics often conflates the interests of the government with the interests of the population. In reality, there is fundamental difference between the two, even in the so-called “liberal democracies.” Experts in geopolitics and specialists in international relations, whether they are public servants, whether they belong to think tanks, or whether they are members of academia, either fail to recognise, or tend to disregard, this divergence of interests between the state and the people.
Geopolitical analysis is usually based on the assumption that the interests of the “nation” are the interests of the country’s political and financial decision-makers. This is not only a problem of semantics; such a position is problematic, to say the least, in a political system that calls itself representative.
With these considerations in mind, it is now possible to look more closely at the question of “Eurasia” from a geopolitical perspective. “Eurasia” will therefore be reviewed first with respect to geopolitical interests, and secondly with respect to the realisation of these interests. Finally, in the third part, the distinction between the interests of the state and the interest of the people will be discussed in more depth.
I. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS
Since a nation has both a geographic and a political dimension, it has “geopolitical” interests. These geopolitical interests are the interests that a nation has in maintaining or acquiring positions that would, caeteris paribus, increase its power relative to other nations. These interests are defined and limited by the physical and human geography of the nation, and are therefore mostly static. When they change, they change only very slowly, when certain geographic conditions vary (e.g. climatic or demographic changes). Each nation, therefore, has its own specific and unique geopolitical interests, which can be determined independently from other considerations.
“Eurasia” should be seen in this context. Originally, “Eurasia” is a geographical notion: in this sense, it is simply the biggest continent; the combined landmass of Europe and Asia. However, geopolitically, the word has several different meanings, reflecting the specific geopolitical interests of each nation. In the widest possible sense, the geopolitical definition of “Eurasia” is consistent with its geographical area. This is sometimes the way the word is understood in countries located at the fringes of, or outside, this area. This is generally what is meant by “Eurasia” in political circles in the USA, Japan and India.2 Two other, narrower definitions of “Eurasia” are also worth noting: the European one and the Russian one.
When Western European political scientists talk about “Eurasia”, they generally mean “Russia integrated into Europe (including Ukraine of course), economically, politically, and even militarily.”3 At least since Napoleon, if not since Peter the Great, European strategists have understood the importance of allying with Russia, and the potential consequences of failing to do so. However, the current European view of “Eurasia” is, for obvious reasons, a far more recent concept, having emerged only in the last two decades, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, this political entity is about half the size, and has only 15% of the population, of the geographical “Eurasia.” Two observations are necessary with respect to what is assumed to be “Europe.” Firstly, in this case, “Europe” is seen as a single economic and political entity; i.e. the European Union.4 Second, in this context of “Eurasia,” “Europe” primarily means Germany. Not only has Germany emerged as the de facto leader of Europe both economically and politically after the recent financial crisis, but it also has deeper historical ties with Russia than most other nations of the European Union. It also has a stronger geopolitical interest in a political and economic integration with Russia, than the rest of the EU.5
Therefore, from this Western European perspective, “Eurasia” means specifically the idea of Russia’s close integration with the European Union in general and with Germany in particular (not the other way around, of course). What would this European concept of “Eurasia” mean in practice? As always, integration between nations can take place in several ways; economically, politically, militarily, and even culturally. “Eurasia” would mean at least the following, from a European point of view: at an economic level, the signing of trade agreements removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs as well as removing legal and bureaucratic hurdles to European investment in Russia; at a political level, an agreement of a EU integration model for Ukraine that is acceptable to Russia, the reduction of Russian border controls and Russian visa restrictions between the two entities, and increasing institutional collaboration; and at a military level, closer Russian alignment with the European Common Security and Defence Policy as well as, inevitably, NATO, as well as some coordination between security and military forces, and a substantial increase in procurement of European weapons by the Russian armed forces.6 Most of these cooperation areas are already included in the concept of “Four Common Spaces” which was established in 2003 between the EU and Russia, but funded by the former.7
Europe’s geopolitical interest in “Eurasia”, as understood by European policy-makers, is clear and the would-be advantages for Europe are well known.8 However, though Russia would make some gains in the long term from such an integration with Europe, Russia’s geopolitical interests are clearly not complementary with the European version of “Eurasia.”9 As one of the few independent nations of the world, Russia insists on establishing relations with Europe, “on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.”10 This is something that Europe neither has the interest, nor the obligation, to accept. Not surprisingly, and often to the frustration of European policy-makers, naturally interested in pushing their own agenda of further integration, Russia has different geopolitical interests, as becomes clear from the Russian definition of “Eurasia.”
The Russian concept of “Eurasia” is very different from the European one. It is a view that has older roots than the European one – not surprisingly, considering Russia’s geographic position. Russian politologists traditionally view Russia itself, being both European and Asian, as “Eurasian.” The geopolitical area of the Russian concept of “Eurasia” corresponded initially more or less to the land area of Imperial Russia in 1914, including parts of Eastern Europe.11 There is undeniably an influence of Panslavism in this definition; originally the idea of “Eurasia” was more romantically rooted in natural geography. It was the idea that the people scattered across the land called “Eurasia” shared common spiritual values due to its geographic traits, such as a flat land with few coastlines but important rivers, a particular climate (continental, often harshly so), and a certain landscape (steppe, taiga, tundra).
This idea had more or less been realised, but with difficulty, during the last phases of the Russian Empire and was then realised again with the Soviet Union after 1945, though not stably enough for enduring success.
Today, though this Russian geopolitical interest still exists, a more realistic assessment has been made. The physical area of the Russian “Eurasia” is now more realistically assessed. The Russian view today is that “Eurasia” consists of the land lying between Europe and Asia proper; namely, those made up of Western and Central Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, part of Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.12 Just as in the case of the European concept of “Eurasia,” the Russian “Eurasia” is a geopolitical interest that underpins foreign policy in that part of the world. Thus, it is not surprising that today one of Russia’s main geopolitical interests lies in ever closer integration with those countries that it considers part of “Eurasia.”
Geopolitical interests are such a fundamental part of a nation’s political culture that they are often instinctively taken for granted, even by civilian and military leaders13. Even the language of geopolitics becomes biased as a result; as the example of “Eurasia” shows, certain words receive their meanings according to which nationals use them. It is clear from the previous examples that there is no universal definition of “Eurasia.” Other words that have such varying geopolitical meanings are: “nation”, “security”, “defence”, “international community”, etc. Part of the mistrust and misunderstanding that currently exist between nations is probably due to the common assumption that such political terms are neutral when in reality they are subjective. This is yet another obstacle that prevents nations from realising their geopolitical interests in a consensual way. The next part deals precisely with this aspect: the realisation of geopolitical interests.
II. THE REALISATION OF GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS
The question of the realisation of geopolitical interests requires a different approach compared to the analysis of geopolitical interests as such. Whatever geopolitical interests a nation has, whether or not these geopolitical interests can or will be realised is an entirely different matter, which depends on the political, economic and administrative situation of the nation in question, with all the day-to-day uncertainties that this implies.14 It is also important to remember that geopolitical interests are only one of many aspects that drive a nation’s foreign policy. Other aspects include, for instance, ideology, purely economic interests, domestic politics, and even sometimes the influence of erroneous estimations and the sway of emotions. Geopolitical interests are generally a substantial and underlying part of nation’s foreign policy – indeed, they inform it. But they can sometimes be overshadowed by more short-term and pressing interests that take over foreign policy, temporarily at least.
Another reason for the necessary distinction between geopolitical interests and their realisation is that there is a natural order of priority to the realisation of geopolitical interests; like a Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs but for nations.15 A nation’s most fundamental geopolitical interests are those of a lower order; they are the most basic interests related to the integrity of its territory, the protection of its people, and the defence of borders. These interests must be fulfilled before the realisation of interests of a higher order can be contemplated.16 There cannot be sufficient political attention or resources available for the realisation of more advanced geopolitical interests, if primary ones have not first been addressed. The Roman Empire did not set out to conquer the Mediterranean before the Republic controlled the Italian peninsula. Great Britain did not manage to control the world’s sea lanes before it had secured the waters near its coast. Sweden did not succeed in dominating, briefly, the Baltic sea before the yoke of the Danish crown had been cast off. The realisation of geopolitical interests is a long process for a nation, involving gains and setbacks. Nations can spend centuries painstakingly trying to fulfil their geopolitical dreams, though few ever realise them all.
Indeed, there are often barriers to realising geopolitical interests. Nations eventually become constrained by resource limitations that come from military or economic over-expansion, if they have not been stopped by others nations.17 The United States is quite exceptional in this sense, since it is one of only a handful of nations in History that has come close to realising the majority of its geopolitical interests for a short period of time.18 It was certainly helpful that the early US leaders gradually took control of a land with a very favourable geography , whose political borders now largely correspond to natural borders. Yet, even the most powerful nations can generally not realise all their geopolitical interests, at least not indefinitely, as is evident from some recent US setbacks.19 It is unlikely that the United States will be able to realise its highest geopolitical interest of global hegemony, as US power in the world has arguably been in slow decline in the last decades.
Geopolitics is, therefore, not primarily the study of geopolitical interests, but the study of their realisation. Geopolitics is mainly about tactics, not as much about strategy. Nations are usually well aware of their geopolitical interests, but generally not so certain how (to try) to realise them, since there are myriad ways to do so, and many uncertainties in doing so, in a constantly shifting political landscape. To solve such problems is the main goal of geopolitics. It is the study of the obstacles to realising geopolitical interests, and in assessing how these obstacles could be overcome, using the means at disposal.
All nations’ geopolitical interests cannot be realised simultaneously; therefore, some of them will be realised at the expense of others. Geopolitics is thus based on the premise that nations are engaged in a subtle, or sometimes not so subtle, competition with each other, at many different levels: diplomatically, economically, militarily and even culturally. The history of modern nations is largely a history of never-ending conflicts of interests. As a nation succeeds in realising geopolitical interests of an ever-higher order, further and further away from its primary, lower-order interests, at some point there will be a clash with the interests of other nations. A nation’s expansion of what it calls its “defence perimeter” is often perceived by another nation as the adoption of a “threatening” or “aggressive position.”20 Again, it is a question of semantics and of geopolitical world-view.
When two nations’ geopolitical interests conflict, the stronger nation can realise its interests by persuading or forcing the weaker nation to yield. This can be done in a number of different ways; by promising economic advantages, by economic pressure such as the threat or actual use of sanctions, by acts of subversion, by threat of force, and ultimately by military force. It is of course tempting for the most powerful nations of the world to use such methods; indeed, they often do so. For instance, most of US foreign policy is based on such tactics. The coercive realisation of geopolitical interests is, still today, the standard way in which the international system works.
It is possible, however, for geopolitical interests to be realised without the use of such coercive means. Nations can realise geopolitical interests consensually, to the satisfaction of all involved parties, if the following two conditions are fulfilled. First, the geopolitical interests of all parties should generally complement each other. Of course, some negotiations concerning details would still take place, but between equal parties. Second, no third party should prevent the realisation of the interests in question. Most likely, such external involvement can come from another nation or from an international organisation. Though these two conditions seem reasonable enough, in reality, they are not so often fulfilled. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature of the modern nation- state, as will be seen in the next part.
The previous points can now be used to analyse the realisation of the different version of “Eurasia.” Looking at the geopolitical interest from the point of the order of priority, “Eurasia” is an ambitious goal, of a high order. However, it is a more important interest to realise for Russia than for Europe. Russia considers, naturally, that one of its fundamental geopolitical interests is to exercise some form of control of what it calls its “nearer abroad.”21 Europe’s motivation for realising its own version of “Eurasia” does not have as high priority, for a number of reasons, one being the existence of security agreements with the USA. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia’s realisation of its view of “Eurasia” is in a far more advanced state compared to the European one, which is at the moment only an idea. Europe has not yet fully managed to bring Ukraine into its fold, whereas the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is now called the Eurasian Economic Union, and Russia has successfully convinced Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to join as members in 2015.22 In other words, Russia is in the process of adding economic integration to a military integration that has largely taken place already between these countries.
Some of the types of coercive methods mentioned above are used in the case of “Eurasia”. Being the more powerful nation, Russia is naturally using many such means in order to incite, or force, other nations into its sphere of influence. This has been the case with Armenia and other nations that will adhere to the Eurasian Economic Union which Russia will lead. Europe has also been trying to use some of these coercive foreign policy tools in order to get Russia to show more interest in an integration with Europe.23 This has been evident not only in the EU’s hitherto inconclusive approach towards Ukraine, but also in its interaction with Russia, such as the latest sanctions show.24 The European Union considers, rightly, that the biggest obstacle to the realisation of its concept of “Eurasia,” is the Russian government. But coercive methods are far more useful and effective when stronger nations use them on decidedly weaker ones. Therefore, while Russia can use coercive methods to realise its view of “Eurasia,” Europe can only realise its own version of “Eurasia” by consensual means.
In this respect, by following the two conditions for consensual realisation of geopolitical interests mentioned above, this means firstly, that the “Eurasian” interests should be complementary between Europe and Russia. This is certainly not the case, since the two parties do not even define “Eurasia” in the same way. In fact, the European and Russian definitions of “Eurasia” cannot both be realised at the same time. Further, Europe and Russia are currently opposed in several important geopolitical areas, the most important of which being the struggle for the control of Ukraine.25 This is not the kind of environment in which the European definition of “Eurasia” can be realised. The Russian view of “Eurasia,” on the other hand, has more probability of success since it does not depend on Europe (with the exception of Ukraine, which will remain problematic for Russia in the future).
The second condition, which must also be fulfilled in order to realise “Eurasia” by consensual agreement, requires that there is no third party with the capability and interest in thwarting these efforts. Here is another strong reason “Eurasia” cannot be realised by Europe: the interest of the United States is in conflict with these “Eurasian” interests. Though the USA and Europe are close allies, the USA opposes the European view of “Eurasia” and cannot allow it to happen. For the US, as Brzezinski wrote, “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus of also challenging America.”26 Currently, Washington easily realises this interest, given the political influence they have over Europe.27 The US uses its system of military allegiance (NATO) in order to both dominate Europe and contain Russian geopolitical expansion.28 Regarding the Russian “Eurasia,” though the US may not be able to prevent it from becoming reality, the US is also more tolerant to it. The United States is not much concerned about Russia’s realisation of this interest, since it understands that Russia will never be a challenger for global hegemony unless it has integrated with a major economy.29 This is the reason the US is carefully monitoring the current rapprochement that is taking place between Russia and China.30 In many ways, the strategic and economic synergies between Russia and China are greater in the long term than the ones between Russia and Europe.31
A final point can be mentioned with regard to the realisation of geopolitical interests. In the last decades, geopolitics has become somewhat less important, because nations have seen their power and sovereignty slowly erode, as globalist, internationalist developments have taken place. Globalisation has made the role that national governments play in international business far less important than it was.32 Thanks to IT technology and cheap transport, even small and medium sized companies – usually the backbone of healthy economies – have become far less dependent on domestic markets and on the political and material support from their government when investing and selling abroad. Further, the emergence of international organisations with supranational jurisdiction (e.g. UN, Bank of International Settlements, EU, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.)33, and their increasing influence over the affairs of the world, has also drained sovereignty from national governments.34 The geopolitical interest of “Eurasia” is itself a part of this current globalist trend, since, in all the definitions of the term, its realisation would mean a certain weakening of national sovereignty.
The result of this evolution in global politics is that geopolitical interests are becoming more difficult, but also less important, for nations to realise.35 Economic and political interests are becoming less tied to geography than before, because they are less tied to nations.36 The realisation of geopolitical interests give nations less rewards than in the past; they will thus dedicate less resources towards efforts to realise them. However, the underlying reason geopolitical interests are becoming less important in this new international context is because geopolitics is based on an incorrect assumption; namely, that the interests of the government and the interests of the people are the same. The next part, therefore, looks at the distinction between state and people, which must be taken into account in order for geopolitical analysis to be complete.
III. DIVERGENCE OF INTERESTS
Government can never be fully representative, even in an ideal democracy. Yet, though no government can possibly represent all interests of all people, in a democracy the government’s interests are the people’s interests (or at least of the majority that elected it).
One of the reasons modern nations should not be called “democratic” is that their governments have many interests which are not the interests of the people.37 Geopolitical interests are a good example of such government interests that are not shared by the people.
There is an obvious reason for this misalignment of geopolitical interests between the state and the people. Nations, as opposed to individuals, are defined by territorial boundaries and geographic characteristics, which the governments of these nations use to project power internationally. Since this is not the case for individuals, the people cannot possibly have “geopolitical” interests. By definition, therefore, geopolitical interests and the intricate question of their realisation are of concern to the state, not to the people. Thus, geopolitics is, by its very nature, a fundamentally undemocratic activity, conducted specifically by the state, in contradiction with the principles of representative government.38
There is, however, one exception to this rule: geopolitical interests of the lowest order, i.e. those related to the defence of the nation, are shared by the people. The people has the same interest as their government in realising such primary geopolitical interests; they seek security and protection, which, not coincidentally, was the original and only function of the early state. The monopoly of physical force is arguably the only monopoly that cannot be avoided in society; therefore, the provision of security and protection of the people is the only legitimate function of the state.39 Other geopolitical interests, i.e. those of a higher order, are not shared by the people; their realisation by the state cannot therefore be legitimate.40 This reasoning is in line with the principles of the Charter of United Nations, which states that military force can only be used by a nation in order to exercise the right of defending itself against foreign aggression.41
Many modern nations only realise primary geopolitical interests, though not because they are committed to conducting an ethical foreign policy, but because they are unable to realise interests of a higher order. In theory of course, the divergence of interests between the state and the people then still exists, but it is not apparent in practice. Therefore, such nations have foreign policies that generally represent well the public interest in this regard.
Because they are more constrained, the smaller and less powerful nations of the world, such as Austria, Sweden or Switzerland, are in this regard more democratic than the bigger and more powerful nations. The latter nations, such as the US, the UK or France, who often realise (or attempt to realise) interests of a higher order, therefore lead a foreign policy that is in conflict with the public interest. As Brzezinski put it, “Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization”.42
The example of the US may briefly illustrate this point. The United States has set up a huge military-industrial complex and hundreds of military bases around the world in order to realise its highest geopolitical interests of global control. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether these efforts of the US government are at all beneficial to the US people. Any benefit to the US people of this enormous military and surveillance bureaucracy is marginal and indirect at best.43 On the contrary, there are many ways in which the foreign policy conducted by the US government is antagonistic to the interest of the US people.44 As mentioned above, the same reasoning is valid for other nations, albeit in more subtle forms since they are geopolitically more constrained.
Despite this bleak reality, and though the public often shows a certain healthy distrust of government, there is still an implicit assumption that the people shares the state’s geopolitical interests. As was seen above, this is not the case, and even the language of geopolitics confirms this. Indeed, semantically, there is no question that geopolitics belongs to the realm of the state alone. For example, terms also used in this essay, such as “nation,” “Europe,” and “Russia,” refer in geopolitics to the governing body of the particular society.
Thus, by “the nation” is generally implied “the state” or “the government;” but certainly not “the people.” By the words “Russia” and “Europe” is usually meant, respectively, “the Russian government” and “the European Commission and the national governments in Berlin, London and Paris.” In a geopolitical context, these terms certainly do not mean the “Russian people” and “the peoples of Europe.” This is also clear from the fact that in foreign policy the names of the capitals, e.g. “Washington” and “Moscow”, can be used interchangeably with the names of the nations, “United States” and “Russia,” to mean the governments of these countries. To take another example, “the national interest” does not mean the “public interest”; it is largely used as a euphemism for “the interest of the state (specifically the three branches of government and certain parts of the state bureaucracy) and the interest of the leaders and largest shareholders of the country’s most powerful corporations.” The same is valid with many other terms that are commonly used in geopolitical discourse.
Since the public also uses these words with the meanings presented above, it implicitly and often unwittingly accepts that they have no say in the foreign policy of their governments because they do not share the geopolitical interests of the state. However, the ruling parts of society are undoubtedly aware that their geopolitical interests are not shared by the people. Those who serve the state at the highest levels rely on a number of methods in order to maintain this inherently undemocratic status quo. The best way is simply to make use of the weaknesses of human nature. A general inclination for conservatism and tradition can be relied upon for the public’s support of the established political system, simply because it is the existing system; the one with which the people is familiar.
Additionally, a quite natural sense of patriotism is also very useful in order to align the interests of the people with the interests of the state. Patriotism is often encouraged by the government and the military in order to gain the support of the people for the realisation of the “nation”’s geopolitical interests (e.g. what is called in the US to “rally ’round the flag”). It is no coincidence that patriotic feeling is so strong in the United States, the country whose state has gone farthest in the realisation of its geopolitical interests. Indeed, in the US patriotic fervour is often whipped up when needed.45 Patriotism can then take extreme proportions: not displaying the correct patriotic feelings (e.g. “Support our troops!”) and the correct patriotic attire (e.g. the flag on the lapel or on the porch), can at times have social consequences, such as being frozen out of the community, being passed over for promotion, etc.46
There is, therefore, usually little need for the government to communicate and explain much to the public about its foreign policy plans.47 Indeed, geopolitical discussions are almost always held by politicians and high officials behind closed doors, keeping the involvement and consent of the people to a minimum. (For instance, this is the case with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.48) When it is impossible to be completely silent about the realisation of geopolitical interests, the docile mainstream media can be relied up to manage the information flow in the interest of the state. Indeed, it is generally difficult to find any serious and objective geopolitical analyses in the mainstream media.49 The role of the mainstream media is also important in making sure the “right” geopolitical semantics is maintained.
Geopolitical terms must continuously imply that the state is alone responsible for geopolitics, and that the people should not get involved because they do not understand it. Of course, the emergence of the Internet has weakened a little the effect of this kind of media control of the public. This is the reason the Internet is perceived by the political and military establishment as a threat, and why many attempts to monitor and control it, technically and legally, are being undertaken by governments in a number of countries, as recent disclosures have shown.50 Before the existence of the Internet, the only way for the layman to learn about the geopolitical interests of his “nation” and get a glimpse of what his government was doing to realise them, was to read specialised foreign policy magazines that most people hardly knew existed (and if they did, they did not have easy access to them).
To the annoyance of the state, sometimes none of the above methods work as hoped. Sometimes the people anyway opposes the realisation by the state of certain geopolitical interests, both military and commercial.51 The state then usually tries to realise them anyway, by simply ignoring public opinion and relying on clever communication.52 This has often worked reasonably well, not least since public opposition usually is only temporary; in the long term, it is often possible for the government to count on a high level of indifference among the people towards question of geopolitics and foreign policy. Again, this public indifference is not particularly surprising, since geopolitical interests are not shared by the people.
These considerations regarding the divergence between the interests of the state and the people should always be kept in mind when discussing geopolitical matters, such as “Eurasia”. Both from the point of view of Europe and Russia, “Eurasia” represents a geopolitical interest of a high order. Abstract geopolitical concepts like “Eurasia” mean almost nothing to the common man. As can be expected, the people’s interest in the realisation of “Eurasia,” both for a Russian citizen and for a European citizen, is therefore doubtful at best. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the average Russian citizen might be more secure if Russia establishes the Eurasian Economic Union with other nations. The basic security of Russian citizens is still far from guaranteed today; the Russian state therefore ought to have other more important internal priorities – the real interests of the Russian people. It is also difficult to understand how the average European citizen might be safer and more secure if the EU somehow managed to integrate economically and politically with Russia. And it is highly dubious, to say the least, whether the peoples of Europe would have much to gain by bringing Ukraine into the European economic and political sphere. On the contrary, before potentially bearing fruits, any rapprochement with Ukraine would have substantial costs for Europe, which hitherto have been born by Russia.
The publics of all nations should make efforts to inform themselves about their “nation’s” geopolitical plans, and ask themselves whether the realisation of these geopolitical interests can be advantageous to them. In the case of “Eurasia,” the people should at least request from their elected representatives, the answer to the following questions: Will the realisation of this geopolitical interest make the public safer? If yes, then in what way? If yes, then what public resources would be spent in order to do so?53 Unfortunately, both these questions and their answers are usually absent from public debate. Clearly, this would not be the case in any reasonably democratic political system, where the interests of the state are the interests of the people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two essential, though often overlooked, aspects of geopolitics have been presented in this essay. These two important distinctions – between geopolitical interests and the realisation of these interests, and between the interests of the state and the interests of the people – are rarely taken into account in geopolitical discourse.
From the point of view of the general public, which should always be the reference in a representative system, geopolitics is not only incomplete but also morally ambiguous without these two distinctions. Only if they are taken into account can a geopolitical concept like “Eurasia” be seen in the right light.
The first of these distinctions makes it evident what should be the focus of geopolitical studies: it is the realisation, or attempts at realisation, of geopolitical interests that should be monitored, analysed, and lauded or criticised, as the case may be. Geopolitics should therefore be more practical than theoretical in its approach. What should be of critical importance to the people are not the geopolitical interests of the state as such, though they should be more widely known, but the waste of public resources – human, financial, material – for the realisation of geopolitical interests that are not shared by the public.
The second of these distinctions goes even further in this direction; for it naturally raises the question of the moral position that should be adopted by the expert in geopolitics. Should he support the realisation of geopolitical interests of the state he serves, directly or indirectly, even though he knows, or should know, that they are not only not in the interest of the people, but actually contrary to the interest of the people? In a democracy, the answer should be obvious. Perhaps subjects like ethics and political philosophy should become a more important part of the curriculum of students in geopolitics. Optimally, a different type of education in geopolitics could even be undertaken along these lines, by independent seats of learning.
When these two distinctions are considered together, it becomes clear that geopolitics is fundamentally incompatible with democracy. For every nation that is looking to realise its geopolitical interests, a people is not democratically represented. In a truly democratic system, in which the interests of the people reign supreme, only geopolitical interests of a lower level would be realised. The states of such nations would then realise only the fundamental geopolitical interests of security and defence, leaving the rest of their geopolitical interests unfulfilled. More space would then be created between nations, both physically and politically, which would not be occupied or controlled by any nation in particular (but for instance by independent organisations or a community of nations, such as a reformed United Nations). In such a world, all other interests would be commercial interests, which national governments would not need to get involved with, and which would be managed internationally between individuals, corporations and international organisations.
Individuals often have conflicts of interests, but in a environment of rule of law they have shown that they are able to resolve them consensually, at the negotiating table. For nations, a system of rule of law – i.e. blind and enforced – may not become reality even in the long term. Geopolitical conflicts will thus continue to simmer around the world, until they are settled by coercive methods rather than by consensual ones. The complete acceptance by the public itself of the current geopolitical language is a sign that geopolitics will likely continue to dominate international relations for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the nations of the world have been slowly surrendering sovereignty in the current international context. Not only are geopolitical interests progressively losing in importance, but nations are also having more difficulties than before to realise them. Though this may not directly give more power to the people over international affairs, it still represents a small step towards a more democratic world.
Author:
Finn Andreen
email : finn.andreen@gmail.com
Notes:
1 Z. Brzezinski, highly influential National Security Adviser under US President Jimmy Carter. The quote is from his book “The Grand Chessboard” (Basic Books), p. xiii. Further: “A power that dominates “Eurasia” would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over “Eurasia” would almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent. About 75 per cent of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources.” (p.31)
2. For instance, this is the way Zbigniew Brzezinski sees ”Eurasia”, naturally taking the US position.
3. As an example: Charles de Gaulle’s famous concept of “Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals”.
4 .Indeed, both Ukraine and Turkey have their own very specific historical, economic, and geopolitical relationship with Russia. And as for “Europe” meaning the EU in this case, this is not to say that the EU is not still quite far from being such a “single economic and political entity.”
5 This is all the more true today since Germany in the financial crisis has further increased its economic and political domination of the European Union. At the same time, the British are probably distancing themselves from the EU, if not de jure yet, at least rhetorically, and France has deep structural problems of its own, preventing it from driving the EU project together with Germany like it has in the past. Germany export-oriented industry is perfectly suited to address the Russian market, and at the same time it needs Russia’s resources. Further, Germany has already got the most developed economic ties with Russia of any major nation.
6 Russia has recently bought French war ships. See RIA Novosti “France Floats Out First Russian Mistral”, Oct 15, 2013 (en.ria.ru/trend/warship_01102009/)
7 At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by creating, in the long term, four common spaces in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997: a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; and a space of research, education, and cultural exchange. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations#The_Four_Common_Spaces
8 Main advantages: The wealthy but struggling economies of the European Union could certainly benefit from tighter integration with the Russian economy for the resources the latter has to offer. These include both the human and natural resources of Russia. There is an obvious interest in getting close access to a large, low-wage and relatively well-educated population. It would bring energy security to Europe by removing once and for all the political and bureaucratic obstacles to the cheap and joint use of Russia’s rich natural resources (gas and oil, but not only). Economically, the realisation of this concept of “Eurasia” would mean that European companies would gain direct access to the huge investment needs of Russian society. From a military perspective, a closer collaboration with Russia would add precisely the element of “hard” power that Europe lacks in order to fulfil its geopolitical interest of dominating the world once again. It would also close once and for all the security issue that Europe perceives in having an independent Russia so close to its eastern borders, as the adherence to NATO of many Eastern European countries show.
9 See for instance, the following information about EU/Russian trade. Russia EU trade, at: russianmission.eu/en/trade
10 See quotation from Mr. Lavrov, Russia Foreign Minister, at: russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations
11 This Russian concept of “Eurasia” can trace its origin to certain Russian émigrés in the 1920s Berlin, Prague and
Sofia. For more details regarding the entire paragraph above, see История евразийского движения, at:
www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/nart/04.php
12 See for instance, this interesting discussion of the Russian view of “Eurasia.” Article by Dmitry Trenin, VPK daily, 29th January 2013, at : rbth.co.uk/opinion/2013/01/29/revising_the_concept_of_“Eurasia”_22305.html
13 For instance, George Friedman wrote, correctly, that: “A country’s grand strategy is so deeply embedded in that nation’s DNA, and appears so natural and obvious, that politicians and generals are not always aware of it. Their logic is so constrained by it that it is an almost unconscious reality. But from a geopolitical perspective, both the grand strategy of a country and the logic driving a country’s leaders become obvious.” George Friedman, in his book “The Next 100 Years”, from p39 (Doubleday). Source: www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
14 There may be many reasons why the government and bureaucracy may not be able, at a given moment, to adequately pursue the realisation of a nation’s geopolitical interests. Certain people or organisations may for instance not be competent enough, or may have serious distractions (e.g. bad economic figures, upcoming re- elections, etc.), or not enough resources, experience or guidelines.
15 See for instance, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs
16 See for instance, the description of the five major geostrategic goals of the United States, by George Friedman, in
his book “The Next 100 Years”, Doubleday. From p58. Source:
www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
17 For instance, George Friedman wrote: “All nations have grand strategies, though this does not mean all nations can achieve their strategic goals. Lithuania’s goal is to be free of foreign occupation. But its economy, demography, and geography make it unlikely that Lithuania will ever achieve its goal more than occasionally and temporarily. The United States, unlike most other countries in the world, has achieved most of its strategic goals, which I will outline in a moment. Its economy and society are both geared toward this effort.” George Friedman, in his book “The Next 100 Years”, from p39 (Doubleday). Source: www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
18 Generally it never lasts more than a couple of centuries at the most: It is possible to mention the Persian empire and the Roman Empire for little more than a century, China during the 15th and 16th centuries, Britain during most of the 19th century, and the USA from 1945.
19 For instance, the continuous rise of China, and the political and commercial gains of China in Africa. The progressive shift in the power balance with China due to the huge US current account deficit with China and China’s substantial ownership of US Treasury bonds. Also can be mentioned the relative failure in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and on-going hesitations of the US concerning Syria. The inability of the US to bring Russia to heel. Etc, etc.
20 There are countless examples of this, from the US/Japan conflict of the 30s and 40s, to the current clash between China and Japan over a group of islands, as China is slowly expanding its naval presence.
21 In Russian : “ближнее зарубежье”
22 Armenia decided in September 2013 to join the “Eurasia” Customs Union. See “Russia Cancels Export Duties for
Gas and Diamonds to Armenia” from Ria Novosti, at: en.ria.ru/russia/20131202/185221476/Russia-Cancels-
Export-Duties-for-Gas-and-Diamonds-to-Armenia.html
23 See for instance, “The EU has accused Russia of implementing protectionist measures in contravention of the WTO rules. The European Commission, meanwhile, is expected to shortly unveil a number of anti-trust charges against Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.” See article, EU-Russia talks downgraded amid tensions over Ukraine, The Irish Times, January 28, 2014. www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eu-russia-talks-downgraded- amid-tensions-over-ukraine-1.1669797
24 For information on European sanctions against Russia, see for instance, “Russia hints at tit-for-tat response to EU sanctions over Crimea”, The Guardian, Saturday 22 March 2014. Source: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/22/crimea-russia-response-eu-sanctions-ukraine
Regarding Ukraine, see for instance, article by Finian Cunningham, “Ukraine and the Bigger Picture of US and European Assault on Russia’s Sphere of Influence”, Dec 6 2013. Also, by the same author: “Ukraine: Imagine Western Interference in Reverse… That Would Be An Impossible European Dream”, Dec 16, 2013. Sources at: www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/12/06/ukraine-and-bigger-picture-us-and-european-assault-russia-sphere- influence.html www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/12/16/ukraine-imagine-western-interference-reverse-would- impossible-european-dream.html
25 See for instance the following analysis: “The EU Agreement [for Ukraine] excludes simultaneous membership in a Russian-led customs union and would thus cut off Ukraine from its main trading partner, with which Ukraine’s industry and transport routes are closely connected. The abolition of customs duties on European goods would also mean bankruptcy for many Ukrainian industries.
The terms of the agreement, which include the introduction of EU rules for labor market deregulation, the privatization of state enterprises and a reduction in the public debt, would have a social impact similar to the EU austerity programs imposed on Greece, Romania and other countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is already denying Ukraine a much-needed credit because the government refuses to hike the price of gas by 40 percent—a move that would inevitably result in the death of many unemployed people and pensioners unable to pay their heating bills.
The Association Agreement would turn the country into an extended workbench for German and European companies, which could produce at lower wage rates than those in China. At the same time, the country’s natural resources, its vast and fertile landmass, and its domestic market of 46 million inhabitants make Ukraine a mouthwatering prospect for German and European businesses.
The agreement would also strengthen the EU’s hand against Russia. A customs union or Eurasian Union comprising Russia and the Ukraine would have had a significantly stronger position in trade negotiations with the EU than an isolated Russia.
Germany, the EU and the US are pursuing not only economic, but also geopolitical, objectives in Ukraine. Given Russia’s loss of influence in Eastern Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the incorporation of Ukraine into the EU would push Russia off to the edge of Europe.” from “The Struggle for Ukraine”, from World Socialist Web Site, Dec 6, 2013. (www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/06/pers-d06.html?view=mobilearticle)
26 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books), p. xiv. This is the same view that George Friedman has: “The United States doesn’t need to win wars. It needs to simply disrupt things so the other side can’t build up sufficient strength to challenge it.” The Next 100 Years, p58. (Doubleday). Source:
27 www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
It is well known that though the US and Europe have different geopolitical interests, the US is the stronger party and often uses Europe as a proxy for its dealings in “Eurasia.” European governments and institutions are so dominated politically and militarily by the United States, that those European leaders who support this concept of “Eurasia” cannot be fully sincere, whether they realise this or not. A real possibility for European version of “Eurasia” can only come if and when Europe manages to completely get rid of this US dominance which has existed since the end of WWII. However, as long as European companies have significant commercial interests in the US, this is not likely to happen. And this certainly cannot happen with the NATO policy as it is today.
28 For information on NATO’s aggressive military positioning in the world, and in particular around Russia, see for instance:www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/10/17/nato-steadfast-jazz-exercise-chill-of-cold-war.html
29 Another possibility might be to make its own economy globally competitive, but this is not likely to happen even in the long term.
30 “Eurasia” is no longer the most important geopolitical goal in the 21st century for the United States: it is Asia, and in particular, China. US now has a “Pivot to Asia” strategy. See article in The Atlantic “What Exactly Does it Mean That the US is Pivoting to Asia?”, by Matt Schiavenza, April 15, 2013. Source: www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/
31Russia is turning its attention to the East, and in particular to China (the Law changing the Russian time zones is one example, bringing Moscow 4 hours from both London and Beijing). China has a strong need for the Russian natural resources lying in relative proximity. The trade between the two countries is expected to soon reach $100Bln per year. From 2012 to 2013, China’s FDI into Russia was multiplied by 6. Further, China has now declared a certain preference for the Russian rouble, and recently Russia and China have declared that they have a “strategic relationship”. A new deal concerning gas delivery over 30 years has just been signed. See following sources: rt.com/business/rosneft-china-sinopec-oil-537/
rt.com/business/russia-china-trade-record-836/ www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/12/china-says-no-to-bitcoins-but-yes-to-the-russian-rouble/? utm_source=contactology&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EconoMonitor%20Highlights%3A%20Whither %20U.S.%20Policy www.contrepoints.org/2014/01/16/153513-investissements-chinois-en-russie-multiplies-par-six-en-2013? utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017
32 Their control of capital has decreased, and tariffs and subsidies have been reduced in many parts of the world (these confer power to those who apply them – the national governments). Further, embassies and chambers of commerce do not have the same importance as before. Despite the constant attempts by national governments to limit, tax, or at least monitor, the movement of people, goods and capital, they are undoubtedly being undermined by such developments.
Though there has been a resurgence of national authority after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, (completely unwarranted, of course, since national governments were largely responsible for the crisis in the first place), this is likely only temporary.
33 See, for instance, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supranational_aspects_of_international_organizations
34 Regarding international organisations, it is true that most of them are financed by the most powerful nations of the
world, in order to help them realise their geopolitical interests under a veil of legitimacy. Yet, at the same time, the power of these organisations, not so much militarily but economically and legally, has grown over time, at the expense of these nations. This factor also contributes to the decline in the importance of geopolitics.
35 This development could initially benefit mostly the smaller and the weaker nations of the world; those nations whose many interests have never been realised because of the existence of a handful overbearing powers. The most powerful nations are naturally most impacted by these globalist changes (since their range of interests is wider and more global). The US’s interests in the Middle East and Asia, and France’s interests in Africa come to mind.
36 Natural comparative advantages between nations matter far less than they did in the 19th century. See for instance, “Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests”, by Professors R. E. Gomory and W. J. Baumol. MIT Press, 2000.
37 There are other reason for not called modern nations “democratic”, but they are not connected with geopolitics and can therefore not be brought up here.
38 Geopolitical interests are of course not the only interests that drive a nation. Its geopolitical interests are an important subset of many national interests upon which the policies of its government are based.
39 This is the concept of the state as “Night-watchman”. See for instance the thoughts of Frédéric Bastiat (Avis à la jeunesse 1830), and for a more recent thinker, Robert Nozick (in Anarchy, State and Utopia, from 1974).
40 This can also be seen in the often cited argument for US foreign interventions : what is invoked is the “threat to national security”. This is an implicit admission that this is precisely what the people are really and only concerned about.
41 See www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. (See article 51). If this is too strict for any state to actually follow, at least
then the less strict “doctrine” from the US, called the “Powell Doctrine”, also demands, in its first statement, that foreign aggression be linked with a risk to national security. It is from 1990, and named after Colin Powell, though not explicitly stated by him. See for instance: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine
42 The full quote goes as follows: “Never before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties, even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization.” Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books), p.35.
43 Though it is true that US military installations around the United States, and private contractors and weapons manufacturers create jobs for the US people, this employment factor has been shown to be inefficient and limited. For instance, according to Robert Pollin, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, public expenditure in education creates two and a half times as many jobs as the same expenditure in the military. See following interview on The Real News Network, June 9, 2013: therealnews.com/t2/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=74&jumival=10284
44 The pursuit of these interests is very attractive to the civilian and military leaders of the military-industrial complex, as well as for the big egos of politicians and civil servants in Washington. But for most of the US population there is not much, if any, benefit. On the contrary, not only is the US population being spied upon by the NSA, not only are US soldiers being killed and wounded in faraway lands for geopolitical purposes, but the huge financial resources which could go to support urgent domestic needs are diverted away from those to which it really belongs: the US people. Further, the image of the US abroad is now so bad because of its foreign policy, that regular average US citizens suffer from this when they travel abroad.
45 This has been done on a number of occasions, starting with US public opinion in WWI. See Edward Bernays’ candid exposition: “Propaganda”.
46 The treatment of US people of Muslim/Arab descent after 9/11, or of Japanese descent during WWII, are other examples of extreme proportion of patriotism.
47 For example, the latest military conflicts initiated by the West generated very little debate or disclosure from the governments involved. Information often came after the act, which seemed acceptable to the people. Examples are NATO’s attack on Libya, France’s attack on Mali and Central African Republic.
48 The TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is a so-called “free trade agreement” being negotiated at top level between the US, Canada and the EU, with a minimum amount of exposure to or debate with the public (see article in below from Le Monde Diplomatique). The TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, is a ”a secret trade negotiation that has included over 600 official corporate “trade advisors” while hiding the text from Members of Congress, governors, state legislators, the press, civil society, and the public.” Source: www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/03/HALIMI/50200
www.exposethetpp.org/
49 See instance, the following excellent analysis: Controlling the Lens: The Media War Being Fought Over Ukraine Between the Western Bloc and Russia, by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, March 14th 2014. Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/controlling-the-lens-the-media-war-being-fought-over-ukraine-between-the-western- bloc-and-russia/5373364
50 This is the case in most countries, also in the West, such as the UK, US, France, etc. For attempts to monitor Internet communication, see recent revelations by Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald and the Guardian newspaper. Further, a rare admission by a senior official about the threat of the Internet to the powers that be: when Secretary of State John Kerry said that “this little thing called the Internet … makes it much harder to govern.”. See article from Aug 13, 2013: www.cnsnews.com/news/article/john-kerry-little-thing-called-internet-makes-it-much- harder-govern#sthash.8FDQM59H.dpuf
51 For instance, during the Vietnam war or before the Iraq War in 2003, as well as more (sometimes more localised) opposition to the realisation by the state of geopolitical interests of a commercial nature, such as trade agreements, etc. The EU treaties were sometimes rejected by voters, but this did not prevent the treaties to be signed anyway (for instance after another referendum was held). This was the case with Ireland for the treaty of Lisbon for instance (voted against in 2008, and then voted for in 2009).
52 There are highly visible recent examples, the US war on Iraq in 2003, the NATO war on Libya in 2011, the French intervention in Mali and Central African Republic in 2012/2013, and many other less visible cases.
53 For instance, the cost of the Iraq war was only disclosed years later to the public and the cost was estimated to be much higher than initially declared. See Stiglitz and Blimes, Vanity Fair, April 2008.
www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/stiglitz200804
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