By Aijaz Zaka Syed

In the past couple of years, there has been a regular stream of opinion pieces and special reports, most of them originating in the West, seeking clues to the big existential puzzle — the mysterious moderation of Indian Muslims. A New York Times article by Jake Flanagin this week screamed: Why India’s Muslims Haven’t Radicalized?

It’s a question that seems to trouble everyone in the big media — from Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal and New York Times to the Washington Post to their counterparts across the pond.

They almost seem to rue the fact that Indian Muslims, the world’s second largest Muslim population and largest minority, has inexplicably remained untouched and unaffected by the global phenomenon of “Islamic extremism.”

The more cautious Europeans have been equally puzzled by the meekness of Indian Muslims. It is not said in so many words but the nuanced suggestion and implication is not lost on anyone.

That at a time when their brethren elsewhere — true to their image of bloodthirsty fanatics — are going berserk everywhere, why in God’s name do they defy the good old traditions and stereotypes to retain their sanity?

The ever reasonable Economist attributed it to the thousand year legacy of Sufi Islam in the subcontinent. Generally speaking though, the ‘moderation’ of Indian Muslims is seen as an exception that stands out like a sore thumb! And there’s more surprise than satisfaction, if you know what I mean.

Our friend Thomas Friedman of the NY Times has repeatedly dwelt on the issue attributing the self-assurance of Muslims to the strength and inclusive nature of Indian democracy. There may be some merit in Friedman’s argument but it’s his patronizing, overbearing, ‘white man’s burden’ complex that gets one going.

Back in 2009, Friedman talked of a “growing trend” among Indian Muslims wherein community members refused to bury the bodies of suicide bombers.

“That’s why India’s Muslims, who are the second-largest Muslim community in the world after Indonesia’s, and the one with the deepest democratic tradition, do a great service to Islam by delegitimizing suicide-murderers by refusing to bury their bodies. It won’t stop this trend overnight, but it can help over time,” he wrote.
“The fact that Indian Muslims have stood up in this way is surely due, in part, to the fact that they live in, are the product of and feel empowered by a democratic and pluralistic society. They are not intimidated by extremist religious leaders and are not afraid to speak out against religious extremism in their midst. It is why so few, if any, Indian Muslims are known to have joined Al-Qaeda.”

In his predictable felicity with facts, the NY Times’ global expert forgets that India has so far, mercifully, been alien to the phenomenon of ‘suicide bombers.’ There have been no suicide vests even in Kashmir, bordering Pakistan, which had been rocked by insurgency and separatist movement in the 1990s with the so-called cross-border infiltration.

Jake Flanagin, however, comes across as more empathetic and understanding. “Despite the enormity of India’s Muslim community, one finds little mention of them in Western media reports on modern Islam. Perhaps because, in the wake of Sept. 11 and in the midst of the war on terror, the West’s chief concern with the global Muslim community has been its capacity for fostering extremism — and India’s Muslims remain largely un-radicalized,” notes Flanagin.
This is something that hasn’t been entirely lost on India’s leaders beginning from Dr. Manmohan Singh who proudly assured his guest, a certain George W Bush, that no Indian Muslim had joined the ranks of Al-Qaeda.

Responding to Al-Qaeda’s recent marketing pitch targeting South Asia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Fareed Zakaria that if anyone thought Indian Muslims would dance to the tunes of groups like Al-Qaeda, they were delusional.

“Indian Muslims would live and die for India,” declared Modi in the feel-good interview primed ahead of his US visit.

President Pranab Mukherjee, another pillar of Indian political establishment, reprised the theme during his foreign sojourns this month. In interviews to Norwegian media, Mukherjee emphasized that hardly any Indian Muslim has been involved in terrorism.

“There may be one or two out of 150 million people but all of these are imported. These are coming from outside. Indigenous terrorist activity in India is extremely negligible and whenever such signs are visible we take appropriate steps,” said Mukherjee, a former finance, foreign and defense minister under three prime ministers.

Of course, this new-found faith and confidence in Indian Muslims whose loyalty to the nation has perennially been suspect, and not just in the eyes of the PM’s Hindutva family and followers, is touching.

What makes no sense though is the special treatment that Muslims continue to receive at the hands of security and intelligence agencies and an increasingly hostile media which essentially speaks the line and narrative it has been fed by the establishment. The legend of the so-called Indian Mujahideen continues to grow with more and more young men being rounded up as the IM members.

On the one hand, you have these touching platitudes to Indian Muslim’s patriotism and loyalty insisting they are part and parcel of the mainstream. On the other hand, anything goes off anywhere, the first reaction of police and intelligence agencies is to go for the nearest Muslim.

No wonder India’s prisons are teeming with the ‘usual suspects,’ far outnumbering their share in population. If “hardly any Indian Muslim is involved in terror activities,” as the president insists, why does he perpetually remain the enemy of the state?

We all know what happened under Modi himself in the ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ and I am not just talking about 2002.

So this exultation over Muslims’ loyalty to India and their apparent indifference to the charms of global terror is indeed touching. But why do we not see the appreciation of this reality on the ground? Why doesn’t their lot change with the rest of the country? Why do they remain permanently in the dock? These are questions that India’s leaders need to ask themselves if they indeed care for this much exploited minority.

Coming back to the Western concern, if Indian Muslims remain “peaceful and unradicalized,” they are not an exception. Even those taking to extremist ways elsewhere were not born that way, nor did their faith force into it. It was thrust upon them by decades of injustice, wars and oppression and you know by who.

When the world is divided into ‘with us-or-against us’ battle zones and you kill and drive people from their homes and cities under one pretext or another, you can’t expect a Gandhian ‘thank you’ in return.

Still, if India’s Muslims haven’t gone that way and retained their sanity, thank God for that! However, as Pankaj Mishra argues, they have far more serious problems to deal with, than fantasize about signing up for Al-Qaeda or the IS armies.

Economically dispossessed and socially deprived on many counts, Muslims have long struggled on the margins of Indian society. Long demonized as the vote bank of the Congress and other ‘secular’ parties, the meteoric rise of Modi and the unprecedented communal polarization in the 2014 polls has reduced Muslims to a political zero.

Uttar Pradesh, with a population of nearly 200 million and 20 percent Muslim population, failed to elect a single Muslim MP. On the other hand, the hysterical targeting of the community under one pretext or another, from terror to ‘love jihad,’ continues unabated although elections are over and Modi’s party is comfortably ensconced in Delhi and in many states.
It’s as though Muslims are being deliberately driven over the edge hoping they would fall into the waiting arms of global terror. Whoever is playing this dangerous game must be prepared for its catastrophic consequences.
As Mishra warns, “the radicalization of even a tiny fraction of 180 million Muslims would not only fatally undermine India’s claims to democracy and secularism. The not-so-reluctant fundamentalists would make the country seem as ungovernable as its neighbor.”

Aijaz Zaka Syed is a Middle East-based writer. Email: aijaz.syed@hotmail.com

The post Who’s Afraid Of India’s Meek Muslims? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sheel Kant Sharma

India’s test of the nuclear capable cruise missile Nirbhay last week was immensely significant in two ways. First, it marked the culmination of DRDO’s efforts of not only the past decade but also the ambitions of its heads. It was in 1987 that the then DRDO Chief Arunachalam was reported to have said that he was launching a study towards making a cruise missile like the then famous Tomahawk. It was in 1987 that the then Soviet Union had agreed with the US on the historic INF Treaty; eliminating, inter alia, the whole class of medium range missiles including the nuclear capable ground launched cruise missiles of range 500-5000 km. The INF treaty then was the high point of interest for disarmament and armament aficionados going all the way up to then PM Rajiv Gandhi and therefore it was smart to want to study how the Tomahawk came into being. Even so, 37 years is a rather long time. However, given the enormous constraints and challenges under which the DRDO works in India, the successful test is certainly “better late than never.” This is especially so since China savvy Pakistanis have already tested the Babur missile several times and like to brandish it to silence any tough talk by India about their transgressions across the border or trans-border terror outfits functioning from Pakistani soil.

Second, a cruise missile like Nirbhay has two main components, namely, the rocket launching it into space and the propulsion system that kicks in after the missile separates, brings out its wings, and flies like an aircraft. The second component has been advanced in several stages from the original cruise missile that the Germans toyed with almost seven decades ago during World War II. Its latest version uses supersonic propulsion, not subsonic, and the scramjet engine for that purpose is also in its second, if not third, decade, ever since the Russians tested a cruise missile with supersonic speeds around 1994. The Indian technology elite must come up to the table to be counted above the subcontinental hyphenation or de-hyphenation with lies, terror and purloined technology. That India still tests an indigenous cruise missile with turbofan engine and can claim all parameters working to copybook precision is more on the side of contentment than resolve to really make it to the big league. If the Maruti 800 of 1980s vintage is surpassed today by much better Indian cars why should India remain satisfied with claiming success about a strategic system that belongs well in the last century?

As regards encouragement to Indian scientists and engineers a comparison with the subcontinental rival may be instructive: the maker of the Pakistani bomb had to suffer only the optics of incarceration by a military regime despite serious external allegations and pressure from donors and allies, whereas a top DRDO scientist in democratic India has to suffer post-retirement for due diligence demanded by compulsions of jurisprudence in regard to dismissal of a lower-echelon employee; unconnected with acquisition of cutting edge technologies or state of the art missiles.

The problem that the defence institutions face in India today must not be suppressed by patriotic pride about the accomplishment – which is justified at all times – but must be addressed head on. Why is India not able to make the engine fly the state-of the-art aircraft? The Light Combat Aircraft is a project going apace with DRDO but with an imported engine with attendant restrictions. The Brahmos missile is supersonic but its range is MTCR compliant under 300 km and its engine is Russian. Former President Kalam is on record talking about the hypersonic missiles in his time as DRDO head as he propounded a 2020 vision. That was at a time when India had just emerged post 1998, shattering global misperceptions about its inherent strength and external powers’ erroneous complacence had to languish in the past decade plus with sub-critical progress on the technology front even when the only superpower recognised Indian prowess and appeared well disposed to see India’s rise, particularly in the technology arena.

The pace of the global march of advanced technology is far too quick for our establishment’s glacial responses and capricious working environment. Just let us look at the present controversy between the US and Russia about the latter’s alleged violation of the INF Treaty by testing advanced cruise missiles supposedly proscribed by the Treaty, and the Russian counter-allegation about the US testing and deployment of systems covered by the Treaty’s remit. Regardless of how Moscow and Washington settle this issue or fail to do so, the current reports have a cold war ring about them, are becoming voluminous, and show the sheer sweep of new technologies that are in the works. The world is at the cusp of a veritable new age of weapon systems for long and short range strikes, with or without nuclear weapons. These technologies are as usual dual purpose and subject to controls – but such controls were also in vogue twenty years ago when, for instance, the Chinese weapon systems were still of much older vintage and were struggling to come of age. Nonetheless, the hype about China, then as now, would remain hard to fathom – then about its impending irresistible rise and now about its having arrived with real strength and considerable clout over today’s technology. So, the lesson is to plan for at least two decades hence, provide the scientists clear policy guidance, required support and protection from systemic infirmities, and an atmosphere for perseverance and striving.

Just in case this emphasis is mistaken for trite arms race enthusiasm, it must be stated that the arms race is in any case already thrust upon India, either from behind or from the front by its colluding neighbours. An action like the testing of an older missile system like Nirbhay too might bring the moral high priests against it and it would not be a surprise if old hat clamour surfaces about destabilisation in South Asia. But in the end it is the prowess that is recognised and cutting edge ability that is respected. DRDO has miles to go before it can have a justified – and overdue – boast in that regard.

Sheel Kant Sharma
Former Indian Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Vienna & the IAEA

The post India: What Is Significance Of Successful Nuclear-Capable Nirbhay Test? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Paulo Gorjão

Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain and Venezuela were elected as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the 2015-2016 biennium. For obvious reasons, Portugal closely followed Angola and Spain’s bids. Whereas in the case of Angola Portuguese support was a mere formality—Luanda ran on a clean slate, getting 190 of the 193 possible votes—Spain managed to be elected only after a third round of voting in which it faced Turkey. Madrid got 132 votes while Ankara received 60.

Ankara’s late decision to bid for a seat partly explains its defeat. Having had a seat at the Security Council in 2009/2010, in 2011 the Turkish government decided to go ahead with a new bid. The tardy decision inevitably became a handicap, as there was lack of preparation and many votes had already been promised to Spain and New Zealand. In addition, the way Turkey has responded both to the civil war in Syria and to the Islamic State’s military progress in the Middle East, certainly had considerable weight on the final voting.

Turkey’s tardy bid, for which Portugal certainly had sympathy—Ankara was one Portugal’s main supporter in its 2010 bid—may have benefited Portuguese diplomacy. By 2011 Portugal had already pledged its support for Spain’s bid, which gave Portugal little room to manoeuvre in favour of alternative candidates. adding to this, given the depth and strength of bilateral relations between Lisbon and Madrid, a sudden shift in preferences would have been highly unlikely.

The Turkish defeat opened a wound that may prove difficult to heal and it will surely leave some scars. However, if Turkey wants to have a more regular presence in the Security Council and intends to make of its participation within UN institutions a central pillar in its foreign policy, Ankara needs then to understand what went wrong and draw some lessons out of the failed bid.

The non-permanent seats at the UN Security Council are becoming increasingly disputed and bids are getting announced with greater forethought. As an example, the Portuguese bid for 2011/2012 was launched 11 years before, in 2000. Having barely ended the two year-term, in 2013 Portugal announced its bid for one of the slots available for 2027/2028—in which Austria is also a candidate—with 14 years to go.

Fierce disputes are understandable. Presence in the Security Council provides prestige, therefore States employ much of their diplomatic effort toward that task. It is not, however, all about prestige. A seat in the Security Council also represents a diplomatic tool that confers influence and additional powers, if in a limited way. As any ambassador of a State that has been in the Security Council can confirm, suddenly the phone does not stop ringing.

As normally happens in these processes, Angola and Spain attached an agenda and a set of priorities to their respective bids. Luanda’s agenda, for instance, includes supporting the Security Council reform process, contributing to the dialogue between civilizations, highlighting the importance of preventive diplomacy and, of course, standing as a pivot in the pursuit of an African agenda. Naturally, part of such bids are mere diplomatic rhetoric—I even dare to call it politically correct jargon— that has to be used, something which in its innocuous version does not generate any disagreements. Other priorities can be said to be more specific and closer to the realistic diplomatic agenda. Matters related to Guinea-Bissau surely have greater priority to Angola, and the same can be said about maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

It is worth noting that the true capacity of any non-permanent member in shaping the Security Council’s agenda—regardless of the prestige, influence and power associated with having a seat—is limited. Furthermore, the recent past teaches us that making big plans is barely worth the effort, as there is always some crisis when and where we least expect it.

Conversely, what is worth planning and coordinating, as I have long argued, is a Lusophone strategy directed at the Security Council.1 Considering the small number of Portuguese-speaking countries, a continued Lusophone presence is certainly difficult to guarantee.

Still, such a strategy would make sense in order to avoid juxtapositions. Brazil and Portugal were simultaneously present at the Security Council in 1998 and 2011, and the same happened to Angola and Brazil in 2004. Notably, such a strategy would be a diplomatic advantage for the Lusophone countries in terms of avoiding juxtapositions and guaranteeing, when possible, a regular Lusophone presence. Planning and coordinating a common strategy would not require much effort. The Angolan seat in the next biennium may turn out to represent the shift towards this goal. However, a pertinent question remains: is there political will?

Published also in Portuguese: Paulo Gorjão, “angola, Espanha e Turquia: algumas notas sobre vencedores e vencidos na corrida ao Conselho de Segurança” (IPRIS Comentário, No. 1, outubro de 2014).

About the author:
Paulo Gorjão
Portuguese Institute of International relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS here as IPRIS Viewpoints 154, October 2014 (PDF).

Notes:
1 Paulo Gorjão, “lusophone countries must devise a grand strategy towards the Security Council” (IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin, February 2010), pp. 6-7.

The post Angola, Spain And Turkey: On Winners And Losers Racing For Security Council Seat – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Besar Likmeta

Both Albania and Serbia are to appeal against the EUEFA ruling on the abandoned Euro 2016 qualifier in Belgrade, which each side has condemned as unjust.

Albanian leaders and football players reacted angrily to the the ruling of UEFA’s Control, Ethics and Disciplinary Body, which declared Serbia had won the abandoned Euro 2016 qualifier match with Albania by 3:0.

UEFA held the Albanian team to blame for refusing to continue to play, following a spate of violent incidents.

The football body will detract three points from Serbia for allowing fans to invade the pitch. Serbia will also play the next two matches without the presence of fans. UEFA also fined the two football federations 100,000 euro each over the incident.

Albania’s Footbal Federation, FShF, described the ruling as unfair and announced that it would appeal.

Edi Rama, Albania’s Prime Minister, has supported the appeal. “UEFA did not deliver justice,” Rama said. “I am disappointed at this ruling, which does not deliver justice,” Gianni De Biasi, the coach of the Albanian national team, agreed.

Bekim Balaj, an Albanian player who was hit by a piece of the stalls by a Serbian hooligan who ran onto the pitch, apologized sarcastically to UEFA’s head Platini on Facebook.

“Sorry, Platini, for nearly breaking that stall with my head. Bravo UEFA,” he wrote. His teammate, Taulant Xhaka, called the decision “shameful in the eyes of the world”.

Albanian MP Erjon Brace went much further, calling the ruling “disgusting and corrupt.

“This is a new standard in football, when you have to play even if they attack you, insult you, want to slaughter you and throw fireworks, lighters, stones and bottles,” he said.

“Football is not a duty that you should have to risk your lives for, it’s a sport, competition and passion,” Brace added.

UEFA’s decision was not welcomed in Serbia, either. Dick Advocaat, the coach of Serbia’s national team, called the ruling “very odd”, adding that UEFA should not have put Albania and Serbia in the same group.

“The epilogue … is simply amazing – only one side was fined, and that was Serbia!” he said.

According to him, the UEFA decision was advantageous for the Albanian team, as they walked off the pitch. “They did not want to continue the game under any circumstances, or that evening with or without an audience, or the next day,” he added.

“I get the impression that someone does not want Serbia to be a participant in the European Championship 2016 in France,” Advocaat wrote.

The Serbian Football Association, FSS, announced it will also file a complaint against UEFA’s decision. It called the decision contradictory, as Serbia was declared the winner, but also lost three points.

“At the same time as proving the guilt of the opposite side, they took away three point from us,” the FSS wrote in a statement.

The first football match ever held between Albania and Serbia ended in chaos after a small drone with a banner embossed with Albanian motifs flew over the pitch, after which Serbian fans erupted.

The banner flown by the drone portrayed a map of “Greater Albania” covered with an Albanian flag and the portraits of independent Albania’s two founding fathers, Ismail Qemali and Isa Boletini.

After Serbian player Stefan Mitrovic pulled down the banner a scuffle ensued between the two teams, as Albanian players grabbed the flag back from Mitrovic.

The scuffle turned into a worse brawl when a group of Serbian fans invaded the pitch and attacked Albanian players, prompting British referee Martin Atkinson to suspend the match. The score was 0:0 at the time.

Videos and pictures show Serbian fans attacking Albanian players with fists and kicks as the Serbian players try to protect them.

Serbian fans also threw torches and lighters at the Albanian players as they left the field. Several Albanian players were hit by hooligan who had invaded the pitch.

Earlier in the match, Serbian fans booed the Albanian national anthem and chanted bloodthirsty, racist slogans, such as “Kill, Slaughter, so that the Šiptar [a pejorative term for Albanians] do not exist.”

The post Albania, Serbia Appeal Against UEFA Ruling appeared first on Eurasia Review.

As a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Kuwait was the world’s 10th largest petroleum and other liquids producer in 2013. Despite being the second smallest in land area among the OPEC member countries, Kuwait exports the fifth-largest volume of crude oil and condensates following Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Nigeria.

Kuwait’s economy is heavily dependent on petroleum export revenues, which account for nearly 60% its gross domestic product and about 94% of export revenues, according to OPEC and IMF data. EIA estimates these revenues were $92 billion in 2013. Kuwait attempts to remain one of the world’s top oil producers as the country targets crude oil and condensate production of 4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) by 2020. However, Kuwait has struggled to boost oil and natural gas production for more than a decade because of upstream project delays and insufficient foreign investment.

To diversify its oil-heavy economy, Kuwait has increased efforts to explore and develop its nonassociated natural gas fields, which currently make up a small portion of its natural gas production. Greater natural gas production would increase Kuwait’s feedstock for its struggling electricity sector, which frequently cannot meet demand in peak times. Kuwait has increased the share of natural gas in its primary energy consumption from 34% in 2009 to 42% in 2012, while the remaining share, consisting solely of petroleum and other liquids, has declined.

Energy policy is set by the Supreme Petroleum Council, overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum and is executed by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and its various subsidiaries. Kuwait also has an active sovereign-wealth fund, the Kuwait Investment Authority, which oversees all state expenditures and international investments.

Despite Kuwait’s constitutional ban on foreign ownership of its resources and revenues, the government has taken measures to increase foreign participation in the oil and natural gas sectors through technical and service contracts. Kuwait is a constitutional emirate led by the Emir of Kuwait, a hereditary seat led by the Al-Sabah family. The Prime Minister and his deputy and the council of ministers are approved by the Emir. Kuwait’s frequent delays of major energy projects are the result of political disagreements between the Emir and the parliament over contract management, especially those contracts involving foreign companies and project logistics.

Petroleum and other liquids

Kuwait holds the world’s sixth-largest oil reserves and is one of the top 10 global producers and exporters of total petroleum liquids.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), as of January 2014, Kuwait had an estimated 102 billion barrels of proved oil reserves, roughly 6% of the world total and sixth among all countries. Additional reserves are held in the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ), which Kuwait shares on a 50-50 basis with Saudi Arabia. The PNZ holds 5 billion barrels of proved reserves, bringing Kuwait’s total oil reserves to 104.5 billion barrels. Kuwait’s oil reserves include approximately 13 billion barrels of heavy oil, located primarily in northern Kuwait, with other reserves concentrated in the PNZ.

Sector organization

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, Kuwait’s national oil company, and its subsidiaries control the entire petroleum and other liquids sector from upstream to downstream and exports.

The government of Kuwait owns and controls all development of the oil sector. The Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) oversees Kuwait’s oil sector and sets oil policy. The SPC is headed by the Prime Minister. The rest of the council is made up of six ministers and six representatives from the private sector, all of whom serve three-year terms, and are selected by the Emir. The Ministry of Petroleum supervises all aspects of policy implementation in the upstream and downstream portions of the oil and natural gas sectors.

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) manages domestic and foreign oil investments. The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), the upstream subsidiary of KPC, was taken over by the Kuwaiti government in 1975 and manages all upstream development in the oil and natural gas sectors. The Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) controls the downstream sector, while the Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC) is in charge of the petrochemical sector. Export operations are overseen by both KNPC and the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC). Foreign interests of KPC are handled by the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (Kufpec), and international upstream development and downstream operations are controlled by Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI). Kuwait Energy Company (KEC) is a privately-held company that has developed a number of foreign interests over the past decade, including interests in Yemen, Egypt, Russia, Pakistan, and Oman.

The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) has its own managing companies, separated by onshore and offshore activities. The onshore sector was developed by American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), which was nationalized in 1977. Getty Oil, which was subsumed by Chevron, was brought in to develop onshore PNZ fields Wafra, South Umm Gudair, and Humma. Chevron remains a participant along with KPC, although management of all KPC’s PNZ interests has been transferred to the Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC). Offshore, a Japanese company, the Arabian Oil Company (AOC) discovered the Khafji, Hout, Lulu, and Dorra oil fields in the 1960s. The concessions with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expired in 2000 and 2002, respectively. KGOC was established in 2002 to oversee the offshore operations for KPC. Subsequently, KGOC, along with Aramco Gulf Operations Company (AOGC), set up a joint operating company, Al-Khafji Joint Operations Company (KJO), which manages the offshore PNZ production.

Exploration and production

Kuwait has implemented enhanced oil recovery measures to boost stagnant production rates. New discoveries have been made, but Kuwait’s regulated oil sector has hindered further exploration and production.

In 2013, Kuwait’s petroleum and other liquids production was approximately 2.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d), including its share of approximately 250,000 bbl/d of oil production from the PNZ. Of the country’s 2013 production, approximately 2.6 million bbl/d was crude oil and nearly 200,000 bbl/d was non-crude liquids. About half of Kuwaiti crude oil production in 2013 came from the southeast region of the country, largely from the Burgan field, which has a production capacity of 1.7 million bbl/d. Current crude oil production capacity from the northern fields has increased to approximately 700,000 bbl/d according to MEES. In early 2011, as one of the few OPEC members with spare capacity, Kuwait increased oil production to compensate for the loss of Libyan supplies.

Because of the constitutional ban on foreign ownership of Kuwait’s natural resources, development of domestic fields has stalled. There have been several discoveries of lighter crudes in the center of the country, but progress has not moved toward production. In 1984, a discovery was made in South Maqwa in the Greater Burgan field, revealing light crude of API 35° to 40° grade, and after drilling began at Kra’a al-Mara in 1990, significant volumes of 49° API crude oil grade were found. Another discovery was made in 2006 in the Sabriya and Umm Niqa areas in the northern region of the country, which added an estimated 20 to 25 billion barrels of reserves, although mostly of a heavier, sour quality and more technically challenging to develop.

In a plan to circumvent the constitutional ban, international oil companies (IOCs) were allowed involvement through Enhanced Technical Service Agreements (ETSA) and through agreements to assist Kuwait in enhanced oil recovery (EOR) of its mature fields. Royal Dutch Shell, in February 2010, signed an ETSA to develop the Jurassic natural gas field in northern Kuwait, although progress to boost production has been slow. KOC is also having trouble developing the Lower Fars reservoir of the northern Ratqa field. KOC initially negotiated with ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total to develop this field, but KOC subsequently abandoned plans for a joint project development. KOC also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in July 2010 with Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) to assess the feasibility of carbon dioxide injection as a potential EOR technique.

KPC announced a $75-billion capital spending plan over five years (2015-20) for the upstream sector ($40 billion) and the downstream ($35 billion) sector, according to MEES. In efforts to continue economic reform and funding for large infrastructure projects, this plan encompasses some of the delayed projects that were part of the five-year spending plan expiring at the end of 2014. Kuwait intends to upgrade its production and export infrastructure, expand exploration, and build downstream facilities, both domestically and abroad. This effort is expected to boost total oil production capacity to 4 million bbl/d by 2020, and it is projected that the production capacity would be maintained through 2030. To achieve its 2020 target, IOC investment and participation will be necessary.

Much of Kuwait’s reserves and production are concentrated in a few mature oil fields discovered in the 1930s and 1950s. The Greater Burgan oil field, which comprises the Burgan, Magwa, and Ahmadi reservoirs, makes up the main portion of both reserves and production. Burgan is widely considered the world’s second-largest oil field, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar field. Greater Burgan was discovered in 1938, but it did not become fully developed until after World War II. The Greater Burgan has been producing consistently since production began. Generally, production from the Greater Burgan is medium to light crudes, with API gravities in the 28° to 36° range. Although the Greater Burgan’s recent production of between 1.1 and 1.3 million bbl/d accounted for about half of Kuwait’s total production, Burgan could be further developed to produce as much as 1.7 million bbl/d. KOC is seeking to boost the Greater Burgan’s capacity largely from the Wara reservoir through enhanced oil recovery methods such as seawater and carbon dioxide injection.

Other production centers in the southwest region of the country include Umm Gudair, Minagish, and Abduliyah. Umm Gudair and Minagish produce a variety of crude oil grades, which largely fall in the medium range, with gravities of 22° to 34° API. In January 2003, water injection began at Minagish to enhance oil recovery and offset natural production declines. According to MEES, Kuwait plans to continue employing EOR techniques in the fields in western Kuwait to maintain output of 500,000 bbl/d from the region.

Northern Kuwait holds the majority of Kuwait’s larger fields apart from the Greater Burgan field. Kuwait’s second-largest source of crude production is from the northern Raudhatain field that has a capacity of 450,000 bbl/d, according to IHS Energy. The Sabriya field, adjacent to Raudhatain, adds another 100,000 bbl/d. The frontier fields of Ratqa, the southern extension of Iraq’s Rumaila structure, and the smaller Abdali field were both obtained after the new border was established in 1993, following the end of the Persian Gulf War. In August 2010, British company Petrofac signed a deal with KOC to boost production capacity at Raudhatain and neighboring Sabriyah fields. Also, Kuwaiti and Iraqi officials agreed in principle to jointly develop shared oil fields, as well as to allow IOCs to aid in such projects.

Project Kuwait

In an otherwise nationalized oil sector, Project Kuwait attempts to incentivize foreign investment to bring production capacity to 4 million bbl/d by 2020.

Project Kuwait is a focal point of Kuwait’s aspirations to attain a production capacity of 4 million bbl/d. Proposed in 1998, Project Kuwait was a concerted effort to create proper incentives to attract foreign participation, particularly for the country’s northern fields. The contract structure that resulted was challenged as unconstitutional, and the National Assembly has impeded progress of Project Kuwait for a number of years. Kuwait’s constitution bars foreign ownership of the country’s natural resources, which precludes the product-sharing agreements (PSAs) that provide the desired incentive for IOC investment. To allow IOC involvement, an incentivized buy-back contract (IBBC) arrangement was created, which does not involve production sharing or concessions.

The structure of the IBBC agreements allows the Kuwaiti government to retain full ownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management of the ventures. Foreign firms are to be paid a per unit (or barrel) fee, in addition to allowances for capital recovery and incentive fees for increasing reserves. In May 2007, the Kuwaiti ruling family conceded the responsibility of approving each related IBBC for Project Kuwait to the National Assembly, which has caused further delays. Additionally, more performance-based incentives have been introduced using the enhanced technical service agreement structure.

The ETSA forged between Kuwait and Royal Dutch Shell in 2010 was designed to raise associated light oil and condensates from the Jurassic natural gas field and to enhance prospects for foreign participation. Parliamentary investigations of the ETSA with Shell have delayed progress to increase output from the Jurassic field over the past few years and have hindered investments from other international companies. KOC intends to raise light oil production at the Jurassic field to 350,000 bbl/d from current output of less than 200,000 bbl/d.

Apart from associated oil production at the Jurassic field, Project Kuwait aims to increase the country’s oil production capacity primarily from four northern oil fields (Raudhatain, Sabriya, Abdali, and Ratqa) and targets nearly 1.1 million bbl/d of output from the fields, up from about 700,000 bbl/d in 2014. This addition will serve as a pivotal component to increase overall oil production capacity to 4 million bbl/d by 2020. KOC announced it plans to spend $15 billion to expand output from non-heavy oil formations in the Sabriya and Raudhatain fields by about 300,000 bbl/d. Heavy oil from the Ratqa field is a major component of Project Kuwait, and it is expected to provide 60,000 bbl/d by 2017 in the first phase, 270,000 bbl/d by 2020 in the second phase, and 270,000 bbl/d by 2030 in a third phase. KOC tendered bids for engineering and procurement contracts for the Ratqa field in 2014.

An unconventional source of potential production will come from the clean-up of the large pools of crude oil that have remained since the withdrawal of the Iraqi army after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In February 2012, KOC awarded tenders to HERA Company of Spain, GS Engineering and Construction Corporation of South Korea, and TERI Company of India to aid in soil remediation, which could result in significant crude oil volumes. The entire operation will take a number of years and cost roughly $3.5 billion, paid for by the United Nations reparations fund. However, the first phase involves only three sites. During the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi army set more than 800 wells on fire, and estimates indicate that as much as 5 million bbl/d were lost over the nine months it took to extinguish the fires, which resulted in the creation of thousands of crude oil lakes. Additionally, the crude lakes restrict access to producing areas and known reserves, which further restricts exploration and production.

Partitioned Neutral Zone

The territorial disputes between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia led to the creation of the Partitioned Neutral Zone. The production of oil and natural gas in the zone is divided equally between the two countries.

The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) was established in 1922 to settle a territorial dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The PNZ encompasses a 6,200 square-mile area that contains an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, according to OGJ. Oil production capacity in the PNZ was 520,000 bbl/d in 2013, all of which was divided equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Onshore production in the PNZ centers on the Wafra oil field, which began producing oil in 1954. Wafra is the largest of the PNZ’s onshore fields with approximately 3.4 billion barrels in proved and probable reserves. Wafra has related production facilities and gathering centers with South Umm Gudair and South Fuwaris. Onshore production in the PNZ has a capacity of 300,000 bbl/d, but it is in decline. A full-field steam injection EOR project led by Chevron is under development to offset field declines and boost production of the heavy oil play by more than 80,000 bbl/d during the first phase. The project is experiencing delays, and Chevron expects the front-end engineering and design to commence in 2015.

The production capacity of offshore fields in the PNZ is less than 300,000 bbl/d, and Khafji Joint Operations, the joint venture developing the offshore capacity of the PNZ, plans to increase production to 400,000 bbl/d by 2019, according to the Wall Street Journal. Production offshore originates from a handful of major fields–Khafji, an extension of Saudi Arabia’s Safaniyah (the world’s largest offshore field); Hout, which is also an extension of Safaniyah; and Durra, an extension of Iran’s Arash and shared with Saudi Arabia. Production at Durra is pending resolution of boundary demarcation negotiations and plans for joint development between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Kuwait exited the Khafji expansion project in 2013 as a result of the country’s political debate over project funding.

Exports and consumption

Kuwait’s domestic consumption has been increasing, but a majority of its oil production is exported to Asia.

In 2013, Kuwaiti exports of crude oil were estimated at 1.9 million bbl/d, making Kuwait the sixth-largest exporter of crude oil among OPEC producers behind Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela, according to tanker data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Most Kuwaiti crude oil is sold on term contracts. Kuwait’s crude exports are a single blend of all its crude types. The largest proportion is the medium Burgan crude, which is blended with heavier, sour crude from northern fields, as well as marginal amounts from Minagish and Umm Gudair. Kuwait’s single export blend (called Kuwait Export) has a specific gravity of 31.4°API (a typical medium Mideast crude), and is generally considered sour, with 2.52% sulfur content. In 2013, the Asia-Pacific region received approximately 1.5 million bbl/d of crude oil. Exports to the United States totaled 334,000 bbl/d, and Europe received around 83,000 bbl/d, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence. The largest importers were South Korea and India. To secure more supply contracts with Asian consumers, Kuwait signed another 10-year contract to double the supply to China’s Sinopec to 300,000 bbl/d starting in 2015.

With the majority of its crude oil export volumes headed to Asian markets, the most significant price benchmarks for Kuwaiti exports are Dubai Crude or Oman Crude or a combination of both, to which Kuwaiti oil exports are priced at a slight discount. As of the beginning of 2010, the price of Kuwaiti crude oil for U.S. customers was tied to the Argus Sour Crude Index (ASCI), a weighted average of various North American medium, sour crudes. European buyers purchase from a benchmark linked between a Brent weighted-average and Saudi Arab Medium.

Mina al-Ahmadi is Kuwait’s main port for the export of crude oil. Kuwait also has operational oil export terminals at Mina Abdullah, at Shuaiba, and at Mina Saud, otherwise known as Mina al-Zour. Increased production generated by Iraq and the northern fields has necessitated the construction of a new terminal on Boubyan Island. This terminal is under construction and is slated to be online by 2015.

Kuwait consumes only a small portion of its total petroleum production. The country consumed a total of 467,000 bbl/d in 2013, leaving most of its production available for exports. According to OPEC, Kuwait exported 805,000 bbl/d of petroleum products in 2013, the highest level among OPEC members. However, domestic oil consumption has been steadily increasing, partially as a result of increased petroleum-fired electricity generation.

Refining

Kuwait maintains refining and marketing interests in Europe and looks to expand into Asia, particularly China, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

The OGJ reports nameplate refining capacity in Kuwait at 936,000 bbl/d in 2014. This production capacity is derived from three refinery complexes: al-Ahmadi, Abdullah, and al-Shuaiba. All of the refineries are located near the coastline, about 30 miles south of Kuwait City and are owned and operated by Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC). The largest refinery, Mina al-Ahmadi, was built in 1949 and has a capacity of 466,000 bbl/d. Mina Abdullah and al-Shuaiba have nameplate capacities of 273,000 bbl/d and 190,000 bbl/d, respectively.

Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI) manages KPC’s refining and marketing operations internationally. Its operations include approximately 4,000 retail stations across Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Italy. KPI has interests in two refineries, owning an 80,000 bbl/d refinery in Rotterdam, Netherlands and a 50-50 joint venture with Italian oil major ENI in the 240,000 bbl/d capacity refinery in Milazzo, Italy.

Kuwait is seeking to cultivate downstream interests in markets with high potential demand growth, the Asian market in particular, specifically China, Vietnam, and India. In China’s Guangdong Province, KPC is negotiating a refinery and petrochemical joint venture with China’s Sinopec. The plant will feature a 300,000 bbl/d capacity refinery, which will also have an ethylene steam cracker with the capacity to produce 0.8 million tons per year of ethylene and its derivatives. In March 2011, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) gave final approval to the project, making Kuwait the second Arab oil producer behind Saudi Arabia to have a major downstream facility in China. The project’s equity shares are still under discussion, and it is unclear to what extent KPC will play a role. The refinery is under construction, although Sinopec delayed the commissioning date by a year to 2017.

Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI) joined with PetroVietnam and Japanese Idemitsu in April 2008 to construct a 200,000 bbl/d refinery in Nhi Son, Vietnam. The project began construction in 2013 and is expected online by 2017. KPI currently holds a 35% stake, and Kuwait has an agreement to supply the terminal with crude oil. To forge stronger ties with Indian purchasers, KPC proposed buying a stake in the Paradip refinery scheduled to come online by the end of 2014. The talks are at an initial stage, and no decision has been made.

Clean Fuels Project and Al-Zour

In June 2011, Kuwait’s Supreme Petroleum Council approved two long-delayed projects: the Clean Fuels Project and the al-Zour refining facility. These two projects have an estimated combined cost of about $28 billion and will serve an increasing domestic oil demand, especially for the petrochemical sector, and for higher-quality products with lower sulfur content in Kuwait’s traditional export markets.

The Clean Fuels Project (CFP) is slated to upgrade Kuwait’s existing refineries and raise overall capacity to 800,000 bbl/d by 2018. The planned overhaul of Kuwait’s refining sector includes building a new Al-Zour refinery, shutting down the al-Shuaiba refinery, and retiring old units and installing new components at the remaining refineries. A crude distillation unit will be taken out of commission at the Mina al-Ahmadi, and Mina Abdullah will lose a number of components, but its overall capacity will increase by 184,000 bbl/d.

The al-Zour refinery was originally put out for bids in 2008, but political opposition led to the cancellation of the bid round. This opposition forced KPC to compensate those companies who had spent resources preparing their bids, placing the entire project on hold. KNPC received the final approvals necessary to develop the Al-Zour project in 2012 and retendered the contracts in 2014. The new refinery is expected to add another 615,000 bbl/d of capacity by around 2020.

Natural gas

Kuwait recently became a net importer of natural gas, leading the country to focus more on natural gas exploration and development for domestic consumption.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal, as of January 2014, Kuwait had an estimated 63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proved natural gas reserves. Natural gas reserves have remained at the same level since 2006. Kuwait’s intent to diversify its economy has spurred an extensive focus on natural gas exploration. Vast discoveries of nonassociated gas in the northern region of the country attracted interest from IOCs. However, contract structures and political uncertainty remain principal impediments to any rapid expansion of either reserves or production. Additionally, new natural gas discoveries are geologically more complex, mainly tight and sour natural gas deposits that require more sophisticated development and have higher capital costs.

Sector organization

Kuwait’s natural gas sector, like the petroleum and other liquids sector, is also managed by Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. Kuwait is using technical service agreements to attract necessary international investment for natural gas development.

As in the oil sector, all of the natural gas resources are owned by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). The Kuwaiti constitution prohibits any use of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) that allow for an equity stake by an IOC in development projects; therefore, Kuwait is using technical service agreements (TSAs) to bring in IOCs to develop more difficult projects. In February 2010, Royal Dutch Shell signed an ETSA to develop the 2006 natural gas discoveries in northern Kuwait, known as the Jurassic fields, which contain 35 Tcf of reserves in place, the nature of which are too sour for local firms to develop.

Exploration and production

Kuwait plans to increase dry natural gas production to 3 billion cubic feet per day by 2030 to satisfy increasing domestic consumption and reduce dependence on natural gas imports during peak summer months.

In 2013, Kuwait produced 1.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), or 552 Bcf per year, of natural gas, the highest on record and up about 15% from production in 2011. Domestic natural gas supplies started rising after 2009 with the introduction of non-associated production and higher oil output in tandem with associated gas production. Given the predominance of associated natural gas in Kuwaiti production, domestic natural gas supplies have relied on OPEC crude oil production quotas.

Kuwait requires increasing supplies of natural gas for the generation of electricity, water desalination, and petrochemicals, as well as for the increased use for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques to boost oil production. Kuwait is shifting its exploration efforts to focus on natural gas discoveries to reduce dependence on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and to decrease the share of oil used domestically, particularly for electricity and desalination plants. KOC has announced a production target of 3 Bcf/d by 2030, double the current production level.

Associated natural gas production makes up the majority of Kuwait’s overall production. In 2013, more than 1 Bcf/d was produced from associated gas, while nonassociated gas production amounted to only 150-200 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d), according to IHS Energy. Production of nonassociated natural gas from the northern region of Kuwait is seen as the most promising source of future natural gas production growth. Given Kuwait’s challenging fiscal and political climate, not much progress has been made in exploring offshore prospects, leaving Kuwait to focus on its natural gas discoveries in its northern region. KPC intended to produce about 1 Bcf/d of nonassociated gas from these fields by 2015, although this goal is likely to be pushed back to 2020 because projects have experienced delays, according to MEES.

The Jurassic nonassociated gas field was discovered in 2006, with an estimated 35 Tcf of reserves. This project has been described as the most difficult in the world, based on the geologic composition, the technical complexities it presents, and the fact that most of the gas quality is tight and ultra-sour. A first phase envisioned 170 MMcf/d of natural gas by 2008. However, it reached a production plateau of 140 MMcf/d, according to IHS Energy. The second phase, which is under construction and scheduled to come online by 2014, has a projected capacity of 500 MMcf/d. A third phase is expected to bring production capacity up to 1 Bcf/d, but political and technical difficulties have occurred. Shell is developing the Jurassic project with KOC through its 2010 ETSA, although the government has held up future phases of the project as the parliament investigates the contract terms.

The other prospect for nonassociated natural gas production is the Dorra gas field offshore PNZ. This field is shared by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia originally planned to begin production at Dorra by 2017, providing an additional 500 MMcf/d for each country, while Iran planned to develop its own side of the field. However, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia decided to delay project development in 2013 because there was disagreement over the allocation of resources and about where to bring the natural gas ashore. Also, political tensions between the Gulf States and Iran, which also lays claim to the field, are likely to preclude any near-term settlement of mutual development between the three countries.

Kuwait is also expanding its natural gas processing infrastructure to meet rising domestic demand. In 2014, Daelim of South Korea commissioned Kuwait’s fourth and largest gas-processing train of the Ahmadi refinery, which as the ability to process 805 MMcf/d of associated gas and 106,000 bbl/d of condensate. This unit will give Kuwait an overall processing capacity of 2.4 Bcf/d for processing liquefied petroleum gas. A fifth train will boost capacity by an additional 800 MMcf/d to 3.2 Bcf/d and is currently in the planning stages. However, neither the current production plans nor the expansion of processing facilities is expected to meet the growing levels of domestic demand for natural gas.

Consumption and imports

In 2013, Kuwait consumed approximately 1.7 Bcf/d of natural gas, equivalent to 630 Bcf per year. Kuwait’s electricity demand, fueled increasingly by natural gas, has outpaced domestic natural gas production during the summer months. This increased demand has resulted in the shutdown of refinery and petrochemical operations to make more natural gas available to generate electricity. Kuwait is seeking to diversify its electricity generation supply portfolio by replacing some petroleum products with more natural gas and renewables. Insufficient domestic natural gas supply has contributed to frequent blackouts and brownouts during peak demand periods. As such, Kuwait resorted to importing LNG as a stopgap measure during the summer months starting in 2009. In 2013, Kuwait imported about 210 MMcf/d (77 Bcf/y) of LNG, representing about 12% of the total natural gas supply, according to IHS Energy.

Kuwait signed supply purchase agreements with Shell and the energy trading company Vitol and received LNG supplies from 2009 through 2013. Kuwait took delivery of the LNG at the Persian Gulf’s first regasification terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi GasPort, a floating facility that has the flexibility to supply LNG to Kuwait during periods of high seasonal demand. The regasification capacity of al-Ahmadi is 500 MMcf/d. When Kuwait’s contract with Excelerate expired in 2013, Kuwait signed another five-year contract with Golar LNG to charter a larger floating LNG vessel with a capacity of 760 MMcf/d. The contract expires in 2019 when Kuwait hopes it can boost domestic natural gas production and establish a permanent land-based liquefaction terminal. The proposed onshore LNG plant could meet Kuwait’s natural gas demand year-round. The Mina al-Ahmadi onshore terminal is designed to have a processing capacity of 1.5 Bcf/d.

LNG imports are largely from Qatar, with small amounts from Nigeria. Kuwait holds medium-term contracts with Shell and BP for cargoes and accepts cargoes from their international portfolios. Other imports are part of a short-term agreement with Qatargas or are spot cargoes.

Kuwait has also recently exhibited interest in supplies from the impending natural gas project in Southern Iraq. Shell, Mitsubishi, and Iraqi state-owned Southern Oil Company (SOC) are developing infrastructure to gather associated natural gas from Iraq’s southern oil fields. A potential pipeline from Iran’s South Pars gas field has been placed on hold, as political considerations make the project less likely. These prospective pipeline imports would still not eliminate the need for continued LNG imports.

Electricity

Kuwait’s electric sector capacity has been slow to expand despite rapidly rising consumption rates over the past decade and persistent power shortages during peak demand periods.

Kuwait relies on fossil fuels, namely oil and natural gas, to generate its electricity. The country struggles to produce and import sufficient natural gas to meet peak electricity demand in the summer months, and as a result, depends on more expensive and heavy fuel oil and crude oil. Kuwait’s economy relies heavily on oil export revenues; therefore, it has financial incentives to move away from burning oil for domestic power use. In 2011, oil accounted for more than 70% of Kuwait’s power generation in 2011, while natural gas made up about 28%, according to IHS Energy.

In 2013, Kuwait had an installed electric generation capacity of 15.7 gigawatts (GW), according to the Arab Union of Electricity, and the country generated electricity at a 44% capacity factor, resulting in an average output of nearly 7 GW. Peak demand in 2013 was 12.1 GW and has been increasing each year since 2004. The rate of growth of power generation capacity is not keeping pace with the rate of growth in demand which has averaged around 5% annually over the past decade. The Arab Union of Electricity expects that Kuwait’s power generation will more than double in the next decade from 61 terawatthours (Twh) in 2013 to 142 Twh in 2024.

Kuwait’s increasing population and gross domestic product levels and low electricity tariffs over the past decade have led to higher demand in the residential sector. According to the World Bank, Kuwait was the world’s fourth-largest electricity consumer on a per capita basis in 2011. In the past decade, the development of Kuwait’s electricity sector has stalled because of political factors and a lack of investment. The country is slow to implement generation capacity projects because of political infighting between the Emir and the National Assembly. Also, the lack of natural gas supply has contributed to the chronic shortages in electricity supply as Kuwait focuses on building gas-fired power generation. Formerly having one of the largest generation reserve margins in the Persian Gulf region before 2006, Kuwait is perpetually in a state of electricity shortage and experiences frequent blackouts and brownouts each summer.

Given the rapidly increasing power demand over the past decade, the Kuwaiti government unveiled an extensive development plan for the electric grid. Since 2007, the Kuwaiti government has commissioned approximately 5 GW in capacity through new combined-cycle gas-fired plants and several smaller expansions to oil-fired facilities; although, this is still insufficient to close the gap between electricity supply and demand. The Kuwaiti government plans to increase installed capacity to 25 GW by 2020 to meet anticipated peak demand of 22.5 GW and to have a reserve margin of more than 10%. Most of this planned capacity will be fueled by natural gas or oil. Kuwait does plan to generate 5% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2020 and 15% by 2030, primarily by using the country’s solar and wind potential, according to a MEED Insight report.

To achieve the goals, Kuwait is employing more private capital through public-private projects (PPP), as well as independent water and power projects (IWPP). Kuwait was the last Persian Gulf country to incorporate the private sector into the development of its electric sector. The first evidence of private sector participation is the expansion project of the Al-Subiya power plant built by General Electric (GE) and Hyundai Heavy Industries of South Korea. In July 2012, GE and Hyundai completed the 700 MW expansion of the power plant to its nameplate capacity of 2,000 MW. The power plant is a combined-cycle facility, using primarily natural gas, with heavy fuel oil as a back-up fuel.

The Kuwaiti government is constructing the country’s first independent power plant, Al-Zour North, with a consortium, (GDF SUEZ, Sumitomo, and Abdullah Hamad Al Sagar & Brothers) that owns 40% of the facility. The first phase of the gas-fired Al-Zour North facility has a generating capacity of 1.5 GW and is scheduled to come online by the end of 2016. The second phase will add another 1.5 GW and is in the tendering process. Total capacity for all four phases of Al-Zour North is 4.8 GW which, if constructed, is expected to meet anticipated electricity demand.

Besides Al-Zour North, two other power plants are under development to achieve the forecast capacity and bring an adequate buffer between peak demand and generation capacity. The Al-Abdaliya project is slated to be the country’s first renewable power plant with a dual-fuel capability of a solar unit and a combined-cycle unit. Total capacity is 280 MW, with 60 MW coming from solar energy. The government is adding two smaller expansion plants with 500 MW each as a short-term solution to meet the rising power needs. In total, these projects will add 6.78 GW of capacity to the electric grid.

Nuclear power

In 2009 Kuwait started plans to develop nuclear energy plants and announced its intention to establish a nuclear commission. In January 2010, the head of the National Nuclear Energy Committee announced a 20-year cooperative deal with the French Atomic Energy Commission to develop nuclear power in Kuwait. Kuwait was considering constructing four nuclear reactors, set to become operational by 2022. The country agreed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into any future nuclear sites. However, following Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Kuwait dissolved its National Nuclear Energy Committee and decided to suspend its plans to produce nuclear power.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) grid

Facing rising electricity demand, the Gulf Cooperation Council is developing an interconnected power grid.

The member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Kuwait is a member) face rapidly increasing demand for electricity. As a result, the six Gulf countries (the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman) commissioned a region-wide power grid. This three-phase project, completed in late 2012, connected the Northern System—Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar—to the Southern System—UAE, and Oman. Some analysts believe the GCC Grid has the potential to expand into North Africa and eventually link with Europe’s power grids. Kuwait already has needed to import electricity from the Northern System, as it has experienced electricity supply shortfalls. In addition to meeting the growing electricity demands and sharing electricity reserve requirements in the Gulf countries, the integrated power grids will reduce power outages in the short term and increase power exchange across seasons and time zones.

Notes

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of October 24, 2014.
• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

The post Kuwait Energy Profile: One Of World’s Top Producers And Net Exporters Of Petroleum – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Australia’s federal government is aiming to raise almost $5 billion by privatizing the country’s largest health insurer:

Australia hopes to raise up to Aus$5.51 billion (US$4.82 billion) through the sale of the country’s largest health insurer in an initial public offering, Finance Minister Mathias Cormann said Monday.

Cormann said the sale would remove the current conflict where the government is both the regulator of the private health insurance market and owner of the largest market participant. Medibank provides cover to 3.8 million people.

The government has previously said Medibank is one of 34 competing funds in the private health insurance market in Australia and that a scoping study had found no evidence that premiums would rise as a result of the sale. (AFP via Yahoo! News)

Australia has been shrinking the role of government in health care. Although a national single-payer scheme was established in 1975, the federal government re-introduced private choice within a few years. Indeed, Medibank Private is the descendant of the original single-payer plan, Medibank.

Today, almost half of Australians have private health insurance. Largely, this was a result of the federal government partially re-introducing underwriting in the late 1990s so that insurers could charge premiums that were more actuarially accurate to an applicant’s age. Previously, age could not be considered in setting premiums. The reform encouraged people to buy hospital insurance by age 30. Every year of delay results in an increase of 2 percent. So, if one dawdles until age 50, one will pay about 40 percent more. This is far from pure actuarial accuracy, but in a health system run by politicians, it is quite a strong achievement.

Obamacare does the opposite: Discouraging people from signing up because they can enroll every year starting November 15 through February 15 of the next year. So, a healthy young person can risk the consequences of being uninsured for no longer than ten months. This is one reason why healthy young people shun Obamacare coverage.

An article written in 2008 by a former colleague of mine gives American readers more details and context about Australia’s increasing privatization of its health sector.

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For the pivotal alternative to Obamacare, please see the Independent Institute’s widely acclaimed book: Priceless: Curing the Healthcare Crisis, by John C. Goodman.

The post Australia To Raise $5 Billion By Privatizing Its Biggest Health Insurer – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

COGEN Europe said Friday it regrets the side-lining by EU leaders of energy efficiency in the 2030 climate and energy policy framework and urges the incoming European Commission to push for the practical adoption of energy-efficient solutions in Europe.

According to COGEN Europe, The deal struck in the early hours of this morning at the EU summit in Brussels unfortunately demonstrates that heads of state and government are still failing to grasp the economic importance of energy efficiency, instead continuing to stick to 2007’s recipe for agreeing the 2020 package.

“Their failure to link greenhouse gas emission cuts to energy efficiency improvements is a cause for concern in the cogeneration sector. Moreover, the EU’s recent focus on energy security did not translate into leaders demanding concrete action from the Commission,” COGEN Europe said in a press statement.

COGEN Europe Managing Director Fiona Riddoch said: “Since the early 2000s, the highly energy-efficient solution of cogeneration has not experienced significant market growth at EU level. The 2020 package certainly did not give any impetus to the cogeneration sector, while the effects of 2012’s Energy Efficiency Directive still remain to be seen.”

“We believe the 2030 framework was the right vehicle to deliver climate and energy policies that boost the growth and jobs agenda. Nonetheless, we look forward to working with Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete on practical ways to foster the adoption of energy-efficient solutions by market actors and citizens,” Riddoch said.

COGEN Europe and its members will continue to play a key role in the implementation of existing EU legislation as well as contributing to forthcoming debates on the European Energy Union and the Jobs, Growth and Investment Package, COGEN Europe said.

The post COGEN Europe Regrets EU Leaders’ Side-Lining Of Energy Efficiency In EU 2030 Package appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Afghan authorities of Kunduz province are concerned about the situation in Dashti Archi and Imam Sahib districts, bordering with Tajikistan

According to observers, there is a sort of parallel government system controlled by the militants in the area, which approves and introduces even development projects.

“If the government doesn’t conduct a special operation, the district can move under the control of militants of the Taliban movement”, said the Dashti Archi district head Nasriddin Sadi. The official specified that there are about 55 rebel groups in the district, including militants from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, with a total of 600-650 people. The head of the Imam Sahib district, Amoniddin Kurayshi, said that the situation in his area is a little better, though however alarming. Terrorists from around the world gathered in the area: Chechens, Tajiks, local Taliban and others. Some 300 militants attack our post that only has 20 people stationed.

The militants are funded and provided with weapons and ammunition from Pakistan. “They take taxes from the population, oppress them, and the people have to pay out of fear”, explained Kurayshi.

The press secretary of the security chief of Kunduz province, Said Sarvar Husaini, said that the provincial government intends to launch an operation against the Taliban in the two districts, as well as in a number of other troubled districts of the province, and he stressed that governmental forces are able to eliminate these militant groups.

New figures released recently by the Defence ministry indicate that 950 Afghan soldiers were killed between March and August 2014, the worst rate of the war. “The fighting in Kunduz did not start this year. But in the past years we had international forces helping the Afhan security forces”, said Ghulam Sakhi Baghlani, governor of the Kunduz province.

The last time that Afghans felt so threatened by in the northern Kunduz province by the Taliban was in 2009, shortly before President Barack Obama deployed thousands of troops to push the insurgents over the border. Now the Taliban have returned.

The post Afghanistan: Taliban Control ‘Parellel Government’ In Northeast appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Brussels has been unable to influence EU member Austria from its cooperation on South Stream with Russia, so instead has tuned its focus now on Macedonia, not an EU member.

Macedonia became the latest Western Balkan country to receive a warning on the implications of building Russia’s South Stream gas pipeline for its EU future, reads euobserver.com. The good news for Macedonia here is that its EU future is bleak.

Janez Kopac, the head of the European Energy Community (EEC), said on Thursday (23 October) that Skopje’s South Stream agreement with Moscow is “not in compliance” with EU energy law.

He noted that as an EEC treaty signatory it has “a legally binding commitment to implement these rules”.

He added, in comments to the Brussels-based dtt-net.com news agency, that “Macedonia will have to withdraw from the IGA [the South Stream accord] or renegotiate it if it wants to become a full EU member”.

The EEC is a Vienna-based body which counts the 28 EU states, the Western Balkan EU-aspirants, Moldova, and Ukraine among its members.

South Stream is to carry Russian gas under the Black Sea via Bulgaria and Serbia to the heart of the EU. But potential branch lines are to connect up with Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

The EU says its current model – in which Russian firm Gazprom owns at least 51 percent and controls both production and distribution – goes against EU laws designed to stop monopolies from inflating prices.

The EEC’s Kopac in panic mode spoke after a senior Gazprom executive met with Macedonian energy officials in Skopje earlier the same day.

Both sides voiced confidence the branch line will go ahead as planned.

For its part, the European Commission on 30 September wrote a formal letter to Macedonia to voice disquiet.

“South Stream, as any other major infrastructure project in Europe, may only be developed and operated fully in line with EU law”, an EU official noted.

“Pipelines developed and operated in conflict with EU law endanger the functioning of the internal market”.

The EEC and commission complaints come after similar criticism of Bosnia and Serbia.

“It should be clear from the beginning that Serbia cannot accede to the EU without bringing this [South Stream] agreement into compliance [with EU law]”, Kopac told EUobserver earlier this month.

Russian president Vladmir Putin has said he hopes to make a deal on the situation with EU leaders.

But in the meantime, Gazprom is pressing ahead with construction of the offshore portion of the pipeline despite the dispute.

EU leaders at a summit in Brussels also on Thursday fretted over how to improve the Union’s energy security in view of its gas dependence on Russia and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Among other provisions, their joint conclusions, published in the small hours of Friday, say the “Southern Gas Corridor” is one of the EU’s “critical projects of common interest … to ensure diversification of energy suppliers”.

The southern corridor is a competing scheme to South Stream which aims to bring gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia.

In light of Kopac’s forceful statements, the conclusions noted that EU states will “further strengthen the [European] Energy Community, which aims to expand the EU’s energy acquis to enlargement and neighbourhood countries, in the light of the EU’s security of supply concerns”.

They added that EU countries should use “foreign policy instruments to convey consistent messages related to energy security, in particular to strategic partners”.

The post Brussels Pressures Macedonia Not To Do Business With Russia On South Stream Project appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The fall in oil prices is creating new complexities for the energy exporting economies of West Asia. With smaller profits, these countries may not be able to buy off political dissent at home and fund client governments and rebels abroad. Lower energy prices could also mean a renewed chance for peace.

By Amit Bhandari

Crude oil prices are at a four-year low and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) prices have also fallen since the beginning of 2014. Rising oil production and a slowing of growth in demand are the two main reasons for the drop. The prospect of large-scale shale gas production in the U.S. is also expected to bring down global energy prices after exports start in 2015.

Gateway House has compiled a list of 58 natural resource-dependent economies. We further shortlisted economies where oil and gas account for over 10% of GDP (Figure 1 and Table 1). 1 Of the 19 countries we thus identified, 15 are in West Asia, North Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. Clearly, these regions will be hurt economically by falling energy prices, even as importers such as India, China and Japan gain. Lower energy prices will also impact ongoing geopolitical events—the Arab uprisings, the rise of the Islamic State (IS), Iran’s nuclear programme, and the confrontation over Ukraine.

Figure 1: Oil and gas dependent economies

Figure 1: Oil and gas dependent economies

Table 1: Large economies dependent on oil and gas exports

Table 1: Large economies dependent on oil and gas exports

The oil rich kingdoms of West Asia—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar—have been the biggest beneficiaries of high oil prices over the past decade. The trade surplus of these four countries has risen from $63 billion in 2009 to $323 billion in 2013. 2 It has allowed these governments to literally buy their way out of domestic and geopolitical trouble—Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar have all tackled Arab upheaval-related political dissent in part by splurging on social spending at home. 3 Lower energy prices will reduce their ability to buy off dissent in the future.

This means that short of quelling future unrest with brute force, these regimes will be forced to introduce some real political reforms where the people are demanding such changes.

The other impact will be on regional unrest: on the Islamic State, Syrian resistance, and the face-off in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army. Qatar had provided loans of $7 billion to Egypt’s now-deposed Muslim Brotherhood government. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia and UAE extended loans to the current military regime for energy purchases. 4 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reportedly also arming and funding various anti-government groups in Syria, according to SIPRI, a Sweden-based think tank. 5 Fundraisers acting on behalf of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have been active in the past in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, according to U.S. government officials. 6 Lower oil prices will bring down the cash surplus in Arab States, and could impact the flow of funds to troubled spots.

The conflicts in Syria and the Islamic State represent a schism in West Asia. On the other side of the divide is Iran, which faces the same financial pressures because of the fall in oil prices even as it aids friendly regimes in Syria and Iraq. Iran’s oil exports have dipped considerably in the past few years, and its financial position is weaker because of ever-tighter U.S. sanctions aimed at bringing it to the negotiating table with western powers on the issue of its nuclear programme. If the economic pain caused by the sanctions does achieve this goal and sanctions are lifted, then Iran will be able to export oil more freely, adding to world oil supplies.

Iran’s petroleum sector has languished since the 1979 revolution: current production of 3.5 million barrels/day is less than two-thirds the levels in 1978 levels. 7 A long-term solution to the sanctions can bring fresh investments and therefore more oil—and lower prices—into the global market, though this can take several years. Till then, Iran too is constrained in its financing of arms and training to its Shia neighbours.

Russia, another major oil and gas exporter, has also been at the receiving end of U.S.-led sanctions because of the Ukraine issue. The sanctions have not been enforced with particular vigor because the European Union states, buyers of Russia’s hydrocarbons, are themselves suffering from slow economic growth and cannot afford the burden. News reports indicate that Europe will reconsider sanctions against Russia near the end of October. 8 The lower oil prices now hitting the Russian economy may prove to be more effective in resolving the Ukraine crisis than sanctions. Russia is now looking for other markets to reduce its dependence on Europe and has recently concluded a $400 billion gas supply deal with China. 9

Venezuela is an example of a petro-state fallen on hard times. The previous president, the late Hugo Chavez, supported friendly regimes in Latin America and was often accused of funding opponents of leaders he disliked by using Venezuela’s oil revenues. However, mismanagement has resulted in a sharp fall in oil production and an economy in deep crisis. This has compounded the impact of low oil prices and has hurt the economy. Venezuela is unable to pay for many imports, and foreign airlines have cut flights to the country because the government is unable to settle their dues in hard currency. 10

The good news is that as more oil and gas supply sources become available in the world market, India can leverage the increasing production of hydrocarbon exporters such as the U.S., Australia and Canada, to reduce its dependence on the volatile West Asian region, from where imports 60% of its oil. 11 The combination of diminished purchases by big Asian buyers like India and lower prices may be the just the jolt that the big West Asian producers need to mend their mischievous ways—and to give peace a chance.

About the author:
Amit Bhandari is Fellow, Energy & Environment Studies, Gateway House.

Source:
This article was published by Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References

1 World Bank, Data: Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP), 2011, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS/countries?display=default > and World Bank, Data: Population, Total, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.>; and World Bank, Data: GDP Ranking, 24 September 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>

2 OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014, <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2014.pdf>

3 Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, To Stave Off Arab Spring Revolts, Saudi Arabia and Fellow Gulf Countries Spend $150 Billion, 11 September 2011, <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/to-stave-off-arab-spring-revolts-saudi-arabia-and-fellow-gulf-countries-spend-150-billion/>

4 The Cairo Post, Egypt to Receive $5B from KSA, UAE to Offset Qatar Payments, 13 October 2014, <http://thecairopost.com/news/126945/business/egypt-to-receive-5b-from-ksa-uae-to-offset-qatar-payments>

5 Wezeman, Pieter D., SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/sipri-yearbook-2013-chapter-5-section-3>

6 Cohen, David, Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing’, remarks on new American security at the U.S. department of the treasury, 3 April 3 2014, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx>

7 British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014, 1 June 1, 2014, <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html>

8 Russia Beyond the Headlines, EU Will Review Russia Sanctions in Late October , 14 October 2014, <http://rbth.com/news/2014/10/14/eu_will_review_russia_sanctions_in_late_october_40586.html>

9 Gazprom, Alexey Miller: Russia and China signed the biggest contract in the history of Gazprom, 21 May 2014, <http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/may/article191451/>

10 Wilson, Peter, ‘Airlines Move to Cut Off Service to Venezuela’, Bloomberg Businessweek, 20 March 2014, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-20/airlines-move-to-cut-off-service-to-venezuela>

11 U.S. Energy Information Administration, India: Country Brief, 26 June 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IN.>

The post Can Cheap Oil Give Peace A Chance? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Hamdi Fırat Büyük

Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic held a crucial press conference after his meeting with European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule, stating that Serbia belongs in the EU.

The meeting between Vucic and Fule was held after a regional conference attended by the foreign affairs and finance ministers from Western Balkan countries. Vucic expressed that talks with Fule mostly focussed on political stability in the region and in Serbia, economic reforms and Serbian accession to the EU.

Vucic emphasized that EU accession is vital for regional peace and economic and political stability, expressing his gratitude to the EU for supporting his country and the region in general.

The EU is not asking Serbia to recognize Kosovo

Outgoing EU Enlargement Commissioner Fule said in Belgrade that the EU is not asking Serbia to recognize Kosovo.

“The position of the EU remains the same as we presented last year when we were adopting the negotiating framework. At that time we made it very clear that what we expect is the continuation of the normalization between Serbia and Kosovo. We, at the time, have not requested the recognition, we are not asking this to be done today,” Fule said.

Fule also stated that Serbia is doing well on its path to the EU, saying, “I am very happy to see that, in less than five years, Serbia has become a certain candidate for EU accession,” adding that it was no longer a question of if, but when Serbia would join the EU.

Putin’s visit and Fule’s statements

This meeting and the significant statements made thereafter by both Fule and Vucic came just after Russian President Putin’s visit to Belgrade last week. Putin was the guest of honour for the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Serbian capital from Nazi occupation.

During the ceremony, a mass military parade that showcased Serbia’s air, naval and land forces took place. Both Putin and Vucic emphasized their two countries’ common Slavic roots as the official welcome ceremony took place in one of the biggest Orthodox Churches of Belgrade at Tashmejdan Park.

Additionally, after the ceremony, several meetings were held between Serbian and Russian politicians culminating in the signing of a number of agreements that seek to improve the trade volume between Russia and Serbia. Fields included in these agreements were military and technical cooperation, data protection, customs, railways, energy efficiency and renewable energy.

It is well known that Russia has a great desire to invest in Serbia. Not welcomed by the EU, Russia has made several strategic investments in Serbia including in its railways, telecom industry and infrastructure.

Putin said that Serbian exports to Russia could reach 500 million US dollars per year if the two sides enforce their agreements, “which would be very beneficial for Serbia and would bring new jobs, but would also be beneficial for Russia.”

Many experts think that both the ceremony and Putin’s visit to Serbia were laden with messages to the EU and the West, and that the timing of Fule and Vucic’s statements is no coincidence.

The post After Putin’s Visit To Belgrade, PM Vucic Says Serbia Belongs In EU – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The governors of New Jersey and New York have issued a mandatory quarantine for those travelers who have been treating or otherwise in contact Ebola-infected patients in West Africa.

One healthcare worker has already been isolated after she developed a fever on Friday, New Jersey state health officials said. The unnamed worker did not have symptoms upon first arriving at Newark Liberty International Airport, but officials quarantined her after she acknowledged that she was in contact with infected patients in Sierra Leone. The fever developed after she had been quarantined.

She is currently being evaluated at Newark’s University Hospital, the New Jersey Department of Health announced in a statement.

The woman originally landed in Newark, though that was not going to be her final destination.

“Her next stop was going to be here in New York,” Christie said during a news conference announcing the mandatory quarantine policy, Reuters reports. “A quarantine order will be issued.”

The new policy is stricter than the standards recommended by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, but “the adjustment in increasing the screening procedures is necessary,” Cuomo said, cited by Bloomberg.

CDC agreed that individual states have the right to exceed federal requirements, Cuomo added. “Public safety and public health have to be balanced and I think that this policy does that.”

The move comes after a healthcare worker who recently returned from Ebola-stricken Guinea, where he treated patients, was admitted to a New York City hospital with fever on Thursday and tests confirmed he was positive for Ebola.

Dr. Spencer, 33, who became the fourth person to be diagnosed with the virus in the United States, was listed in stable condition in Bellevue Hospital’s isolation unit on Friday.

Spencer arrived at John F. Kennedy International airport on October 17 and went through all the ramped-up screening procedures, triggering no alert, because he “did not have a fever or other symptoms of illness.”

Since then he acknowledged riding the subway and taking a cab to a Brooklyn bowling alley, still self-monitoring his health and not showing symptoms. Although he did feel fatigue on October 21, he did not report a fever until Thursday.

“It’s too serious a situation to leave it to the honor system of compliance,” Cuomo said announcing the mandatory 21-day quarantine initiative on Friday.

Furthermore state health officials will now extensively interview all travelers arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport from Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The post NY, New Jersey Issue Mandatory Ebola Quarantine For Risk Travelers appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has ordered a revision of all relations with Spain due to the support Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has shown to Maduro’s opposition, La Vanguardia newspaper reported.

“I have ordered… the Foreign Minister Rafael Ramirez to review all relations with Spain due to this unfriendly and meddling act of support to the ultra-right groups from Mr. Rajoy,” La Vanguardia quoted Maduro as saying Friday.

Maduro asked Rajoy to respect Venezuela like the Venezuelan people respect the Spanish and insisted that Rajoy’s government should not meddle in another country’s internal affairs, the newspaper reported.

Maduro decided to revise the country’s relations with Spain over Spanish Prime Minister’s call for Maduro’s opponent Leopoldo Lopez to be released from jail. Lopez, who led the 2014 protests in Venezuela, was arrested in February and was charged with arson, terrorism, homicide and conspiracy, and faces a ten-year imprisonment.

The protests broke out in Venezuela in February. Thousands of people took to the streets of Caracas to protest against Maduro’s government. Demonstrators, many of them students, were demanding economic reforms to tackle inflation and growing poverty. Forty-three people died, with nearly 1,000 people injured and over 3,000 detained.

The post Venezuelan President Maduro Orders Revision Of Relations With Spain: Reports appeared first on Eurasia Review.

IT SOUNDS like a joke. But it isn’t.

About a month ago, on the eve of the Jewish New Year, the government statistical office published a set of interesting items about the population of the state. It is intended as a gift for the citizens. The population is growing, it is getting richer and it is satisfied.

One of the items lists the most popular names given last year to newborn boys and girls.

When the statisticians saw the results, they were flabbergasted. It appears the name that topped the list was Muhammad.

Muhammad? The most popular name in the Jewish state?

There is a simple explanation for this. Arabs constitute more than 20% of the citizenry. Arab parents like to give their sons the name of the Prophet, God bless his soul. Also, Arab citizens have many more children than Jewish citizens. If every second Arab boy is called Muhammad, you get in principle 5%.

Jewish citizens have a much wider choice. There are hundreds of names for boys, and the list is growing all the time, because young parents like to invent fresh Hebrew names. Even if a tenth of the Jewish parents prefer the name Josef, the most popular Hebrew name according to the list, you get only 4%.

What to do? Simple: you just omit the Arab names. No Muhammad.

When this became known, many Israelis laughed. How silly can you get?

BUT IT is not a joke. It shows that the Arab citizens are not considered as really “belonging”. 66 years after the foundation of Israel, the place of the Arabs in the “Jewish State” remains problematical, to say the least.

Last Tuesday, reading Haaretz, I noticed that a whole page – page 4 – consisted of news concerning Jewish-Arab relations.

Item 1: Tens of Jewish settlers invaded the Arab neighborhood of Silwan, next to the Temple Mount, in the middle of the night. Silwan, the biblical Shiloah, is an Arab village that was joined to Jerusalem when East Jerusalem was annexed by Israel after the Six-day War. For years now an association of settlers called Elad has been trying to Judaize this neighborhood by secretly buying properties from poor Arabs, using Arab traitors as straw-men. Now the association has decided to fill these houses, arriving like thieves in the night.

(The president of Elad is Elie Wiesel, the Holocaust writer and Nobel Peace Prize laureate. I boast of having detested him from first sight, and even invented a new Hebrew word for him. It translates roughly as “Holocaustist”.)

Item 2: It was disclosed that the central building organization of the settlers, which is heavily subsidized by the government, is giving huge donations to a group called “If You Will”, which specializes in ferreting out leftist lecturers in the universities and other places.

The group has built a Stasi-like system of informers, and claims to “promote Zionist values in Israel” – denouncing lecturers who demand equality for Arabs and such.

Item 3: Professor (emeritus) Hillel Weiss, still a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University, published a call on Facebook for genocide of the Palestinians. “Since they are not a people, this would not constitute genocide,” he asserted, “but just the eradication of rabble.” He advised the Palestinians to leave Eretz Israel (the land up to the Jordan) at once, before the inevitable genocide occurs.

Bar Ilan University, it should be remembered, is the Alma Mater of Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin.

Item 4: The Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, demanded that Hanin Zuabi should be put “in prison for many years”.

Zuabi, a female Member of the Knesset for a small nationalist Arab faction, has a knack for uttering extremely provocative statements. Lately she said that there is no difference between an ISIS fighter who cuts off individual people’s heads and an Israeli pilot who pushes a button and kills many Palestinians.

Lieberman told Zuabi to go and live in Gaza. He suggested that “as an unmarried woman, who dresses as she dresses (wearing modern clothes)” she would suffer under Hamas. He also demanded that she be stripped of her Israeli citizenship.

Item 5: This does not directly concern the Arabs, but represents racism at its worst. The Israeli Supreme Court, which acts as a constitutional court (though Israel has no written constitution, only some “basic laws”), has ordered the government to close at once an “open” prison built in the middle of the desert for African asylum-seekers, who are held there indefinitely without trial, until they agree to leave Israel “voluntarily”.

The government has refused to obey the order, something quite unprecedented, and is now in the process of enacting a new law, which would allow 61 (out of 120) Knesset members to overturn Supreme Court decisions.

ISRAEL BOASTS of being the Only Democracy In The Middle East.

These random items, and those published on any other day, throw some doubt on this assertion.

Of course, in its treatment of its national minority Israel is not alone, and not the worst. Almost every state around the world has one or more national minorities, and almost every national minority has cause for complaint. One has only to think about the Kurds in Syria, the Russian-speakers in Ukraine or the Tamils in Sri Lanka to get some sense of proportion.

I would guess that in any impartial worldwide review of the status of minorities, Israel would figure somewhere in the middle.

I suppose that the position of every minority is unique, conditioned by history and local circumstances. The position of the Arab minority in Israel certainly is.

First of all, like the Aborigines in Australia and the Inuit in Canada, they were here long before the present majority. The case of Zuabi-Lieberman is a case in point.

The family of Hanin Zuabi has been in Lower Galilee for centuries, perhaps millennia. After the foundation of Israel, Saif-al-Din Zuabi has been a member of the Zionist Labor Party and a deputy speaker of the Knesset. Another relative, Abd-al-Rahman Zuabi, has been a Supreme Court judge. Abd-al-Aziz Zuabi, a Knesset member of the Zionist Mapam party (now Meretz) was a deputy minister.

Lieberman’s original first name was Evet. He was born in Kishinev in Soviet Moldova, and his mother tongue is Yiddish. Though he came to Israel in 1978, he is still considered a “new immigrant” and speaks Hebrew with a marked Russian accent. Of the two, Hanin Zuabi arguably speaks better Hebrew.

It was Abd-al-Aziz who coined the sentence “my tragedy is that my country is at war with my people”.

That is the second anomaly: “Israeli Arabs” are an integral part of the Palestinian people. Almost every Israeli Arab citizen has relatives in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip or both, as well as in the refugee camps.

When actual fighting is going on, as in the recent Gaza war, their hearts are with the other side, the “enemy”. At this moment, several young Israeli Arab citizens are fighting with ISIS, after crossing into Syria through Turkey.

AS THE Zuabi family tree shows, there is another side of the coin. Arab citizens are deeply interwoven in the fabric of Israel.

I often wonder what would happen if the wishful thinking of Lieberman (and others of his ilk around the world) were fulfilled, and the minority left the country.

We know from history. When the French Huguenots were expulsed from France, many of them fled to the fledgling Prussian state. Backward Berlin became an economic center and Prussia flourished, while France was enfeebled. The same, but even more so, happened to Spain after the expulsion of the Jews and Muslims. Spain was never the same again, and the Ottoman empire, which gladly absorbed most of them, was enriched.

Israel’s Arab citizens do not serve in the army. They do not want to fight against their Palestinian brothers, nor does the army want to train them and give them arms, God forbid. (Though at this moment, the army would like to enlist Christian Arabs, a minority of the minority, in order to create a split. Some Arabs, mostly Bedouin and Druze, do serve.)

But apart from army service, Arab citizens fulfill all the duties of a citizen. They pay their taxes. Since Value Added Tax and other indirect taxes make up a large part of government revenues, they cannot evade them. They fulfill many tasks.

Indeed, Arabs are far more deeply imbedded in Israeli society than many of them would like to admit. They are physicians, lawyers, engineers, judges. When I brought my late wife to hospital, it took several days before I realized the head of the department was an Arab doctor.

All Arab citizens learn Hebrew and speak it well, while our army intelligence department has a hard time finding Jews who speak Arabic.

The personal income of Arab citizens is on average lower than that of Jewish citizens, but still far higher than that of their relatives in the occupied territories. Arabs in the annexed areas of East Jerusalem, who have not been accorded Israeli citizenship but are officially “residents”‘ , still enjoy full rights under the national insurance system, which are considerable.

IN GENERAL, the situation of the Arab citizens is far from what we (and they, of course) desire. We must fight for total equality. This fight should be continuous, and should be fought by Jewish and Arab human rights activists hand in hand.

However, the sad fact is that this cooperation, which once was close and almost intimate, has become distant and rare. Arabs are afraid of “normalization”, which might look like supporting the occupation. Jews are afraid of being branded by the extreme Right as “Arab-lovers” and traitors.

This situation, though natural, must be overcome. The Israeli Left has no chance of ever regaining power without active cooperation with “the Zuabis”, as Finance Minister Yair Lapid once contemptuously called all Arab citizens. Including Hanin, though she is a woman, unmarried and dressed as she wants.

And all the missing Muhammads.

The post Muhammad, Where Are You? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

With the Abu Baker al-Siddiq Brigade, Zintan, Libya

A second interview by this observer with Seif al Islam Gadhafi, formerly the heir apparent to his father Moammar, was sought and finally arranged as a follow up to an earlier one focusing of my interest in the Imam Musa Sadr case. That case involves a great crime against a great man and conciliator and his historic cause, and exposes those who betrayed him in Lebanon and two other countries while swearing their personal devotion and shedding crocodile tears over the past 36 years. That research is nearing completion and publication awaits DNA results from body samples more credible than the ones offered by the Bosnia laboratory two years ago and immediately demonstrated to be fraudulent. The story of why that particular lab was chosen and by who goes to the essence of the current stonewalling campaign with respect to informing the public about what exactly happened to Imam Sadr and his partners on 8/3l/1978 in Tripoli, Libya. It also identifies who instructed Gadhafi to kill them over the strong objections from the PLO’s Yassir Arafat who spoke with Gadhafi and tried to save the trio of Lebanese Shia.

But our discussion soon turned to other subject as Seif’s jailers may have taken seriously my joke that if they extended the original 20 minutes I was granted to two hours, I would deliver to them 10 US Visas and they could fill in any names the might choose. Truth told, of course I could not even get myself a passport renewal as former US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman reportedly sneered at a US Embassy Christmas party a few years back, “Lamb will serve ten years hard time in the Feds for hobnobbing with terrorists (Hezbollah in those days…who knows today?) when we get him back home.” I admit that Jeff and I both have a problem with Hezbollah. His is because Hezbollah just may liberate Palestine and mine is that Hezbollah needs to do more in Lebanon and use 90 minutes of Parliament’s time, where it has the power, to grant Palestinian refugees in Lebanon the right to work and to own a home. But that is also another story and Hezbollah continues to report that they are ‘working on the problem but it’s politically complicated.”

Meanwhile, Da’ish (IS) is metastasizing fast in Libya through its main affiliate al Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) and plans to add Tripoli, to its Islamic Caliphate along with Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and Beirut during the coming months and if necessary, years. This, according to Seif al Islam and representatives of the Zintan brigades based southwest of Tripoli as well as two representatives of other tribes and militia moving toward supporting the still vital Gadhafi regime remnants.

Libya may be the lowest hanging ripe fruit within easy reach of Da’ish (IS) and its growing number of affiliates, according to US Ambassador Deborah Jones during a recent visit to the US Embassy in Malta, to discuss her own problems in Libya which include the 8/31/14 take-over by al Fajr Libya (FL) of the US embassy compound barely a month after it was evacuated and moved to Tunisia for the second time since February of 2011. Secretary of State John Kerry reassured the media in Washington recently that “the embassy was not really closed, but had moved out of Libya”. One Religion Professor at Tripoli University joked last week that “Kerry is correct, the US embassy is here but it’s in a state of occultation. We can’t see it but it’s around and watches us.” A Libyan photographer who was at the embassy compound when Al Fajr Libya (FL) arrived reported that the Da’ish (IS) affiliate had moved into buildings inside the embassy complex claiming that they would ‘protect it’ as they carted off boxes of documents for ‘safe keeping.’ FL is described by a former Dean at Tripoli U. as between al Nusra and Da’ish (IS) with a fragile partnership between the two and presenting to the public “ A Good cop-Bad cop tag-team with differences to be worked out once all the infidels are vanquished.

Libya, as with the Arab Maghreb, is on the cusp of a new wave of Islamist groups, and is moving beyond al-Qaeda of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Abdelmalek Droukdel, to Baghdadi’s ISIS and its widely perceived logical offshoot ISIM being planted in North Africa and the Sahel. The threat of the Da’ish (Islamic State is already deeply anchored and expanding in the now lawless Libya, according to UN envoy Bernardino León. Several Libyan organizations recently announced their loyalty to IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This has confirmed a speculation that IS has penetrated Libyan public institutions. The Ansar al-Sharia group, affiliated with ISIS, has declared authority during the last several days over the coastal city of Darna which is located strategically between Benghazi and the Egyptian border – just 289 km (179 miles) and 333 km (206 miles), respectively.

Countless militia are forming, merging, changing names and lying low as perceived interests dictate. Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria was retitled, revitalized and repackaged to enhance its appeal on social media as has the Furqan Brigade of the AQIM in Tunisia. Ansar Al-Sharia is another one becoming very active.The Uqba bin Nafi Brigade, has just declared allegiance to ISIS as has the Islamic Caliphate in the Islamic Maghreb. al-Ummah Brigade, which operates out of Libyan coasts and airports, another is Al-Battar is attracting pro-ISIS elements. Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (the Islamic Youth Shura Council), or MSSI. According to Libyan sources and journalist Adam al-Sabiri, writing in Al Akbar, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi asked these elements to deploy to the Libyan front to counter the attacks by the Libyan army led by Khalifa Haftar as part of Operation Dignity seeking to “purge Libya of terrorists.”

Libyan friends, some from three years ago, advise that more people have been killed in the past three years than during the 2011 revolution and they now fear a Somalia-like “failed state” given all the weapons, lawlessness, and growing number of Islamists. The South of Libya has not been spared the lawlessness, as tribal battles continue for control of a lucrative smuggling trade. Friends point out that the country no longer even bothers to celebrate the National Holiday commemorating the 10/23/2011 “total liberation of Libya.” “It’s a cruel joke” my friend Hinde advised as she explains that many Libyans yearn for the stability of the Gadhafi days. “Maybe wanting to turn the clock back is the same in Iraq and Egypt and Syria?” she wondered.

“The rampant regional, ideological and tribal conflicts are worse than the rule of the dictator,” said Salah Mahmud al-Akuri, a doctor in Benghazi. “Some Libyans are looking back to the old regime.”

Amidst all the chaos, Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thinni claimed last week that groups loyal to the IS, such as al Fajr Libya, are presently in control of the city of Derna and other Libyan towns and have begun summoning townspeople to public squares to witness declarations of fealty to Da’ish (IS), even beginning their signature public executions. Libya’s “government” claims that its “army” is preparing to expel Fajr Libya (FL) and retake the capital, as more militia rush to join FL. Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani’s said in a statement this week that he gave orders to the government forces to “advance toward Tripoli to liberate it and to free it from the grip of al Fajr Libya”. The Libyan embassy in Washington told a House Foreign Affairs committee staffer that they expect that residents in Tripoli will launch “a civil disobedience campaign until the arrival of the army.” Walking around the former “Green Square” this observer saw no signs of this rather he observed citizens stocking up on necessities or packing their cars. Later, Thani added, military forces in the strife-torn country “have absolutely united to also recapture Libya’s second city Benghazi from the local IS affiliate, al Fajr Liyba (FL). Leading one to wonder whether the Libyan “army” will fare better than Maliki’s did in Mosul and Anbar.

According to students and staff at Tripoli University, (known as Fatah University during the Gadhafi decades) a few of whom this observer first met in the summer of 2011, and who lived the political events in their country since while some of their friends and relatives, as in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, are preparing to leave and start a new life somewhere. Hasan, a Gadhafi supporter I was with nearly daily three years ago in Tripoli still curses what, “NATO| did this to our country. The Gadhafi regime was changing as you know Franklin, but the reformers were prevented from making the changes that Seif al Islam and his associates got their father to agree to. Remember when Saif said “My father wants to live in a tent where he is most happy and write a history of the Jamahiriya (land of the masses). He will offer advice but have just a ceremonial role out of politics? You remember that? We believed Seif didn’t we?. Anyhow, khalas!, Libya is finished! NATO gave it to Da’ish just as they gave Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to Iran.”

Libya is now moving beyond al-Qaeda of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Abdelmalek Droukdel, to Baghdadi’s ISIS and its widely perceived logical offshoot Islamic State in the Islamic Maghreb (ISIM-Damis) now expanding in North Africa and the Sahel. Former rebels who fought against Gadhafi have formed powerful militias and seized control of large parts of Libya in the past three years. Back in mid-august of 2011, the late American journalist Marie Colvin and I stood on the balcony of the Corinthia Hotel opposites the still empty Marriott where some kid was practicing sniping from the roof, at my expense, as I pointed out to Marie a body floating just off the beach of the Mediterranean across the road. We walked over and examined it and decided while it was dressed in religious garb the man may have been an army deserter; there were increasing numbers in those days, because of his military style boots. We alerted some militia guys driving along the corniche who said they would report the body and before long an ambulance did arrive. Two of the militia waded out waist deep and pulled in the bloated body to shore, unlaced his tan leather boots while holding their noses from the stench. They then threw the new boots in the back of their pick-up and drove off with no more than a smiling ‘shukran habibis’ (thanks dears). Later that day Marie and I counted a column of 143 pickups with AK-47 jubilant fist waving rebels entering along the coastal road toward downtown Tripoli having come from battles in the east around Misrata. In the next few days we discussed how there seemed to be countless ‘free-cigarettes, $200 on the first of each month and your personal Kalasnikov’ militia popping up like mushrooms after a summer rain. Three years ago one of their battle cries was “Death to Gadafi—Yes to Freedom!” Today one hears around Tripoli another slogan from the lips of young men many of whom may be the same, chanting, “Death to the kafirs (disbelievers,” or infidels) Yes to Islam!Abas (that’s all!”

Seif el Islam still resides at his cell in Zintan which, even though jail is jail, has been upgraded from when he was captured in the Sahara making his way toward Niger and his finger was cut off as a warning.

Seif, has proposed talks and is ready to participate in bringing together Libya’s warring parties and aiding the transition to what he claims he was working on before the February 17, 2011 uprising in Benzhazi which quickly spread.

Seif’s team would likely include his father’s cousin and confident Ahmed Gaddaf al-Dam, former Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled Kane, long-time Libyan diplomat, the widely respected Omar el Hamdi now is Cairo, and Seif’s sister Aisha, now living with his mother and children in the Gulf.

Seif has no illusions of returning Libya to the past, but argues that elements of the former regime deserved to be heard. “We were in the process of making broad reforms and my father gave me the responsibly to see them through. Unfortunately the revolt happened and both sides made mistakes that are now allowing extreme Islamist group like Da’ish to pick up the pieces and turn Libya into an extreme fundamentalist entity in their regional plans.”

With respect to Seifs trials, whether ins the Tripoli courthouse or at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the odds of either happening anytime soon, ior at all, are fading as negotiations for an arrangement are reportedly progressing.

A solution is being sought, according to sources at the Justice Ministry in Tripoli because there are many problems with Seifs case which was supposed to begin earlier this year, and the case has been criticized by a number of international actors. Not least for which how Libya and the ICC have handled their cases. For example, Human Rights Watch has accused the Libyan government of failing to provide adequate legal representation and the ICC it has been unable to compel the Libyan government to allow it access — just one of many challenges to the ICC’s legitimacy in recent years. Meanwhile it is likely that Seif’s jailers, who increasing respects and admires him, may have other ideas that would enhance their own standing in Libya. In addition, certain NATO countries are said to be privately discussing with Washington, Paris London and Bonn the idea of finding a role for Seif and certain of his associates and family members in “the new Libya.”

According to Seif, and former regime officials, several NATO countries have sent messages claiming they did not intend for his father to be killed but were searching during the summer of 2011 for a refuge for his father in Africa. Seif does not believe them.

Seif al Islam still has substantial influence among tribes still loyal to Gaddafi as well as former regime officials in the army and government. The delegation Seif could assemble, including Ahmad Gadaff al-Dam, would benefit from the latter’s still strong connections with Arab governments, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as some European countries.

More on this and other subjects related to Seif and the growing international recognition over the need for expulsion of Islamists from Libya, and a possible significant role for Seif, are expected to be discussed publicly soon.

The post Will Seif Al Islam Lead Expulsion Of The ISIS Affiliate, Al Fajr Libya? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On the evening of October 15, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev arrived in Dushanbe, Republic of Tajikistan, to begin on the following day his official visit in the neighboring country.

On October 16, President Ilham Aliyev attended the official welcoming ceremony in the Palace of Nations in Dushanbe, welcomed by President Emomali Rahmon and a guard of honor holding the flags of both nations. In this occasion members of both governments were introduced by the two heads of state respectively.

Subsequently the two presidents held a one-on-one meeting in which President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon emphasized: “We are satisfied with this visit to Tajikistan. Welcome! Tajikistan and Azerbaijan are bound together by ancient historical and cultural ties. I am confident that this visit will give a new impetus to our bilateral relations. During this visit we will certainly have wide discussions on important areas of our bilateral relations and define the agenda of our multilateral cooperation.”

The relations between Baku and Dushanbe are developing successfully; bilateral trade is poised to grow, and political consultations are at the highest levels.

On this occasion President Ilham Aliyev stated: “I thank you for inviting me to visit you beautiful country. I am happy to be here again, and I see impressive changes. In a short period of time I will see impressive changes. All these improvements reflect a rapid development of your country. As your friends, this makes us very happy, and we certainly have big hopes that the potential of our bilateral cooperation will be strengthened. We have strong ties. We are friends and partners. This is a visit of a friend, partner. We also hope that this visit will encourage a rapid development of our economic relations. Because we both agree that our trade is not at the desired levels. This is why in our delegation we have included representatives of business circles, and many ministers. On this occasion I believe that we will have positive results.”

The two presidents’ informal meeting was followed by an expanded session between members of the Azerbaijani delegation and their counterparts from Tajikistan led by President Emomali Rahmon. At this meeting, the two heads of state made public statements and reiterated the importance of strengthening the bilateral cooperation.

The expanded meeting was followed by a signing ceremony of a joint declaration between the President of Azerbaijan and the President of Tajikistan. This declaration was followed by the signing of a bilateral agreement that consisted on strengthening the coordination between of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on Civil Defense, Prevention and Elimination of Emergency Situations” it was signed by Azerbaijan`s Minister of Emergency Situations Kamaladdin Heydarov and Tajikistan`s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sirodjidin Aslov.

The second agreement was signed in the area of “Isolation of Plants disease” signed by Azerbaijan`s Minister of Agriculture Heydar Asadov and Tajikistan`s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sirodjidin Aslov.
The third bilateral agreement on cooperation “between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was in the field of Healthcare” it was signed by Azerbaijan`s Minister of Health Ogtay Shiraliyev and Tajikistan`s Minister of Health and Social Protection of Population Salimzoda Nusratullo Faizullo.

The fourth “Agreement was focused on Scientific Cooperation between the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan”, it was signed by the president of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences Akif Alizade and president of the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan Farhad Rahimi.

After this memorable ceremony, the two statesmen delivered statements to the press and in the afternoon hours, President Ilham Aliyev visited the statue of Ismoili Somoni in the complex of the Tajik National Solidarity and Revival Complex in Dusty Square, Dushanbe. The Azerbaijani head of state was honored by a guard of honor during the wreath laying ceremony in front of the statue.

At the Tajik National University, Dushanbe, President Ilham Aliyev was presented with an Honorary Doctorate diploma. Rector of the University Mahmadyusuf Imomov read out the Academic Council`s decision to give the Honorary Doctorate degree to the President of Azerbaijan and select him as the Honorary Member of the Council. Subsequently President Ilham Aliyev was presented with the diploma and mantle of the Honorary Doctor. The head of state delivered a speech in front of the professors, teachers and students of the university.

After the ceremony President Ilham Aliyev, met with Prime Minister of Tajikistan Kokhir Rasulzoda. During the meeting, both leaders discussed the extensive bilateral relations. It was noted that the visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, would play a big role in order to further deepen the relations between the two countries. The two parties said that the documents signed during the visit would contribute to the expansion of friendly ties between the two countries and people, particularly in political, economic and humanitarian areas.

Later, President Ilham Aliyev attended the official dinner reception hosted by the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon in his honor.
In this ceremony President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon stated: “I am very pleased to welcome distinguished Ilham Heydarovich Aliyev, my dear friend, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and a substantial delegation of fraternal Republic of Azerbaijan. As part of the visit of esteemed Ilham Heydarovich Aliyev we had a constructive and extensive conversation during which we defined the ways of elevating our interactions to a higher level. The Republic of Azerbaijan takes an important place in the structure of international relations of our country. The fact that our countries share the same stance on many international and regional issues, conceptual approaches of both Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in international and regional organizations fosters dynamic and steady development of Tajik-Azerbaijani relations. The contemporary history of the Tajik-Azerbaijani relations is a testimony of a fruitful course of a bilateral partnership which brings long-term, reliable and effective interactions, based on principles of benevolence and mutually beneficial partnerships. Today, we strengthened the existing legal framework by signing several important documents and, thereby, once more expressed our will and determination towards closer cooperation. I want to express hope that we will be able to achieve the goals set forth, mutually beneficial cooperation for the good of our friendly peoples through our joint efforts.”

In addition to strengthening its partnership with Azerbaijan and other neighboring countries, Tajikistan has established a dynamic cooperation agenda with various EU member countries such as Estonia. Dushanbe has recently been focused to strengthen its economic cooperation, e-services and e-government initiative, tourism sector and transportation engineering with a significant support from the government of Estonia.

On the other hand, over the last three years, the European Union has supported Tajikistan with 62 million euros, which have gone into developing social coverage, welfare, healthcare and the private sector. In late 2013, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan have begun a major railway infrastructure project that will connect the three countries and will stretch in approximately 400 kilometers. This cooperation is expected to strengthen the economic relations between these countries in the region.

In his speech, during the official dinner reception, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev stated: “My official visit is nearing its end. I would like to express my gratitude to you once again, esteemed Emomali Sharipovich, for your hospitality. From the first moment of our stay on this wonderful soil, we felt just like at home. Today was a very eventful and fruitful visit. We, as you noted, discussed with you a broad agenda of our bilateral relations. We had a very objective analysis of what is happening around us as well as a sincere exchange of views on a wide range of issues of mutual interest. The main thing is the result of our work – we determined the concrete ways of development of our relations. Having wonderful political relations and cooperating actively at international organizations and supporting each other on all the matters of principle, we, of course, must step up our work in the economic field as well. The decisions adopted during the meeting of the intergovernmental commission will soon yield positive results.”

President Aliyev continued by emphasizing the cooperation history of both countries: “Our cooperation is based on the history, affinity and centuries-long friendship of our peoples. Today, our countries are two independent states that are active members of the international community, our countries pursue their independent policy, foreign policy, and we work actively to deepen regional security. I think the regional cooperation in the Central Asia, Caspian Sea and the Caucasus will largely depend on the interaction of our nations, close coordination of our efforts. This is because we have a common goal of improving the lives of our people, strengthen independence of our countries, and cement the international position of our two nations. Our meetings with Emomali Sharipovich Rahmon are regular at every international Summit and we meet several times a year. We treat each other as brothers whenever we meet. It gives a great impetus to our relations and to those who solve important issues in the government, parliament or at public offices.”

Aliyev closed his remarks by extending a warm invitation to President Emomali Sharipovich Rahmon to visit Azerbaijan at his earliest convenience.

The post Azerbaijan And Tajikistan: Reinvigorating Bilateral Partnership appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Daoud Kuttab

“My homeland is not a suitcase and I am not a traveler,” wrote Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish.

But for many Palestinians living in the besieged homeland, the right to movement guaranteed in the University Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13) is just ink on paper.

I met last week in Beirut a Palestinian woman from Gaza who had spent four days trapped in a Cairo airport basement along with tens of others awaiting a visa.

Her ordeal began when she tried to exit Gaza. Hamas, which controls the border crossing with Egypt, assigns a person a particular day (usually a couple of weeks after applying) to travel.

Since one does not know exactly when that day is, it is often hard to calibrate one’s life.

Meral (not her real name) was invited to a media conference in Beirut whose sponsors had applied for a visa for her, which had not come on the day she was told she could travel.

Having traveled many times before and usually been allowed into Egypt, she decided to take the risk because if she did not use her allotted day, she would have missed the conference.

The Egyptian authorities, according to her, made travel much more difficult since Fatah and Hamas created the unity government.

Women, for example, used to be allowed into Egypt freely; this time, Meral was not allowed.

The fact that she is married to a Turkish journalist made the Egyptians even more determined not to let her go, simply because Cairo and Ankara are not seeing eye to eye politically these days.

Eventually Meral was allowed to travel on a procedure referred to as tarheel (deportation), whereby transit travelers are hauled in a security-guarded bus to a windowless room at the Cairo International Airport and are kept there until they can produce a valid visa and a ticket.

Passports are kept with the security until the “deported” passenger reaches the plane staircase.

Meral’s sister was allowed 72-hour freedom of movement in Egypt because she had an appointment at the US embassy.

Apparently where one is going determines whether one is allowed in freely or “deported” to the airport basement.

It took Meral four days before she got her visa and was able to travel to Beirut.

At different times, she claims security officials hinted they could help her if she paid a bribe. Bribes of this nature are in the hundreds of dollars, she learned from other passengers. Smaller bribes were necessary to secure food, phone sim cards, and other basic needs while awaiting the visa.

Meral’s problems are not unique. Almost every Palestinian faces some kind of discrimination.

If one lives in East Jerusalem one cannot enter Jordan by land except over the King Hussein Bridge, where one must pay the permit fee of 230 shekels (about $70) to Israeli authorities, in addition to the exit tax of 180 shekels ($55).

Jordan, which does not consider the bridge an international border, does not allow Palestinians to use the Sheikh Hussein Bridge.

The Israelis give Palestinians in East Jerusalem a travel permit called laissez-passer, but that travel document is not renewed if one cannot prove that the “center” of one’s life is Jerusalem.

If one lives outside the city for an extended period of time, one loses one’s right to it even if born in it.

Travel in and out of Jerusalem is much more restrictive if one is a Palestinian Jerusalemite, unlike Jewish settlers who have alternative roads and much easier procedures at checkpoints.

I was told that if one has a foreign passport with an Israeli stamp, one is allowed in as long as the person is not of Palestinian origin.

So even if one has a European or American passport, being born in Jerusalem automatically bars one from obtaining a visa at the airport, while other citizens from the same country can get a visa even if they have an Israeli stamp on their passports.

The travel troubles facing Palestinians, especially those of Gaza, are apparently a major motivation for attempts to emigrate (legally or illegally) to Europe or any other Western country whose passports are much more respected than Palestinian or Arab passports.

Frustration about not being able to travel freely and seek opportunities elsewhere is apparently a strong motivator for joining radical groups.

When Palestinian officials meet this week indirectly with the Israelis under Egyptian supervision, the issue of the airport will be discussed.

While few hold hope that the Israelis will allow the reopening of the Gaza International Airport, there is ample evidence that the issue of freedom of movement is not a demand by one single Palestinian faction, but a requirement for a sane life by all Palestinians.

Darwish’s desire to return to his homeland produced verses. To Palestinians living in the occupied homeland, the freedom of movement is a top priority.

The issue cannot be shoved under the carpet anymore.

Daoud Kuttab is a Palestinian journalist and former professor of journalism at Princeton University.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect Ma’an News Agency’s editorial policy.

The post Israeli Restrictions On Movement Strangle Palestinian Life – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Current development suggests that the opposition-dominated parliament would be President Jokowi’s biggest challenge in delivering reform. What are the possible scenarios for Jokowi’s relationship with parliament in the next five years?

By Tiola Javadi and Adhi Priamarizki

Although President Joko Widodo’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) won the 2014 legislative elections, his Great Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat, KIH) did not secure the majority of seats in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR). On the other hand, the Red-White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih, KMP), which supported Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 presidential election, significantly outnumbers the ruling coalition in the DPR.

Nevertheless, the saga has moved far beyond the Jokowi versus Prabowo relationship to a more complex competition for political power. Prabowo’s Gerindra Party is no longer the sole director of the KMP with Golkar now the primary conductor of the orchestra.

Different scenarios

The dynamics between the new administration and the parliament can be understood in terms of different scenarios. In the best-case scenario, Jokowi will be able to preserve and upsize his current coalition, which will definitely ease the new government’s burdens. A middle scenario suggests that the ruling coalition will need to constantly engage in intensive lobbies with the balancing party to get its agenda through. In the worst-case scenario, the opposition KMP manages to expand its influence by capturing more political parties, causing Jokowi to lose control of his alliance and the new administration struggling to ensure full support from the parliament.

Scenario 1: The highroad

The first scenario pictures a condition in which Jokowi succeeds in upsizing his coalition. Currently, the United Development Party (PPP) is considering to join Jokowi’s camp. Leadership change in the KMP is also likely to lead to alteration in the current political configuration, particularly within the Golkar party – which has never been out of the ruling coalition since its establishment.

Furthermore, it is still possible for Jokowi to attract the Democratic Party (PD) – former president Yudhoyono’s political vehicle – which has positioned itself as a balancer. If the PPP’s current position favouring Jokowi stays put, the expanded size of the ruling coalition will potentially attract the PD to form the majority in DPR.

Under this configuration, maintaining the unity of the ruling coalition would be crucial for Jokowi to prevent the political parties from crossing to the other side. Ensuring PDIP’s full support is also essential, considering that this party holds the largest number of seats in parliament. By sustaining such support PDIP could act as Jokowi’s surrogate. Jokowi needs PDIP as a spearhead to guard his policies which will uphold the efficacy of the new government’s performance.

Scenario 2: Hard landing

The second scenario puts greater emphasis on stances taken by PPP and PD. Suryadharma Ali, who is temporarily dismissed from his position as PPP chairman, has attacked the party’s switch of support to PDIP as illegal. If PPP decides to reunite with the opposition KMP, PD’s role would be crucial as it will determine each voting result. Thus, PD’s bargaining power will increase as both KMP and KIH will compete to draw the party into their camp so as to prevail during the vote.

Public opinion will determine which side PD chooses to support, as the party needs to regain its popularity after the party’s downfall prior to the 2014 elections due to corruption scandals of some of its leaders. Therefore, it will be highly essential for Jokowi to win public support to protect government policies in the parliament. The new president needs to maintain good political communication to convince the public to support his policies.

Scenario 3: A dirty clean sweep

The ongoing process of electing DPR commission heads may further jeopardise Jokowi’s chance to run an efficient government. The newly-endorsed Legislative Institution Law, better known by its acronym MD3, requires the implementation of a package system in which each candidate must have the support of at least five party factions. Golkar Party Chairman Aburizal Bakrie has asserted KMP’s ambitious goal for a clean sweep to dominate all commission head positions.

Although the public has criticised KMP’s overwhelming dominance in parliament, the coalition seemed to deprioritise popularity — at least temporarily — for the sake of securing strategic positions. In the case of the regional election bill (RUU Pilkada), for instance, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) revealed that 81 per cent of Indonesians were against the proposal for indirect elections. However, KMP rowed against the tide of public opinion and endorsed the Law.

If the opposition KMP is able to gain the support of the Indonesian public, it will have even more avenues to attack Jokowi’s administration. When Jokowi plans to cut the fuel subsidy — a highly sensitive policy which always invites protests — the opposition could easily gain a majority vote to refuse the proposal.

Rejection may even come from within the PDIP itself, as the party had always opposed such policies during the ten years of President Yudhoyono’s term, upholding their slogan as partai wong cilik (the party of little people). The secret ballot mechanism in DPR will also allow PDIP lawmakers to vote against their own party’s stance, complicating the Jokowi government’s consolidation process and thereby heightening the political costs.

Tough ride against dependency mentality

The honeymoon between the people and the new president may end much sooner than expected. Breaking through the PDIP’s internal structures, parliamentary opposition and the public’s dependency mentality like cutting the fuel subsidy could prove daunting, and the new administration may fail to deliver its promises due to slowing economic growth.

While Jokowi is likely to push ahead with his reform plans regardless, the Red-White Coalition may have a field day demonising the Great Indonesia Coalition and accuse them of proposing policies that hurt the people. In a country where meritocracy struggles to fight patronage and collusion, Jokowi and his new cabinet may find a hard time getting support to run an efficient government.

Tiola Javadi is a Research Associate and Adhi Priamarizki Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

The post Coalition Collision: Jokowi Vs The Opposition In Parliament – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A group of Catholics in Vietnam held a rare protest demanding that local officials in the capital Hanoi halt the filling of a lake on property they say belongs to their parish, according to priests and church members on Friday.

Followers of the Thai Ha Redemptorist Church in Dong Da district held the protest outside of the local People’s Committee office on Thursday, carrying banners which said the decision by authorities to fill the 18,200-square-meter (195,900-square-foot) Ba Giang lake was in violation of the law.

Followers of the parish group say the longstanding land dispute stems from a “state policy” of limiting the influence of religion in communist Vietnam, where freedom of worship is tightly controlled.

No one was sent Thursday from the People’s Committee office to meet with the protesters, who dispersed after security guards tore down their banners, church members told RFA’s Vietnamese Service.

The protest followed a complaint dated Oct. 16 that the group had sent to Hanoi People’s Committee chairman Nguyen The Thao, calling on the government to cease filling the lake, which it said was an infringement on the legal rights of the Thai Ha church.

The complaint was never answered, members of the group said, and calls by RFA to Dong Da’s People’s Committee office, People’s Council office and the office of Land and Urban Management received no answer.

Priest Nguyen Ngoc Nam Phong told RFA that an increasing number of people from the local community had sought to join Thai Ha parish and that the church wanted the government to return the entire six-hectare (15-acre) plot it claims to have owned since 1928.

“Right now we only have 2,700 square meters (29,000 square feet) of the total six hectares, while our demand is growing,” Phong said.
“Every Sunday we have about 15,000 people coming to attend service, but we don’t have anywhere to hold classes and the premises are not big enough to meet the demand,” he said.

“We have asked the government to return our Ba Giang lake, which is now [being filled], or give us new land. That land legally belongs to us and the government’s documents also confirm that.”

Growing membership

A church member who spoke on condition of anonymity said that so many area children had been coming for Bible classes on Sundays that study sessions had to be organized in the yard.

“There are many more children attending classes now—every Sunday afternoon at 2:00 p.m. there are hundreds of them,” he said, adding that the church did not have enough room to host evening activities either.

“Many people want to know more about the Bible, but we don’t have room to hold classes … We lack a lot, but [the authorities] don’t care.”

According to parishioners, the six hectares of land in Dong Da district have belonged to Thai Ha since it was bought by Canadian priests in 1928, and usage of Ba Giang lake was never granted to any individual or organization through legal contract.

They say district officials contend that Priest Nguyen Ngoc Bich signed a document handing all six hectares of the land over to the government in 1961, but have been unable to provide evidence of the document despite repeated requests.

The church has actively pursued its claims to the land since 1996, demanding that the land be returned, but local officials continue to carry out “illegal construction” on the plot.

‘State policy’

A second church member, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that while the government stood to benefit from developing the land for its own purposes, its real aim was to reduce the influence of the church in Vietnam, which strictly controls religious freedom.

“Actually, they likely have something against our religion, so that is why they repress us,” he said.

“They use their power to take our assets and we can’t claim them back.”

Thai Ha’s Phong said that the government’s refusal to return the land was in line with “state policy,” which he said was “one of limiting religions.”

“If they can’t destroy a religion from the inside, they attack it from the outside and repress the development of the religion. This policy makes land disputes difficult to resolve,” he said.

“Their policy on religion never changes and when the policy will not be changed, nothing can be solved.”

Catholicism claims some 6 million followers in Vietnam, making it the second largest religion after Buddhism among Vietnam’s 92.5 million people.

Vietnam and the Holy See—the government of the Catholic Church—have not had formal diplomatic relations since Vietnam’s communist government took over in 1975, but have been working toward closer ties since resuming dialogue in 2007 with the establishment of a Joint Working Group.

Last month, officials from Vietnam and the Vatican held talks on prospects of restoring full diplomatic ties.

Vietnam’s communist government says it respects the freedom of belief and religion, but religious activity remains under state control.

Reported by An Nguyen for RFA’s Vietnamese Service. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

The post Vietnam Catholics Demand Return Of Land In Rare Protest appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Given a large body of evidence that television influences cultural attitudes, the fear that foreign content erodes local culture may be justified. Such reasoning is often cited in support of the cultural exception that the audiovisual industry routinely receives. This column introduces an economic model of cultural transmission and viewer choice to argue that a competitive TV industry is the best way to ensure cultural survival.

By Esther Hauk and Giovanni Immordino

The idea that television can transform culture has been prominent in the political debate, an unregulated television industry being perceived as a threat to cultural diversity. A common argument for maintaining public television is to ensure the supply of diverse and high-quality programming that caters to the entire population – to all communities and cultures.

Politicians who care about local culture often argue that TV imports threaten local diversity. The fear for trade in cultural services is widespread: it lead to UNESCO’s 2005 Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity granting the products of audiovisual industry the status of ‘cultural exceptions’ – implying that this industry is not subject to free trade. The fight to preserve this status nearly lead to the breakdown of the initiative to create the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) even before the first round of negotiations had started in June 2013. The French prime minister threatened to use its right of veto to protect its cultural industries. France managed to rally 13 EU countries, and trade in audio-visual services was excluded from the EU negotiating mandate for TAFTA.

The argument for cultural protectionism

Communication scientists have convincingly shown that exposure to television over time cultivates viewers’ perceptions of reality (Shanahan and Morgan 1999). Similarly, the cultural content of TV programs will shape people’s cultural attitudes. If the cultural content of those programmes is predominantly foreign, the local culture will be lost. Therefore, to preserve this culture, local productions have to be favoured.

The truth and the flaw in the argument

There is vast evidence that television affects and changes cultural attitudes. The reception of the Globo signal in Brazil – a network with virtual monopoly power on telenovelas – did not only significantly lower fertility choices but also increased the share of women who divorced or separated (La Ferrara et al. 2012, Chong and La Ferrara 2009). In India the entry of cable TV led to increases in subjective measures of female autonomy and declines in pregnancy rates (Jensen and Oster 2009). Being exposed to television programmes in the Islamic world has an effect on the way people judge the West (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004).

It is also true that there is some US dominance in the audiovisual industry despite protectionist measures. (In Europe the US dominance is more than 60%, according to a Wall Street Journal article from the 12th of June 2013). However, quotas for home production are often not binding due to high consumer demand (see e.g. Cohen 2005 for Israel, and Papandrea 1999 for Australia).

However, the argument that TV can induce a cultural change and therefore will wipe some cultures off the map is naïve. For one thing, it overlooks the likelihood that people who care about their culture will take this danger into account when deciding on their TV demand. Moreover, an unregulated profit-maximising TV industry is likely to choose optimally the contents of its programming given people’s demand.

Recent research

In a recent paper we develop an economic model of cultural transmission of preferences and examine how different market structures affect the long-run survival of cultural traits (Hauk and Immordino 2014). In a society with two cultural traits where television (besides providing entertainment) plays the role of socialisation, cultural coverage is strategically chosen by a profit-maximising TV industry. Parents decide how much time to invest in socialising their child while the rest of the time the child is left to watch television. If parental socialisation fails, the child is affected by the entire system of messages received by the television programme. These messages consist of the amount of coverage of each cultural trait, which determines the probability that the child will adopt this trait conditional on being socialised by television. Hence, watching television might infect the child with the ‘wrong’ cultural values. This danger is bigger the less television programming reflects the parental culture. Therefore the higher the coverage of the parental culture, the lower is parental socialisation effort, since TV is likely to transmit the right values anyway.

The TV industry exploits this parental behaviour.  The likelihood of cultural extinction is highest under a free-to-air duopoly. To understand why, observe that parents will pick the channel (for their children) that maximises their utility. This makes specialisation by each channel on a single culture a dominant strategy. Both cultures will survive in the long run if and only if the competitors specialise on different traits. When the profitability of one group is particularly large the media industry will cover that group only, leading to no cultural coverage of the less profitable group and its long-run extinction.

When all channels cover the more profitable trait, the incentives to deviate to cover the less profitable trait increase in the number of competing firms. The higher the number of competitors, the stronger the forces pushing towards cultural diversity. Moreover, the capacity of firms to reduce competition by differentiation is amplified whenever TV firms can exploit another variable on which to compete such as a fee or the level of entertainment quality. Therefore, the presence of pay-TV reduces the likelihood of cultural extinction. Pay-TV firms will charge a positive (indeed maximal) price if they specialise on different traits and therefore have less incentive to cover the same trait.

Implications for policy

To summarise, our model predicts that cultural extinction can only occur under very special circumstances. The correct regulatory measures are not protectionist, but ones that allow for competition on several dimensions and increase the number of competitors in the market.

About the authors:
Esther Hauk
Scientific Researcher, Institute of Economic Analysis

Giovanni Immordino
Associate Professor of Economics, Università of Naples Federico II and CSEF Fellow

References
Chong, A and E La Ferrara (2009) “Television and Divorce: Evidence from Brazilian Novelas”, Journal of the European Economic Association 7: 458-468.

Cohen, J (2005) “Global and Local Viewing Experiences in the Age of Multi-channel Television: the Israeli Experience”, Communication Theory 15: 437-455.

Gentzkow, M and J Shapiro (2004) “Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18: 117-133.

Hauk, E and G Immordino (2014) “Parents, Television and Cultural Change”, The Economic Journal 124: 1040-1065.

Jensen, R and E Oster (2009) “The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women’s Status in India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1057-1094.

La Ferrara, E, A, Chong, and S Duryea (2012) “Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4: 1-31.

Papandrea, F (1999) “Willingness to Pay for Domestic Television Programming”, Journal of Cultural Economics 23: 149-166.

Shanahan, J and M Morgan (1999) “Television and its viewers”, Cultivation theory and research, Cambridge University Press.

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