By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury

Europe is evolving a new kind of relationship with the South Asian states. It draws upon the interactions of the past colonial era on a matrix of current international relations. This paper is an examination of this trend and covers the relationship among four factors – Europe, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.

Bangladesh

The historic relations between the old Bengal, of which present-day Bangladesh is a part, dates back to the eighteenth century. Following the battle of Plassey in 1757, the British gradually expanded their sway throughout Bengal, and beyond, and made Calcutta the capital of the British Indian Empire (which remained so until the seat of government was shifted to New Delhi in 1911). The European influence on Bengal was mostly British, though there was a minor French presence as well. The so-called Bengal Renaissance, the intellectual efflorescence of the Bengali middle-class or the bhadralok, was owed to British influence.

This was markedly so even in the works of the grand old man of Bengali literature, Rabindranath Tagore (Irish strains in many of his musical works are discernible).

With the emergence of (East) Pakistan in 1947, and thereafter of Bangladesh in 1971, the British influence, socially, politically and economically, persisted. Bangladeshi diaspora in Britain made substantive contribution to the development of the host culture. Writers like Zia Haider and Tahmima Khan are examples. It is the Bangladeshis who rendered Chicken tandoori masala the most favoured pub-fare in England. British politicians of Bangladeshi origin today sit in both Houses of Parliament and hold several local Council mayorships. This is also the case with the diaspora in Europe, though less prominently so.

The relations between the European Union and Bangladesh are rooted in three major documents, that are dated 1973, 1976 and 2001.The last was the most substantial one that included political dialogue. In 2007 the EU drafted its Country Strategy Paper that covered the period till 2013. It identified the following as key challenges confronting Bangladesh:

A continued struggle in addressing the structural problems of poverty and achieving the (UN) Millennium Development Goals by the target date of 2015;

Good governance problems that affect the efficient and effective delivery of the basic public services to the poor; and

Potential economic and political shortfall following the termination of the WTO textile quota system; and the need to diversify the industrial base and also improve the enabling environment for business.

It is noteworthy that the document was prepared acknowledging Bangladesh’s own response to the challenges contained in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper crafted in November 2005.

The EU determined that its impact would be maximised and there would be more effective use of resources if development commitments were concentrated on three focal areas (Human and social development, Good Governance and human rights, and Economic and trade development) and two non-focal areas (Environment and disaster management, and Food security and nutrition).

The EU’s decision to provide unimpeded market access through EBA or the policy of ‘Everything but Arms’ has been a great boon for Bangladesh’s garment exports. Along with America’s, the European market turned Bangladesh’s garment industry into the locomotive of economic growth of that country, helping poise it on the threshold of being perceived as another emerging Asian economy, which takes full advantage of the preferential trading system. The EU is currently the destination of 48 per cent of Bangladesh’s total exports. As for foreign aid over the next three years, the EU will provide Bangladesh with US$ 413- million for support to health, education, food security and rural development sectors.

This is part of the plan to assist Bangladesh achieve by 2015 the MDGs set by the UN. While many western and developed countries are critical of the EU’s policy of agricultural subsidy, ironically it renders grain cheaper for net food-importer like Bangladesh. In the setting up of Bangladesh’s National Human Rights Commission, European support has been invaluable, as also in the election process in 2008. Having been a member of the government through this period, the author would like to underscore the critical nature of his relationship with Ashton’s predecessor, Austria’s Benita Ferrero.

Nepal and Bhutan

Unsurprisingly, Nepal’s European contacts were, and still are, largely through the United Kingdom. The ties between Britain and Nepal go back a couple of centuries. But it was a conscious policy of Britain ‘not to colonise, but to partner and influence’, in the words of a British Ambassador to Nepal, Andrew Sparkes. It was the Treaty of Sergauli in March 1816 that established formal relationship between Nepal and Britain as two independent states, confirmed by the 1923 Treaty by which London accepted Nepal as an independent country. Nepal became an important recruiting ground of Gurkha troops for the British Army, who fought so valiantly for the British Empire during the two World Wars. The romance of the Himalayas always beckoned British adventuring climbers, including George Mallory, who died in his effort to climb the Everest ‘because it is there!’ (As he had famously said.) Today Britain remains the largest single-country donor for Nepal, providing around 106 million pounds annually.

Nepal’s formal ties with the EU began in 1975 and the EU-Nepal Cooperation Agreement was signed in June 1996. Within its framework EU-Nepal Joint Commission meetings take place on a bi-annual basis. The EU uses this forum to discuss with Nepal the prevailing political situation following the Maoist uprising, and Nepal’s democratic transition to a republic from a monarchy. The EU’s primary focus is on three sectors: one, education, peace and stability; two, trade facilitation; and three, economic capacity-building. Between 2011 and 2013, EU development assistance amounted to 60 million euros.

The EU also evinces keen interest in such areas as the protection and promotion of human rights, food security, environmental conservation, safe migration, public finance management and sustainable production and consumption practices. Nepal and the EU also cooperate in disaster risk-management, and adaptation and mitigation in regard to climate change. The Europeans are appreciative of Nepal’s role in the United Nations as a provider of peace- keeping forces.

Bhutan was in a competitive relationship with the East India Company of England from as early as the eighteenth century. Apprehensive of British intrusions the ‘druk desi’ signed a peace treaty with the British East India Company in April 1774. Bhutan agreed to pay a symbolic tribute of five horses to the British, and more importantly, allowed the latter to harvest timber in Bhutan.

However boundary disputes continued; Bhutan sent an emissary to British Calcutta in 1787, and Britain despatched missions to Thimpu in 1815 and 1838, but talks were inconclusive. Eventually, the Ponlop of Tongsa, Ugyen Wangchuk earned British favours by providing services to secure the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904.

Bhutan’s foreign relations defer largely to India’s, and it was the first foreign destination in June 2014 of the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Nevertheless Bhutan has made an international impact by introducing democratic reforms and introducing the index of ‘gross national happiness’ as a yardstick of progress and development in the UN. This seeks to balance spiritual and material advancement through sustainable and equitable economic growth and development; preservation and sustainable use of the environment; preservation and promotion of cultural heritage; and good governance.

Though the EU does not have a permanent presence in Thimpu, in 2015 EU and Bhutan will celebrate thirty years of diplomatic relations. These began in 1985. The EU-Bhutan Strategy Paper (2002-2006) allocated 15 million Euros in assistance with priority accorded to renewable natural resources, especially livestock production and integrated pest management. Support was also given to the promotion of health and traditional medicine, trade development, and export diversification. The next Strategy Paper (2007-2013) mainly focused on the renewable natural resources sector. Good governance, democratisation and trade facilitation were also listed for support. In the financial cycle beginning January 2014 development assistance is planned to be enhanced significantly. The idea would be to buttress Bhutan’s own policy of reducing rural poverty by creating income-generating activities in the villages and improving farm-to-market access.

Along with Nepal and Bangladesh, Bhutan is in the UN list of Least Developed Countries, and, therefore, like the two others, a recipient of EU preferential treatment in trade.

About the author:
Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh, and he can be contacted at isasiac@nus.edu.sg. Opinions expressed in this paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief No. 349 – 5 November 2014.

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Farmers and human rights activists on Wednesday marched to the residence of President Benigno Aquino to demand “criminal accountability” for the massacre of farmers in Hacienda Luisita ten years ago this week.

Hacienda Luisita is a 6,435-hectare sugar plantation in the province of Tarlac owned by the Cojuangco family, which includes the incumbent president.

The protesting farmers, who marked the 10th anniversary of the massacre, accused Aquino of being “one of the main perpetrators” of the killing of seven farmworkers.

“Aquino cannot ensure justice for the victims because he himself is one of the staunchest defenders of the massacre,” said Ranmil Echanis, deputy secretary general of the Union of Agricultural Workers.

“President Aquino can never wash his hands of responsibility for the bloodshed in Luisita ten years ago,” said Rudy Corpuz, vice-chairman of the workers’ union.

The protesters adorned the streets near the president’s house in Quezon City with “blood-stained” yellow ribbons. They said it symbolizes the Cojuangco and Aquino families’ alleged role in the violent dispersal of striking workers on November 16, 2004.

In 2005, survivors and the families of victims filed criminal and administrative charges against Aquino and officials of the Department of Labor and Employment after an official investigation concluded that state security forces unlawfully killed the strikers.

Aquino, who was then a congressman representing the province of Tarlac, said the soldiers fired at the farmers “in self-defense.”

He delivered a “privilege speech” in Congress claiming that the clash, which resulted in the death of the seven farmers but no injuries to soldiers, was triggered by gunfire coming from the ranks of the strikers.

A privilege speech is a parliamentary privilege enjoyed by members of Congress and provided for by the Philippines’ Constitution, which states that “no member (of Congress) shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech” made in Congress.

Ten years after the incident, no one has been tried, prosecuted or made liable for the massacre.

Early into Aquino’s first term as president, the Office of the Ombudsman also dismissed all charges against police and military respondents implicated in the killings.

“There is no hard evidence to the allegations,” said presidential spokesman Herminio Coloma Jr.

“It is best to follow processes under the rule of law,” he said in a text message.

In August, families of victims filed a petition in court to reopen the case. The petition exposed the role allegedly taken by Aquino in the violent dispersal of strikers.

The petition said the president “committed grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public office”.

It was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman on October 2.

Marie Hilao-Enriquez, chairwoman of the human rights group Karapatan (Rights), alleged that the president has “continued to use state machineries to maintain control of the hacienda”.

“The use of thugs to get what he and his family wants shows his real character of a blood thirsty warlord,” said Enriquez in a statement.

She cited the killings of Dionisio Garete, a sugar cane farmer, on March 14 this year, and Romeo Capalla, a labor leader, who were allegedly killed by a paramilitary group identified as having links to the presidential palace.

“After 10 years [since] the Luisita workers strike, our call for land distribution and justice for victims of the massacre continues,” Enriquez said.

The post Philippines: Farmers Demand Aquino Face ‘Criminal Accountability’ Decade After Massacre appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Othman Atiq, a 17-year-old Moroccan rapper known as “Mr. Crazy,” is due to be released by Moroccan authorities on November 12, 2014, after completing a three-month sentence for “offending a state institution,” “harming public morality,” and other offenses related to his lyrics.

Atiq, whose songs and music videos depict the gritty lives of Casablanca’s unemployed youth, is the second performer in Morocco’s flourishing rap music scene to go to prison for his lyrics, in violation of international free speech standards.

“The Moroccan government sent the wrong message by prosecuting a rapper like ‘Mr. Crazy’ for peacefully expressing his views,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director. “Jailing a 17-year-old for his songs hardly makes sense in a country that regularly hosts international music festivals and human rights conferences.”

Atiq, who sings in Moroccan Arabic, has been in custody since responding to a summons from the Casablanca prosecutor on August 8. On August 12 the court transferred him to a juvenile detention facility in Ain Sbaa, where he has been held since. On October 17, a Casablanca court juvenile chamber convicted him of “insulting a state institution” under the penal code, “incitement to consume drugs” under the narcotics law of November 15, 1958, and producing and displaying content that is “harmful to public morality” under the press code, Atiq’s lawyer, Saâdia Harrab, told Human Rights Watch.

In “Aqliya Mhabsa” (“Prison Mindset”), Atiq sings, “In my country/ you steal or you deal/ a stick-up here, a dope sale there/ all set up in advance/ I got it worked out with the police/ bought the market in my neighborhood/ made the policeman my dog.”

The video for the song “Fatcha M’absa” (“Scowling Face”) shows young men lounging about on Casablanca streets: it features obscene words in English and images of pills and rolled cigarettes.

The video for “Aqliya Mhabsa” depicts a young man in a milieu of drug-dealing and petty crime who ends up behind bars. In “Hyati naqsa,” (“My Life is Incomplete”), Atiq dismisses as “mere words” and “a dream” the national anthem’s references to Morocco as a country of “free men” and as “a source of light.”

Harrab, Atiq’s lawyer, said that “Hyati Naqsa,” “Fatcha M’absa,” and “Aqliya Mhabsa” were among Atiq’s songs produced as music videos that figured in the prosecution’s evidence, along with “Brika Ma3ksa” (“A Stubborn Lighter”), “Casa Mkarfsa” (“Casa is Dirty”), “Passé noir” (“Black Past”), and “Amrek Tansa” (“You Never Forget”). Most music videos can be found on Atiq’s Youtube channel.

The offense of insulting a state institution is found in penal code articles 263 and 265. The court discounted Atiq’s assertion that he did not insult the institution in question – the police forces – but was rather criticizing individual police agents who were corrupt.

In April 2013, another rapper, Mouad Belghouat, known as “Al-Haqed” (The Sullen One), completed a one-year sentence for a YouTube video set to one of his songs, “Kilab ed-Dowla” (“Dogs of the State”), which the court deemed insulting to the police. Al-Haqed also argued unsuccessfully that his song criticized individual police agents rather than the police as an institution.

Al-Haqed also served two shorter sentences on common criminal charges, including a four-month sentence earlier in 2014, for allegedly being inebriated in public and assaulting and insulting policemen.

Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the independent expert body that monitors state compliance with the covenant, has stated in a General Comment on freedom of expression that public authorities “are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. Accordingly, the Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such matters as … disrespect for authority. … [Governments] should not prohibit criticism of institutions, such as the army or the administration.”

Morocco’s constitution, in article 25, guarantees freedom of expression “in all its forms” and the “freedom to create, publish and display literary and artistic materials…” However, since its adoption in 2011, authorities have yet to amend an array of laws that impose prison terms for nonviolent speech offenses, such as those used to prosecute Atiq.

The post Morocco: Unjustly Jailed Rapper To Go Free, Says HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Black politics had been on life support for quite some time but flat lined on January 3, 2008. On that date Illinois senator Barack Obama won the Iowa caucuses during his presidential campaign. By doing so he proved that white people would vote for him and thereby answered a question which black people had pondered for decades. Millions became focused on one idea alone. Their sole political aspiration was seeing Barack Obama sworn in as president and the already precarious plight of African Americans has sunk further ever since.

In 2008, anyone who didn’t support Barack Obama or who even dared to ask a question was silenced with pleas for a dubious kind of racial solidarity. They were given assurances that once in office, black people would then “hold his feet to the fire.” The promise was always phony, a call from people who never really had an interest in making political demands. After his election all talk of making demands disappeared. Every act was met with the same excuses. Wait until after the mid-term elections, wait for him to re-elected, wait for the next mid-terms.

The faulty logic was always dangerous, making black people more vulnerable and Obama and company more brazen. Ironically, the 2014 mid-term elections and the resulting republican control of both houses of congress brings a new opportunity for black America to rise and make good on a long legacy of protest.

There are fewer opportunities for Obama to act out his love for the grand bargain. There should be no need to talk over black people’s heads to speak to white voters. Instead of shedding tears because of Obama’s political misfortunes, black people should celebrate. However, that scenario assumes that the pledge of holding feet to fire was ever serious in the first place.

Unfortunately there is no honesty to be had in this sorry story. The Obama idol worshipers were always content to just worship and never cared about Obama’s policies. The president doesn’t really like black people very much and rarely passes up an opportunity to deliver mockery and insult. Astute observers knew that “hope and change” was always an elaborate marketing gimmick.

Even if the people who always claimed they wanted to make demands did so, their pleas would fall on deaf ears. The lame duck president will do as he has always done. He has always acted on his conviction that the system needs more deal making and not more change.

Obama was always conservative. He said so when he spoke of his admiration for Ronald Reagan. He said so when he said that black people were “90 percent of the way” towards equality. He said so in his first appearance before the American people in 2004 when he made the astounding assertion that “there is no black America, there is no white America.”

The Obama lovers have already fallen back on familiar terrain. Instead of asking hard questions they have chosen to blame the Democratic party for the defeat. Yet they absolve the man who leads the Democratic party of any blame. His absence from the campaign trail and unfunny jokes about cousins Pookie and Ray Ray were a sorry substitute for making a political case and Republican control is the result.

The Democrats never really want to activate their base. They thrive best on Republican unpopularity and not ownership of their policies. Obama’s signature political achievement, the Affordable Care Act, is on the verge of being picked apart by a conservative Supreme Court. That wouldn’t be the case if we had a single payer system of Medicare for all but that was never on the Democratic party agenda. Now their mish mash of a plan may be diminished severely if not disappeared altogether.

The lack of a black political agenda will be all the more evident over the next two years. The plight of the undeserving Obama will be lamented even as life gets worse for the black America he says doesn’t exist.

The post Obama’s Feet To The Fire? Not Likely, Not Ever – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

One remarkable aspect in the recent fall in global oil prices is that Saudi Arabia has not cut production to prop them up. Much of the speculation about why the Saudis have sat by passively and allowed the oil price decline has been that they are trying to undermine higher-cost producers in the US and Canada. A decline in oil prices will make some of that production uneconomical.

While American producers will see their profits fall as oil prices decline, American consumers benefit from lower gas prices. Meanwhile, the oil price decline will hit Russia much harder than the US.

After the Russian intervention in Ukraine, both the US and EU announced economic sanctions against Russia. Those sanctions have had a minimal effect on the Russian economy, whereas the decline in oil prices poses a much larger threat. The Russian economy has been slow to advance in the decades since the Cold War, and has become increasingly dependent on natural resource exports for financial support. The decline in oil prices will hurt.

Among various economic threats thrown back and forth as a result of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, Russia has threatened to cut off energy exports to Ukraine and the EU, and the economic impact of lower oil prices makes Russia more dependent on that revenue, and so less likely to actually follow through and cut off its exports.

I’d be hard-pressed to claim that pressuring Russia is the reason the Saudis have stood by and allowed global oil prices to fall. They may well have in mind undercutting high-cost American producers, as news analysts have suggested, and lower oil prices also puts pressure on Iran, which may help stabilize the Middle East.

Whatever their motives (and they may be many), it is easy to see that the decline in global oil prices, facilitated by the passive Saudi response, hurts Russia far more than the economic sanctions imposed by the US and EU.

The post Saudi Arabia Pressures Russia – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Yavuz Yener

Cyber threats have resided at the top of NATO’s agenda in recent years. This is especially true after 2007, when alleged Russian cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia prompted the alliance to take serious steps to address threats emanating from cyber space. Accordingly, NATO has undergone exponential developments in strengthening its cyber defence capabilities since then. Nonetheless, the 2014 NATO Wales Summit was overshadowed by the Ukraine-Russia crisis, in which Russian aggression was seen as threatening wider European security, and the rapid advances of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, which posed a direct threat to the alliance on its southeastern flank, namely, Turkey. Even so, of the myriad items on the agenda, a vital decision was made on cyber security. The Wales Summit Declaration expressly paved the way for interpreting cyber strikes as physical attacks, thus embedding them in Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, which rules that an attack on any NATO ally will be treated as an attack on all allies and requires necessary action to be taken on behalf of the collective defence of NATO.

The initial efforts to recognize cyber security at the state-level were taken by the United States. In February 2003, the US Department of Homeland Security revealed the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace as a component of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. In 2005, Germany announced its National Plan for Information Infrastructure Protection. The following year, Sweden published its Strategy to Improve Internet Security. And in 2008, Estonia adopted a National Cyber Security Strategy. Seeing that it included the concept of cyber security in a strategy document for the first time, the Estonian initiative was of both symbolic and tangible significance.

NATO as a cyber actor

In the case of NATO, we see the gradual albeit highly effective development of a cyber strategy. Following the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders declared their aim to develop cyber defence capabilities for the first time. Using the word “cyber”, Art. 4(f) of the Prague Summit Declaration expressly stated “We [the Heads of State and Government] have therefore decided to… strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.” However, the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 and later on Georgia in 2008 represented critical cases that pushed the allies to reconsider the vitality and effectiveness of the alliance’s cyber capabilities.

In Estonia, the attacks were launched amid the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a war memorial, known as the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, to the Tallinn Military Cemetery in 2007. This memorial was of symbolic value to ethnic Russian residents of Estonia, and the government’s decision to relocate it sparked controversy and public unrest in the country’s capital of Tallinn. As a result, starting from April 27, 2007, Estonia experienced a string of large and organized cyber attacks, including distributed denial of service (DDOS), ping floods, spam distribution and defacement, the alleviation of which could only be provided with the help of NATO experts. Unsurprisingly, Russia was the usual suspect. Considering the intensity, scope and complexity of these attacks, a state-level support, likely Russian, was seen necessary for mounting such an organized operation. Nonetheless, no Russian government involvement was proven. These attacks on Estonia’s internet systems represented the first case in which direct government involvement, whether proven or not, was employed in cyberspace for achieving political objectives. The second critical case prompting NATO to accelerate efforts to improve its cyber capabilities again involved Russia. In the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, cyber attacks had been used as a way of spreading propaganda. Even before Russia launched its military campaign, many Russian hackers disrupted Georgia’s internet communications and systems, defacing many government websites with pictures depicting then Prime Minister Saakashvili as Hitler. This also indicated a crucial innovation, or transformation, in modern warfare. Despite the tentative cyber attacks on the U.S. and other NATO allies during the Balkan conflicts and Kosovo War of the 1990s, for the first time in history a state, or its affiliates, employed offensive cyber methods adjunct to a physical war. Under these conditions, this incident triggered NATO to more effectively and profoundly consider the modern threats to the future of the alliance. It also accelerated the processes of cyber strategy formulation at the state-level.

As a result of these threatening cases, NATO adopted its own cyber strategy in order to improve the defensive capabilities of the alliance in cyberspace, and even to attain the offensive power to deter further attacks.

NATO and Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C. The wording of Art. 5 reads as follows:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

The reference to Art. 51 of the UN Charter legitimates collective self-defence in that the Charter allows a collective defence organization to take necessary measures against an aggressor state, including armed response. But the one and only time that Art. 5 was ever invoked came right after the 9/11 attacks.

The rarity in which Art. 5 has been initiated shows that the alliance interprets the article with a high degree of diffidence. This has mostly been the case. Nevertheless, considering the context of the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, in which Russia was involved in an armed conflict with Ukraine and the so-called Islamic State expanded its control in the Middle East, the future and solidarity of the alliance has been brought into question. NATO needed to issue a harsh response, at least rhetorically, to signal its determination to maintain the formidability of the alliance and its image.

Accordingly, the Wales Summit Declaration revealed some of NATO’s general policies on and interpretations of cyberspace. For instance, NATO advocates that the same normative sources of international law, international humanitarian law and the UN charter apply to cyber security. But more importantly, NATO foresees the possibility of a cyber strike being probable cause for the invocation of Art. 5.

“We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.”

Of course, this does not mean that any cyber attack on any NATO country will be interpreted as an act of aggression. Indeed, NATO recognizes the varying levels of cyber attacks, which can range from inconsequential to catastrophic. But most of the time these cyber attacks are limited in scope, and usually less effective than anticipated. Also, the definition of concepts such as “armed attack” and “use of force” are not very clear, which is why the Declaration prefers to interpret every attack on a case-by-case basis. Yet still, this decision is vital in that it reaffirms NATO’s determination and seriousness in challenging cyber threats in any possible way. Because there has been uncertainty about how states should respond to cyber attacks, or what form cyber defence should take, this decision has cleared some doubts as to the limits of NATO’s possible retaliatory action.

To conclude, the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales reaffirmed to NATO’s adversaries that the alliance was determined to protect its members in cyberspace. Although it was by and large overshadowed by genuine armed conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, cyber security nonetheless maintained its prominent position on the alliance’s agenda.

The post NATO Reaffirmes Commitment To Cybersecurity – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Atsuko Higashino

Few countries have enjoyed such a problem-free relationship as the one between Turkey and Japan. In Japan, in particular, the public image of Turkey as one of the most pro-Japanese nations in the world has greatly strengthened the Japanese people’s psychological attachment to the country. There are a number of reasons for this – historical, political and economic – and, in recent years, there have been several occasions that have contributed considerably to the reinforcement of a general pro-Turkish feeling in Japan.

History Matters

History matters greatly in Turkish-Japanese relations and, curiously, it has been disasters – accidents, wars and earthquakes – that have brought the two countries closer together. Painful memories and experiences of mutual assistance have actually worked to renew and reinvigorate their friendship.

In January 2004, for example, the NHK broadcast a documentary program (‘Project-X’) which explained how the Turkish government and Turkish Airlines helped Japanese nationals to leave Iran in the middle of the 1985 Iran-Iraq war. The then-government in Turkey made an extraordinary decision to send a Turkish Airlines aircraft to Tehran in order to help evacuate the roughly 200 Japanese residents who were at risk due to severe air strikes being held by Iraq while the Japanese government failed to make a prompt decision on sending an aircraft to save its own nationals. This caused a huge response in Japan, fortifying an image of Turkey as one of Japan’s most reliable friends. Eventually, in 2006, then-Prime Minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi even ordered the decoration of 11 members of the Turkish Airlines staff who were involved in the rescue operation at that time.

Another significant example of the rooted relationship can be seen in a children’s book that was published in 2003. This novel, based on the tragedy of the Ertugrul Frigate disaster in 1890, described how a frigate from the Ottoman Empire, which sank off the coast of Kushimoto, served as the basis of a deep friendship between Turkey and Japan. This book also touched upon the above-mentioned rescue operation during the Iran-Iraq war, emphasizing the kindness and loyalty of the Turkish people. In the following year, the book was recommended for fifth and sixth grade elementary school pupils who had to write book reviews for a nation-wide annual writing competition. Taking into account the popularity of this writing competition, a large number of Japanese pupils are estimated to have read the book. While this disaster was already quite well-known amongst adults in Japan, the impact of this publication was still significant, as the history of the friendly relationship between the two countries was widely learnt by the younger generations of Japan thanks to this book.

Furthermore, several huge earthquakes that have been experienced by both countries respectively have served to strengthen their ties. Turkey has been remembered as a country that offered wholehearted emergency assistance at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan made a special web page which featured the activities of the Turkish rescue team, which was sent to the Miyagi prefecture immediately after the earthquake. The website emphasized that out of all the international teams, it was the Turkish one that stayed in the affected area for the longest period of time (almost three weeks). Likewise, it is often proudly remembered that Japan extended emergency assistance to Turkey when the country was hit by huge earthquakes in Izmit in 1999 and in Van in 2011.

It is therefore well known that the two countries have extended assistance to one another in times of serious disaster. These tragic events have served as a catalyst for establishing and reinforcing the relationship between the two countries. The effect of this collaboration was exemplified in 2003 being named the ‘The Year of Turkey’ in Japan and 2010 being named the ‘Year of Japan’ in Turkey, thus bolstering the favorable perspective the two countries have of one another.

Strategic Importance

In addition to these positive public debates concerning the relationship between Turkey and Japan, some Japanese politicians have emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey in world politics, claiming that Japan should strengthen its partnership with Turkey. It remains unchanged that the core of Japanese foreign policy is the US-Japan alliance, but partnerships with other countries have also been actively sought for years in order to widen the scope and potential of Japan’s foreign policy. In this context, Turkey has frequently been mentioned as one of the most promising candidates for such a partnership, especially considering its deep knowledge of and expertise in the workings of the Middle East and Central Asia. Amongst others, it was Taro Aso, Japan’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who went on to become Prime Minister, and is now the Minister of Finance in the second Abe Administration, who repeatedly stressed the need for Japan to align with Turkey. In November 2006, for instance, Aso held his famous speech entitled “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons” in which he made a strong reference to Turkey:

“… the wisest way for us to go about building these connections is to count on nearby countries with a deep understanding of Japan as a toehold, so to speak. Some examples that immediately spring to mind are Turkey, which is truly a treasure house of knowledge about the Middle East and Central Asia.”

Turkey also is also mentioned in a number of speeches that Aso has made since then. It is often said that Aso has a huge influence over current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and it seems that Abe shares the view that Turkey should be given a central position in his government’s diplomatic pursuits. This idea has been reinforced by the two visits Abe made to Turkey in May and October 2013. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also visited Japan in January 2014. The political relationship between the two countries has intensified rapidly over the past several years.

Flourishing Economic Relationship

This intense political relationship has been underpinned by the strong economic interests shared between the two. The Second Bosphorus Bridge, built in 1988, is a classic example of the economic cooperation between the two countries, and the Marmaray Transportation project which started in October 2013 is yet another fruit of Japanese-Turkish cooperation. Currently, the Japanese government regards the Sinop Nuclear Plant as a vital test case for Japan in its effort to export nuclear plant expertise and technologies to foreign countries after the Fukushima disaster.

Also, the possibility of a Japan-Turkey Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been actively sought after. In July 2013, the Report of the Joint Study Group for an EPA between the two countries was published, arguing strongly in favor of the start of negotiations. While this EPA needs to be in line with the ongoing EPA negotiations between the EU and Japan, as well as the already existing EU-Turkey Customs Union, it is widely expected that the potential EPA could further expand and deepen Japanese-Turkish relations. The economic triangle of EU-Japan-Turkey is expected to be formed, while the EPA negotiations between the EU and Japan have been experiencing quite a few obstacles.

Turning Good Images into a Substantial Relationship

As stated above, longstanding favorable images and discussions have underpinned the flourishing political and economic relationship between Turkey and Japan. It is however important to note that there is still ample room for the two to develop their relationship. In other words, a considerable gap between the good, friendly images and the reality is still observable. As Selcuk Colakoglu rightly suggests, Turkey’s trade volume with Japan falls well behind its trade volume with China, India and South Korea, thus making Japan only the fourth biggest economic partner of Turkey in Asia. Also, the diplomatic reality is that Turkey sees China and South Korea as equally important to Japan. This means that, despite the existence of a very favorable pro-Turkish perspective in Japan, Japan is one of the important countries for Turkey, not necessarily the most important one. Favorable images and discussions therefore now have to be matched with reality. Continuous efforts need be made in order to establish a full-fledged political and economic relationship between the two countries.

*PhD, Senior Lecturer at the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Japan.

The post Turkey-Japan Relations: Images And Reality – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Qatar, caught in a Catch-22 between a requirement to quickly reform its labour system in a bid to convince human rights and trade union activists that it is serious and the need domestically to proceed slowly, risks losing goodwill it has built in recent years that could further fuel demands to deprive the Gulf state of its 2022 World Cup hosting rights.

A just published Amnesty International report entitled ‘No Extra Time: How Qatar Is Still Failing on Workers’ Rights Ahead of the World Cup’ signals that activists’ patience with Qatar’s failure to act on promises to reform the living and working conditions of foreign workers, who constitute a majority of the Gulf states’ population, is running out.

Qatar’s engagement with activists in the last three years in for the Gulf unprecedented ways and the adoption of significantly improved living and working standards for foreign labour by two major Qatari institutions, the Qatar Foundation and the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, suggested that the Gulf state was serious about reform.

The standards adopted by the foundation and the committee are however mandatory only for companies contracting with the two institutions. Qatar could have significantly boosted confidence in its sincerity by enshrining those standards in national law.

Recent remarks to Qatari media made by Labour and Social Affairs Minister Abdullah Saleh Mubarak Al Khulaifi suggested that only some of those standards such as an obligation of employers to pay employees through bank transfers to ensure that they are paid on time would be included in a new labour law expected to be adopted before the end of the year.

It wasn’t clear from Mr. Al Khulaifi’s remarks whether the new law would incorporate promised modifications of Qatar’s kafala or sponsorship system that put workers at the mercy of their employers. The changes would fall far short of demands by human rights groups and trade unions to abolish the system but would constitute an improvement.

Qatar has suggested that it would limit sponsorship for a period of up to five years rather than the current indefinite period and replace the exit visa system with a new system that would give employers 72 hours to appeal against an employee’s intention to leave the country.

Qatar, in response to a stream of reports of work-related injuries and deaths as well as workers being caught in Catch-22s without papers and insurance as a result of the sponsorship system, has said that it has increased by 25 per cent the number of its labour inspectors, shut down more than 30 sub-standard worksites and increased mandatory living space for workers by 50 per cent. While the measures constitute progress, they fall short of full implementation of promises made and fail to inspire confidence that Qatar has put the mechanisms in place to efficiently supervise adherence to rules and regulations.

In an interview with Associated Press Qatari Sports Minister Salah bin Ghanem bin Nasser al-Ali insisted that the labour issue was “a human question.” Qataris are not “vicious people who are like vampires. … We have emotions, we feel bad,” Mr. Al-Ali said. Earlier Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani said he was personally hurt by the workers’ plight.

While that is no doubt true, Sheikh Tamim also has to reckon with widespread opposition to radical changes or abolition of the kafala system among Qataris who worry that they could lose control of their state and society and see their culture diluted if foreigners were to gain rights. Qataris constitute a mere 12 per cent of the Gulf state’s population. Many realize that their demography is unsustainable, but cling to the status quo in the absence of a solution that would address their existential fears.

Sheikh Tamim’s adoption of more gradual reform of Qatar’s labour system to take those existential fears into account risks however losing the benefit of the doubt human rights groups were willing to grant Qatar. With the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) more hard line in its approach, Qatar’s failure to convince activists of its sincerity could result in a renewed push to deprive the Gulf state of its World Cup hosting tights on grounds of violations of human and labour rights.

A renewed campaign would come at a time that international sports associations are starting to make adherence to human, labour and gender rights a pre-condition for the awarding of hosting rights. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has begun writing those rights into host city contracts. The International Volleyball Federation (FIVB) warned Iran this week that it would be stripped of its right to host the 2015 Under-19 men’s championship if it did not lift its ban on women attending matches in stadia. Members of the executive committee of world soccer body FIFA have acknowledged that human rights would have to figure in the future awarding of the World Cup.

In its report, Amnesty noted that Qatar had in May made a series of promises of reform in response to criticism by human rights activists that was echoed in a report by law firm DLA Piper commissioned by Qatar. Those promises included beyond changes in the kafala and exit visa system also the abolition of a rule that bars workers from returning to Qatar for two years after they have ended a contract. “Even these limited proposed reforms remain unfulfilled,” Amnesty said, noting that measures to improve the health and safety of construction workers had been “inadequate.”

Sherif Elsayed-Ali, Amnesty’s head of refugee and migrant rights, warned in a statement that “time is running out fast. It has been four years since Qatar won the bid to host the World Cup, putting itself in the global spotlight, so far its response to migrant labour abuses has not been much more than promises of action and draft laws… The government of Qatar still appears to be dragging its feet over some of the most fundamental changes needed such as abolishing the exit permit and overhauling its abusive sponsorship system… Urgent action is needed to ensure we do not end up with a World Cup tournament that is built on forced labour and exploitation,” Mr. Elsayed-Ali said.

The post Qatar At Crossroads: Reform Labour Laws Or Risk Revived Calls For Relocating World Cup – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Afghanistan post-2014 politico-strategic perspectives are complex, intriguing and clouded by unpredictability given its tortured history where external powers outplayed their strategic hands at the cost of Afghanistan’s political stability.

Afghanistan has been the crucible of competing external strategic interests for over two centuries. In 2014 as its end draws near, Afghanistan post-2014 politico-strategic perspectives suggest that these competing interests would now revolve around the strategic stakes in Afghanistan’s future of the United States, Russia, India, Iran and China-Pakistan strategic nexus.

Afghanistan Post-2014 unfolding events, when analysed, portend that Afghanistan can no longer be the exclusive strategic preserve of the United Sates or the United States bowing to strategic sensitivities of the US-Collusive Pakistan Army on Afghanistan.

In 2014 year-end as Afghanistan prepares to settle down to the impending reality of drawdown of US Forces, the political situation is relatively more stable than the earlier exit of US involvement after its first military intervention in Afghanistan in the earlv1990s. However, this relative Afghan political stability is not on sound foundations as the national unity power-sharing political dispensation contrived by the United States to facilitate its smooth exit carries inherently in its conception, seeds of further political instability.

United States second military intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 viewed in 2014 does not seem to have attained any of its strategic and military objectives. Afghanistan is still open to Pakistan Army’s military destabilisation operations, Taliban terrorism arising from the foregoing and a marked reluctance of the United States to clamp down hard on its Pakistan Army protégé to desist from disruptive strategies in Afghanistan

.United States and Pakistan represented by the US-Collusive Pakistan Army and its notorious intelligence set-up the ISI, have been the prime external military actors for over two decades and responsible for muddying the politico-strategic broth in Afghanistan beyond comprehension.

The resultant security environment in Afghanistan is a likely reversion to the chaotic and explosive situation prevailing prior to the US military intervention. Once again the Taliban and the Al Qaeda are again rearing their heads in Afghanistan with the obvious encouragement of Pakistan. To make matters worse the ISIS is also heading towards Afghanistan aided singly or jointly by these Islamic Jihadi entities.

Russia, India and Iran have legitimate high strategic stakes in Afghanistan’s stability and despite this have limited their engagement and involvement in Afghanistan to the political and economic domains so far. However, the unfolding threatening security environment in Afghanistan Post-2014 threatening to impact their respective national security interests, they may now be impelled towards a more active involvement in Afghanistan, including possibly military.

China’s has lately developed significant economic stakes in Afghanistan. China however has significant strategic stakes in Afghanistan by virtue of propping up the strategic interests in Afghanistan of its “Iron Friend”, namely Pakistan. The China-Pakistan strategic nexus considerations determine China’s policy attitudes and strategic formulations on Afghanistan.

Before analysing the stakes and strategic challenges faced by the external powers in Afghanistan, a few salient points need to be observed with clarity to establish the contextual setting. Afghanistan’ post-2014 stable future would still be outside the purview and control of the Afghanistan national unity political dispensation installed in Kabul. Post-2014, Afghanistan would be passing through a highly fragile follow-up existence politically, economically and militarily. Residual US military presence left behind in Afghanistan would be insufficient to deter Pakistan Army’s protégés in Afghanistan from attempting to regain control of Kabul and Afghanistan. Pakistan does not seem to have taken kindly to a national unity power-sharing political dispensation in Kabul which in actual effect amounts to power being shared by the Pashtuns with the Northern Alliance.

In such a fragile military situation as Pakistan attempts install a wholly Pakistan-friendly regime in Kabul dominated by its Pashtuns affiliates, political dangers lurk where Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups opposed to Pakistani control of Afghanistan may resort to a civil war to secure their interests. Politically the Afghan situation would continue to be tenuous in the absence of credible political institutions.

Economically, Afghanistan without sizeable economic aid from the global donors would be unable to survive and reconstruct war-ravaged Afghanistan and rescue it from poverty. United States and the West may not be all that inclined to assist in ample measure.

Pakistan’s nefarious role in Afghanistan for over two decades now hardly qualifies it to be considered as a responsible and benign stakeholder in Afghanistan’ stability. Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan Post-2014 is predictable and that of being an irresponsible ‘regional spoiler state’ intent on subverting Afghanistan to its dictates. Therefore nothing more needs to be said on its unidirectional fixative obsession on Afghanistan of reducing it to a Pakistan satellite or colony. The United States lost this perspective early in its military intervention post 9/11 and is now facing the costs of a double-timing ally.

United States would be in effect abandoning Afghanistan for a second time without even notional military stabilisation after a decade of military intervention, sustained military operations and control for more than a decade.. In the Post-2014 phase the United States in view of advances made by ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban anticipating US drawdown from Afghanistan may be forced to revise its military exit schedules or increase its residual presence in Afghanistan from the figure of 6,000 to 9,000 announced. The United States drawing on its Iraq experience of being forced to re-deploy US Forces to combat the ISIS menace may have to drastically revise its Post-2014 strategies and contingency plans on Afghanistan.

With economics fraying the Atlantic Alliance ties, NATO countries may now be reluctant to follow suit and oblige the United States in its revised formulations and decisions.

The resultant security environment ensuing in Afghanistan Post-2014 would therefore be nightmarish for the United States to manage on its own, single-handedly.

United States would then be forced to be more accommodative and to accept an increased involvement of Russia, India and Iran and not be overwhelmed by Pakistan Army’s contrarian sensitivities and objections on the subject.

United States would have to be wary of an increased role of China in Afghanistan which though welcome on the face of it would in effect endanger United States national security interests in the region, in Central Asia, and in Afghanistan

Russia India and Iran have legitimate strategic and security stakes in Afghanistan’s stability. Pointed many times over in my past SAAG Papers on Afghanistan are the imperatives that these three significant regional actors have in coordinating their responses and involvement in Afghanistan’s future even if in the end -game it entails military involvement to secure Afghanistan’s future as a moderate and democratic Islamic state.

Afghanistan Post-2014 would pose a special challenge to Chinese policy planners where China’s Pakistan-Centric policy fixations in the region would dominate China’s perspectives in the Post-2014 phase and these would be in contradiction to the strategic interests of Russia, India and Iran of a stable Afghanistan not vulnerable to Pakistan’s military coercion. Despite Afghanistan’s new President’s undertaking his maiden foreign visit to China, though politically ominous, China would in the ensuing period may find it difficult to elbow out Russia, India and Iran from the Afghan political and strategic space.

Concluding, politico-strategic perspectives on Afghanistan Post-2014 suggest that Afghanistan is in a long haul of a transitional future where the United States alone would not be in a position to militarily, economically and politically determine events in Afghanistan. In United States own national security interests and Afghanistan’s stable future. American strategic prudence would dictate jettisoning its Pakistan Army-Centric Afghan formulations and co-opt Russia, India and Iran as responsible regional players and partners to secure Afghanistan’s future.

Only the passage of time will tell whether the United States has in it the strategic prudence and vision to do so.

(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army (Brigadier), Cabinet Secretariat and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea, and USA. Currently, Consultant, International Relations& Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

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By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

It was a surprise that the two main stream parties Nepali Congress and the UML along with the RPP of Surya Bahadur Thapa and three independent members formally made a proposal on 3rd November that completely ignored the legitimate interests of the Madhesis in the configuration of the two Madhesi provinces. All these parties and the individuals together make 404 members in the Assembly that gives them a two third majority to ram through this proposal.

It may be recalled that in the last – the second election to the Interim Constituent Assembly, the Terai voted overwhelmingly for the mainstream parties the Nepali Congress and the UML. This also led to the total decimation of the Madhesi parties which carried considerable clout in the previous assembly with more than 80 seats.

The results of the elections not only showed the disapproval of the people in Terai over the political leaders in the Terai who were engaged mostly in pursuit of power and wealth, but also an endorsement and faith of the people of Terai on the two mainstream parties the NC and the UML.

An analysis of the election results to the second CA in the Terai would have shown that the constituencies with an overwhelming presence of the Madhesis voted for the NC and the UML and not the Madhesi parties.

The hope was that the Terai would get a better deal with the mainstream parties rather than with the regional “Madhesi” ones. Those who had watched the political developments in Nepal would have welcomed the result as it would finally put an end to the identity crisis of those Madhesis who had high hopes after the 1990 revolution that were only belied by the democratic parties that came to power under the new and restructured “constitutional monarchy.”

I recall the agonising days Gajendra Narain Singh, the Terai leader spent before finally giving up all hopes of continuing with the Nepali Congress. Mahant Thakur another loyal Nepali Congress leader from the Terai was forced to quit the Congress after he realised that the Terains are not going get justice from the Nepali Congress. A few leaders like Mahendra Narain Nidhi spent their time till the end with the Nepali Congress though they were marginalised and given only ‘symbolic posts’.

The present proposal of configuration of the two Madhesi provinces would not only push the Madhesi groups into confrontation but also throw them on the lap of the Maoists that is likely to have serious long term repercussions on the security interests of India too.

There are reports that the proposal has already polarised the ruling and opposition parties and this is likely to affect the stability of the country too.

Full details of the proposals in a nutshell are given in the Himalyan Times of 4th November with a map of the proposed seven provinces on page 5.

Maoists leader Dahal has rightly pointed out that the proposal shuts out consensus. Consensus has not worked so far. The opposition parties have not been very cooperative and the CPDCC had also been deliberately delaying the final report.

If the ruling parties are to go ahead with voting in the CA they will be justified – but that has to be done with some responsibility and reasonableness.

The proposal:

The two Madhesi provinces have been carved out without including the three southern districts of Biratnagar, Sunsari and Jhapa in the east and two districts of Kanchanpur and Kailali in the west. Two districts in the central region Chitwan and Nawal Parasi have also been left out of the Madhesi provinces with Chitwan going to Bagmati Pradesh and Nawal Parasi going to Gandaki Pradesh.

Biratnagar and Sunsari being both prosperous districts have been deliberately left out though these by any measure should have been included in the Janakpur Pradesh. One can however understand Jhapa being kept separate as it is peopled overwhelmingly by people from the hills.

There is no justification either of Kailali and Kanchanpur both comparatively more prosperous being detached from the proposed Lumbini Pradesh.

A look at the map gives the impression, that the Ruling Party consisting mostly of people from the hills wanted a direct outlet to the southern Indian border and it is seen that four of the five provinces proposed in the north four (excepting Karnali) have access to the southern border.

It was heard that many senior leaders of the Nepali Congress expressed a fear that they will be “choked” and blocked if the provinces of the hills do not have direct access to India. This is rather unfortunate.

Conclusion:

The proposal of the ruling parties does great injustice to the Madhesis who have along with those in the hills have struggled and suffered to usher in democracy in Nepal. This proposal if gone through will divide the country and this may lead to serious long term consequences.

The ruling parties have suggested that this is just a proposal and could be discussed. There are whispers that senior leaders of the Nepali Congress and also the Chairman of the UML K.P Oli were determined not to give in to the Madhesis.

It will be very unfortunate if this proposal is gone through in this form.

The post Nepal: NC-UML Proposal Of Seven Provinces Is ‘Anti-Madhesi’ – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Spain is to sue Catalan president Artur Mas for “disobedience and dishonesty” after he defied a court injunction not to hold a vote on secession, court sources said on Wednesday, Nov 12, potentially barring him from running in regional elections, Reuters reports.

Mas and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy have said they want to start a dialogue in the next days after two years of acrimonious fighting over Catalonia’s relationship with Spain.

On Tuesday, Mas proposed that they establish a permanent dialogue over Catalan independence and measures to boost the economy of the region, which accounts for about a fifth of Spain’s population and economic output.

Close to two million Catalans voted on Sunday in favor of seceding from Spain in a symbolic vote following a legal block by the central government against a more formal, albeit still non-binding ballot.

While Rajoy has already said he would never agree on a legal referendum on Catalonian independence, last week he suggested Spain may reforming its constitution and give the autonomous community more say over tax collection and spending.

The court sources said, according to Reuters, that the complaint was being fine-tuned and was likely to be filed later on Wednesday or on Thursday.

The public prosecutor’s case against Mas and his deputy Joana Ortega may stand in the way of this political push as it could eventually mean Mas is banned from running in the next regional elections, due to be held late in 2016.

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The fantastic decade-long mission of ESA’s Rosetta robotic space probe chasing Comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko has reached its zenith on Wednesday, as the Philae robotic lander has detached from the mothership comet-chaser and landed on its target.

Philae’s harpoons were confirmed fired and reeled in surface of the comet. The signal confirming that broke a seven-hour and sparked scenes of elation at the European Space Agency’s mission control in Darmstadt.

Just minutes earlier, Rosetta took a breath taking image Philae lander falling against the pitch black of space towards comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko.

The lander is to study the comet’s surface, while the scientists are keen on finding out if it contains any organic amino acids. This could yield vital clues about the beginning of our solar system and the origin of life on Earth.

The European Space Agency launched their Rosetta probe more than a decade ago – since that time the spacecraft and its lander Philae have traveled more than six billion kilometers.

The jubilant scientists – and the world – had to wait for 28 minutes for the confirmation of the touchdown to reach the earth, as the comet is some 510 million kilometers away from our planet. The whole descent had to be precalculated and run automatically.

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Shark populations in the Mediterranean are highly divided, an international team of scientists, led by Dr Andrew Griffiths of the University of Bristol, has shown. Many previous studies on sharks suggest they move over large distances. But catsharks in the Mediterranean Sea appear to move and migrate much less, as revealed by this study. This could have important implications for conserving and managing sharks more widely, suggesting they may be more vulnerable to over-fishing than previously thought.

The study, published in the new journal Royal Society Open Science, used genetic techniques to investigate the population structure of the small-spotted shark, Scyliorhinus canicula. The species is common throughout Europe and has been eaten since ancient times, as documented in Roman mosaics.

In the UK anglers catch it for sport and it can often be seen in rock pools at low tide. The study found evidence of isolated populations in the Mediterranean, but no population division was found between catsharks around the North East Atlantic and British Isles. During the last ice age, about 20,000 years ago, ice sheets occupied much of the Seas and Ocean of this region and catsharks probably didn’t survive in the area. This means the region had to be recolonised, and there are very little genetic differences between them today.

The study also highlights differences in the movements of males and female catsharks – an increasingly common finding in sharks.

Dr Griffiths, based in the School of Biological Sciences, said: “It makes a lot of sense, females may want to stay in areas that are good for laying eggs, but males are often the dispersing sex, perhaps taking risks to increase how much they reproduce.”

This research has conservation implications; if patterns of population structure vary hugely in different seas, and between the sexes, then shark resilience to fishing can vary greatly, meaning that better informed management could be needed for many species.

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The loss of eyesight, often caused by retinal degeneration, is a life-altering health issue for many people, especially as they age. But a new development toward a prosthetic retina could help counter conditions that result from problems with this crucial part of the eye. Scientists published their research on a new device, which they tested on tissue from laboratory animals, in the ACS journal Nano Letters.

Yael Hanein and colleagues point out that a growing range of medical devices has become available to treat conditions, including visual impairment, that involve sending sensory signals to the brain.

Patients with one type of eye disorder called age-related macular degeneration (AMD), for example, could potentially benefit from such a device, they say. AMD usually affects people age 60 or older who have damage to a specific part of the retina, limiting their vision.

Scientists are trying different approaches to develop an implant that can “see” light and send visual signals to a person’s brain, countering the effects of AMD and related vision disorders.

But many attempts so far use metallic parts, cumbersome wiring or have low resolution. The researchers, an interdisciplinary team from Tel Aviv University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Centers for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology and Newcastle University, wanted to make a more compact device.

The researchers combined semiconductor nanorods and carbon nanotubes to create a wireless, light-sensitive, flexible film that could potentially act in the place of a damaged retina. When they tested it with a chick retina that normally doesn’t respond to light, they found that the film absorbed light and, in response, sparked neuronal activity. In comparison with other technologies, the researchers conclude theirs is more durable, flexible and efficient, as well as better able to stimulate neurons.

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A group of Israeli settlers set fire inside a mosque in the Palestinian village of al-Mughayyir near Ramallah early Wednesday, locals told Ma’an.

Worshipers said that when they went to the mosque to perform dawn prayer around 4:30 a.m., they saw smoke smoke and flames coming from the first floor of the two-story building.

The first floor was seriously damaged, and the second floor was lightly damaged, they said.

They said the settlers left behind racist slogans in Hebrew on the outer walls of the mosque.

The same mosque has been targeted by Israeli settlers before, locals told Ma’an.

“Every time the mosque is torched, the (Israeli) occupation police conduct an investigation just for show, and never arrest a single settler,” one resident said.

Locals say Israeli forces have confiscated more than 75 percent of the village’s lands for settlements, military bases, and natural reserves.

Israeli settler violence against Palestinians and their property is commonplace but is rarely prosecuted by Israeli authorities.

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The UN refugee agency on Tuesday warned that a US$58.45 million funding shortfall, coupled with this year’s sharp recent growth in internal displacement, could leave up to 1 million Syrians and Iraqis without proper help as winter approaches.

“The shortfall affects our winter preparedness programmes, although we have already invested US$154 million on winter aid for Syrian and Iraqi refugees and internally displaced, and means that UNHCR is having to make some very tough choices over who to prioritize,” chief spokesperson Melissa Fleming said in Geneva.

“Factors we are considering include the elevation of refugee settlements, the composition of the family unit (e.g. number of children and female-headed households), family health concerns, new arrivals, available family resources, shelter conditions and other considerations. For those we’re unable to prioritize, the conditions could nonetheless be very tough,” she added.

“I wish we could support everybody and I wish we could give everybody more. The reality is that the population moved and continues to move quickly in 2014 and the funding continues to trickle in slowly,” added Amin Awad, director of UNHCR’s Middle East and North Africa Bureau.

While the problem is most acute in Iraq and Syria, there are also needs in other parts of the region. This will be the fourth winter away from their homes for many Syrian refugees and the first for the 1.9 million Iraqis who have become internally displaced this year.

In the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq, winter has already arrived in Dohuk governorate. By December, temperatures can range from +5 degrees Celsius in more temperate areas to minus 16 degrees Celsius in the mountains.

“But protecting people from cold costs money. Right now, we estimate the overall winter shortfall for UNHCR’s programme alone to be at least US$58.45 million for some 990,000 people – mainly newly internally displaced people [IDP] in Iraq and Syria [including a gap of US$27.4 million for internally displaced people inside Syria, and US$25 million for internally displaced in Iraq],” Fleming said.

In Iraq, the needs are massive but funding has not kept pace with the new displacement. With 1.9 million IDPs and 225,000 refugees – and 300-500 more arriving daily in northern Iraq from the Syrian border city of Kobane – UNHCR is deeply concerned about the ability of the international community to meet urgent winter needs.

Approximately 800,000 people are in need of shelter assistance, while 940,000 lack basic winter household items. With current funding, UNHCR expects to reach only 240,000 displaced Iraqis with winter aid instead of the 600,000 planned under an inter-agency effort.

New and multiple displacement inside Syria – with people having to move several times inside the country in search of safety – has fuelled an increase in the need for winter aid. Here, as part of an inter-agency effort, UNHCR is focusing on providing relief items including thermal blankets, winter clothing, extra plastic sheeting and reinforcing collective and private shelters currently housing thousands of displaced families.

Priority areas for distribution of these items are in Aleppo and northern parts of the country as they are the coldest. UNHCR was planning to help 1.4 million people with winter aid but only has enough funds to provide kits for 620,000 people through December.

In Lebanon, meanwhile, UNHCR and its partners estimate some 132,000 refugee households (660,000 people) are in need of some kind of assistance during the winter to keep them warm and dry. With refugees scattered across 1,700 localities throughout Lebanon, providing that assistance is a huge undertaking.

Vulnerable refugees living at cold, higher elevations are given precedence. UNHCR’s US$42 million winter programme consists of a variety of activities and aid items. These include ensuring that sub-standard shelters are sealed off against the elements; and provision of high-thermal blankets, stoves, fuel vouchers and cash to purchase fuel and other items refugees need to stay warm.

This winter, UNHCR plans to provide weatherproofing kits for some 37,200 households (186,000 people) living in sub-standard dwellings and in improvised, informal settlements. Monthly fuel vouchers of US$100 will also be provided to 34,000 vulnerable families living above 1,000 metres. The programme also aims to provide blankets for up to 84,000 families (420,000 people), as well as stoves for up to 18,000 families (90,000 people) living above 900 metres.

In Jordan, meanwhile, UNHCR’s US$16.5 million winter programme in Jordan for some 240,600 refugees requires another US$5.5 million, primarily to cover cash assistance in January and February next year, for about 55,000 people. The programme consists of four main components: supplemental cash for Syrians in urban areas; camp winterization; financial assistance to non-Syrians; and contingency stocks for new Iraqi arrivals.

In Azraq and Za’atari camps, work will include provision of concrete floors in 6,480 shelters in Azraq; distribution of 10,000 plastic sheets for better insulation in Za’atari; provision of 50,000 high-thermal blankets in both camps; distribution of 4,000 gas heaters and refill tanks.

In urban areas, cash assistance averaging US$360 per family is to be provided to 27,800 of the most vulnerable Syrian families to cover winter needs. Only half of the US$10 million required has been received. Also in urban areas, 2,200 non-Syrian vulnerable refugee families (mainly Iraqis but also Somalis and Sudanese) already receiving monthly cash assistance will get an additional $360 to cover winter needs.

Egypt’s refugee population is almost entirely urbanized. The winterization effort in Egypt will focus on cash assistance, with commodities available locally. Since early November, UNHCR has started receiving calls from refugees requesting assistance to purchase warmer clothes and blankets for their children. A total of approximately 56,000 Syrian refugees (40 per cent of the registered population), are in need of such assistance.

Due to funding shortfalls, UNHCR will only be able to reach 38,000 of the most vulnerable refugees – or 60 per cent of those in need of winterization assistance. Each refugee will receive US$28 with a maximum ceiling of US$168 for families with six or more members.

In Turkey, UNHCR Turkey is providing winter support to both camp and vulnerable non-camp refugees. UNHCR will provide winter assistance to all Syrian refugees living in camps in Turkey, about 220,000 people. The assistance will include: two high-thermal blankets per person; three plastic mats per family; anoraks; and high-thermal top and bottom clothes. UNHCR will also provide winterization assistance to some 120,000 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees living outside camps.

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For more than 2,000 years, the Jewish People have been a small and often persecuted minority. So it is not surprising that less than ten thousand non-Jews convert to Judaism every year.

But very surprising is when an Israeli newspaper (HaAretz) reports that British historian Tudor Parfitt, an expert on Judaizing movements, and a keynote speaker at a Jerusalem conference in early November. claimed that the number of non-Jews who believe they are descendants of Jews or ancient Israelites, about equals the total number of Jews who are counted in official international censuses.

Twenty five hundred years ago the prophet Zachariah declared: ‘This is what the LORD Almighty says: “In those days (to come) ten people from every language and nation will take firm hold of each Jew by the edge of his robe and say, ‘Let us go with you, because we have heard that God is with you.'” (8:23)

In many cases, Parfitt said, this voluntary identification with the Jewish people is a relatively new phenomenon, which only began in the five decades following the recreation of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel.

Members of these newly identified Jewish communities could be found in places as diverse as northeastern India, Papua New Guinea, Nicaragua, the jungles of South America and southern and central Africa, he said.

In many cases, the global spread of Evangelical Protestant Churches, with their emphases on eschatological thinking, in the decades after the resurrection of a Jewish State in the Land of Israel, has stimulated a self selecting group of the ‘locals’ to relate so strongly with ancient Israelites, that they have found vestiges of Jewish identity within their own souls.

For example, Matthew Fishbane reports in Tablet Magazine (July 8, 2010) that he traveled to Medellín, Colombia to see how a part of an evangelical megachurch called the Centro de Terapia Integral Para la Familia, or the Center for Integral Family Therapy, has morphed into a Hebrew-speaking, Sephardic, Orthodox Jewish community
complete with daycare, a Hebrew school, a self-managed kosher market, and claims to an ancestry that makes them more returnees than converts.

But other Judaizing communities in Africa have an even more amazing connection with Jewishness. Parfitt, an emeritus professor of modern Jewish studies at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, says,

“I think one of the interesting, paradoxical things is the effect of the Holocaust on the way that people want to identify as Jews. You’d think that it would be the opposite, but in the case of both the Igbo and the Tutsi tribes in Africa, for example, they both had their own genocides, and they increasingly perceive themselves as Jews as a result of that.”

Among these millions of Judaizing non-Jews are small communities in Asia and Africa that see themselves as descendants of the 10 lost tribes (the part of the original 12 Hebrew tribes deported from the Kingdom of Israel after it was conquered by the Neo-Assyrian empire in about 720 BCE).

Shalva Weil of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an expert on the lost Israelite tribes, said the growing worldwide Judeophile phenomenon was motivated partly by a desire for economic improvement. since many of those claiming this status were members of impoverished and marginalized communities.

But, Weil said that this was not the primary motivation and that globalization in general was a more important factor. In particular, she noted the tendency of young Israelis to explore remote corners of their world, including places where locals may not otherwise have had much interaction with Jews.

Thousands of backpackers go forth from Israel each year on post-army trips, “where they come into contact with exotic and wonderful people and begin to see similarities with their own religion,” Weil noted.

Another factor explaining the proJewish identity she said, was the worldwide rise of evangelical fundamentalism, with it’s messianic fervor. “Eschatological visions have always been associated with the 10 lost tribes,” she said.

While some of these communities, like the Bnai Menashe of Israel, have undergone official conversion processes so they could emigrate to Israel, most of them have not been driven to move to Israel as part of the realization of their Jewish identity.

“In Africa, among groups I work with, there doesn’t seem to be a large number that want to come to Israel,” noted Parfitt. “They love Israel, they support Israel, they want to study, but they’re not dying to come.”

I myself think they would be happy to just be welcomed into the worldwide Jewish community without the traditional Orthodox suspicion of potential converts, in fulfillment of the Biblical prophecy of prophet Zachariah:

‘This is what the LORD Almighty says: “In those days (to come) ten people from every language and nation will take firm hold of each Jew by the edge of his robe and say, ‘Let us go with you, because we have heard that God is with you.'” (8:23)

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An Egyptian navy ship has suffered a “terrorist” attack, leaving five servicemen injured and eight others missing, the AFP news agency reported.

Military officials said dozens of “armed assailants” attacked the vessel on Wednesday off the coast of the north-east province Damietta.

The air force helped destroy four of the boats used by the suspected militants, the military said.

Thirty-two people were arrested and are being questioned, officials said.

Original article

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Is the growing proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) an automatic security threat? Ulrike Franke doesn’t think so. In her view, drones only become a problem when they are armed, used irresponsibly by states, or deployed by terrorists.

By Ulrike Franke

Drones appear to be everywhere at the moment, and the media loves to report on them. In recent years, the global market for drones has grown impressively and is forecasted to grow even more rapidly in the future. Only legal reform and some technical improvements (mainly a reliable sense-and-avoid technology) now stand in the way of large-scale commercial use. Moreover, an increasing number of armed forces around the world now use drones. Even ISIS puts videos on YouTube that are filmed with the help of a drone.

For many people, this sounds ominous. In particular, the rapid, international proliferation of military drones is a cause for concern. In a recent ISN article, Wim Zwijnenburg argued that new arms control regimes are needed to stop or curb the proliferation of military drones. “Today’s arms control agreements”, he claims, are not “comprehensive enough to regulate the growing investment in unmanned systems”.

There certainly is nothing wrong with introducing new arms control agreements and strengthening existing ones. But the issue many articles on drone proliferation fail to address is why the proliferation of drones should be curbed. Why, exactly, is “the huge expansion of this technology”, as Zwijnenburg puts it, a problem?

The answer to this question depends on definitions and circumstances. Some cases may appear straightforward (We can all agree that ISIS, for instance, should not have drones). However, in many cases, it is not actually the proliferation of drones that we should be concerned about.

The term ‘drones’, as it is currently used in the general media, refers to all kinds of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). [1] This includes UAVs that are remotely controlled from the ground, for instance via radio or satellite link, as well as those that can be pre-programmed to follow a flight path or carry out specific missions without guidance from the ground. Drones come in all shapes and sizes: both the tiny British “Black Hornet” as well as the notorious US “Reaper,” which can carry an array of armament, are drones. Military drones are not the same as armed drones, albeit the former includes the latter. The designation ‘military drone’ simply refers to drones used by the military, for instance for surveillance and reconnaissance, but it also includes drones used for missile or bomb delivery.

Why are these distinctions important? Because a great deal of confusion exists, in debates over the proliferation of ‘drones,’ about what exactly is being discussed. Some even use this confusion to their advantage. What kind of drone proliferation, then, should we be worried about and why? While the possession of armed drones by rogue statues and terrorist groups is a cause for concern, the proliferation of drones per se should not be.

Terrorist groups and drones

The easiest case is the proliferation of drones to terrorist groups. We do not want ISIS (or any other terrorist group) to have drones of any kind. But this is true for all kinds of weapons. Is there a reason why it would be particularly threatening if terrorists had drones rather than other weapons?

At the moment, several terrorist groups appear to have small drones. Hezbollah has flown Iranian-built drones over Israeli territory several times since the early 2000s. This is an issue for Israel as these flights may provide the terrorists with information Israel would prefer them not to have, such as regarding the structure of their nuclear plants. But because these drones have so far been rather low-tech (indeed, it is unclear whether they were able to send back the data they collected in-flight or whether the data would have to be recovered manually after the drone’s return), Israel’s biggest concern is currently financial. In order to shoot down a drone which probably cost the Iranian government a few thousand dollars, it had to send up F-16 fighter jets and use guided missiles, causing costs of several hundred thousand dollars.

Hence, terrorist groups having unarmed drones is a concern, but not necessarily more so than terrorist groups having any other kind of military equipment. Terrorist groups can use drones to their advantage by improving their intelligence and causing financial losses to their adversaries. Beyond this, the biggest risk may be that a drone controlled by a terrorist group could cause panic among the population. But, in terms of unarmed drones, the main challenge is terrorism in general, rather than drones in particular.

The situation is different with respect to armed drones. Terrorists operating unmanned aircraft loaded with missiles or bombs would certainly pose a threat. For the moment, no terrorist group has been able to use armed drones.[2] Armed drones are currently (officially) produced only by Israel and the US, and both countries are strictly controlling the export of this technology, even to their allies. Some other states, namely Iran and China, have armed drone programs and will soon be able to produce armed drones that could potentially end up in the hands of non-state groups. Thus, while it remains difficult for a terrorist group to acquire armed drones, this is likely to change in the future.

Nevertheless, flying an armed drone is considerably more difficult than flying an unarmed drone. Armed drones tend to be large, sophisticated aircraft, while some unarmed drones can be controlled by iPhone applications and bear more resemblance to model aircraft than to weapon systems. [3] Although some smaller, easier- to- control armed drones do exist, these are ‘kamikaze’ systems whose explosive power is limited and that, in any case, can only be used once. This means that, on the whole, the possession of armed drones by terrorist groups is not a grave danger, at least at the moment.

Some warn that terrorists may use drones to deliver biological and chemical agents. This is of course a frightening prospect. But the problem in this scenario is not the drone but the biological and chemical weapons. A group that is capable of acquiring CBRN weapons is likely to be capable of delivering them in a variety of ways, and doing so with a drone is not necessarily more threatening than doing so by other means.

This analysis of the terrorism-drone nexus has shown that the main concern is not the proliferation of drones per se but mainly the proliferation of armed drones. And this is equally true for states.

States and drones

At the moment, 76 countries are known or suspected to have military drones at their disposal.[4] Most of these states, however, only have unarmed drones. Should the proliferation of unarmed military drones (which is not only underway but has clearly already taken place) be a cause for concern?

While there are legitimate reasons to be wary, the proliferation of unarmed drones is not negative per se. The list of drone-states includes many regimes such as Iran and North Korea, whom many would prefer not to possess advanced military equipment. But drones are not the main problem here. As surveillance drones proliferate, both sides in military confrontations will have better information about their adversaries. This could potentially be a good thing as it could lead to attacks that are more targeted and result in fewer civilian casualties. Greater transparency also decreases the likelihood of dangerous misunderstandings.

The main hazard of unarmed drone proliferation is that because drones are unmanned, they may embolden leaders to attempt more politically daring missions than they would attempt otherwise. One example is China’s recent use of drones over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, disputed between China and Japan. The detection of a drone in foreign airspace or even the shooting down of a drone could cause diplomatic tensions and, in the most extreme case, could lead to war. Although this is a real danger, it rests upon the assumption that governments use drones in politically careless ways.

Some argue that the proliferation of unarmed drones could lead states to pursue armed ones. While there may be some truth to this, it also points to what most would consider the real problem: the international proliferation of armed drones.

For the moment, only three states – the US, the UK and Israel – officially have armed drones, but many other states have programs or are trying to import armed drones. This number is therefore likely to rise. Should we be worried about this? First, from the little empirical research that is available, it seems that armed drones are valuable military tools. As with all kinds of military equipment, therefore, we would prefer that potential enemies not acquire it.

Another challenge associated with the use of armed drones around the world is that other countries could start following the precedent set by the United States in using armed drones outside of declared warzones. The use by the US of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes, especially the targeting of individuals in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, has been criticised extensively in recent years. Worryingly, it might also be difficult to prevent other countries from following the US example, because the US precedent complicates any legal case against using armed drones in this way. Indeed, China in particular appears to be aware of this. In 2013, it announced that it had considered killing a drug trafficker in Myanmar with the help of a drone. Though Beijing ultimately refrained from doing so, the incident illustrates the world of possibilities that US policy has created.

The real problem: policy

On the whole, therefore, drone proliferation itself is not a problem that needs to be countered. Surveillance drones have already proliferated extensively, and the threat they pose is unclear to say the least. Furthermore, armed drones will soon be used in many countries around the world. For sure, this raises questions about how these armed drones are being used. But, ultimately, this is a policy issue. The drones themselves are not the main problem. Advocating a new arms control regime for drones when the problem lies elsewhere propagates the idea that the problem lies with the technology – when, in fact, it lies with the policy.

[1] Originally, the term ‘drone’ was used to describe a specific type of unmanned aerial vehicle, namely a pre-programmed system, often used for target practice.

[2] Some reports have claimed otherwise, but for the moment these claims cannot be confirmed.

[3] Of course, many unarmed drones are high-tech devices. The largest drone currently in use is the unarmed “Global Hawk”, a drone the size of a commercial airliner and full of high-end technology.

[4] The exact numbers and an explanation of the methodology can be found at Franke, Ulrike Esther. “The Global Diffusion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or ‘Drones’”. In Precision Strike Warfare and International Intervention: Strategic, Ethico-Legal and Decisional Implications, edited by Mike Aaronson, Wali Aslam, Tom Dyson and Regina Rauxloh: Routledge, 2014. (Information as of September 2013).

Ulrike Esther Franke is a DPhil student in International Relations at Oxford University and focuses on the strategic implications of the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or “Drones”) by Western armed forces.

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No doubt, the financial markets collapse of 2007-8 will go down in American history as one of the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This financial crisis was so severe that it triggered a radical and somewhat unorthodox monetary policy response from the U.S Federal Reserve- the equivalent of Central Banks in most African countries. And the U.S Federal Reserve was not mucking around! This unconventional policy known as Quantitative Easing, saw the Fed pumping up to $85 billion a month into the world`s largest economy through purchases of bonds, as it meant to stimulate economic activity. Over the years, the Federal Reserve has steadily reduced this amount to $15 billion a month as recovery in the United States improved.

About a fortnight ago however, the Federal Reserve`s Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced an end to its asset purchase programme which has injected a jaw-dropping $4, 5 trillion dollars over the space of 6 years into the United States economy, since its inception in December 2008. This came on the back of a continued resurgence of the American economy. So what it is the effect, if any, of this development to Africa?

To understand the relationship between the US Federal Reserve`s policies and Africa`s emerging markets, it is prudent to get an understanding of how Quantitative Easing (QE) worked. The US Federal Reserve would buy mostly bonds from investors, thereby introducing more money into the market. However, as interest rates in America were at historically low levels, rational investors shunned investing that cash domestically. Instead, they looked for higher yields elsewhere. Most foreign investors found ‘refuge’ in the emerging markets of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Africa`s emerging and frontier market economies, notably South Africa, Ghana and to some extent Rwanda have benefitted from these private capital inflows.

These massive tides of liquidity from developed to developing countries have played a major role in financing infrastructure development projects, corporate investment as well as boosting household consumption albeit financed by credit on the continent. Over the years, several African countries were quick to latch on to this sudden abundant liquidity brought from developed economies.

Rwanda, Zambia and Ghana issued Eurobonds that were oversubscribed, as they too tapped into this vast pool of liquidity. In 2013 alone, sub-Saharan African countries raised more than $5 billion through the issue of bonds. In part, this was because of the effects of historically low levels of benchmark interest rates brought about by the Quantitative Easing (QE) exercise that were in America.

Now faced with the prospect of higher interest rates in the developed economies like USA, as QE draws to a halt, most emerging and frontier market economies-those in Africa included- face huge downside risks of sudden stops or reversals of the foreign liquidity they had depended on. Consequently, these developments are likely to pose instability to most African economies, especially those that lack sufficient buffers in the way of hard currency reserves or those that have relatively larger current account deficits. South Africa fits the bill perfectly, and already, signs of distress as investors pull out their funds from the country have been seen through the continued decline of the Rand against the Dollar.

Coupled with other structural issue like slumping commodity prices in international markets and loss of competitiveness, African countries that had become reliant on QE induced cash inflows will more likely be hurt by the sudden withdrawal of funds. An explanation for this would be the fact that foreign investors are now paying greater attention to the economic fundamentals (risk profile) of African countries and will not hesitate to reinvest their money elsewhere-read developed markets- in search of safety and higher interest yields. Hence African countries that have had their fiscal deficits, infrastructure projects and corporate expansion projects financed by these inflows will be left in the lurch.

This exposes the glaring shortcomings of most African economies, in terms of lack of sufficient economic buffers to cushion themselves against shocks such as this sudden withdrawal of funds. Considering the highly interconnected and globalised financial markets of today, policymakers in African economies would do well to address these structural problems. In the meantime though, Ghana and South Africa continue to suffer the caprices of this pull-out of capital and the Cedi as well as the Rand have weakened as a result.

However, the situation is not as dire, yet. The FOMC has announced that though they have stopped bond buying, they will keep interest rates at the low levels they have been at in the short term. This means the withdrawal of capital from Africa`s emerging economies will not be as large as it could have been. Emerging markets still offer relatively higher interest rates than the United States, and investors will not completely pull out of these economies. Additionally, the Bank of Japan is still buying bonds and the European Central Bank will likely follow suit as the Eurozone continues in stagnation. The implication is that, liquidity will potentially remain plentiful in the immediate future, and Africa`s emerging and frontier markets will be set to benefit from this abundant global liquidity too. So as the U.S Federal Reserve halts its QE, there is no substantial cause for concern for African emerging markets, well in the short run at least.

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