By P.K. Ghosh

India’s courtship of Vietnam is now overt. For instance, during the recent visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minster Nguyen Tan Dung, New Delhi not only laid out the red carpet for the visiting Vietnamese leader and the accompanying business delegation of 50 members, it took the decisive step of overtly acknowledging its assistance in modernising Vietnam’s armed forces, much to the chagrin of China.

Vietnam has its own difficult history with China. It is not surprising, then, that this emerging country is often seen as a linchpin in India’s counter-encirclement and “Look East” policies. As a consequence, New Delhi is actively courting Vietnam with defense-related offers and infrastructure deals.

Providing impetus to these bilateral relations have been a flurry of senior-level official visits to and from Hanoi. The Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited India in November 2013, during which eight MoUs were signed, and Vietnam offered India seven oil blocks for exploration. India already had three Vietnamese blocks, in which the state-run ONGC Videsh (OVL) had invested about $360 million.

President Pranab Mukherjee then visited Hanoi in September this year, just ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, sending a strong message of unity with the Vietnamese. During this visit seven pacts were inked along with a $100 million in credit for defense deals. This could be seen as a tit for tat with the Chinese president’s subsequent visit to Sri Lanka and Maldives; a region that the Chinese have been trying to influence. The Chinese reacted sharply to Mukerjee’s visit by sending a military incursion into Chumar sector on September 15 – the day the deals were signed.

The bilateral bonhomie was again on display during Dung’s recent visit to India. For the first time India openly acknowledged modernizing Vietnam’s armed forces and enhancing its maritime capacity. In addition, India was one of the few countries to continue expanding its energy exploration in South China Sea waters that are claimed by China.

On that occasion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “Our defence cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the modernization of Vietnam’s defence and security forces. This will include expansion of our training programme, which is already very substantial, joint-exercises and cooperation in defence equipment. We will quickly operationalise the $100 million line of credit that will enable Vietnam [to] acquire new naval vessels from India.”

Given the need to keen an eye on Chinese movements in this volatile region, India is keen to have basing rights in Vietnamese ports such as Na Trang for its naval warships. This would not only help give India a presence in the region, it would also serve as a quid pro quo for the increasingly frequent Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). While the forward base in Na Trang has not yet been made available, Indian naval warships are extended special privileges when berthing at any Vietnamese port.

When the Indian warship Airavat was challenged by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in September 2012 while on passage from Vietnam, it reinforced the need for India to enhance maritime cooperation and interoperability with the Vietnamese. That opportunity for developing interoperability has presented itself again, with the Vietnamese having taken delivery of the first of six Russian-made 636 Kilo-class submarines on order.

In the very near future Vietnam will have a fleet of submarines requiring skilled submariners to man these sophisticated platforms. The Indian Navy has stepped in and begun training a large number of Vietnamese sailors in submarine operations and underwater warfare. The ongoing “comprehensive underwater combat operations” training for these Vietnamese sailors is in progress at the Indian Navy’s INS Satavahana (Submarine School) in Visakhapatnam.

The Indian Navy’s experience since the mid 1980s in operating Russian Kilo-class submarines will undoubtedly help in this effort. In the past, India had supplied spare parts for the Russian-origin Petya-class warships and OSA-II class missile boats of the Vietnamese Navy, while from continuing to train its military personnel in information technology and English language skills.

This development is likely to perturb Beijing, and it will also be closely watched by Pakistan. It may prove to be the impetus that prompts China to consider giving Pakistan a nuclear submarine, which would raise the security stakes for India considerably.

Apart from submarine training, India also plans to train Vietnamese Air Force Sukhoi pilots, while Vietnam has also been negotiating to acquire the supersonic anti-ship cruise missile BrahMos, which is built jointly in India with Russia.

This ongoing strategic game of chess underscores the importance of India and Vietnam to each other. While China continues to make inroads into Sri Lanka and other Indian neighbors, India is returning the favor with growing support for Vietnamese capacity building.

(Dr. P K Ghosh is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. He is the former co-chair of the CSCAP International Study Group on Maritime security and has been closely following the South China Sea dispute.)

Courtesy : The Diplomat Magazine

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Surging U.S. oil production has sent oil prices tumbling.

The shale revolution, which began here at home, has driven oil prices down 25 percent since June, and OPEC is reeling. With the U.S. now the world’s largest natural gas producer and soon to become the world’s largest oil producer, it may be tempting to think that the world, particularly the United States, has entered a new age of energy abundance, but that would be a grave mistake.

The instability that has driven up oil prices over the past year—conflict in Libya, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, sanctions on Iran and war in Iraq and Syria—is far from over. The market may have grown accustomed to geopolitical turmoil in key energy producing states, but the threat of major supply disruptions has not gone away.

In fact, just a few months ago many analysts thought it a small miracle that oil prices, already well above $100 per barrel, weren’t climbing higher. Why not? The reason is that U.S. production, up more than 60 percent since 2008, was almost singlehandedly keeping prices in check.

Holding oil prices steady won’t just take keeping existing production online, it will also require adding new sources of supply. The global demand for oil continues to rise. Millions of new drivers are filling China’s and India’s roads every year.

Unfortunately—and erroneously, in all likelihood—war-torn Iraq recently was named by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as the key country for meeting growing world oil demand in the coming two decades.

In May, the IEA reported that Iraq was producing 3.4 million barrels of oil per day. IEA projections pegged Iraqi production rising to 5.8 million barrels per day by 2020 and to 7.9 million barrels per day by 2035. As U.S. laser-guided bombs now are trying to stem the ISIS advance on Iraqi oilfields, these projections look wildly optimistic, if not absurd.

Almost 1 million barrels of crude oil are being pumped in Libya—the same Libya that doesn’t have a central government and is again in the midst of civil war.

The world needs U.S. oil production more than ever.

Shale oil production isn’t just an American success story—it has been a lifesaver in the global energy marketplace. And despite the Obama administration’s willingness to take credit for the surge in domestic production, it has come largely despite the administration’s efforts—not because of them.

Mr. President, you didn’t build our globally important energy sector.

Shale production takes place almost entirely on private land where regulation of drilling is handled, quite effectively, by the states. While total U.S. oil production has increased dramatically in the past few years, production on federal lands between 2009 and 2013 is down 6 percent. Of course, the physical locations of shale deposits contribute to that trend, but substantial regulatory and permitting hurdles continue to keep many acres of publicly owned lands off limits to exploration and recovery.

Smarter energy policy peels back the barriers to environmentally responsible energy production on federal lands and resists calls to overregulate the burgeoning shale revolution. The world needs the steadying hand of expanding U.S. energy supplies, and communities across the country need the good jobs that come with sustained and sustainable private investment in energy development.

Mrs. Clinton, don’t let anyone tell you that only the public sector is responsible for economic prosperity.

Just because we are in a season of oil and natural gas plenty now does not mean that winter will not return. So, let’s all enjoy lower prices at the pump while they last, but craft an energy policy as if they are the exception, not the rule.

This article appeared at Deseret News and is reprinted with permission.

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Foreign mothers of Saudi children can now apply for permanent residency without having sponsors and regardless of whether they are married, divorced or widowed.

The Passports Department has begun receiving applications to grant them residency, said Col. Ahmed Al-Luhaidan, media spokesman of the department. He said that the women also do not need to have employers.

However, they must prove they were legally married to citizens and gave birth to their children. The Passport Department will submit these applications to the General Directorate in Riyadh to issue free iqamas, or residency permits, for a period of five years.

Al-Luhaidan said the various branches of the Passport Department would soon be capable of handling requests.

The Cabinet had previously approved permanent residency for foreign mothers of Saudi children, with all fees covered by the state.

They are allowed to work in the private sector and counted toward Saudization quotas, and treated as Saudis in terms of access to public universities and treatment at public hospitals.

The post Permanent Residency For Expat Mothers Of Saudis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Paulo Gorjão

Following two days of intense popular protests in Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign his office and seek refuge in Côte d’Ivoire. Compaoré was in power for 27 years and it was precisely the attempt to perpetuate himself in the presidential office that caused his fall.

As happened during the 2011 Arab Spring,1 with the ousting of Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Compaoré’s removal from power has raised hopes for some and fear for others in Angola. In some way, the events in Burkina Faso reminded many that José Eduardo dos Santos is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-serving leaders. Does that mean that Compaoré’s fall must be a reason for hope or fear in Angola? What has changed in Angola between 2011 and 2014? Is a contagion effect a real possibility?

The immediate answer is that there is no reason to hope, or fear, that the events in Burkina Faso will cause any sort of replica or contagion effect in Angola.2 Firstly, there is no geographical contiguity, or even a common past, between Angola and Burkina Faso. Geography and history do not operate as a political and social stimulus. Secondly, Angola’s 27 years of civil war ended only in 2002, making it very much alive in that nation’s collective memory. While not everyone has equally benefited from the peace dividends, it is, however, not possible to counter argue and deny the fact that living conditions have improved considerably over the past 12 years. In fact, economic growth has never been the engine of political instability in Angola, far from it. Thirdly, there is no concrete alternative to MPLA’s hegemony, or even a charismatic figure to lead the opposition. Thus, contrary to what happened during the Arab Spring, or recently in Burkina Faso, and as far as it is possible to anticipate, it is hard to recognize a catalyzer, or discontentment in significant proportions, that may serve to mobilize Angolans. From this point view, nothing has changed in Angola between 2011 and 2014.

Naturally, there are Angolans that do not identify themselves with José Eduardo dos Santos’ long lasting leadership. Many have abstained, or did not vote, for the MPLA in the August 2012 general elections. Regardless, the MPLA got 71,8% of the votes in an electoral process deemed free and fair by the CPLP, SADC and African Union observers, despite some relevant and substantive punctual remarks.

Today there is no institutional blockage in Luanda, nor a problem with political legitimacy, in a scale that justifies popular protests similar to those that took place in Ouagadougou. This does not mean that it is illegitimate and unreasonable to discuss, in Angola and abroad, José Eduardo dos Santos’s political succession. As a matter of fact, the President’s age—72 years old—is more than a sufficient reason for, sooner or later, making the matter of political succession an unavoidable issue. Hence, the apparent relevance of Manuel Domingos Vicente’s choice to take the Vice- Presidency.

Having said this, and as far as what is possible to understand from the course of events in Angola, waiting for Compaoré’s fall to resonate in the ousting of José Eduardo dos Santos is likely to be useless. It may be better to put the champagne bottles back in the fridge.

Published also in Portuguese: Paulo Gorjão, “Déjà vu em Angola: o Burkina Faso e o mito do efeito de contágio” (IPRIS Comentário, No. 12, Novembro de 2014).

About the author:
Paulo Gorjão
Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 163, NOVEMBER 2014

Notes:
1. See Vasco Martins, “Empty words of revolution in Angola” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 43, March 2011).
2. See Carina Branco, “Sismo político no Burkina Faso pode ter réplicas em Angola?” (RFI, 8 November 2014), e, Nádia Issufo, “Burkina Faso: Angola e outros regimes temem efeito de contágio” (Deutsche Welle, 3 November 2014).

The post Déjà Vu In Angola: Burkina Faso And The Myth Of Contagion Effect – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sandra Fernandes

Since the creation of the acronym in 2001, the BRICS countries have met six times at high level summits. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the later only since 2010) are (re)emerging powers predisposed towards multipolar governance of the international order. Their recent meeting on July 15, in Fortaleza, Brazil, highlights their shared desire to further such political objectives under the umbrella of this diplomatic initiative. This condition has become increasingly salient since the 2012 New Delhi summit. Yet, despite gestures designed to expand the areas of cooperation, deepening trade relations has been the core focus of the BRICS countries. The creation at Fortaleza of a BRICS Development Bank and of a common foreign currency reserve is a step towards new global economic governance modalities distinct from Euro-American institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. The first financial instrument aims to avoid conditionality in loans that often dictate unwanted internal structural reforms. In the view of the Russian Finance minister, loans which necessitate such transformations are an intolerable form of political interference.1 The second instrument aims to protect the BRICS from changes in American monetary policy that risk disrupting their economies by provoking capital withdrawals. Its ability to do this has yet to be proven.2 These initiatives may constitute alternatives to the prevailing financial order, but they raise doubts about the degree of genuine cohesion among these countries. On the one hand, the main contributor will be China; while, on the other hand, the expected gains appear to vary from one country to another.

Taking this state-of-play into consideration and the renewed promises of the BRICS multilateral forum, we aim to explore the following issue: what might the BRICS really achieve, as a group? We argue that the rhetoric of achieving new global governance has to be considered in the context of a distinction between political and economic governance. In order to understand the feasibility of these countries’ common quest for a new role, it is essential to analyze what traits they share and what they do not. We explore, therefore, the core features of the BRICS members and of their relations with each other.

Except South Africa, all of the BRICS members are gigantic countries in many regards. Nonetheless, they fail to be classified as rich countries because their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is inferior to the United States, Japan and Europe. Collectively, they have generated 30% of the world’s growth since 2001. They currently represent 18% of global GDP; 40% of the world’s population; 15% of global trade, and 40% of foreign currency reserves. Synergies are grounded in access to the natural and agricultural resources of Russia, Brazil and South Africa, and Chinese capacity to deliver low price consumption goods to the middle classes of the other countries.3 Confident of their growing economic weight, the BRICS aim to enhance their political role not only in institutions such as the IMF but also at the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

They claim, for instance, that voting in the IMF should be reweighted proportionally, and countries such as Brazil or India should be entitled to a seat at the UN Security Council. The BRICS countries are in fact “light-weight” when it comes to vote-share with 11% of the votes in the IMF, contrasting with the 32% al- located to the European countries, which collectively with the US, then account for nearly 50% of the votes.4 The BRICS nations expressed directly their dissatisfaction with this imbalance in 2011: “We call for a quick achievement of the targets for the reform of the International Monetary Fund agreed to at previous G20 Summits and reiterate that the governing structure of the international financial institutions should reflect the changes in the world economy, increasing the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing countries”.5 The rationale for their request is proportional representation based on economic weight. That same year, the BRICS nations also abstained in votes on military strikes against Libya, which were approved by the UN.

With the BRICS accounting for almost half of the world’s population, these aspirations to rebalance international politics and create a more multipolar equilibrium puts them at odds with the Western liberal values that currently shape the global rules of the game. In this context, the G20 multilateral forum is particularly relevant for the BRICS: “we reaffirm that the G20’s founding spirit of bringing together the major economies on an equal footing to catalyze action is fundamental and therefore agree to put our collective political will behind our economic and financial agenda, and the reform and more effective working of relevant international institutions”.6 To this end, 19 member states plus the EU have gathered, since 2008, for the purpose of economic cooperation and collective decision-making.

However, the intra-BRICS dynamics need to be addressed to assess the prospects for their intent to re- form global governance. The BRICS that share a direct border have more potential for—even overt—conflict among themselves. That is the case for Russia-China and of India-China relations. As far as the Sino-Russian relationship is concerned, both BRICS members took a growing interest in Central Asia during the 21st century, potentially to the detriment of Russian engagement there. Arguably Chinese and Russian paths have diverged since 1979 when Beijing initialed its economic overture and Moscow invaded Afghanistan. A decade before Russia’s opening, China’s evolution has been more dynamic and advanced.7 A 2001 bilateral treaty between the two nations, sealing mutual friendship and cooperation, already included a willingness to address the new global strategic equilibrium. Nevertheless, this goal is hampered by the relative growth in Chinese power compared to Russia, and increased competition in their common neighborhood. Energy relations in Central Asia have highlighted both a change in the power balance, according to which China accepted a privileged Russian interest there, and a boost in Chinese investments.8

Until 2005, China was the primary purchaser of Russian armaments, when it was substituted by India, which is also the biggest importer of arms in the world.9 For its part, Beijing has become autonomous from the second largest exporter, namely Moscow.10 In terms of nuclear armaments, Russia’s power is contracting in contrast with that of China and India (and Pakistan).11 Globally, Indo-Russian relations are intensifying, as demonstrated by a 24% growth in trade during 2012 12 and by Russian support for the entry of New Deli into the Shanghai Co- operation Organization (SCO).

Considering Indo-Chinese historical tensions, namely their disputed border, Russian actions might be seen as unwanted from Beijing’s perspective. The Chinese president’s visit to India last September is illustrative of the importance of the regional balance of power between these two BRICS. The visit was overshadowed by clashes of troops in the disputed Ladakh border region (Indian-administered Kashmir and Chinese-administered Aksai Chin). The clashes undermined Xi Jiping’s rhetoric concerning China’s peaceful intentions and trade deals. As Tiezzi underlines, “How Beijing can balance its ideal of a “peaceful rise” with achieving the territorial aspects of the “China dream” will ultimately determine how far China-India cooperation can go”.13

Since the New Delhi summit of 2012, the BRICS members have focused on boosting intra-BRICS trade and the expansion of the areas of cooperation. A lot has still to be done, for instance, to improve the BRICS coordination in multilateral forums such as the WTO. Trade between BRICS members is also very uneven. China has an enormous share of trade with Moscow, New Delhi and Brasília, with roughly 80%, and with Pretoria, 70%. It means that China is the main trading destination of the other BRICS. In contrast, Russia and South Africa have almost no bilateral trading relations. The other shares are very low, with only India and South Africa surpassing mutual shares of 10%. The trade by destination between China and the other BRICS is the unique that present a balanced distribution: 30% towards Brazil, 28% to Russia, 26% to India, and 16% to South Africa.14

An overview at the BRICS’s profile also highlights contrasting features as emerging economies. During the 2000s, all the BRICS saw their GDP per capita rise; Russia took the lead, closely followed by Brazil, both demonstrating values above the world average. China and India remained below the world average. The experience of South Africa was different, with a relatively small increase and well below the world average. However, the growth rate in Russia has been well below the Chinese and Indian ones, with about 4% in 2011, as in Brazil.

While Russia has recorded inflation rates higher than the other BRICS, Moscow registered the second best performance in terms of unemployment and poverty rates. Literacy rates and human development indexes also demonstrate significant differences between the BRICS (Russia has the highest values). Public debt represented 12% of Russian GDP in 2011, much lower than its counterparts, but it was also the only with negative population growth. In terms of trade balance, Russia and China are clearly above the others, with Beijing having the best position, although its record has declined since 2008. Brazil and South Africa have nearly achieved a positive trade balance, while India has a negative balance.15 A sectorial analysis also highlights significant differences that might evolve into complementary interactions, or on the contrary, establish structural heterogeneity in the group. For China, the industrial sector is crucial for its GDP, whereas agriculture is of primary importance for India. For Brazil and South Africa, services constitute the biggest share of their GDP. However, in terms of exports, South Africa relies heavily on the mining sector, whereas Brazil relies on the industrial and agricultural sectors. For Russia, although services generate most of the GDP, the energy sector far exceeds its exports earnings. Finally, for China, the manufacturing sector is responsible for above 80% of its foreign trade.16

The BRICS are, therefore, countries that are powerful individually but not yet able to command significant influence as a group. The declared aspiration to become “regime makers” instead of “regime takers” in global affairs is still confronted by two major issues that point to the group’s heterogeneity. The first issue is related to political coordination and the second to intra-trade dynamics. On the one hand, some BRICS have conflicting relations that put a serious brake on political convergence among themselves. This is particularly evident in the case of Sino-Russian relations and Sino-Indian relations. On the other hand, their main aspiration remains to reform institutions such as the IMF and the WTO, or to boost forums such as the G20, whereas intra-BRICS trade remains low with limited prospects for improvement. In fact, although the BRICS collectively account for a large share of global trade, this is mainly due to the rise of China in world trade since the 1990s, and this is not reflected in trade among the BRICS themselves. At a time when even EU member states are not trading much with each other and the WTO forecasts for 2014 are gloomy, the BRICS face a real challenge that will not be easy to achieve. Globally, China is the only one to grow its trade in 2014, while Russia, India and Brazil face worsening situations.17 Changing the shape of global governance still requires serious political engagement and work towards enhancing the synergies of the group.

About the author:
Sandra Fernandes
Research Unit in Political Science and International Relations (NICPRI), University of Minho

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 164, NOVEMBER 2014

Notes:
1. Marie Charrel, “Les BRICS ont lancé leur banque de développement” (Le Monde, 16 July 2014).
2. Ibidem.
3. “La montée en puissance du groupe des BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine, Afrique du Sud)” (La Documentation Française, 2012).
4. “Light-Weight BRICS” (The Economist Online, 6 June 2011).
5. “Sanya Declaration” (BRICS Leaders Meeting, 14 April 2011).
6. “Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All” (G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration, 4 November 2011) p. 19.
7. Raquel Vaz-Pinto, “A geopolítica russa: o desafio da gestão energética” (35a Edição dos Colóquios de Relações Internacionais da Universidade do Minho. Braga: 28 de Maio 2014).
8. Thomas Stephen Eder, “China-Russia Relations in Central Asia. Energy Policy, Beijing’s New Assertiveness and 21st Century Geopolitics” (Springer VS, 2009).
9. Sipri Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (SIPRI, 2013).
10. “Numéro deux mondial de l’armement, la Russie a augmenté ses parts de marché” (Les Echos, 17 March 2014).
11. Sipri Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (SIPRI, 2013).
12. Dadan Upadhyay, “India, Russia to negotiate on CECA with Customs Union” (Russia & India Report, 3 April 2013).
13. Shannon Tiezzi, “Can India and China Overcome Their Border Dispute?” (The Diplomat, 19 September 2014).
14. Data was retrieved from Sajal Mathur and Meghna Dasgupta, “BRICS: Trade Policies, Institutions and Areas of Deepening Cooperation” (Centre for WTO Studies, March 2013), pp 8-9.
15. Ibidem.
16. Ibidem.
17. Shawn Donnan, “Five reasons why the picture is looking gloomy for global trade…” (Financial Times online, 24 September 2014).

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An audio calling for “volcanoes of jihad” has been posted on the internet, allegedly belonging to Islamic State (formerly ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi amid recent reports of him being critically wounded or even dead.

The 17-minute audio did not make any reference to recent reports of his death or critical injury, after a US-led airstrike set off rumors that he had been eliminated. The voice alleged to be Baghdadi’s also claims that the US-led strike campaign is failing.

The audio additionally stated that the caliphate had been expanded to encompass Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria.

Reports of the Islamic State group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, being wounded in an airstrike on November 8, were confirmed by Iraqi officials and state television the next day. At the same time, the Pentagon said it had no such information.

“We do not have any information to corroborate reports out of Iraq that Baghdadi has been either killed or wounded,” Colonel Steve Warren, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters.

The US is leading an international campaign of airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. On September 22, the US, at that point without its NATO allies, launched air strikes against IS in Syria with the stated aim of preventing the extremist group from grabbing more power in the embattled country.

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The liver stores excess glucose, sugar, in the form of glycogen—chains of glucose—, which is later released to cover body energy requirements. Diabetic patients do not accumulate glucose well in the liver and this is one of the reasons why they suffer from hyperglycemia, that is to say, their blood sugar levels are too high.

A study headed by Joan J. Guinovart at the Institute for Research in Biomedicine (IRB Barcelona) demonstrates that high hepatic glucose stores in mice prevents weigh gain. The researchers observed that in spite of having free access to an appetizing diet, the animals’ appetite was reduced. This is the first time that a link has been observed between the liver and appetite.

On the basis of the results published in the journal Diabetes, the researchers argue that the stimulation of hepatic glycogen production would provide an efficient treatment to improve diabetes and obesity.

“It is interesting to observe that what happens in the liver has direct effects on appetite. Here we reveal what occurs at the molecular level,” explains Guinovart, head of one of the leading labs worldwide devoted to glycogen metabolism and associated diseases.

Tomorrow, November 14 is World Diabetes Day. The incidence of diabetes and obesity is rising. The World Health Organization estimates that 382 million people worldwide currently live with diabetes and for 2035 it forecasts that one in every 10 people will have this disease. With respect to obesity, which is closely associated with the onset of type 2 diabetes—the most common type of diabetes—the numbers are even higher. In 2008, more than 200 million men and around 300 million women were classified as obese.

“By understanding what doesn’t work properly in diabetes and obesity in the molecular level, we will be closer to proposing new therapeutic targets and to finding solutions,” explains Guinovart, although both diseases can be prevented by eating a balanced diet and exercising daily. “In the case of type 2 diabetes, with diet alone the numbers of people with this condition would half,” states Guinovart.

How do the liver and brain communicate with each other to regulate appetite?

The researchers questioned why mice that accumulated most glycogen in the liver did not gain weight in spite of having access to an appetising diet. In addition to observing that these animals ate less, the scientists found that the brains of these animals showed scarce appetite-stimulating molecules but rather many appetite-suppressing ones.

“Then we finally hit on the clue—with the signal that could explain the liver-brain connection,” explains Iliana López-Soldado, a postdoctoral researcher who has been working on these experiments for three years.

The key to the liver-brain link is ATP, the molecule used by all living organisms to provide cells with energy and which is commonly altered in diabetes and obesity. “We have seen that high levels of hepatic glycogen, stable levels of ATP, and high levels of appetite-suppressing molecules in the mouse brain are perfectly correlated,” explains López-Soldado.

The post Liver And Brain Communicate To Regulate Appetite appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Weather, which changes day-to-day due to constant fluctuations in the atmosphere, and climate, which varies over decades, are familiar. More recently, a third regime, called “macroweather,” has been used to describe the relatively stable regime between weather and climate.

A new study by researchers at McGill University and UCL finds that this same three-part pattern applies to atmospheric conditions on Mars. The results, published in Geophysical Research Letters, also show that the sun plays a major role in determining macroweather.

The research promises to advance scientists’ understanding of the dynamics of Earth’s own atmosphere – and could provide insights into the weather of Venus, Saturn’s moon Titan, and possibly the gas giants Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune.

The scientists chose to study Mars for its wealth of data with which to test their theory that a transitional “macroweather” regime exists on other planets. They used information collected from Viking – a Mars lander mission during the 1970s and 1980s — and more recent data from a satellite orbiting Mars.

By taking into account how the sun heats Mars, as well as the thickness of the planet’s atmosphere, the scientists predicted that Martian temperature and wind would fluctuate similarly to Earth’s – but that the transition from weather to macroweather would take place over 1.8 Martian days (about two Earth days), compared with a week to 10 days on Earth.

“Our analysis of the data from Mars confirmed this prediction quite accurately,” said Shaun Lovejoy, a physics professor at McGill University in Montreal and lead author of the paper. “This adds to evidence, from studies of Earth’s atmosphere and oceans, that the sun plays a central role in shaping the transition from short-term weather fluctuations to macroweather.”
The findings also indicate that weather on Mars can be predicted with some skill up to only two days in advance, compared to Earth’s 10 days.

Co-author Professor Jan-Peter Muller from the UCL Mullard Space Science Laboratory, said: “We’re going to have a very hard time predicting the weather on Mars beyond two days given what we have found in weather records there, which could prove tricky for the European lander and rover!”

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Arctic sea ice has diminished significantly in recent decades, particularly in summer. Researchers from Norway and China have collaborated on developing an autonomous buoy with instruments that can more precisely measure the optical properties of Arctic sea ice while also taking measurements of ice thickness and temperature.

The retreat of Arctic sea ice is a key concern of climate researchers and a focal point of media coverage on climate change. Distressing images of polar bears on melting ice floes are everywhere, and indeed, satellites have confirmed that ice is covering less and less of the Arctic Ocean. The summer of 2012 set a record low for sea ice cover.

Sea ice thickness is significant

Scientists still have a great deal to learn about the ice cover around the North Pole, not least about the full meaning of the thickness of sea ice. Norwegian and Chinese researchers have now collected a wealth of data about the optical properties and thickness of sea ice, providing a sound basis for further research. These efforts were part of the project Advancing Modelling and Observing solar Radiation of Arctic sea-ice – understanding changes and processes (AMORA). The Research Council of Norway provided much of the project’s funding.

One thing is certain: global warming is reduced by snow and sea ice reflecting solar energy back into space. (The reflecting power of a surface is called its albedo.) Conversely, when there is less Arctic sea ice, the ocean absorbs more heat from the sun, adding to global warming.

Unmanned research platform developed

This marks the first time that Norwegian and Chinese researchers have collaborated on a project to study Arctic sea ice and snow cover.

A core component of the project was the development of a Spectral Radiation Buoy (SRB). Outfitted with specialised instruments, the buoy functions as an unmanned research platform for continuous measurements of solar radiation absorption and other critical properties of Arctic snow and ice.

Big difference from 2012 to 2013

The researchers set the buoy adrift throughout the summer seasons of 2012 and 2013. It drifted from its North Pole starting point and into the Fram Straight between Greenland and Svalbard. Each course took roughly half a year. In its 2013 deployment the buoy went missing, but the researchers had already received large amounts of unique data from the buoy via satellite transmission.

In the summer of 2012 a record low for Arctic sea ice was set, while the ice cover in summer 2013 was somewhat more normal, with the 6th lowest amount of sea ice since comprehensive records began in 1979. The AMORA project researchers have collected a large quantity of data that document how differently these two Arctic summers turned out.

Sunlight reflection an important climatic factor

Calculations of the Earth’s albedo, i.e. its reflectivity of sunlight, are important for constructing reliable climate models.

Albedo is a ratio of how much sunlight (and its thermal radiation) is reflected back into space by a given surface. The albedo of newly fallen snow may approach 90 per cent, while the far-more-absorbent surface of seawater has a low albedo. Thus the amount of snow and ice cover in the Arctic during the high-sunlight season is assumed to have a major impact on global climate.

“Because access to the Arctic is so difficult, there is not much reliable data on albedo there,” explains Sebastian Gerland, who headed the AMORA project and is a research scientist at the Norwegian Polar Institute.

All the previous albedo data had been collected by manned monitoring stations, which as a rule are only active for short periods. Measurement expeditions typically have to rely on a sea-going vessel and are costly and challenging to carry out.

“The unmanned SRB buoy we built made it possible for the first time to generate continuous data on albedo and other properties of sea ice over a long period,” says Dr Gerland.

Data capture southwards from the Pole

The SRB buoy was set up on an ice floe near the North Pole, and was left to eventually drift southwards with the ice.

“The buoy worked well,” continues Dr Gerland, “measuring light reflection off the ice as well as how much light penetrated into the ocean beneath the ice.”

“Via satellite we received a continuous data feed on changes in albedo on the ice floe where we placed the SRB. Along the floe’s drift course southwards from the Pole, we could see in detail at what point the ice began melting. In addition we received detailed data on changes in the thermal radiation reaching the seawater through the ice.”

“This knowledge about how Arctic sea ice melts over the course of the summer season will be valuable in further research,” he says. “It will help us to find clearer answers as to whether the Arctic sea ice melts primarily due to higher temperatures or whether the sea ice is shrinking due to changes in wind and ocean currents.”

Role of snow cover revealed

The SRB data has also helped climate researchers to understand how the snow cover on Arctic sea ice affects melting of the ice.

“We confirmed that the snow also plays an important role in melting,” says Dr Gerland. “The puddles that form atop the sea ice are the melted snow. These puddles are dark, so they reduce the albedo ratio and accelerate ice melt. This is one of several ways snow affects the sea ice and climate in the Arctic.”

Sunlight that penetrates the ice is also critical for algae and plankton of the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic ecosystem is finely adapted to the amount of light that penetrates the ice. Scientists have also learned more about this solar radiation from the project.

Successful Norwegian-Chinese cooperation

An important component of the AMORA project was to establish ties and share knowledge between Norwegian and Chinese scientists. Researchers from Finland, the USA and Germany also participated in the project.

China is investing relatively heavily in research on the Arctic and Antarctic, with publicly funded institutions as well as universities active in the field. The two Chinese institutions participating in the AMORA project were the Polar Research Institute of China Shanghai and the Dalian University of Technology.

Several of the Chinese researchers, from fellowship holders to senior scientists, have had a research stay in Norway in connection with AMORA project activities. Workshops and project meetings were held in China (Shanghai and Dalian), Norway (Tromsø) and Finland (Helsinki).

“Without a doubt,” concludes Dr Gerland, “this cooperation has taught us a great deal about how the Chinese polar researchers work, and they have gained a deeper understanding of our work in this field.”

The post Norwegian-Chinese Cooperation Yields More Reliable Thermal Readings Of Arctic Sea Ice appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A University of Leicester planetary scientist has hailed the European Space Agency’s mission to land a probe on a fast-moving comet as a success despite issues with the landing.

Professor Stan Cowley, of the University’s Department of Physics and Astronomy, has said the probe, known as Philae, could begin to unlock answers about the creation of the solar system with data collected from its landing debris.

The small satellite touched down on comet 67P/C-G at about 3.30pm yesterday after a seven hour journey across empty space following its release from Rosetta.

The moment was witnessed by millions of people across the world who had streamed a live feed from the operational control room, in Darmstadt, Germany.

But evidence soon came to light which showed that the probe’s harpoons, which were supposed to anchor Philae to the comet, had not fired.

And ESA scientists are working to figure out exactly what happened and whether the misfire will become an issue.

Professor Cowley, who was involved in the early planning stages of the Rosetta mission, said it is not completely clear what happened with the probe’s harpoons.

He said: “Well it looks like everything has gone mostly according to plan – though with a few hiccups, as often happens with something so complex.

“The lander is down on the surface, which is a marvellous achievement, though it is not clear whether the harpoons actually fired into the surface to hold it there – but if they did not, it is unclear why Philae didn’t just bounce off again into space.

“Possibly the surface material is light and fluffy and that it stuck into this material – and there is indication that it buried itself several centimetres into the surface which suggests that it is not very hard.

“On the other hand the screws appear to have worked, which is good, but it is still not very clear how tightly it is gripping onto the surface. We will have to wait for further data to see.”

It is the first time that scientists have successfully touched down on a speeding comet and images from the icy surface were due to be released yesterday, but as of yet remain with ESA.

One thing that has come from the landing is the material analysis of dust and ice from the initial impact of the probe.

Scientists are looking at all the surface debris which was disturbed when Philae touched down.

Professor Cowley said data from the material will already explain a lot about the formation of solar system.

“One early result that we are now waiting for is the measurements on the analysis of the debris cloud that was kicked up by the landing.

“One key result concerns the oxygen isotope ratios in the comet water – are they the same as at Earth, and the Sun, or different?

“If different it would put a big question mark over the idea that a large fraction of Earth’s water came from comet bombardment early in the solar system’s formation, as in ‘late heavy bombardment’ picture 3.8 billion years ago. We will have to wait and see.”

The mission objective is to learn more about the composition of the comet, which is a remnant from the formation of the solar system some 4.6 billion years ago.

Analysis of the water, ice, gas and organic material trapped within the comet could help explain how the Earth acquired its water and could even answer questions about the origins of life on our planet.

The post Rosetta: What Happens Next? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Stunting (Described as low height for age) in Indian children, 6 to 24 months of age, could be dramatically reduced if children receive three things that are critical for good nutrition – adequate feeding, health care and environmental health, says a new World Bank report which analyzes data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) 2005-06 and the HUMGaMA Survey 2011 to indicate a strong co-relation between stunting in children and their adequacy or inadequacy in these three dimensions.

The three key determinants critical for good nutrition:

• Food care: Minimum acceptable diet as defined by WHO (0-6 months: be exclusively breastfed, not fed even water; between 6-8 months along with breastmilk be fed at least twice a day with foods from three or more food groups; between 9-24 months: be fed at least three times a day with foods from four or more food groups)
• Health care: Regular and timely antenatal visits, age appropriate immunizations, birth through skilled attendant, mother’s Body Mass Index (BMI) being greater than the threshold
• Environmental health: Good hygiene with proper water and sanitation practices.

The report, Nutrition in India, shows that stunting rate in children with adequate feeding, health care and environmental health is half as compared to those with none of these in adequate measure – 23 percent as compared to 52 percent in children who have inadequacies in all dimensions.

Even states and districts with poor nutrition outcomes, as well as rural areas show a similar trend. For example, in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh the prevalence of stunting in children with adequate feeding, care and environmental health is 30 percent as compared to 54 percent in those who have none of these in adequate measure. In 100 rural districts (Ranked as being at the bottom of the human development index), surveyed by HUNGaMA 2011, stunting amongst those who have adequate feeding, care and sanitation is 20 percent as compared to 52 percent amongst those who were adequate in none. Similarly, in rural areas, although a very tiny proportion of children (less than 1 percent) have all adequacies, stunting is much lower in this group (16 percent) compared to 51 percent who are inadequate in all three.

The report, available as an eBook, comprises 11 policy briefs covering various aspects of nutrition. Highlighting the need to use stunting as a primary indicator of chronic undernutrition, it says stunting is associated not only with failure in physical growth but also with impaired brain and cognitive development. There is only a narrow window of opportunity – from conception to two years of age – to improve stunting. Height at age two is the best predictor of adult height and of future human capital, it says.

National data shows that stunting in children from households in middle and upper wealth quintiles is also quite high – about 50 and 25 per cent respectively. The report reveals that even amongst the wealthiest Indians, i.e., the top third of the wealth distribution, only about 7 percent children between 6 and 24 months receive adequate feeding, health care and environmental health. While nearly 70 percent of them have adequate environmental health (i.e. water and sanitation), only 36 percent receive appropriate health care and an even lower about 18 percent are fed recommended quality and quantity of food for their age.

“Appropriate infant and young child feeding practices even in the highest wealth quintile are extremely poor. This indicates that undernutrition in India is not a poverty or food insecurity issue alone, and that child care and feeding information and awareness play an important role. Effective interventions, which cover the three critical determinants, when provided at scale during the first 1,000 days of life, can reduce stunting and improve undernutrition significantly,” said Onno Ruhl, World Bank Country Director in India.

Less than 2 percent of the children, 6-23 months old have adequate feeding, health care and environmental health. To reduce stunting it is imperative to ensure that most mothers and children during the critical window of opportunity get these in adequate measure. Stunting in early years is also linked to a 4.6 cm loss of height in adolescence, 0.7 grades loss of schooling and a 7-month delay in starting school. Annually, India loses over US$12 billion in GDP to vitamin and mineral deficiencies, the report says.

It also reiterates the significant direct and indirect economic losses associated with undernutrition with direct productivity losses estimated at more than 10 percent of lifetime individual earnings, and about a 2-3 percent loss to GDP. Indirect losses are associated with deficits in cognitive development and schooling, and increased costs of health care.

“Innovations within the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), India’s flagship nutrition program that focused on the critical ‘window of opportunity’ – pregnant, nursing mothers and children under three – has helped improve nutrition, and ensured improved quality and coverage of key nutrition services in several pilot districts. Household counseling for behavior change, under the ICDS program, have also demonstrated significant improvements in the nutritional status of children. Coupled with better health, water and sanitation programs, the ICDS could have a lasting impact on nutrition,” said Ashi Kathuria, Senior Nutrition Specialist, World Bank.

The post India Has Potential To Dramatically Reduce Stunting In Children appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee

India’s sensitive North Eastern region, especially Assam, is fast emerging as an epicentre of international jihadi networks. The state is increasingly becoming vulnerable to Islamic terrorist outfits largely because of the unabated influx from Bangladesh and presence of several fundamentalist organisations. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi recently informed the state assembly that a few Islamic terrorist groups, including Pakistan-based Harhat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), had been active in some parts of Assam and that a number of persons affiliated to such outfits were lodged in different jails of the state.

The latest reports indicate that the radical Islamic forces are trying to make inroads into the Muslim-dominated areas of the state. In a major development on October 9, Assam Police arrested six persons from Barpeta district for their alleged links with the October 2 Burdwan blast. Police said they were key members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) module operating in the state. The arrested persons admitted during interrogation that they were instructed to remain as sleeper cell and search for potential Muslim youth keen to join jihad. Some of them had also undergone training in handling explosives and ideological indoctrination at various Madrassas in Bengal’s Burdwan and Murshidabad districts.

Subsequently, on October 11, three more persons were arrested from Dhubri district’s Mankachar area bordering Bangladesh, in connection with the blast. Recently, police also seized a huge cache of explosives from a bus bound for Goalpara, in Guwahati and arrested two persons. In another incident on October 21, an arms dealer and suspected linkman of Islamic terror groups was killed in an encounter with the security forces in Kokrajhar district.

All these developments demonstrate a growing trend of Islamic radicalisation in Assam. In the eyes of police, four districts having considerable Muslim population—Dhubri, Goalpara, Kokrajhar and Karimganj, are vulnerable to Islamic terrorism. The presence of Bangladesh-based jihadi outfit JMB has been reported for the first time in Assam. Interrogation of the arrested persons has unearthed that Shakil Ahmed, a JMB activist who died in the Burdwan blast, had visited Barpeta on several occasions in his bid to motivate local youth for jihad. Police suspect that several Muslim youths of lower Assam have been trained to make IEDs with locally available materials and there may be more terror sleeper cells in the state.

The existence of jihadi elements in Assam was traced earlier too, but security officials say they had “never made their presence visible”. Meanwhile, state’s civil society has been alarmed by the sudden rise of Islamic militancy. Several organisations, including AASU, have blamed the state government’s inaction in curbing the activities of radical Islamic groups. They maintain that at least 14 Islamist groups having links with international terror outfits are operating in the state. Some of them include Muslim United Liberation Tiger of Assam (MULTA), Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam, Islamic Liberation Army of Assam, United Reformation Protest of Assam and People’s United Liberation Front.

The security forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations had already communicated to the state government about ISI links of these outfits and heightened activities of MULTA in lower Assam. Moreover, the alleged links between SIMI and Assam’s MULTA and Muslim United Student Association, has been brought to notice.

The Union Home Ministry sent directives to the state government in the wake of ethnic violence in BTAD and the resultant polarisation of voters along religious lines during the 2014 Lok Sabha polls that Assam has been figuring in the Islamic terror map. Reports suggest that repeated violence in four districts of BTAD—Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri, directed against Bengali-speaking Muslim settlers, who are often dubbed as illegal Bangladeshi migrants by the indigenous Bodos, could have radicalised a section of Muslim youths.

This is particularly so after the 2012 riots. In the opinion of senior security officials, Assam has been featuring in “discourses of pan-Islamic jihadi forces” since then. They say the districts bordering Bangladesh might have been intruded by radical Islamic ideologues and jihadi elements. The forces inimical to India are making concerted efforts to motivate the Muslim youths to participate in jihad by raising issues like “ethnic conflict, unemployment and Islamic identity”. Besides, numerous NGOs, religious and political leaders who had been involved in providing relief, perhaps facilitated the radicalisation process.

Under such circumstances, the major concerns remains—al Qaida gaining foothold in Assam, particularly after Ayman al-Zawahiri’s announcement of launching a new jihadi front, Qaedat al-Jihad, in the Indian sub-continent to establish a caliphate in the region. In an online video released on September 4, the al Qaida chief specifically mentioned ethnic violence and communal riots in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and Assam. The following day, Assam chief minister said his government had intelligence inputs that al Qaida was trying to set up base in the state. It was also suggested that the dreaded terrorist outfit had reached a tacit understanding with the ULFA(I) led by Paresh Baruah. The possibility of ULFA(I)’s tie up with the al Qaida can not be ruled out completely as in the past also, it had established working relations with the religious extremist forces of Bangladesh.

Furthermore, the ongoing conflict between Rohingya Muslims and ethnic Rakhine in neighbouring Myanmar has contributed to growing resentment among Muslims in the state. The security officials have already cautioned that persistent radicalisation of Rohingyas pose a threat to peace and stability of North East. Intelligence agencies have found evidences of Rohingyas taking shelter in some parts of the region. The backlash of ethnic violence in Rakhine province assumes significance since al Qaida chief’s focus of jihad also includes Myanmar and JMB leaders’ earlier revelation that they had recruited and trained several Rohingyas.

The Gogoi government has initiated some measures to counter the menace of Islamic terror in Assam. A high alert has been sounded across the state and vigilance stepped up along India-Bangladesh and inter-state borders following intelligence inputs indicating JMB’s plan to spread tentacles in the state. Assam DGP says several Muslim youths of the state have joined JMB after being trained in the terror outfit’s camps in Bangladesh. He has noted that “some youths from Assam are traveling to Bangladesh frequently” and in touch with their handlers based in the neighbouring country.

The porous India-Bangladesh borders in certain segments are being used by the jihadi outfits to foment trouble in restive Assam. Some cadres of HuM and other terror groups who were arrested earlier revealed that they had traveled from Pakistan to Bangladesh and subsequently to India through Assam. Intelligence sources say Karimganj in southern Assam and Garo Hills in Meghalaya—both the regions bordering Bangladesh, are key entry points for jihadi elements. Unlike other North Eastern militant outfits, the Islamic terrorist groups consider the two routes “safe corridor for travel”. It is imperative that the Centre takes appropriate measures to ratify the Land Boundary Agreement signed with Bangladesh in September 2011 and completely seal the international borders to stop cross-border terrorism.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ThreatofIslamicterrorloomslargeoverAssam_RBhattacharjee_121114.html

The post Threat Of Islamic Terror Looms Large Over Assam – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Abhijit Singh

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares to leave for Brisbane for the G-20 summit, there is considerable excitement among India’s maritime analysts. On completion of the world leaders’ meet, the prime minister will then have bilateral talks with Australian prime minister. Among a range of issues, maritime cooperation is expected to top the agenda for discussions.

Ever since Canberra officially declared its interests in the Indian Ocean last year, there has been hectic speculation about the possibility of an India-Australia maritime security arrangement in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Indeed, over the past few years Australia has been trying to strengthen its nautical posture in the Indian Ocean. As a part of its Indian Ocean outreach it has started reviving its ties with regional states, especially its relationship with India – a key security provider in the IOR.

In a series of bilateral visits and official declarations recently, Canberra has expressed a desire for a deeper, more purposeful maritime association with New Delhi. Last year, on a special invitation from Australia, the Indian navy (IN) sent its latest indigenous warship INS Sahyadri to participate in the International Fleet Review (IFR) in Sydney – a move widely perceived as a sign of a growing nautical convergence.

Not only was India one of the few Indian Ocean states to have been invited to the IFR, the maritime interaction stood out as being the first concrete achievement in a set of deliverables envisaged during a landmark bilateral interaction last year. It was during AK Antony’s visit to Canberra in June 2013 – the first ever by an Indian minister of defence – that India and Australia had agreed to conduct regular ministerial level meetings, frequent exchanges between the defence establishments, and effective diplomatic and maritime collaboration – both in the Indian Ocean Region (through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the IORA) and the Asia-Pacific region (via the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus).

Since then, India and Australia have been giving serious consideration to proposals for a more substantive naval collaboration. In his visit to New Delhi a few weeks ago, Prime Minister Tony Abbott discussed the prospects for greater cooperation in the maritime domain. The joint statement at the end of the visit reaffirmed a common desire for a “peaceful, prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, underpinned by cooperative mechanisms”. The maritime collaboration now stretches across the policy and operational spheres, and is exemplified by the decision to conduct defence policy dialogues, armed forces staff talks, professional military exchanges, and even a bilateral naval exercise – the first of which will be held next year. Considering that the last time the two navies had a structured operational engagement was during exercise-Malabar in 2007, the developing correspondence of maritime interests seems even more substantial.

And yet, the maritime interaction between the Indian navy and Royal Australian navy (RAN) hasn’t attained the critical mass needed for a self-sustaining relationship. While it is true that the two navies have worked together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the joint maritime endeavours still lack the momentum needed for a durable partnership. The statements of intent have been encouraging, but have not triggered operational cooperation in all areas of maritime security.

It is believed that while the Indian navy is keen to expand the scope of the 2015 exercises, a continuing political ambivalence prevents the injection of strategic content into the maritime relationship. If India-Australia maritime cooperation has to be taken to a higher level, however, the naval exercises next year will need to focus on high-end engagement. The extant template of operations that limits maritime interaction to exercises such as ‘search and rescue’ (SAR) and ‘disaster relief and humanitarian assistance’ (HADR), will need to be expanded to include high-spectrum operations like anti-submarine warfare and anti-air drills, VBSS operations, Special Forces engagement etc.

From an Indian standpoint, it is pertinent that Canberra’s options for maritime partnerships in the Indian Ocean are not limited. In recent days, Australia has indicated its willingness to partner Seychelles and Mauritius, two key Indian Ocean island states, in a ‘blue economy’ project, meant to harness the potential of the Indian Ocean. This comes with the promise of greater capability for hydrocarbon exploration in the Seychelles’ EEZ and better Australian technology to harvest renewable energy from the ocean’s waves. The marine economy projects Canberra is willing to underwrite have considerable traction with many smaller Indian Ocean states.

Even in its maritime relationship with India, the impetus for bilateral collaboration has come from Australia. The extent to which Canberra regards cooperation with New Delhi as being critical for regional maritime security is clear from Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper which prioritises relations with India and Indonesia. Interestingly, only a few months after the release of the White Paper, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India which identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential for a close maritime partnership.

The deepening of India-Australia maritime cooperation comes at a time when Canberra is drawing closer with Tokyo, and building a more pragmatic political relation with Jakarta. Reports from Canberra about a potential deal for the procurement of the Soryu class submarines from Japan, and the reinvigoration of a political dialogue with Indonesia to resolve the sea-boundary dispute are a sign that Australia is forging a network of strategic relationships in its near and extended neighbourhood. Strategic ties with Japan and Indonesia are a key factor in India’s own geopolitical calculus, because of which New Delhi will be interested in observing the developing inter-regional synergies closely.

The most important factor driving India-Australia maritime security cooperation is the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’. This novel geo-strategic construct, which integrates the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean into one unified theatre, is premised on the idea of stronger security cooperation between regional states. Officially recognised by Australia in its 2013 Defence White Paper, the concept is beginning to find greater acceptance in India. A number of Indian analysts now agree that in the implementation of the current government’s ‘Act East Policy’ needs to legitimise the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept – even if in a qualified sense. Some analysts even recommend the creation of Indo-Pacific ‘middle power coalitions’ – an informal arrangements where the powers in the middle would make it a priority to strengthen and help one another, working in self-selecting groups, or ‘minilateral’ arrangements that do not include China or the United States.

The imperative for India to cooperate with Australia is also driven by the fact that the latter is in charge of both the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the IORA. The Indian navy has been the motivating force behind the IONS initiative and is keen to see the grouping enhance its stature and utility. India has also, for the past few years, been the prime mover of the IORA agenda and realises the need to engage with like-minded nations.

It will be in India’s interests to develop a strong maritime relationship with Australia. In the past few weeks India has shown it is ready to refocus attention on its Indo-Pacific partnerships by reaching out to Japan, the US and Vietnam. A maritime security arrangement with Australia will serve as a good augury.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ModisAustraliavisitMaritimeCooperation_asingh_131114.html

The post Modi’s Australia Visit: Maritime Cooperation In Focus – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kevin J. Jones

The apostolic nuncio to Lebanon has said the country is a model of multi-religious coexistence that could help resolve violent sectarian conflicts in the Middle East.

“There are no majorities or minorities here, but each one is part of the whole,” Archbishop Gabriele Caccia told several Catholic reporters in a recent meeting at the nunciature in Jounieh, Lebanon.

“Even at this moment, if we look at a solution for Iraq and Syria, one group is dominating all the others,” he said. “Their inspiration could be Lebanon, where there is space for all communities.”

The archbishop said that Lebanon is “very open to the West.” On the other hand, it is also “very traditional in values.” He described this as a “sign of balance” amid its many contradictions.

The country’s population is divided unevenly between Maronite and other Christians, Shia and Sunni Muslims, and Druze.

Archbishop Caccia said the country’s constitution rejects both laicism and theocracy. The state allows each community to behave according to its laws.

“This is a way to stay together,” he said. He described the country not as a “democracy of numbers” but a “democracy of common decisions” that reflects both Christian and non-Christian visions.

“There are no majorities or minorities here, but each one is part of the whole.”

Lebanon’s neighbor Syria has been engulfed in a civil war since early 2011, when demonstrations critical of president Bashar al-Assad were attacked by government forces that triggered further violence. More than 200,000 people have been killed, and 11 million displaced from their homes.

Assad, an Alawite Muslim, has drawn support from Shia Muslims and religious minorities including Christians, while his opposition has drawn support from Syria’s majority Sunni Muslim community. Hundreds of smaller militias with shifting loyalties also control small regions of Syria.

Iraq, for its part, has devolved into sectarian conflict and persecution following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

The regional situation is further complicated by the rise of the Islamic State and al-Nusra Front, both of which have support from some Sunni Muslims and are active in Iraq and Syria as well as small areas of Lebanon. The groups seek the restoration of a caliphate and the imposition of a strict interpretation of Islamic law.

Archbishop Caccia said that the Islamic State, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh, has tried to sow “discord” in the Lebanese army and claims that the army is supporting the Shia political party and militant group Hezbollah.

“They have tried to divide the army, because the army is the institution which keeps everyone together and is able to control the territory,” Archbishop Caccia said.

“Until now, it hasn’t worked because all political leaders were united to condemn this effort.”

The Lebanese army last week reestablished control of the northern city of Tripoli after clashes with militant supporters of the Islamic State and al-Nusra Front. These supporters object to Hezbollah’s support for Assad in Syria.

Archbishop Caccia, who has served as nuncio to Lebanon since 2009, said the preservation of political stability in Lebanon is “vital” to providing an example to the region.

The nuncio cited St. John Paul II’s 1997 speech in Beirut, in which the Pope said Lebanon is “more than a country, it is a message,” a message of freedom and of coexistence.

The country’s constitutional power-sharing agreement requires the country’s prime minister to be a Sunni Muslim, the country’s president must be a Maronite Christian, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite Muslim. Half of parliamentary deputies and ministerial positions are allocated to Christians.

Unlike most other countries in the Middle East, religious conversions are legal in Lebanon. The nuncio praised this respect for conscience that coexists in a system he said allows 18 different religious communities “to have a say in the country.”

Lebanon is “very complex, but beautiful,” the nuncio said. He said that it is very difficult to move in elite society without meeting people from different religious communities, especially in the capital of Beirut.

“There are family ties, because sometimes you have one family that has one branch Christian and one branch Muslim, but in the end there is the same family.”

Archbishop Caccia also noted the absence of a sitting president in Lebanon. The Christian community continues to be divided between two coalitions: the pro-Syrian government faction known as the March 8 Alliance and the anti-Syrian government faction known as the March 14 Alliance. They take their names from the dates of massive protests in March 2005.

The nuncio tied the lack of a president to the instability in the region.

He emphasized that most Lebanese, as well as major world powers, are intent on avoiding another civil war.

From 1975 to 1990, the country’s deadly civil war killed over 150,000 people. Scars of the war are still evident in Beirut, where bullet-marked buildings and burned out movie theaters still stand, locals say, as a reminder to avoid the destruction of war.

Archbishop Caccia said the country is “relatively peaceful and calm,” but that Pope Francis is nevertheless “very much worried” by the situation there.

Papal concerns include humanitarian issues related to helping the victims of conflict, and the arms trade supplying the fighting.

Archbishop Caccia stressed that atrocities are being committed against both Christians and Muslims.

He said the damage to Christians is “collateral damage” of the major policies of the great powers in the region.

The fate of Christians “is not something which really interests the big political agendas of the great nations.”

“Of course they have to do something, just in case, but it is not a priority.”

However, the nuncio stressed that Lebanese Christians have played the role of a bridge between Shia and Sunni Muslims.

He said that Lebanon has many single-religion villages of Shia, Sunni, Christians, and Druze.

“But in mixed villages, you will never find a village where there are Shia and Sunni. But you can find Sunni and Christian, Druze and Christian, Shia and Christian.”

“Christians have the possibility to talk, and to be a bridge, for everyone,” the nuncio said, noting Christians’ role in education and in providing a “vision of society.”

The presence of Christians in the Middle East is also vital for those who see freedom and democratic values as global solutions to political problems.

Archbishop Caccia said “it is more clever to help communities who are living in this part of the world and share this mentality, than to destroy and take out these people, (than) to try to convince the others from outside that they have to change (their) minds.”

The post The Lebanese Model: Multi-Religious Solution For Syria And Iraq? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Bradford John Davis

In 2010, two Japanese coast guard vessels and a Chinese fishing boat collided in the disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, sparking increasingly confrontational behavior by both China and Japan.1 The pattern of escalation continued in 2012 when Japan nationalized several of the disputed islands by purchasing them from the private owner. China promptly responded by sending warships to the area in a show of force.2 Although escalation to the point of war is unlikely, these incidents underscore the destabilizing regional effects of the disputed islands and associated maritime boundaries. China’s territorial claims are rooted in historical context, nationalism, national security, and economic interests.3 By understanding China’s perspectives, motives, and approaches to resolving this dispute, the United States can anticipate the current pattern of escalation, forecast future Chinese behavior, and identify opportunities for conflict management and eventual de-escalation to improve strategic stability in the region.

Named the Senkaku Islands by Japan and the Diaoyu Islands by China, the group of eight small uninhabited islands in the southern end of the Ryukyu Island chain comprise a mere 7 square kilometers of land.4 In the context of increasingly contested sovereignty in the East China Sea, these seemingly unimportant islands have a far greater strategic significance than size and location would otherwise warrant. The Sino-Japanese friction over maritime resources has created a dangerous military competition in which both countries are applying a zero-sum-gain approach based on sovereignty.5 As the current pattern of escalation continues, the risk of destabilizing the region also increases.

Aerial Photo of Kita-Kojima (left) and Minami-Kojima of Senkaku Islands, Ishigaki City, Okinawa, Japan (Courtesy National Land Image Information)

Regional instability in the East China Sea carries several significant risks to U.S. strategic interests. First, increased militarization of the dispute generates pressure for both China and Japan to invest in weapons technologies and additional platforms.

Second, as more ships and aircraft operate in the area while China and Japan endeavor to demonstrate administrative control of the maritime boundaries, the likelihood of an incident sparking rapid escalation increases. This carries significant alliance implications for the United States vis-à-vis the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan.6 Third, American corporations have economic interests in keeping the sea lines open to international shipping and ensuring access for future energy exploration. Finally, the United States needs to maintain healthy diplomatic relations with China to encourage Chinese acceptance of international norms and promote global economic stability.7 Because these are vital interests to the United States, it is important to understand China’s approach to the dispute when developing a regional strategy.

China’s historical claim to the uninhabited islands dates back to the Ming Dynasty, when the Ryukyu Kingdom served as a vassal state from the 14th to 17th centuries and tribute payments continued until 1875. During this period, Chinese fishermen used these islands as shelter and navigational aids. As Chinese power waned during the Qing Dynasty and Japanese power grew as a result of the Meiji Restoration, Japan formally annexed the islands as part of the Okinawa Prefecture in 1895. The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations led China to believe the Allied Powers would expel Japan from the Ryukyu Islands at the conclusion of World War II. Instead, the United States retained administrative control and eventually returned the Ryukyu Islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to Japanese administration in 1972.8 The Chinese connect the current territorial disputes to a greater historical context of past treatment by the great powers.9

The “Century of Humiliation” is a powerful narrative in Chinese modern culture invoking nationalism and strong emotions against the great powers. China’s agitation and protests over Japanese textbooks that China feels underemphasize war atrocities and official ceremonies at the Yasukuni Shrine, where individuals convicted of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal of the Far East are enshrined, reinforce and exemplify these deep-seated historical grievances.10

Nationalism builds a strong narrative in China’s domestic views toward the dispute.11 As Japan’s relative economic power declines and China experiences a surge in patriotism with its newfound economic strength, the narrative of the disputed islands increasingly has become one of national pride and just restoration of what rightfully belongs to China.12 Elite power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, a slowing of the economy, or Japanese actions undermining the legitimacy of the current rulers could increase the sense of nationalism among the Chinese population or even cause China’s political leaders to promote anti-Japanese sentiment to deflect attention from domestic political rancor.13 This sense of nationalism reduces China’s political flexibility in de-escalating or resolving the dispute and may promote inflammatory rhetoric aimed at placating China’s domestic audience at the risk of sending undesirable signals to the international audience.14

National security is also a significant factor in China’s approach to the dispute. The U.S. alliance system along the First Island Chain stretching from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines,15 and arguably as far as Australia with proposed American basing initiatives, serves as a de facto line of containment using an offshore control strategy. While this strategy seems defensive in nature from the U.S. perspective, it directly threatens China’s economic survival by giving the United States the ability to readily interdict China’s shipping.16 Strategically, China would want to prevent total containment17 within the First Island Chain and ensure access to its self-proclaimed exclusive economic zone. In these terms, China’s desire to exert sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can be viewed as a natural defensive strategy to protect shipping lanes supporting China’s energy and economic interests. Additionally, China has established a pattern of using military force as a means of signaling in its offshore territorial disputes.18 This pattern of aggressive military signaling increases the potential for incident and conflict.

In understanding the historic context, the strong narrative of nationalism, and the military framing of the dispute, the United States can work toward several opportunities for de-escalation. Foremost, it is essential that the United States maintain a strong alliance with Japan to persuade it from developing a more aggressive national defense force or a nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the United States should continue a policy of strategic ambiguity over the disputed territory and encourage China and Japan to leave the disputed islands unoccupied and not pursue unilateral resource exploration and development.19 China and Japan have already initiated negotiations for energy development in areas of the East China Sea, but confrontation over the disputed islands disrupted the negotiations.20

The United States could also improve regional stability by promoting joint Sino-Japanese security patrols and development of the economic resources as a means to de-escalate tensions. Joint patrolling builds trust, and joint development can work to decouple use of the resources from the issue of sovereignty.21 China established precedence for joint development vis-à-vis a 2004 agreement for energy exploration in the South China Sea with the Philippines. Although the joint exploration project failed to produce results and was eventually discontinued, it demonstrated the potential of joint development initiatives as opportunities for de-escalation.22 Additionally, a narrative constructed from joint cooperation can work to assuage a small portion of the anti-Japanese sentiment in China.

The United States can also help China and Japan establish bilateral institutions to serve as a mechanism to resolve disputes. For example, a joint Sino-Japanese commission active from 2006 to 2010 reviewed the historic claims to the islands, enabling a shared understanding of the dispute.23 Additionally, bilateral institutions can develop policy and establish frameworks to peacefully resolve disputes, thus eliminating the need for risky military signaling. Although China is unlikely to engage in multilateral institution-building at this time because its relative power is greatly reduced in a multilateral environment, opportunities to increase regional security cooperation through multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum may arise as bilateral institutions mature.24

Final resolution of the dispute will take time, patience, and commitment by all parties to develop and adhere to a resolution process. In developing this process, the first step is reframing the problem from unilateral enforcement of perceived sovereignty into cooperative enforcement of international norms in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Strict adherence to international norms would not only reduce the risk of the current dispute escalating into a conflict, but also decrease uncertainty for corporations wanting to participate in joint ventures developing offshore resources.25 In reframing the dispute, China and Japan can change their approach from the current win-lose dilemma into a win-win solution acceptable to both countries.

By understanding China’s perspectives, motives, and approaches to resolving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the United States can help “create a context in which [China and Japan] can choose to construct a mutually acceptable framework of common practice in the East China Sea.”26 It is in U.S. strategic interests to promote regional stability, maintain strong Asia-Pacific alliances, safeguard international shipping lanes, and ensure access to energy resources. The United States is in a unique position to de-escalate the dispute by encouraging China and Japan to institute joint patrols, joint resource development, bilateral institutions, and adherence to UNCLOS norms. If managed carefully, the United States could assist in de-escalating the Sino-Japanese dispute while simultaneously building a stronger diplomatic relationship based on strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing.27

Source:

This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter, October 2014), which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1. Tim Giannuzzi, “Three Boats Making Waves in East China Sea,” The Calgary Herald, September 16, 2010.
2. Mure Dickie, “Beijing Attacks Deal to Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands,” Financial Times, September 11, 2012; “China Sends Warships after Japan Announces Purchase of Disputed Senkaku Islands,” Asian News International, September 11, 2012.
3. Shihoko Goto, “Introduction,” in Clash of National Identities: China, Japan, and the East China Sea Territorial Dispute, ed. Tatsushi Arai, Shihoko Goto, and Zheng Wang, 5 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013), available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/ files/asia_china_seas_web.pdf>.
4. Marianne Lavelle and Jeff Smith, “Why are China and Japan Sparring over Eight Tiny, Uninhabited Islands?” National Geographic News (Online), October 26, 2012, available at <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/10/121026-east-china-sea-dispute/>.
5. Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013), 27–44.
6. Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 10, 2012), 27–30.
7. Ibid., ii.
8. Daqing Yang, “History: From Dispute to Dialogue,” in Clash of National Identities, 22–24.
9. Zheng Wang, “Perception Gaps, Identity Clashes,” in Clash of National Identities, 14.
10. James J. Przystup, Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place, An Interpretative Essay, INSS Strategic Perspectives, No. 12 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 2012), 4.
11. Thomas J. Bickford, Heidi A. Holtz, and Frederick Vellucci, Jr., Uncertain Waters: Thinking About China’s Emergence as a Maritime Power (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, September 2011), 56.
12. Goto, 6.
13. M. Taylor Fravel, “The Dangerous Math of Chinese Island Disputes: If History Is Any Guide, There’s a Real Risk Beijing Will Use Force Against Japan Over the Senkakus,” Wall Street Journal (Online), October 28, 2012.
14. Jessica Chen Weiss, “Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-foreign Protest” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at San Diego, 2008), 13.
15. Bickford, Holtz, and Vellucci, 15.
16. T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic Forum, No. 278 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2012), 5.
17. Bickford, Holtz, and Vellucci, 74–75.
18. Fravel.
19. Shinju Fujihira, “Can Japanese Democracy Cope with China’s Rise?” in Clash of National Identities, 44.
20. Przystup, 18–19.
21. Tatsushi Arai, “Transforming the Territorial Dispute in the East China Sea: A Systems Approach,” in Clash of National Identities, 93.
22. Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia,” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 10.
23. Yang, 26.
24. Akihiko Kimijima, “From Power Politics to Common Security: The Asia Pacific’s Roadmap to Peace,” in Clash of National Identities, 62–64.
25. O’Rourke, 52.
26. Akio Takahara, “Putting the Senkaku Dispute into Pandora’s Box: Toward a ‘2013 Consensus,’” in Clash of National Identities, 77.
27. Phillip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security, Strategic Forum, No. 281 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, August 2013), 10.

The post Opportunities In Understanding China’s Approach To Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David S. Forman

The record reveals that defense planners have not been particularly successful in predicting the future. The U.S. has suffered a significant strategic surprise once a decade since 1940: Pearl Harbor, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet H-bomb test, the Soviet reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union and, most recently, 9/11. — Mackubin Thomas Owens

As China rises and the United States seeks to maintain its global dominance, the world is faced with a new historical phenomenon: a dramatic shift in power between two nuclear-capable nations. As the relative power of each nation nears parity, tension is inevitable and the character of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship poses a risk of nuclear miscalculation. Nuclear use between China and the United States would be a catastrophe, but China is an independent actor, and the United States can only influence, but not control, the crossing of the nuclear threshold. If U.S. policymakers neglect this risk, miscalculation is more likely.

This article analyzes nuclear deterrence principles with China across the spectrum of peacetime, conventional crisis or conflict, and nuclear war. If the United States finds itself in a crisis or conflict with China, it would be important to know how the United States achieved deterrence in peacetime as well as how deterrence might be regained if a crisis deteriorates to the point of involving nuclear weapons. The article then makes recommendations on how to enhance nuclear deterrence. By assessing the full spectrum of potential conflict in this manner, the United States can lower the risk of miscalculation.

Nuclear weapons have helped prevent conflict between world powers on anything close to the scale of another world war,1 but nuclear deterrence toward China is different. Pivotal factors that allowed deterrence to be effective in the past do not project to the future of the Sino-U.S. relationship for two main reasons: the relative growth of China within the relationship, and the fluid maritime relationship between the United States and China, which affects how a conflict might begin and therefore how nuclear deterrence could be implemented.

Though 20th-century China developed in a world largely influenced by the United States, China is now in a position to influence the world toward its own interests.2 China’s growth from a considerably closed society in 1972 to a global near-peer to the United States today is a fundamental difference from the Soviet-U.S. relationship. The history of the nuclear age has yet to see a significantly weaker nuclear power eclipse a dominant nuclear power.

The second factor that distinguishes the Sino-U.S. relationship is its maritime nature, and military tensions at sea differ greatly from tensions on land. Naval assets are continually in motion, and there is no equivalent to trench warfare or prolonged stalemates in the air or on the sea. Also, as evidenced by North Korea’s suspected sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010,3 the sea sometimes offers a sense of plausible deniability that leads to aggression that would not occur on land.

China’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to be small in comparison to that of the United States, but it is growing.4 Without official reports from China, U.S. estimates are susceptible to large errors, but analysts assess that China holds between 175 and 250 nuclear warheads.5 China has demonstrated land and air launch capabilities, and reliable submarine launch capability is expected in 2014 or 2015.6 Some of China’s missiles are already capable of reaching portions of the United States, and fielding capable ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will only improve their capability.

If conflict begins, China and the United States do not currently have the tools to ensure it does not become nuclear.7 When policymakers consider the art of nuclear deterrence, many still default to Cold War principles.8 Blindly assuming that two great powers, each with expectations of influence and respect, can avoid conflict is unwise and increases risks of miscalculation. Based on the character of the Sino-U.S. relationship, nuclear deterrence cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, but rather along a continuum of peacetime, conventional crisis or conflict, and nuclear war.

Deterrence during Peacetime

A nation’s primary goal for peacetime deterrence should be to achieve its political objectives without fighting a nuclear war.9 Three basic elements help codify peacetime deterrence. First is a nation’s nuclear declaratory policy, which lays the foundations of a nation’s intentions and is a powerful political tool. Second is the demonstrated performance of delivery systems and warheads, referred to as deterrent reliability. Third is a measure of each nation’s ability to achieve military objectives using only its conventional capability (without resorting to nuclear weapons), or nonnuclear stability. When each nation can manage these three elements in the correct way, the cost-benefit calculations of each side should favor deterrence of a nuclear conflict.

Declaratory Policy. From Beijing’s perspective, current U.S. nuclear declaratory policy suggests that if Washington determined an “extreme circumstance” existed, it might resort to using its nuclear weapons to strike first. Because China is not a nonnuclear country under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the negative security assurance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review does not apply to China.10 Though U.S. political leaders assess a first strike as next to impossible, not all Chinese leaders hold the same view.11

Deterrent Reliability. A credible nuclear deterrent is the product of capability and intent.12 Intent derives from declaratory policy as mentioned above, and capability is sustained through demonstrated reliability of delivery systems and warheads. The United States expends considerable effort to ensure the reliability of each leg of its nuclear weapon delivery triad, which consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and B-2 and B-52 bombers. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fully test the continuity of launch signals and together launch five unarmed missiles each year. The launch record is stellar, and confidence in these delivery systems is extremely high.13 Confidence in the warheads is a different story.

The United States last detonated an actual warhead in 1992. Time is incrementally eroding warhead reliability and, in turn, U.S. nuclear credibility. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) was created in the mid-1990s to ensure existing warheads were properly maintained, and from a scientific perspective, this program is a success; however, as noted by Dr. Kathleen Bailey from the National Institute for Public Policy, “SSP is not intended as, nor is it, a substitute for nuclear testing. There is no way that SSP can ever provide the high level of confidence in reliability of the stockpile that can be achieved by nuclear testing.”14 Despite rigorous nonnuclear testing of the stockpile,15 quarterly testing reports from the National Nuclear Security Administration eventually may be insufficient to convince future adversaries, China included, that U.S. warheads are reliable.16 Detailed computer simulations provide American scientists with confidence of continued reliability, but the United States is not trying to deter American scientists.17 After 21 years, the question is rapidly becoming: do other countries consider U.S. warheads credible?

Nonnuclear Stability. When nuclear-capable nations are greatly outmatched by an adversary’s nonnuclear capabilities, leaders of the less capable nation are forced to rely more heavily on their nuclear arsenals for security. Retired Russian General Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow, stated in 2004, “Basically [our nuclear arsenal] is the only factor which can still ensure our country’s safety. We have nothing else to repel strategic military threats anymore.”18 In response to a perceived threat, if a nation’s leaders are forced to choose between relinquishing their own political power and authorizing a nuclear strike, then under some circumstances, a nuclear strike becomes a rational decision.

Five Policy Recommendations

First, the United States should maintain its current nuclear declaratory policy and not adopt an explicit “no first use” policy; certain forms of strategic ambiguity discourage military adventurism and can enhance nuclear stability. As a deterrence specialist stated, the overall concept of deterrence “takes place in the head of an adversary who lives in another country, has different values, is under different pressures, and has different goals.”19 Being too explicit in declaratory policy removes political options and reduces the strength of deterrence.

Second, to maintain the reliability of its nuclear arsenal, the United States should seek international agreement among current nuclear powers to test nuclear warheads on a cyclic schedule. Each nation would be permitted to conduct infrequent underground tests that could be observed by select nuclear and nonnuclear countries. Though the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) procedure for peaceful tests was meant to account for geological construction projects, the precedent could be expanded because testing with international consensus would not be provocative.20 Periodic international testing dates would serve as natural vehicles to discuss nuclear policies, and extended deterrence credibility could be strengthened. With no testing ever, the success of the CTBT could undermine nuclear deterrence and threaten the very security it was designed to protect.

Third, the United States must continue the uphill battle of maintaining the demonstrated reliability of its nuclear delivery triad. More specifically, the Air Force has yet to determine plans for replacing its long-range bombers21 and has been plagued by injurious reports that could undermine confidence in the reliability of the ICBM launch teams.22 The Navy is under pressure to justify the cost of its plans to replace its SSBN fleet. After a recent 2-year delay in the planned SSBN replacement program, any further delays would cause shortages in the 2030s of SSBNs for combatant commander requirements.23 The challenges of designing, testing, certifying, and deploying a new submarine, combined with the challenges of maintaining the oldest Ohio-class submarines, already incur additional risk for the leg of the triad that could carry up to 70 percent of U.S. nuclear warheads.24

Additionally, if the United States were to lose its current ICBM capability, either deliberately or due to perpetual neglect, the lack of a land-based deterrent would allow China to focus solely on SSBNs to prevent U.S. retaliatory attack capability.25 The likelihood of being able to simultaneously disarm U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs is so remote that China would be wasteful to invest in trying; however, if the United States reverts to a dyad of delivery systems in SLBMs and aircraft (aircraft cannot be readied quickly), then investing in technology to mitigate SLBMs becomes reasonable. This may still sound like a wasteful investment, but private enterprise is inadvertently allowing potential adversaries to close the gap on U.S. undersea dominance. Google is mapping and imaging the ocean floor in high resolution,26 and research initiatives are proliferating underwater hydrophones that stream to the Internet.27

Fourth, although too much information about an adversary can tempt the use of force,28 the United States must seek a basic understanding of the essential elements of Chinese nuclear doctrine to lower the risk of miscalculation. The United States can incentivize information-sharing by offering China economic benefits. China’s recent economic growth is not on auto pilot, and the success of President Xi Jinping’s domestic agenda is far from certain. As one example, exchanging U.S. support for Chinese membership in the developing Trans-Pacific Partnership for basic Chinese nuclear doctrinal information would be a win-win for regional strategic security.29

Fifth, the United States must consider how the development of a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability—the ability to conduct a conventional strike anywhere in the world within 1 hour—would affect the nonnuclear balance with China. As part of a broader desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy, the Obama administration has continued to support the Department of Defense’s pursuit of a global strike capability that was mentioned in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.30 The capability of CPGS may prove advantageous in some scenarios,31 but those advantages do not come without a cost to nuclear deterrence stability with China—a cost that could outweigh the benefits.

Deterrence during Conventional Crisis or Conflict

Despite overt attempts by the United States to support the peaceful rise of China’s military through cooperation in events such as Rim of the Pacific 2014 and humanitarian assistance/disaster response exercises, the United States does not have the only vote when it comes to choosing peace or conflict. There is evidence that the Sino-U.S. relationship will be predominantly adversarial. Henry Kissinger recently noted, “Enough material exists in China’s quasi-official press and research institutes to lend some support to the theory that relations are heading for confrontation rather than cooperation.”32

China has rapidly modernized its naval forces over the last decade,33 and David Gompert’s research at RAND provides evidence of why the Sino-U.S. relationship is especially challenging. He analyzed three historical cases of what happened when developing sea powers challenged existing sea powers: Germany and the United Kingdom in 1914, Japan and the United States in 1941, and the long but steady ascent of the U.S. Navy over the Royal Navy. The first two cases ended in war, and the third “led to a gradual and largely amicable transfer of first regional and then global predominance from one navy to the other.” 34 But importantly, Gompert quickly notes, “the United States is not about to defer to China in East Asia as Britain deferred to America in the Western Hemisphere.”35 If the Sino-U.S. relationship develops similarly to Gompert’s first two cases studies, then history’s lessons do not bode well for peace in the Pacific.

Assessing the Actual Threat. The United States misjudged the precursors of conflict in the past, and the same could happen again. Dennis Ross, chief peace negotiator for George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, recounts how the United States misjudged Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait: “Few in the neighborhood or in the administration foresaw the possibility of Iraq actually seizing all of Kuwait. Their assessments were guided by the wrongheaded assumptions about Saddam Hussein.”36 China analysts must consider the consequences of similarly wrongheaded assumptions. For example, few analysts predicted China’s decision to declare its November 2013 Air Defense Identification Zone, yet its unilateral action sent shockwaves of concern through the region.37

How Limited Can War Be? Several of America’s previous limited wars were fought against vastly weaker and nonnuclear powers. Yet China is not vastly weaker than the United States, and the United States would be unwise to assume crisis or conflict with China would remain limited. Carl von Clausewitz theorized that war is a “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,”38 and conclusions extrapolated from previous wars cannot completely inform American policymakers in their thinking about the possibility of conflict with China.

Many current discussions of the likelihood of conventional confrontation leading to nuclear conflict are not logically consistent. Writers often simplify their analyses and presume the use of nuclear weapons is so unlikely it can simply be ignored. As an example, defense policy advisor Michael Pillsbury specifically depicts 16 Chinese fears, 6 of which specifically apply to conventional crisis or conflict scenarios: fear of an island blockade, fear of aircraft carrier strikes, fear of major airstrikes, fear of attacks on strategic missile forces, fear of jamming or precision strikes, and fear of attacks on antisatellite capabilities.39 Yet despite China’s proximate fears, some analysts propose strategies that directly stimulate those fears while ignoring the nuclear threat.40

In the Journal of Strategic Studies, Sean Mirski of Harvard Law School explores how the United States might implement a blockade strategy against China but also admits, “The United States will probably never have to consider implementing a blockade in the context of an unlimited war because such a conflict . . . could only arise subsequent to a total breakdown in nuclear deterrence.”41 Additionally, T.X. Hammes of the National Defense University promotes a distant blockade of China that “establishes a set of concentric rings that denies China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, defends the sea and air space of the first island chain, and dominates the air and maritime space outside the island chain.”42

All these concepts fail to adequately consider that China is a nuclear capable nation with several hundred warships. Even though not all of those warships are extremely able or their crews proficient, analysts should not assume China would allow the United States to starve China’s economy with a blockade. A blockade would threaten China’s regime and easily cause it to resort to force, and perhaps nuclear force. Precisely because some analysts do not understand China’s psychology and assess scenarios devoid of nuclear risk, promoting these strategies may increase the likelihood of nuclear miscalculation.

Finally, the precedent of U.S. actions will determine the future validity of extended nuclear deterrence, and if U.S. commitment is rapidly eclipsed by desires to de-escalate, other nations may find renewed desire to both increase their own conventional weapon capabilities and seek their own nuclear arsenal. Nations such as Japan and South Korea may decide America’s extended deterrent guarantees are unreliable and pursue nuclear weapons as security against nuclear attack.43 The United States must anticipate how difficult it might be to pursue a limited conflict due to the political pressures to defend other nations in the region and prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Crisis Before the Storm. A Sino-U.S. confrontation would have global consequences that could cause physical and economic hardship for millions.44 Political and military leaders would find themselves in crisis mode, and understanding this mindset is critical to sustaining nuclear deterrence during a Sino-U.S. crisis or conflict. William Ury and Richard Smoke, from Harvard and Brown universities, respectively, analyze nuclear crises and note, “Times of crisis call for a special kind of negotiation. There is no time for drawn-out discussion or the usual diplomatic dance, and typically the negotiators are under considerable stress.”45

In conventional engagements with modern powers such as China and the United States, large quantities of airplanes, ships, submarines, and cyber and space assets can rapidly come into play. As Ury and Smoke make clear, “Decision makers may fail to appreciate the value of time in a crisis or potential crisis, thereby unintentionally allowing the crisis to grow worse.”46 If conflict begins, events may transpire at a pace that challenges the current national security decisionmaking apparatus. If this occurs, the risk of miscalculation will increase.

Natural uncertainties inherent in any conflict would be exacerbated because the U.S. method of political and military communication is so different from China’s. For example, when a Chinese F-8 aircraft collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft in April of 2001, the United States struggled to get China to take the collision seriously and questioned if Beijing even knew the collision occurred. The Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to China recounted: “While we in the Embassy were trying without success to reach officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command made the incident public in a brief, neutrally worded press release posted on its Web Site.”47 If a collision between Chinese and U.S. aircraft was posted on a Web site before any official diplomatic or military communication was established, a similar uncertainty should be expected in the future.

Three Policy Recommendations

First, America’s political leaders and policymakers must aim to better understand the structure of China’s nuclear forces and its military decisionmaking process.48 The United States must ensure a well-intentioned plan or military action does not inadvertently appear as a preemptive strike on China’s nuclear forces.49 Years ago, when China needed to develop its command and control organization for its nuclear forces, China’s Second Artillery Corps, also known as Strategic Rocket Forces, were deemed highly capable and given the task. As a result, nuclear and nonnuclear forces are physically collocated and share the same command and control structure. John Lewis and Xue Litai, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, describe a plausible scenario: China launches a conventional missile in a crisis or conflict, and the United States counterstrikes against Chinese collocated conventional and nuclear systems and “force[s] the much smaller surviving and highly vulnerable Chinese nuclear missile units to fire their remaining missiles.”50 Resolving incongruous Sino-U.S. perceptions about the employment of the Second Artillery Corps is possibly the single most influential aspect of avoiding nuclear miscalculation.

Second, a reliable second-strike capability is a predominant factor for dissuading first strikes, and therefore the United States should take care to avoid explicitly targeting—and the appearance of targeting—China’s developing SSBN capability. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recently stated, “The JL-2 [Julang-2], when mated with the [People’s Liberation Army] Navy’s JIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”51 If China can achieve reliable second-strike capability through deployment of its SSBNs, it may be ready to divide its conventional and nuclear forces to achieve a greater margin from nuclear miscalculation.

Third, the potential for conventional crisis or conflict with nuclear-capable powers requires matching military means to political ends in a fundamentally different way. The United States must consider not approaching a Sino-U.S. engagement with expectations to establish large areas of military dominance. Dominance requires flawlessly attacking Chinese antiaircraft missile sites and command and control nodes that also serve China’s nuclear forces. Flawless military plans are fiction, and based on what the United States knows of China’s Second Artillery Corps, the dangers of trying and failing could result in tactical victory but ultimate strategic defeat.52 To prevent a potential Sino-U.S. conventional conflict from becoming nuclear, the United States should aim to keep the engagement zone away from mainland China. American political and military leaders must be prepared for heavy losses of personnel and military ships and aircraft, and while unnecessary loss is abhorrent, aiming for a blinding victory risks nuclear retaliation that could lead to more catastrophic loss.

Deterrence during Nuclear War

In the unlikely but not impossible case that nuclear deterrence fails, if the United States has not prepared methods or plans to de-escalate in advance, the results could be far more calamitous than necessary. By developing and potentially announcing broad methodologies for how the United States would reluctantly fight a nuclear war, it is perhaps possible to reach China’s breaking point sooner, allow China to communicate when the breaking point is reached, and conclude hostilities earlier than if the conduct of a nuclear war were never discussed at all. For purposes of this analysis, assume China employed a nuclear weapon by some means and that the United States or its allies faced continued nuclear threats from China.

Four Policy Recommendations

First, how does the United States avoid using more nuclear weapons than necessary to achieve its military and political objectives? One way is to promote interval attacks that allow for conflict resolution between each attack. China is not yet capable of executing mutually assured destruction doctrine like Russia, and based on the reliability of military or political communications between China and the United States, the United States could choose to launch successive attacks within a matter of hours or a matter of days. If China attempted attacks at a rapid pace, and if a failure of U.S. theater or national missile defense allowed China’s attacks to be successful, the pace of U.S. launch could be adjusted accordingly.

Second, Washington could consider how to rapidly shift to deterrence by denial. How would the United States take away China’s nuclear capability altogether? China has been historically assessed to have a “minimum retaliatory strike deterrent” designed to dissuade other nations, but most specifically the United States, from blackmailing or using nuclear weapons against China.53 If China uses nuclear weapons to attack the United States or a U.S. ally, America’s political leaders might feel compelled to use all of the Nation’s capabilities to eliminate China’s ability to launch any further nuclear attacks.

An important aspect of deterrence by denial is ballistic missile defense. According to the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, “China is one of the countries most vocal about U.S. ballistic missile defenses and their strategic implications, and its leaders have expressed concern that such defenses might negate China’s strategic deterrent.”54 What was potentially destabilizing in peacetime—better U.S. missile defenses may cause China to develop more missiles—can rapidly become essential to ending a nuclear conflict. As both China’s launch capability and U.S. missile defense capability evolve over the years, U.S. ability to negate China’s deterrent in peacetime may fluctuate. While ballistic missile defenses alone may be overwhelmed by China’s arsenal, conventional attacks on China’s launchers combined with missile defense may be adequate to protect the United States from a nuclear weapon. Protecting the United States from attack will enable de-escalation much sooner than if a nuclear weapon lands on U.S. soil.

Third, the United States should assess how nuclear war could be ended by nonnuclear and nonmilitary means. To assume nuclear weapons can only be answered with nuclear weapons is a false premise. Depending on the circumstances of the engagement, the United States does not necessarily need to respond in kind. If the United States can achieve its political and military objectives without using its own nuclear weapons, then it should do so.

Various political methods exist to convince China to end the conflict. As one example, despite the current cold relations between Washington and Moscow, some in Russia support a concept of “the Great Strategic Triangle” between the United States, Russia, and China.55 Russia might gain elevated international influence following a Sino-U.S. nuclear conflict, and while Moscow should not be expected to directly support Washington’s interests, Russia may still have interest in ending the conflict quickly. Russia might be in a position to use its own political and military ties with China and the United States to enable Sino-U.S. communications from its third-party perspective. Depending on the character of the war, such interlocutors may be needed to avoid further unnecessary escalation or sustained nuclear attacks.

Fourth, while conceptualizing the end of a nuclear war with China, a secondary issue to consider is the uncertainty of the assumption that the United States could communicate with China’s political leadership. Even in peacetime, the United States doubts the robustness of China’s nuclear command and control structure. The burden and chaos of nuclear war may cause the United States to further question China’s political control of its nuclear arsenal. If China’s command and control fails during nuclear conflict, it might become impossible to deter China, and the U.S. President will be left with little choice but to use military force to disarm China of its nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence and nuclear war are two fundamentally different acts, yet they must be considered together to support proper analysis and policy. As the Sino-U.S. relationship moves forward, nuclear deterrence should not be relegated to the sidelines. China developed nuclear weapons to prevent U.S. coercion, but now a clear power struggle in the Asia-Pacific creates the potential that military conflict could begin and subsequently grow out of control. If the United States takes proactive measures in peacetime and has prepared for unwanted but possible transitions to conventional and nuclear conflict, then some risk could be mitigated. Unfortunately, the limited bandwidth of policymakers has not yet allowed meaningful consideration of nonpeaceful contingencies for China.

The United States clearly does not want war; nuclear war with China would be an unfathomable calamity. However, even though the United States can influence the probability of a conflict, in the end, Washington does not have the final word. Therefore, prudence requires the United States to prepare for the worst in a way that does not make nuclear war a self-fulfilling prophecy. Preparations must not lead to the very endstate the United States is trying to avoid.

The road ahead is long, and the issues presented here could be pertinent for decades. Solutions that seem impossible now may become more plausible over time, and the United States should continue to evaluate reasonable methods to lower the risk of nuclear conflict. War is possible but not inevitable, and as Vice President Joe Biden recently quoted his father, “The only conflict worse than one that is intended, is one that is unintended.”56

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter, October 2014), which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes
1. Clark A. Murdock, The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 13.
2. Many international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations are heavily influenced by American views on economics, human rights, and government. Between President Richard Nixon’s famous trip in 1972 to Beijing and 2011, China’s gross domestic product grew from 19th globally ($1.28 billion) to 3rd ($4.2 trillion). See United Nations, “GDP and its breakdown for all years—sorted alphabetically, All countries for all years—sorted alphabetically,” National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp>.
3. Victor Cha, “The Sinking of the Cheonon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 22, 2010, available at <http://csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan>.
4. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 6 (November 1, 2013), available at <http://thebulletin.org/2013/november/chinese-nuclear-forces-2013>.
5. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 134 (2010), 139.
6. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 31.
7. Avery Goldstein, “First Things First,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), 53.
8. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics (New York: Times Books, 2012), 257.
9. T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 13. Renowned economist Thomas Schelling made popular the concept of a “tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons” within the theory of nuclear deterrence.
10. Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), viii. In this report, the United States created a negative security assurance for several countries. The United States declared it “would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners” (viii–xi) and that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations” (viii).
11. Bill Gertz, “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner, Chinese general who threatened nuclear strike on U.S. visits Washington this week,” The Washington Free Beacon, March 4, 2013.
12. Terry Diebel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143.
13. Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin-Built Trident II D5 Missile Achieves a Total of 148 Successful Test Flights Since 1989,” September 24, 2013, available at <www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2013/september/924-ss-FBM.html>. To verify reliability, the Air Force annually removes nine launch cables from randomly selected intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and reconnects them to test equipment to verify correct launch signals are sent to the missiles. The launch signal is also tested from E-6 aircraft to verify connectivity with the Airborne National Command Post, a vital element of the contingency control system governing nuclear launch. Additionally, once a year the Air Force removes the warhead from a Minuteman III ICBM and actually launches the missile. The Navy also removes the warheads from four submarine-launched ballistic missiles every year and conducts four launches to fully test the reliability of the launch signal system and missile launch capability.
14. Kathleen C. Bailey, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the Debate (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2001), 8.
15. Cole J. Harvey, “Nuclear Stockpile Modernization: Issues and Background,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 15, 2010, available at <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-stockpile-modernization/>.
16. Quarterly testing reports are available at <http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/sspquarterly>.
17. Nevada National Security Site, Stockpile Stewardship Program (Las Vegas: National Nuclear Security Administration, 2013), available at <www.nv.doe.gov/library/factsheets/DOENV_1017.pdf>.
18. David Holley, “Seeking respect and protection, Russia bolsters nuclear arsenal,” Seattle Times, December 13, 2004, available at <http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002117512_russarms13.html>.
19. William F. Hoeft, Jr., “Deterrence: Now More Than Ever,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 6 (June 2013), 26–31, available at <www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-06/deterrence—now-more-ever>.
20. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 77, available at <www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf>. Although the CTBT of 1996 prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,” the treaty also provides a procedure to seek approval of testing for peaceful purposes. Specifically, Article VIII states: “On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.”
21. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Air Force Chief: Bomber Cost to Be Tightly Capped,” Global Security Newswire, November 15, 2013, available at <www.nti.org/gsn/article/air-force-chief-bomber-cost-be-tightly-capped/>.
22. Robert Burns, “AP Exclusive: Commander Cites ‘Rot’ in Nuke Force,” The Big Story, May 8, 2013, available at <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-exclusive-air-force-sidelines-17-icbm-officers>.
23. Rear Admiral Richard P. Breckenridge, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 12, 2013, available at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20130912/101281/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-JohnsonD-20130912.pdf>.
24. Amy F. Wolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, R41219 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 20, available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf>.
25. Bomber aircraft are not usually loaded for nuclear strikes and can take a long time to prepare for nuclear missions.
26. “A clearer view of the seafloor in Google Earth,” Google.com, February 2, 2012, available at <http://google-latlong.blogspot.com/2012/02/clearer-view-of-seafloor-in-google.html>.
27. Rhitu Chatterjee and Rob Hugh-Jones, “Sounds of the sea: Listening online to the ocean floor,” BBC News Magazine, January 16, 2012, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16555916>.
28. Goldstein, 75.
29. Ryan Burkhart, “The U.S., China, and the Trans Pacific Partnership,” Diplomatic Courier, November 1, 2013, available at <www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/asia/1868-the-u-s-china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership>.
30. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 6, available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf>.
31. M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo, Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability? Strategic Forum, No. 263 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 5. Bunn and Manzo note four plausible scenarios where conventional prompt global strike would clearly enhance U.S. security objectives: “when terrorist leaders are located, WMD transfers are suspected, missile launches are imminent, and ‘high-value’ targets (for example, a national leader or command and control nodes) are identified in larger military campaigns.”
32. Henry Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012), 44–45, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/the-future-of-us-chinese-relations>.
33. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2012), 40, available at <https://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/>.
34. David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), iii.
35. Ibid., xiii.
36. Dennis Ross, Statecraft and How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 75.
37. Daniel Byman, “The Foreign Policy Essay: Oriana Skylar Mastro on ‘China’s ADIZ—A Successful Test of U.S. Resolve?’” Lawfareblog.com, December 15, 2013, available at <www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-essay-oriana-skylar-mastro-on-chinas-adiz-a-successful-test-of-u-s-resolve/>.
38. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
39. Michael Pillsbury, “The Sixteen Fears: China’s Strategic Psychology,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 (October–November 2012), 149–182, available at <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2012.728351#preview>.
40. See, for instance, Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010. The U.S. Navy recently invested in next-generation jamming capability for the EA-18B aircraft, and the Department of Defense refocused its attention on antisatellite weapons in the summer of 2013.
41. Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (June 2013), 390.
42. T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic Forum, No. 278 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2012), 4.
43. Steve Herman, “Rising Voices in S. Korea, Japan Advocate Nuclear Weapons,” Voice of America, February 15, 2013, available at <www.voanews.com/content/rising-voices-in-south-korea-japan-advocate-nuclear-weapons/1604309.html>; and M.J. Chung, “Keynote: M.J. Chung, Member, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,” panel, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Washington, DC, April 9, 2013, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/09/keynote-m.j.-chung-member-national-assembly-of-republic-of-korea/fv9t>.
44. Douglas P. Guarino, “Study: Two Billion Could Starve in Event of ‘Limited’ Nuclear War,” Global Security Newswire, December 10, 2013, available at <www.nti.org/gsn/article/study-two-billion-could-starve-event-limited-nuclear-war/>.
45. William L. Ury and Richard Smoke, “Anatomy of a Crisis,” in Negotiation Theory and Practice, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 47 (Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1991).
46. Ibid., 49.
47. John Keefe, “A Tale of ‘Two Very Sorries’ Redux,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 21, 2002, available at <www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/646427/posts>.
48. Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, “Inside China’s New Security Council,” The National Interest, November 21, 2013, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-chinas-new-security-council-9439>.
49. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), iii.
50. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making China’s nuclear war plan,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (2012), 61, available at <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23840/Making_China’s_nuclear_war_plan.pdf>.
51. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 214.
52. Goldstein, 88.
53. Linton Brooks, “The Sino-American Nuclear Balance: Its Future and Implications,” in China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship, ed. Abraham Denmark and Nirav Patel, 64 (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009).
54. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 34.
55. Alexi Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The Great Strategic Triangle (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2013).
56. Joe Biden, “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan,” December 2, 2013, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/03/remarks-press-vice-president-joe-biden-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-jap>.

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By Bhartendu Kumar Singh

Defence and development have remained watertight compartments in India’s national security discourse and are largely perceived within the ‘guns versus butter debate’. Both compete for the scarce resources and hesitate to reach out to each other, both in terms of academic literature or through policy manifestations.

While former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s model of ‘inclusive growth’ attempted to bridge this divide in conceptual terms, the incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has gone a step further and announced an investment of Rs. 50,000 crore towards the development and construction of six submarines on indigenous platforms. The move is likely to usher in another chapter where the defence sector would adopt a development approach in expanding the domestic military industrial complexes (MICs).

The new decision points towards an optimistic future in many ways. First, it is a significant step towards saving foreign exchange that is spent on the purchase of imported weaponry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the past five years, India accounted for 14 per cent of international arms imports. Its weapons imports are almost three times higher than China and Pakistan; and certainly embarrassing for a great power candidate that imports its 70 per cent armory through imports. An inflated dollar in the international market has only complicated India’s woes. Second, India funds the revitalisation process of foreign MICs. Russia and Israel export 38 and 33 per cent of their arms respectively to India; and many European countries follow.

The sick MICs of these countries owe a lot to Indian benevolence for their resurrection. However, investing this money in domestic MIC will create jobs apart from the proliferation of ancillary industries in different geographical hubs. Third, such investments would also contribute in capacity development of defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and help them compete in the global market. It is quite a tragedy that there are only two Indian defence PSUs that figure in world’s top 100 arms producer: the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (40th position) and the Ordnance Factories (47th position). Their shares in arms exports are quite negligible and make a mockery of the taxpayers’ investments.

Past experiences in defence manufacturing, however, engender certain apprehensions. First, many defence projects have stretched beyond a reasonable period of time and have had excessive cost over-runs. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, for example, has been delayed for ages and now when it is ready for induction, the preference is for the French-made Rafale. Thus, the opportunity for self-reliance in a critical area like fighter jet technology is again being missed out. The progress in another ambitious project, MBT Arjun has been rather self-defeating, forcing the army to look for substitute purchases from Russia. Similarly, India’s Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), INS Vikrant, being built by the Cochin Shipyard Limited in Kochi, is delayed by four to five years, and is now likely to be on sea only around 2018. The 2011 defence production policy therefore needs to be made more robust to cater to these issues.

Second, as has been experienced in some projects, the ‘make in India’ efforts ultimately lead to ‘assemble in India’ wherein foreign components still dominate; technological growth does not take place and the efforts to expand the domestic MIC fail miserably. Dependence on foreign countries in critical technologies will dilute the efforts to make commercial use of indigenous defence products since a heavy forex would still fly abroad in royalty.

Additionally, several contemporary challenges thwart the government’s effort to create a mutually supportive environment where defence would promote development. First, the domestic MIC is dominated by defence PSUs and ordnance factories; with very little contribution from the private sector. Worse, their geographical distribution is mostly in developed pockets where the cost of labour and infrastructure is high. Backward states like Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa etc. should, therefore, also get an equitable pie in the development cake. Fresh capital investments must consider these issues since they will act as ‘engines of growth’ and could arrest outward migration from these regions.

Second, while the present capital investment is a generous step, sustaining it on a long-term basis would be difficult unless the revenue capital ratio (presently at 57:43) in the future defence budgets is rationalised. Rightsising of manpower based on global experience is the sin-qua-non for transferring the rupee towards the domestic MIC.

Third, getting the best from defence PSUs, despite fresh investments, remains a challenge since they work in a monolithic environment, behave largely as departmental extensions and resist corporate reforms. Its time to look beyond them; and the government’s incentives must indeed be reserved for investment in new technologies, patents and innovations in defence that could be marketed and put through commercial utilisation. If the private sector joins the bandwagon, it would be encouraging.

A developmental approach to defence that allows it to promote growth and development rather than treating it as only ‘cash outgo’ is required in administering the defence budget. Many middle powers like Germany, Sweden, Italy, Ukraine etc. make a killing from vibrant MICs providing jobs to millions and earning foreign exchange. India can similarly reorient its defence expenditure and unleash harmonious progress of defence and development.

Note: Bhartendu Kumar Singh, PhD, is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. Views are personal.

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When it comes to U.S.-China trade, semiconductors are a big deal. The chips that power virtually all modern electronics are one of the United States’ most valuable exports at $42 billion a year (second only to auto exports at $51 billion), and China’s biggest import at $232 billion – bigger even than oil. But so far, China’s own role in semiconductor production and chip design has remained relatively small, despite concerted but flawed efforts by previous Chinese administrations to boost it.

So it was no small matter this past June when the fresh Beijing leadership under President Xi Jinping issued a new set of “Guidelines to Promote National Integrated Circuit Industry Development.” The guidelines spell out concrete and ambitious development targets for China’s semiconductor industry, with the goal of moving from playing catch-up to forging ahead as an industry leader in integrated circuit (or IC) design and fabrication.

Now noted analyst Dieter Ernst, an economist with the East-West Center in Hawaii, has put out a new study examining the objectives, strategy and implementation policies of China’s new push in semiconductors and what they imply for the country’s prospects in this key industry.

Ernst’s study, From Catching-Up to Forging Ahead? China’s Prospects in Semiconductors, explores how China’s new strategy seeks to benefit from four global transformations in semiconductor markets and technology: the demand pull from mobile devices; new opportunities for China’s factories in trailing-node semiconductor technologies; global changes in the IC fabrication landscape; and a new interest in strategic partnerships and mergers and acquisitions.

The study analyzes two particular policy initiatives of the new Chinese strategy: the IC Industry Support Small Leading Group to enhance strategy coordination, and equity funds to improve investment allocation and enhance firm capabilities through strategic partnerships, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions involving both foreign firms and domestic firms.

“The implementation of both policies signals a genuine effort to experiment with a bottom-up, market-led approach to industrial policy,” Ernst says. “In the Leading Group, for instance, experts who are knowledgeable and well-connected in the highly globalized semiconductor industry play an active role in policy formulation and implementation.”

The use of professional investment fund managers, as opposed to government subsidies or investment programs, signals the emergence of a hybrid model that seeks to combine the logic of equity fund management with the objectives of China’s semiconductor development strategy, Ernst writes.

However, his study concludes that, despite movement in the right direction, the new Chinese semiconductor strategy’s capacity for flexible policy adjustments remains limited, and that multi-layered industrial dialogues among key stakeholders in the industry are still at an early stage.

“To exploit the tailwinds from the market, China needs to experiment further with new more market-driven approaches to industrial policy,” Ernst says.

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By Wolfe Braude

Group of 20 (G-20) Summits are a magnet for expectations. Ever since the grouping was formed in the turbulent early days of the 2008 global financial crisis major stakeholders have pinned many hopes on the ability of the group to steer the globe back to growth.

The ongoing impact of the crisis has brought into perspective the relationship between issues which previously were tackled in isolation such as growth, energy, tax, reform of global institutions, corruption, employment, investment, trade, infrastructure, and financial regulation. An unexpected consequence of the crisis was the realisation by financial and political elites that many of these issues are interconnected and have an impact on economic growth and overall development. These revelations are not new to many non-governmental stakeholders and their realisation offers intriguing possibilities for coordinated action, but at the same time has led to a very diverse G-20 agenda and high expectations for delivery across these issues.

The expectations for delivery have been heightened by fractious and paralysed multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organisation and the entrenched nature of Great Power positions in the United Nations. This has highlighted the fact that although the last few decades have seen the construction of an interdependent global economy, there is no central authority for its structured management. The emergence of developing world economic power has not been reflected in related reforms of the few global financial institutions that do exist, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This lack of reform has therefore reduced their importance and leadership potential, leaving the G-20 as the only legitimate forum.

The 2014 Summit is the ninth for the G-20. The position of Chair and host rotates annually. Last year’s Chair was Russia, this year it is Australia, and in December 2014 the baton will pass to Turkey. Faced with a broad agenda and a fragile, sluggish global economy, Australia decided to focus on two areas that encapsulate the needs of the global economy – growth and resilience.

In February 2014 G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed to try and boost GDP across the G-20 by at least 2 per cent above current projected levels over the next five years. Fulfilling this expectation could add over $2 trillion to global GDP and millions of additional jobs. To make this a reality a ‘Brisbane Action Plan’ will be discussed at the Summit and will detail short and medium-term actions to help achieve this growth. This will be a collective commitment; and each country will undertake particular actions to implement this. The G-20 members will each in theory have their comprehensive national growth strategies expected to contain macroeconomic and structural reforms when they meet this month. Areas of intervention include: infrastructure investment, reducing trade barriers, promoting competition and boosting employment and economic participation.

The global economy came within inches of another Great Depression when the crisis erupted. The work of the G-20 members at that time was crucial in coordinating a response. The lingering effects of the crisis and the apparent fragility of the global system has led to concerted efforts by the G-20 to ensure that international and domestic economic policies work together to protect the global economy against future shocks. The repair work is on-going and business and investor confidence have not fully recovered. A return to global growth and growth that is sustainable requires addressing the causes of the crisis and ensuring financial stability.

To this end, G-20 efforts comprise: financial regulation reforms; revamping the international tax system; making global institutions more representative of new voices; improving global energy market operation and resilience; strengthening the global trading system and addressing corruption.

Development has been acknowledged to be an integral component of the G-20’s agenda. Two thirds of the world’s poor actually live in G-20 countries. A Development Working Group (DWG) was established at the 2010 Seoul Summit, along with a Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. The DWG emphasises the role of economic growth in reducing poverty and opening up opportunities for the poor. The G-20 is trying to complement international efforts towards further progress on internationally agreed development goals and ensure that any future G-20 development agenda is flexible enough to respond to the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The most recent Summit, in late 2013 in St Petersburg, Russia, produced a Development Outlook as a successor to the Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan.

For South Africa, the 2014 Summit agenda is particularly relevant to its development. The country’s leaders and diplomats will seek to influence discussions so as to emphasise domestic and continental positions and realities while playing its part in any coordinated action. The focus on growth is of direct interest given the aim of the National Development Plan to achieve average GDP growth of over 5 per cent, yet estimates for 2014 are 2 per cent. For Africa, although it has remained the only region where growth has largely continued in spite of persistent sluggish global conditions, African policymakers want to ensure any global recovery is inclusive and are concerned whether their growth is sustainable. Experience shows that decades of sustained growth are required to structurally transform economies and lift significant numbers of people out of poverty.

Team South Africa will be carrying this message to Brisbane in the hope of supporting outcomes that deliver to these constituencies.

Wolfe Braude is Stakeholder and New Business Development Manager at the South African Institute of International Affairs. This article was originally published with AllAfrica.com.

Source: SAIIA

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By Ronojoy Sen

Nearly six months after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government came to power in India, a much-awaited Cabinet expansion took place on 9 November 2014 with the induction of 21 new ministers. The load of some ministers has been made lighter, a few have got new responsibilities and there has also been an induction of fresh faces. Besides getting trusted ministers for key positions, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his advisers have factored in regional and electoral interests. However, Shiv Sena’s wrangling with the BJP over government formation in Maharashtra cast a shadow on the cabinet expansion. The Sena, one of whose MPs was slated to be a minister, boycotted the swearing-in ceremony.

The Key Portfolios

The most important changes in the Cabinet were the allocation of the defence portfolio, earlier held by Arun Jaitley in addition to finance, to former Goa Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar and the appointment of Suresh Prabhu as railway minister in place of Sadanand Gowda. The appointment of Parrikar, an alumnus of the elite Indian Institute of Technology and a former member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), as defence minister had been widely anticipated. As chief minister of Goa he had built up a reputation for being a tough and efficient administrator. He is expected to fast track indigenous production of defence equipment, where foreign investment has recently been upped to 49%, and oversee major arms acquisition deals. That Jaitley was in charge of two key portfolios for nearly six months as well as the fact that Modi had to uproot a successful chief minister and bring him to the Centre is an indication of the paucity of experience and talent among the BJP’s MPs. Both Parrikar and Prabhu are not members of Parliament and would have to be elected to the Rajya Sabha (Upper House).

The induction of Prabhu, a former Shiv Sena member who was a minister under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, into the Union Cabinet was also expected but his name was doing the rounds for the head of the revamped Planning Commission. That Prabhu, a chartered accountant by training, was given the important railway portfolio speaks of the faith that Modi has in him. Indeed, Modi was not averse to irking the Shiv Sena since Prabhu formally quit the Shiv Sena to join the BJP. Gowda, who had not lived up to Modi’s expectations as railway minister, has been shifted to the law and justice ministry.

Though Jaitley, who is possibly closest to Modi in the Cabinet, was divested of the defence portfolio he will still hold multiple portfolios. In addition to finance, he has now been put in charge of information and broadcasting (I&B). This is significant since Modi, who rarely interacts with the privately-owned media, has put tremendous emphasis on the state-owned Doordarshan and All India Radio to reach out directly to the people.

Others who have been divested of multiple portfolios are Ravi Shankar Prasad, Prakash Javadekar and Nitin Gadkari. Prasad, the communications and IT Minister, has lost the law and justice portfolio, Javadekar, the environment minister, no longer holds the additional charge of I&B and Gadkari, the transport and shipping minister, has been stripped of rural development. The shift of Health Minister Harsh Vardhan to the low-key science and technology ministry is most likely aimed at allowing him to devote more time to the upcoming Delhi Assembly elections in early 2015 where he is a frontrunner for the chief minister’s post. The BJP’s organisational man and strategist, J P Nadda, who lost out to Amit Shah for the BJP president’s post, has been rewarded with the health ministry.

A Mixed Bag

The other ministerial appointments are a mixed bag. Some have been accommodated with future elections in mind. Thus, three new ministers have been inducted from Bihar. Each of them is from a different caste which probably goes to show that the BJP is trying to get its electoral calculations right before the state goes to polls in 2015. Ram Kripal Yadav, who broke away from the Rashtriya Janata Dal to join the BJP before the 2014 national elections, belongs to the Yadav caste; Giriraj Singh, a known Modi loyalist, is a Bhumihar; and Rajiv Pratap Rudy, who had earlier been a minister under Vajpayee, is a Rajput. Similarly four new ministers are from Uttar Pradesh, which goes to polls in 2017, raising the state’s total tally in the Cabinet to 12. Especially significant is the inclusion of Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, a prominent Muslim face of the party, given that the BJP has no Muslim MP in the Lok Sabha (Lower House). Naqvi, who is now the junior minister for minority affairs, is a member of the indirectly-elected Rajya Sabha as is his senior minister Najma Heptullah.

Among the first-time MPs who have been appointed ministers are Jayant Sinha, a former investment banker and son of BJP leader Yashwant Sinha; Rajyavardhan Rathore, an Olympic medallist; and singer Babul Supriyo. Sinha is expected to play an important role as the junior minister for finance while Supriyo’s appointment is clearly aimed at future municipal and Assembly elections in his home state of West Bengal.

The expansion has not been without controversy. Ram Shankar Katheria, who has been appointed the junior minister for human resources development, has 23 criminal cases registered against his name. According to one calculation, despite Modi’s promise of clean politics nearly a third of the ministers are tainted by criminal charges. While many of these charges are slapped on Indian politicians for taking part in street protests, some of them are for serious offences such as attempt to murder.

Conclusion

The expansion of Modi’s ministry brings it to 66 members which is still considerably leaner than former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s team, which had 78 members before the 2014 elections, and Vajpayee’s which had a whopping 88. Both Singh and Vajpayee of course had to contend with coalition partners. The BJP has no such compulsions and this has shown in its dealing with its allies. It has already given short shrift to the Shiv Sena. In the Cabinet expansion the Telugu Desam Party, the BJP’s ally in Andhra Pradesh, got only one junior ministry while the Akali Dal in Punjab did not get any. This is an indication that the BJP would prefer to fight the coming state elections on its own, unencumbered by allies.

About the author
Dr Ronojoy Sen is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS), and at the Asia Research Institute at the NUS. He can be contacted at isasrs@nus.edu.sg. Opinions expressed in this paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief No. 350 – 12 November 2014

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