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FBI Offers Circumstantial Evidence That North Korea Is Responsible For Sony Hack – OpEd

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FBI statement: As a result of our investigation, and in close collaboration with other U.S. government departments and agencies, the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North Korean government is responsible for these actions. While the need to protect sensitive sources and methods precludes us from sharing all of this information, our conclusion is based, in part, on the following:

  • Technical analysis of the data deletion malware used in this attack revealed links to other malware that the FBI knows North Korean actors previously developed. For example, there were similarities in specific lines of code, encryption algorithms, data deletion methods, and compromised networks.
  • The FBI also observed significant overlap between the infrastructure used in this attack and other malicious cyber activity the U.S. government has previously linked directly to North Korea. For example, the FBI discovered that several Internet protocol (IP) addresses associated with known North Korean infrastructure communicated with IP addresses that were hardcoded into the data deletion malware used in this attack.
  • Separately, the tools used in the SPE attack have similarities to a cyber attack in March of last year against South Korean banks and media outlets, which was carried out by North Korea.

The emphasis above is mine.

It’s reasonable to assume that the hackers don’t want to get caught and thrown in jail. It’s also reasonable to assume that they would want to evade detection by disguising themselves as North Korean. An abundance of clues that this attack emanated from North Korean sources may just as likely indicate that it came from somewhere else.

Moreover, given that the U.S. government takes a firm position on refusing to pay ransoms for the release of hostages, why would they not have strongly advised Sony to refuse to capitulate in the face of implausible threats?

President Obama now says that Sony “made a mistake” by pulling the release of the film.

Hmmm… Maybe Sony will now reconsider its decision — they can pitch the release of The Interview as an appropriate form of retaliation and also take advantage of the most massive run of free publicity a movie has ever had.

Sony executives may honestly believe that this film is “desperately unfunny,” but at the end of the day, this isn’t about free speech — it’s about making money.

The post FBI Offers Circumstantial Evidence That North Korea Is Responsible For Sony Hack – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.


New Life In Uruguay For Six Former Guantánamo Prisoners – OpEd

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Good news from Uruguay, where five of the six men released from Guantánamo on December 7 and given new lives in Montevideo have been photographed out and about in the city (here).

The sixth man, Abu Wa’el Dhiab, the Syrian who became confined to a wheelchair whilst at Guantánamo, had been on a hunger strike and had challenged the US authorities in the courts, has not yet been seen publicly, but is apparently recovering from his long ordeal. His lawyer, Cori Crider of Reprieve, commented that he “had difficulty believing he would ever be released until he boarded the plane out of the US military base,” as the Guardian put it. Crider said, “You inhale the air for the first time as a free man and only then it’s real. It’s going to take some time for him to come down from his hunger strike, he’s six foot five and only weighs about 148 pounds, he’s extremely thin, in pain, emaciated and still confined to a wheelchair.”

Immediately after their arrival, the Associated Press reported that Michael Mone, Ali al-Shaaban’s Boston-based lawyer, said that, with the exception of Abu Wa’el Dhiab, “The other men are all up on their feet. They have big smiles on their faces and they are very happy to be in Uruguay after 12 plus years of incarceration.” As the AP described it, Mone was “accustomed to his client being shackled and strictly monitored during meetings in Guantánamo,” and said it was “an emotional experience to see al-Shaaban experiencing freedom for the first time in years.” The AP also reported that al-Shaaban “spoke by phone with his parents, who are in a refugee camp in a country Mone declined to identify, fleeing the turmoil of their homeland.”

Mone also said of his client, “He’s relaxed, he’s not flinching every time there’s a knock on the door or the close of a gate. He just seems so much more alive than when I used to see him in Guantánamo.”

The AP also noted that Uruguay’s defense minister Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro had welcomed the men to their new home, and had told a local radio station that he expected them to find “a job, work to put bread on the table, bring the family, live in peace and sit in the stands of a stadium, becoming a fan of some soccer team.”

One of the men, Abdelhadi Omar Faraj, released a letter, via his lawyer Ramzi Kassem, a law professor at City University of New York, in which he thanked the people of Uruguay for taking them in, and added that he had “already become a fan of the country’s national soccer team,” as the AP put it.

Faraj, the AP continued, “described himself as an innocent man from a modest background who had worked as a mechanic and butcher” before he was seized after crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December 2001, and, he said, sold to US forces.

“Were it not for Uruguay,” he said, “I would still be in the black hole in Cuba today. It is difficult for me to express how grateful I am for the immense trust that you, the Uruguayan people, placed in me and the other prisoners when you opened the doors of your country to us. We cannot thank you enough for welcoming us in your land.”

A week after their arrival, at a press conference on Tuesday December 16, President Mujica made a point of showing a document from the US State Department, dated December 2, which stated that there was no information that “the men were involved in conducting or facilitating terrorist activities against the United States or its partners or its allies,” as the Miami Herald described it, adding that “[m]embers of Uruguay’s opposition had requested the release of the documents as proof that the men are not dangerous.”

“I never doubted, just by using my common sense, that they were paying for something they never did,” President Mujica also said, adding, “We considered this to be a just cause and we had to help them.”

The Miami Herald also reported that, after being released from the military hospital where they were first housed, so that their health could be checked, the men have been staying in a house in Montevideo “as guests of a major labor union,” and have been taking Spanish classes. Four of the men, the newspaper added, “were seen strolling through Uruguay’s capital last week and stopping to buy cheese and bread in their first long walk in freedom.”

On Massachusetts’ MassLive website, further details were provided by Buz Eisenberg, one of the lawyers for Mohammed Taha Mattan, the Palestinian who was nearly given a new home in Germany over four years ago.

Eisenberg said, “Mattan has been granted refugees status, from the United States of America, because he was kidnapped, held for 12 and a half years and tortured, with not one charge filed against him, which is contrary to every law.” He added, “His release should have been earlier this year, but was blocked by the secretary of defense, who had to sign certification required by congress, 30 days before a transfer, and it just sat there.”

Mattan, who is now 35 years old, was seized, with other young men, in a guesthouse in Pakistan in March 2002, and always maintained that “his travels were for the purpose of religious study.” As Eisenberg noted, “He was deemed innocent so many times,” adding, “He has finally been transferred, from  Guantánamo, to Uruguay, to rebuild his life, that was stolen from him by his kidnapping, and he is grateful to Uruguay and congress for not impeding his ability to start his new life.”

Prior to Mattan’s release, Eisenberg met with him in Guantánamo, where, he said, “his client was held for days, in isolation,” and where he never saw him unshackled. “He was apprehensive, but overjoyed to be in any place but Guantánamo, to get out of hell,” Eisenberg said of Mattan’s state of mind before his release.

Eisenberg also explained that Mattan has been associated with Jama’at al-Tablighi, a huge Islamic missionary organization, and had been such a good student in the West Bank that he had “elected to travel and do service work” with the organization “as a way of getting into university.”

“He was a victim of the process of buying bodies and offering bounties to warlords, poor people and policemen,” Eisenberg said of his capture. He has also represented other prisoners, and he explained that he became involved because he “took an oath (as a lawyer) to support and defend the US Constitution.”

Lauren Carasik, another of Mattan’s lawyers (and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western New England University School of Law), said she had “long been concerned about the injustice of Guantánamo.” She added, “When I first spoke with Buz Eisenberg about Mattan’s case, I was struck by his compelling story and the travesty of his detention without trial for so many years. I was also aware that fear and misperception, about many of the men imprisoned at Guantánamo, had eroded the nation’s commitment to justice and fairness.”

“[T]he real test of our core democratic principles,” she also said, “is how we protect the integrity of the legal system not only in the easy cases but also in the difficult ones. So it was an easy decision to join the team of lawyers who had been working tirelessly on Mattan’s behalf.”

Speaking of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA torture program (see my article here), Eisenberg said that, while he was “not surprised” by it, “this is not who we should be.” Lauren Carasik added, “President Obama has made his position clear: we should look forwards, not backwards, on torture. But the Convention Against Torture requires nations to investigate and prosecute violations of its prohibitions and to provide redress to victims. Until we have accountability for torture, and fulfill our obligations under federal and international law, we risk repeating this ill-advised and inhumane conduct, at an incalculable cost to our moral standing in the world. Accordingly, we cannot be satisfied with the Senate’s report. Instead, the nation must: undertake a complete, impartial and unclassified investigation into our practices that should serve as the basis for reforms both within the C.I.A. and its oversight mechanisms; prosecute those who have violated the law; and provide reparations for victims” (see her article for Al-Jazeera here).

As the six men released from Guantánamo settle into their new lives in Uruguay, there are reasons to believe that they are in a place where they will be cared about. As the Guardian noted of the Uruguayan people, “The good will is evident even on the streets of Montevideo where [Cori] Crider has been the object of spontaneous clapping and congratulations from passers-by who recognize her from appearances on the local media. ‘It’s amazing,’ said Crider. ‘The good will from the government and even from people on the street is unlike anything I have encountered in my 10 years of doing this.’”

The post New Life In Uruguay For Six Former Guantánamo Prisoners – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Ralph Nader’s Recommended Holiday Reading For The Agitated Mind – OpEd

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1. The Invisible Soldiers by Ann Hagedorn (Simon & Schuster, 2014).
Ann Hagedorn, a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal tells the troubling story of the corporatization of America’s national security—a “bold, new industry of private military and security companies,” embedded deeply in and sometimes outnumbering our armed forces and always pressing for more influence, power, and markets.

2. Why Not Jail, Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government Inaction, by law professor Rena Steinzor (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Professor Steinzor zeroes in on the highest level of corporate crime, culpable executives, and argues that criminal prosecution of these corporate bosses is not only more just but is the most effective deterrence of corporate crime that has been repeated time and again with impunity.

3. The GMO Deception, edited by Sheldon Krimsky and Jeremy Gruber (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).
This is a project of the Council for Responsible Genetics, started by MIT, Harvard and other scientists. This book, for which I wrote the foreword, takes a comprehensive look at the social, political and ethical implications of genetically modified food from secrecy-ridden companies like Monsanto to farms and markets worldwide. It shows the power of distorted, non-peer-reviewed corporate science and its political marketers.

4. The Dictionary of American Political Bullshit by Stephen L. Goldstein (Grid Press, 2014).
This book delivers on its title to make you angry and laugh at the same time. Coming off the November elections, you may resonate with the author’s definition that “political bull derives from the universal ‘language’ of hyperbole, duplicity, and braggadocio.”

5. Sustainable Happiness: Live Simply, Live Well, Make a Difference edited by Sarah Van Gelder and the staff of Yes! Magazine (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2014).
This is not a touchy-feely psycho screed. It has political, civic, environmental, consumer and personal viewpoints from leading thinkers and doers such as Wendell Berry, Vandana Shiva, Annie Leonard, and John McKnight. A fast and engrossing read.

6. A Big Fat Crisis by Deborah A. Cohen, M.D. (Nation Books, 2014).
This work goes beyond exhortation and clarifies the hidden forces behind the obesity epidemic and offers concrete ways to diminish this burgeoning human condition. Dr. Cohen offers concrete things to do that include major policy changes and ground-up initiatives for you or activist groups. Definitely not a diet book.

7. Rich People’s Movements by Isaac William Martin (Oxford, 2014).
This is a counter-intuitive up-to-date history of mass protest movements “explicitly designed to benefit the wealthy!” Professor Martin reveals how “protests on behalf of the rich appropriated the tactics used by the left—from the Populists and Progressives of the early 20th century to the feminists and anti-war activists of the 1950s and 1960s.”

8. The Evolution of a Corporate Idealist by Christine Bader (Bibliomotion, 2014).
This is the story of a Yale graduate who went to work inside big business and became one of the few idealists striving to elevate standards and conduct. A rare, short narrative that illuminates why some idealists become great, courageous whistleblowers.

9. Leningrad: Siege and Symphony by Brian Moynahan (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2014).
Leningrad, the Soviet Union’s second largest city, took 750,000 fatalities from Hitler’s war, siege and starvation—almost double the toll by the U.S. in World War II. This massive work tells the heroic story in 1941 and 1942 of the gripping determination to perform Dmitri Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony in the besieged, devastated city on August 9, 1942. If there ever was a movie looking for a book, this tribute to the irrepressible human spirit is it.

10. Ha!—The Science of When We Laugh and Why by Scott Weems (Basic Books, 2014).
Can a cognitive neuroscientist explain laughter and enlighten and entertain? You better believe the answer is yes. A delightful, brainy, historical and contemporary cultural excursus that “reveals why humor is so idiosyncratic, and why how-to books alone will never help us become funnier people.” It explained to me why all those joke books I used to read weren’t really all that funny! More rewarding than a thousand giggles.

Two more enticements. You can get free the quarterly newsletter FDIC Consumer News. Yes, a government agency produces a winner. You can’t help but become a smarter saver and preserver of your finances in this wild west credit economy than by exploring this well-laid out eight-page publication. Call Toll Free, 1-877-ASK-FDIC.

Finally, if you want to see what one person—a young lawyer, Morris Dees—started and persisted with scores of dedicated fighters for justice, obtain the beautifully designed, illustrated history of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s cases and causes, Keeping the Dream Alive by Booth Gunter (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014, Montgomery, Alabama).

The post Ralph Nader’s Recommended Holiday Reading For The Agitated Mind – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Pope Francis And Poverty – OpEd

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By Yash Tandon

In his first major speech on the financial crisis, Pope Francis called on people to restrain their obsession with materialist consumption and wealth accumulation. He exhorted world leaders to serve the poor and not allow themselves to be deluded by blind market forces.

Encouraged by this I downloaded his apostolic exhortation – Evangelii Gaudium and I was pleasantly astonished to discover its hidden passion and analytical depth. Although it was aimed at Catholics, I venture to suggest that Pope Francis was addressing the whole of humanity … irrespective of people’s religious or secular affinities.

STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF POVERTY

Most astonishing to me was his reference to the structural causes of poverty. I had not expected that. Mainstream writers on poverty seldom (indeed, never) refer to structural causes of poverty, not even the Nobel Laureates Amratya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman. As for Marxists, they think they have a kind of monopoly on inquiring into the structural causes of social injustice. The Pontiff is no Marxist, but in some ways he is deeper, for he has another level of consciousness – divine or spiritual consciousness – that most Marxists lack. I will come back to poverty again, but let me first elaborate on the last point.

SIX LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

I believe that there are (at least) six levels of consciousness, only some of which we as ordinary mortals are aware.

First is self-awareness – consciousness about one’s own self as a physical mortal being and about one’s identity.

Second is other awareness – consciousness about the other, not as an enemy but as another human being.

Third is nature awareness – consciousness about the environment including trees, bees, butterflies and tigers.

Four is system awareness – consciousness about the global system of production and distribution of the means of personal and social existence.

Five is divine consciousness – awareness about the supreme being, defined either as an ontological something out there, or as a spiritual experience inside the person.

Six is awareness of the subconscious – the hidden impulses behind the conscious that a psychoanalyst might help one to become aware.

The reason I go into this is to underscore the point that while most of us are aware of only some of the above layers of consciousness, the politicians, especially when in power, are usually aware of only the first one – self-awareness, in particular their power and how to sustain it. For them the other is the enemy; the environment is to be exploited for profit; the system is the one that serves as something called national security in whose name horrendous acts of cruelty are inflicted on the other; the divine is either non-existent or a religious ritual to justify acts of cruelty, and the unconscious is simply left to the psychoanalyst, or to bad dreams.

There are some rather exceptional people who are aware of all six dimensions of consciousness. Pope Francis, I think, is one.

THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF POVERTY

The Pontiff has said repeatedly that life for ordinary people has become worse, not just in the countries of the south but also in the rich countries of the north. People struggle to survive, often an undignified existence. In his Evangelii Gaudium, this is what Pope Francis says:

‘188. The Church has realised that the need to heed this plea is itself born of the liberating action of grace within each of us, and thus it is not a question of a mission reserved only to a few … it means working to eliminate the STRUCTURAL causes of poverty and to promote the integral development of the poor, as well as small daily acts of solidarity in meeting the real needs which we encounter.’ (Emphasis added)

Pope Francis then expounds on the word solidarity. ‘The word solidarity,’ he says, ‘is a little worn and at times poorly understood, but it refers to something more than a few sporadic acts of generosity. It presumes the creation of a new mindset, which thinks in terms of community and the priority of the life of all over the appropriation of goods by a few.’

The theme of structural causes of poverty is reiterated.

‘202. The need to resolve the structural causes of poverty cannot be delayed, not only for the pragmatic reason of its urgency for the good order of society, but because society needs to be cured of a sickness, which is weakening and frustrating it, and which can only lead to new crises. Welfare projects, which meet certain urgent needs, should be considered merely temporary responses. As long as the problems of the poor are not radically resolved by rejecting the absolute autonomy of markets and financial speculation and by attacking the structural causes of inequality, no solution will be found for the world’s problems or, for that matter, to any problems. Inequality is the root of social ills.’

The Evangelii Gaudium goes on to elaborate on what Pope Francis means by structural causes. I will leave this for the curious reader to explore. It is important that we read this document for our enlightenment and in solidarity with the people for whom it is written – The Wretched of the Earth (a phrase I borrowed from the French-Martinique psychoanalyst, Frantz Fanon).

THE OTHER

In our time, the other is defined by the West’s political leadership and the dominant media as the Muslim fundamentalist. For Pope Francis this is nothing short of a fraud committed by the spin doctors of Western politicians and Christian fundamentalists.

‘252. Our relationship with the followers of Islam has taken on great importance, since they are now significantly present in many traditionally Christian countries, where they can freely worship and become fully a part of society. We must never forget that they “profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one, merciful God, who will judge humanity on the last day”… They also acknowledge the need to respond to God with an ethical commitment and with mercy towards those most in need.’

And, further down:

‘253. In order to sustain dialogue with Islam suitable training is essential for all involved, not only so that they can be solidly and joyfully grounded in their own identity, but so that they can also acknowledge the values of others, appreciate the concerns underlying their demands and shed light on shared beliefs. We Christians should embrace with affection and respect Muslim immigrants to our countries in the same way that we hope and ask to be received and respected in countries of Islamic tradition… Faced with disconcerting episodes of violent fundamentalism, our respect for true followers of Islam should lead us to avoid hateful generalisations for AUTHENTIC ISLAM AND THE PROPER READING OF THE KORAN ARE OPPOSED TO EVERY FORM OF VIOLENCE.’ (Emphasis added)

I have read the Koran (Qur’an), and I testify to the Pontiff’s claim that contrary to the oversimplified view of the teachings of the Prophet Islam is not a violent religion. I will not go deeper into this very significant issue of our time. Contrary to biased historians, Islam spread from the 7th to the 11th century not by the sword but by word. Of course, there were many Muslims who violated the Prophet’s word namely that “There should be no compulsion in religion.” (Qur’an 2:256). And yes, there were many wars during this period. But these wars were unleashed mainly by Christian Crusaders blessed by the ruling Pontiffs of the time – a historical irony given Pope Francis’s position on this matter today.

HAS POPE FRANCIS A FUTURE?

I don’t know. Whatever one might say about the Pontiff’s future, one thing is certain, poverty will not end unless its structural causes are analysed and dealt with.

I give a little historical note to make this point. In the 1960s the developing countries of the south attempted to challenge the structural causes of poverty in their countries. They called for a new dispensation, a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which led to the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Its creation was also associated with the ideas of Raul Prebisch, its first secretary general. He, among others, had developed a theory to counter the mainstream growth theory. This counter-hegemonic theory, known as the underdevelopment theory, or the centre and periphery theory, and or the Latin American dependencia theory, analysed the structural causes of enduring underdevelopment of the south.

What happened to that alternative vision? It died. With the rise of the neo-liberal ideology in the 1980s the idea of NIEO died. The dependencia school was marginalised and with it the UNCTAD issues, such as technology transfer, terms of trade, and the scrutiny of transnational corporations, were taken out of UNCTAD. The present dominant structure on issues of trade is the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which without the UNCTAD issues, has become a club of the rich and powerful.

The entire UN system is hostage to the agenda of the rich and powerful, although from time to time, the countries of the south are able to express their independent opinion in its general assembly (GA), such as on the issues of Palestine and Cuba. But the GA (unlike the Security Council) has no teeth; it cannot enforce its resolutions. The result that positive initiatives taken by the countries of the south get watered down. A good example of this is the ill-fated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which reduced a structural problem into a statistical numbers game. At the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, the UN launched the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as its post-2015 development agenda. Once again, this did not address underlying structural causes of continuing underdevelopment of the countries of the south. The UN simply changed the goal posts from MDGs to SDGs. Take a lesson from history – SDGs are a smokescreen just like the MDGs.

Take Pope Francis’ wisdom in order to chart out the future of humankind, address and deal with the structural causes of poverty, and do not treat the other as enemy. I know this is easier said than done. But the first step is the most difficult. This step was taken by many before Pope Francis. But Francis has added his significant voice to delegitimising a market-based, neoliberal ideological growth model of the rich and powerful. Now it is for the rest of us to take further steps. It is time for Intifadah, for Chimurenga, for struggle against oppression, exploitation, and injustice. (For a definition of these terms see my first blog Global Intifada and National Chimurenga. (Posted on 27 September 2013.)

* THE VIEWS OF THE ABOVE ARTICLE ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR’S AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PAMBAZUKA NEWS EDITORIAL TEAM

The post Pope Francis And Poverty – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Ruble Takedown Exposes Cracks In Putin’s Defense – OpEd

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“The plunge of the Russian currency this week is the drastic outcome of policies implemented by the major imperialist powers to force Russia to submit to American and European imperialism’s neo-colonial restructuring of Eurasia. Punishing the Putin regime’s interference with their plans for regime change in countries such as Ukraine and Syria, the NATO powers are financially strangling Russia.”

– Alex Lantier, Imperialism and the ruble crisis, World Socialist Web Site

“The struggle for world domination has assumed titanic proportions. The phases of this struggle are played out upon the bones of the weak and backward nations.”

– Leon Trotsky, 1929

Russian President Vladimir Putin suffered a stunning defeat on Tuesday when a US-backed plan to push down oil prices sent the ruble into freefall. Russia’s currency plunged 10 percent on Monday followed by an 11 percent drop on Tuesday reducing the ruble’s value by more than half in less than a year. The jarring slide was assisted by western sympathizers at Russia’s Central Bank who, earlier in the day, boosted interest rates from 10.5 percent to 17 percent to slow the decline. But the higher rates only intensified the outflow of capital which put the ruble into a tailspin forcing international banks to remove pricing and liquidity from the currency leading to the suspension of trade. According to Russia Today:

“Russian Federation Council Chair Valentina Matviyenko has ordered a vote on a parliamentary investigation into the recent activities of the Central Bank and its alleged role in the worst-ever plunge of the ruble rate…

“I suggest to start a parliamentary investigation into activities of the Central Bank that has allowed violations of the citizens’ Constitutional rights, including the right for property,” the RIA Novosti quoted Tarlo as saying on Wednesday.

The senator added that according to the law, protecting financial stability in the country is the main task of the Central Bank and its senior management. However, the bank’s actions, in particular the recent raising of the key interest rate to 17 percent, have so far yielded the opposite results.” (Upper House plans probe into Central Bank role in ruble crash, RT)

The prospect that there may be collaborators and fifth columnists at Russia’s Central Bank should surprise no one. The RCB is an independent organization that serves the interests of global capital and regional oligarchs the same as central banks everywhere. This is a group that believes that humanity’s greatest achievement is the free flow of privately-owned capital to markets around the world where it can extract maximum value off the sweat of working people. Why would Russia be any different in that regard?

It isn’t. The actions of the Central Bank have cost the Russian people dearly, and yet, even now the main concern of RCB elites is their own survival and the preservation of the banking system. An article that appeared at Zero Hedge on Wednesday illustrates this point. After ruble trading was suspended, the RCB released a document with “7 new measures” all of which were aimed at protecting the banking system via moratoria on securities losses, breaks on interest rates, additional liquidity provisioning, easier credit and accounting standards, and this gem at the end:

“In order to maintain the stability of the banking sector in the face of increased interest rate and credit risks of a slowdown of the Russian economy the Bank of Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation prepare measures to recapitalize credit institutions in 2015.” (Russian Central Bank Releases 7 Measures It Will Take To Stabilize The Financial Sector, Zero Hedge)

Sound familiar? It should. You see, the Russian Central Bank works a lot like the Fed. At the first sign of trouble they build a nice, big rowboat for themselves and their dodgy bank buddies and leave everyone else to drown. That’s what these bullet points are all about. Save the banks, and to hell the people who suffer from their exploitative policies.

Here’s more from RT:

“Earlier this week a group of State Duma MPs from the Communist Party sent an official address to Putin asking him to sack (Central Bank head, Elvira) Nabiullina, and all senior managers of the Central Bank as their current policies are causing the rapid devaluation of ruble and impoverishment of the majority of the Russian population.

In their letter, the Communists also recalled Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly in which he said that control over inflation must not be in the way of the steady economic growth.

“They listen to your orders and then do the opposite,” the lawmakers complained.” (RT)

In other words, the RCB enforces its own “austerity” policy in Russia just as central bankers do everywhere. There’s nothing conspiratorial about this. CBs are owned and controlled by the big money guys which is why their policies invariably serve the interests of the rich. They might not call it “trickle down” or “structural adjustment” (as they do in the US), but it amounts to the same thing, the inexorable shifting of wealth from working class people to the parasitic plutocrats who control the system and its political agents. Same old, same old.

Even so, the media has pinned the blame for Tuesday’s ruble fiasco on Putin who, of course, has nothing to do with monetary policy. That said, the ruble rout helps to draw attention to the fact that Moscow is clearly losing its war with the US and needs to radically adjust its approach if it hopes to succeed. First of all, Putin might be a great chess player, but he’s got a lot to learn about finance. He also needs a crash-course in asymmetrical warfare if he wants to defend the country from more of Washington’s stealth attacks.

In the last 10 months, the United States has executed a near-perfect takedown of the Russian economy. Following a sloppy State Department-backed coup in Kiev, Washington has consolidated its power in the Capital, removed dissident elements in the government, deployed the CIA to oversee operations, launched a number of attacks on rebel forces in the east, transferred ownership of Ukraine’s vital pipeline system to US puppets and foreign corporations, created a tollbooth separating Moscow from the lucrative EU market, foiled a Russian plan to build an alternate pipeline to southern Europe (South Stream), built up its military assets in the Balkans and Black Sea and, finally–the cherry on the cake–initiated a daring sneak attack on Russia’s currency by employing its Saudi-proxy to flood the market with oil, push prices off a cliff, and trigger a run on the ruble which slashed its value by more than half forcing retail currency platforms to stop trading the battered ruble until prices stabilized.

Like we said, Putin might be a great chess player, but in his battle with the US, he’s getting his clock cleaned. So far, he’s been no match for the maniacal focus and relentless savagery of the Washington powerbrokers. Yes, he’s formed critical alliances across Asia and the world. He’s also created competing institutions (like the BRICS bank) that could break the imperial grip on global finance. And, he’s also expounded a vision of a new world in which “one center of power” does not dictate the rules to everyone else. That’s all great, but he’s losing the war, and that’s what counts. Washington doesn’t care about peoples’ dreams or aspirations. What they care about is ruling the world with an iron fist, which is precisely what they intend to do for the next century or so unless someone stops them. Putin’s actions, however admirable, have not yet changed that basic dynamic. In fact, this latest debacle (authored by the RCB) is a severe setback for the country and could impact Russia’s ability to defend itself against US-NATO aggression.

So what does Putin need to do to reverse the current trend?

The first order of business should be a fundamental change in approach followed by a quick switch from defense to offense. There should be no doubt by now, that Washington is going for the jugular. The attack on the ruble provides clear evidence that the US will not be satisfied until Russia has been decimated and reduced to “a permanent state of colonial dependency.” (Chomsky) The United States has launched a full-blown economic war on Russia and yet the Kremlin is still acting like Washington’s punching bag. You can’t win a war like that. You have to take the initiative; take chances, be bold, think outside the box. That’s what Washington is doing. The rout of the ruble is perhaps the most astonishingly-successful asymmetrical attack in recent memory. It involved tremendous risks and costs on the part of the perpetrators. For example, the lower oil prices have ravaged important domestic industries, created widespread financial instability, and sent markets across the planet into a nosedive. Even so, Washington persevered with its audacious strategy, undeterred by the vast collateral damage, never losing sight of its ultimate objective; to deprive Moscow of crucial oil revenues, to crash the ruble, and to open up Central Asia for imperial expansion and US military bases. (The pivot to Asia)

This is how the US plays the game, by keeping its “eyes on the prize” at all times, and by rolling roughshod over anyone or anything that gets in its way. That is why the US is the world’s only superpower, because the voracious oligarchs who run the country will stop at nothing to get what they want.

Does Putin have the grit to match that kind of venomous determination? Has he even adjusted to the fact that WW3 will be unlike any conflict in the past, that jihadi-proxies and Neo Nazi-proxies will be employed as shock troops for the empire clearing the way for US special forces and foot soldiers who will hold ground and establish the new order? Does he even realize that Barbarossa 2 is already underway, but that the Panzer divisions and 2 million German regulars have been replaced with high-powered computers, covert ops, color-coded revolutions, currency crises, capital flight, cyber attacks and relentless propaganda. That’s 4th Generation (4-G) warfare in a nutshell. And, guess what? The US attack on the ruble has shown that it is the undisputed master of this new kind of warfare. More important, Washington has just prevailed in a battle that could prove to be a critical turning point if Putin doesn’t get his act together and retaliate.

Retaliate?!?

You mean nukes?

Heck no. But, by the same token, you can’t expect to win a confrontation with the US by rerouting gas pipelines to Turkey or by forming stronger coalitions with other BRICS countries or by ditching the dollar. Because none of that stuff makes a damn bit of difference when your currency is in the toilet and the US is making every effort to grind your face into the pavement.

Capisce?

There’s an expression is football that goes something like this: The best defense is a good offense. You can’t win by sitting on the sidelines and hoping your team doesn’t lose. You must engage your adversary at every opportunity never giving ground without a fight. And when an opening appears where you can take the advantage, you must act promptly and decisively never looking back and never checking your motives. That’s how you win.

Washington only thinks in terms winning. It expects to win, and will do whatever is necessary to win. In fact, the whole system has been re-geared for one, sole purpose; to beat the holy hell out of anyone who gets out of line. That’s what we do, and we’ve gotten pretty good at it. So, if you want to compete at that level, you’ve got to have “game”. You’re going to have to step up and prove that you can run with the big kids.

And that’s what makes Putin’s next move so important, crucial really. Because whatever he does will send a message to Washington that he’s either up to the challenge or he’s not. Which is why he needs to come out swinging and do something completely unexpected. The element of surprise, that’s the ticket. And we’re not talking about military action either. That just plays to Uncle Sam’s strong hand. Putin doesn’t need another Vietnam. He needs a coherent gameplan. He needs a winning strategy. He needs to takes risks, put it all on the line and roll the freaking dice. You can’t lock horns with the US and play it safe. That’s a losing strategy. This is smash-mouth, steelcage smackdown, a scorched-earth event where winner takes all. You have to be ready to rumble.

Putin needs to think asymmetrically. What would Obama do if he was in Putin’s shoes?

You know what he’d do: He’d send military support to Assad. He’d arm rebel factions in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Nigeria and elsewhere. He’d strengthen ties with Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador providing them with military, intelligence and logistical support. He’d deploy his NGOs and Think Tank cronies to foment revolution wherever leaders refused to follow Moscow’s directives. He would work tirelessly to build the economic, political, media, and military institutions he needed to impose his own self-serving version of snatch-and-grab capitalism on every nation on every continent in the world. That’s what Obama would do, because that’s what his puppetmasters would demand of him.

But Putin must be more discreet, because his resources are more limited. But he still has options, like the markets, for example. Let’s say Putin announces that creditors in the EU (particularly banks) won’t be paid until the ruble recovers. How does that sound?

Putin: “We’re really sorry about the inconvenience, but we won’t be able to make those onerous principle payments for a while. Please accept our humble apologies.” End of statement.

Moments later: Global stocks plunge 350 points on the prospect of a Russian default and its impact on the woefully-undercapitalized EU banking system.

Get the picture? That’s what you call an asymmetrical attack. The idea was even hinted at in a piece on Bloomberg News. Here’s an excerpt from the article:

“Sergei Markov, a pro-Putin academic, wrote in a column on Vzglyad.ru. “Since the reasons for the ruble’s fall are political, the response should be political, too. For example, a law that would ban Russian companies from repaying debts to Western counterparties if the ruble has dropped more than 50 percent in the last year. That will immediately lower the pressure on the ruble, many countries have done this, Malaysia is one example. It’s in great economic shape now.” (Is Russia ready to impose capital controls? Chicago Tribune)

Here’s more background from RT:

“Major banks across Europe, as well as the UK, US, and Japan, are at major risk should the Russian economy default, according to a new study by Capital Economics. The ING Group in the Netherlands, Raiffeisen Bank in Austria, Societe General in France, UniCredit in Italy, and Commerzbank in Germany, have all faced significant losses in the wake of the ruble crisis…

Overall Societe General, known as Rosbank in the Russian market, has the most exposure at US$31 billion, or €25 billion, according to Citigroup Inc. analysts. This is equivalent to 62 percent of the Paris-based bank’s tangible equity, Bloomberg News reported.

Following the drop, Raiffeisen, which has €15 billion at risk in Russia, saw its stocks plummeted more than 10 percent. Raiffeisen also has significant exposure in Ukraine, which is facing a similar currency sell-off as Russia.” (Russia crisis leaves banks around the world exposed by the billions, RT)

So Putin defaults which nudges the EU banking system down the stairwell. So what? What does that prove?

It proves that Russia has the tools to defend itself. It proves that Putin can disrupt the status quo and spread the pain a bit more equitably. “Spreading the pain” is a tool the US uses quite frequently in its dealings with other countries. Maybe Putin should take a bite of that same apple, eh?

Another option would be to implement capital controls to avoid ruble-dollar conversion and further capital flight. The beauty of capital controls is that they take power away from the big money guys who run the world and hand it back to elected officials. Leaders like Putin are then in a position to say, “Hey, we’re going to take a little break from the dollar system for while until we get caught up. I hope you’ll understand our situation.”

Capital controls are an extremely effective of avoiding capital flight and minimizing the impact of a currency crisis. Here’s a short summary of how these measures helped Malaysia muddle through in 1998:

“When the Asian financial crisis hit, Malaysia’s position looked a lot like Russia’s today: It had big foreign reserves and a low short-term debt level, but relatively high general indebtedness if households and corporations were factored in. At first, to bolster the ringgit, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim pushed through a market-based policy with a flexible exchange rate, rising interest rates and cuts in government spending. It didn’t work: Consumption and investment went down, and pessimism prevailed, exerting downward pressure on the exchange rate.

So, in June 1998, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad… appointed a different economic point man, Daim Zainuddin. In September, on Daim’s urging, Malaysia introduced capital controls. It banned offshore operations in ringgit and forbade foreign investors to repatriate profits for a year. Analysts at the time were sharply critical of the measures, and Malaysia’s reputation in the global financial markets inevitably suffered.

According to Kaplan and Rodrik, however, the capital controls were ultimately effective. The government was able to lower interest rates, the economy recovered, the controls were relaxed ahead of time, and by May 1999 Malaysia was back on the international capital markets with a $1 billion bond issue.” (Is Russia ready to impose capital controls, Chicago Tribune)

Sure they were effective, but they piss off the slacker class of oligarchs who think the whole system should be centered on their “inalienable right” to move capital from one spot to another so they can rake-off hefty profits at everyone else’s expense. Capital controls push those creeps to the back of the line so the state can do what it needs to do to preserve the failing economy from the attack of speculators. Here’s a clip from a speech Joseph Stiglitz gave in 2014 at the Atlanta Fed’s 2014 Financial Markets Conference. He said:

“When countries do not impose capital controls and allow exchange rates to vary freely, this can give rise to high levels of exchange rate volatility. The consequence can be high levels of economic volatility, imposing great costs on workers and firms throughout the economy. Even if they can lay off some of the risk, there is a cost to doing so. The very existence of this volatility affects the structure of the economy and overall economic performance.”

That sums it up pretty well. Without capital controls, the deep-pocket Wall Street banks and speculators can simply vacuum the money out of an economy leaving the country broken and penniless. This nihilistic decimation of emerging markets via capital flight is what the kleptocracy breezily refers to as “free markets”, the unwavering plundering of civilization to fatten the coffers of the swinish few at the top of the foodchain. That’s got to stop.

Putin needs to put his foot down now; stop the outflow of cash, stop the conversion of rubles to dollars, force investors to recycle their money into the domestic economy, indict the central bank governors and trundle them off to the hoosegow, and reassert the power of the people over the markets. If he doesn’t, then the speculators will continue to peck away until Russia’s reserves are drained-dry and the country is pushed back into another long-term slump. Who wants that?

And don’t think that Putin’s only problem is Washington either, because it isn’t. He’s got an even bigger headache in his own country with the morons who still buy the hogwash that “the market knows best.” These are the fantasists, the corporate toadies, and the fifth columnists, some of whom hold very high office. Here’s a clip I picked up at the Vineyard of the Saker under the heading “Medvedev declares: more of the same”:

(Russian Prime Minister) “Medvedev has just called a government meeting with most of the directors of top Russian corporations and the director of the Russian Central Bank. He immediately announced that he will not introduce any harsh regulatory measures and that he will let the market forces correct the situation. As for the former Minister of Finance, the one so much beloved in the West, Alexei Kudrin, he expressed his full support for the latest increase in interest rates.”

This is lunacy. The US has just turned Russia’s currency into worthless fishwrap, and bonehead Medvedev wants to play nice and return to “business as usual”??

No thanks. Maybe Medvedev wants to be a slave to the market, but I’ll bet Putin is smarter than that.

Putin’s not going to roll over and play dead for these vipers. He’s got to much on the ball for that. He’s going to beat them at their own game, fair and square. He’s going to implement capital controls, restructure the economy away from the west, and aggressively look for ways to deter Washington from spreading its heinous resource war to Central Asia and beyond.

He’s not going to give an inch. You’ll see.

 

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The Legal Foundations Of The Islamic State – Analysis

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By Mara Revkin for Syria Comment

Notoriously violent groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS), and the Taliban are widely assumed to be lawless organizations. Judge Abraham Sofaer, former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, summed up this attitude when he stated in 1989, “Terrorists have no respect for law and no commitment to accept the rules of any legal system.” In this article, I explain why Sofaer’s claim is false. Evidence from recent and current insurgencies in the Middle East indicates that jihadist groups are in fact pre-occupied with the creation of law, justice, and order as a platform for state-building.

Observers of Islamist insurgencies in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Mali, have noted that one of the first things that jihadist groups do when they take over new territory is to establish courts and other legal institutions that facilitate governance. To understand and effectively confront the dangers posed by violent Islamist groups, it is imperative that policymakers take seriously their internal legal infrastructure and state-building aspirations. Although IS and other insurgent groups are promoting a version of rule of law that is deeply incompatible with liberal democratic principles of justice and equality, studying jihadists’ legal systems is essential to understanding how they use law to create a foundation for political power and legitimacy.

Examples of lawmaking by Islamist insurgent groups are abundant:

  • The Taliban establishes courts and appoints judges in newly conquered territories. It has built a school system to train judges.
  • IS’  “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appealed to judges and fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic jurisprudence) to join the Islamic state as one of his first acts of statesmanship. This targeted recruitment of legal experts is evidence of the centrality of law in al-Baghdadi’s state-building project.
  • IS deploys legal jurists known as shari’is alongside combatants in Syria to underscore the primacy of law. One of the functions of these embedded jurists is to advise military commanders on the legality of operations according to Islamic law, not unlike the role that American JAG lawyers play in monitoring and advising U.S. military commanders.
  • IS has created accountability mechanisms that enable civilians to seek legal redress for their grievances. For example, in early December, IS issued a document in Aleppo stating that civilians are entitled to legal redress through IS courts for alleged violations of their rights by IS combatants or commanders. In this video, an elderly civilian man describes how he successfully brought charges against an IS emir, who was subsequently convicted in an IS court and sent to prison.
  • IS’ concern with lawmaking is manifest in its publication of an 136-page document on December 6, 2014 that details ten Islamic rulings governing the (mis)treatment of prisoners of war. The rulings specify the conditions under which Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners may be killed, decapitated, tortured, enslaved, or mutilated. The rulings, which are scrupulously supported with Quranic verses, represents IS’ doctrine on the law of war and rules of engagement. While the document provides support for brutal practices that violate core principles of customary international humanitarian law – such as the absolute prohibition on torture – it nonetheless constitutes a detailed legal framework that regulates the conduct of IS fighters and imposes clear limits on permissible violence. mkluilso in December, IS distributed an illustrated pamphlet in Mosul clarifying the rules governing the treatment of non-Muslim female slaves. Although the pamphlet describes captured female slaves as “merely property” who can be bought, sold, beaten, and under certain conditions raped, the pamphlet does guarantee some very limited rights for captives. For example, a female slave can buy her freedom, a pregnant slave cannot be sold, and mothers cannot be separated from their children. The fact that IS would seek to impose any codified rules on the treatment of slaves – rather than allow their owners to exercise unlimited discretion – is another example of the many ways in which IS uses law to control populations in the territory it occupies.

The Paradox of Power and Constraint

Insurgent groups such as IS have the ability to wield violence and terror arbitrarily. Yet the examples above indicate that these groups frequently choose to create legal institutions and rules of warfare that restrict when and how they can they can use force against enemies. The fact that so many jihadist groups voluntarily tie their own hands by adopting legally binding rules of engagement suggests that insurgents derive strategic benefits – in terms of local support and legitimacy – when they establish systems of law and order. Legal scholars have long noted a paradoxical relationship between power and constraint, whereby leaders who voluntarily limit their own authority with self-imposed checks tend to enjoy greater popular support and therefore greater power. Insurgent groups that constrain themselves by establishing courts and other disciplinary institutions appear to be benefiting from this paradox.

An Islamist rebel group in Aleppo called “the Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and Supporting the Oppressed” was seen reviewing applications for aid on Feb. 25, 2013. In addition to handing out aid, the Islamist group said it was carrying out civilian administration in parts of Aleppo. Attorney Jamil Osman says he joined the court system because “it’s the religious ruling that Syrians want. The memories of the corrupt court system of the regime of President Bashar Assad are too fresh.” IS refused to join the Aleppo Sharia Council, but Shaykh Maqsuwd (الشيخ مقصود), who was photographed participating in the council, is an al-Nusra Judge.

In Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria, Islamist insurgencies have established justice systems that are widely perceived by civilians as more neutral, efficient, and committed to rule of law than state courts, which are frequently plagued by corruption, or in cases of extreme conflict such as Syria, have ceased to function at all.

For example, in this video, a civilian resident of Idlib describes how the establishment of an IS court in the city has improved security and stability, and notes that residents prefer IS courts over the “corrupt courts” of the Assad regime. In another video, a Syrian civilian claims that IS courts have reduced crime by 90 percent.

Although IS and other insurgent courts often inflict severe punishments and even torture, civilians may still view these courts as a fairer and more legitimate alternative to regime courts as long as their rulings – however punitive and harsh they may be – are administered according to consistent and transparent procedures.

Entrance to the Aleppo Sharia Commission in Aleppo City, headquartered in what was the Eye Hospital

Entrance to the Aleppo Sharia Commission in Aleppo City, headquartered in what was the Eye Hospital

There is strong historical support for the claim that law is an effective tool for legitimizing and maintaining political power in modern states, and if we think of insurgencies as “quasi-states,” “proto-states,” or even full-blown states – as IS purports to be – then we should expect to find that law plays as important a role in the formation of insurgent states as it did in the formation of modern bureaucracies.

The role of law in insurgent state-building is poorly understood, and this blog post will suggest some of the ways in which the creation of courts and justice systems may help insurgent groups to build legitimacy and consolidate power. In doing so, I draw on the history of legal institutionalization in modern Europe to argue that insurgent groups are using law to build political institutions in ways that are strikingly similar to processes of state formation that gave rise to Western industrialized bureaucracies.

The Legal Foundations of Insurgent States

Legal institutionalization has long been recognized as a critical phase in the consolidation of modern states, particularly in Europe, where Max Weber traced the origins of industrialized bureaucracies to a process of “legal-rational bureaucratization” in which traditional models of governance based on personal loyalty were gradually replaced by impersonal, “faceless” administrative institutions and objective legal rules. For those familiar with the history of bureaucratization in Europe, it should not be surprising that law is playing a similarly important role in the consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State. I outline below several of the ways in which IS, like any other state, is using law to strengthen its control over people and territory:

Legitimizing Violence

An essential criteria of statehood is the ability to claim a monopoly on legitimate violence that is justified by law. Islamist insurgent groups including IS appear to be more successful in gaining local support when they legitimize their use of violence through the establishment of a legal framework based on clear rules and procedures, as opposed to wielding violence arbitrarily. This claim is consistent with research suggesting that when insurgent groups resort to indiscriminate violence that is not disciplined by rules, civilians turn against them. As Jason Lyall has argued, “Indiscriminate violence can undermine an insurgent organization’s military effectiveness by driving a wedge between locals and insurgents.”

The alienating effects of arbitrary violence by Islamist groups were seen in the cases of Algeria (1990s) and Iraq (post-2001), where indiscriminate targeting of civilians by insurgent groups provoked a violent backlash. Al-Qaeda leaders later pointed to these unsuccessful insurgencies as cautionary lessons about the counterproductive consequences of unrestrained violence.

For example, after the killing of former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, U.S. intelligence recovered a letter in his possession from an Algerian al-Qaeda official who urged him to avoid repeating the mistakes of his country’s Armed Islamic Group: “[In] Algeria between 1994 and 1995 when [the GIA] was … on the verge of taking over the government … they destroyed themselves with their own hands with their lack of reason, delusions, ignoring the people, their alienation of them through oppression, deviance and severity, coupled with a lack of kindness, sympathy and friendliness.” Similarly, a member of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, Ansar al-Sharia, stated in an interview in 2012 that the group had “learned their lesson from Iraq,” and were focused on a “hearts and minds” campaign.

The cases of Iraq and Algeria suggest that one of the motivations underlying IS’s creation of an elaborate court system is to maintain discipline and cohesion within its own ranks and prevent the type of arbitrary violence that has undermined popular support for other Islamist insurgencies. Insurgencies are more successful when they develop internal regulatory mechanisms to ensure that violence – however extreme and brutal it may be – is only used according to well-defined rules and procedures, and IS is a clear example of this phenomenon. The practice of embedding jurists (shari’is) alongside combatants exemplifies the type of legal disciplinary mechanism that states create to justify and legitimize their monopoly on violence.

Discipline and Socialization

In addition to legitimizing violence, states have historically used law as a tool to discipline and socialize their citizens. Antonio Gramsci identified courts, along with schools, as the two most important instruments of state formation, citing the role of the “school as a positive educational function, and the courts as a repressive and negative educative function.”

IS appears to be using judicial and law enforcement institutions in a similar manner to maintain discipline within its own ranks and to socially engineer the society that it aspires to govern. In a clear example of the disciplinary function of jihadist lawmaking, this video shows IS morality police (referred to as al-hisba) confiscating hundreds of containers of cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs, and lighting them on fire. IS also uses law as a disciplinary tool to regulate the behavior of its own fighters and leaders.

For example, in October, IS executed two of its own fighters after they were tried and convicted on charges of banditry, spying, and embezzlement. In the same month, IS executed two of its own judges – both Kuwaiti nationals – after they were charged with spying.

These examples illustrate how IS uses law to maintain internal discipline and obedience.

Contracts

Another way in which law facilitates state-building is by enabling the enforcement of contracts that are essential to regulating social and economic relations, including not only concrete agreements concerning the exchange of property or money, but also the abstract “social contracts” that provide a basis for reciprocal rights and obligations between rulers and citizens. Anthony Giddens’ account of state formation emphasizes the importance of a “centralized legal order permitting and protecting an expanding range of contractual rights and obligations.”

The Islamic State appears to be using written contracts to organize economic and political activities in a similar manner. For example, IS drafts and signs written contracts governing the sale of smuggled oil – a lucrative black market industry that generates millions of dollars a day. The fact that IS goes through the trouble of formalizing oil sales with written contracts suggests that the group is actively trying to legitimize its activities to its followers and to the world.

Legal Pluralism and Fragmentation in Syria

While it is clear that IS and other Islamist insurgent groups in Syria are using law to consolidate political power and legitimacy, it is important to note that different factions are promoting competing and sometimes irreconcilable interpretations of Islamic law.

IS’ understanding of shari’a is the most conservative and orthodox – based strictly on the text of the Quran – but some of the more moderate Islamist groups are open to more flexible interpretations of Islamic law. The rivalry and fragmentation between different insurgent justice systems has given rise to a situation that law scholars recognize as “legal pluralism” or the coexistence of multiple systems of order within the same territorial jurisdiction.

The sharpest dispute between IS and other Islamist factions is over the permissibility of codifying (taqnīn) the shari’a in a written code. The Islamic State, like most other Salafi jihadist groups, fundamentally rejects the validity of codified or “man-made” law as an illegitimate violation of the principle of absolute divine sovereignty (tawhīd). According to this view, the shari’a is a complete and comprehensive body of law that can be interpreted and applied by judges; codification would unnecessarily distort its original meaning by introducing fallible human judgment.

Arguing against the strict textualist approach favored by IS, other Islamist factions and even a Salafi group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda are supporting the adoption of the Unified Arab Code (UAC), a codified body of law developed by the Arab League in the 1980s that is based primarily on the shari’a.

In August, the Islamic Sham Organization (a revolutionary Islamic scholarly association) published a document recommending the adoption of the UAC. Islamic Sham makes several pragmatic arguments for codification, summarized by Maxwell Martin, including the claim that a written code will make it easier for judges to apply the law and will provide a stable legal order until a unified national judiciary is established. The document points to the drawbacks of allowing a diverse and decentralized assortment of insurgent courts to interpret and apply the law as they see fit – a chaotic scenario that could be remedied by the adoption of a written code to which judges could look for guidance.

The debate over whether to codify the shari’a or instead allow judges to interpret it freely has important implications for legal stability and eventual post-conflict reconstruction in Syria. Interestingly, the arguments for and against codification are reminiscent of debates in European history concerning the design of legal systems under conditions of civil war, where the choice was between common law systems (where judges have broad discretion to shape the law according to independent interpretation) and civil law systems in which judges are constrained by a written code.

Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer have argued that common law systems are easier to implement in peaceful contexts (citing the example of 12th-13th century England), whereas civil law systems are more appropriate for conflict-ridden states in which judges are likely to be subject to “bullying” and coercion (such as France). Under conditions of conflict, civil law systems supposedly insulate judges “from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes.” This claim is relevant to the Syrian case, where a major obstacle to the establishment of a coherent and unified legal system will be the problem of distrust and infighting among rival factions.

The debate over the codification of Islamic law in Syria provides further evidence for my claim that insurgent groups use law to control people and territory in ways that are surprisingly similar to Western patterns of state formation. If Islamist insurgencies are understood as state-building projects, then it is logical to expect that law should play as important a role in the formation of IS’s caliphate as it did in the creation of Western bureaucracies. It is impossible to understand the rapid rise of the Islamic State without understanding the laws on which it is based.

Mara Revkin is a J.D./Ph.D. student in Political Science at Yale Law School/Yale University. She is on Twitter @MaraRevkin. Email mara.revkin@yale.edu

This article was originally published at Syria Comment and has been slightly edited.

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The Non-Arab Middle East: Iran, Turkey And Israel – OpEd

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A certain TV art critic, when discussing familiar masterpieces, used to insist on turning them upside down. He maintained that viewing a work of art from an unfamiliar perspective added greatly to one’s understanding. The same can apply in other spheres – for example, the geopolitics of the Middle East.

The Arab world is located fairly and squarely within that area of the globe now designated the Middle East (it has borne other names), but the Middle East is not exclusively Arab. In addition to the numerous non-Arab minorities that inhabit the region, three major non-Arab states straddle it – Iran, Turkey and Israel. In today’s world there is little love lost between them. It was not always so.

The three differ in several basic respects, the most obvious being size. Iran consists of some one-and–a-half million square kilometers, Turkey is about half that, while Israel is tiny by comparison at 21,000 square kilometers. Iran and Turkey both have populations pushing some 80 million; Israel barely achieves 8 million. In geopolitical influence, however, the three probably stand shoulder to shoulder.

Another basic difference is religion. While Israel is a Jewish state – the national home of the Jewish people – Iran and Turkey represent the conflicting branches of Islam. Iran is the leading exponent of the Shi-ite tradition; Turkey is a committed Sunni Muslim state.

Accordingly Iran and Turkey are actively engaged, though from opposing points of view, in the turmoil that has engulfed the Arab world.

In the Syrian civil war, Iran supports the Shia-associated regime of President Bashar Assad; Turkey regards Assad as its mortal enemy – partly because of his support for Kurdish independence. Many believe Turkey even goes as far as providing aid and comfort to the brutal, but Sunni, Islamic State (IS), which is intent on spreading its control over as much of Syria and Iraq as possible, before advancing even further into the Islamic world.

Underlying Iranian-Turkish antagonism lies the Iranian bid for political hegemony in the Middle East, to be underpinned by its acquisition of nuclear military capability – a bid that runs counter to the aspirations of Turkey’s new president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who also seeks to dominate the region. The ambitions of both, of course, conflict with those of the leading state of the Arab world – Egypt. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has two major enemies: the Muslim Brotherhood and its satellite, Hamas in Gaza. The former is heavily supported by Turkey; the latter, despite its Sunni adherence, by Iran as part of its anti-Israel policy.

For if anything unites the political philosophies of these two non-Arab states, it is their opposition to the third – Israel. Both Iran and Turkey seek to boost their popularity in the Arab world by unrestrained hostility towards Israel. Iran not only engages in terrorist activities against Israeli targets worldwide, but finances and supports anti-Israel terrorist action from wherever it emanates, in particular Shi-ite Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also Sunni Hamas in Gaza. Turkey under Erdogan, first as prime minister from 2003, now as president, has sought to enhance its credentials in the Muslim world by adopting a consistently anti-Israel stance.

It was not always so. Once the three non-Arab states stood side by side. Back in March 1949 Turkey was the first Muslim majority country to recognize the State of Israel; a year later Iran followed suit. Following Turkish recognition, cooperation between Turkey and Israel flourished, particularly in the military, strategic, and diplomatic spheres. Trade and tourism boomed, the Israel Air Force practiced maneuvers in Turkish airspace and Israeli technicians modernized Turkish combat jets. There were also plans for high-tech cooperation and water sharing.

When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister of Turkey in 2003, he initially maintained a “business as usual” approach, and indeed paid an official visit to Israel in 2005. However his sympathies, shaped by his Muslim Brotherhood background, very quickly resulted in his realigning Turkish policy in favor of an Islamist pro-Arab stance. Relations with Israel deteriorated rapidly, reaching their nadir in the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when an attempt, backed by the Turkish government, to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza led to an armed encounter on the high seas, which resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish nationals.

As for Iran, from the establishment of the State of Israel up to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, the two countries maintained close ties. Israel viewed Iran as a natural ally, and fostered the relationship as part of the strategy favored by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, of an “alliance of the periphery”. After the Six Day War in 1967, Iran supplied Israel with a significant portion of its oil needs, and Iranian oil was shipped to European markets via the joint Israeli-Iranian Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline. Israeli construction firms and engineers were active in Iran, and military projects are believed to have been wide-ranging, including an Iranian-Israeli attempt to develop a new missile.

In December 1979 the Islamist Ayatollah Khomenei became Supreme Leader of Iran. Before the end of the year, Iran had severed diplomatic relations with Israel, and withdrawn its recognition.

How extraordinary, therefore, that the leading Arab media organisation, Al-Arabiya, on its website on December 16, 2014, should run a long article by Turkish political analyst, Ceylan Ozbudak, headed: “Old Friends Can’t be Foes”. In it she maintains that “a new warmth is in the air for Turkey-Israel relations,” citing Israel’s offer of $20 to $23 million in compensation for the families of the nine Turkish nationals killed during the Mavi Marmara incident as “a major step forward to secure a normalization process with Turkey”. This, she says, can lead to further positive developments for both countries, and the region, in terms of security, economy and foreign policy. “Today,” she maintains, “with the latest situation in the Middle East and the ongoing Syrian situation, the countries need the partnership of each other maybe more than ever.”

In support of this, she claims that a Turkey-bound pipeline is the most feasible option for exporting the natural gas being developed in Israel’s offshore exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that four Turkish companies are currently involved in negotiations to begin importing Israeli gas starting in 2017.

Ozbudak points out that Turkey is the only regional country to which both Iranian and Israeli citizens can travel without a visa. Turkey, she maintains, is moving towards a closer diplomatic relationship with Iran. “It’s also high time,” she asserts, “to come closer to Israel to be able to mediate between the two countries when the need emerges.”

Turkey as honest broker between Israel and Iran? That would indeed be an upside-down world – a re-aligned Turkey and a radically different Iran. But we’ve been there before, and what goes around, comes around. It’s a thought.

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Obama And Pope Are Right On Cuba – OpEd

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President Obama made the right decision on Cuba. Kudos also to Pope Francis for working to break the stalemate between the United States and Cuba. While a lot of foolish things have been said by those on both sides of this issue, the fact is that the only losers in this gambit are the Communists in Cuba.

Cuba’s economy is in deep trouble, and its patrons in Venezuela are in no position to help them. The amount of traffic that this opening will bring—look for hoards of Cubans and non-Cubans to line up for travel to Cuba—will ineluctably whet the Cuban appetite for more freedom. Once Cubans learn more about the lifestyle of their relatives in the U.S., and the freedoms they enjoy, they will press for more changes.

Economic liberty does not guarantee political liberty, but it does work to undermine the forces of repress ion. More important than markets is the exchange of ideas that this rapprochement will bring. And no idea is more threatening to a dictatorship than liberty. While no one expects a Jeffersonian democracy to appear overnight, historically these kinds of thaws work to undermine the tyrants. Given the proximity of the two nations, the vector of change will move more quickly toward freedom.

Ever since Pope John Paul II’s visit to Cuba in 1998, the Catholic Church has been gaining more breathing room there. The recent decision by the Cuban government to allow Cubans from Tampa, Florida to fund the construction of a Catholic Church on the island is a good omen. There will be more such opportunities. As with economic liberty, religious liberty also works to facilitate political liberty.

Fidel Castro was a wealthy man who did more to punish the poor than any of his predecessors. A true Communist—he once begged Herbert Matthews of the New York Times to stop calling him an agrarian reformer and start labeling him a Communist—he is the ultimate loser in this development.

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Ruble Trouble: The Politics Of Russia’s Financial Crisis – Analysis

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By Chris Miller*

The Russian ruble’s wild ride—starting the week at 58 to the dollar, spiking to nearly 80 on Tuesday, and settling back near 60 by Thursday—has left many questioning Russia’s political and economic stability. Since the ruble’s sharp fall on ‘Black Tuesday,’ a series of measures, from a 6.5 percentage point hike in the Central Bank’s main lending rate, to promises of an extensive bailout of the banking sector, appear to have restored the ruble to its previous level, at least temporarily. Yet the crisis will have serious long term ramifications. The economic problems that sparked the crisis have only been swept under the rug, while aftershocks are still reverberating through Russia’s political system. Why has the ruble been so volatile? And how will the crisis change Russia?

A Backdoor Bailout

Much of the ruble’s decline over the past several months has closely tracked the falling price of oil, but the ruble’s collapse earlier this week was not linked to the oil price. Instead, it was caused by a loss of faith in the country’s mechanisms for governing the financial system. The Central Bank of Russia has long been seen as one the best governed institutions in the Russian government and is broadly trusted by financial markets as a neutral arbiter.

That changed last week, as Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil giant, received a $10 billion bailout from the central bank that violated the implicit rules-of-the-game and marked a new, more explicit politicization of the central bank. Rosneft, which is prohibited by Western sanctions from raising funds in the West, owes $7 billion in loan repayments that are due on Dec. 21, but it struggled to finance its debts. Rosneft hoped to receive funds from one of the government’s long-term savings funds, but the process was dragging on, and Rosneft leadership apparently feared it would not come before debt payments were due.

Rosneft worked with state-owned banks and the central bank to issue 625 billion rubles of new securities at an interest rate that was even lower than the Russian government pays on debt. The central bank accepted these securities as collateral, allowing the banks that purchased Rosneft securities to offload them on the central bank, and receive newly-created rubles in return. In essence, the transaction amounted to paying for Rosneft’s debt by printing rubles.

The Rosneft refinancing spooked markets for three reasons. First, it underscored the power of leading state-owned companies, which are evidently capable of hijacking central bank policymaking to refinance their debt. Second, it suggested that the central bank itself was losing control of monetary policy, and that the ruble was becoming an object of political conflict between interest groups. Finally, the Rosneft refinancing set a dangerous precedent. If other companies refinanced their debt in a similar fashion, it would devalue the ruble and spark even higher inflation.

Investors fled the ruble in response, and the currency’s exchange rate with the euro and dollar fluctuated wildly. Sergey Shvetsov, an official at the central bank, said that “We couldn’t imagine what’s happening in our worst nightmare even a year ago,” while Uralsib, a Moscow-based investment bank, predicted a “fully-blown crisis developing in Russia” and argued that a “bank run is on the cards.” Whether or not bank runs come to pass, it is clear that the Rosneft bailout has sparked an institutional crisis that calls into question the fundamentals of Russia’s financial system. The country’s political balance may shift rapidly as a result.

A Struggle for Resources

The plummeting ruble has placed immense stress on Russia’s political system, as it struggles to divide a shrinking pie. Bloomberg News calculated that Russia’s 15 richest men have lost a collective $50 billion over the past year, as the falling ruble forced down asset prices. In the aftermath of the central bank’s Rosneft bailout, other oligarchs and interest groups have been jockeying to get their time at the trough. Oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, for example, called on the central bank to auction off additional liquidity even if buyers lack credible collateral, which would function as a transfer of resources from the government to banks.

The apparent inability of the central bank to stem the crisis has emboldened those who believe its orthodox economic policies helped cause the crisis. Sergey Glazyev, a Putin aide who had been shortlisted to lead the central bank before Nabiullina was selected, as criticized the bank for cutting of credit to the real economy. Glazyev, who has long backed a policy of easier monetary policy, argued that the central bank’s decision to increase interest rates is starving the real economy of credit while emboldening “speculators.” Glazyev’s call for more industrial subsidies is backed by many others in the elite. Dmitry Rogozin, the deputy prime minister in charge of the military-industrial complex, has used the crisis to advocate import substitution and for higher subsidies for industry—policies that would benefit the interest groups he represents. As the crisis deepens, the struggle between oligarchic groups will only increase. Putin may struggle to maintain balance.

Retreat from Ukraine?

Media attention has focused on the collapse in the ruble’s value, but the past several days have seen surprising statements from Moscow, Kyiv, and from Western diplomats suggesting that Russia may be backing down from its aggressive posture in Eastern Ukraine. Diplomatic efforts have focused on reviving the Minsk ceasefire agreement, which Russia and Ukraine signed in September and which were promptly broken.

This week, however, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko reported that fighting along the line separating Ukrainian government forces from Russian-backed separatists had calmed considerably. Ukraine’s military said that shelling near Donetsk airport—previously at the center of the conflict—had declined by 80 to 90 percent. Poroshenko signaled that he was placing renewed emphasis on implementing the Minsk ceasefire.

Russia, too, appears newly willing to move toward a settlement with Kyiv, judging by recent statements from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Such statements should be read with caution, both because Lavrov is not himself a key decision maker on questions of foreign policy, and because during the past year, there has often been a wide gap between the public statements of Russian leaders and their actions on the ground.

Nonetheless, Lavrov’s rhetoric over the past two days is notably different than before. He has lavished praise on Ukraine’s president Poroshenko, calling him “Ukraine’s best chance.” Lavrov also highlighted what he portrayed as a newly productive dialogue between the two countries. “I can’t say that there are any difficulties in contacts with the president of Ukraine,” Lavrov. “At the level of the leaders of the two countries there is a regular dialogue.”

Russian-Ukrainian dialogue has become more productive, it appears, because Moscow may be backing down from much if its earlier rhetoric that threatened Ukraine’s sovereignty over its eastern provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk, in the Donbass region. The Kremlin began building the insurgency in the Donbass while claiming that it was backing local calls for more autonomy from Kyiv. The rebels were not ‘separatists’, in Russia’s terminology, they were ‘supporters of federalization.’ Russia was widely believed to be backing federalization because such a policy would maintain the Kremlin’s influence in the Donbass and therefore in Ukraine more widely.

Now, though, Russia appears to be back peddling on its demands for federalization. On Dec. 16—as the ruble began its sharpest fall yet—Lavrov told a French TV station that “we aren’t suggesting federalization or autonomy [for the Donbass]…That is a question for Ukrainians.” Indeed, Lavrov claimed that the idea of federalization and autonomy came from European officials, rather than from Russia. This is false, but it provides additional evidence that Russia may be backing away from its strongest demands in Ukraine. Lavrov also explicitly stated that, with the exception of Crimea, which Russia no longer recognizes as part of Ukraine, the Kremlin believes that Ukraine’s “territorial integrity should be supported in its [current] form”—that is, Donbass should stay part of Ukraine.

Moscow had never adopted a policy of recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed republics in the East, but the past few weeks have seen fewer top officials discussing ‘Novorossia,’ a region that Russian nationalists believe encompasses much of southern and eastern Ukraine and which, they believe, should be independent from Kyiv or annexed to Russia. In a major speech in early December, Putin declined to use the word ‘Novorossia’ and focused entirely on Crimea, a territory he described as ‘sacred’ to Russians. This overblown rhetoric about Crimea is an attempt to refocus Russians’ attentions on the ‘success’ in Crimea—and to distract them from the fact that the Kremlin has gotten mired down in the Donbass. More than at any point since the war began, it looks as though the Kremlin is preparing to call a retreat.

Why? Russians themselves are unenthusiastic about the war—polls suggest that most Russians are unaware that the Kremlin deployed troops in the Donbass, and oppose such a move. At the same time, the economic costs of the war are beginning to hit home. For one thing, paying for the establishment of the new governing structures in the Donbass was turning into a more expensive proposition that the Kremlin appeared to have initially realized. Equally important is the rising cost of Western sanctions. While Russian officials long downplayed the effect of sanctions, now many Kremlin allies are openly blaming sanctions for the crisis. On December 17, for example, Alexey Pushkov, head of the Duma’s foreign affairs committee, complained on twitter that “The EU is not interested in the collapse of the Russian economy, [but] it will seriously hit Europe. The consequences are already being felt from Finland to Italy. Sanctions are dangerous.”

The effect of sanctions are felt across Europe, but they are only a real danger to Russia, which is why the Russian elite is pushing for policy shifts that would lead the West to lift sanctions. In recent days, Western diplomats have highlighted their willingness to remove sanctions if Russia changes its policy in the Donbass. “These sanctions could be lifted in a matter of weeks or days, depending on the choices that President Putin takes,” US Secretary of State John Kerry said this week. Kerry also underscored that “Russia has made constructive moves in the last days and there are some indications that whether it is the line of control negotiation or the calm that is, in fact, in place…the withdrawal of certain people, there are signs of constructive choices.” If Kerry is correct—if Lavrov’s new rhetoric is being coupled with serious action on the ground—a deal over the Donbass may be closer than many expect. If so, Moscow’s deepening financial crisis is a main reason why.

Conclusion: The Conflict between the TV and the Fridge

Historian Nikolai Svanidze has described current Russian policy as a conflict between the TV and the Fridge. Russian propaganda—the TV—has spun a narrative of Putin as a skilled and decisive leader. That story worked for a while, but reality is catching up. Higher prices for food and other basic goods—what Svanidze calls the Fridge—are beginning to illustrate the true costs of Putin’s policies, especially his war in Ukraine.

The West hopes that the economic crisis will force Putin to seek relief from sanctions by cutting a deal on Ukraine. Such an outcome is more likely, but it is still far from guaranteed. Putin has staked his credibility on the conflict, building up a nationalist movement in Russia that opposes any retreat. Having declared that the people of the Donbass face a “fascist” threat from the government in Kyiv, Putin will struggle to explain a policy of disengagement, even given his control of Russia’s media.

The currency crisis has heightened the economic stakes of Putin’s decisions. Russia’s leadership is skilled at blaming the West for domestic problems, but the Kremlin’s dilemma is that a deal over Ukraine, which is the only way the West will lift sanctions, would contradict the narrative that Russia is under siege. Even if the currency crisis leads to a deal over Ukraine and the lifting of sanctions, the results of this crisis will shape Russia’s domestic politics for years.

About the author:
*Chris Miller, Associate Scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale. In 2012-2014, he worked as a visiting researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center while on an Alfa Fellowship and taught history at the New Economic School, a university in Moscow. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Source:
This article was published here by FPRI.

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India: J&K Elections Of Competing Nationalisms – Analysis

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By Kaustav Chakrabarti*

India’s counterinsurgency rhetoric is steeped in the grievance school of thought − the argument that civil wars result from widespread feelings of grievances borne out of political, economic, or ethnic deprivation. According to this view, marginalised people excluded from democratic institutions feel alienated from the mainstream and hence bear arms to reassert their rights. Whether it is resentment arising out of successive rigged elections in Kashmir, ethnic slight caused by the storming of the Golden Temple in Punjab, or sub-national aspirations in the North-East, New Delhi’s dominant narrative is infused with sympathy and apologies, expressed in hindsight. It follows that the rhetoric is matched with the practice of supplementing the application of violence with restoration of elections and the disbursement of development aid to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of previously disenfranchised citizens.

The policy is driven by the supposed palliative effects of democratic institutions, specifically their ability to provide a channel for people to address their differences using the power of public office, and in the process wean away the majority of insurgent sympathisers. To be fair, it is possible that people participate in elections to address their economic needs and simultaneously support the insurgency to advance their political demands. Counterinsurgency recognises this and considers identity to be malleable. Successive free and fair elections, effective government, and economic development, in time, are believed to blunt the edges of ethno-nationalism. Counterinsurgency, in this view, is the Clausewitzian politics by other means. Elections are the benchmark for assessing counterinsurgency performance, and public participation in the process is considered to be a measure of normalisation. The road to stability, it seems, passes through elections.

The theoretical foundation of India’s strategy yields a simple prediction − high voter turnout in yet another State assembly election in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) suggests a consistent increase in people’s faith in democratic institutions. The first two phases of polling registered more than 71 per cent voting. Constituencies more likely to vote in high numbers are known to be front-loaded in the polling schedule. The actual turnout could be less when the final turnout is announced after the end of polling; nevertheless, overall participation is likely to remain high. This suggests that J&K has turned the corner, and democracy is celebrated as a critical factor. After all, if elections were regarded as dubious, why would the masses participate in high numbers?

Yet, the last five years has been anything but ‘normal’ in Kashmir. The State administration was beset with one mass protest after the other − the Amarnath land agitation, the Shopian rape case, unprecedented protests in 2010 following the Machil fake encounter and death of 17-year-old Tufail Mattoo and most recently, public dismay over the government’s handling of the floods. I travelled to J&K during the last week of October to learn about people’s views of India’s response to the conflict. Despite having read a fairly diverse literature on the topic, I was stuck with a sense of widespread lack of credibility of ‘Indian democracy’.

Widespread cynicism

Be it urban Srinagar or rural Kupwara, the grouse is similar: India controls the democratic process and exercises its veto at various levels. To reproduce some of the sentiments expressed, New Delhi is believed to ‘manage’ elections by ensuring that no local party can form a government without support from a national party. Rigging has given way to ‘sophisticated management’ of elections. I was explained how strongholds of parties out of favour in New Delhi witness boycott calls and stone-pelting to deter voting, while bases of support for its rivals are insulated from such intimidation. The State’s fiscal autonomy is believed to be deliberately stalled, in contrast to the general trend in other States following the economic reforms of 1991. Cynicism is writ large over conversations about politics; one veteran professor simply described India’s actions as ‘wretched’.

The most damning indictment of India’s ‘political’ strategy is how leaders who agree to participate in elections or hold peace dialogues with New Delhi end up ‘delegitimised’ by the local population. The incumbent National Conference, its rival People’s Democratic Party (PDP), as well as separatist leaders like Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah, and Sajjad Lone, cease to command either the stature or the mass following as a result of holding peace talks with India that have so far precluded the option of greater autonomy − the most popular condition for resolving the conflict short of independence. The reasons that have made this demand so enduring and non-negotiable in the Valley’s political life require greater study; perhaps it is the historicity of the conflict that has sharpened the salience of ethnicity and made Kashmiri exceptionalism so sticky.

The message from Kashmir to its leaders is clear − negotiating with India when it does not consider autonomy as a feasible option is tantamount to being an agent to its pacifying program. Perhaps the best metaphor to encapsulate this is the mausoleum of ‘Sheikh Saab’ – one of the founders of the National Conference and arguably Kashmir’s most important public figure, Sheikh Abdullah.

Abdullah had launched a mass movement for greater civil rights against the Maharaja before independence, implemented the finest land reform program in India and emancipated the peasantry, and served 20 years in prison for refusing to accept India’s demand of forgoing the demand of plebiscite. His pioneering role gave him the sobriquet ‘Sher-e-Kashmir’ [Lion of Kashmir]. He relented and finally accepted India’s terms during his dying years, and was elected Chief Minister once again in 1977 with a large majority. Yet, for this final act of submission, his grave, located on the banks of the Dal Lake paints a lonely picture. Rather than attract crowds of followers who once equated him with a Pir or [saint], it has to be protected by central security forces to prevent its abuse. This fate, I was told repeatedly, awaits Kashmiri leaders who agree to talk to New Delhi on the latter’s terms.

For a political entrepreneur in Kashmir, electoral politics presents a dilemma: access to public office provides an opportunity of attaining the high stature of becoming peacemaker to one of the oldest disputes in the UN; yet, the very attachment to formal politics runs the risk of becoming ‘irrelevant’ to the masses.

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) accent to power in New Delhi and its likely success in the State elections are likely to exacerbate the dilemma mentioned above. Two reasons account for this − changes in its policy towards Pakistan, and increased polarisation of J&K’s electorate between a fractured Muslim Kashmir and an increasingly consolidated non-Muslim Jammu and Ladakh region.

First, the government’s decision to cancel talks with Pakistan over its High Commissioner’s meeting with the Hurriyat Conference suggests a restitution of India’s previous position of treating the Kashmir conflict as a bilateral dispute between two sovereign states. Though the view of Kashmiri leaders of various denominations may be considered, it seems, they are no longer considered party to the negotiations. On this negotiating table, foreign policy analyst C. Raja Mohan, writes, there is simply no room for a third chair. Increasing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in terms of economic capacity, military strength, and diplomatic clout appears to be the determinant of India’s decision to shrink its bargaining space and dictate the terms of talks with Pakistan. Driven by Thucydidian logic, New Delhi’s newly acquired worldview obviates innovative solutions like soft borders, joint management of the region, and greater autonomy.

Second, Kashmir’s ability to influence policy changes in New Delhi is hampered by shifting bases of support of local and national parties. The Amarnath land agitation of 2008 in Kashmir led to a counter protest in the Jammu region which demanded an end to the perceived ‘appeasement’ of Kashmir within the State at the expense of the Jammu and Ladakh regions. Why is the State Chief Minister always a Kashmiri Muslim, Jammu asked. The movement generated increased support for the BJP in the Jammu region, traditionally a Congress stronghold. This occurred alongside the party’s increased nation-wide popularity at the wake of strong anti-incumbency sentiment against the UPA-2. During the General Elections in May, the BJP led in 30 of the 37 Assembly segments in Jammu and 3 of the 4 in Ladakh, and is expected to replicate the performance in the ongoing State elections. In fact, its strategy to win the J&K elections, presented as ‘Mission 44′, has garnered support among the Hindu Kashmiri Pandit migrant community spread in and around Delhi region, and sought collaboration with individual leaders in the Valley. Sajjat Ghani Lone’s recent meeting with Narendra Modi fuelled speculation about such a strategy at work.

Competing nationalisms

The BJP’s popularity in the Jammu region has risen along with the Congress’s spectacular decline: its last Chief Minister, Ghulam Nabi Azad, failed to defend his constituency during the national elections. The Jammu electorate has consolidated itself about the BJP ‘wave’. In stark contrast, the Valley’s votes are still divided between the National Conference (NC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Despite a dismal performance since 2008, the NC retains the support among older voters who still retain loyalty to ‘Sheikh Saab’ and rural areas where its cadre managed to survive insurgent violence during the 90s. In addition, some parts of the Valley where the Hurriyat organisation is strong will most likely refrain from voting, further fracturing the electorate.

Poll analysts in J&K seem certain that the BJP will sweep Jammu and the PDP will emerge as the largest party in Kashmir. But this remains to be seen. Without a clear majority, their collaboration will be interesting to watch; both represent competing nationalisms, the PDP based on securing Kashmiri autonomy, while the BJP intent on subsuming it within Indian nationalism.

Will the BJP allow popular programmes suggested by the PDP that are typecast as ‘pro-separatist’ among security circles, such as rehabilitation of former insurgents especially those based in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, greater leniency towards stone-pelters, transfer of water resources, demilitarisation, and ‘self-rule’, the party’s articulation of autonomy? The BJP has threatened to veto any measure to dilute the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) as suggested recently by former Home Minister P. Chidambaram. What does this mean for the PDP’s rising popularity in the Valley; for how long will people depose their faith on their party as its promised policies are vetoed by a possible national coalition partner?

From the vantage point of Lal Chowk, this presents a contradiction in India’s policy towards Kashmir and the limit of the praxis of political realism. True to the traits of a rising power, India external goal is driven by maximising power in relation to Pakistan and negotiating disputes on terms favourable to it. Soft borders, joint management, and consultation with the separatist leadership are ruled out. Precisely because of its newfound intransigence, India’s domestic goal of creating liberal democratic institutions is compromised. From New Delhi, forgoing autonomy reflects power and statecraft; from Srinagar, it reeks of submission, an unfair settlement and in words of a Kashmir University professor, an ‘ugly peace’.

(Kaustav Chakrabarti is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

Courtesy: The Hindu, December 18, 2014

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Islamic State Executes 100 Foreign Fighters For Trying To Quit – Report

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ISIS ‘military police’ executed 100 foreign fighters who attempted to quit and flee from the insurgents’ de-facto capital of Raqqa in northern Syria as frustration among militants has been growing, a UK newspaper reported citing a witness activist.

“Local fighters are frustrated — they feel they’re doing most of the work and the dying . . . foreign fighters who thought they were on an adventure are now exhausted,” an activist, opposed to both the Syrian regime and Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS/ISIL), told The Financial Times newspaper, which claims the source is reliable.

The activist said he had “verified 100 executions of foreign ISIS fighters trying to flee the northern Syrian city of Raqqa.”

The media reported that the insurgents created a “military police to crack down” on those unwilling to serve the so-called Islamic State.

In a bid to control how jihadists fulfill their tasks, the IS reportedly created some kind of documentation. The paper also reported, citing activists, that many fighters serving the IS have been arrested after their homes were raided.

“In Raqqa, they have arrested 400 members so far and printed IDs for the others,” the activist who asked his name to be withheld for security reasons said.

He also said that some fighters have become discontent and frustrated with their leaders and disillusioned with the realities of fighting for IS, through warning the change of mood “doesn’t affect the hardcore people of ISIS.”

According to the report, foreign militants have often been the most active in major battles, but most of the demands are put on local fighters.

“They feel they are the ones going to die in big numbers on the battlefield but they don’t enjoy any of the foreigners’ benefits — high salaries, a comfortable life, female slaves,” the activist from Deir Ezzor said.

Another problem in the ISIS ranks is growing tensions between fighters of different ethnic groups, the report says.

“Many fighters apparently group themselves by ethnicity or nationality — a practice which undermines ISIS’s claim to be ridding Muslims of national borders,” The Financial Times reported.

A point of no return?

Volunteers to fight for ISIS have been flocking to the region from all over the world. Up to 11,000 fighters from 74 nations had gone to Syria to fight for militant groups during the protracted civil war with up to 2,800 from the West, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London (ICSR) estimated last year.

France, Germany and the UK account for the largest number of citizens fighting with militants in Syria. UK media reported in September that five disillusioned Britons accompanied by three Frenchmen, two Germans and two Belgians were stripped of their weapons and taken prisoner by their militant commanders after an attempt to flee Syria.

In November, British PM David Cameron said that ISIS jihadists returning from the conflict region will be barred from coming home. Between 30 and 50 Britons want to return but fear they face jail, according to researchers at ICSR.

In September, France’s parliament opened a debate on a bill to cope with the terrorism threat. Bill aims at imposing a travel ban on those suspected of planning terror activities.

Meanwhile, the first German was to be tried for fighting with ISIS was sentenced to 45 months in jail in December. German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere has urged to “especially prevent [the militants’] return as fighters to carry out attacks in Europe.”

The militants have experienced losses in the past weeks. On Thursday Iraqi Kurds claimed they broken IS siege of Iraq’s Sinjar mountain during a two-day attack, involving 8,000 peshmerga fighters and US-led airstrikes, AFP reported. The victory freed hundreds of people from Iraq’s Yazidi religious minority, who had been trapped on the mountain since August. At the same time US Pentagon announced the strikes killed several ISIS leaders.

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Tunisians Anticipate Sunday’s Run-Off Election

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For the first time in their history, the Tunisians will have to stay up very late tomorrow night before they can learn the name of their new president. Optimists see this as an achievement, while pessimists like to remind them that the next president will rule for five full years (or a maybe less). Some mischievously quip that they intend to vote for 88-year-old Beji Caid Essebsi because they expect him to die soon, after which they would get new elections ahead of their constitutional date.

The ‘pessimistic-optimism’ of the Tunisians does not stop here. Doubts and questions loom heavily over the political landscape. But the most important question seems to be about whether the fledgling democracy – the only one that has succeeded (for the time being according to pessimists) in the countries of the so-called Arab Spring countries – would last.

The concerns have to do primarily with two main issues. First, there is the volatile regional situation, from Syria to Egypt all the way to neighboring Libya, where a brutal civil war is raging allowing some terrorist groups to gain a foothold there. These concerns have been exacerbated by recent threats made by jihadi terrorist leaders in Tunisia, including Abu Bakr al-Hakim, who for the first time claimed responsibility for the assassinations in Tunisia in the past two years.

The second issue has to do with the sharp tensions seen during the electoral campaigns for the run-off round of the presidential elections. The two contenders, incumbent 69-year-old President Moncef Marzouki, and his rival Beji Caid Essebsi, the candidate for Nidaa Tounes, and their supporters have been engaging in relentless mudslinging and punches “under the belt” against each other.

A climate of tension:

One of the accusations that the two sides have exchanged is “seeking to divide society and undermine national unity.”
The controversy began in the wake of the last legislative election, in which the Nidaa Tounes coalition (consisting of cadres of the disbanded Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), in addition to former leftists, liberals, and trade unionists) beat its main rival the al-Nahda Party (Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated), Marzouki’s main ally in this election. The results showed Nidaa Tounes ahead in polls, especially in northern provinces, and al-Nahda in the south, with influence shared almost equally in the center. As result, there were comments and analyses regarding this north-south divide, including comments that were unfortunate, while many remarks were used out of context to discredit opponents.

However, the peak of the tension was undoubtedly was when Marzouki called his rival Caid Essebsi, without naming him, al-Taghut, which roughly translates to “tyrant” but is a term used by some jihadists to accuse their opponents of idolatry and justify their murder. Marzouki apologized later for the “gaffe.” On the other hand, Essebsi, in a statement to a French radio station, claimed that Salafi-Jihadists support Marzouki, a self-styled moderate secularist and human rights advocate, as Essebsi said.

This tension was more visible and crude among the two men’s supporters. Marzouki’s supporters have no qualms about describing Essebsi as a demented old man and a “ghool” [monstrous juggernaut], fearing his party would become unstoppable if it adds the presidency to the government and parliamentary majority in its possession. Meanwhile, Essebsi’s supporters have called Marzouki “al-mahboul” (the idiot), having called him “al-tartour” (the lackey), throughout the tenure of the former troika.

The alignments game:

After the close results in the first round (39.46 percent of Caid Essebsi versus 33.43 percent for Marzuki), the two contenders have spared no effort to woo the supporters of the candidates who were excluded in the first round. Both men’s strategy is based on fear-mongering.

The supporters of Caid Essebsi portray Marzouki as al-Nahda’s candidate, and say if he remains in office, the violence perpetrated by the Leagues for the Protection of the Tunisian Revolution would continue against opponents, along with the leniency shown with Salafis and terrorism. Meanwhile supporters of Marzouki portray Caid Essebsi as the candidate of the former regime and the disbanded ruling party, and say that his victory would end the democratic process and reinstate the policy of uprooting Islamists and then the rest of the opposition as happened under Ben Ali and now in Egypt.

Despite the exaggeration involved, these accusations are not completely devoid of the truth. Clearly, the al-Nahda popular base and some prominent leaders like clerics Sadik Chourou and Habib al-Lawz, who are close to the Salafis, support Marzouki, who they say is the only one who can prevent their re-incarceration.

This is despite the fact that al-Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi continues to play all sides, having said repeatedly that his movement, which did not put forward a candidate in the first round, stands at the same distance from both candidates. Furthermore, Ghannouchi has not stopped trying to woo “the friend Mr. Beji” to get him to agree to the idea of a national unity government bringing their two parties together.

It is also evident that Nidaa Tounes relies more than any other side on the base of the disbanded RCD (Ben Ali’s party), especially in the countryside, and on financial and media lobbies close to the RCD.

To win over the critical voter block that would decide the results of the second round, Essebsi knows that he cannot count on the support of the smaller parties (the Destourians, liberals, and center-left parties). Similarly, Marzouki knows that he cannot benefit much from the support of the small parties that back him (Islamists and centrists).

For this reason, both candidates are trying to woo the supporters of the Popular Front (the alliance of nationalist and leftist parties), whose candidate Hamma Hammami came third in the first round with about 8 percent of votes.

Huge popular pressure has been brought on the supporters and leaders of the Popular Front. However, Nidaa Tounes has put greater pressure. Some of its leaders, especially former leftists, have sought to remind – if not emotionally blackmail – the Popular Front for the blood of the martyr Chokri Belaid and their previous alliance last year in the Salvation Front, after the assassination of the second leader of the Popular Front Mohammed Brahmi.

This pressure is based primarily on Essebsi’s pledges to “uncover the truth about the assassinations,” as an important segment of the supporters of the Popular Front suspect leaders from al-Nahda were involved, and also accuse Marzouki of “covering up the crime.”

After dragging its feet for the past several weeks, trying to get a pledge from Nidaa Tounes not to form a coalition government with al-Nahda, the leaders of the Popular Front made their final decision on Thursday, calling on supporters not to vote for Marzouki, and giving them the choice to vote for Caid Essebsi. This position caused a great controversy, but it may not be enough to settle the results of a very risky election, as many Tunisians see it.

Original article

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Role Of Economy In Iran-Turkey Relations – Analysis

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By Fahimeh Ghorbani*

Political relations between Iran and Turkey have continued steadily since the 1979 Islamic Revolution despite the existence of structural differences between them. A close look at the ties between the two neighbors shows that economy as one of factors has played an important and fundamental role in facilitating the expansion and continuation of their relations. It is worth mentioning though that their bilateral interests in maintaining regional stability and their commitment to containing and controlling Kurdish separatist movements in the Middle East, i.e. their security cooperation, are two other important factors contributing in the consolidation of their political relations. However, what I will be discussing here today is the contribution that economy has made to the two countries’ relations.

Since the sixteenth century, a number of important factors have constituted the differences between Iran and Turkey. The most prominent of which are: the geographical location of the two countries, minority issue, religious sectarian division, distinct political models of Turkey and Iran, border disputes and regional rivalries. Despite the differences, the two sides have common interests that have served to facilitate their political relations, and prevent their rivalries from further intensifying. Among those common interests, we should point to increasing and expanding economic relations. For instance, escalations of tensions between Tehran and Ankara, caused by deep differences over the Syrian crisis, have failed to strain or sever their relations. The reason for that should be sought in the basics of Iran and Turkey’s political relations, one of which economy.

How the economic factor has facilitated the continuation of Iran-Turkey relations should be discussed at two major and minor levels. At the minor level, the nature and approaches of the two countries’ foreign policy and the role of economy in it should be examined. And at the macro level, the economic interdependence of Iran and Turkey in the areas of energy, transit, cross-border trade, economic crises, and commercial ties, has to be discussed.

About Turkey’s foreign policy, the fact is that Turkish foreign policy is strongly influenced by its economic considerations. For example, from the very beginning of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, its leaders have always looked at industrialization, modernization and development as strategic goals. In this framework, they have taken two directions in their foreign policy: The first westernization in accordance with the teachings of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the republic who believed that Turkey has to follow the path of Europe as the most developed bloc in the world. And the other, a tendency to refrain from tensions and disputes in foreign policy, because, in their opinion, tensions and disputes, would hamper Turkey’s development and progress.

Of course we shouldn’t lose sight of the two strategies of “import substitution” and “export promotion” in Turkey’s economic development in the past century. A successful export promotion strategy entails a peaceful foreign policy and expansion of regional and international relations and cooperation. Turkish authorities employed the export promotion strategy at two junctures in the past three decades. The first time it was initiated in the 1980s during the premiership of Halil Turgut Özal which gradually transformed Turkey from being a security state into a trading state. As a result of that, trade and investment development takes center-stage in Turkish foreign policy. And for the second time, the strategy was adopted by the Justice and Development (AK) party, when it came to power in 2002 and is still in place.

When it comes to Iran’s foreign policy and the role of economy in it, Iran’s regionalism approach needs to be considered. When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, regional cooperation became a priority in Tehran’s foreign policy. Iran’s insistence on regionalism was to some extent a result of measures taken by Western countries to impose sanctions on Tehran and to isolate it internationally. Therefore, one of the main reasons why Iranian leaders adopted the regionalism approach was that, according to their calculations, trade and energy cooperation based on interdependence with close neighbors, especially a powerful neighbor such as Turkey, would be safest way for Iran to ward off the impact of Western sanctions. And this practical approach has turned Turkey into an important trade partner for Iran.

Additionally, the role of economy in the two countries’ relations can be explained at a macro level and based on the neoliberal school in international relations. From that standpoint, countries that engage in intensive trade relations have strong incentives to avoid confrontation. Trade increases the costs of conflict, disincentivizing trade partners to escalate disagreements. In line with that [in line with that], now Iran and Turkey have interdependence economic relations in the five areas of energy, transit, border trade, economic crises and commercial ties. We should consider that the most important factor in the interdependence economic relations between Iran and Turkey is energy. Iran is at the top on the list of countries selling oil to Turkey. For example, in the first quarter of 2011 only, Iran was the leading exporter of crude oil to Turkey, with a 30 percent share of Turkey’s total oil imports. Also, Iran is the third largest provider of Turkey’s natural gas, after Russia and Iraq. Energy trade between Iran and Turkey serves the interests of both states. That means Turkey is facing an increasing local demand for energy, and Iran considers Turkey as a developing foreign market for energy. In addition to that, Turkey is a transit route for energy to European customers. Actually, Turkey is a crucial transit route for Iranian imports from Europe.

Furthermore, the growth of economic relations in border regions between the two countries should also be considered. In 2009, Iran eased its customs regulations in East Azarbaijan province to facilitate trade with the neighboring Van province in Turkey. In the same year, the two countries also agreed to establish a joint industrial zone in Iran near Makou (is located in 25 miles from the Turkish border). And by March 2012, Turkish firms accounted for half of all foreign investors in Tabriz’s Foreign Investment Zone.

Another factor that’s lead to an expansion of bilateral relations is the “economic crisis and war” factor. For example, after Iran’s Islamic Revolution and during the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, Iran was in a state of political and economic isolation and dealing with aftermath of the war. Therefore, Iran started cultivating closer relations with Turkey and import much-needed strategic goods from it. At the same time, doing trade with Iran was lucrative for Turkey; indeed, trade with Iran helped Turkey’s bankrupt economy get back on its feet, and somehow supported Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s liberal economic reforms in the early 1980s.

I’m also going to mention the issue of Western sanctions and their impact on the two countries’ relations in the contemporary era. Generally speaking, Iran provides Turkey with the energy it needs for economic development. Instead, Iran has been viewing Turkey as a country through which it can break the spell of western sanctions, especially since 2011 when financial sanctions caused a serious challenge to Iran’s banking. Since then Turkey has emerged as Iran’s economic lifeline. When the big banks in Europe, and Asia, especially the ones in Dubai refused to transfer money into and out of Iran, a number of Turkish financial institutes rushed to Iran’s rescue. For instance, Halkbank, 75% of which is owned by the Turkish government, started to pay the Indian oil company to buy its oil from Iran.

It has to be mentioned here that the U.S. government warned Turkish firms and financial institutions about the possibility of losing access to the American market if they continued to deal with Iran. Yet, the Turkish government has so far refused to implement any of the unilateral sanctions that the U.S. and the European Union have imposed on Iran. While expressing a willingness to cooperate with any sanctions endorsed by the United Nations, Turkey has moved forward with the expansion of economic ties with Iran in all domains that have not been targeted by UN sanctions. At the same time, the Turkish government has announced that Turkish firms that do business with the United States are free to make their own individual decisions with respect to dealing with Iran. It should also be mentioned that the sanctions have prompted Iran to shift its foreign investments from Dubai to Turkey, so much so that the number of Iranian firms in Turkey increased from 319 in 2002 to 2072 in 2011. Furthermore, the two countries have announced plans to increase the volume of their economic transactions to 30 billion dollars by 2015.

Therefore, the “economy factor” is one of the reasons that has facilitated the political relations between the two countries to continue since the Islamic Revolution in Iran. A case in point is Turkey’s support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities in 2007 (political cooperation). On the other hand, high-ranking diplomatic visits by the two countries’ political figures are an example of the continued political relations between the two neighbors. What’s important about those trips is that although they have been high-level political-diplomatic visits, bilateral economic cooperation and its expansion have always been high on their agenda, and has involved trade delegations from each country. A case in point is President Rohani’s two-day trip to Turkey on June 19 of this year. Accompanying Dr. Rouhani to Ankara were the Iranian Central Bank Manager and a number of private sector Chambers of Commerce representatives. At the same time as President Rouhani’s trip to Turkey, the two countries signed around 10 cooperation documents for investment in bilateral infrastructural projects such as transportation, transport and export of gas, industrial borderline regions, and commercial development.

Thus, economic relations, is among important factors that has prevented Iran and Turkey from cutting relations over occasional tensions like the Syrian crisis.

*Fahimeh Ghorbani is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies (IMESS) in Tehran.

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Obama: America’s Resurgence Is Real – Transcript

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In this week’s address, the President reflected on the significant progress made by this country in 2014, and in the nearly six years since he took office. This past year has been the strongest for job growth since the 1990s, contributing to the nearly 11 million jobs added by our businesses over a 57-month streak. America is leading the rest of the world, in containing the spread of Ebola, degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL, and addressing the threat posed by climate change. And earlier this week, the President announced the most significant changes to our policy towards Cuba in over 50 years. America’s resurgence is real, and the President expressed his commitment to working with Congress in the coming year to make sure Americans feel the benefits.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
December 20, 2014

Hi, everybody. As 2014 comes to an end, we can enter the New Year with new confidence that America is making significant strides where it counts.

The steps we took nearly six years ago to rescue our economy and rebuild it on a new foundation helped make 2014 the strongest year for job growth since the 1990s. Over the past 57 months, our businesses have created nearly 11 million new jobs. And in a hopeful sign for middle-class families, wages are on the rise again.

Our investments in American manufacturing have helped fuel its best stretch of job growth since the ‘90s. America is now the number one producer of oil and gas, saving drivers about 70 cents a gallon at the pump over last Christmas. The auto industry we rescued is on track for its strongest year since 2005. Thanks to the Affordable Care Act, about 10 million Americans have gained health insurance in the past year alone. And since I took office, we have cut our deficits by about two-thirds.

Meanwhile, around the world, America is leading. We’re leading the coalition to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. We’re leading the global fight to combat the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. We’re leading global efforts to address climate change, including last month’s joint announcement with China. We’re turning a new page in our relationship with the Cuban people.

And in less than two weeks, after more than 13 years, our combat mission in Afghanistan will be over, and our war there will come to a responsible end. Today, more of our troops are home for the holidays than at any time in over a decade. Still, many of our men and women in uniform will spend this Christmas in harm’s way. And as Commander-in-Chief, I want our troops to know: your country is united in our support and gratitude for you and your families.

The six years since the financial crisis have demanded hard work and sacrifice on everyone’s part. But as a country, we have every right to be proud of what we’ve got to show for it. More jobs. More insured. A growing economy. Shrinking deficits. Bustling industry. Booming energy.

Pick any metric you want – America’s resurgence is real. And we now have the chance to reverse the decades-long erosion of middle-class jobs and incomes. We just have to invest in the things that we know will secure even faster growth in higher-paying jobs for more Americans. We have to make sure our economy, our justice system, and our government work not only for a few, but for all of us. And I look forward to working together with the new Congress next year on these priorities.

Sure, we’ll disagree on some things. We’ll have to compromise on others. I’ll act on my own when it’s necessary. But I will never stop trying to make life better for people like you.

Because thanks to your efforts, a new foundation is laid. A new future is ready to be written. We have set the stage for a new American moment, and I’m going to spend every minute of my last two years making sure we seize it.

On behalf of the Obama family, I wish all of you a very Merry Christmas.

Thanks, and have a wonderful holiday season.

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Will The Russian Fire Burn Turkey? – OpEd

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By Öznur Keleş

The Russian economy falling on difficult times has an impact on other countries’ economies. Turkey has one of the economies that is in danger. The crisis in Russian economy has a potential to affect Turkey deeply in terms of textile, food and expressly tourism.

The Russian currency has lost more than 50 percent value against the U.S dollar since December 17, 2014. It is losing value against the dollar due to two reasons: oil prices and capital outflows.

The Russian economy, with more than half of which is based on oil and gas revenues, has been recently experiencing hard times due to the oil price falling below $60.

Even after the Russian Central Bank increasing the interest rate, which is the harshest rise in the past 16 years, the dollar versus the ruble has continued to strengthen.

The economic crisis in Russia has brought the Turkish fresh fruit and vegetable exporters to the brink of bankruptcy. Turkish exporters have been forced to sell products as the crisis of the Russian economy deepens and the ruble falls.

Exports to Russia amounted to $6.5 billion in the period of January-November of 2013. However, this decreased to $5.6 billion year on year. In addition, Russia dropped from 4th to 6th among Turkey’s export partners.

Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TİM) Deputy Chairman Mustafa Çıkrıkçıoğlu announced that Turkish exporters selling goods in rubles to the Russian market have lost between 20-25%.

Although this past September, the chairman of TIM Mehmet Büyükekşi said, “despite a decline in August, Turkey’s exports will increase with Russia’s food purchases in the coming months, the exporters call for that urgent measures should be taken to protect them.”

The sanctions have also decreased the share of Turkish exporters in European markets, as the European exporters’ focus on European markets increased following the sanctions.

According to Business Insider, Turkish companies rank 5th among the companies that are most at risk. Turkish companies generate more than 5 percent of their incomes from Russia.

Furthermore, the number of Russian tourists coming to Antalya has declined by 35 percent in October and November. The Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TÜRSAB) Alanya Regional Executive Chairman Suat Çavuşoğlu remarked that tourism in the region would be adversely affected and some tourism companies may go bankrupt due to the depreciation of ruble against dollar.

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South-East Europe On Edge Of Civilization: Depending Who You Ask – Essay

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“Freaks” in and around US Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina

My dear mother! There are a lot of symbolic reflections within Bosnia and Herzegovina that might also be observed around the region of South East-Europe, but it looks like there is only one very specific case to Americans, and locals, within the US Embassy in Sarajevo.

Immediately there comes to mind as a much bigger issue the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, which brings to light more than anything else what has been done in Bosnia and Herzegovina by US officials (I have to here underline those US people, and especially respected voices of those who did place enormous pressure on the US government to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina back in the nineties). That said, please allow me to make a small introduction to the title of this essay. Richard Holbrooke, the so-called ‘Almighty’ of the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war of 1992-1995 in BiH made a huge mistake in Dayton? Which one? He let the same people who conducted the war, to negotiate the peace.

Sociologically, politically and even in a humanitarian way of thinking, this should not have happened. Why? The answer you can see almost twenty years later in the current Bosnia and Herzegovina, about which I have been writing in Eurasia Review this past year and that is published in recent book ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina and the XXI Century’.

The mistakes of U.S. government officials are not based on the non-willingness to conduct the proper way of establishing the so-called ‘Democracy’, which I called a long time ago ‘Demo(n)cracy’ (Question: Am I fundamentalist if I say that real democracy – or just the announcement of such – exists only in Iceland, Sweden, Norway and/or Finland?). Democracy, according to my humble opinion, is the state of acting (and mind, of course) in which my freedom does not threaten the freedom of others, and it stops immediately if I base my freedom on cancelling and hindering the freedom of others. Just check out the World of the XXI Century and the answer will be given.

So, to make a long story short, US government officials’ mistakes are always based on ignorance and an emptiness of local people’s thoughts, conclusions, culture and knowledge.

Question: When was the last time when you met a US Embassy official walking around the old part of Sarajevo, titled ‘Baščaršija’ (rough translation is ‘Just the city’ or ‘Just the place of living and working’) while talking to the locals, except those individuals whom they hire? Never, or just only when some US Government official arrives in Bosnia and Herzegovina who wants to taste ćevapcic, baklava and other traditional foods, and of course to be seen by the local media on the streets of a ruined city. The locals who work for them?

As a person who worked for almost seven years for the International community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-2000) I can simply say, but strongly have to underline: 65 percent of the local employees for the International organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been instructed to be there and serve indirectly local powers regardless if they were Bosniaks (Muslim), Croats and Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina. What does this mean? The ignorance of the so-called CIA, NASA, MI, NI and so many other acronyms of the great intelligence organizations from United States of America did not do their job. Or did they? We will never know. Why? It is simply irresistible to answer: ignorance.

Then we come in medias res of the essay, which is  an example of the total disaster of American policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with the help of locals).

Recently, I wanted to share a presentation and valuable ideas about electronic government that could very well be implemented by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of USAID and the US Embassy in Sarajevo. I, along with my colleague and friend, Peter Tase, a US citizen, a scholar and journalist, on December 11, 2014 were to present (remember the word “presentation”, please) a potential project for Establishing the E-Government Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

But — and it seems there is a always a ‘but’.

Everything began back on October 29, when on behalf of Peter — who was coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2014, to promote his book ‘The Image of Paraguay in the United States 2012-2014’ and my book as I mentioned above — I sent an e-mail to US officials at the US Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The answer back came not from US officials, but from the local Project Management Specialist from USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina (whom I do not want to mention her name) who was very nice in her correspondence with Peter — and later with me — in regards to arranging a meeting for the above-mentioned presentation on which I was working, since I had just returned from Kazakhstan, a government that is very advanced with respect to doing everything on-line (and which hosted in October 2014 the World E-Government forum). The idea of the presentation was simple: Through the establishment of E-government in Bosnia and Herzegovina we would connect not just a ruined country, but also the ruined people(s) of Bosnia and Herzegovina and improve their living conditions in a well-organized society where they could get any document they needed within a matter of hours, and not in weeks or months.

As we had previously agreed we were scheduled to meet on Thursday, 11.12.2014 at the US Embassy, we thought that we would be able to deliver the presentation of 30 slides containing our joint proposal, on which we had been working for over two months.

Nevertheless, problems began right in front of the gate at the US Embassy of Sarajevo. First, one police officer said that we could park on the sidewalk adjacent to the walls of the embassy, right next to the main entrance of the embassy, even though there was a sign that prohibited the parking of vehicles there. But soon another police officer arrived, and was very aggressive towards us — and indeed almost ate me alive — just after I had parked our vehicle, and told us that we couldn’t park there and continued, “in regards to my opinion, you can park on Skenderija (note: 2 kilometers away) if you want to, but here you cannot park.”

I had to move the vehicle 400 meters away to a paid parking lot while my colleagues (Peter Tase and Goran Vrhunc) waited on a cold winter day wearing only regular suits (without jackets).

Problems only increased when we entered the control gates and moved toward the embassy’s metal detectors — which was even more protected than a guarded customs area at a major airport anywhere in the world.

Having in mind that I am a Muslim (Bosniak), I expected that I would be thoroughly searched as a possible ‘terrorist’, because you are guilty until is proved differently. As said, I expected this — and certainly kept in mind that the US policy in the world is making more enemies than friends recently — but, what I did not expect was that they would treat my colleague Peter Tase as a possible terrorist and thoroughly search his body for an extended time. Additionally,  I had thought that the USAID’s representative who had exchanged many emails with me, would come and welcome us at the security check point. Not so.

Goran, meanwhile, was still waiting outside to be invited to go through a meticulous search.

It seems the problem was with the word, as I mentioned previously, “presentation.” Namely, when I was in a position to be thoroughly searched, a problem appeared. I was asked  to leave my laptop in the security check point. Okay.

But, when I was asked to leave my USB with the security officer it became obvious that it was pointless to attend a meeting without showing a Power Point presentation.

While I was explaining this to the local female police officer our escort suddenly appeared, as I was told, to take us to the main building. She again repeated the same adage that we did not agree to bring the USB to our meeting at the embassy. I repeated again that I am an Assistant Professor at a University, and had always used the word “presentation” in my emails.

To which she stated, “you have not written that you will bring the USB.”

My response was that a Project Management Specialist should know what I was talking about when stating that I would give a presentation, as we did days ago at other institutions in Sarajevo.

To which she suggested that “we can have a chat.” How is it possible that USB with the size of 1cm x 2cm can threaten a world power?

This blew my mind.

Peter then entered the security check point, and again they requested his ID and then exited the armored room of the check point.

Meanwhile, Goran was still standing outside confused, probably asking himself, what was going on inside.

In the end, we simply said that we would not go and have a chat (we were prepared to make concrete suggestions and give a serious presentation) and that we would inform the public about their rude behavior and we exited.  My colleagues had to wait outside of the entrance to the main gate in a subzero temperature with a freezing wind, which made Peter have a terrible pain in his ears that would continue for days, while I went to pick up our car.

Finally, last but not least, what is the outcome of all of this?

At the outset we thought that it might be good for US Foreign Policy — since the US is the main coordinator of the Dayton Peace Agreement — to promote an e-government initiative in the most politically complicated country on Earth.

But, it the end, we decided to explore other venues to move forward with such a dynamic project of e-government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the US Embassy staff is overshadowed by local unprofessional ‘advisers’ who distort the true realities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The US Embassy staff is simply:

1. Controlled by local feudalistic and ignorant people who have been threatened by our proposal;

Or

2. Are certainly uninformed in regards to the means of a real communication process that is used to convey ideas, and exchange experiences among intellectuals while using the US Embassy as the launching point of this exciting initiative.

Or

3. All above, including ‘1’and ‘2’

Where is the answer? That is the million dollar question. That is the amount of money that Bosnia Herzegovina loses every month if it does not implement the e-government project very soon.

E-government is here to come, regardless with or without us.

The “Presentation” was the problem. Especially when it comes from someone who knows what they are doing. An aspiration and a Presentation destined for the benefit of my nation and the common good — unlike many others whose goal is for personal profit, and do not bring anything new to the table. Unfortunately, freaks in and around the US Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not see its content. Or perhaps they do not want to.

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Turkey: Court Issues Arrest Warrant For Gulen Over Coup Plot Allegation

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A Turkish court has issued an arrest warrant for the influential cleric Fethullah Gulen, BBC News reports.

Gulen, who is in self-imposed exile in the US, is accused of establishing and running an “armed terrorist group”.

He was once an ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan but has now been accused of plotting to overthrow the Turkish government – a claim the cleric strongly denies.

The US is thought to be unlikely to act on any extradition request.

The move comes amid a national crackdown on perceived supporters of the cleric.

Over 20 journalists working for media outlets thought to be sympathetic to the Gulen movement were arrested last weekend.

Eight of them were freed on Friday on the orders of a court in Istanbul. Those released include Ekrem Dumanli, editor-in-chief of Zaman newspaper. Four others, including a TV station boss, remain in custody.

According to BBC, it was expected that the authorities would go after Gulen after having targeted those linked to him.

While the US and Turkey have an extradition agreement, the warrant is considered to be largely symbolic – and unlikely to be acted upon.

The relationship between Washington and Ankara has grown fractious, though they remain allies.

Erdogan has faced criticism from international leaders and his opponents, who accuse him of authoritarianism and undermining free press.

Many abroad believe that the charges against Gulen are politically motivated.

The wealthy cleric, who operates an international network of schools and businesses, has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999.

According to media reports, the prosecutor filing the arrest warrant accused Gulen of leading an armed terrorist group – a charge that carries up to 15 years in prison.

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Is China’s Coast Guard Troubling The Waters? – Analysis

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The establishment of the China Coast Guard (CCG) in 2013 created a huge stir. Neighbouring countries may see the CCG as a major instrument for China to reconfigure maritime power structure in the region.

The CCG was established under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), from the merger of several formerly disparate agencies: the Maritime Police  — the nucleus of the CCG, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, the General Administration of Customs, and China’s Maritime Surveillance. These represent four of the five agencies that enforce China’s maritime laws and regulations. Only the Maritime Safety Administration remains independent from this newly created maritime law enforcement authority. This integration facilitates greater resource pooling, promotes uniformity in action and assigns accountability.

 

China was a latecomer in developing a unified coast guard.  In a 2007 report by Ningbo Academy, it was stressed that China’s ‘maritime law enforcement forces … are not commensurate with [its] status and image as a great power’. A 2010 paper from the US Naval War College also pointed out that China was in a position of ‘relative weakness in a strong neighbourhood’. China’s neighbours were well ahead in developing their respective coast guards — Japan since 1948, South Korea since 1953 and Taiwan in 2000. Surely, unresolved disputes may have contributed to the realisation of the project or to speeding up the process, but given the country’s bustling maritime economy,  the establishment of the CCG was inevitable.

Placing the CCG under the SOA, instead of the Ministry of Public Security, suggests not only the CCG’s civilian and desecuritised character, but its possible use for strategic peacetime activities. The SOA is in charge not only of maritime law enforcement, but also of maritime policy, ocean economic development, marine environmental protection, international maritime cooperation, resource exploration, and polar scientific expedition. The SOA also engages in marine scientific surveys and research which may involve foreign partners. This allows the SOA to facilitate exploratory cooperation with the marine scientific community of East Asian coastal states, including claimants in the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes.  But at the same time, placing the CCG under the SOA may also signal greater resolve on Beijing’s part to administer disputed islands and waters. The SOA’s mandates also include the management of islands.

Given the tense atmosphere in the region, the development of the CCG should proceed with reassurances to allay fears that China may use this new body to the detriment of its neighbours. It is the inherent right of every sovereign country to develop institutions to protect and promote its legitimate national maritime interests. But it also has a duty to ensure that in such a pursuit, peace and amity with its neighbours will not be compromised. This is especially so if what it considers as its indisputable maritime domain has long been considered as the traditional and lawful maritime domains of other parties.

In the context of China’s continuing efforts to build structures in the South China Sea and challenge Japan’s administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the CCG may be seen as a means for China to reconfigure the maritime power structure in the region. Integrating national objectives into one body may enable China to gradually change the status quo. The CCG could embolden Chinese fishing vessels to venture out farther into the East and South China Seas to fish in waters already considered as territories or maritime zones of other countries. Farther CCG patrols may also increase the likelihood of coming into contact with maritime law enforcement agencies of neighbouring states. This increases the risk of friction in the region, particularly if appropriate mechanisms are not in place.

The establishment of CCG should not forestall China’s efforts to continue exploring ways to engage its neighbours to address common threats and challenges in their shared maritime domain.

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is an MA Asian Studies student at the University of the Philippines Asian Center. The views expressed here are the author’s own.

This article was published at East Asia Forum.

The post Is China’s Coast Guard Troubling The Waters? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Obama Signs National Defense Authorization Act

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President Barack Obama today signed the annual legislation that keeps the Defense Department running.

The “Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” Obama said in a written statement, “will provide vital benefits for military personnel and their families, as well as critical contingency authorities needed to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and to respond to emerging needs in the face of evolving terrorist threats and emergent crises worldwide.”

The full text of the White House statement follows:

Today I have signed into law H.R. 3979, the “Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.” I have signed this annual defense authorization legislation because it will provide vital benefits for military personnel and their families, as well as critical contingency authorities needed to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and to respond to emerging needs in the face of evolving terrorist threats and emergent crises worldwide.

Earlier this month, the Department of Defense transferred the last remaining third-country nationals held in U.S. custody in Afghanistan, ending U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan. Yet halfway around the world, the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, remains open for the 13th consecutive year, costing the American people hundreds of millions of dollars each year and undermining America’s standing in the world. As I have said many times, the continued operation of this detention facility weakens our national security by draining resources, damaging our relationships with key allies and partners, and emboldening violent extremists. Closing the detention facility is a national imperative.

I have repeatedly called upon the Congress to work with my Administration to close the detention facility at Guantanamo once and for all. Individuals from across the political spectrum have recognized that the facility should be closed. But instead of removing unwarranted and burdensome restrictions that curtail the executive branch’s options for managing the detainee population, this bill continues them. Section 1032 renews the bar against using appropriated funds to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any Guantanamo detainee in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense unless authorized by the Congress. Section 1033 likewise renews the bar against using appropriated funds to transfer Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, contains similar provisions as well as those relating to existing restrictions on the transfer of detainees abroad. I have consistently opposed these restrictions and will continue to work with the Congress to remove them. More than 80 percent of detainees at one time held at the detention facility have now been transferred. The executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees who remain, to determine when and where to prosecute them, based on the facts and circumstances of each case and our national security interests, and when and where to transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane treatment policy. Under certain circumstances, the provisions concerning detainee transfers in both bills would violate constitutional separation of powers principles. In the event that the restrictions on the transfer of detainees operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of powers principles, my Administration will implement them in a manner that avoids the constitutional conflict.

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US To Send Up To 1,300 Additional Troops To Iraq

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By Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jake Richmond

Up to 1,300 more U.S. troops, including approximately 1,000 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, will begin to deploy to Iraq in late January, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby said on Friday.

“Their mission will be to train, advise and assist Iraqi security forces,” Kirby told reporters at a Pentagon briefing. “This deployment is part of the additional 1,500 troops that the president authorized in November.”

The roughly 300 troops who are deploying in the same timeframe as the 82nd Airborne group will be from multiple services, the admiral said. Their contributions will be in “largely enabler capabilities,” Kirby added.

Changes in Location, Not Mission

“What makes this [deployment] different is simply the geography,” Kirby explained. The advising teams will operate in the Anbar area and north of Baghdad, he said.

Kirby added, “But they’re still going to be on a base and advising and assisting at the same higher headquarters level, [like] the 12 teams that are already there are doing.”

While the American troops will be interacting directly with Iraqi troops, the admiral emphasized that those interactions will be occurring in a training environment and not out in the field.

The overall mission is still designed around training 12 Iraqi brigades, including nine from the Iraqi security force and three from the Peshmerga, Kirby said.

Role of Airstrikes

While the training mission is ongoing, the U.S. military continues to conduct airstrikes at an appropriate pace and with an appropriate sense of precision and urgency, Kirby said.

“It’s twofold,” he said. “It’s to go after them where we know we can and we should, but also to support Iraqi security forces on the ground.”

Kirby mentioned a “big spike” in airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant over the last week.

“That was to help prepare the Peshmerga for the operations that they conducted around Mount Sinjar, which, while they’re still ongoing, have proven to be promising, so far,” he said.

“It’s not just a matter of more or less,” the admiral added. “It’s got to be appropriate to the threat and to the operations on the ground.”

The post US To Send Up To 1,300 Additional Troops To Iraq appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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