By Jos Boonstra*

The European Union’s (EU) Strategy for Central Asia is being reviewed for the fourth time. Over the last eight years, the EU has been successful in creating several institutionalized mechanisms for working and bolstering relations with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. But the overall picture of the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; democracy is seen by the regimes as a threat to their survival; and human rights have been backsliding.

Whereas some global and regional actors have laid out a broader policy vision for Central Asia – ‘New Silk Road’ by the United States (US), ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ by China – the EU devised a detailed written strategy in 2007 outlining seven priorities ranging from democracy promotion to education and from security to energy and trade interests. The EU’s Central Asia Strategy is more than a policy expression in which just a few objectives are outlined, but less than an extensive and detailed strategy that would ideally be accompanied by an action plan and measurable benchmarks. As the latter will not come about and the EU is unlikely to step back to a simpler document or statement, the strategy is probably here to stay as a reference document for EU policies. This brief looks at the main ingredients of the strategy that need revision and strengthening.

A strategy of engagement

The EU Central Asia Strategy seems ambitious, given that member state activities suggest only a marginal interest in the region, an area that is not a geopolitical priority for Europe. The EU will need to carefully balance limited interests and resources with a few achievable long-term objectives. In 2012, the EU’s review of its Central Asia strategy was heavily focused on the impact of Afghanistan on Central Asia. Today, the bearing of the situation in Afghanistan is less central to Brussels- based policy-makers than the impact of the Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations on Central Asia. Whereas these all imply important developments that need to be assessed, the EU should focus on long- term priorities – rather than solely focusing on contemporary issues.

Russian influence on its neighbors will remain substantial. Although the priority of relations for Russia and the EU currently lie in Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent in the South Caucasus, even Central Asia will be affected by increased geo-political competition between Moscow and Brussels. Moscow will try to derail initiatives that bind the EU too closely to Central Asian partners while seeking to bring those republics further within its orbit. The EU should seek partnership with and reform in Central Asian countries, all of which are keen on an alternative to Russia’s policies (and China’s economic influence).

Abolishing the position of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia last March was a mistake (regardless of the budgetary and institutional considerations underlying the decision). EUSRs have been the face of Europe in Central Asia and have had a positive impact on the otherwise limited visibility of the EU in the region. Senior EU officials expect that the new EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, will soon appoint a high-level European representative to the region who can speak with authority on behalf of the EU institutions and member states.

After the last review in 2012, the EU sought to institutionalize a ‘High-Level Security Dialogue’, but the first meeting in Brussels in June 2013 fell far short of that stated ambition. Some Central Asian governments sent only ambassador-level officials. A second gathering planned for May 2014 in Tajikistan was cancelled owing to a lack of Central Asian interest. The main reason for the EU embarking on this initiative was to address Central Asian security challenges while offering the opportunity to the partners to outline their concerns over Afghanistan’s future. The EU will have another go at this mechanism in the first quarter of 2015 in Tajikistan. The European External Action Service (EEAS) – which is responsible for continuing this process – should consider involving member states at a high level, preferably foreign ministers, to attract Central Asian attention.

One subject that should be considered for the agenda is the fact that many Muslims from Central Asia and Europe have left for Syria to fight for the Islamic State (IS) and their return will prove a security risk. Whereas Europe and Central Asia have very different domestic settings, the motivations of people from both regions fighting for IS are largely similar. Another area that the EU and Central Asian partners could focus on is conflict prevention mechanisms, as conflict in and between Central Asian states cannot be excluded in the future (a series of border incidents between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan took place last year while tensions over hydroelectric power between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remain worrisome).

Although the EU has little influence in Central Asia, adherence to democratic principles should be the centerpiece of engagement, since these countries will only become more reliable partners when they would develop and respect the rule of law and apply democratic governance. For the EU, democracy should be a sine qua non. Central Asian regimes see democracy as a threat to their existence and are more comfortable with Russia’s model of authoritarian governance. The EU should use a smart combination of aid, conditionality and political engagement in seeking out some change in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Kazakhstan and the latter’s wish to play a leading international role should also be exploited to encourage Astana to adopt democratic reform. In the more closed dictatorships of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the EU lacks leverage, but Brussels has little to lose in discussing democratic reform with them.

Human rights should remain a major focus for the EU in Central Asia. The ‘Human Rights Dialogues’ created by the EU have a modest but very welcome added value mainly as a complimentary tool of ‘persuasion’ (in addition to the UN mechanisms) and with respect to improving the situation of specific (prosecuted) human rights activists. Meanwhile, the ‘Civil Society Seminars’ have the potential to establish a ‘healthy’ dialogue between civil society actors, the government and European actors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. So far, however, they have mainly resulted in a modest contribution on anti-torture legislation in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, there is barely any independent civil society with which to collaborate.

The EU (preferably through an EUSR) should regularly exchange information and discuss development cooperation in Central Asia with other powers, such as the US, China, Turkey, Japan and perhaps Russia at a later stage – depending on that country’s political trajectory. On the ground in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan coordination is especially important where donor coordination is concerned; the trick here will be to involve China in such coordination.

Beijing has pledged $40 billion to a fund for a Silk Road Economic Belt (foremost aimed at linking China via Central Asia to Europe) and a Maritime Silk Road (directed at China’s littoral neighbors to the south). These donations will partly benefit Central Asia – primarily aimed at infrastructure development – and dwarf EU assistance (€1 billion over the coming 7 years) or any Russian engagement. EU-Chinese cooperation on Central Asian development, for instance by combining European know-how and Chinese funding, would seem logical. Still, prospects for this to happen seem bleak, since, for example, European firms will find it difficult to buy into Chinese commercial operations in Central Asia.

The options for concrete cooperation in infrastructure and energy projects (outside regional and UN organizations) will remain limited, not only between China and the EU, but even between the US and the EU. For the EU and China, the modus operandi is too different to find a match. In the case of EU-US cooperation both actors do not regard Central Asia as a priority (like the Middle East), which limits the will for concrete cooperation.

Bilateral approaches

The EU’s main focus in Central Asia should be on bilateral relations, rather than regional approaches (which as a regional Union based on integration, the EU tends to adopt). The Central Asian states have become more diversified and expect to build their own bilateral relations with Europe. Engagement and assistance to each country will need to be further tailored to ensure that cooperation is in the best interest of both parties. This should also include an increased effort by the EU to engage with Central Asia’s marginalized civil society organizations through funding, projects, networks, debates, consultations and so on.

Kazakhstan is the top priority for most EU member states in Central Asia. Half of foreign investment in Kazakhstan is of European origin and about 40 percent of Kazakh exports go to Europe. Last year the EU and Kazakhstan concluded negotiations on an ‘enhanced’ PCA, embodying Astana’s special relations with Brussels. This year the enhanced PCA should be signed, although attention is warranted owing to the country’s lack of democratic reform and poor human rights record. Kazakhstan’s fear of being locked into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) gives the EU some leverage, which could be taken up by the European Parliament or member states to persuade Kazakhstan to make some concrete reform steps.

If tensions between the EU and Russia arise in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is the most likely ‘battleground’. Its upcoming membership of the EEU places the country more firmly in Russia’s orbit. The relatively open character of the country is under threat and the democratically elected government is not performing well. Whereas in EU eyes Kyrgyzstan was foremost an opportunity for democratization, the immediate future seems more geared towards Kyrgyz geopolitical choices between powerful neighbors and Western actors. The EU (and other democracy supporters) will be severely challenged in obtaining results from Bishkek. Ethnic tensions still lingering after the 2010 violence between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in the south of the country remain a matter that needs monitoring.

Tajikistan also plans to join the EEU but is unstable and vulnerable to outside influences from Russia and China (and to a lesser extent Iran). For the EU, getting development assistance right – by being tough on the conditions for giving aid, including checks on implementation – will be essential as corruption is rife (and impeding economic development) and EU border management assistance programs are hampered by the country’s elites that are involved in the lucrative opiates trade.

Turkmenistan is the only republic in Central Asia where the EU does not yet have a full-fledged Delegation. The reason for this seems to be budgetary, which is strange as energy remains officially a priority for the EU in Central Asia, and Turkmenistan is the only new opportunity for gas imports (opportunities in Kazakhstan’s oil industry are already being exploited by Europe): this might be explained by the fact that gas imports from Turkmenistan are not expected any time soon. Currently Turkmenistan exports most of its gas to China, in the absence of any progress in building a Trans Caspian pipeline to Azerbaijan and from there a connection across the Caucasus and Turkey to the EU. As only a few EU member states are represented in Ashgabat, it would make sense for the EU to have a Delegation in order to engage and monitor developments in this geo-politically challenged country, bordering Afghanistan and Iran as well as the Caspian Sea.

EU relations with Uzbekistan have not really taken off since the lifting of all sanctions (2009) and the establishment of a Delegation in Tashkent (2011). The regime is difficult to deal with, while European trade and other interests are very limited. This non-aligned and most populous Central Asian country is, however, crucial for regional stability. It is of interest to the EU to keep channels of communication open and to assess local developments. New EU development funding is currently fully geared towards rural development; a questionable venture though in a sector that does need support.

Regional approaches

EU regional cooperation initiatives will need to be carefully focused and if applied, should be made more flexible. As regional lines become ever more blurred and the current five ‘Stans’ are not eager to be rounded up by the EU in joint formats, the focus should be on cooperation with two, three or more countries that are willing and able to work on a particular subject. This could also involve other countries in the broader region such as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan or Mongolia.

The EU’s three regional programs – rule of law, water and environment, and education – for Central Asia should be evaluated in-depth. If useful, they should be expanded, if not, they should be scrapped.

The rule of law (rather than democracy and human rights) is an odd subject to take up in a regional format with Central Asian governments, but is at least possible to address, as democracy as such is not open for joint discussion. The initiative’s platform has created a useful database of European rule of law projects in Central Asia. It is doubtful, however, whether the broader initiative (run by France and Germany) will actually coordinate, foster and track meaningful reform.

The same can be said about the water and environment initiative led by Italy and Romania. This is a subject important to all Central Asian republics. However, sensitivities and tensions between several countries make it difficult to make progress. Moreover, most international donor programs increasingly seek a national rather than a regional approach which has greater practical impact.

Over the last eight years, no member state has been willing to take on the education initiative. This is disappointing, as it is this sector that deserves most attention – though not necessarily on a regional basis. If the EU wants to contribute to the development of Central Asia, become more visible, act strategically over the long-term, and counter Russian influence, it should invest heavily in higher education (and where funds allow, also in technical vocational and secondary education). However, such an investment (largely consisting of Central Asian students having the opportunity to study in Europe) will only be useful if programs are able to tackle or circumvent the risk of brain- drain and unequal access (of the elites) to higher education.

The BOMCA border management program is the EU’s flagship security program in Central Asia. The ninth phase of BOMCA over the coming three years has only been allocated €5 million. The reason for this is that the program’s implementation is being transferred from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to a group of EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Portugal). The parallel program CADAP (EU Central Asia Drug Action Program) was already earlier transferred from UNDP to GIZ, the German development agency. This is a positive development as the EU’s Central Asia policy will need more member state involvement. There is now also an opportunity to think through EU border management support. The EU will need to decide if the program will focus on border areas between the five Central Asian republics (some republics barely participate) or on the ‘external’ Tajikistan-Afghanistan border where many other donors are also active (while being affected by Tajikistan’s unwillingness to undergo wholesale reform of border security). Central Asian recipients have always sought equipment support from donors while the EU preferred border guard training. Next steps could involve a stronger focus on migration issues and border monitoring.

Development assistance

From 2007 to 2013 the EU’s development assistance to Central Asia amounted to roughly €750 million – of which one- third was allocated to regional programs and two-thirds to bilateral initiatives. From 2014 to 2020, the EU plans to spend about €1 billion in Central Asia. The EU has learned from the first seven year-cycle of Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) spending (paralleling the political strategy), in which it spread its modest funds over a long list of priorities and areas. In the new cycle, the main recipients Kyrgyzstan (rule of law, education and rural development) and Tajikistan (health, education and rural development) will have only three sectors, and Uzbekistan (rural development) and Turkmenistan only one (education). Kazakhstan does not receive bilateral aid anymore as it is considered an upper middle-income country, while in Turkmenistan aid will likely be phased out in 2017 when the country is also likely to reach the upper middle-income status.

It is not exactly clear what the rationale is behind the increase of pledged allocations to Central Asia over the current cycle (even though it makes sense that fewer countries should receive funds for a smaller number of concrete initiatives). The region is not a priority for the EU and earlier development aid has been heavily affected by recipients’ unwillingness to engage in democratic reform and tackle endemic corruption. Meanwhile the practice of sectoral budget support in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is continued, even though this is avoided by most other international donors. The EU, however, continues the practice – with increased funding – which has advantages but also grave risks. Over the coming years, monitoring of its implementation will be essential for the EU’s development approach to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia watchers also wonder about the steep rise in allocations to Uzbekistan (€168 million from 2014 to 2020) that had received little funding under the former funding cycle, and is mentioned by the few active donors as extremely difficult to work with. Still, the EU has more than doubled the budget for Uzbekistan without making clear why the chances of real impact are suddenly higher. A hands-on approach and close monitoring are warranted to ensure that support to Uzbekistan’s rural sector has the desired effect.

Conclusion

The EU is unlikely to radically revise its strategy for Central Asia as the document is still a useful catalog of relations with the region, and member states are unlikely to push for an overhaul of policy as their interests there are not essential, and as concerns closer to home in Eastern Europe take precedence. If the EU would decide to narrow its focus on a few matters where it would seek concrete impact, the focus should be on: bilateral partnerships and increased ties with civil societies; support for democratization and strengthening the defense of human rights; modest security cooperation based on conflict prevention; and a more simplified and effective development policy with a heavy emphasis on education.

About the author:
*Jos Boonstra is Head of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Programme at FRIDE

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as EUCAM Policy Brief / No. 34 (PDF).

Notes:
This policy brief is based on an earlier EUCAM memo (January 2015) for European policy-makers. The author thanks Vera Axyonova, Marlene Laruelle, Andreas Marazis, Sebastien Peyrouse, and Tika Tsertsvadze for their input.

The post Reviewing The EU’s Approach To Central Asia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Daniel McAdams

When a Russian bomber flew over international waters some 25 miles off the southwest tip of England last week, UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon called Russia “a real and present danger.” The UK government scrambled jet fighters to meet the Russian aircraft as a show of force.

Said Secretary Fallon of the incident, “NATO has to be ready for any kind of aggression from Russia, whatever form it takes.” He added that, “NATO is getting ready,” warning particularly that Russia may soon move to invade the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Reading the feverish Twitter feed of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Phil Breedlove, one would get the impression that NATO is already at war with Russia. Fighter jets sit menacingly atop aircraft carriers as the General beams about NATO member countries’ commitment to contribute to the fight.

Our @NATO allies are stepping up, making significant contributions. #NATO pic.twitter.com/hTtHNvi0Bm

— Phil Breedlove (@PMBreedlove) February 25, 2015

The message is clear: Russia is about to attack! NATO has, for no understandable reason, found itself in Russia’s crosshairs. NATO cannot figure out how it is that Russia could possibly feel threatened by its actions, which, unlike Russia’s are not in the slightest provocative.

Russian military plane over international waters 25 miles from the UK coast is “real and present danger” to NATO. Yet…

Yet yesterday US combat vehicles conducted a military parade and show of military force in Estonia just 300 yards — yards! — from the Russian border. That is just over 60 miles from downtown St. Petersburg.

Here is dramatic video of NATO’s military display just three football fields from Russia:

This is not a provocation, we are to believe. This is not a “real and present danger” to Russia. NATO is exempt from the rules it imposes on its enemies.

In the Guardian’s review of a new book by Politics professor George Sakwa, the current fallout from a near quarter century of post-Cold War NATO policies is perfectly captured:

The hawks in the Clinton administration ignored all this, Bush abandoned the anti-ballistic missile treaty and put rockets close to Russia’s borders, and now a decade later, after Russia’s angry reaction to provocations in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today, we have what Sakwa rightly calls a “fateful geographical paradox: that Nato exists to manage the risks created by its existence”.

That line bears repeating: “Nato exists to manage the risks created by its existence.”

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

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By Matt Hadro

Middle Eastern Christian communities face extinction, and the results for the stability and peace of the region would be devastating, said an advocacy group asking Americans to speak out on their behalf.

“They have been there since the time of Christ, and they are now arguably in the time of their greatest need,” said Kristina Olney of the advocacy group In Defense of Christians. “We are basically seeing history erased.”

In Defense of Christians is a non-profit that raises awareness of the plight of Middle Eastern Christian communities threatened by sectarian conflict and the terror group ISIS.

The advocacy group organized a “Day of Action” for those communities on Feb. 25, imploring U.S. Christians to pray and sacrifice “in the spirit of Lent” and give to charities that help Middle Eastern Christians. They have also called participants to contact members of Congress, the White House, and the State Department to advocate for the persecuted.

Olney spoke to CNA about the Day of Action and the current situation for Christians in the Middle East, where millions have been displaced and many more are threatened with harsh daily realities of persecution and violence.

These communities are the glue of society – if they are eradicated, the whole region will suffer, Olney argued.

“The Christian communities in the Middle East as well as the other vulnerable religious minorities who have also suffered persecution in the region, are essential not only as bedrocks of civilization in the region, but also filters for de-radicalization.”

The initiative is even more significant after the recent beheadings of 21 Coptic Christians in Libya by ISIS, as well as the reported abduction of an estimated 150 Christians in Syria by the same militant group.

“This issue is not a priority for the U.S. administration,” Olney said. “The American people need to understand that ultimately if this issue is not championed by them, it isn’t just naturally going to be championed by our government.”

For instance, she noted that Congress created a special envoy for persecuted religious minorities in the Middle East to report directly to the president. But President Obama has not nominated a candidate to fill the position.

“So we are asking our base of supporters across the country to call the White House and ask that an appointee for this position be named,” Olney said.

In Defense of Christians also wants more accountability for U.S. aid promised to the beleaguered Christians. The State Department admitted in December that the overall needs of Iraqi refugees were not being met, in the dead of winter.

Last month, the United Nations’ refugee arm UNHCR – which has been giving the majority of aid to the refugees – reported a 40 percent shortfall in aid, Olney pointed out.

“If that aid does not reach those communities in the coming months, then there are going to be significant ramifications for the refugees in the region, because many of them don’t have shelter, basic survival needs,” Olney said.

Ultimately, she stressed, U.S. Christians must take the lead in educating everyone about the importance of the issue.

“You can’t defend what you don’t know,” she said. “People simply don’t know the history of those communities.”

“To remove them would be to remove a part of history,” she added. “If in America we were to have our monuments bulldozed, if we were to have our Constitution burned, those are things that would affect everyone, because it’s our national history.”

These sentiments were shared by Archbishop Joseph Kurtz of Louisville, who heads the U.S. Bishops’ Conference, and Bishop Oscar Cantu of Las Cruces, chair of the bishops’ Committee on International Justice and Peace.

Earlier this week, the two bishops sent letters to the Obama administration and Congress calling for more to be done on behalf of Christians in the Middle East.

The U.S. could counter ISIS with military force, the bishops said, but within the parameters outlined by Pope Francis and the Holy See – that the use of force be “proportionate” to the threat, “discriminate,” and used under “international and humanitarian law.”

And military action is not enough, Archbishop Kurtz and Bishop Cantu insisted. They emphasized the “overwhelming” needs faced by refugees and called for the U.S. to increase its assistance, including by accepting “its share” of refugees unable to return to their homes.

The U.S. should also emphasize a foreign policy of religious freedom, human rights, and inclusion of minority sects in civic matters, the bishops continued.

“Attacks on religious and ethnic minorities are attacks on the health of an entire society,” they said. “The rights of all Syrians, Iraqis, Libyans and others in the region are at risk from the current situation.”

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By Jonathan Cook*

It was another difficult week for Israel.

In Britain, 700 artists, including many household names, pledged a cultural boycott of Israel, and a leader of the Board of Deputies, the representative body of UK Jews, quit, saying he could no longer abide by its ban on criticizing Israel.

Across the Atlantic, the student body of one of the most prestigious US universities, Stanford, voted to withdraw investments from companies implicated in Israel’s occupation, giving a significant boost to the growing international boycott (BDS) movement.

Meanwhile, a CNN poll found that two-thirds of Americans, and three-quarters of those under 50, believed the US foreign policy should be neutral between Israel and Palestine.

This drip-drip of bad news, as American and European popular opinion shifts against Israel, is gradually changing the west’s political culture and forcing Israel to rethink its historic alliances.

The deterioration in relations between Israel and the White House is now impossible to dismiss, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama lock horns, this time over negotiations with Iran.

The US was reported last week to be refusing to share with Israel sensitive information on the talks, fearful it will be misused. A senior Israeli official described it as like being evicted from the “deluxe guest suite” in Washington. “Astonishing doesn’t begin to describe it,” he said.

The fall-out is spreading to the US Congress, where for the first time Israel is becoming a partisan issue. A growing number of Democrats have declared they will boycott Netanyahu’s address to the Congress next month, when he is expected to try to undermine the Iran talks.

Things are more precarious still in Europe. Several leading parliaments have called on their governments to recognize Palestinian statehood, and France rocked Israel by backing just such a resolution recently in the UN Security Council.

Europe has also begun punishing Israel for its intransigence towards the Palestinians. It is labelling settlement products and is expected to start demanding compensation for its projects in the occupied territories the Israeli army destroys.

This month 63 members of the European Parliament went further, urging the European Union to suspend its “association agreement”, which allows Israel unrestricted trade and access to special funding.

None of this has gone unnoticed in Israel. A classified report by the foreign ministry leaked last month paints a dark future. It concludes that western support for the Palestinians will increase, the threat of European sanctions will grow, and the US might even refuse to “protect Israel with its veto” at the UN.

Israel is particularly concerned about the economic impact, given that Europe is its largest trading partner. Serious sanctions could ravage the economy.

One might assume that, faced with these drastic calculations, Israel would reconsider its obstructive approach to peace negotiations and Palestinian statehood. Not a bit of it.

Netanyahu’s officials blame the crisis with Washington on Obama, implying that they will wait out his presidency for better times to return.

As for Europe, Netanyahu blames the shift there on what he calls “Islamisation”, suggesting that Europe’s growing Muslim population is holding the region’s politicians to ransom. On this view, the price paid for the recent terror attacks in Paris and Copenhagen is Europe’s support for Israel.

Instead, Netanyahu has begun looking elsewhere for economic – and ultimately political – patrons.

In doing so, he is returning to an early Israeli tradition. The state’s founders were inspired by the collectivist ideals of the Soviet Union, not US individualism. And in return for attacking Egypt in 1956, Israel was secretly helped by Britain and France to build nuclear weapons over stiff US opposition.

In response to recent developments, Netanyahu announced last month that he was courting trade with China, India and Japan – comprising nearly 40 per cent of the planet’s population.

Last year, for the first time, Israel did more trade with these Asian giants than with the US. Much of it focused on the burgeoning arms market, with Israel supplying nearly $4 billion worth of weapons in 2013. A region once implacably hostile to Israel is throwing open its doors.

India, plagued by border tensions with Pakistan and China, is now Israel’s largest arms purchaser – and such trade is expected to expand further following the election last year of Narendra Modi, known for his anti-Muslim views.

He has lifted the veil off India’s growing defense cooperation with Israel, one reason why Moshe Yaalon last week became the first Israeli defense minister to make an official visit.

Ties between Israel and China are deepening rapidly too. Beijing has become Israel’s third largest trading partner, while Israel is China’s second biggest supplier of military technology after Russia.

Last month the two signed a three-year cooperation plan, with China keen to exploit – in addition to Israel’s military hardware – its innovations on solar energy, irrigation and desalination.

Emmanuel Navon, an international relations expert at Tel Aviv University, claims that, despite its poor public image, Israel now enjoys a “global clout” unprecedented in its history.

Israel’s immediate goal is to future-proof itself economically against mounting popular pressure in Europe and the US to act in favor of the Palestinian cause.

But longer term Israel hopes to convert Chinese and Indian dependency on Israeli armaments – based on technology it tests and refines on a captive Palestinian population – into diplomatic cover. One day Israel may be relying on a Chinese veto at the UN, not a US one.

*Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books). He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: www.jonathan-cook.net. (A version of this article first appeared in the National, Abu Dhabi.)

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Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman held wide-ranging talks Wednesday with King Abdallah of Jordan on a range of key regional issues with special reference to the ways and means to boost bilateral links further.

King Salman expressed hope that the visit of the Jordanian king would further enhance bilateral cooperation in different areas, including security and counterterrorism.

During the talks, the two leaders underlined the need to formulate common policies on challenges facing the Middle East region. “They exchanged cordial talks and discussed issues of common interest between the Kingdom and Jordan,” said the SPA.

Arab News could not reach Jordanian Ambassador Jamal Shamayleh for more information. But, a diplomatic source, preferring anonymity, said “the talks covered a number of regional issues, including the campaign against the Islamic State.”

“Jordan, a country invited by the GCC to join the bloc, has been a close regional ally of the Kingdom,” he added.

King Salman hosted a lunch banquet in honor of the Jordanian king and his accompanying delegation.

The talks and the luncheon banquet were attended by top Saudi officials and several members of the royal family, including Crown Prince Muqrin; Riyadh Gov. Prince Faisal bin Bandar, National Guard Minister Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah and Finance Minister Ibrahim Al-Assaf.

From the Jordanian side, Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh; Fayez Al-Tarawneh, chief of the Hashemite Royal Court; Gen. Mashal Al-Zaben, chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff; and Gen. Faisal Al-Shoubaki, director of the General Intelligence Department, were present.

Later on Wednesday, King Abdallah left for Jordan and was seen off by Crown Prince Muqrin at the airport.

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A South African delegation led by the Deputy Minister of International Relation and Cooperation Ms. Nomaindia Mfeketo is visiting Sri Lanka this week and the team will enlighten the Sri Lankan officials on their experience in reconciliation and nation building.

Deputy Minister Mfeketo and her delegation met with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader, Minister of Urban Development, Water Supply and Drainage Rauff Hakeem on Wednesday (25th) and discussed matters on reconciliation efforts and Nation Building process backed by the South African Government.

South Africa has been asked to share with Sri Lanka its experience in terms of reconciliation and nation-building.

South African High Commissioner in Colombo, G.Q.M. Doidge also accompanied the high level delegation.

During the five-day visit Deputy Minister Mfeketo will meet her counterpart and other important role-players in Sri Lanka. South Africa has been asked to share with Sri Lanka its experience in terms of reconciliation and nation-building.

This is the first high-level visit from South Africa to Sri Lanka since the new administration of President Maithripala Sirisena took over following the Presidential elections held in Sri Lanka on 8 January 2015.

It is also the first follow up visit by South African government delegation, since the visit to Sri Lanka by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as the special envoy of South African President Jacob Zuma in July 2014.

Meanwhile, the Fifth Partnership Forum between South Africa and Sri Lanka was also taking place in Colombo on 24 and 25 February 2015 with the representation of a number of South African Government Departments.

The two sides are expected to sign two agreements on tourism cooperation and cooperation between the South African and Sri Lankan Zoological Gardens.

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By Sushant Sareen

If, apart from either a limited or an all-out war, dialogue is the only weapon in your arsenal to deal with an openly hostile country, then it stands to logic that it must be used sparingly, judiciously, creatively and in a way that it yields something tangible. India has, however, mastered the art of frittering away its sole weapon against Pakistan on a whim and a fancy of the powers that be. False premises built on an inadequate and incomplete understanding of Pakistan, future assurances by silver-tongued emissaries that are invariably dishonoured, and a bit of nudge and push by international powers, also play a role in India’s glaring inability to have a coherent and consistent policy on Pakistan. The ill-thought U-turn made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government on its principled position of not engaging Pakistan at the political level until that country addresses India’s concerns and respects its red-lines fits in this sordid pattern that has defined India’s non-policy on Pakistan. Quite clearly, the government has not worked out the serious diplomatic, political and security implications of this U-turn.

The fig leaf of the new Foreign Secretary visiting Pakistan as part of a purported ‘SAARC Yatra’ is not being bought by anyone, least of all the Pakistanis who are crowing with delight over the unseemly climb-down by the Modi government. They were quite confident that it was a matter of a few weeks, or at best a few months, before the Indians come scurrying back to the dialogue table, partly as a result of Pakistan’s aggressive diplomatic posturing and political rhetoric, partly because of the clamour that would steadily be built up inside India through the pro-Pakistan lobby, and partly as a result of the pressure that the Americans and their Western allies would exert on the Indian government. Past experience has taught the Pakistanis that India’s grand-standing against their country has a rather short shelf-life – a few months after the Parliament attack, Prime Minister Vajpayee extended his infamous ‘hand of friendship’; about six months after 26/11, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did a Sharm-el-Sheikh; and six months after Prime Minister Modi put his foot down on Pakistani hobnobbing with the Hurriyat, it is back to the talks table.

There is nothing unusual about making a U-turn, whether in politics or in diplomacy. But the thumb rule is that the U-turn is made either to minimise damage or to maximise advantage. What is extraordinary about the Modi government’s U-turn is that it maximises losses and minimises advantages. Further, the factors that prompted the current government to make an about turn on Pakistan remains shrouded in mystery. From what is available in the public domain, the following are the possible factors that made the government embark on the desultory path of re-engaging Pakistan:

• The red-lines laid down at the time when the Foreign Secretary’s visit in August 2014 was cancelled have been strongly registered and therefore there is no reason to not re-start the process of engagement;
• America and its allies were leaning on India to engage Pakistan;
• There was the whole issue of government formation in Jammu and Kashmir, with the BJP’s prospective ally laying down the condition of dialoguing with Pakistan;
• There was no domestic electoral reason to continue with the hard-line on Pakistan since no state assembly election is due in the near future and this opened a window of opportunity;
• The policy of non-engagement had run its course and has become subject to the law of diminishing returns;
• Events in the region are moving fast and, by not engaging Pakistan, India would be left standing on the side-lines in Afghanistan;
• And, the most outrageous one is that, Pakistan had changed after the Peshawar school massacre and is no longer going to flirt with any terrorist organisation, not even the India-centric ones. It would, however, sequence action against groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa after first cracking down on the Taliban – the classic post-dated cheque that will invariably bounce.

Frankly, none of these reasons or causes that are being proffered as justification for the U-turn really does anything to forward India’s national interests. Instead of firmly drawing red-lines, the government’s U-turn has effectively reduced them to the status of an appeal from a supplicant. From a point where Pakistan was told to decide on whether it wants to talk to the Indian government or to those seeking to break India to now when the government is saying that Pakistan can talk to the separatists but should avoid talking to them just before and after they talk to the Indian government, it is a rather steep fall. To avoid the embarrassment of seeing Pakistan fete the separatists on 23 March, the government is keen to hold talks in Islamabad well before so that Pakistan can do what it does and India can turn a blind eye to it.

In any case, when the Government of India is itself ready to talk to separatists – that’s part of the Faustian bargain struck with the PDP in Jammu & Kashmir – then surely its opposition to Pakistan meeting the separatists does not hold much water. In other words, there are no red-lines any more. Worse, Srinagar will henceforth hold a veto on what goes for India’s Pakistan policy. After all, the BJP has conceded the PDP’s demand to hold a dialogue with Pakistan so that it can gain the privilege of becoming a junior, if also powerless, partner in the state government. The future implication of such political pusillanimity in India’s relationship with its other neighbours is, to say the least, extremely troublesome. Equally worrisome is the suggestion that the so-called hard-line taken by the government was not part of a new, but still incipient, policy framework but more a function of domestic political posturing with an eye on State assembly elections.

Perhaps the Americans did lean on India to engage Pakistan and India gave in. Circumstantial evidence suggests so. A day before Modi twittered the news of the Foreign Secretary’s SAARC Yatra, President Obama had apparently told Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to expect a call from his Indian counterpart. So much for India’s strategic autonomy! But more importantly, what was the pushback from the Indian side? Surely, the Americans could have been asked to make Pakistan deliver on some of our concerns if they were so keen on India once again engaging with Pakistan. It is another matter that with the Americans having failed to force compellence on Pakistan in their own cause, there is not very much that they could ask Pakistan to deliver in India’s cause. Be that as it may, at the very least, India could have let a respectable period of time elapse rather than responding with such alacrity to an American request or pressure. That would have salvaged some dignity.

The Americans insist that their relationships with India and Pakistan ‘stand on their own’. If so, then what is in it for India to accede to American requests to engage Pakistan, unless of course India has now decided that America’s interests are synonymous with India’s interests. But that is clearly not the case because both sides agree that there are areas where their interests diverge, and Pakistan is one such area. The US believes that it will be able to change Pakistan’s strategic orientation by continuing to mollycoddle it. India, on the other hand, is convinced that this is a failed policy and only ends up encouraging, emboldening and incentivising Pakistan to continue on the path it has been treading so far.

It is of course possible that the Americans and their allies got taken in by the Pakistani propaganda that India was opening the Eastern front at a time when Pakistan was moving against the Taliban. But this nonsense could have been easily shot down by India. For one, the ceasefire violations are initiated by Pakistan and India is only responding, albeit much more robustly than in the past. For another, there is no dramatic escalation from the Indian side and the response is only in the narrow area where Pakistan initiates the firing. Third, India has not opened up the entire Line of Control (LoC) or responded with higher calibre weapons to Pakistani provocations. If it was India’s intention to shift Pakistan’s focus away from its Western front, then surely India would have opened up the entire LoC in order to force Pakistan to redeploy troops to its Eastern front. This has clearly not happened. And while it is true that there is some action being taken by Pakistan against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), there is as yet nothing on the ground to even remotely suggest that Pakistan’s policy on using terrorists as an instrument of state policy has changed or even that it is no longer discriminating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists. At least insofar as India is concerned, there is absolutely no change in policy.

It can be, and is being, argued that the Foreign Secretary’s visit does not amount to a structured dialogue and will at best be talks about talks. Even so, by agreeing to send the Foreign Secretary, India has committed a blunder, the price of which it will pay in the months ahead. A certain pressure has been built on Pakistan by calling off the talks in August 2014. Despite their usual bombast, Pakistanis were in a quandary as to how India would react to anything they do. This pressure has now been released by backing down on the issue of sending the Foreign Secretary. Come to think of it, if the Foreign Secretary had to be sent and India had to resile from the position it had taken last August, then it just did not make sense to cancel the talks back then. Even at that time, following the visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Delhi, the Pakistanis were on the defensive and were trying to figure out the new dispensation. Six months later and after the U-turn, the Pakistanis are convinced that the new dispensation is no different from its predecessors. As they see it, they just need to hold their nerve and sooner or later India will scurry back to the talks table. The point is that if this is what India will do, then why break off the talks in the first place?

Talks with Pakistan come with a price tag, however. The past record suggests that every time India is engaged in a dialogue with Pakistan, there is a spike in incidents of terrorism; and every time India breaks off dialogue, terrorism incidents are few and far between. This is partly because talks serve as a buffer to any possible offensive action that India might contemplate in retaliation to a terror strike. It is so much easier to call off talks than to take offensive action. But when the talks are broken off, this buffer is not there and hence there is greater uncertainty about India’s reaction. In other words, talks create space for Pakistan to export terrorism. It can of course be argued that there are enough spoilers inside Pakistan who would like to sabotage the talks. Even if for the sake of argument it is accepted that these are non-state actors – a clear fiction when it comes to groups like the LeT/JuD – this is of small comfort from an Indian perspective. Indians would rather not talk to Pakistanis and remain relatively secure from Pakistan’s most potent export – terrorism – than talk to them and become victims of terror.

Finally, there is the whole issue of a policy having run its course and becoming subject to the law of diminishing returns. The problem is that Indians tend to treat policy like instant coffee, something that must produce results within a relatively short time – not more than a quarter and certainly not more than six months – and when that does not happen, as it never will in this short period, there is clamour for a review. By never allowing a policy to run its course, India ends up going round and round in circles and making the same mistakes time and time again. In the process, it ends up reaffirming the stereotype that Pakistan has of India – a weak country without either the will or the staying power. This is the cardinal mistake being committed by the Modi government in sending the Foreign Secretary to Pakistan. As a result, the next time the government tries to play hard-ball, it will not be taken seriously, not by the Pakistanis, not by the international community and not even by Indians.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

“Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasNonPolicyonPakistan_ssareen_260215.html

The post India’s Non-Policy On Pakistan: U-Turn To Square One – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Binodkumar Singh*

After six years of the constitution drafting process, the political class in Nepal on Jan 22, 2015, once again missed another deadline to deliver the new constitution.

Notably, the first Constituent Assembly (CA), constituted on May 28, 2008, with mandate to deliver the constitution by May 28, 2010, was dissolved on May 27, 2012, after four extensions. Correspondingly, the second CA constituted on Jan 21, 2014, fixed the deadline for delivery of the Constitution as Jan 22, 2015, and missed it again. The unresolved issues include the form of government, federalism, judiciary and the electoral system.

Earlier, as the deadline for the constitutional draft approached in the Himalayan nation, protests and bandhs (shut downs) became the order of the day. Remarkably, during one such bandh enforced by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M)-led alliance, which turned violent in several parts of the country, a protester, identified as Rajaram Jha (25), died at Bhramarpurachok in Dhanusha District on Jan 12, 2015. Further, in a clear manifestation of growing political volatility among the parties, on Jan 20, opposition members of the CA, led by UCPN-M, vandalized the parliament and attacked the ruling Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) leaders and security staff, leaving four security staff members injured. Once again, on Jan 22, opposition CA members threw microphones and shoes at the members of the ruling alliance in the parliament. Preliminary estimates showed that the unprecedented vandalism that took place at the CA hall caused damage of around Rs.3 million.

In fact, the clashes ensued after chairman of Rastriya Janamorcha, Chitra Bahadur KC, on Jan 16 submitted a list of signatures of 413 CA members of lawmakers from NC, CPN-UML, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist-Leninist (CPN-ML), Rastriya Janamorcha, CPN (Samyukta), Nepal Family Party, Bahujan Shakti Party, Nepali Janata Dal, Akhanda Nepal Party and Janajagaran Party Nepal to CA Chairman Subash Nembang demanding promulgation of new constitution by Jan 22.

Meanwhile, UCPN-M chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda on the day of submitting the list of signatures instructed party leaders and cadres in Lalitpur district to foil any attempt in promulgating the new constitution through voting process in the CA. In fact, the 19-party bloc led by UCPN-M has been insisting on forging consensus rather than going for voting on disputed issues and warned of consequences if the ruling NC and CPN-UML went ahead with the voting process. Significantly, during the discussion on the Constitutional Political Dialogue and Consensus Committee (CPDCC) report in the CA on Jan 18, lawmakers representing the Maoists and Madhesi parties insisted on consensus. On Feb 7, chairman of the Terai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP), Mahantha Thakur addressing the first national gathering of the Terai Madhes Democratic Teachers’ Union in Birgunj town of Parsa district, said federalism along with ethnic identity was the need of the hour.

Further hardening their stand, UCPN-M top leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Baburam Bhattarai and Narayan Kaji Shrestha on Feb 1 said that they will not attend any meetings aimed at drafting the constitution on the basis of majority. Further, on Feb 3, UCPN-M chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal revived the dormant controversial paramilitary youth wing of the party — the Young Communist League (YCL) — by inaugurating its central committee meeting. On the same day, speaking in an interview with Republica (a national daily which has a partnership with the International New York Times), UCPN-M senior leader Baburam Bhattarai said that putting federalism on hold will not be acceptable to the Maoist under any condition. In another place, on Feb 4, UCPN-M chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal addressing the mid-command level special training programme in Kathmandu urged the party leaders and activists to fulfil their responsibilities to make the mass meeting scheduled for Feb 28 a grand success. Party’s vice-chairman Narayan Kaji Shrestha also appealed to all forces to unite in view of the opposition’s headlong move.

Remarkably, amid calls from the UCPN-M and Madhes-based parties to cancel the majority process of statute writing, a meeting of the CA Proposal Drafting Committee on Feb 1, formed a nine-member Questionnaire Sub-committee headed by CPN-UML lawmaker Agni Prasad Kharel to prepare questionnaires taking the issues raised by the CA members. On Feb 8, 2015, the Questionnaire Sub-committee prepared 242 questions relating to disputed issues in constitution making, including 72 on state restructuring and 170 other disputes related to various other themes such as system of governance, judicial and electoral models and submitted the report to the Questionnaire Committee. But the Questionnaire Committee brought down the questions to 232 and the committee chairmain Kul Bahadur Gurung of NC handed the report over to CA chairman Subash Nembang on Feb 9.

Meanwhile, Nembang while receiving the report of the Questionnaire Committee at Singha Durbar in Kathmandu said he will take the majority course of constitution making process ahead on the basis of the report of the CA’s questionnaire committee if the political parties fail to settle disputes through consensus. Further, he urged the leaders of the major political forces to reach political agreement before the CA plenary is convened on Feb 12.

Notably, on Feb 8, UCPN-M chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal talking to journalists at the Siraha District headquarters said that his alliance was ready to sit for a dialogue if the ruling parties created a trustworthy environment. Further, in order to bring the constitution drafting process back on track, Prime Minister Sushil Koirala while addressing a party gathering at the NC headquarters at Sanepa in Lalitpur district on Feb 10 said his party is ready to adopt “maximum flexibility” in talks with the opposition parties. He said “We have repeatedly said there is no alternative to consensus and it’s impossible to draft a constitution without consensus.”

Indeed, Nepal is currently threatened by political turmoil as political parties in Nepal have shown little sagacity over the past years, keeping Nepal teetering on the brink of enveloping disorder. Even though, the massive turnout of 78.34 percent in the 2013 CA elections was far above the record turnout of 68.15 percent in the 1991 general elections showing the overwhelming public aspiration for peace, order and democratic governance, nevertheless, the persistent deadlock over the constitutional draft can undermine the surge of optimism. And any political formation against popular will is unlikely to secure significant support and will push the country towards increasing uncertainty.

*Dr. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Nepal: Missing Constitution Deadline Betrayal Of Public Aspirations – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Today the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a non-elected federal government agency, voted three-to-two to reclassify broadband Internet as a common carrier service under Title II of the Communications Act. This means that – without the vote of Congress, the peoples’ branch of government – a federal agency now claims the power to regulate the Internet. I am surprised that even among civil liberties groups, some claim the federal government increasing regulation of the Internet somehow increases our freedom and liberty.

The truth is very different. The adoption of these FCC rules on the Internet represents the largest regulatory power grab in recent history. The FCC’s newly adopted rule takes the most dynamic means of communication and imposes the regulatory structure designed for public utilities. Federal regulation could also open the door to de facto censorship of ideas perceived as threatening to the political class – ideas like the troops should be brought home, the PATRIOT Act should be repealed, military spending and corporate welfare should be cut, and the Federal Reserve should be audited and ended.

The one bright spot in this otherwise disastrous move is that federal regulations making it more difficult to use the Internet will cause more Americans to join our movement for liberty, peace, and prosperity. The federal government should keep its hands off of the Internet!

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: Internet, RIP? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Chayanika Saxena*

The birth pangs of democracy can be painful and last many days, even months, as the case of Afghanistan’s political scenario has come to show. The initial, tumultuous struggle apart, the formation of cabinet in Afghanistan continues to be in jeopardy, impacting the country on all its fronts. Added to which, the increasing attacks on civilian life in Afghanistan has left the country bewildered about the fledgling present that many fear might become its future as well.

The cabinet at the centre in Afghanistan is far from taking shape. Where it had already taken the Unity Government more than a hundred days for declaring the list of its ministerial hopefuls, most of the berths continue to remain unoccupied. Amid rumours about ministerial positions being handed over to the leaders of Taliban, only a few ministerial portfolios (eight+ one National Directorate of Security) have been granted their takers after their approval from the 250 strong Wolesi Jirga. Names were taken down on grounds of dual citizenship, inadequate educational qualifications and some for reasons that have been cited as ‘voluntary withdrawals’.

The international circles too are abuzz with news of uncertainty that looms large over the political establishment in Kabul, shaking their confidence in the civilian government even more. In such circumstances, it will neither be hasty nor unreasoned to conclude that a debilitating political balance will spell derailment for the economy and society of Afghanistan.

A gloomy boding for the future of Afghanistan is not without its proof. Languishing for factors that can be roughly classified into (overlapping) essential, instrumental and constitutional reasons, the cabinet formation in Afghanistan has been both the cause and the consequence of intense political confrontations. The cooks of this potpourri are just too many, and to top that, are equipped with their own set of spices that none are willing to compromise on.

Beginning with the ‘politics of essential’, the ethnic faultlines in Afghanistan are yet to disappear from the ground; and, they may never either, considering that democracy has a tendency of carving niches out of socio-economic and political cleavages. Although not unparalleled, yet the ethnic diversity in Afghanistan is an antagonised and militarised lot. The experience of heavily armed clashes in the last three decades, with hordes of civilian casualty has created enemies of camps-that-are-not-like-us. As a result, the choice of ministerial candidates has been clouded by inter-ethnic rivalries. The absence of Nuristanis from the proposed cabinet; the snubbing of the Heratis that was questioned in a warning tone by their old patriarch, Ismail Khan; the dismayed Hazaras are some of the many instances when ethnicity came in the way of effective political functioning .

If the present day National Unity government is anything to go by, its purported relevance in mitigating ethnic frictions has not been realized. The claimed prudence involved in the manufacturing of a united front has been trounced by attempts of internal hacking that continue to happen along ethnic lines. In fact, the past of this coalition, which it is not willing to leave behind, is a testimony of the internationally induced, artificially constructed ethnic bonhomie. This arranged marriage may thus, have a tough time in managing its domestic affairs with all the conflicts its two sides are themselves bringing to the table.

Undeniably, the not-so-invisible-hand of economics too is working behind the operation and aggravation of ethnic differences. The course of the three-decade long clashes in Afghanistan allowed many of the presently dissatisfied forces to create their regional coteries. For all the centralization that is being imposed from the top in Afghanistan, not a lot has trickled down to the regional and district levels. In fact, the appearance of the authority at the centre in the past, if not wholly in the present, has been oxymoronically centripetally centrifugal — where there is a consequent rush towards the centre from different directions, but with little intention for consolidation. The distance from power continues to be measured from the different regional points to the centre and not significantly the other way around.

The regions, which are roughly distributed into West (Herat), North (Mazar) and South (Kandahar), are still controlled by people who have the economic lifelines, crucially the highways and poppy production, in their grip. Many have doubled up as major realty owners that allow greater penetration into the locales of these regions to which the centre will take long to reach. In these conditions, the decision on the ministerial portfolios is bound to turn into a battleground for the replaying of economic and ethnic rivalries.

Essentially for the good of democracy, but the checks and balances placed in the constitution are being manipulated by the interplay of these economic and ethnic factors. The Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) under a combination of Chapters (3, 4 and 5) and articles (64 and 71) gives Wolesi Jirga the ultimate authority to ratify and approve the candidates nominated for the 25 (at present) cabinet portfolios by the president. As the Lower House of the National Assembly, the members of this Jirga are elected from the district councils, with no party affiliations. Not outlawing political formations as such, however, candidates run as individual contestants to (theoretically) reduce ethnic factionalism — which on the ground hardly translates into anything. In the absence of a party whip and a secret ballot sealing the fate of the hopeful ministerial candidates, a lot of ‘lobbying’ emerges as a result.

Claims have been mounted in the past about horse-trading, bribery and other sorts of money and muscle flexing for getting the ministers of choice onto the cabinet. And, while the present situation does not cry foul as much, these acts have not vanished from the sight either. Also, as the Wolesi Jirga will be up for polls in the coming months, the situation is bound to get messier. In the hope of getting re-elected, the sitting MPs would have to make choices, raise demands and clamour for what they believe will influence their voter base. At the same time, they are also bound to look for sources that will cushion their possible failure too.

A combination of the above mentioned factors has made cabinet-formation in Afghanistan quite an uphill task. The political tussles that have been on for months now, have left people impatient and wanting for what they were promised, if not more. The manipulation of ethnic, economic and constitutional factors is slowly converting the enthusiasm that surrounded elections into exasperation with the system.

*Chayanika Saxena is a Research and Teaching fellow at Ashoka University, Sonepat. she can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post The Curious Case Of Cabinet Formation In Afghanistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Washington Post reports: The world knows him as “Jihadi John,” the masked man with a British accent who has beheaded several hostages held by the Islamic State and who taunts audiences in videos circulated widely online.

But his real name, according to friends and others familiar with his case, is Mohammed Emwazi, a Briton from a well-to-do family who grew up in West London and graduated from college with a degree in computer programming. He is believed to have traveled to Syria around 2012 and to have later joined the Islamic State, the group whose barbarity he has come to symbolize.

“I have no doubt that Mohammed is Jihadi John,” said one of Emwazi’s close friends who identified him in an interview with The Washington Post. “He was like a brother to me. . . . I am sure it is him.”

A representative of a British human rights group who had been in contact with Emwazi before he left for Syria also said he believed Emwazi was Jihadi John, a moniker given to him by some of the hostages he once held.

“There was an extremely strong resemblance,” Asim Qureshi, research director at the rights group, CAGE, said after watching one of the videos. “This is making me feel fairly certain that this is the same person.” [Continue reading…]

Qureshi, in a statement on the CAGE website, portrays Emwazi as a victim of British counter-terrorism policies:

This case should trigger thinking about British domestic and foreign policy. What risk assessments, if any, have been made about British counter-terrorism policy and the key part it plays in radicalising individuals? How have the security services been allowed to get away with abusing British citizens without redress? Why are the long-standing grievances over Western interventions in the Muslim world been ignored?

Propagandists have a habit of becoming the most devout believers in their own narrative, but I think it requires a particularly distorted mindset to portray Emwazi, given his alleged actions, as a victim.

In a press conference today, Qureshi described Emwazi as a “kind” and “gentle” young man.

In a video released today, Qureshi says: “The questions shouldn’t be about Jihadi John but they should be about what role our security services have played in alienating people in this society and turning them away from being able to find solutions to the problems they have.”

Moazzam Begg, CAGE’s director of outreach and a former detainee at Guantánamo, can also reasonably argue that he has been a victim of Britain’s counter-terrorism policy and what some see as its over-zealous security services.

Given Qureshi’s reasoning, are we to imagine that Begg or anyone else finding themselves in a similar position might be just as likely to follow in Emwazi’s footsteps and become another of ISIS’s executioners?

In fact, Begg has no illusions about ISIS: “You have no idea how dangerous these people are,” he wrote on Facebook in early 2014.

He also wrote:

“I saw muhajireen (foreigners), locked in cages, by Allah worse, than my Guantanamo cell.

“They beat people to make them confess…just like the Arab regimes, there is no difference.

“I have been to many places, Bosnia, Afghan… but never seen this kind of fitnah [turmoil] and such dangerous extremism and readiness for takfeer [excommunication].

“Syrians on the ground have started to hate foreigners because of them.

“ISIS have even detained and killed aid workers…brothers from UK who have taken convoys [have] been looted by ISIS, guns shoved in faces of brothers who have crossed Europe to bring aid.

“And what’s the basis of detaining the non-Muslim aid worker [Alan Henning] who came in as a guest of Muslims, under their protection? They’ve probably murdered him too, just like many Muslims they’ve done that to.”

The world is full of people who for multitudes of justifiable reasons regard themselves as victims, yet this doesn’t absolve them of responsibility for their own actions.

The Guardian adds: “Jihadi John” is one of a trio of Britons who held hostage Spanish, French, Danish, British and US nationals. The hostages were captured in northern Syria, some in Idlib province, others in Aleppo and a third group in and around Raqqa province, which has since become the main Syrian stronghold of Isis.

The jihadi cell that spawned Isis was initially strong in Idlib province, having taken root there in the summer of 2012. From there it spread to Aleppo, where hostages that had been captured at that point were held in one of two locations – under the eye hospital in the centre of the city or in a factory deep in an industrial zone on its northern outskirts.

By February last year, all the hostages, including Briton John Cantlie, who is one of two remaining western hostages, were moved to Raqqa.

It was in Raqqa that the hostages first became aware of the status that Emwazi had developed among Isis. One former hostage described him as “cold, sadistic and merciless”.

The post ‘Jihadi John’ Named As Mohammed Emwazi, Portrayed As Victim Of UK Counter-Terrorism Policies – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Make no mistake about it, sports are important.

That’s true if for no other reason than the fact that sports absorb billions of hours of people’s time – at all ages.   Whatever you think about sports, they’re clearly important for that reason alone.

Sports are also important because they have become a multibillion-dollar industry, one of the top ten biggest industries in the country.  According to Plunkett Research, the estimated size of the entire sports industry in 2012 was $435 billion.  That makes it much bigger than the U.S. auto industry, movie industry and many others.

Sports are important because professional and big-time college sports basically operate as self-regulated monopolies.  That creates problems that filter all the way down to sports at the high school and youth levels.

Finally, sports are important because sports ethos, mentalities and policies impact, in one way or another, virtually all aspects of our society.

While sports started as a form of play, recreation, and fun for family and friends, they have increasingly become commercialized and professionalized spectacles, at all levels (See: Little League World Series).  The result is our games suffer from a general soul sickness, resulting in problems that are zapping the human spirit out of the games we love at their best.

Clearly, sports are worthy of more serious examination than they receive in the United States today.

Nevertheless, controversial sports problems and abuses haven’t received the persistent, timely attention they deserve, including the development of well-conceived remedies for the games’ ills.

Until now.

How We Can Save Sports: A Game Plan, by Dr. Ken Reed a former college athlete, coach, long-time sports marketer, sports management instructor and sports issues columnist, and now sports policy director for our League of Fans (see leagueoffans.org) is unlike any other sports book I’ve seen.

There are plenty of books on the market about each of our most popular sports – football, basketball, baseball, hockey, tennis, golf, etc.  There are numerous books that profile our well-known sports figures.  And there are a few books on specific sports issues like concussions and taxpayer-financed stadiums and arenas.

But Reed’s book is different.  It covers the whole waterfront of sports issues and looks at how they’re all interconnected.  It’s basically a sports manifesto that looks at nine of the most important sports issues we face today and the red thread that weaves through them all, from youth sports to the pros.

And what is that red thread?

According to Reed, it’s ego and greed, and the win-at-all-costs (WAAC) and profit-at-all-costs (PAAC) policies and mentalities those vices have spawned throughout the world of sports.

In fact, it is these WAAC and PAAC policies and mentalities that are the foundation of the numerous issues Reed addresses in his book, including: adult-dominated youth sports; the demise of physical education and intramural sports in our schools; militaristic coaches that berate and abuse our young athletes; the lack of adequate concussion safety protocols and return-to-play guidelines throughout sports; a college sports model in which athletes’ economic and civil rights are denied; wealthy pro sports owners who hold taxpayers hostage in order to get publicly-financed sports palaces built; and an ongoing lack of equal opportunity in sports for female, disabled, and LGBT athletes and administrators.  The list goes on.

One issue that Reed addresses in his book really hits home with me.  He points out the fallacy behind the idea that the United States is a “sports mad country” as many outsiders have called us.  In effect, we’re a country that’s mad about spectator sports.  Our sports pages should really be renamed “Spectator Sports” because that’s all they cover. They have nothing to do with community participatory sports.

Americans love watching sports, usually while sitting on their couches eating junk food.  It’s interesting to note that in a University of Arkansas, Little Rock study, highly identified sports fans had significantly higher health risk behaviors than non-sports fans on a range of health behavior measures, including a higher Body Mass Index (BMI), along with higher fat, fast food and alcohol consumption.

Reed also takes a jab at the sports media.  He points out that the media will occasionally identify scandals, and other symptoms of problems in the sports world, but then stop.  What’s left missing is a discussion regarding how to mitigate these problems.  Also, mostly left out is any reporting of sports reform initiatives and grassroots movements designed to change sport—unless there is a major eruption or scandal that can’t be ignored.

Why?  Because sports media corporations, and most sports journalists, have too much invested, economically and psychologically in the current system to push for significant change.  As Reed says, the dominant ideology of commercialized and professionalized sport is diffused through corporate entities, including sports media.

Therefore, it’s up to citizens who love sport at its best, to rise up and push for change.  Reed labels his call to action “citizenship through sports activism.”  He provides would-be sports reformers and activists the analytical foundation, recommendations and resources needed to improve the valuable sports experience for all stakeholders.

He also identifies where people are already fighting for needed change around the country.

That’s good news because sports can be healthy socio-cultural practice of much value when win-at-all-cost and profit-at-all-cost thinking aren’t driving the bus.

Let’s hope that a significant number of sports fans—including concerned parents of young athletes—take Reed’s lead and start debating and discussing these issues in their communities.

It’s time for a grand slam look at the entire sports scene.

The post Ralph Nader: New Sports Expose, Changes Needed In All Directions – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

In its bid to dislodge the Awami League (AL) government, the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) seems to have disowned rational thinking.

BNP supremo Khaleda Zia even asked the activists to enforce a transport blockade on the International Language Day — a desperate move Bangladesh has hardly witnessed before. On Feb 21 every year, the people pay homage to the martyrs of the 1952 Language Movement. This particular day is dear to all as Bangladesh became the first nation in the history of mankind to gain independence on the basis of language.

However, the BNP-led 20-party opposition alliance has ignored “Amar Ekushe”— an event that subsequently changed the political course of the Bengalis in erstwhile East Pakistan. Such insensitivity towards an occasion of national significance may not go down well with the people.

The BNP leaders’ growing display of belligerence has made the civil society concerned about the future of the country’s hard earned democracy. The battle of attrition between the two Begums has often made Bangladesh vulnerable to threats like military intervention and resurgence of religious extremism in the recent past. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has pointed out several times that in order to sustain democracy; Bangladesh must restore law of land. It is an irony that despite being the oldest and largest organised party in the country, the AL suffered most from the political machinations of the undemocratic and anti-liberation forces. It seems the AL’s “boat” has entered the volatile political waters of this country yet again.

The opposition-sponsored non-stop blockade and street violence have almost paralysed Bangladesh since January. In the face of relentless attacks on public vehicles, especially bus and disruption of communication networks, the common people are more worried about their personal safety and livelihood due to the fast deteriorating political situation in the country.

Bangladesh politics is becoming uglier with the passing of each day. In a move to exert pressure on the BNP chief to call off the ongoing blockade, the electricity supply and internet connection to her Gulshan office were snapped on Feb 1. The authorities soon restored them after a hue and cry in the local media, which said the government has no right to discontinue utility services of anybody unless found to be a defaulter.

However, such media intervention primarily seeking to reinstate neutrality of the government machineries did not help Khaleda’s cause. Instead, she is now confronting the wrath of ordinary citizens for attempting to push the country towards anarchy. Indefinite blockade forced the authorities to reschedule the Secondary School Certificate examination, affecting 1.5 million candidates. Reports suggest that about 15,000 students and their guardians protested against the strikes in front of the BNP headquarters. The peaceful sit-ins taking place across the country can no more be called politically inspired or organised along party lines. Several professional groups have deplored violence and transport blockades and wondered what type of politics is being played which does not care for “people’s welfare, life and livelihood”.

It appears that in pursuing a single-point agenda of regaining power by any means, the BNP leaders have simply gone berserk. Whatever public sympathy Khaleda earned previously has been dissipated for causing severe inconvenience to normal life and business throughout the country.

The chronic political unrest has a debilitating impact on the economy. It may negate the country’s recent gains in women empowerment, public health and poverty alleviation. The Bangladeshi business and industry leaders are getting frustrated as political bickering has started hurting the economy. According to an estimate, Bangladesh has already incurred nearly Tk 75,000 crore losses since January. Businessmen led by Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry took to the streets on Feb 8 demanding an immediate end to the political crisis to help save the economy. Sectors like readymade garments, agriculture and transport are the worst suffers.

The present political stalemate has attracted the attention of the international community as well. The US has urged the political parties to shun violence and initiate dialogue. But the AL government is unlikely to attach much importance to the US on domestic political matters of Bangladesh where the American ambassador in Dhaka was seen openly siding with the BNP-Jamaat alliance. There is hardly any possibility of any foreign nation or regional grouping brokering a truce between the two parties. Like any other Third World country, Bangladesh strongly defends itself against foreign interference in internal affairs.

The ongoing political stand-off may persist for some more time as the likelihood of dialogue between the two contending political formations looks remote at this point. While visiting the arson victims at a hospital on Feb 11, Hasina made known her government’s inability to hold talks with “killers” such as BNP and Jamaat and warned that those involved in “militant acts” would be put on trial. Earlier on Feb 2, a criminal case was filed against Khaleda for masterminding bomb attacks on a public bus, killing 42 people.

Hasina also turned down the opposition demand of her resignation and reiterated that her government had received people’s mandate to run the country for the next five years. Since the assumption of office in January 2014, Hasina has consolidated her power by initiating trials of Khaleda and her eldest son on graft charges. Moreover, several other measures have been undertaken to keep the opposition in check. BNP’s deputy leader Fakhrul Islam Alamgir alone is facing as many as 68 cases of violence. He and many senior leaders are more engaged in seeking bail rather than charting new political strategy to facilitate BNP’s return to power.

However, it does not suggest that Bangladesh’s civil society, particularly the intelligentsia has approved Hasina’s present stint in power. In usual Bangladeshi style, the opinion is divided. Some political analysts maintain that the government lacks legitimacy while others say Hasina came to power through general elections which might not be inclusive but constitutional and legal.

Hasina may not find the task of governance easy in a fractious and highly politicised country like Bangladesh. The BNP is likely to adopt a more confrontationist attitude towards the ruling dispensation in the coming days to force Hasina’s resignation. The BNP is under the impression that if a snap poll is organised, it will come back to power with simple majority.

Since the restoration of parliamentary system in 1991, Bangladesh has been alternately ruled by AL and BNP. The bitter power rivalry between the two parties has not only made political instability almost endemic to an over-populated and impoverished country but also impeded the process of democratic institution building.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Bangladesh: Caught In Mesh Of Political Attrition – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Drinking coffee may be associated with a lower risk of developing multiple sclerosis (MS), according to a study released today that will be presented at the American Academy of Neurology’s 67th Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, April 18 to 25, 2015.

“Caffeine intake has been associated with a reduced risk of Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases, and our study shows that coffee intake may also protect against MS, supporting the idea that the drug may have protective effects for the brain,” said study author Ellen Mowry, MD, MCR, with Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in Baltimore and a member of the American Academy of Neurology.

For the study, researchers looked at a Swedish study of 1,629 people with MS and 2,807 healthy people, and a U.S. study of 1,159 people with MS and 1,172 healthy people. The studies characterized coffee consumption among persons with MS one and five years before MS symptoms began (as well as 10 years before MS symptoms began in the Swedish study) and compared it to coffee consumption of people who did not have MS at similar time periods. The study also accounted for other factors such as age, sex, smoking, body mass index, and sun exposure habits.

The Swedish study found that compared to people who drank at least six cups of coffee per day during the year before symptoms appeared, those who did not drink coffee had about a one and a half times increased risk of developing MS. Drinking large amounts of coffee five or 10 years before symptoms started was similarly protective.

In the US study, people who didn’t drink coffee were also about one and a half times more likely to develop the disease than those who drank four or more cups of coffee per day in the year before symptoms started to develop the disease.

“Caffeine should be studied for its impact on relapses and long-term disability in MS as well,” said Mowry.

The post Drinking Coffee May Reduce Risk Of MS appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya*

In the latest development in the terror finance scenario of Pakistan, as reported on Feb 9, 2015, the Interior Minister, Chaudhary Nisar Khan directed the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to immediately analyse the money transactions made through 667 accounts of Afghan refugees recently identified by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and proceed with necessary legal action after due process of investigation. During the meeting, Nisar Khan directed FIA to proactively pursue the cases of terrorism financing and, in particular, target the cases of illegal transactions through Hawala and Hundi. So far, the FIA has arrested 32 accused involved in suspicious activities since January 2014.

An official of the ministry further informed that the Financial Management Unit (FMU) of SBP had recently issued suspicious transaction reports (STRs) of money transactions made through 667 accounts of Afghan refugees and reported to FIA in this connection. As part of implementation of National Action Plan (NAP), the Ministry of Interior had recently asked FMU to keep a close eye on money transactions of Afghan refugees staying in Pakistan. It is however a question how Afghan refugees can operate bank accounts in Pakistan.

Earlier, Pakistan froze the bank accounts of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the frontal organisation of terror group, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as part of the country’s move to block funding to militant outfits. A spokesperson for the foreign ministry Tasnim Aslam publicly confirmed the decision at her weekly briefing on Jan 22, 2015 amid Pakistan’s efforts to implement a national anti-terrorism plan.

Supposedly, choking financing for terrorists and terrorist organizations is part of the 20 point National Action Plan, or NAP, announced days after a group of heavily armed Taliban militants attacked an army run school in Peshawar on Dec 16, 2014.

Officials believe outlawed armed groups had been receiving funding through illegitimate overseas banking channels. The government also informed the Senate Standing Committee on Finance in January, 2015 that more than Pakistani Rupees 1 billion worth of accounts (about US$16.3 million) of banned organizations had been frozen in Pakistan in order to implement the UN resolutions on curbing terrorist financing. Officials say they are now effectively dealing with all domestic and international flows of funds to suspected terrorist entities in accordance with an anti-money laundering law.

The legal tension of restraining terror fund is not a new political trouble for Pakistan. Since 2008, Pakistan has been experiencing international pressure to regularise financial transactions. Pakistan was first publicly identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2008 for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing AML/CTF regime. Officials believe that the hawala-hundi, an informal system of transferring money, had been a source of funding to militant groups in Pakistan. These are age-old systems of financial transaction, prevalent in the region of South Asia. Unfortunately, these channels became conducive for terror organisations and other non-state actors. Hawala-hundi system had previously been common in the northwestern parts of the country that had badly been affected by violent extremism; but Pakistan has to a large extent curbed this system and efforts are continuing to strictly monitor all such illegal channels.

Interestingly, on Dec 30, 2014 Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar, blaming the security apparatus stated: “The law enforcement and security agencies lack proper training to investigate the financing of terrorist activities.” Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did direct all financial institutions of the country to monitor funding of terrorists in the country in the aftermath of the Peshawar school massacre. “The finance ministry, State Bank and commercial banks must monitor funding of terrorists and militant organisations in the country. We will have to stop their funding,” the prime minister has said.

Acting on the premier’s directive, in December 2014 Dar held a high level meeting and asked the participants to finalise their proposals to prevent financing for terrorists and militant organisations in the country. “The focus of security agencies was more on nabbing terrorists rather than looking for their sponsors, which was the root cause of the problem. There was also no system to maintain consolidated data on prosecutions carried out by law enforcement, which could be shared by the agencies to further help their investigation,” the meeting was told.

Unfortunately, the official stance of curbing terror finance and dealing with the JuD, is going in vain. According to a Feb 10, 2015 report, JuD operates freely across the country, testing Islamabad’s new resolve to tackle militancy.

Although, the leadership of Pakistan vowed to end its tolerance of so called “good” militants after a Taliban massacre at a school in Peshawar, the government’s list of 60 or so banned organisations features the country’s Taliban and secessionist rebels from Balochistan province, but the state has long shied away from action against groups fighting abroad in India or Afghanistan.

Following a UN Security Council resolution, the leadership of Pakistan said it had JuD’s assets frozen after the 26/11 attacks, an undertaking it has repeated in recent weeks. But at JuD’s headquarters, a sprawling high security complex nestled among rice fields in the town of Muridke, north of Lahore, little seems to have changed. In show of sheer audacity and no legal respect, JuD leader Hafiz Saeed leads a high profile public life. Today, once again, the LeT is sending fighters to Afghanistan’s eastern Nuristan province, according to Afghan officials cited in a UN report. Moreover, the Pakistani establishment is still not providing a clear picture whether JuD has been officially banned on not, with occasional reports claiming both, and also the investigation into Afghan refugee accounts might act as public ‘eye-wash’ in the long run.

*Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya is a Research Associate with the Institute for Conflict Management. She can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Pakistan’s Curbing Terror Finance An Eyewash? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sheikh Rahman*

The Obama doctrine finally got a field test in India with the demonstration of the President to walk the talk on America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific. The US may be perceived to have gone overboard by the offer of transfer of defense technology for coproduction and development of weapons and weapons systems in India. In an attempt to forge closer ties with India, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta had referred to India as a ‘lynchpin’ of America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific. American defence policy intends to build the military capability of the South Asian power primarily to counterbalance any aggressive moves of the Chinese.

Bolstering India’s defence capability will guarantee the balance of power between the rival Asian powers. Both India and the United States will gain extra leverage against China from a strategic partnership. The US navy will be able to exercise its power to wield ‘broader’ influence in the Indian Ocean and enable the Indian naval fleet to reign supreme in the region. On the lose-lose side of the argument, there is the possibility of antagonizing a common foe by the veiled threat to China posed by the eminent visionaries reiterating the “importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea” (China Daily Jan 29, 2015).

Transfer of civil-nuclear deal and commercial arrangements between the superpower and the South Asian power holds promises for future political, economic and commercial prospects. The strategic partnership of the US and India goes a step beyond the primary concentration of the American pivot to the Pacific onto the Indian Ocean region (IOR); and, echoes of the Marshall Plan for Europe to contain communism.

The signing of the Defence Framework Agreement in 2005 signified a convergence of the strategic objectives of India and the US for joint collaboration for the enhancement of defence capability and mutual cooperation for regional security. Slow progress in realizing the objectives of the framework for defence cooperation did not dissuade the decision makers from renewing the commitment to “support stronger military-to-military engagement, including deeper maritime cooperation and increased opportunities in technology and trade”.

Washington strongly believes that joint collaboration in the production and development of weapons and weapons systems in India under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative holds the key to the maintenance of regional security in the Asia-Pacific.

Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) will usher in a new era of defence industrial cooperation between the United States and India. Under this initiative a working group will be formed to explore aircraft carrier technology sharing and design; and, explore possible cooperation on development of jet engine technology. Since there are significant bureaucratic hurdles and operational issues, initially the production of low end systems will be undertaken – such as, the Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the reconnaissance modules for the C-130J Super Hercules aircraft. Technology transfer and trade will allow US defence companies to participate in a defence industrial partnership for the modernization of India’s defence industrial base.

In 2013, the United States became the largest arms supplier to India with an estimated transfer of US$1.9 billion. India emerged as the world’s largest importer of arms with total overseas purchase of US$5.9 billion. During the last decade India imported armaments worth about US$10 billion from the United States consisting mostly of high end military hardware. Recent purchases have included the Boeing’s C-17A strategic transport aircraft and P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Manufacturing of the next generation Javelin anti-tank missiles in India by a joint venture of Raytheon and Lockheed carries the potential to boost India’s defence capability.

Since China has acquired advanced weaponry capable of defeating American projection of power in the region, its peaceful rise may not be regarded as ‘totally benign’. Countering the deployment of naval bases, ships, and submarines of the Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean has been the main concern of the Indians, apprehensive about the military dimension of a questionable peaceful rise.

India, aspiring to be a supreme power in the region, urgently feels the need to modernize its defence with the avowed purpose of deterring Chinese encroachments in South Asia. Collaboration with the US is essential for India to be a preeminent power in the region and at par with China. India expects to benefit from the cooperation by the strengthening of its military and economic power; and, the US by the active involvement in regional and bilateral security arrangements.

President Barack Obama occupied a special place of honour as the chief guest on the occasion of India’s Republic Day. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s desire to take the Indian economy to the next level by enhanced cooperation with the United States prompted the warm welcome accorded to President Obama. Optimism surrounded the vision espoused by the duo by dint of their innate knowledge and foresight of the dynamics of the region. The leaders shared a strategic vision for enhanced cooperation on mutual security and defence; and, realizing the tremendous potential for economic and industrial development of the region. Long-term outlook on national security, regional stability and economic well-being of the people apparently influenced the leaders in favour of a strategic partnership.

*Sheikh Rahman is an expert on American foreign policy and national security and has served as a Consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense. He may be contacted at: rsheikh5@aol.com

The post China In Mind As India, US Forge Strategic Ties – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

What geopolitical factors helped transform Geneva into a global economic and diplomatic center? For Nayef Al-Rodhan, two of them stand out – the city’s role as a safe haven during the two World Wars, and its ability to provide a needed ‘coordination point’ during the Cold War.

By Nayef Al-Rodhan*

On 19 May 2015, Geneva will celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of its accession to the Swiss Confederation. This occasion provides an opportunity to reflect on how the past two hundred years have transformed Geneva’s relationship to Switzerland and Geneva’s role in the world. With a population of less than 200,000 inhabitants, Geneva is a global and multicultural city, a hub for humanitarian diplomacy, an epicenter for banking and trading, and it ranks behind only Zurich and Vienna in global measures of the quality of life.

Alongside New York, Geneva has also become one of the most active locations for multilateral diplomacy . It hosts 30 international organizations, including the European headquarters of the United Nations, 250 international non-governmental organizations and 172 permanent missions. In total, the international sector in Geneva employs over 28,000 people. Geneva is a center of humanitarian action, education, peacekeeping, security and nuclear research. This critical mass of mandates makes the city uniquely relevant in world politics.

The story of how Geneva acquired this role is tightly connected to the history of power politics in Europe, the distinct advantages of Swiss neutrality and the evolution of international diplomacy. Two hundred years ago, Geneva was treated as an object of geopolitics and bartered away at the Congresses of Paris and Vienna in order to establish a post-Napoleonic equilibrium on the European continent. This geopolitical role was retained until the Inter-War Period. Today, Geneva is often described as “the diplomatic capital of the world” and is an important node in the global economy. Two factors explain this remarkable transformation: 1) the role of the city as a “safe haven” that could offer intact infrastructure and ‘business as usual’ during the two World Wars and 2) its role as a hub of political and economic coordination between the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Paris, Vienna and Geneva

The year 1815 marked the end of a fifteen-year period of French rule over Geneva. After Napoleon’s troops were driven from the city following his defeat at Leipzig in 1813, the Swiss federal assembly voted to integrate Geneva, Neuchâtel and the Valais into the Confederation, leading to the signing of the Treaty for the Admission of Geneva on 19 May 1815.

On Geneva’s part, the move for admission was primarily a geopolitical calculation. In an era of empires and nation-states, Geneva recognized that city-states would require a larger entity to provide for their defense and survival.

At the Congresses of Paris and Vienna, Geneva won support for its desire to become a part of Switzerland. Represented by the diplomat Charles Pictet de Rochemont, Geneva received seven communes from the Pays de Gex and twenty-four communes from Savoy. Both France and the Kingdom of Sardinia ceded territories for this purpose, according to the Treaty of Paris of 1815 and the Treaty of Turin of 1816.

Geneva achieved its objectives because they were in line with the geopolitical aims of the great powers of the day. At the same time, those great powers guaranteed the city’s neutrality which helped it to become an important setting for international cooperation.

Fifteen years after Geneva became the twenty-second canton of Switzerland, Swiss philanthropist Jean-Jacques Sellon created the Society for Peace. Another 33 years later, Geneva became the seat of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and witnessed the signing of the first international humanitarian treaty, the Geneva Convention, in 1864.

A global capital

The first attempts at formal international cooperation in Geneva were not resoundingly successful. The League of Nations, which came into existence in 1920, was headquartered in the city – first in the Palais Wilson and then in the purpose-built Palace of Nations. Though it ultimately failed to prevent the slide towards the Second World War, the League was not without its successes: for instance, the work performed by the International Labour Organization, the International Refugee Organization and the Health Organization helped to raise Geneva’s stature in the interwar period.

Geneva attained even greater significance, however, in the post-War period when many high-level negotiations and diplomatic summits began to take place in the city. These included the 1954 Conference on Indochina, the post-war meeting of the Allies in 1955, the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in 1985, START negotiations in 2008-2009, and the ongoing high-level talks on the Iranian nuclear weapons program. For its contributions to international peace and stability, Geneva-based organizations and personalities have received no fewer than sixteen Nobel prizes, most of them for peace. The first was awarded to Henry Dunant, the founder of the ICRC; the most recent was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Geneva, however, is not only a global diplomatic capital but an important node in the global economy. In particular, it has become a center for the global trade in raw materials. More than 500 multi-national corporations trade in raw materials from Geneva, accounting for approximately 10% of the city’s (and the canton’s) GDP. On a given day, Geneva-based corporations process over 700 million tons of oil, which exceeds the trading volumes of the City of London (approximately 520 million tons per day) and Singapore (440 million). 80% of all Russian oil is traded through the city and approximately 20% of all cotton. Some estimate that a third of the global trade in oil, cereals, cotton and sugar, as well as half of the global trade in coffee are also directed through Geneva.

Geneva has risen to become an important geopolitical city for a variety of reasons. During the First World War, Switzerland, and hence also Geneva, was able to offer “business as usual” to international trading firms. During the 1920s, the first cereal traders, such as André, came to Geneva, primarily to be close to their main customer, Nestlé. On top of this, several Ottoman and later Turkish traders found it convenient to establish trading subsidiaries in the region of Lausanne, located on the route of the Orient Express between London and Istanbul.

Furthermore, Geneva began to benefit from the image of neutrality bestowed upon the city by the international organizations which increasingly established their headquarters there. Yet it was perhaps Geneva’s role as a “safe haven” (and its intact infrastructure) during the Second World War that attracted the most business to the city.

During the Cold War, as a result, Geneva was already well known throughout the world as a ‘neutral’ trading location. This meant that it was in Geneva that economic and political coordination between the West and the Soviet bloc came to be orchestrated. It also continued to function as an economic safe haven. Indeed, it was to Geneva that Egyptian cotton traders transferred their activities during the Nasser era, just like many Arab oil traders after the oil crisis of 1973-1974.

Swiss meta-geopolitics

Undeniably, one of the reasons why Geneva is so international is because the European headquarters of the UN and its agencies are located in the city. This reflects Switzerland’s long-standing commitment to provide federal and cantonal support to the United Nations. Most recently, this took the form of a generous loan at preferential rates for the renovation of the UN’s Palais des Nations, covering almost 50% of the costs (approximately 300 million Swiss francs). Nowhere else does the UN benefit from such facilities and this level of support.

Over decades, Geneva has established a well-defined identity as a city of peace and an ideal meeting place for diplomats – whether in the field of humanitarian action, disarmament, climate change or other concerns. In recent years, activities in other sectors, such as the crude oil trade, have increased the city’s international renown. While Geneva faces competition as a global economic and diplomatic center from cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America – some of which are becoming prominent regional centers of dialogue and diplomacy – it is unlikely that the city’s stature will diminish anytime soon.

Using the framework of meta­-geopolitics, the following table discusses the geopolitical strengths and imperatives of “International Geneva.”

*Nayef Al-Rodhan is a Philosopher, Neuroscientist and Geostrategist. He is an Honorary Fellow at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK, and Senior Fellow and Head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland. Author of Neo-statecraft and Meta-Geopolitics. Reconciliation of Power, Interests and Justice in the 21st Century (LIT: Zurich, 2009)

The post The Meta-Geopolitics Of Geneva 1815-2015 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In light of the ongoing Brussels dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, the time has also come for Kosovo Serbs to seize the opportunity to address the practical needs of their community within the framework in which they find themselves. There are four ideas – including working together as a community and participating at all levels in Kosovo institutions – that might serve as guiding principles for their next steps.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

The EU will apparently be sponsoring an April conference in Kosovo to provide a forum for Kosovo Serbs to begin formulating a common agenda and strategy to serve their community in the current context. This is a good initiative and long overdue. (For the first five years after Pristina’s declaration of independence, the Quint – chiefly the US and Germans with NATO and EULEX – used and allowed Pristina to use force and threats to bully Serbs north and south of the Ibar into accepting control by the new Kosovo institutions they empowered.) But in light of the ongoing Brussels dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina – a product of the Quint’s recognition that north Kosovo could not be subdued by force and Belgrade’s existential need to settle on Kosovo in order to move into the EU – the time has also come for Kosovo Serbs to seize the opportunity to address the practical needs of their community within the framework in which they find themselves.

The essential decisions will be made by Kosovo Serbs themselves. But I offer here four ideas that might serve as guiding principles for considering their next steps:

• The vital usefulness of working together as a community. This would mean putting aside petty differences and arguments over the past to formulate joint approaches that all political actors combine to achieve with full support of all Serb communities within Kosovo. United in pursuit of a common agenda, Kosovo Serbs can be a potent player in central politics as well as more effectively governing their own municipalities. Working together would also prove a powerful lure to the internationals eager to provide support for peaceful change in the Balkans.

• Putting aside – if not necessarily abandoning – the larger political issue of status. This would mean focusing on putting the compromise arrangements presented by an Ahtisaari-Plus approach and the Brussels dialogue to the test. The status of Kosovo has been contentious for decades. Milosevic’ efforts to use repression of Kosovo Albanians for his political interests eventually doomed Yugoslavia and closed off any likelihood of autonomy-within-Serbia alternatives. That truth must be faced in its entirety. Serbia has accepted this truth – perhaps not fully admitted yet – and Kosovo Serbs must do the same if they are to preserve their life in Kosovo and Kosovo’s Serbian heritage.

• Seeking to achieve practical solutions to practical problems. The Ahtisaari package provides a robust framework for local control of local and cultural matters and preserving links between Serb municipalities in Kosovo and with Belgrade. As further elaborated through the Brussels dialogue, this could provide a full range of means to work to address practical issues and establish a sustainable environment for security and development. No one else will work to ensure this framework is fully honored if Kosovo Serbs don’t use it.

• Participation at all levels in Kosovo institutions. The Serbian connection to Kosovo can only be preserved through the full participation of Kosovo Serbs in central as well as local institutions. That means all eligible Kosovo Serbs voting in all Kosovo elections. Given the political divisions within the Kosovo Albanian community, Kosovo Serbs may well have a political weight greater than their numbers. Given what should be their natural inclination to support democracy, human rights and transparency, Serbs may also find willing allies among at least some Albanians.   Full Serb participation in Kosovo politics would serve the interests of everyone and most especially themselves.

The truth seems to be that whatever the political status of Kosovo – and as the region moves further into Europe over the coming decade that may matter less – there exists the possibility of making it a truly multi-ethnic polis. For this to happen, Kosovo Serbs must work together to achieve practical solutions using all the political means available to them. And the internationals – bravo to the EU for finally getting it – must continue to assist.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. He was Diplomat-in-Residence at Drake University for the 2013-14 school year and now works as an independent consultant.

The post What Next For Kosovo Serbs? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lanka’s new government should advance a reform agenda to address past and ongoing human rights problems in the country, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to the newly elected president, Maithripala Sirisena. The government has already undertaken important new initiatives, such as reviewing cases of detainees under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, lifting restrictions on media reporting, ending Internet censorship, and removing nongovernmental organizations from Defense Ministry oversight.

However, many important human rights concerns still need to be addressed. Among them are the use of torture by police, the protection of minority communities, the independence of government oversight committees, and the repealing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Holding accountable those responsible on both sides for violations of international law during Sri Lanka’s long civil war is crucial for the country’s future, Human Rights Watch said.

“President Sirisena has an important opportunity to right the wrongs of his predecessor,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government’s strong initial steps should be followed by lasting measures to re-establish Sri Lanka as a rights-respecting democracy.”

The Sri Lankan police routinely torture and ill-treat criminal suspects taken into custody. The government should act to eliminate the use of torture against detainees and improve redress mechanisms for victims.

During the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, Sri Lanka’s minority communities increasingly came under threats and violence instigated by ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups. While the new president in several speeches has acknowledged the government’s failure to act on behalf of these minority groups, more needs to be done to alleviate their concerns. The government should fully investigate and appropriately prosecute members of sectarian groups for inciting communal violence, as well as police who failed to stop such crimes.

The number of people arbitrarily detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act is unknown, and many of their families are unaware of their fate or whereabouts. In addition to releasing or charging those detained, the government should promptly act to repeal the law, which has long underpinned widespread human rights violations, particularly against ethnic Tamils.

On accountability for wartime abuses, the decision of the United Nations to postpone the release of its investigation into violations of international law in Sri Lanka until September 2015 provides the government an opportunity to put into place an effective mechanism with a significant international component. Previous government accountability mechanisms have been impaired by harassment, threats and violence against witnesses and judges. The best way to address this problem would be to create a combined international and domestic court similar to the successful hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Human Rights Watch said.

“Creating a predominant international presence in a special Sri Lankan court would reduce the scope for interference against national judges and prosecutors,” Adams said. “A strong hybrid court would lend credibility and independence to the proceedings that purely domestic proceedings may lack.”

The post HRW Calls For Sri Lanka To Press Ahead On Rights Reforms appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Spanish economy grew in 2014 for the first time since the start of the crisis, and with accelerating growth. At the close of 2014, year-on-year growth stood at 2%, 0.4% higher than in the previous quarter and the fastest rate seen in the last six years.

Quarter-on-quarter progress stood at 0.7%, 0.2% higher than in the third quarter and the fastest rate seen since 2007. The year as a whole closed out with average annual growth of 1.4%, 2.6% higher than that posted for 2013. Internal demand improved its contribution, with seven consecutive quarters of quarter-on-quarter growth in household consumption. Employment recovered by 2.4% in the last quarter compared with one year ago, which is 0.7% higher than in the third quarter, and last year 392,000 equivalent full-time jobs were created.

Growth of the Spanish economy continues to be bolstered by solid domestic demand, with a 2.7% contribution to the year-on-year increase in the GDP in the fourth quarter, 0.1% higher than in the third quarter. In turn, net external demand also improved its contribution to GDP by 0.3% compared with the previous quarter, to stand at -0.7%.

In a more detailed analysis of the trend in domestic demand, household expenditure on final consumption stepped up its rate of quarter-on-quarter growth to 0.9% (0.8% in the third quarter). In turn, public authority expenditure on final consumption fell by 1%, compared with -0.1% in the previous quarter. Gross fixed capital formation posted a quarter-on-quarter increase of 1.4%, 0.3% higher than in the previous quarter. This heightened increase was down to greater dynamism in the investment in construction, which increased from 0.5% in the third quarter to 1.4% in the fourth quarter.

The slight downturn in the net external demand on year-on year on GDP was as much due to the slowing of imports as the acceleration in exports. Imports grew by 7.7% in the fourth quarter, which was 0.9% less than the previous quarter, while exports increased by 4.7%, which is 0.2% higher than in the third quarter.

In turn, there was a reduction in the trend of exported goods, with year-on-year growth of 5.3%, while exported services increased their rate of growth by 3.4%. In terms of imports, year-on-year growth fell up to 7.7%, with a lower rate for imported goods which was partially offset by increased growth in imported services, to 8.7% year-on-year.

In terms of supply, the Gross Added Value (GVA) of the services sector increased by 0.6% in the fourth quarter of last year, to post a year-on-year increase of 2.3%, while the GVA of the construction sector rose by 3.4% year-on-year. In turn, the GVA of the industrial sector rose by 2.1% year-on-year, while the GVA of the agricultural sector declined by 3.4% compared with the fourth quarter of the previous year.

The quarter-on-quarter rate of job creation, in terms of equivalent full-time jobs grew in the last quarter of 2014 by 0.2%, to stand at 0.7%, thus recording the fourth consecutive quarter of growth in quarter-on-quarter terms. In year-on-year terms, employment increased for the third consecutive quarter, posting an increase of 2.4%, a rate that had not been achieved since the first quarter of 2008. In turn, employee wages fell by 0.5%, 0.2% more than in the third quarter, such that unitary labour costs fell by 0.1%, 0.2% less than in the previous quarter.

The year-on-year rate of the GDP deflator stood at -0.6% in the fourth quarter of 2014, 0.3% less than that posted in the previous quarter and negative for the fourth consecutive quarter. This higher decline was mainly down to the considerable fall in the consumption deflator (-0.5%, compared with -0.2% in the previous quarter).

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