By Robert L. Mabry

We succeed only as we identify in life, or in war, or in anything else, a single overriding objective, and make all other considerations bend to that one objective. — Dwight D. Eisenhower

The United States has achieved unprecedented survival rates (as high as 98 percent) for casualties arriving alive to a combat hospital.1 Official briefings, informal communications, and even television documentaries such as “CNN Presents Combat Hospital” highlight the remarkable surgical care taking place overseas. Military physicians, medics, corpsmen, and other providers of battlefield medical care are rightly proud of this achievement. Commanders and their troops can be confident that once a wounded Servicemember reaches the combat hospital, his or her care will be the best in the world.

Combat casualty care, however, does not begin at the hospital. It begins in the field at the point of injury and continues through evacuation to the combat hospital or forward surgery. This prehospital phase of care is the first link in the chain of survival for those injured in combat and represents the next frontier for making significant improvements in battlefield trauma care.

Even with superb in-hospital care, recent evidence suggests that up to 25 percent of deaths on the battlefield are potentially preventable.2 The vast majority of these deaths happen in the prehospital setting. The indisputable conclusion is that any meaningful future improvement in combat casualty outcomes depends on closing the gap in prehospital survival. Improving prehospital combat casualty care, however, may be significantly more challenging than improving hospital-based casualty care because of significant structural challenges facing the military medical establishment. I describe five key challenges and a plan to overcome them.

Challenge 1: Ownership

Responsibility for battlefield care delivery is distributed to the point where seemingly no one “owns” it. Unity of command is not established, and thus no single senior military medical leader, directorate, division, or command is solely focused on battlefield care, the quintessential mission of military medicine. This diffusion of responsibility is a result of multiple agencies, leaders, and units of the Service medical departments each claiming bits and pieces, with no single entity responsible for patient outcomes forward of the combat hospital. Combat arms commanders “own” much of the battlefield casualty care assets in that medics, battalion physicians, physician assistants, flight medics, and associated equipment are assigned to their operational units, yet combat arms commanders are neither experts in, nor do they have the resources to train their medical providers for, forward medical care. Commanders rely on the Service medical departments to provide the right personnel, medical training, equipment allocations, doctrine, and the medical force mix in their units. In turn, while the institutional base trains and equips the combat medical force, it defers the responsibility of battlefield care delivery to line commanders. While this division of responsibility may at first glance seem reasonable, the net negative effect of line commanders lacking expertise and medical leaders lacking operational control has been documented.3 The axiom “when everyone is responsible, no one is responsible” applies.

The concept of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) evolved to fill this gap for line commanders. Originating from a paper published in Military Medicine in 1993,4 TCCC created a conceptual framework focused on treating life-threatening battlefield injuries while taking into account tactical considerations. A Navy physician and former SEAL team member, Dr. Frank Butler spearheaded what has now emerged as the most significant battlefield medical advancement of the past decade. Before the advent of TCCC, combat medics were taught civilian-style first aid. Many of these techniques, based on civilian injury patterns such as motor vehicle accidents, were unhelpful or frankly dangerous when performed under fire.

The Committee on TCCC (CoTCCC) is organized under the Joint Trauma System and is responsible for promulgating the tenets of TCCC. Its origins were nontraditional, reflecting a grassroots effort by a dedicated group of surgeons, emergency physicians, and experienced combat medics to incorporate new evidence and best practices into prehospital treatment guidelines. As a paradigm, it is thoroughly grounded in the realities of the modern battlefield. The very existence of the CoTCCC, an organization born outside the traditional military medical establishment, exposes a void in ownership and expertise in battlefield care.

In contrast to combat casualty care, other areas of the military medical establishment are led by flag officers. In the Army Medical Department, for example, brigadier generals lead veterinary medicine and warrior transition care. Dentistry and nursing are both led by major generals. Battlefield care would strongly benefit from similar centralized senior leadership. Establishing organizational ownership such as a battlefield medicine directorate, division, or command is the key first step.

Challenge 2: Data and Metrics

The Services’ medical departments repeatedly cite the reduction of case fatality rates to historically low levels as a major medical accomplishment during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While seemingly positive, this statistic tells only part of the story. The case fatality rate, or the percentage of those injured who died, reflects multiple factors including weapons and tactics, protective equipment, and medical care.5 In other words, current data equally support the conclusion that the enemy’s lack of regular combat units, artillery, and armor (the major casualty producers in conventional warfare) and reliance instead on improvised explosive devices is plausibly just as responsible. While many intended improvements have been made in military trauma systems, especially at the combat hospital and higher, there are few data to link specific actions to a direct and quantifiable relationship to lowered case fatality rates. Repeatedly citing “the lowest case fatality rate in the history of warfare” as an affirmation of military medicine’s success over the past decade, without a sober account of other contributory and confounding factors, risks sending the message that battlefield trauma systems are nearly perfected and no further significant improvements are required or even possible.

Another problematic statistic is the “died-of-wounds” (DOW) rate, or the percentage of those reaching medical care who later die. Remarkably, recent DOW rates exceed those of World War II and the Vietnam era.6 While startling, this does not necessarily reflect a decline in care. As evacuation becomes faster and prehospital care improves, the DOW rates will go up as more mortally injured casualties will reach the hospital alive. Conversely, if evacuation is delayed or medic care is poor, more will die in the field and reduce the DOW rate. Neither the DOW nor the case fatality rate quantifies the effect of medical care on survival, nor do they provide insight into where specific improvements in combat casualty care can be made.

Another statistic that distorts the overall effectiveness of combat casualty care is the hospital survival rate. Surgical care in combat hospitals and care in the subsequent evacuation chain back to the United States have advanced to such a degree that 98 percent of casualties making it there alive will go on to survive their wounds. By definition, it does not capture those with potentially survivable injuries who died in the field or died during prehospital evacuation. In other words, it does not speak to all of the casualties who succumb prior to hospitalization. What is needed is a metric encompassing the full spectrum of care that includes the prehospital setting.

In contrast, the potentially preventable death rate illuminates where care can be improved along the entire chain of survival, from the point of injury to rehabilitation back in the United States. This rate is defined as deaths that could be avoided if optimal care could otherwise be delivered. The challenge of deriving this statistic comes from the complexity in determining if a death is potentially preventable. To accomplish this, specific clinical facts must be collected on each case; however, as we discuss shortly, prehospital data are often difficult to collect.

The potentially preventable death rate is derived by examination of autopsy and medical records by a multidisciplinary physician panel. One such review examined all the U.S. combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 until 2011 and found up to 25 percent to be potentially preventable.7 The vast majority of these (87 percent) died before reaching a surgeon or combat hospital. Many of the remaining 13 percent who died in the hospital were in profound shock on arrival and would have likely benefited from aggressive prehospital resuscitation. It is important to recognize that this figure, like the DOW rate, does not necessarily reflect inadequate care. All of these casualties were severely injured. Some would have required immediate, on-the-spot access to the most advanced care (that is, the kind found only in premier trauma centers in the United States) to have any hope of survival, and others died related to unavoidable delays due to ongoing combat operations (for example, hostile fire). However, many could have survived with currently available prehospital medical interventions if only these interventions were routinely and correctly employed. Unfortunately, we continue to know little about what care is provided before casualties reach the combat hospital.

The key goal is a coherent system to collect prehospital patient care information. We know little about this phase of care.8 Only one military unit we are aware of, the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment, has collected complete sets of casualty care data. The commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment has taken ownership of that unit’s casualty response system. Using their Ranger Casualty Card and their unit casualty registry, unit leaders are able to determine what happened to every Ranger casualty during all phases of care. Ranger commanders routinely use this data to improve their casualty response systems. The Rangers are also the only unit in the U.S. military that can demonstrate no potentially preventable deaths in the prehospital setting after more than a decade of combat.9

Systematically examining potentially preventable deaths and prehospital care data gives a more accurate assessment of the entire continuum of care compared to other metrics. If collected and analyzed quickly, it also allows for the development of an agenda to improve casualty care in near real time. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) medical corps has embraced the concept of eliminating preventable deaths as part of the next 10-year force build-up plan and emphasizes point-of-injury care.10

A significant recent positive example of data-driven combat casualty care improvement concerns the capabilities of medics staffing medical evacuation (medevac) helicopters, which have traditionally been staffed by medics trained at the basic emergency medical technician level. Staffing civilian medical helicopters with advanced paramedics has been done since the 1980s and advocated for military medevac since the 1990s. A recent study comparing a National Guard medevac unit staffed with flight paramedics trained in critical care showed a 66 percent reduction in mortality compared to the standard flight medics.11 The Army adopted a program—after nearly 40 battlefield after-action reports recommended it but lacked detailed supporting data—in 2011 to train critical care paramedics for helicopter medevac. With better data collection in the prehospital setting, it is likely the decision cycle could be far reduced from the 11 years observed.

Changing the narrative of “unprecedented” survival rates to instead highlight the 25 percent potentially survivable death rate does place military medicine in a difficult strategic communications predicament. A fair and open accounting of the successes to date as well as where progress needs to be made is imperative. In 1984, Dr. Ron Bellamy examined many of the same issues discussed here following analysis of Vietnam-era casualty data. He noted, “A research program designed to improve health care delivery will have the greatest impact if its goals are chosen after a comprehensive review has been made in the ways of which the existing system fails.”12 A similar comprehensive review of combat casualty care in Iraq and Afghanistan is recommended.

Challenge 3: Prehospital and Trauma Expertise

If the prehospital setting is the area where nearly all potentially preventable deaths occur, then it is likely not coincidentally an area of limited organizational expertise. It would be natural to expect that the Services, especially the ground forces, would invest heavily in clinical experts in far-forward combat casualty care. Paradoxically, the opposite appears true. The Army, for example, relies on the Professional Officers Filler System (PROFIS) to provide the bulk of forward medical officers. PROFIS is a Cold War–era program whereby primary care physicians from the base hospital are tasked, often just before combat deployment, to serve as battalion surgeons responsible for the resuscitation of battle casualties in the battalion aid station. This is reminiscent of how emergency rooms (ERs) were staffed in the 1960s and 1970s, when junior physicians just out of training (or disinterested physicians from unrelated specialties) were rotated into the ER. Like the PROFIS physicians, these physicians had no in-depth training in resuscitation or emergency care or, worse, little interest in even learning it. Many of these PROFIS physicians, often inexperienced and unprepared, are placed into operational positions outside the scope of their training. This professionally unrewarding experience likely contributes to many leaving the military at the first available opportunity.13

The Korean and Vietnam wars set the stage for the emergence of modern emergency medical services (EMS) systems in the late 1960s. These wartime experiences spurred the development of a robust “system of systems” comprised of emergency medical technicians, ambulances, communications, training programs, medical direction, and trauma centers that integrate prehospital and hospital trauma care. The investment paid off as trauma centers opened in nearly every major urban center, and large swaths of the population are now served by effective and cohesive trauma care systems. Yet the combat casualty on the battlefield today, like the accident victim in the 1960s ER, is likely attended to by a physician or physician assistant with no formal training in emergency medicine or trauma resuscitation. In the intervening years, ERs and the physicians who staff them have evolved into a sophisticated and specialized system of care, while the model for physician care in forward aid stations remains largely stuck in the practices of the past century.

Since the 1980s, programs have emerged to train physician specialists in trauma surgery, emergency medicine, and prehospital care. Without a major conflict since the emergence of these new specialties, there simply has not been a demonstrated need for them in the military until now. Nor has there been a critical appraisal of how these relatively new specialties could be leveraged to optimize combat casualty care. For example, the Department of Defense has only one relatively new prehospital training program capable of training three physicians per year. Today, the Army has fewer than a dozen prehospital physician specialists and about the same number of trauma surgeons on Active duty. By comparison, the Army has roughly the same number of radiation oncologists and nearly three times the number of pediatric psychiatrists and orthodontists. This is largely because medical specialty allocations are based on traditional peacetime beneficiary care needs. Refocusing on the wartime needs could populate key institutional and operational billets with a critical mass of trained prehospital and trauma specialists and drive further advances in battlefield care during peacetime.

Challenge 4: Research and Development

Current research and development efforts are focused on material “things,” and our current medical combat development efforts are primarily focused on rearranging existing paradigms for doctrine, manpower, and equipment. Less attention is paid to training, leadership, and organization, yet the current literature shows these areas have made the most significant documented improvements in survival. Three examples can illustrate the potential for capitalization. First, the Rangers, with their command-led casualty response system, are able to document no potentially preventable prehospital deaths after more than a decade of combat.14 Second, staffing a forward battalion aid station with emergency medicine–trained providers showed a 30 percent reduction in deaths.15 Third, adopting current civilian air ambulance standards during helicopter evacuation in Afghanistan showed a 66 percent reduction in the risk of dying.16 The training level and capabilities of the providers in these examples exceeded the existing doctrinal model, and the benefits were tangible. The solution lay with people, not technology. Using a sports analogy, the Department of Defense is spending billions of dollars trying to perfect golf clubs, golf balls, and golf shoes, and virtually no research dollars on how to train the best golfers.

Prehospital care experts should direct and advise key research and development efforts and set research priorities focused on improving prehospital casualty survival. Traditional measures of research program success (grants awarded, papers published, and abstracts presented) should be shifted in favor of measurable solutions to specific battlefield problems (such as reducing preventable death, improving procedural success, and reducing secondary injury).

To be sure, advanced technology can pave the way for enhanced combat casualty care. Examples of recent tools placed in the hands of medics and battalion medical officers include tourniquets, junctional hemorrhage control devices, and intraosseous needles. Yet many of these so-called new tools and concepts have existed for decades or even centuries. With the exception of the hemostatic dressing, no new technology has been put into the medic’s aid bag today that did not exist a century ago. The proposition is to balance the investment between things and people to optimize care on the battlefield.

Challenge 5: Hospital Culture

The delivery of health care in fixed facilities is military medicine’s largest mission, dwarfing all the others. At a cost of nearly $60 billion, the Military Health System (MHS) represents one of the most expensive components of the overall defense budget and is under constant scrutiny from Pentagon leaders. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Dr. Sue Bailey stated that “we are an HMO [health maintenance organization] that goes to war,” a statement that sums up a continuing concept regarding military medicine’s primary focus on beneficiary care at fixed facilities. Indeed, when physicians are tasked to deploy from hospitals in the United States to the combat zone, a regulation calls them “fillers,” and hospital personnel officers colloquially refer to the loss of skilled physicians as “the operational tax.”17

Regarding the combat medics’ role, the traditional conceptual framework for some medical leaders starts not at the point of injury but rather in the combat hospital (or forward surgical team): “Get the casualty to the hospital and we will take care of them.” This is a legacy of the Cold War era when the combination of massive casualties and limited far-forward capability meant few meaningful interventions were possible until the casualty reached a combat hospital.18 Today, we know the actions or inactions of the ground medic, flight medic, or junior battalion medical officer can mean the difference between delivering a salvageable casualty or a corpse to the combat hospital. We expect medics to perform life-saving treatment under the most difficult of circumstances, but we invest minimal institutional effort toward training them to a high level or insisting they train alongside physicians and nurses in our fixed military hospitals during peacetime.

In their defense, military medical leaders face a unique set of challenges combat arms commanders do not face. Combat arms commanders focus on preparing for war. When not deployed or in a recovery or support cycle, they are focused on training and preparing for the next mission. Conversely, the MHS is expected to perform its mission of delivering high-quality healthcare to military beneficiaries in its fixed facilities every day and be prepared to go to war at a moment’s notice. Historically, the overwhelming pressures of providing beneficiary care in clinics and hospitals have conspired to redirect resources away from maintaining or improving battlefield care skills during peacetime.19 Future efforts should be devoted to breaking free from this seemingly intractable constraint.

A Way Forward

If history is any guide, making significant interwar advancements in battlefield medical care will be difficult. As the current conflicts end, repeating the narrative of low case fatality and high survival rates without a comprehensive and sober review of both successes and where improvements could be made risks impeding the ability to truly learn the lessons that would improve the survival of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen in the next conflict.

As a call to action, the following steps offer a potential way forward to overcome these five challenges.

• Adopt the Israel Defense Forces or similar model of combat casualty care focus and make an institutional commitment to eliminating potentially preventable death. Allow careful study of these deaths to drive the training, research, and development agenda.
• Establish leadership of battlefield care at the most senior level, and hold the Service medical departments accountable for improving it.
• Obtain data and metrics from the point of injury and throughout the continuum of care, and use this information to drive evidence-based decisions.
• Commit to training physician, nursing, and allied health providers to become “combat medical specialists” and placing them in key operational and institutional positions to leverage improvements in training, doctrine, research, and development.
• Direct research funds toward solving prehospital clinical problems, and balance these funds to include research on training, organization, and leadership, not just material solutions.
• Evolve the current paradigm of military medicine from an organization culture chiefly focused on full-time beneficiary care in fixed facilities and part-time combat casualty care—the “HMO that goes war”—toward an organizational culture that treats battlefield care delivery as its essential core mission. This need not lessen the importance or scope of beneficiary care and, if agilely executed, could enhance the prestige and cachet of the beneficiary mission.

Addressing leadership, strategy, metrics, workforce, and patient outcomes is the common methodology for promoting excellence in hospital-based healthcare. The same methodology could be used to improve care forward of the hospital. Such a program would require a significant realignment of resources and priorities within military medicine that would challenge existing bureaucratic and leadership hierarchies. Acting on what we have learned to prepare for the next conflict in a resource-constrained interwar period will challenge our medical leaders. Civilians can operate peacetime hospital systems, perhaps even more efficiently than the military. Yet ultimately, going to war is the unique mission of military medicine that distinguishes us from civilian healthcare and justifies our cost to the Nation. If military medicine cannot demonstrate ownership of and expertise in its quintessential mission, prehospital and battlefield trauma care, we must ask ourselves why military medicine exists.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 76, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1. The author would like to recognize Surgeon Commodore Alasdair Walker, the United Kingdom’s Military Health Services’ Medical Director, as the inspiration for this article. During the 2013 Military Health System Research Symposium in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Dr. Walker described a concept called the “Walker Dip.” Citing the abysmal medical care available to British forces during the Crimean War, he traced recurrent historical cycles whereby medical care improves during conflicts, but the lessons are forgotten afterward and have to be relearned again during the next war, thus repeating the cycle. The Walker Dip can be traced from the American Civil War through every U.S. conflict since, including Iraq and Afghanistan. The author hopes this discussion will help the U.S. military health system avoid the Walker Dip and thanks Dr. Walker for his inspiration.
2. Brian J. Eastridge et al., “Death on the Battlefield (2001–2011): Implications for the Future of Combat Casualty Care,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 6, Supplement 5 (December 2012), S431–S437; Joseph F. Kelly et al., “Injury Severity and Causes of Death from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom: 2003–2004 Versus 2006,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 64, no. 2 (February 2008), S21–S26; discussion S27.
3. Robert L. Mabry and Robert A. De Lorenzo, “Improving Role I Battlefield Casualty Care from Point of Injury to Surgery,” Army Medical Department Journal (April–June 2011), 87–91.
4. Frank K. Butler, Jr., John Hagmann, and E. George Butler, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special Operations,” Military Medicine 161, no. 1, Supplement 1 (August 1996), 3–16.
5. John B. Holcomb et al., “Understanding Combat Casualty Care Statistics,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 60, no. 2 (February 2006), 397–401.
6. Ibid.
7. Eastridge et al.
8. Brian J. Eastridge et al., “We Don’t Know What We Don’t Know: Prehospital Data in Combat Casualty Care,” Army Medical Department Journal (April-June 2011), 11–14.
9. Russ S. Kotwal et al., “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield,” Archives of Surgery 146, no. 12 (August 2011), 1350–1358.
10. Author correspondence with Dr. Elon Glassberg, Head of Trauma and Combat Casualty Care Branch, Israel Defense Forces, August 20, 2013.
11. Robert L. Mabry et al., “Impact of Critical Care-trained Flight Paramedics on Casualty Survival during Helicopter Evacuation in the Current War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 2, Supplement 1 (August 2012), S32–S37.
12. R.F. Bellamy, “The Causes of Death in Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for Combat Casualty Care Research,” Military Medicine 149, no. 2 (February 1984), 55–62.
13. Melony E. Sorbero et al., Improving the Deployment of Army Health Care Professionals: An Evaluation of PROFIS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).
14. Kotwal et al.
15. Robert T. Gerhardt et al., “Out-of-Hospital Combat Casualty Care in the Current War in Iraq,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 53, no. 2 (February 2009), 169–174.
16. Mabry et al.
17. Sorbero et al.
18. Robert A. DeLorenzo, “Improving Combat Casualty Care and Field Medicine: Focus on the Military Medic,” Military Medicine 162, no. 4 (1997), 268272.
19. Robert A. DeLorenzo, “How Shall We Train?” Military Medicine 170, no. 10 (2005), 824–830.

The post Challenges To Improving Combat Casualty Survival On Battlefield – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

An Egyptian Cabinet decision to end the suspension of professional soccer in late March but reinstitute the ban on spectators attending matches could spark renewed clashes between militant fans and security forces. The decision against the backdrop of mounting evidence that Egyptian general-turned-President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi has no apparent intention of easing repression implicitly acknowledges the role of fans in continued widespread opposition to his rule.

Professional soccer was suspended in early February after some 20 members of Ultras White Knights (UWK), the militant support group of Al Zamalek SC, were killed in a stampede at a Cairo stadium. The incident was likely the result of supporters seeking to gain access to a match in the absence of available tickets rather than a deliberate and planned assault by security forces. UWK is nevertheless convinced that it was targeted by security forces much like militant supports of Zamalek arch rival Al Ahli were three years ago.

Soccer has been suspended for much of the last four years since mass anti-government protests erupted in 2011 that forced President Hosni Mubarak from office. Spectators have been banned from matches that were played since 74 supporters of Al Ahli were killed in 2012 in a politically loaded brawl in Port Said. The stampede in Cairo was after Port Said, the worst sporting incident in recent Egyptian sporting history.

Militant, highly politicized, street battle-hardened supporters of both clubs played a key role in the demonstrations that removed Mr. Mubarak from power and in protests against all subsequent governments, including that of Mr. Al Sisi. The fans have long called for an end to bans on spectators and have repeatedly clashed with security forces in protest against it.

The renewed ban is as a matter of principle unlikely to go down well with the fans. UWK said earlier that it has no faith in a government investigation of the Cairo stampede or the Egyptian justice system and would prevent matches from being played until justice had been served for its martyrs.

The fans’ no-confidence vote came in response to a pledge by Mr. Al Sisi in a televised speech that those responsible for the UWK deaths would be held accountable. Overall, the president appeared to suggest in his address that there would be some easing of brutal repression that has cost the lives of at least 1,400 protesters in the last 20 months and put thousands more behind bars. Speaking a day before the verdict in a trial against prominent bloggers and activists, Mr. Al Sisi said that “I am sure there are many innocent people inside prisons. Soon many of them will be released according to the available permissions.”

Mr. Al Sisi’s remarks regarding the stampede came in the wake of reports in state-run media that unlike Zamalek, with its confrontational approach to its militant fan base, Al Ahli has succeeded in reducing tensions by engaging with Ultras Ahlawy, the club’s hard line support group. The reports appeared to suggest that Mr. Al Sisi might be backing away from earlier tacit support for a war against UWK by Zamalek president Mortada Mansour, a larger than life character and long-standing ally of Messrs. Mubarak and Al Sisi.

Mr. Mortada has prided himself on asking the security forces to intervene to prevent fans from entering the Cairo stadium without tickets, charging that UWK had been paid to confront the security forces. In response to a journalist’s question about how fans of his club had died, Mr. Mortada, who asserts that UWK tried to assassinate him, said, “ask the Muslim Brotherhood,” the group of Mohammed Morsi, the president toppled by Mr. Al Sisi in a military coup in June 2013 that has since been outlawed as a terrorist organization and that has suffered the brunt of security force brutality in the last 20 months.

Mr. Mansour has charged that UWK tried to assassinate him. His petition that the group be banned as a terrorist organizations has however been rejected by two Egyptian courts who argued that they were not the competent authority.

“There is a major difference between the approach of Ahli and Zamalek. Taher was smart; he knew that it’s unnecessary to create any rifts with that section of the supporters as long as the channel of communication operates perfectly,” Ahram Online quoted sports journalist Sherif Hassan as saying. Mr. Hassan was referring to Al Ahli president Mahmoud Taher, who in December persuaded Ahlawy ultras to voluntarily leave an empty stadium they had stormed hours before an African Confederation Cup final.

Any hope the fans and other Egyptians may have had that change was at hand was dashed a day later when a court sentenced prominent activist and blogger Alaa Abd El Fattah to five years in prison and 24 others to three years for violating Egypt’s draconic anti-protests law. At about the same time, UWK’s convictions that it was targeted were reinforced by an audio recording obtained by Al Jazeera that appeared to reveal Egyptian interior minister Mohamed Ismail discussing how the government can crack down on protesters.

In a meeting with senior officers of Egypt’s notorious Central Security Force (CSF), Mr. Ibrahim is heard discussing a strategy for dealing with demonstrations, including ways to shoot protesters without turning them into martyrs. He suggested that the CSF using anything ““permitted by law without hesitation from water to machine guns.” The meeting was held in advance of a major anti-government protest on November 28 in which at least four protesters were killed.

Potentially deepening animosity between the security forces and fans, Mr. Ibrahim went on to say that no attempt at political change in Egypt would succeed without the support of the military and the police, in his words, “the strongest institutions in the state.”

Mr. Ibrahim, who served in the Morsi government, played an important behind-the-scenes role in exploiting widespread criticism of Mr. Morsi and instigating mass protests against his government in late June 2013 that persuaded the military to remove Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president from office.

Militant fans were divided in their evaluation of the Morsi government but united in their frustration that the hopes for greater freedoms and social and economic justice after the overthrow of Mr. Mubarak had not been achieved. In the absence of security sector reform, Mr. Ibrahim’s remarks are likely to reinforce hostility between his ministry and fans who have proven to be a constant thorn in the government’s side.

The post Egyptian Spectator Ban: Flashpoint For Conflict And Statement Of Weakness – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Why does the State of Assam in India continue to experience outbursts of Bodo separatist violence? Anshuman Behera’s answer points to New Delhi’s decision to privilege military force over meaningful dialogue with the region’s militant groups.

By Anshuman Behera*

India has recently experienced an upsurge in violence in Assam’s Bodo Territorial Area District (BTAD). Over the course of two days in December 2014, the IK Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S) executed 76 people that it believed were responsible for the death of three of its militants at the hands of Indian security forces. Prior to this, the same outfit was also responsible for the deaths of 41 Bengali speaking Muslims as punishment for not voting for Bodo People’s Front candidates in the 2014 general elections.

These are just the latest victims in a violent campaign that dates back to the early 1990s. Since then, militants agitating for a greater recognition of Bodo rights and identity have claimed several hundred lives and caused the displacement of thousands. The Indian government’s most recent response, ‘Operation All Out’, is currently hunting down NDFB-S militants and attempting to seize their illegal weapons.

So, who are the Bodo militants, what are their specific aims, and how close is New Delhi to resolving this decades-old conflict?

Origins

The Bodos currently make up 40% of the tribal population of Assam, a statistic that makes them the state’s largest ethnic grouping.  Their fight for greater political autonomy and economic rights dates back to the post-colonial era, and was initially spearheaded by organizations like the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) and Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC). In 1967, the PTCA made the first demand for a separate Bodo territory known as  Udayachal. This was scaled back in 1987 after the ABSU’s call for a ’50-50 division of Assam’ gathered momentum. Six years later, both the BPAC and ABSU signed the Bodo Accord with the national and regional government. This endorses the formation and election of a Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) that covers the ‘contiguous geographical areas between the River Sankosh and River Pasnoi’. However, the accord failed to demarcate the boundary of the proposed BAC, which eventually resulted in increased agitation and the subsequent formation of militant outfits like the NDFB and Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT).

Formed in 1996, the BLT has three core objectives: the creation of a separate province within Indian Union of Bodoland; the creation of an autonomous district council on the south bank of Brahmaputra River, and the inclusion of Bodos living in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam in the sixth schedule of the constitution of India. Once known as the Bodo Security Force (BSF), the NDFB was originally focused on the liberation of Bodoland from Indian expansionism and occupation and the creation of an independent socialist state. Both groups were responsible for the deaths and displacement of thousands of civilians throughout the 1990s.

Things started to change around the turn of the century when the BLT negotiated a unilateral ceasefire with authorities in July 1999, followed by a formal surrender in 2003. This led to the signing of the second Bodo Accord and the formation of the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC), an organization that promotes ‘the economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos’. It also resulted in the BLT transforming into a legitimate political party— the Bodo People’s Front (BPF) – which currently dominates the BTC.

The NDFB initially shunned the ballot box and remained committed to advancing the Bodo cause with violence. This changed in 2005 when it also entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Assam and Indian governments. However, the organization split in half in 2008 after Ranjan Daimary, the NDFB President, was uncovered as the mastermind behind a series of bomb attacks throughout Assam. The splinter faction (known as NDFB-RD) continued its militant activities until it finally declared a unilateral ceasefire in 2011 following the arrest of Daimary and associates by Indian and Bangladeshi security forces.

Yet, this was by no means the end of NDFB-related violence in Assam. In November 2012, I K Songbijit, the head of the Bodoland Army (the armed wing of the NDFB-RD), formed a ‘nine member council’. Under its leadership, the now NDFB-S remains in an armed struggle with the national and regional governments, and is recognized by security forces as one of the most lethal militant outfits currently operating inside Assam. That’s because the group is increasingly funding its activities through extortion, particularly along the Bhutan-Assam border. In addition, the NDFB-S also makes demands for a share of development projects in BTAD areas, and also ‘collects taxes’ from tea estate owners.

Beyond identity

However, the Bodo insurgency is about more than safeguarding an identity and securing separate a homeland. Access to natural resources is also a major factor behind the Bodos’ struggle with Assam and New Delhi. During the colonial era, the British brought ethnic minorities known as Adivasis to Assam,  especially from Bihar, West Bengal and Odisha,  and assigned them small pieces of land in exchange of their work in the tea estates. As these Adivasis acquired more land over time, they came to be perceived as outsiders and enemies by aggrieved local Bodos. Conflict between the Bodos and Adivasis intensified in the early 1970s following the influx of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh.

Adding to the Bodos’ grievances are perceptions that the BTC is biased towards the region’s non-Bodo community. They point to the BTC Act’s failure to ‘disallow any citizens from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, settlement or by any other way of transfer’ as evidence that the body is safeguarding non-Bodo property rights at the expense of the indigenous community. And because the BTC is perceived as acting brazenly in favor of the non-Bodos, groups like the NDFB-S have opportunities to build on their support base and launch further attacks against their neighbors.

In response, the Adivasis have formed their own armed groups to counter the threats posed by Bodo militants. These include the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), the Birsa Commando Force (BCF) and several other groups. Beyond defending their rights and property from Bodo attacks, these groups also feed off disputes between Bodo and non-Bodo representatives on the BTC.  Many non-Bodos feel that they are not adequately represented by this administrative body, a situation which adds further fuel to sporadic outbursts of violent confrontation with Bodo militants.

Difficult times ahead

So why have successive national and regional governments failed to address the Bodos’ grievances? Part of the answer lies in the continued use of force at the expense of meaningful dialogue. While security operations like ‘All Out’ might bring temporary relief from militant Bodo activity, they are not backed up by multi-party talks or negotiations. This means that the warring parties continue to lack a more nuanced understanding of either sides’  grievances and vested interests. Consequently, dialogue is needed that brings together all the stakeholders in the Bodo conflict. This must be accompanied by the disarmament of all militant groups and stemming the flow of arms into Assam from neighboring areas.

However, the challenges facing future multi-party talks should not be underestimated. Calls for a separate Bodo homeland will continue to face resistance from non-Bodo communities fearful of the potential impact it might have on their rights. Not pushing for an independent Bodo territory might increase the sense of insecurity felt by some ethnic Bodos. Resolving this dilemma not only requires constructive dialogue, but also innovative thinking. Yet, given New Delhi’s previous track record in dealing with this protracted conflict, neither is likely to emerge in the near future.

*Anshuman Behera is Assistant Professor on the Conflict Resolution Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India.

The post No Easy Solutions For Ending India’s Bodo Conflict – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — Germany’s parliament approved an extension of Greece’s bailout on Friday after Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble, who has voiced doubts about whether Athens can be trusted, promised it would not be allowed to “blackmail” its euro zone partners.

With 542 lawmakers voting in favour, including almost all of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s right-left coalition plus the opposition Greens, it was the biggest majority for any euro zone rescue package so far in the 631-seat chamber.

The Bundestag vote was the only major parliamentary hurdle for a four-month extension to the bailout programme for the most heavily-indebted country in the single currency zone.

Greece’s economy contracted more than originally estimated in the last quarter of 2014 compared with the previous three-month period, a revised estimate by the ELSTAT statistics service showed on Friday.

The estimate of gross domestic product, based on seasonally adjusted data, showed the economy shrank 0.4 percent in October to December. This was worse than a flash estimate of a 0.2 percent drop made earlier this month, and growth of 0.7 percent in the third quarter.

Greece’s economic boom of the early 2000s ended with the country sinking into a recession after a global credit crunch. A subsequent debt crisis and austerity imposed by the international lenders who bailed out the country deepened the recession, wiping out a quarter of the economy over six years.

The post Germany: Parliament Approves Greek Bailout Extension appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Jokowi cabinet is planning to involve the country’s military in agriculture and food security affairs in order to achieve food sovereignty and 100 percent rice self-sufficiency. What would be the implications for the country’s long term food security?

By Jonatan A. Lassa and Adhi Priamarizki*

The Indonesian government is moving quickly to create a big impact in the agricultural and food sectors. Framed within a strong food sovereignty narrative, President Joko Widodo is now imposing two big agendas for the rice sector’s development. The first is to boost rice production to achieve 100 per cent self-sufficiency. The second is to graduate from 100 per cent rice self-sufficiency to be a rice exporting nation in the near future.

To achieve these targets, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) recently planned to re-utilise the military’s (TNI) civic mission (TNI Manunggal Masuk Desa) through the Village Supervisory Non-Commissioned Officers (Babinsa) as quasi-agricultural extension officers. Amran Sulaiman, the minister argued that “50,000 Babinsa across the country would be a big help to cover the deficit of 20,000 agricultural extension officers (AEOs)”. In the past, this was largely inspired by security concerns (such as controlling communism and farmers’ movement).

Military in food production: Fruitful engagement?

Jokowi’s food sovereignty concept has its origin in the global farmers’ movement which allowed farmers to have greater autonomy and control over their own affairs based on their own decisions. In fact, food sovereignty is a rather ‘leftist paradigm’. The military’s recent interest in backing up Jokowi’s agenda could be justified by their interest in controlling the implication of food sovereignty on the farmers’ movement.

One can therefore question why and how the government’s involvement of the military in boosting agricultural production as a temporary solution to quicken the achievement of rice production targets amid the lack of AEOs. Some concerns remain as this policy may have long term implications. Firstly, one may question the urgency, effectiveness and value added of the military involvement in entering the rice field.

Secondly, the military presence may affect civil society’s role in agriculture because their involvement may discourage the genuine participation of farmers. Even though agriculture work can be classified under military operations other than war, the government should be able to explain the urgency of the military’s involvement in the food sector. This can be counter-productive for food production. A decline in public trust in Jokowi’s administration can dramatically accelerate.

Long road to rice self-sufficiency?

Food self-sufficiency has been a sacred goal that often received high political endorsement. Despite scepticism and criticism from the national and international experts and economists concerning the lack of rigour in its rice self-sufficiency (RSS) policy, many governments view RSS as the most politically correct goal.

Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia have been able to achieve full rice self-sufficiency. These countries have maintained rice productivity above 250 to 350 kg/person/year over the last ten years. In the case of Vietnam, apart from having less mouth to feed, the secret behind the self-sufficiency is its adoption of better technology and incentives for the farmers to grow rice.

Indonesia has currently achieved 180 kg/person/year and faced serious difficulties to achieve rice productivity beyond 250 kg/person/year. Technically speaking, achieving the RSS ratio is simple. Once the country produces enough rice for everyone (presumably above 144 kg/person/year) and having enough buffer stock in local markets and government warehouses, 100 per cent RSS can in theory be achieved, as we have seen in 1984/85 and 1992/93. In fact, apart from the decline in RSS to 93.8 per cent in 2011, overall, Indonesia has been successfully maintaining a self-sufficiency rate above 96 per cent level since 2004.

What is the right question?

The ministry of agriculture can also consider maximising the pioneering farmers (Petani Pelopor) that have long been fostered by former governments to play greater roles amid the short supply of AEOs. There are more than a million Petani Pelopor who have been successful farmers as they have been equipped with adequate level of practical knowledge and experience that can be capitalised.

Indonesia has the potential to achieve a rice yield above 6.5 tonnes per hectare and potentially can be above 7 or 8 tonnes per ha. However, it will have to deal with the continued decline in agricultural land and lack of consistency in providing incentives for farmers. Besides, the demographic pressure faced by Indonesia will not be easily resolved.

By the time Jokowi steps down from office in 2019, there will be about 15 million new babies born. Should he win a second term and steps down from office in 2024, about 31 million people – a population equivalent to Malaysia (or Cambodia, Lao PDR and Timor Leste combined) today – will be born.

The real agriculture and food production problems in Indonesia is a complex mixture of technology, incentives, demographic change, climate change and agrarian issues which may not be solved solely by military engagement because some of these problems lie in many domains – from the legal system and corrupt bureaucracy (issue of governance) to proper institutional mechanism. Still farmers outside Java continue to experience delays in the distribution of seeds and fertilisers today.

One deeper problem with Jokowi’s policy of food sovereignty is probably not about involving the military. The core problem is that the present government does not have the capacity to ask the right questions in the food and agricultural sector. If the military is the answer or solution to Indonesia’s future food security, the big question is: what then is the real problem?

*Jonatan A. Lassa is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies and Adhi Priamarizki is Associate Research Fellow at the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The search for AirAsia Flight 8501 has been largely commended as a success. While not without obstacles, the multilateral efforts led by host country Indonesia contributed to a smooth search. This success can be a positive precedent for future cooperation.

By Henrick Z. Tsjeng*

The multinational effort to locate the crashed Indonesia AirAsia Flight QZ8501 and recover victims has been largely commended as a success. Both “black boxes” – the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder – have been recovered and investigations are well under way as to what caused the tragic crash of the plane en route from Surabaya to Singapore.

Vessels and aircraft from several countries have participated in the search, with the Information Fusion Centre, located in Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, assisting in coordination efforts. Apart from the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the National Search and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS), the international contributors, other than Singapore, included Australia, China, Malaysia, the United States and Russia. The countries involved deployed maritime and air assets, including ships with sonar scanners and diving teams.

Factors in favour of QZ 8501 search

The QZ8501 search operation has been relatively free from the mass confusion and finger-pointing generated during the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 earlier last year, and is a positive step forward for future cooperation should the need arise again.

A major reason for the success of the search-and-locate (SAL) operation for QZ 8501 and the ensuing investigation were the relatively conducive conditions for the recovery of debris and victims, not least the “black boxes” which contain information critical for ascertaining the cause of the crash. There were no known drastic deviations in flight path, and the last reported location of the plane was in an area of shallow waters and within a confined sea space. The circumstances surrounding MH370’s disappearance were exactly the opposite. Even if these factors were independent of the efficacy of the search efforts by various regional countries, they nonetheless contributed towards a relatively successful international effort.

This is not to say that the search operation has been without setbacks. For instance, bad weather and rough seas slowed the operation, especially at the beginning phase of the search. Moreover, the TNI and BASARNAS were releasing conflicting data at the initial stage of the search as a result of internal coordination issues, which were addressed once President Joko Widodo took on a coordinating role. Nonetheless, the AirAsia search illustrates further the extent to which regional multilateral cooperation has improved since the disappearance of MH370 which lost contact on 8 March last year.

Effective coordination and transparency

Firstly, the SAL effort by Indonesia appeared to have been effectively coordinated and was transparent. The Indonesian authorities were quick to produce a search plan which also saw requests for assistance to Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United States, among others, and the country was also forthcoming with accepting international assistance.

The TNI and BASARNAS, after overcoming initial communication issues, closely coordinated with its foreign counterparts, who brought debris and bodies to the Indonesians when found. This was in stark contrast to the chaotic situation that prevailed in the first hours of the disappearance of MH370, which saw many actions taken that were eventually deemed counterproductive to the search, including searches in the South China Sea during the initial phases.

The QZ8501 search also saw more transparency, especially on the part of the Indonesian government. In contrast to the opacity and confusion that characterised the first several hours after MH370 was first reported missing, the Indonesian authorities were more forthcoming in providing information to the parties involved in the search, after the initial internal coordination issues were addressed.

No politicisation of search effort

Moreover, the search did not see any dramatic politicisation of the incident. In the case of MH370, the tragedy quickly became a thorny political issue, with blame-shifting rife on many sides. China was fiercely vocal in its criticism of Malaysia, particularly because the majoritty of the MH370 passengers were Chinese nationals. As a result, the incident became a sticking point in Sino-Malaysia relations, though Malaysia on its part was prudent not to escalate its differences with China.

In the multinational SAL effort for QZ8501, there was an incident that could have derailed the collaboration. About a week after the plane first disappeared, Indonesia deployed the KRI Usman Harun in the search. The vessel is controversial as it was embroiled in a political row between Singapore and Indonesia over its name. Nonetheless, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence responded by saying that the Singapore Armed Forces will “continue to assist in this search effort professionally”.

Both countries did not allow this issue to overshadow their close multilateral cooperation, which continued without any further notable incidents. Notably, the search was conducted wholly within Indonesian waters, which left Singapore with little reason to protest. The Singaporean vessel, MV Swift Rescue, eventually went on to locate the main fuselage of the wreckage. This demonstrated an important point – that political goodwill can overcome contentions and ease the way for greater multilateral cooperation, whether in the maritime sphere or elsewhere.

The presence of American, Chinese and Russian vessels dispatched to assist in the SAL operations demonstrated the willingness of the involved countries to set aside political differences and disputes during cooperation, contribute their assets in the search for the downed plane, and in doing so build goodwill with host nation Indonesia and the other countries involved.

Way forward

The search for QZ8501 marks a break from past experiences in the region in which considerations over sovereignty, national security and political differences dampened such willingness among certain parties to cooperate or accept international assistance, as was seen in the search for MH370, as well as the multilateral relief operations for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.

The search for QZ8501 is a significant step forward for the region towards deeper maritime engagement and cooperation in search operations. It is particularly helpful for building the ASEAN Community, as well as for overcoming obstacles such as the lack of regional support for the Search-and-Rescue Convention and the need to harmonise international air and maritime search-and-rescue regimes.

Even though national considerations that may hamper multilateral cooperation are unlikely to vanish overnight, the goodwill arising from the multilateral search for the AirAsia plane will likely set a positive precedent for future SAL operations.

*Henrick Z. Tsjeng is an Associate Research Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

The post The AirAsia Search: Positive Precedent For Future Cooperation – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Mexico has captured the country’s most wanted drug lord still at large, Servando “La Tuta” Gomez, police said on Friday, Feb 27 in a boost for President Enrique Pena Nieto as he grapples with grisly gang violence, according to Reuters.

Gomez, 49, was the prime target of Pena Nieto’s drive to regain control of Michoacan, a violent western state wracked by clashes between Gomez’s Knights Templar cartel and heavily-armed vigilantes trying to oust them.

His arrest comes a year after the capture of Mexico’s most notorious drug lord, Joaquin “Shorty” Guzman, the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, one of the most powerful drug smuggling gangs in the world.

It also comes as Pena Nieto seeks to quell outrage over violence, impunity and corruption in Mexico after the abduction and apparent massacre of 43 trainee teachers by corrupt police in league with gang members.

A police spokesman said federal police captured Gomez in Morelia, Michoacan’s state capital, after months of intelligence work. “He will be brought to Mexico City in the coming hours to make a declaration.”

Gomez was arrested at a house without any shots being fired, local media reported.

Last week, police seized many properties in that area and arrested a handful of people connected to La Tuta. Local media reported that earlier operation had led to the arrest of the drug boss.

Police also arrested a number of other people with him.

Since the Mexican government began a military crackdown in 2007 on drug gangs, more than 100,000 people have been killed in drug-related violence.

No kingpin sought the limelight as often as Gomez.

Whether railing against political corruption on YouTube, or giving interviews in hideouts to the media, Gomez relentlessly baited the government, accusing it of colluding with rival gangs while defending his Knights Templar as a “necessary evil.”

“Our only function is to help the people, preserve our state, and preserve our country from people causing terror,” Gomez said in a video posted online in 2012, sitting in front of images of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and other revolutionary icons.

A former school teacher, Gomez insisted the cartel followed a strict ethical code, though as time passed he became more open about the criminal side of a gang which in 2013 held much of the impoverished, mountainous landscape of Michoacan in a firm grip.

During their ascendancy, the Knights Templar extorted a broad sweep of businesses, controlled politicians and diversified from drug trafficking into a myriad of other businesses including the export of iron ore.

A father of at least seven, Gomez is wanted by the United States for methamphetamine and cocaine trafficking. The Justice Department says he is also implicated in the 2009 murder of 12 Mexican federal police officers.

Mexican authorities had placed a bounty of 30 million pesos ($2 million) on his head.

The post Mexico: Police Capture Country’s Most Wanted Drug Lord appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman has called on Muslims to shun intolerance and extremism, work to unify their ranks and seek international cooperation.

King Salman made these comments during a reception at his palace in Riyadh for the scholars and experts who participated in the international counterterrorism conference organized by the Muslim World League (MWL) in Makkah earlier this week.

King Salman also said that Saudi Arabia “is the land of Islam that implements the Shariah in all walks of life.” He said Saudi kings have been proud of having the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. “We ask the Almighty to guide us so that we can serve our religion of tolerance.”

He said Islam is a religion of moderation. “We have to follow what is stated in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and his followers. We should not alienate people. There are people who abuse Islam and drive people away from it. We beseech Allah to return them to their senses.”

King Salman highlighted the government’s efforts to develop Makkah and Madinah and expand the two holy mosques. “I tell you frankly that Makkah and Madinah are the most important for us, before anything else in this country.”

In his speech, King Salman told Muslim leaders: “Your country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, enjoys security and prosperity as a result of the application of the Shariah and you also know that the Constitution of the Kingdom is the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger.”

King Salman said all Saudi kings over the years had prioritized the Kingdom’s security and worked to enhance services for Haj and Umrah pilgrims.

During the event, King Salman received an honorary doctorate from the Islamic University of Europe in the Netherlands, given to King Abdullah for his efforts to combat terrorism. King Salman also received an honorary doctorate from the university for his aid to Muslim minorities.

Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh hailed the king’s efforts to strengthen Muslim unity. MWL Secretary-General Abdullah Al-Turki presented a copy of the conference’s final communiqué to the king.

Meanwhile, Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Ali Al-Naimi said, quoting UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, that King Salman had done in 10 days what new rulers would take 100 days to accomplish. Al-Naimi said this during an address at the Jazan Economic Forum on Wednesday.

The post Saudi Arabia: King Salman Calls On Muslims To Shun Intolerance, Extremism appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The English graffiti artist has taken his politically charged message to the bombed-out neighborhoods of Gaza, where a series of murals amid a backdrop of devastation attempts to give voice to the desperation felt by Palestinians.

The first mural, entitled “Bomb Damage,” appears to be inspired by Rodin’s famous sculpture “The Thinker.” In Banksy’s version, however, the viewer is struck with the realization that the only possible thing on the mind of the subject is the utter despair and devastation that surrounds him.

Another piece, which was featured in streetartnews, is done in the artist’s trademark stark, stenciled imagery. It shows the silhouettes of children riding an amusement park swing that is circling around one of the looming guard stations that punctuate the length of the West Bank barrier, which, upon completion, will be approximately 700 kilometers (430 miles).

The artist also provided his personal thoughts on the situation confronting the people of Gaza:

“Gaza is often described as ‘the world’s largest open air prison’ because no one is allowed to enter or leave. But that seems a bit unfair to prisons – they don’t have their electricity and drinking water cut off randomly almost everyday,” Banksy said in a spray-painted statement.

In another painting, in which a huge white kitten appears to toy with a ball of coiled metal in a field of rubble and debris, the artist is hurling criticism at the popular Internet meme involving felines, which attract so much social-media attention at the expense of more serious issues.

The street artist explained in yet another spray-painted bit of commentary the reaction of a local man to the work, and his response:

“A local man came up and said ‘Please – what does this mean?’ I explained I wanted to highlight the destruction in Gaza by posting photos on my website – but on the internet people only look at pictures of kittens.”

In another place, Banksy offered some advice on a concrete wall: “If We Wash Our Hands Of The Conflict Between The Powerful And The Powerless We Side With The Powerful – We Don’t Remain Neutral”.

The post World Famous Artist Banksy In Gaza appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In this week’s address, US President Barack Obama reiterated his commitment to middle-class economics, and to ensuring that all hard-working Americans get the secure and dignified retirement they deserve. While most financial advisers prioritize their clients’ futures, there are some who direct their clients towards bad investments in return for backdoor payments and hidden fees. That’s why earlier this week the President announced that he is calling on the Department of Labor to update rules to protect families from conflicts of interest by requiring financial advisers to put their clients’ best interest before their own profits. The President emphasized his promise to keep fighting for this policy and for others that benefit millions of working and middle class Americans.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
February 28, 2015

Hi everybody. In America, we believe that a lifetime of hard work and responsibility should be rewarded with a shot at a secure, dignified retirement. It’s one of the critical components of middle-class life – and this week, I took new steps to protect it.

Six years after the crisis that shook a lot of people’s faith in a secure retirement, our economy is steadily growing. Last year was the best year for job growth since the 1990s. All told, over the past five years, the private sector has added nearly 12 million new jobs. And since I took office, the stock market has more than doubled, replenishing the 401(k)s of millions of families.

But while we’ve come a long way, we’ve got more work to do to make sure that our recovery reaches more Americans, not just those at the top. That’s what middle-class economics is all about—the idea that this country does best when everyone gets their fair shot, everybody does their fair share, and everyone plays by the same set of rules.

That last part—making sure everyone plays by the same set of rules—is why we passed historic Wall Street Reform and a Credit Card Bill of Rights. It’s why we created a new consumer watchdog agency. And it’s why we’re taking new action to protect hardworking families’ retirement security. If you’re working hard and putting away money, you should have the peace of mind that the financial advice you’re getting is sound and that your investments are protected.

But right now, there are no rules of the road. Many financial advisers put their clients’ interest first – but some financial advisers get backdoor payments and hidden fees in exchange for steering people into bad investments. All told, bad advice that results from these conflicts of interest costs middle-class and working families about $17 billion every year.

This week, I called on the Department of Labor to change that – to update the rules and require that retirement advisers put the best interests of their clients above their own financial interests. Middle-class families cannot afford to lose their hard earned savings after a lifetime of work. They deserve to be treated with fairness and respect. And that’s what this rule would do.

While many financial advisers support these basic safeguards to prevent abuse, I know some special interests will fight this with everything they’ve got. But while we welcome different perspectives and ideas on how to move forward, what I won’t accept is the notion that there’s nothing we can do to make sure that hard-working, responsible Americans who scrimp and save can retire with security and dignity.

We’re going to keep pushing for this rule, because it’s the right thing to do for our workers and for our country. The strength of our economy rests on whether hard-working families can not only share in America’s success, but can also contribute to America’s success. And that’s what I will never stop fighting for – an economy where everyone who works hard has the chance to get ahead.

Thanks, and have a great weekend.

The post Obama: Ensuring Hardworking Americans Retire With Dignity – Transcript appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in Moscow was well-planned, investigators said. Versions of the crime range from a political provocation to a revenge killing by radical Islamists.

“There is no doubt that this crime was carefully planned. The location and timing of the killing indicated that as well. The investigation found out that Boris Nemtsov was going with his female friend to his apartment, which is located close to the murder scene. The organizers and the executers apparently knew his route,” Vladimir Markin, spokesman for the Investigative Committee, told journalists.

Markin said the best detectives and forensic experts are involved in the case, which is considered a top priority by law enforcement authorities.

Preliminary results show that the politician was killed from a Makarov pistol. Experts found six 9-mm cartridge cases at the scene, Markov said. The cartridges were produced by several different manufacturers, he added.

At the moment the investigation is focused on questioning the eyewitnesses and studying mobile traffic data in the immediate area of the crime, which may provide an insight into communications of the criminals. Footage from CCTV cameras is also being studied.

The investigation is looking into five possible motives behind the high-profile assassination, Markin said.

“The murder could be a provocation to destabilize the political situation in the country. Nemtsov could have been chosen as a sort of ‘sacral sacrifice’ by those who don’t hesitate to use any methods to reach their political goals,” he said.

“There are reports that Nemtsov received threats due to his position over the shooting of Charlie Hebdo staff in Paris,” Markin said, adding that a possible link to the Ukrainian civil war was also being investigated.

“It’s no secret that both sides of that conflict have among their ranks very radical figures who take no orders from any authority,” he said.

Other versions voiced by Markin involve Nemtsov’s business interests and a possible assault related to his personal life.

Later in the day, the car allegedly used in the attack was discovered not far from the scene of the crime. Russian media reported that it had Ingushetian license plates.

The Kremlin called on political commentators not to pressure the investigators.

“This is a top priority case now and it’s important that the investigation produces results as soon as possible. Don’t hamper their work, just be patient and wait,” presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Dozhd television.

President Vladimir Putin has himself pledged that the people behind this “despicable and cynical crime” will be held accountable.

Boris Nemtsov, a veteran opposition figure in Russia, was gunned down in a drive-by attack in central Moscow on Friday night. The murder triggered worldwide condemnation and calls to bring the killers to justice.

The post Russia: Assassination Of Opposition Leader Nemtsov Well-Planned appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“Will the United States, Germany, the rest of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund – collectively constituting the International Mafia – allow the new Greek leaders of the Syriza party to dictate the conditions of Greece’s rescue and salvation? The answer at the moment is a decided “No”. — William Blum, The Greek Tragedy, CounterPunch

“The Greek economy is finished…. There is no power, no force within the Greek economy, within Greek society that can avert – it’s like – imagine if we were in Ohio in 1931 and we were to ask: What can Ohio politicians do to get Ohio out of the Great Depression? The answer is nothing.” — Yanis Varoufakis, Greek Finance Minister

A disagreement over the terms of a deal to provide a bailout extension for Greece, has set the stage for a final clash between the Eurogroup and members of the Greek ruling party, Syriza.  Although the agreement was approved on Tuesday when a list of reforms were submitted by Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis to the Eurogroup, Varoufakis believes that changes to the original program give him greater flexibility to implement policies that will end austerity, reduce the ailing country’s primary budget surplus, and ease the humanitarian crisis that has persisted for 6 years.  Regrettably,  no one at the ECB, the European Commission or the IMF shares Varoufakis’s views on the subject. The so called “troika” thinks that Greece has signed on to essentially the same program that was in place before the negotiations, give or take a few cosmetic changes in the language. And because the program is the same, they think Varoufakis should stick with the same policies as his predecessor and ignore mounting public opposition to austerity. Given the irreconcilable differences between the two parties, there’s bound to be a violent confrontation in the near future that will lead to heated recriminations and, eventually, a Grexit.

To illustrate the widening chasm between Varoufakis and the members of the Eurogroup, consider the fact that, going into the negotiations, Varoufakis was determined to end the bailouts and secure a “bridge” loan that would shield Greece from default for a six month period of adjustment after which basic changes to the current austerity regime would be re-negotiated. While the Eurogroup agreed to change the term “program” to “agreement” and “troika” to “institutions”, in the minds of the EU finance minsters, the substance of the original deal, which was laid out in the hated Memorandum of Understanding, remained the same. Take a look at this excerpt from a letter from ECB president Mario Draghi and Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem and you’ll see how this is playing out:

“I assume that it is clear, that the basis of concluding the current review, and also any future arrangements, will be the existing commitments in the current Memorandum of Understanding and The Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies  (MEFP). In this context we note that the commitments outlined by the authorities differ from existing programme commitments in a number of areas. In such cases, we will have to assess during the review whether measures which are not accepted by the authorities are replaced with measures of equal or better quality in terms of achieving the objectives of the programme.” (Naked Capitalism)

What Draghi is saying is that Varoufakis’s changes will be put under a microscope to see if they conform with the memorandum which Varoufakis believes no longer applies. The way this will work on a practical basis, is that additional money will only be meted out incrementally depending on compliance with, you guessed it, the old agreement. In other words, Varoufakis will not have a 4 month grace period to experiment with his pro-growth, anti-austerity economic policies. He’ll be expected to toe the line from Day 1.

Varoufakis either doesn’t understand what he signed or thinks he can implement his own plan without too much interference from the Eurogroup. Either way, there’s probably going to be a confrontation given the vast disparity in the way the agreement is being interpreted. In a Tuesday interview with CNBC, Varoufakis said that the new deal is fundamentally different than the previous agreement. He said:

“Some people have been insisting that the program that we’ve been under must surely be the program that we shall remain under simply refuse to understand that this has changed. So they keep insisting that that program is still on-going. Let me give you a very simple number. The program that we challenged compelled to the Greek government to extract 4.5% of the primary surplus every year in a depressed economy. We’ve changed that. Now surely that is not dismissed as simply a non-event and it’s business as usual, so it’s not business as usual we have a fresh start and now what matters is to use the opportunity of that fresh start in order to build something good on top of it. And we will endeavor to do this.” (“CNBC Exclusive Interview: Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis“, CNBC)

See? He sincerely believes that the old deal is history. But the troika, the Eurogroup, and the majority of people who have analyzed the new arrangement, disagree. They think everything is the same (which explains why critics on the right and left have repudiated the deal as a “climb-down, a capitulation and a sellout.)

In an interview with Nikos Hatzinikolaou on REAL FM, Greece, Varoufakis rejected the Memorandum while claiming that the new agreement represents “a huge success’ in ending the “recessionary measures” that are needlessly prolonging Greece’s Great Depression. Here’s what he said:

Varoufakis: “The current  government (Syriza) wants to say things with their name. I will explain it to you in very simple terms, Mr. Hatzinikolaou. As long as our debt is what it is, as long as Greece was bounded within this iron cage of primary surpluses that were impossible to achieve without killing whatever is left in the private sector, and as long we have a negative sign in investments (essentially, real investments), it was impossible to achieve this exit.

What we are trying to do – and have succeeded in doing so; it was a huge success, I’d say – is to create a four-month bridge during which we achieve the following:

First, the cancelation of the recessionary measures and the implementation of a transitional program we ourselves have made, one the Greek society will be able to withstand. This will help us negotiate during this four-month period a new contract between us and our partners with the goal of solving this system of three equations with three unknowns.

Hatzinikolaou: Thus, we are talking about a new Memorandum? ….

Varoufakis: OK. Let us be careful with the words. What does the Memorandum mean? … Let me remind you of what it comprises. It comprises the logic of continuous domestic [or internal] devaluation, of  huge primary surpluses in an economy that does not have a real credit system, where investments are negative, and at the same time where we have a series of measures that empower this recession.  This is the MoU. It is the automation, the a-politicization, and the subjection to the crisis.” (“The juicy interview of Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis“, Greek Analyst)

Varoufakis  appears to be saying that, in his view, the new agreement constitutes a rejection of the memorandum and, thus, is a de facto repudiation of austerity.  The question is whether Varoufakis is stretching the facts to give himself greater latitude to relieve Greece’s humanitarian crisis and to put Greece back on a sound path to growth.  While those are worthy goals, they are not likely to win the Eurogroup’s support. Check out this excerpt from a letter from the IMF to Dijsselbloem concerning the vagueness of Varoufakis’s reform package:

“In quite a few areas, however, including perhaps the most important ones, the letter is not conveying clear assurances that the Government intends to undertake the reforms envisaged in the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies. We note in particular that there are neither clear commitments to design the envisaged comprehensive pension and VAT policy reforms, nor unequivocal undertakings to continue already-agreed policies for opening up closed sectors, for administrative reforms, for privatization, and for labor market reforms. As you know, we consider such commitments and undertakings to be critical for Greece’s ability to meet the basic objectives of its Fund-supported program, which is why these are the areas subject to most of the structural benchmarks agreed with the Fund.” (Excerpt IMF letter posted at Naked capitalism)

Repeat: “We consider such commitments and undertakings to be critical for Greece’s ability to meet the basic objectives of its Fund-supported program.”  In other words, Greece should not expect to get its loan extension unless it follows the troika’s explicit orders on pensions, VAT (sales taxes), government cutbacks, privatization and labor market reforms.

So, what is Varoufakis’s approach to these benchmarks?

Let’s take a look at pension reform. In an interview with CNBC’s Julia Chatterley on Tuesday, Chatterley asked Varoufakis point blank, “So you’re ruling out pension cuts?”

Varoufakis: “Of course over the next four months there will be no such thing.” (CNBC)

How about raising the VAT tax?

Same thing. And in the interview on REAL FM Varoufakis covered the other policies that the troika sees as “critical”. Listen to this exchange:

Hatzinikolaou: My fundamental question about the e-mail is whether or not it entails layoffs in the public sector …, if it entails pension reductions … if it entails wage reductions?

Varoufakis: I will answer to all these questions, since these are very specific questions, and it is best that we speak forthrightly. My answer to all of these questions is NO, in NO WAY.”

Let’s summarize: No pension cuts, no higher VAT taxes, no lower wages for public workers, and no layoffs. While I admire what Varoufakis is suggesting, I can’t figure out how he’s going to convince the troika to give him more money.  Apparently, he thinks that streamlining the government and aggressively pursuing tax cheats will do the trick. Or maybe he has something else up his sleeve, like ignoring the terms of the agreement long enough to generate growth in the economy, lower unemployment, and create an improved environment for foreign investment. He might think that that will force the troika to acknowledge that austerity has failed and that pro-growth Keynesian strategies actually produce positive results. Of course, that’s just a guess on my part. It’s impossible to know for sure.

Here’s more of the interview with CNBC:

Varoufakis:   “The reason why we have this 4 month period is to re-establish bonds of trust between us and our European partners as well as the IMF in order to build a new, we call it, contract between us and our partners so as to put an end to this spiral, the debt inflationary spiral; reform Greece; and make sure that CNBC doesn’t care about Greece anymore, because we don’t want to be in the headlines for all the wrong reasons.” (“CNBC Exclusive Interview: Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis“, CNBC)

The “bonds of trust” are going to  put to the test if Varoufakis doesn’t comply with the troika’s diktats, that’s for sure.

Varoufakis assumes that the troika doesn’t understand the impact of its belt-tightening policies. He seems to think that the punishment that’s being inflicted on Greece is just the unfortunate byproduct of debt reduction policy and not a deliberate attempt to crush the unions, roll back progressive reforms, decimate the welfare state, and reduce the country to a condition of “permanent colonial dependency.”    But that viewpoint is shockingly naïve, after all, the IMF has been in the looting biz for a long time and has a pretty good grasp of the effects its toxic policies.  They know what they’re doing, just like know that austerity is just a refinement of the “shock doctrine” which is the traditional way the elites exploit crises by imposing harsh, economy-demolishing reforms that only benefit themselves and their class. The men who conjure up these thieving schemes aren’t likely to be hoodwinked by Varoufakis’s vague reforms. They’re going to force Varoufakis to jump through all their respective hoops before he gets one dime of their precious money. Here’s Varoufakis again:

“There is going to be a great deal of toing and froing between us and the institutions and our partners but what we have established through stubborn refusal to succumb to the notion that elections change nothing over the past couple of months or weeks I should say is the notion that this government deserves to have a degree of room for policy-making that allows us to reform Greece and to carry the great multitude out there with us. This is the government for the first time in Greece that has the people behind it and it would be a terrible waste not just for us but for our partners to allow this wave of support to dissipate through non-action.” (CNBC)

Does Varoufakis really think he can pull this off?  Does he really think he can out-fox the slimy, authoritarian brigands and leg-breakers who run these extortionist institutions and who will use every means possible to extract the last drop of blood from their victim be he an aspiring, but penniless student at the university or a destitute pensioner huddling homeless and frozen in an abandoned doorway in downtown Athens?

This isn’t going to end well. Varoufakis had one card to play–the threat of leaving the Euro–and he failed to play it. Now his leverage is gone and the roof is about to cave in. Just wait and see.

The troika isn’t going to convene another dreary round of negotiations to rehash the same old nonsense. Those days are over.  They’re simply going to withhold the money, curtail liquidity assistance, and torpedo the Greek banking system. Kaboom! That’s the way this thing is going to go down. The mood among the EZ finance ministers has soured considerably since the last meeting. They want to put this whole thing behind them. They’re sick of it.  They want closure. They’re not going to quibble over issues they’ve already gone over and clarified a million times.  Varoufakis will either have to get with the program or face the consequences. That’s the way it works in Mafia-land; you either pay the piper or you find yourself in the East River in cement booties.

Who knows: maybe this is what Varoufakis wanted from the beginning, a ferocious clash ending in banishment, a Grexit.  Well, he won’t have to wait long now.

The post Showdown In Athens – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Beginning in 1966, at the outset of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards went on a rampage destroying museums and bulldozing graves. Now ISIS is doing the same thing in Iraq. Sledgehammers have been used to behead statues and other artifacts at the Mosul Museum—winged bulls dating to the seventh century B.C. have been smashed—a winged lion has been defaced, and other antiquities have been annihilated. Great works of art, extending to the ancient Assyrian empire, have been ransacked. This happened just a few days after the burning of the Mosul Public Library. In addition, tombs have been destroyed.

This is not the face of authoritarianism—this is the face of totalitarianism. Authoritarian dictators want to monopolize their power, but they have no interest in upending the past; they leave libraries, museums, and gravesites untouched. ISIS, following Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, wants to eradicate the collective memory of the people, which is why it goes beyond killing men, women, and children: by destroying ancient works of art, and turning over graves, the totalitarians seek to erase the past, thus paving the way for the future.

Totalitarians assault art and religion precisely because they bind people to their roots, thus creating an obstacle to the new social order. ISIS barbarians want to do more than kill Christian Assyrians, and those who are not just like them—they want to kill everything that ties the present to the past.

The Obama administration does not understand ISIS because it does not understand the mind-set of totalitarians. It thinks it is dealing with a conventional sectarian struggle, the kind of uprising that pops up now and then. It is not. It is dealing with an apocalyptic movement that is fueled by a desire to own the past, the present, and the future. And like communism, it is not content to lay anchor in one country.

We need to hear from presidential hopefuls why they think the Obama vision is impaired, and what they plan to do about it.

The post The Totalitarian Face Of ISIS – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

An Egyptian court has ruled that the Palestinian resistant movement Hamas is a terrorist organization.

In late January a court declared the armed wing of the organization, Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, a terrorist group and banned it.

There were subsequent protests by Hamas supporters in the Gaza strip against the decision.

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has cracked down on Islamist groups in the country. Hamas is connected to the Muslim Brotherhood which has also been blacklisted.

The post Egypt: Court Lists Hamas As Terrorist Organization appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fuad Huseinzadeh*

The Republic of Azerbaijan has applied for the observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The announcement was made by SCO Secretary General Dmitry Mezentsev, according to TASS News Agency.

Mr. Mezentsev stated that Syria, Belarus, Armenia and Bangladesh also have applied for the observer status.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Iran, Pakistan, India and several other countries have expressed interest in cooperating with the SCO and are currently participating as observers of this organization. In addition, the SCO is already considering the applications of Pakistan and India to become permanent and full members of this prestigious forum.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has not commented on Baku’s intentions to become an observer of the SCO. In any case, Azerbaijan’s expression of interest to join this organization is logical, and if not anything, it is a surprise why it took this long to submit an application. The key areas of development identified by Azerbaijan and the SCO are practically the same.

According to official information, the priorities of cooperation with the SCO are the development of transportation infrastructure, telecommunications, the oil and gas industry, and agriculture. All these areas are also priorities for Azerbaijan. The country is the initiator of and an active participant in all regional energy and transportation projects. Moreover, there is a growing emphasis on the development of the non-oil sector of Azerbaijan, especially in information and communications technology and agriculture.

It is important to note that of the potential observer countries, Azerbaijan, in contrast with, for example Armenia, does not come to the organization empty-handed. The country brings with it a hefty portfolio of its own projects of global importance, which, of course, are of interest to the organization’s participating countries. And it’s not just energy. This year should see the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway – a major transportation project, which in the foreseeable future, could link China and the countries of Central Asia to Europe. According to experts, this railway will reduce the transportation time of goods from China to Europe by half, and its total length will stretch nearly 7,500 km.

Of no less importance is the fact that Azerbaijan enjoys long-established and strong relations with almost all SCO member states and will not have to develop ties from scratch with any of them. The current members of the SCO are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – that is, the traditional partners of Azerbaijan. Russia is a key trade and economic partner of the Republic, and Azerbaijan has had relations with the countries of Central Asia for many years, and as time passes, the two sides continue to build bilateral economic and political relations.

In addition, Chinese officials have repeatedly called Azerbaijan a key partner in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan for its part has shown great interest in the markets of the Asia-Pacific region. We are talking about major investments in Asian stock and currency markets from the assets and foreign exchange reserves of the State Oil Fund (SOFAR) and the Central Bank, and the acquisition of currencies, equities and real estate in the region. Thus, the State Oil Fund alone plans to spend 500m dollars to purchase Chinese currency, and the Central Bank, twice that, i.e. one billion dollars to purchase Chinese currency and bonds in Chinese markets.

In addition, the State Oil Fund has invested USD 447million dollars in South Korean real estate and is also planning to purchase real estate in other countries in the region. In this regard, Azerbaijan’s presence in the SCO will allow it to take a more active role in these and other large-scale projects.

In addition, there is another important political aspect that draws Azerbaijan’s interest to the SCO, which is the extremely pragmatic approach to different formats of economic and political cooperation in the region. From Baku’s point of view, the presence of two SCO regional giants, Russia and China, is a plus. And not just because these countries are among the leading countries in the world with powerful industrial potentials but above all the lack of dominance of any one of the participating countries in the SCO makes the organization a more acceptable format of regional integration for Azerbaijan, than, for example, the Eurasian Union, which is pressing for the country’s accession.

Thus, some have described last week’s visits to Baku in yet another attempt to convince Azerbaijan to join the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich and Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov as a “Russian landing force”. The latter, in a conversation with reporters expressed openly the hope that Baku would support the “line of integration with the Eurasian Economic Union”.

And despite the fact that it was Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev who first proposed the creation of the EAEU many years ago, lately, the words of “Russian Project” are being applied to this organization.

It is no secret that the China-Russia tandem is crucial to the development of the SCO. Nicola Contessi, an expert on the SCO from Laval University in Canada, believes that the future of the organization depends largely on the development of Russian-Chinese relations. According to him, Russia is watching China’s increasing penetration into Central Asia with growing concern, and the SCO’s prospects will largely depend on whether the Celestial Empire is able to show restraint to this matter.

However, despite the Canadian expert’s wariness, Russia has no alternative at a time when Moscow’s relations with the West are going through perhaps their worst phase in history. In addition, China is the leader and the engine of the world economy, which bodes well for the future of any organization of which this country is a part of.

In any case, Azerbaijan’s participation in any project of regional integration promises great benefit to all parties, and especially in the framework of the SCO – the largest Eurasian project.

By the way, as the Russian president’s special envoy the SCO Bakhtiar Khakimov stated, “Moscow hopes that the decision to expand the SCO will be made at this year’s summit in Ufa on July 9-10, 2015. Approval of the organization’s development strategy through 2025 is on the agenda for the meeting of the Council of Heads of State, and one of the main points of the document is accepting new members into the SCO.

The post Baku Paves Bridge Towards Shanghai – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Tom Westcott

The roundabouts in the Libyan capital of Tripoli have long been a place for Egyptians to find work. Every day, carpenters, builders, plumbers and decorators sit and wait, each man carrying the tools of his trade to make it easier for prospective employers.

Nowadays there are no Egyptians. Last week the Islamic State (IS) in Libya released a video showing the beheading of 20 Egyptian Coptic Christians and a Ghanaian. Since then, over 25,000 Egyptians have returned, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while hundreds of detained irregular migrants have been released from jail. Egyptians have reported an uptick in attacks – at one roundabout, a Libyan man was shot dead for trying to prevent a group of men harassing Egyptian workers.

But for some, the prospect of returning to a life in poverty in their home country makes staying on in Libya’s warzone a risk they are willing to take.

Revenge and revenge again

Libya is split between two rival parliaments and governments – the internationally-recognised ones in the eastern towns of Tobruk and Beida, and rival breakaway institutions, led by the Libya Dawn movement in the capital Tripoli.

The situation for Egyptians is worse in the west. The prime minister for the Tripoli-based government Omar Al-Hassi has urged all Egyptians to leave Libya, according to the state news agency LANA, admitting his government’s security authorities are unable to guarantee Egyptians’ safety. There are no firm figures for how many Egyptians are in Libya, with estimates ranging from 40,000 to over 100,000.

Bricklayer and tiler Hisham, who has lived in Tripoli for 23 years, said some 75 percent of the Egyptians he knew in the city had left since the release of the video. “It could have happened to any nation but now it has knocked at our door,” he said. “We have seen atrocities committed in Syria and Iraq and now we feel the same.”

The brutal IS killing is believed to have taken place on the outskirts of the central town of Sirte, 280 miles from Tripoli, which is currently occupied by a group of Islamists who have declared loyalty to the so-called Islamic State (IS). The group has murdered Christians and other minority groups in Syria and Iraq.

In retaliation for the killings, Egyptian planes bombed Derna – the first Libyan town overrun by IS forces. Egyptians of all religions in the country fear the move could provoke another wave of violence against their countrymen.

“There is a genuine fear of revenge and retribution and we know Libyans are under the same pressures as Egyptians, with warring factions,” Hisham said. “The fear of revenge is one of the reasons why many have left.”

Advocacy group Amnesty International warned in the aftermath of the IS video: “Civilians in Libya are in mortal danger as retaliatory attacks by all sides spiral even further out of control.”

The minister of Tripoli’s Anglican Church, the Reverend Eban Baskra Vasihar, said the release of the video had sent shockwaves through the whole Christian community, as well as ordinary Libyan families. “Most Libyans are very gentle people and are very upset about what happened.”

A few Egyptian Coptic Christians are among those choosing to stay. The last Coptic church closed last year, so its former congregation either worship in private or attend services in the other churches in the capital.

Among them is Amoun, who attends one of the three churches still open in Tripoli. He said he would not be scared away easily. “I have been living here for eight years, working in the oil industry, and the situation is good for me,” he said. “I have had no problems and I will stay here, although family and friends back home are putting pressure on me to leave.”

Those Egyptians who remain in the capital are keeping the lowest of profiles and Hisham said he would consider leaving if the situation got much worse and the supportive community in which he lives flees. The pre-revolution days of Qaddafi’s Libya are a fading memory. “We were the largest non-Libyan community here before the revolution,” he said. “But now we have become another minority, one under threat from many sides.”

Eastern towns, such as Tobruk, are considered slightly safer by Egyptians, who say there is little evidence of IS forces in the region. Hisham explained that, even as the Egyptian government encourages its citizens to return, hundreds of Egyptians continued to illegally cross the border into eastern Libya. “The reward of wages is still very tempting, especially for poor manual labourers,” he said.

The Egyptian economy has struggled since a 2011 uprising led to ongoing political chaos. While Libya, too, has been hit by chaos, wages are far higher in the oil-rich nation. “I’m not going,” said Ahmed, a fruit-seller in the eastern city of Benghazi. “Nothing is harder than living in Egypt with no money, food or shelter.” While fighting has raged in the city for the last six months, he has kept his stall open. “There is no life for me in Egypt,” he said.

Detention centre deal

Many Egyptian workers in Libya enter illegally. Those who do so risk being stopped at checkpoints from where, if they have no paperwork, they are taken to holding centres and undergo blood tests for Hepatitis and HIV. Those who test positive or who cannot produce adequate paperwork are transferred to one of the country’s 19 overcrowded detention centres, where conditions are grim.

One former detainee, Mohamed, said up to 90 migrants were crammed into one room in a centre where treatment “depended on the guards” and there was no medical care for those who fell sick. After visiting nine government detention centres last year, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said two should immediately be closed, citing torture, abuse and dire sanitation conditions.

Yet in recent days the Tripoli-based government agreed to free Egyptians who had been detained for entering the country illegally.

When IRIN visited the Krareem detention centre in a former school on the outskirts of Misrata, hundreds of migrants sat cross-legged, cramped into a sandy courtyard. They were separated into two groups: 63 Egyptian detainees who were about to be freed, and several hundred Sub-Saharan Africans, who were not. Nervous about publicity, despite their imminent repatriation, some of the Egyptians waiting to board the coach hid their faces from cameramen, wrapping their heads in scarves.

“None of these men had visas, so they are illegals,” one guard explained, gesturing over the heads of the seated men. “But for the Egyptians, their government is taking them back now. Their government asked for them, after the video.” The coaches, funded by the Libyan authorities, would pick up more Egyptians from other centres en route to the Tunisian border crossing of Ras Jadir, he said.

“We have already transferred 250 people in co-ordination with the Egyptian embassy in Tunisia, from five detention centres in the west of Libya, including 26 women,” head of public relations for the department of illegal immigration in Tripoli Mabrouk Rajab told IRIN. “We want to transfer all Egyptians who are detained in centres here.”

Egypt’s repatriation programme has offered detainees an escape route from an otherwise uncertain period of incarceration. But it is not known how many more are held in unregulated prisons run by militias across the country.

* Some of the names in this story have been changed for security reasons

The post Egyptians In Libya: To Flee Or To Stay? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Bhaskar Roy*

The anti-government agitation that was started by the opposition, led by the BNP on January 6 appears to be metamorphosing into a terror campaign. Over one hundred innocent people have died. Terrorists have entered the fray, ably engineered by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) Bangladesh, which is the BNP’s main strength on the streets.

Pakistan’s hand in this has been exposed with the detention and expulsion of a diplomat from the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka, for funding and colluding with terrorist groups.

India somehow remains silent, at least publicly. If Bangladesh becomes a powerhouse of terrorists, led by the JEI and fermented by Pakistan through its intelligence agency, otherwise known as the deep state, India will suffer greatly. Pakistan’s agenda to extract revenge against India for the 1971 war is still very much alive and active.

The BNP’s agitation is rooted against the January 5, 2014 elections which the ruling Awami League conducted without a caretaker government. The caretaker government elections were agreed to by all parties including Awami League in 1996. The experience under the BNP-JEI led government in 2006 did not work neutrally to start with. People who ran the caretaker government were selected with BNP-JEI bias. Elections were finally held in December 2008.

The BNP and its allies boycotted the 2013 elections, leading to Awami League and its coalition partners being elected unopposed. To this extent, the election was flawed. The powerful western countries also supported BNP’s demand for fresh elections which the government did not accede to.

Two things must be noted here. The 1996 election rule was not written in stone. Many amendments have been introduced in the electoral laws including bringing back a secular mode. The constitution was amended accordingly.

Next, Prime Minister Sk. Hasina invited the opposition to take part in the election period government so that they could ensure no fraud was committed by the ruling coalition.

The 2008 elections showed that people rejected the BNP and the JEI roundly, with the Awami League winning an unprecedented 230 seats out of 300. The BNP and JEI lost due to unbridled corruption, political assassinations, and encouragement and support to terrorists to further their agenda.

The JEI was debarred from 2013 elections as they refused to conform to the amended electoral laws and the constitution. They refused to discard their religious political party constitution. Their position was also anti-women.

Political agitations in Bangladesh have hardly ever been peaceful. People are sensitive about political issues, and are emotional in this context. This country of rivers, cyclones and greenery have produced both poets and patriots. When agitations, however, take the form of terror, using petrol bombs, IEDs, and extremist Islamic literature for motivation, it becomes a different ball game altogether.

In the recent turmoil, most people died of burns from petrol bomb attacks as the agitators were trying to bring transportation to a standstill. The rising social indicators are being hurt. More than one billion US dollars have been lost. The garment sector, Bangladesh’s biggest foreign exchange earner and employer has suffered the most. So has education.

An attaché from the Pakistani High Commission, Mohammad Mazar Khan, was arrested by Bangladeshi security agencies in January, from Dhaka, while meeting some of his local agents. Information released by the Bangladeshi authorities to the media said Mazar Khan was an officer of Pakistan’s ISI. He was involved in terror financing and forgery and distribution of Indian currency, along with other colleagues from the high commission. His main contacts and collaborators included the JEI, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT) and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). The Bangladesh government inexplicably soft-treated the issue. Pakistan was asked to withdraw Mazar Khan instead of declaring him persona-non-grata (PNG) and expelling him.

According to information in the Bangla media, the terrorists involved with Mazar Khan were also linked with terrorist acts and bomb-blasts in Burdwan, across the border in India. These elements have built up a network in India. The ISI network in Pakistan High Commission, remains and their activities continue.

A militant training camp was discovered, from where (apart from arms, ammunition and bomb making material), Al Qaida and Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) literature and terror videos were recovered. The training camp was camouflaged as a poultry farm in Banshkhali, Chittagong, a stronghold of the JEI. Many terrorists belonging to different groups have been arrested from other parts of the country.

The view of some experts including in India that the ISIS has very little purchase in South Asia is a dangerous misperception. ISIS has already found takers in Pakistan, and Bangladeshi terrorists are not too far behind, as evidence shows.

There are more than one hundred recorded Islamic terrorist groups in Bangladesh. Many are banned, but they continue to flourish underground. Money from the Gulf and Middle East NGOs still come in by various means, including camouflaged bank transfers. The Islamic Bank of Bangladesh, formed after the assassination of Sk. Mujibur Rahman in 1975, and started as a Saudi initiative, was the biggest culprit in money laundering for terrorist organizations including Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Bangladeshi banks, especially the state’s Bank of Bangladesh (BOB), have received training from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on checking money laundering. Movements and terrorism require money to survive. And they seem to be getting more than adequate support.

To stabilize Bangladesh and help it on its way to development and women’s empowerment, a herculean effort is required. The liberation of Bangladesh is still being questioned not only by the fifth column inside the country but from the outside as well. There has been a concentrated effort to overturn 1971.

The situation in the country would not have come to this impasse if the west did not play its political games to project parties and groups like the JEI as moderate Islamists. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) I and II, set up to judicially try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity during the liberation war have been roundly criticized by western countries.

The European Union (EU) has abolished the death penalty, and impresses upon Bangladesh to do the same. They must understand that the two are not comparable in any manner. It is the same with other developing countries. Yet the world’s only super power, the US, perhaps conducts the largest number of executions.

How is it that the two sons of opposition leader Ms. Khaleda Zia got bail and could travel and remain abroad on medical grounds, despite their serious crimes? Is it because of heavy weight first world countries favoring them and putting pressure on Sk. Hasina’s government? Using the development assistance to interfere wrongly in the legal affairs of a small country is nothing but condemnable.

Many attempts have been made on the life of Sk. Hasina. In a grenade attack on 21 August 2004, twenty four members of her party were killed and she was seriously injured. According to court depositions, the then ruling party, the BNP, was involved at the highest level. Intelligence agencies were used. This case and others are still dragging on in the courts in Bangladesh for more reasons than one.

Under BNP-JEI rule, Bangladesh government became a terrorist exporting country, India being the main target.

The BNP and the JEI are concerned that they stand to be nationally and internationally condemned and their future challenged, if these cases are brought to a proper conclusion. The street movements and terrorism to oust the Awami League from power is a survival issue for the opposition.

In a welcome step the US and the EU have been persuading Khaleda Zia to disassociate with the JEI. Can she do it? And is the JEI going to be designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, since they do not qualify any longer as a political party in Bangladesh.

India must begin to act to help consolidate the Bangladeshi government. It is good that Indian foreign secretary S. Jaishanker will visit Bangladesh soon. Prime Minister Narendra Modi can visit Bangladesh only when some pending agreement can be signed – the Teesta water agreement which has been agreed to by both governments and waiting to be signed. The other is the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) signed in 1974, ratified by Bangladesh but waiting ratification by India. The NDA government in India with a huge majority in parliament is willing to do it, though the BJP opposed both these agreements when the UPA government was in power.

It would not be wise to depend on the promises made by West Bengal Chief Minister Ms. Mamata Bannerjee on these two agreements, when she visited Bangladesh recently. She left some questions on Teesta water sharing agreement and is going to do some political bargaining with the central government. The Bangladesh government made it clear they are not going to move from the agreed text of the Teesta interim agreement.

There is a lot of work to be done in Bangladesh to prevent it from forces inimical to internationally accepted rule of law. If Bangladesh goes down the west will not remain unaffected. The UK, where the JEI has acquired an influential niche for itself, should pay special attention.

*The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

The post Ignoring Bangladesh Can Spell Disaster – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nasurullah Brohi*

The question of post-2014 Afghanistan and its aftermath has remained of prime concern to regional states and as well as to the international community, as the stability of the country greatly influences the whole region. In this manner, it is strongly believed that peace in the region is mainly associated with the peace in the Afghanistan.

The new Afghan government under President Ashraf Ghani is fervently exploring a variety of ways to bring peace to the prolonged war-ridden country. As such, the new regime is also seeking China’s role in helping the Afghan government to bringing the Taliban to the negotiation tables and for its part, China is keenly willing to mediate in the stalled peace process and play a role in the reconciliation between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.

The Chinese are geared up to engaging in a leisure and useful role for endowing with the crucial facilitation to Afghanistan to save the country from sliding into further commotion specially in the aftermath of the combat mission by allied forces.

Many countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and especially the United States have already tried at best to bring peace through the political means and the Taliban therefore were brought to the negotiations through the Qatar-process, but unluckily there wasn’t reached any fruitful conclusions mainly due to the former President Hamid Karzai’s withdrawal from the talks.

However, the need for China’s mediatory role seems much important because other countries either were not that successful in brokering negotiations or otherwise there was less interest and acceptance by the contending parties. Noticeably, China for its neutrality is trusted and respected by all the players i.e. Taliban, Afghan government and the Pakistan.

According to China’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Sun Yuxi, his country is committed to do more and they want to play a bigger role and also inviting other regional and international powers called ‘six plus one’, which consists US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran.

Nevertheless, according to the proposal, the whole process will remain Afghan-led.

The current intermediary role by China also indicates a foreign policy transformation and a time to test China’s political and diplomatic capacity as a major player in the regional affairs. China has already initiated a trilateral framework with Iran and India. The Chinese led trilateral diplomatic forum with Pakistan and Afghanistan also aims to persuade their cooperation and closeness.

The recent meetings on February 9, between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China’s officials in Kabul aimed to initiating the process of trilateral dialogue for the regional cooperation in general and for Afghan stability in particular. Beijing has well-built motives to enhance regional cooperation and address the important regional security challenges that are of prime concern to its own security as well because China also perceives the Uyghur separatists and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as major security threats to its national security.

Moreover, for some or other reasons the trilateral cooperation will go further ahead because of the Russia’s role as a major player in the region. As a SCO member state, the Russians will also agree to China’s proposals and the cooperation can further go ahead by the joining of Central Asian Republics who are also victims at the hands of separatist and radical movements.

* The writer works as a Research Fellow at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad and
can be reached at nasurullahsvi@outlook.com

The post China’s Role In Afghan Peace Process – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and is among the world’s top five exporters of LNG. Despite the relatively large volumes of oil it produces, Nigeria’s oil production is hampered by instability and supply disruptions, while the natural gas sector is restricted by the lack of infrastructure to monetize natural gas that is currently flared (burned off).

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, holds the largest natural gas reserves on the continent, and is among the world’s top five exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Nigeria became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, more than a decade after oil production began in the oil-rich Bayelsa State in the 1950s.¹ Although Nigeria is the leading oil producer in Africa, production suffers from supply disruptions, which have resulted in unplanned outages as high as 500,000 barrels per day (bbl/d).

Nigeria’s oil and natural gas industry is primarily located in the southern Niger Delta area, where it has been a source of conflict. Local groups seeking a share of the wealth often attack the oil infrastructure, forcing companies to declare force majeure on oil shipments (a legal clause that allows a party to not satisfy contractual agreements because of circumstances that are beyond their control). At the same time, oil theft leads to pipeline damage that is often severe, causing loss of production, pollution, and forcing companies to shut in production.

Aging infrastructure and poor maintenance have also resulted in oil spills. Natural gas flaring, the burning of associated natural gas that is produced with oil, has contributed to environmental pollution. Protest from local groups over environmental damages from oil spills and natural gas flaring have exacerbated tensions between some local communities and international oil companies (IOCs). The industry has been blamed for pollution that has damaged air, soil, and water, leading to losses in arable land and decreases in fish stocks.

Nigeria’s oil and natural gas resources are the mainstay of the country’s economy. The country’s oil and natural gas industry typically accounts for 75% of government revenue and 95% of total export revenue.² Nigeria’s economy is vulnerable to a drop in crude oil prices as it is very dependent on oil revenue. Nigeria’s fiscal buffers, the Excess Crude Account and Sovereign Wealth Fund, include savings generated when oil revenues exceed budgeted revenues. However, those funds declined from US$11 billion at end-2012 to US$3 billion at end-2013.³

Total primary energy consumption

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that in 2012 total primary energy consumption in Nigeria was about 4.5 quadrillion British thermal unit (Btu). Of this amount, traditional biomass and waste (typically consisting of wood, charcoal, manure, and crop residues) accounted for 80%. This high share represents the use of biomass to meet off-grid heating and cooking needs, mainly in rural areas. It’s important to note that estimates of traditional biomass consumption are imprecise because biomass sources are not typically traded in easily observable commercial markets. The electrification rate in Nigeria is estimated at 41%—leaving approximately 100 million people in Nigeria without access to electricity.⁴

Regulation of oil and natural gas industry

The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was initially proposed in 2008, is expected to change the organizational structure and fiscal terms governing the oil and natural gas industry if it becomes law. IOCs are concerned that proposed changes to fiscal terms may make some projects commercially unviable, particularly deepwater projects that involve greater capital spending.

The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was created in 1977 to oversee the regulation of the oil and natural gas industry, with secondary responsibilities for upstream and downstream developments. In 1988, the NNPC was divided into 12 subsidiary companies to regulate the subsectors within the industry.⁵ The Department of Petroleum Resources, within the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, is another key regulator, focused on general compliance, leases and permits, and environmental standards.⁶

Currently, most of Nigeria’s major oil and natural gas projects are funded through joint ventures (JV) between IOCs and NNPC, where NNPC is the majority shareholder. The rest of the projects are managed through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) with IOCs. PSCs are the fiscal regime typically, but not always, governing deepwater projects and contain more attractive terms than those in JV arrangements, which is the fiscal regime typically governing onshore/shallow water projects. PSC terms on deepwater projects tend to be more favorable to incentivize the development of deepwater projects.

NNPC has JV arrangements and/or PSCs with Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, and Eni. Other companies active in Nigeria’s oil and natural gas industry are Addax Petroleum, Statoil, and several Nigerian companies. IOCs participating in onshore and shallow water oil projects in the Niger Delta region have been affected by the instability in the region. As a result, there has been a general trend for IOCs, particularly Shell, Total, Eni, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, to sell their interests in marginal onshore and shallow water oil fields, mostly to Nigerian companies and smaller IOCs, and to focus their investments on deepwater projects and onshore natural gas projects.

The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was initially proposed in 2008, is expected to change the organizational structure and fiscal terms governing the oil and natural gas industry if it becomes law. IOCs are concerned that proposed changes to fiscal terms may make some projects commercially unviable, particularly deepwater projects that involve greater capital spending. Some of the most contentious areas of the PIB include the potential renegotiation of contracts with IOCs, changes in tax and royalty structures, deregulation of the downstream sector, restructuring of NNPC, a concentration of oversight authority in the Minister of Petroleum Resources, and a mandatory contribution by IOCs of 10% of monthly net profits to the Petroleum Host Communities Fund.

The latest draft of the PIB was submitted to the National Assembly by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources in July 2012. The delay in passing the PIB has resulted in fewer investments in new projects, and there has not been a licensing round since 2007, mainly because of regulatory uncertainty. The regulatory uncertainty has also slowed the development of natural gas projects as the PIB is expected to introduce new fiscal terms to govern the natural gas sector.

Petroleum and other liquids

Nigeria has the second largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, but reserve estimates have been stagnant as exploration activity has been low. Rising security problems coupled with regulatory uncertainty have contributed to decreased exploration activity.

According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Nigeria has an estimated 37 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves as of January 2015—the second-largest amount in Africa after Libya.⁷ The majority of reserves are found along the country’s Niger River Delta and offshore in the Bight of Benin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Bight of Bonny. Current exploration activities are mostly focused in the deep and ultra-deep offshore. NNPC had undertaken onshore exploration activities in northeast Nigeria, within the Chad basin, but the lack of discoveries and the presence of the militant group Boko Haram put exploration at a standstill. Exploration activities in the onshore Niger Delta have decreased because of the rising security problems related to oil theft and pipeline sabotage. Several major IOCs have divested from their onshore assets, which has created opportunity for local Nigerian companies to step in. The investment uncertainties surrounding the long-delayed PIB have also contributed to delayed investment in deepwater projects, and the start dates for these projects have continuously been pushed back.

Production and consumption

Crude oil production in Nigeria reached its peak of 2.44 million bbl/d in 2005, but it began to decline significantly as violence from militant groups surged, forcing many companies to withdraw staff and shut in production. Oil production recovered somewhat after 2009 but still remains lower than its peak level because of ongoing supply disruptions.

Nigeria produces mostly light, sweet (low sulfur) crude oil of which the vast majority is exported to global markets. Crude oil production in Nigeria reached its peak of 2.44 million bbl/d in 2005, but began to decline significantly as violence from militant groups surged, forcing many companies to withdraw staff and shut in production. The lack of transparency of oil revenues, tensions over revenue distribution, environmental damages from oil spills, and local ethnic and religious tensions created a fragile situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta. By 2009, crude oil production plummeted by more than 25% to average 1.8 million bbl/d.

In late 2009, amnesty was declared, and the militants came to an agreement with the Nigerian government whereby they handed over weapons in exchange for cash payments and training opportunities. The rise in oil production after 2009 was partially because of the reduction in attacks on oil facilities following the implementation of the amnesty program, which allowed companies to repair some damaged infrastructure and bring some supplies back online.

Another major factor that contributed to the upward trend in output was the continued increase in new deepwater offshore production. The government took measures to attract investment in deepwater acreage in the 1990s to boost production capacity and to diversify the location of the country’s oil fields. To encourage investments in deepwater areas, which involve higher capital and operating costs, the government offered PSCs in which IOCs received a greater share of revenue as the water depth increased.

In 2014, Nigeria produced 2.4 million bbl/d of petroleum and other liquids, of which 2.0 million bbl/d was crude oil and the remainder was condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and refinery processing gains. Nigeria’s 2014 production was slightly higher than in 2013 because of fewer supply disruptions but still lower than previous years. No major oil fields have started production since the 125,000-bbl/d Usan deepwater field came online in February 2012. The 40,000-bbl/d Bonga North West field came online in 2014, helping to offset production declines.

There are several planned deepwater projects in Nigeria that have been repeatedly pushed back because of the delayed passing of the PIB and the uncertainty that new fiscal/regulatory terms will impose on the oil industry. The latest drafts of the PIB have also prompted questions about the commercial viability of deepwater projects under the proposed changes to fiscal terms. Deepwater projects have typically included more favorable fiscal terms than onshore/shallow water projects, but the PIB, if passed into law, is expected to increase the government’s share of production revenue coming from deepwater projects. As a result of the uncertainty, only two of nine planned deepwater oil projects have been sanctioned by IOCs, while the rest have not received a final investment decision to develop. The planned deepwater oil projects have the potential to bring online 1.1 million bbl/d of new production over the next five or more years, however, only 23% (260,000 bbl/d) reached the critical development milestone. Additionally, global crude oil prices have fallen substantially since mid-2014. If global crude oil prices remain low, this will also exacerbate project delays in Nigeria.

Oil theft

The instability in the Niger Delta has resulted in significant amounts of shut-in production at onshore and shallow offshore fields, forcing companies to frequently declare force majeure on oil shipments.

Since the mid-2000s, Nigeria has experienced increased pipeline vandalism, kidnappings, and militant takeovers of oil facilities in the Niger Delta. In the past, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was one of the main groups attacking or threatening attacks on oil infrastructure for political objectives, claiming to seek a redistribution of oil wealth and greater local control of the oil sector.

Security concerns have led some oil services firms to pull out of the country and oil workers’ unions to threaten strikes over security issues. The instability in the Niger Delta has also resulted in significant amounts of shut-in production at onshore and shallow offshore fields, forcing companies to frequently declare force majeure on oil shipments.

The amnesty program implemented in 2009 led to fewer attacks and supply disruptions in 2009-10, and some companies were able to repair damaged oil infrastructure. However, the lack of progress in job creation and economic development has contributed to increased oil theft and other attacks in recent years.

Nigeria’s oil theft and trade business is based on a complex system of networks comprised of domestic, regional, and international actors, involving various people—local youth and communities, professionals such as corrupt bank managers, and high-level elites such as government officials and security force personnel. Oil is stolen at various stages of the production process from upstream to downstream operations—wellheads, manifolds, pipelines, and storage tanks at export terminals. Most oil theft operations typically involve tapping or siphoning oil from a pipeline by a hose and pumping the oil onto barges or small tankers.⁸

Some stolen crude oil is taken to illegal refineries along the Niger Delta’s swampy bush areas and the refined products are then sold domestically and regionally. However, the bulk of the crude oil makes its way to international markets. Most of that oil is sold to world markets directly from Nigeria’s export terminals, which is known as white collar theft. White collar theft entails filling tankers (or topping them off) with stolen oil at export terminals or stealing crude from storage tanks and loading it onto trucks. A portion of the global illegally traded oil also involves the transfer of crude oil from small tankers to larger tankers waiting further offshore, also known as ship-to-ship transfers.

Estimates of stolen crude oil vary and can reach as high as 400,000 bbl/d, but some believe that estimate is too high and may include the volume lost in oil spills. It is difficult to measure the volume of stolen crude oil because metering systems are usually at export terminals and, therefore, oil stolen between the wellhead and pipelines is not easily detected.⁹ Furthermore, IOCs do not collectively report volumes stolen, so there is no authoritative source for total volumes stolen.

Environmental damages

Poorly maintained, aging pipelines and pipeline sabotage from oil theft have caused oil spills. The oil spills have resulted in land, air, and water pollution, severely affecting surrounding villages by decreasing fish stocks and contaminating water supplies and arable land.

The Niger Delta region suffers from environmental damage caused by pipeline sabotage from oil theft and also spills from illegal refineries. Poorly maintained, aging pipelines have contributed to oil spills as old pipelines can rupture when they corrode. The amounts spilled because of oil theft versus aging infrastructure and/or operational failures are highly debated among oil companies and environmental and human rights groups.

The oil spills have caused land, air, and water pollution, severely affecting surrounding villages by decreasing fish stocks and contaminating water supplies and arable land. The United Nations Environment Program released a study on Ogoniland and the extent of environmental damage from more than 50 years of oil production in the region. The study confirmed community concerns regarding oil contamination across land and water resources, stating that the damage is ongoing and estimating that it could take 25 to 30 years to repair.¹⁰

Piracy in offshore West Africa

Piracy in West Africa has increased over the past few years, affecting the region’s oil industry and naval transportation. Security experts say that the West African coast has become the most dangerous in the world as the amount of piracy incidents has surpassed those in East Africa (particularly around offshore Somalia) and several piracy attacks have resulted in the injury or deaths of crew members. The International Maritime Bureau, an agency that tracks piracy incidents, believes that piracy occurrences are underreported in West Africa’s waters because of a fear of more attacks, potential increased insurance costs, and the proprietary information about vessels.¹¹

Piracy attacks include armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, boarding offshore oil platforms, and stealing tankers or siphoning oil from tankers. Piracy in West Africa has focused more on crude oil and refined product theft compared with piracy in East Africa, which mostly involves kidnapping for ransom. Some oil companies have reported stolen cargoes of crude oil.¹² Some analysts believe that the pirates are from Nigerian militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). One of the major impediments to reducing piracy incidents, particularly those offshore Nigeria, is that the Nigerian government does not allow foreign armed guards in its waters, which was a successful tactic used to curtail piracy in East Africa.¹³ According to the United Nation’s Operational Satellite Applications Program (UNOSAT), the number of piracy-related attacks in offshore West Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea, shows no signs of decreasing, and the attacks have become more violent.¹⁴

Methodology matters

Oil production and supply disruption estimates for Nigeria can vary widely among Nigerian government officials, global consulting firms, and other international organizations. The main reasons underlying the different production estimates are the classification of crude versus condensate and the type of liquids that are included in the total oil supply estimate. The disruption estimates vary because of the methods and definitions used to measure outages.

EIA’s total oil (petroleum and other liquids) supply estimates include crude oil, condensate, natural gas plant liquids (ethane, propane, butane, and natural gasoline), and refinery processing gain. Nigeria’s total oil production is typically reported differently among groups and depends on what liquid streams are included in the numbers. Furthermore, Nigeria’s crude oil production may be reported differently among groups because of the classification of crude versus condensate. A large portion of Nigeria’s oil production, about 350,000 to 400,000 bbl/d, may be considered either crude or condensate (the latter has a higher API gravity) depending on the qualification on the API scale. The qualification used to classify crude and condensate can differ among groups.

EIA estimates that unplanned supply outages to Nigeria’s oil production typically range from 100,000 to 300,000 bbl/d, although they have reached as high as 500,000 bbl/d in the past. The methodology employed to measure disruptions can be different across sources and largely depends on production capacity estimates. EIA uses the concept of effective production capacity (which takes into account the amount of production that could come back to markets within a year) to measure Nigeria’s unplanned outages. Effective capacity takes into account permanent and/or prolonged production loss as a result of the degradation of shut-in oil fields and damages to operational components that would take longer than a year to repair, which is dependent on financial, security, and political situations.

Crude oil and condensate exports

Europe is the largest-regional importer of Nigerian crude oil. In 2014, Europe imported slightly more than 900,000 bbl/d of crude oil and condensate from Nigeria, accounting for 45% of exports.

In 2014, Nigeria exported 2.05 million bbl/d of crude oil and condensate, according to an analysis of data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence (APEX tanker data). The United States traditionally had been the largest importer of Nigerian oil until the last few years. The United States changed from being the largest importer of Nigerian oil in 2012 to the 10th largest in 2014. India is now the largest importer of Nigeria’s oil, purchasing about 370,000 bbl/d or 18% of Nigeria’s total crude exports in 2014. Europe continued to be the largest-regional importer of Nigerian oil, importing slightly more than 900,000 bbl/d or 45% of the exports in 2014.

Trade patterns

The United States typically imported between 9% and 11% of its crude oil from Nigeria before 2012. However, this share has fallen, and in 2014, U.S. imports of Nigerian crude oil accounted for less than 1% of total U.S. crude oil imports.

Nigeria in the past has been an important oil supplier to the United States, but the absolute volume and the share of U.S. imports from Nigeria have fallen substantially. The United States imported an average 60,000 bbl/d of crude oil from Nigeria for the first 11 months of 2014, the lowest amount since the United States started importing Nigerian crude in 1973 and more than a 90% drop from the average volume imported in 2010.

As a result, Nigeria fell from being the 5th-largest foreign oil supplier to the United States in 2011 (accounting for 9% of U.S. crude imports) to the 10th in 2014 (accounting for less than 1% of U.S. crude imports). The growth in U.S. light, sweet crude oil production from the Bakken and Eagle Ford has resulted in a sizable decline in U.S. imports of crude grades of similar quality, such as Nigeria’s crude oil.

As U.S. imports of Nigerian oil decreased over the past few years, European imports increased. European imports of Nigerian crude and condensate increased year-over-year by more than 40% in 2011 and by 30% in 2012, making Europe the largest regional importer of Nigerian oil by far. The European embargo on Iranian crude imports and sporadic supply disruptions in Libya contributed to Europe’s increased oil imports from Nigeria.

Oil consumption and refining

Nigeria has a crude oil distillation capacity of 445,000 bbl/d. Despite having a refinery nameplate capacity that exceeds domestic demand, the country must import petroleum because refinery utilization rates are low.

Nigeria consumed 305,000 bbl/d of petroleum in 2014. The country has four oil refineries (Port Harcourt I and II, Warri, and Kaduna) with a combined crude oil distillation capacity of 445,000 bbl/d, according to OGJ.¹⁵ The refineries chronically operate below full capacity because of operational failures, fires, and sabotage mainly on the crude pipelines feeding the refineries. The combined refinery utilization rate was 22% in 2013.¹⁶ As a result, the country must import petroleum, although its refinery nameplate capacity exceeds domestic demand. Nigeria imported 164,000 bbl/d of petroleum products in 2013.¹⁷

For several years, the Nigerian government has planned the construction of new refineries, but the lack of financing and government policies on fuel subsidies have caused delays. A Nigerian company, the Dangote Group, plans to construct a $11 billion, 500,000 bbl/d refinery near Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city. Plans for the refinery complex include petrochemical and fertilizer plants. The refinery is expected to come online by mid-2018.¹⁸ If the refinery is built, it will be the largest in Africa.

A controversial component of the draft PIB is the potential plan to privatize the refining sector and liberalize domestic fuel prices by removing subsidies. There was a proposal to the federal government to privatize the refining sector in late 2013, but the federal government did not approve it. The country’s two main oil workers unions had threatened to go on strike if the refineries were sold.¹⁹

Fuel subsidies

According to an article from Brookings, Nigeria’s fuel subsidies cost $8 billion in 2011, accounting for 30% of the government’s expenditure, about 4% of GDP, and 118% of the capital budget.²⁰

On January 1, 2012, the Nigerian government removed the federal government fuel subsidy on the grounds that it caused market distortions, encumbered investment in the downstream sector, supported economic inequalities (as rich fuel-importing companies were the main beneficiaries), and created a nebulous channel for fraud. However, the government quickly reversed course about two weeks later and reinstated a partial subsidy as public outcry and massive strikes organized by oil and non-oil unions threatened to shut down oil production. Many Nigerians consider the fuel subsidy a key benefit of living in the oil-rich country.

Controversy over Nigeria’s fuel subsidy program resurfaced shortly after the partial removal, and there have been government-led investigations into corruption and mismanagement. A report by a Presidential Commission put the revenue losses associated with embezzlement and mismanagement of the fuel subsidy program at about $1.1 billion.²¹ Tensions between Nigerian fuel importers and the government were also high because the government launched an investigation of the industry to mitigate subsidy mismanagement. The investigation led to the arrest of several marketers and the suspension of companies that were accused of siphoning funds and inflating prices.

Natural gas

Nigeria is the largest holder of proved natural gas reserves in Africa and the ninth-largest holder in the world. Nigeria produced 1.35 Tcf of dry natural gas in 2013, ranking among the world’s top 30 largest natural gas producers. Natural gas production is constrained by the lack of infrastructure to monetize natural gas that is currently being flared.

Nigeria had an estimated 180 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proved natural gas reserves as of January 2015, according to OGJ, making Nigeria the ninth-largest natural gas reserve holder in the world and the largest in Africa.²² Despite holding a global top-10 position for proved natural gas reserves, Nigeria produced 1.35 Tcf of dry natural gas in 2013, ranking among the world’s top 30 largest natural gas producers. Natural gas production is constrained by the lack of infrastructure to monetize natural gas that is currently being flared. Most natural gas reserves are located in the Niger Delta. The natural gas industry is also affected by the same security and regulatory issues that affect the oil industry.

Dry natural gas production in Nigeria grew for most of the past decade until Shell declared a force majeure on natural gas supplies to the Soku gas-gathering and condensate plant in November 2008. The Soku plant provides a substantial amount of feed gas to Nigeria’s sole LNG facility. Shell shut down the plant to repair damages to a pipeline connected to the Soku plant that was sabotaged by local groups siphoning condensate. The plant reopened nearly five months later, but it was shut down again for most of 2009 for operational reasons. As a result, the plant’s closure led to a reduction in Nigeria’s natural gas production, particularly from Shell’s fields in the Niger Delta, and a decline in LNG exports in 2009. Natural gas production gradually grew after 2009, and it reached its highest level of 1.5 Tcf in 2012. In 2013, production fell by 10% to 1.35 Tcf because of supply disruptions and a temporary blockade on Nigeria’s LNG shipments, which also led to a corresponding fall in exports and, to a lesser extent, domestic consumption. Nigeria consumed 490 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of dry natural gas in 2013, about 36% of its production.

Natural gas flaring

Natural gas flared in Nigeria accounted for 10% of the total amount flared globally in 2011. Gas flaring in Nigeria has decreased in recent years, from 540 Bcf in 2010 to 428 Bcf in 2013. There are a number of recently developed and upcoming natural gas projects that are focused on monetizing the natural gas that is currently flared.

A significant amount of Nigeria’s gross natural gas production is flared (burned off) because some of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the infrastructure needed to capture the natural gas produced with oil, known as associated gas. In 2013, Nigeria flared 428 Bcf of its associated gas production, or 15% of its gross production.²³ According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), natural gas flared in Nigeria accounted for 10% of the total amount flared globally in 2011.²⁴

The amount of gas flared in Nigeria has decreased in recent years, from 540 Bcf in 2010 to 428 Bcf in 2013. According to Shell, one of the largest gas producers in the country, the impediments to decreasing gas flaring have been the security situation in Niger Delta and the lack of partner funding that has slowed progress on projects to capture associated gas. The company recently reported that it was able to reduce the amount of gas it flared in 2012 because of improved security in some Niger Delta areas and stable co-funding from partners, which allowed Shell to install new gas-gathering facilities and repair existing facilities damaged during the militant crisis of 2006 to 2009. Shell also plans to develop the Forcado Yokri Integrated Project and the Southern Swamp Associated Gas Gathering Project to reduce gas flaring.²⁵

The Nigerian government has been working to end gas flaring for several years, but the deadline to implement the policies and fine oil companies has been repeatedly postponed, with the most recent deadline being December 2012. In 2008, the Nigerian government developed a Gas Master Plan that promoted investment in pipeline infrastructure and new gas-fired power plants to help reduce gas flaring and provide more gas to fuel much-needed electricity generation. However, progress is still limited because security risks in the Niger Delta have made it difficult for IOCs to construct infrastructure that would support gas monetization.

Gas-to-liquids (TL)

A Chevron-operated Escravos GTL project is currently underway, albeit about a decade behind schedule. Chevron (75%) and NNPC (25%) are jointly developing the $10 billion facility. Sasol Chevron, a joint venture between South Africa’s Sasol and Chevron, provided technical expertise to design and develop the GTL plant. The project started small-scale production in mid-2014, but full production is expected to start in mid-2015.²⁶ The project will convert 325 MMcf/d of natural gas into 33,200 bbl/d of liquids, principally synthetic diesel for cars and trucks.²⁷

LNG and pipeline exports

Nigeria exported about 800 Bcf of LNG in 2013, accounting for about 7% of globally traded LNG and ranking Nigeria among the world’s top five LNG exporters. Japan is the largest importer of Nigerian LNG and received 23% of the total in 2013.

Nigeria exports the vast majority of its natural gas in the form of LNG, and a small amount is exported via the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) to nearby countries. The pipeline was shut down from August 2012 to July 2013 for repairs after it had been severed by a ship’s anchor in the Togolese waters. As a result, natural gas exports via WAGP fell from 29 Bcf in 2011 to 14 Bcf in 2012, but recovered to 21 Bcf in 2013, according to Cedigaz data.²⁸ The WAGP operates at about one-third of its capacity.

Nigeria exported about 800 Bcf of LNG in 2013, ranking Nigeria among the world’s top five LNG exporters, along with Qatar, Malaysia, Australia, and Indonesia.²⁹ Estimates of Nigeria’s LNG exports vary among sources, with the BP 2014 Statistical Review of World Energy placing it at almost 800 Bcf in 2013 and the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin estimating it at 866 Bcf in 2013. Nigeria’s LNG exports accounted for about 7% of globally traded LNG. Japan is the largest importer of Nigerian LNG and imported 23% of the total in 2013, followed by South Korea (17%) and Spain (14%).

Trade patterns for Nigerian LNG have changed over the past few years. Most notably, Nigeria’s LNG exports to Europe have decreased significantly. In 2010, Europe imported about 67% of total Nigerian LNG exports, but in 2013, that share dropped to 31%. Nigeria has increased its LNG exports to Asia, namely Japan, following the Fukushima nuclear incident in March 2011. Japan’s imports of Nigerian LNG were six times the 2010 level by 2013.³⁰

U.S. LNG imports from Nigeria have declined substantially, similar to the trend in U.S. crude oil imports. U.S. imports from Nigeria peaked at 57 Bcf in 2006 and fell to 2 Bcf in 2011, mostly as a result of growing U.S. natural gas production. In 2012, the United States did not import LNG from Nigeria for the first time since 1999. In 2013, the U.S. resumed imports from Nigeria, receiving 2.5 Bcf of LNG.

Bonnny LNG facility

The Nigeria’s LNG facility on Bonny Island is Nigeria’s only operating LNG plant. It is operated by Nigeria LNG Limited (NLNG) and its partners include NNPC (49%), Shell (25.6%), Total (15%), and Eni (10.4%).³¹ NLNG currently has six liquefaction trains with a production capacity of 22 million tons per year (1,056 Bcf/y) of LNG and 4 million tons per year (80,000 bbl/d) of liquefied petroleum gas. A seventh train is planned to increase the facility’s LNG capacity to more than 30 million tons per year (1,440 Bcf/y).³²

Planned: Brass LNG facility

Brass LNG Limited, a consortium made up of NNPC, Total, and Eni, is developing the Brass LNG Liquefaction Complex. ConocoPhillips was a partner in the consortium but divested from the project in mid-2014 and transferred its shareholder interest to the other members.³³ The LNG facility is expected to have two liquefaction trains with a total capacity of 10 million tons per year (480 Bcf/y). The project is in the early engineering phase and is running several years behind schedule.³⁴

West African Gas Pipeline

Nigeria exports a small amount of its natural gas via the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which began commercial operations in 2011. The pipeline is operated by the West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCo), which is owned by Chevron West African Gas Pipeline Limited (36.9%), NNPC (24.9%), Shell Overseas Holdings Limited (17.9%), Takoradi Power Company Limited (16.3%), Societe Togolaise de Gaz (2%), and Societe BenGaz S.A. (2%).³⁵

The 421-mile pipeline carries natural gas from Nigeria’s Escravos region to Togo, Benin, and Ghana, where it is mostly used for power generation. WAGP links into the existing Escravos-Lagos pipeline and moves offshore at an average water depth of 35 meters. The pipeline has the nameplate capacity to export 170 MMcf/d (62 Bcf/y) of natural gas,³⁶ although it’s actual throughput is about one-third of its capacity. In 2013, Nigeria exported 21 Bcf through the WAGP, according to Cedigaz.³⁷

Proposed: Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline

Nigeria and Algeria have proposed plans to construct the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP). The 2,500-mile pipeline would carry natural gas from oil fields in Nigeria’s Delta region to Algeria’s Beni Saf export terminal on the Mediterranean Sea and is designed to supply gas to Europe. In 2009, NNPC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Sonatrach, the Algerian national oil company, to proceed with plans to develop the pipeline. Several national and international companies have shown interest in the project, including Total and Gazprom. Security concerns along the entire pipeline route, increasing costs, and ongoing regulatory and political uncertainty in Nigeria have continued to delay this project.

Electricity

Nigeria has one of the lowest rates of net electricity generation per capita in the world. Electricity generation falls short of demand, resulting in load shedding, blackouts, and a reliance on private generators.

Nigeria’s generation capacity was 6,090 megawatts (MW) in 2012, of which 3,960 MW (65%) was from fossil fuel sources, 2,040 MW (33%) was from hydro sources, 88 MW from biomass and waste (1%), and 2 MW (<1%) from wind. Net electricity generation falls well below capacity and was 27 billion kilowatthours (3,080 MW) in 2012, or nearly half of capacity. Nigeria’s power sector suffers from poor maintenance of electricity facilities, natural gas supply shortages, and an inadequate transmission and distribution network. Only 41% of Nigerians have access to electricity and actual electricity demand in Nigeria is estimated at 10,000 MW.³⁸

Nigeria has one of the lowest rates of net electricity generation per capita in the world. Those with access to electricity face load shedding, blackouts, and a reliance on private generators. According to a 2010 Harvard paper, more than 30% of electricity is produced by inefficient private generators.³⁹ Businesses often purchase costly generators to use as back-up power supply during outages. Most Nigerians use off-grid traditional biomass and waste, such as wood, charcoal, and animal dung, to fulfill household energy needs, such as cooking and heating.

On November 1, 2013, Nigeria’s federal government officially sold almost all of its successor electricity generation companies (GenCos) and distribution companies (DisCos) to private owners. The privatization was part of a power sector reform initiated by the 2005 Electric Power Sector Reform Act, which called for the unbundling of the state-owned Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), which oversaw the GenCos and DisCos. The private companies that purchased the GenCos and DisCos took physical ownership of the generation and distribution infrastructure and the responsibility of improving/repairing the system. Five of six GenCos and ten of eleven DisCos sold, while the remaining two successor companies will go under Nigeria’s state-owned Transmission Company, which will remain under the federal government’s control.

The federal government is in the process of selling 10 natural gas-fired power plants that are a part of the National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP). NIPP was established in 2004 by the Nigerian government as a plan to construct multiple natural gas-fired power plants using natural gas that was flared. However, there is a shortage of natural gas supply for power generation in Nigeria because it competes with exports, and it is more profitable for producers to export the gas rather than selling it to the domestic market for a lower price. This has affected the state’s ability to sell the NIPP plants.

Nigeria has set ambitious goals to increase generation capacity. Nigeria plans to increase generation from fossil-fuel sources to more than 20,000 MW by 2020. Nigeria plans to increase hydroelectricity generation capacity to 5,690 MW by 2020, almost tripling the capacity from the 2012 level. The country plans to upgrade current hydroelectricity plants and construct new plants: Gurara II (360 MW), Zungeru (700 MW), and Mambilla (3,050 MW).⁴⁰ In late 2013, the Nigerian government announced a $1.3 billion deal with China to build the 700-MW Zungeru hydropower project. The Export-Import Bank of China will cover 75% of the cost, and the Nigerian government will finance the remaining amount. The project was initially scheduled to be completed in 2017, but that date has been pushed back because of legal challenges that have delayed construction work.⁴¹

Notes:

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of February 27, 2015.
• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

Endnotes:
¹Secretariat of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Nigeria facts and figures, accessed January 2015.
²International Monetary Fund, Nigeria, IMF Country Report No. 14/103, (April 2014), page 10 and 25.
³International Monetary Fund, Nigeria, IMF Country Report No. 14/103, (April 2014), page 5.
⁴African Development Fund, “Project Appraisal Report: Partial Risk Guarantee in Support of the Power Sector Privatizations,” (December 2013), page 8.
⁵Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Group, About NNPC, accessed January 2015.
⁶The Petroleum Regulatory Agency of Nigeria, About Us, accessed January 2015.
⁷Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, (January 1, 2015).
⁸Chatham House, “Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil,” Chapter 1 and 3, (September 2013).
⁹Ibid.
¹⁰United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland,” (2011).
¹¹Reuters, “Oil tankers run gauntlet in Nigeria’s pirate alley,” (February 5, 2015).
¹²Global Risk Insights, “Piracy in West Africa targets the region’s oil industry,” (December 27, 2014).
¹³Reuters, “Oil tankers run gauntlet in Nigeria’s pirate alley,” (February 5, 2015).
¹⁴United Nation’s Operational Satellite Applications Program,UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy, (2014).
¹⁵Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Refining, (January 2015).
¹⁶Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Annual Statistics Bulletin, (2013).
¹⁷Secretariat of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014, page 59.
¹⁸Bloomberg Business, “Dangote Says Nigeria Lagos Refinery to start by mid- 2018,” (November 17, 2014).
¹⁹Platts, “Nigerian government did not approve oil refineries privatization plan: report,” (January 3, 2014).
²⁰Brookings, “Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma,” (January 10, 2012).
²¹Bloomberg Business, “Oil’s Slump Gives Nigeria Chance to End $7-Billion Subsidy,” (December 23, 2014).
²²Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, (January 1, 2015).
²³Secretariat of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014, page 31.
²⁴National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Estimated Flared Volumes from Satellite Data.
²⁵Royal Dutch Shell, Annual Reports, (2012 and 2013).
²⁶Reuters, Sasol says Nigeria gas-to-liquids plant producing by mid-2015,” (November 6, 2014).
²⁷Chevron, Nigeria Portfolio, Exploration and Production, (May 2014).
²⁸Cedigaz, Statistical Database, 2013.
²⁹BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, Excel workbook of historical data, 2014.
³⁰Ibid.
³¹Nigeria LNG Limited (NLNG), Shareholders, accessed February 2015.
³²Nigeria LNG Limited (NLNG), Our LNG: commercial capacity, accessed February 2015.
³³LNG World News, “ConocoPhillips exits Brass LNG project,” (July 30, 2014).
³⁴Total, The Brass LNG Project (Nigeria), accessed February 2015.
³⁵West Africa Gas Pipeline Company limited (WAPCo), Company Profile, accessed February 2015.
³⁶West Africa Gas Pipeline Company limited (WAPCo), The Pipeline System, accessed February 2015.
³⁷Cedigaz, Statistical Database, 2013.
³⁸African Development Fund, “Project Appraisal Report: Partial Risk Guarantee in Support of the Power Sector Privatizations,” (December 2013), pages 1-8.
³⁹Harvard, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, “Nigeria: The Next Generation Report,” (October 2010), PGDA Working Paper No. 62, page 47.
⁴⁰Nigeria’s Presidential Task Force on Power, Roadmap for Power Sector Reform, (August 2013), page 24.
⁴¹HydroWorld.com, “Nigeria’s US$1.3 billion 700-MW Zungeru hydroelectric project deals with challenges,” (December 12, 2014).

Figures and table sources:
Table 1. Planned liquid fuels projects in Nigeria. Project name and peak production: Chevron, Nigeria Portfolio, Exploration and Production, (May 2014); ExxonMobil, Financial & Operating Review 2013, page 25; Royal Dutch Shell, Annual Reports, (2012 and 2013); Total, The Egina Project (Nigeria), accessed February 2015; Oil & Gas Journal, Major Upstream Projects, (October 1, 2012).

Table 2. Planned natural gas projects in Nigeria. Project name and peak production: Chevron, Nigeria Portfolio, Exploration and Production, (May 2014); ExxonMobil, Financial & Operating Review 2013, page 25; Royal Dutch Shell, Annual Reports, (2012 and 2013).

Figure 1. Nigeria’s total primary energy consumption, 2012. Traditional solid biomass and waste data: International Energy Agency, World Energy Statistics.

Figure 3. Nigeria’s crude oil and condensate exports, by destination, 2014 and Table 5. Nigeria’s crude and condensate exports, by region: Lloyd’s List Intelligence, APEX tanker data, accessed February 2015.

Figure 6. Nigeria’s dry natural gas production and consumption. Natural gas production and consumption estimates, 2010-13: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014. Secretariat of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014, pages 30-31.

Figure 7. Nigeria’s exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), by destination, 2013. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, Excel workbook of historical data, 2014.

The post Nigeria Energy Profile: Largest Oil Producer In Africa – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

No matter how one cuts it, slices it, dices it, phrases it, parses it, Debaltseve was an ignominious defeat for Kiev. Whether we believe the separatist version of 3000 Ukraine government troops surrendering with all their equipment, or Mr. Poroshenko’s claim of an orderly fall back to a better strategic location for any future hostilities, the fact remains Debaltsevo — the name’s Russian ending seems more appropriate now — was a vital railroad junction needed to hold the separatist areas together.

Mr. Putin with his enigmatic smile, must be pleased as Punch as to the way things have turned out in Ukraine. It is a bankrupt state and he wanted nothing to do with it. The IMF has released the first tranche of a $17.5 billion loan with $40 billion to come. Russia is getting paid by Ukraine for its gas — $2 billion in the first installment. From its vantage point, what could be better? It has Crimea; its Sevastopol naval base is secure; and the industrial heart of Ukraine (on which the economy relied) is now within its ambit. The West has on its hands a basket case. Now who could have thought up the Ukraine adventure?

A mix of European majors’ greed — bring in Ukraine to sell to — and American expansionism — missiles on Russia’s doorstep to neuter them militarily in addition to economically. Well, Russia can easily divert its gaze from Europe; it has a ready market in a fast-growing China hungry for its oil and gas — a country that is already the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power-parity terms and will soon be so in absolute dollars.

Looking around, it is difficult to see any foreign policy success. Afghanistan is in a mess with civilian deaths from violence soaring. How stable can it be when a complete US withdrawal is unlikely in the near term? In Iraq, it is back again openly from the air, with war authorization for ground forces pending in Congress. Libya has two governments and has exported Islamic radicalism south as far down as Nigeria. South America? Problems with Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina … ; Central America is a mess except for Nicaragua that successfully withstood the US. Honduras tried for a time with elected President Jose Manuel Zelaya, who tried modest social change asking for support at the beginning of this administration. Instead, he was ousted in a coup. No wonder children are streaming out of Central America to escape the hell created there.

Five trillion wasted in Iraq and a country destroyed. One trillion in Afghanistan, in a backwater where no one knows why the US invaded. Almost anyone with a questioning brain knew there were no WMDs in Iraq. And what if there were? How did they endanger the US, or even Israel with its massive nuclear retaliation capability? By the way, does Israel feel safer with IS? — especially when it starts to recruit from the almost marginalized Israeli Arabs.

Imagine a world where these trillions could have been used for genuine help to make lives better. That would be dreaming. Instead we have six million refugees from Iraq and Syria, millions from Afghanistan, Libyans leaving their country in droves and hundreds of thousands displaced in Ukraine.

The dreams become a nightmare when politicians come up with proposals to punish the weakest in US society — cuts in Social Security pensions, SSI, Medicare, Medicaid. All the while, the defense budget and military expenditures continue to soar over made-up threats and wars of choice — wars that have consistently increased terrorism especially in the hapless targeted countries.

It is said the measure of a civilized society is how it treats its weakest.

The post Driving Russia Into China’s Arms And Other US Failures – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.