By the time Putin has accomplished what Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and China’s Deng Xiaoping did — setting up an orderly political succession system for nourishing authoritarian governance — the West has to re-calculate how they could cope with Russia and China simultaneously.

One of the seldom-mentioned masteries of Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015) [Note 1] is that after 31 years in service as the merciless founder and captain of Singapore, he had structured an intra-party succession system to make his signature steering style sustainable. Goh Chok Tong, hand-picked by Lee, took up the Prime Minister post in 1990 and did not derive any one inch from Lee’s ideological contrivance during his 14-year tenure. For example, Goh made it crystal clear that Singapore should not be ashamed of “low rank for press freedom”. Although Singapore is a close ally of the United States, it was ranked the 150th out of 180 in Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index 2014 (Russia 148th, China 175th ), and the 152th out of 197 in FreedomHouse’s Global Press Freedom Rankings 2014 (Russia 176th , China 183th ) [Note 2].

Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. Photo Credit: USGov-Military, Wikipedia Commons.

In 2004, Goh passed on the baton to his mentor’s son — Lee Hsien Loong — who still rules the state with an iron fist. True, Lee Kuan Yew passed away but his paternal governance is here to stay very much alive in this city-state which has one of the world’s highest GDP per capita at US$55,182 in 2013 (USA $53,042, Japan $38,633, Germany $46,268) [Note 3]. Few analysts reckon that a fundamental change is underway. What it means, at least to the journalists and tourists, is that they must be aware of caning as a legal whipping penalty as well as banning of chewing gum. Despite numerous challenges arising in this digital age, Lee’s political succession system works like elixir to ensure that, generation after generation, only those selected elites who are committed to administering his creed can sit in the ministry offices.

At almost the same time when Lee Kuan Yew paved the way for Goh in 1989/90, Deng Xiaoping (1904-97) passed on his power status to Jiang Zemin and erected his own system for intra-party succession, Jiang followed Deng’s instruction to hand over his official authority to Hu Jintao in 2002. In 2012/3, Xi Jiping took over smoothly from Hu and became the head of the third generation Politburo teams after Deng. Despite all sorts of forecasts that the communist regime would collapse “very soon”, Xi is now busy with laying the foundation of a multi-polar world by, for example and the most recently, inviting such nations as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Russia and Vietnam to join his Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank [Note 4] .

Singapore since 1955 and China since 1987 have demonstrated that authoritarian governance with an orderly political succession system has been able to, like it or note, implement long term policies without disruption caused by a particular leader’s death or downfall, thus giving rise to a new species of powers in the world arena.

Vladimir Putin (1952-) has been widely criticized for all his aggressive moves in, just name a few, Russo-Georgian War 2008 and the ongoing Ukraine secession crisis but the fact that he took the risk to let Dmitry Medvedev (1965-) complete the tenure as the Russian President for 2008-12 is an indication that he is neither Stalin nor Mao nor Tito who all refused to leave the office until death. However disingenuous he may be, Putin has shown his capability of knowing when to proceed and when to stop. It would not be a surprise to see Putin step down from the presidency in 2020 at the age of 68. Both Lee and Deng remained influential after official retirement and Putin will definitely be no exception. Nevertheless, it could be the beginning of a new post-strong-man era which would reveal its time horizon differences from the notorious personal life-long dictatorships in the past.

Alongside Medvedev, Vladislav Surkov (1964-), Vasily G Yakemenko (1971-) who heads Nashi (a youth movement), and even young female Alena Arshinova (1985-) who leads the Young Guard of the ruling party United Russia are all hard-liners getting prepared to carry on Putin’s determination, either on stage or behind the scene, to “restore the glory to Russia” [Note 5]. Given the feasible tactics showing how Lee’s People’s Action Party (PAP) could monopolize the Singaporean parliament for more than 60 years through censorship and gerrymandering, it is not impossible for the United Russia to duplicate PAP’s success in maintaining majority control over State Duma for decades to come. In other words, from a longer time horizon to see this Eurasia power, Putin and his successors have the potential of strengthening Russia to the extent that its neighboring countries would become untouchable by the NATO.

For sure, the predictions on all sorts of collapses in Singapore, China and Russia and the deliberations on how threatening and evil these “un-free” states are will continue to circulate. Nonetheless, without acknowledging the cultural developments and the unprecedented strengths of the new political succession system evolving among the descendents of Tsar Peter the Great and Huangdi respectively, policy makers and congressmen in the West may continue to be riveted at deploying military means, thus overlooking the need of taking a long time (in terms of hundreds of years) for other countries to comprehend their Enlightenment concepts such as political equality and trias politica. A better alternative to pointing a gun to force another civilization to respect human rights is, through more cultural exchanges, to present yourself as a good role model to these non-American or non-Christian nations who simply want to emulate the West rather than conquer the world.

This article was first published by Foreign Policy In Focus on Apr 2, 2015.

[Note 1]
AFP, Grateful Singapore gives Lee Kuan Yew a hero’s funeral, Mar 30, 2015.

http://news.yahoo.com/singapore-honours-lee-elaborate-state-funeral-232512712.html

[Note 2]
RedOrbit, Singapore not ashamed of low rank for press freedom, Oct 31, 2005.

http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/290904/singapore_not_ashamed_of_low_rank_for_press_freedom/

Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2014.

http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php

Freedom House, Press Freedom Rankings.

https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2014/press-freedom-rankings#.VRUA62AfqM8

http://cf.datawrapper.de/s4MnR/6/

[Note 3]
World Bank, Data: GDP per capita (current US$).

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD

[Note 4]
Wikipedia, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Infrastructure_Investment_Bank

[Note 5]
New York Times, Putin Wants ‘Glory to Russia’, Sep 20, 2012.

http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/05/how-powerful-is-russia/putin-wants-glory-to-russia

The Guardian, Vladimir Putin: ‘We have won. Glory to Russia.’, Mar 4, 2012.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/04/vladimir-putin-won-russia

The post Putin Ensuring Authoritarian Governance With An Orderly Political Succession – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Musa al-Gharbi

Iran’s nuclear program founded in 1957 as part of U.S. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative. As part of this deal, the United States helped provide the training, technology and infrastructure allowing Iran to become a nuclear power. It was America that built Iran’s first nuclear reactor in 1967, subsequently providing them with the highly-enriched uranium to power it.

Soon thereafter, Iran began researching how to weaponize the technology. Ironic from today’s vantage point, Israel played a pivotal role in helping Tehran develop this capacity–much to the chagrin of the United States at the time. Washington would soon see further “Atoms for Peace” investments in India, Pakistan and Israel translated into weapons programs—with these latter three successfully obtaining the bomb, refusing in the interim to sign onto the U.S.-sponsored Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Reza Shah did sign onto the treaty in 1968, although this did not end his ambition for weaponized nuclear capacity. Instead, his quest was terminated by the 1979 Islamic Revolution which drove the U.S. proxy from power.

Iran’s new religious leadership affirmed the NPT signed by the deposed dictator, with Ayatollah Khomeini disparaging nuclear weapons as haram–a fatwa reiterated and expanded in 2005 by Khomeini’s successor and current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

However, Western leaders distrusted Iran’s religious government, and have from the outset sought to contain or even overthrow the Islamic Republic. Iran’s nuclear program became the primary means of justifying these ambitions in 1995 when, as a result of extensive lobbying by AIPAC, the United States first declared Iran’s nuclear program as a national security threat and priority.

Since that time, much of the intelligence supposed to demonstrate Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has been falsified and heavily politicized—even to the point where the IAEA has recently initiated an extensive review of their past reports on Iran’s nuclear program, worried that key evidence provided to the agency by Israel and Iran may have been tampered with or be otherwise unreliable. The organization has not been able to substantiate that the Islamic Republic has ever had a nuclear weapons program.

Even U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies, who endorse (and generally provided) this intelligence are in agreement that the suspected nuclear weapons program has been inactive for more than a decade, with no evidence that the Islamic Republic intends to “sprint” for the bomb in the foreseeable future. Instead, all parties agree that Iran has been fully compliant with the terms of the nuclear negotiations entered into in 2013.

But goal from West is to prevent Iran from having the means to obtain nuclear weapons in the event that these internal dynamics shift—principally by gaining increased transparency of Iranian operations and facilities, while limiting/ restructuring the program to ensure a 1-year “breakout time,” allowing the U.S. and its allies ample room to detect and deter or forcibly interrupt such a pursuit until such a time as Iran has built enough trust to put the international community at ease about its intentions.

Why Does Iran Want Nuclear Power?

Critics of Iran often wonder why Iran is pursuing nuclear technology so doggedly, if their intentions are strictly peaceful, given the country’s extensive fossil-fuel resources which render nuclear power superfluous in their estimation.

There are a number of reasons:

First, Iran’s nuclear program has become an important focal point of national pride. The aforementioned NPT affirms it as a right for all signatories to enrich uranium and develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. And given that, as we have explored, critics have failed to demonstrate that Iran’s nuclear weapons program is anything but peaceful—Iranians believe that it is the U.S. and its allies who are violating international norms and laws by carrying out hostile actions against a non-aggressor state with the express aim of undermining said nation’s rights and sovereignty.

But there are pragmatic dimensions as well.

Iran is a fossil-fuel superpower, possessing more than 10% of the world’s total proven oil reserves, 15% of its natural gas reserves, and 1.9 billion short-tonnes of coal reserves. However, these “dirty” energy sources are increasingly subject to regulations and fees aimed at limiting and reducing their use; much of the world is increasingly moving off of fossil fuels to renewables, and seeking to dramatically increase fuel efficiency in the interim.

While there will be increased energy demands in the developing world in the coming years, China is increasingly committed to reducing its carbon footprint as well. While energy producers may continue to sell fossil fuels to other developing nations, it will likely be at a much lower price.

This is in part because, even as demand for fossil-fuels is set to decline across the richest countries, the supply is expanding dramatically: the United States has dramatically ramped up its energy production and exports (to include becoming a net-exporter of petroleum); there may be a similar shale-boom coming in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Oil from Libya and Iraq would make a huge impact on global supplies if and when those countries become more fully-operational.

So betting on nuclear over fossil fuels is an attempt to be on the right side of dynamics in the energy market–especially given that oil prices are already painfully low, to the point of destabilization, for those nations whose economies rely principally on the sale of these fuels.

Diversifying Iran’s energy portfolio is also a means of ensuring that they will be able to continue selling fossil fuels down the line. For instance, due to increased urbanization and other trends, not only will Saudi Arabia not be able to continue to sell oil indefinitely, they are projected to become an oil importer by 2030; domestic demand will exceed production. And because the entire Saudi economy is premised on oil sales, it is not clear how the economy will continue to function once the country burns through its (admittedly immense) monetary reserves.

An integrated Iran would likely see a similar boom in domestic energy use. By using nuclear energy to offset increased local demand, Iran would protect its ability to continue selling fossil fuels internationally over the medium-to-long term.

There are also myriad other important but peaceful applications of nuclear technology in the domains of medicine, industry and agriculture. In short, Iran has a legitimate stake in nuclear power, and they argue, a legitimate right to develop it.

Source:
This article was published by SISMEC, which may be found here.

The post Critical Context On Iran’s Nuclear Program – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A U.S.-Iran rapprochement increasingly became a reality when the five United Nations permanent members and Germany (P5+1) agreed to a tentative framework on Tehran’s nuclear program on 2 April 2015. While welcoming the deal, Russia declared the possibility of selling S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran if sanctions against its regional ally were lifted. These actions betray Moscow’s growing concerns over the changing geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. By contrast, warming relations with Tehran would allow the U.S. to decrease its regional engagement and deepen its growing security commitment to the Ukrainian crisis. Moscow has already been trying to forestall such eventualities but can do little to challenge Washington’s burgeoning security engagement in and around Ukraine.

A U.S.-Iran rapprochement would undermine Russia’s regional strategy. From Moscow’s perspective, a U.S. that is bogged down in the Middle East would be favorable. Therefore, Iran was a critical regional ally in influencing Washington’s two-front wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the emerging U.S.-Iran rapprochement could sound the death knell for the Moscow-Tehran alliance. Moreover, Russia’s tense relations with Sunni countries, especially Saudi Arabia, would limit Moscow’s ability to find Iran’s regional replacement. If sanctions are lifted, Russia could sell S-300 missiles to Iran to sow seeds of regional tensions. Nevertheless, the elimination of sanctions would also allow Tehran to enjoy access to the global hydrocarbon market and even emerge as Russia’s energy competitor. Countries in Russia’s peripheries, particularly Turkey and Central Asian nations, would be interested in leveraging Iran’s potential as a regional economic hub to hedge against Moscow’s influence.

More significantly, a détente with Tehran would allow the U.S. to redistribute its resources to the Ukrainian crisis from the Middle East. In fact, on the eve of the Iranian nuclear deal, this trajectory already became clear as the U.S. confined its role to logistical support to the ongoing Saudi-led airstrikes against Yemen’s al-Houthi forces. By contrast, the Ukrainian crisis has led the U.S. to contain Russia by increasingly organizing an anti-Russian front stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. This emerging alliance is increasingly taking on a security dimension as the U.S. continues to provide military support and conduct joint exercises in and around Ukraine. A U.S.-Iran rapprochement could further boost Washington’s military involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, including the possibility of providing arms to Kiev.

Despite its attempts, Moscow will remain constrained in its ability to prevent the growing U.S. military presence in Russia’s eastern periphery. Since the Ukrainian crisis in early 2014, Russia has been boosting its efforts to distract Washington’s attention away from Kiev by forging long-term energy relations with various countries, including China. However, the Kremlin’s pinching economy led to the cancellation of South Stream in December 2014, boding ill for the country’s ability to complete proposed energy projects, such as the $46 billion Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline to China. More significantly, Moscow’s sustained ability to manage the Ukrainian crisis is increasingly questionable. Uncertainties grew as to the Russian president Vladimir Putin’s political power within the Kremlin after his 10-day absence from the public view shortly after Boris Nemtsov’s murder on 27 February 2015.

The latest Iranian nuclear deal increasingly points to a Washington-Tehran détente. This emerging reality challenges Moscow’s regional strategy in the Middle East as well as its future ability to manage the Ukrainian crisis. Russia will likely continue to distract U.S. attention from Ukraine. Nevertheless, Moscow’s options are limited in the face of growing U.S. military presence in its eastern periphery.

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By Zaur Shiriyev*

Following the recent (March 4) visit to Ankara by his counterpart from Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a trilateral mechanism on energy issues between Turkey, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. He specifically noted that the three countries share a vision of transferring Turkmenistani natural gas to Europe via Turkey. This announcement reopened discussions on the practical possibilities for the realization of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP). When the three countries’ foreign ministers met in Ashgabat in January 2015, the Azerbaijani and Turkish sides reportedly invited Turkmenistan to join the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) project.

Analysis

The European Union has voiced support for the Trans- Caspian Pipeline since 2011 in particular, hoping that its realization will reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian gas. Russian and Iranian opposition to the Trans- Caspian Pipeline remains strong, and Turkmenistan has not yet declared whether it believes trilateral energy cooperation offers the way forward for realizing the TCP.

However, recent regional and international developments have influenced Ashgabat’s calculations, and emphasized the need for close cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Within the trilateral format, both Azerbaijan and Turkey see broader opportunities for cooperation with Turkmenistan, and this format has worked effectively over the course of the last year.

From Turkmenistan’s point of view, Gazprom’s declaration that it would cut its imports by nearly two-thirds—to 4 billion cubic meters (bcm)—has serious implications. The Russian financial crisis and decline in oil prices has had a direct impact on Turkmenistan’s internal market; notably, it has devalued its currency by 19 percent versus the dollar. These various factors have strengthened Ashgabat’s motivations for seeking alternative markets for its gas.

But Turkmenistan’s traditional approach to pipeline politics—that of “zero financial burden, hun- dred percent effectiveness”—remains unchanged, and so Ashgabat is interested in exporting to markets through existing pipelines or where there are opportunities for expansion, like with the China route. Despite Ashgabat’s dissatisfaction with Gazprom’s decision to cut gas imports, after twenty years of neutrality, Turkmenistan’s approach is unlikely to change; it will almost certainly maintain political sensitivity in its approach toward Moscow. This is particularly important given the broader atmosphere of confrontation between Russia and the West. Ashgabat is highly unlikely to actively support the European Union’s energy diversification strategy, as this would contradict the strongly business-based approach of the Turkmenistani leadership toward gas politics.

On the other hand, in the last year, Turkmenistan has become much more aware of the opportunities on the Turkish market, both in and of itself, and as a conduit to the European market, in terms of diversifying gas exports. Erdogan’s visit to Ashgabat last November saw the signing of a framework agreement for bilateral energy cooperation, details of which have not been made public, and since then, the prospects of exporting Turkmen gas to European market have increased. Notably, by joining TANAP, Turkmenistan does not necessarily commit to exporting its gas via Iranian or Azerbaijani territory. In both directions there are problems both in terms of infrastructure and market. The Azerbaijani route requires the construction of the TCP, and there is no existing infrastructure inside Iran that would allow the transfer of Turkmenistani gas to Turkey’s borders.

Moreover, Azerbaijan is primarily interested in selling its gas to European markets. Prior to the decision between the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Nabucco-West for the transfer of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Phase 2 gas to Europe, gas from Turkmenistan was intended to increase the scope of the project and attract investment from European energy firms. Today, however—without underestimating its value— Turkmenistani gas no longer plays a significant functional role in relation to TANAP and TAP. And in the Iranian direction, there is no existing pipeline to export huge volumes of Turkmenistan’s gas to Turkey. With the partial normalization of relations with EU countries, Tehran is looking to export its gas to the European market, and in that respect, Turkmenistan could be a competitor. Thus, while Turkey’s aim is to become an energy hub, politically speaking Ankara is not declaring any preference for or putting political support behind exports of Turkmenistani gas through Turkish territory.

Nonetheless, the trilateral consultation among Azerbaijan’s, Turkmenistan’s and Turkey’s foreign ministers—which in the next stage will involve the presidents—is a major diplomatic achievement by Ankara. Turkey first began political consultations to bring all sides closer together less than a year ago.

The EU has been trying to forge energy cooperation for the TCP between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan since 2011, without result. In fact, Turkey’s idea for trilateral energy consultations dates back to 2008, when Turkey invited both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to cooperate on a drilling project in the Black Sea. Today, there are greater opportunities for cooperation between the three sides’ energy firms than in 2008. Nevertheless, two major barriers remain to translating the idea of energy consultation into practical action on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline.

First, both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are anticipating the results of the next summit between the Caspian heads of state in Astana in 2016, when the legal status of the Caspian Sea will be on the agenda. The fate of the TCP has long been closely linked to this issue. At the 39th meeting of the Working Group on the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, issues related to environmental problems and use of water were agreed between Caspian littoral states, according to the Azerbaijani side. Consensus on environmental issues—raised by Russia and Iran—is key, but in the absence of a signed agreement on the status of the Caspian, the issue remains unresolved. Therefore, neither Azerbaijan nor Turkmenistan is ready for intensive discussions on the TCP in advance of the 2016 Astana summit.

Second, the crucial question of who will undertake the financial burden of the TCP remains unclear to observers. Essentially, Turkmenistan is not interested in shouldering this burden, and since Azerbaijan has already funded major parts of the TANAP and TAP projects, Baku is not especially keen to either. Baku and Ashgabat, though they have never said this officially, are probably expecting the EU to cover the construction cost, given that the construction will serve the EU’s interests. Aspects of the feasibility study for the TCP pipeline were presented at the Turkmen Gas Summit in 2014 (Trans Caspian Pipeline Environmental Overview, accessed March 11), but the precise details of the budget have not been published—though it is likely to be in excess of $3 billion. More importantly, the EU has not made any commitment, without which it will be hard to convince either Baku or Ashgabat.

Conclusion

At first glance, this trilateral energy cooperation does not seem to be directly linked to the TCP, and progress remains suspended until the Astana Summit. However, in the long term, this new format could facilitate an energy dialogue between Baku and Ashgabat. Involvement in joint projects, no matter how small, could be a positive step during this initial stage.

The main challenges in regard to the TCP will be the ongoing Azerbaijani-Turkmen disputes over Caspian oil fields, where there is a long history of conflict. Notably, Turkmenistan lays claim to the Kapyaz oil field, which appears to straddle the median line between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The key question here is whether the construction of a pipeline westward from Turkmenistan across the Caspian to Baku will be sufficient reason for these two parties to reach agreement on ownership of the fields in question.

Last but not least, Iran’s international standing is set to change following the preliminary nuclear agreement with Western countries. In the long term, Tehran can plan for the development of national energy infrastructure and gas exports to Western markets, but this will take at minimum 4-5 years, given that Iran still lacks both technological capacity and the relevant energy infrastructure. Prior to that, the Astana meeting between the heads of the Caspian littoral states in 2016 will mark a crucial moment in terms of revealing whether Iran has changed its position towards the West.

Previously, Tehran’s chief argument against the TCP has been the alleged environmental cost. Therefore, it might be useful to include Iran in trilateral energy meetings; this would be diplomatically effective as well as a good opportunity for the regional countries involved in the talks.

About the author:
*Zaur Shiriyev, senior research fellow at the Caspian Center for Energy and Environment (CCEE) of ADA University, is the author of the policy brief. This is the updated version of article before published at EDM.

Source:
This article was published by CCEE, which may be found here (PDF).

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By Rabia Akhtar*

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a political framework agreement that has been reached between Iran and six major powers including the five permanent nuclear weapons states: U.S., Russia, U.K., France, China plus Germany (together known as P5+1) on April 2, 2015.

The agreement is being hailed as a triumph of international nuclear diplomacy. However, the JCPOA is still not finalized. Between now and June 30th, the details will be further negotiated and then finalized to be implemented in the later part of this year.

What has Iran agreed to? And Why?

Iran has agreed to bring down the number of its centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,104. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium in only one nuclear facility based in Nantanz for the next ten years. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium at 3.67% at this facility for the next fifteen years.

Iran has agreed to allow highly intrusive IAEA inspections, both announced and unannounced at all its nuclear related and R&D facilities for the next twenty five years. Iran has agreed to do all this so that its political and economic isolation could come to an end.
In return, P5+1 have accepted that uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is Iran’s right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus the agreed number of centrifuges must spin.

It was interesting to see the joyous Iranian public out on the streets rejoicing at the prospect of their country’s normalization following the live telecast of President Obama’s speech in Iran but the devil is in the details. In addition to the spinning machines, Iran has been promised that its nuclear and economic sanctions will soon be lifted.

Although P5+1 want to see Iran implement the deal as soon as possible and are eager to see it follow through on the terms of the deal, details on immediate-, short-, medium- and long-term relief from sanctions for Iran are yet to surface. Relief from sanctions was an outstanding issue for the Iranian negotiators and it still remains to be seen whether the Iranians have struck the grand bargain where they are not the only ones at the giving end. While President Obama announced , “If Iran cheats, the world will know it,” the Iranian President Rouhani in his speech also echoed the same but with a warning: if the international community falters on its promises of lifting nuclear and economic sanctions, Iran will not be obliged to keep its end of the bargain.

After the Promise?

The JCPOA is being seen in the U.S. as a triumph of U.S. nuclear diplomacy. However, it is premature to say whether this success will also translate into a long-term victory for the U.S. non-proliferation policy in the Middle East.

By reaching out and negotiating with an adversary with which U.S. diplomatic relations had been in suspension for the past thirty five years and which was tagged as a part of the axis of evil as late as 2002, the Obama administration has walked the extra mile. It has shown the rest of the world and primarily Israel that Iran is neither an existential threat to Israel nor uranium enrichment on Iranian soil a threat to Middle Eastern security and stability. To be honest, there is plenty brewing in that region for which Iranian nuclear ambitions are not to be blamed. However, the important question remains: Is the U.S.-Iranian rapprochement sustainable beyond Obama? While the EU approach towards the Iranian nuclear issue has remained more or less stable over the years, it is the consistency in the U.S. policies towards Iran that the world is worried about and for good reason.

We have witnessed tensions between Netanyahu and Obama over the past several years on the latter’s willingness to accommodate the Iranian point of view. We also witnessed the unprecedented act of letter writing to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran by 47 Republican Senators undermining the negotiation process and basically telling the Iranian leaders not to get too comfortable with any deal signed by the current U.S. president for it can be scrapped ‘with a stroke of a pen’ by the next president. While the Obama administration has dealt with these policy challenges successfully at home and aboard, the promise of a sustainable U.S. foreign policy towards Iran remains weak. Will the axis of evil be revisited once Obama is out of the White House in 2016? If the Republicans come to power, will they be as understanding of the Iranian position as the Democrats have been for the past four years? There are plenty of statements out there by the Republicans wanting to bomb Iran to make us all worry about the prospects of use of force on Iran under some ill-conceived pretext or Israel’s use of force on the post-deal lone Nantanz facility without much repercussions from the international community. These are legitimate concerns which require critical analysis.

Implications for U.S. Non-proliferation Policy in the Middle East

U.S. non-proliferation policy has historically been dictated by its foreign policy and what dictates U.S. foreign policy are the global and regional dynamics which remain ad hoc at best. The U.S. has conveniently been shifting its non-proliferation goalposts to achieve broader foreign policy objectives in regions where countries have had nuclear ambitions. It did so with both Pakistan and India. Let’s take Pakistan for example. Inconsistent application of U.S. non-proliferation laws (Symington, Glenn, Pressler and Solarz) against Pakistan during the course of the latter’s nuclear weapons development from late 1970s until 1998, coincided with the final decades of the Cold War where U.S. needed Pakistan to play proxy.

As quid pro quo the United States deliberately decided to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development. Good for Pakistan I say, but bad for U.S. non-proliferation policy. Pakistan was the NPT outlaw and still is. Same goes for Israel. But not Iran. With Iran the U.S. has established a quid pro quo which is unprecedented. NPT compliant behavior after almost two decades of non-compliance is being forgiven and forgotten on the promise that both sides will keep their word: thou shalt be allowed to enrich uranium in 6,104 centrifuges and your compliance will be rewarded with nuclear cooperation and economic reintegration. This is not to be taken lightly and Iran will make sure that the promises made are kept.

The Iranian nuclear deal with P5+1 binds all countries with audience cost and not just Iran even if it seems that the entire burden of proof or show of commitment rests with Iran. From this point onwards, the U.S. can no longer allow its alliance with Israel or Saudi Arabia to dictate its Middle East policy. And although through this deal, the U.S. has signaled Israel to move on and move forward, it needs to do the same for itself. Faltering on its word after stripping Iran down to a specific number of centrifuges with one functional nuclear facility will not bode well for U.S. non-proliferation policy. Iran is a nuclear threshold state and the nuclear know-how it possesses cannot be reversed or forgotten. It has brilliantly established weaponless deterrence that has allowed Iran to successfully negotiate its foreign policy objectives with the major powers.

One wonders if Iran is even aware of what it has managed to achieve. By striking this deal with P5+1, Iran has not only succeeded to establish parity with Israel’s weaponized nuclear ambivalence through non-weaponized means but it also gets to do the following: keep its centrifuges spinning and continue to enrich uranium on its soil while anticipating the end of its political, economic and nuclear isolation. May this be a stable beginning for all parties involved.

*Rabia Akhtar is a Fulbright Scholar and PhD Candidate in Security Studies at Kansas State University. This piece originally appeared in South Asian Voices

The post Let It Spin: Iranian Nuclear Deal And Implications For US Non-Proliferation Policy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Many Arab and Middle Eastern countries, including Yemen, have been on fire since 2011. The Houthi separatists in Yemen revolted against President Abed Rabou Mansour Hadi and forced him to leave the country. Hadi took refuge in a hideout in Aden, before fleeing to Riyadh, whereas the Houthi rebels have completely captured the capital Sanaa and large part of Yemen. This rebellion was brewing since 2011. It is to be noted that Al Qaeda and other Sunni militants took shelter in Yemen after they were repulsed by the American allied forces from Afghanistan.

Presently, Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen are faced with double challenges of Al Qaeda on one hand and legitimate Yemeni govt. of on the other. Saudi Arabia, along with its Gulf allies like UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, has launched aerial offensive against Houthi rebels and started bombing them. Saudi Arabia claims to have taken this military action in order to protect the UN recognized Yemeni govt. from the assault of Houthi rebels. However, the real motive behind this military assault of Saudi to stop Iran-backed Shia rebels to take control over Yemen, its strategic backyard. It is also noteworthy here that Iran denies Saudi claims that it is providing any type of assistance to Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen.

It is believed that the US has an important role in this indirect confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It’s a matter of thought as to why the Saudis and allies have not taken any action against the Sunni Wahabi ISIS led by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, who is committing heinous crimes against humanity across Syria, Iraq and other countries of middle east and calls for establishment of an ‘Islamic empire’? Why Saudi and allies are not bombing the IS terrorists?

Another noteworthy point is why the US asked Iran for its support to fight against Sunni Wahabi ideology based IS? Two disparate faces of American strategy can be seen in Iraq and Yemen. While in Yemen, it seems to condone the acts of Saudi Arabia against Shia rebels, whereas in Iraq it is seeking support from Iran against IS. While Yemeni rebels are said to have been supported by Tehran, the IS fighters seem to have moral support from Riyadh. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hussain Amir Abdul Lahiyan recently met the UN Secretary General and made an appeal to immediately stop military intervention by Saudi Arabia in Yemen. It has also warned that such uncalculated military actions are not in the interest of Saudi Arabia and this step of Saudi could risk the peace in the entire region. Iranian Minister has demanded that the UN should use its influence in Yemen and ask Riyadh to immediately stop aerial attacks against the rebels.

The American role in Yemen can be gauged from the fact that last days an American media house CNN broadcasted news claiming that Pakistan has joined Saudi Arabia in its aerial offensive to crush Shia rebels in Yemen. 15 of its fighter planes are participating in the aerial attacks. Immediately after the broadcast of this news, the Defence Minister of Pakistan Khwaja Asif denied such reports, calling them baseless and stressed that Pakistan is not a part of Arab military coalition in Yemen. What was the purpose of the CNN to telecast such irresponsible news on behalf of Pakistan? Was that an American attempt to exploit Shia-Sunni divide by showcasing Pakistan in support of Arab countries and against Iran? Yemen’s internal security situation is precarious. If Yemenis themselves couldn’t find a timely solution out of this power struggle, then Yemen is destined to become a rogue state and a battleground for foreign powers. It can’t be ruled out that eventually Yemen may become another Somalia. And if that happens, it will be seen as another successful outcome of American strategy in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is also worried by the softening of American stance vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear programme. It is neither happy with the flexibility in Washington’s policy towards Iran, nor is able to digest American-Iranian cooperation against IS in Iraq. Military intervention in Yemen by Saudi-led coalition is also an outcome of Riyadh’s exasperation against Iran. Another interesting aspect of this entire episode is that even though the Western media is trying to label it as an example of Shia-Sunni tension; many Muslim countries and majority of the Muslims of the world don’t tend to look at it from sectarian angle. A major section of the world’s Sunni population also believes that the Muslims countries should get rid of such rulers who play puppet to America. Such Muslims also favoured the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s stake against American hegemony. The same section of the Muslims was vocal against the cruelty and tyranny of Saddam Hussain, at the same time supporting his stand against the US. This section of Sunni Muslims is certainly against the Arab rulers who are puppets of America. But it has become the need of Arab rulers to adulate Washington in order to save themselves and their dictatorships from internal rebellion. On the other hand, the US, which otherwise pretends to be an advocate of democracy, has turned a blind eye towards tyrant Monarchs and dictatorship in the Arab world.

There is little doubt that had the Muslim world been united and there was mutual trust, then Palestine would have become an independent nation long ago and won’t have to witness Israeli excesses time and again. Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan would neither have been destroyed this way. But, the Muslim countries fell prey to the American great game and started fighting amongst themselves. This Shia-Sunni confrontation in the form of Saudi-Iran standoff is an outcome of the same strategy. It is yet to be seen that for how long the Muslim world plays to the tunes of Uncle Sam.

The post Shia-Sunni Conflict: An Outcome Of American Strategy? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Orsetta Bellani

From their vehicles, tourists stared in awe at the hooded Tzeltal indigenous people, who were sat on the edge of the road that leads to the Agua Azul waterfalls. Their machetes and facemasks were incongruous with the image of a quiet earthly paradise that is promoted by the state government of Chiapas.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) sympathizers from San Sebastián Bachajón were charging tolls and distributing flyers to the tourists. In a statement, they explained their Dec. 21, 2014 decision to retake control of the portion of their ejido (communally-owned land) where the toll booth for access to the waterfalls is located.

“The comisariado ejidal (the ejido administrative official) Alejandro Moreno Gómez does not provide information about the money that comes from paying at the entry or the gravel bank. We want to appoint someone else who can manage the resources that are ours,” explained an ejido member to Latinamerica Press.

On Jan. 9, the farmers were evicted by government order and then, while they were blocking the road, they were attacked by agents of the State Police who fired at them for about 20 minutes. Two people were injured.

In a further attempt to intimidate the residents, on Mar. 21, 600 troops of the public forces, which respond to the orders of Moreno Gómez, according to the ejido members, burned the ejido regional headquarters in San Juan Bajachón, built by the adherents to the EZLN Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (2005) — a statement against the capitalism that “turns everything into merchandise, turns people, nature, culture, history, conscience into merchandise” — near the waterfalls.

“Is demonstrated again the policy of death and corruption of a bad government, its contempt for the people and human rights, because of his ambition on our territory to strip the land, water and everything that exists in our country to make money as if these are merchandise,” denounced the residents.

Attacks against common landowners

Few tourists know that Agua Azul, the location of the beautiful turquoise waterfalls amidst wild vegetation, is one of the most contentious areas of Chiapas. In 2008 the US tourism consulting firms EDSA and Norton Consulting recommended to government authorities to ensure that visitors feel safe and protected in the region.

“The Zapatista movement is still strongly associated with Chiapas,” wrote the consulting firms in a document on the development strategy for the construction of a luxury hotel in the area. “Chiapas is still considered unsafe by many who are not familiar with the region.”

Three years later, on Feb. 2, 2011, 17 tourists who were in Agua Azul had to leave the area by air. That day a pro-government shock troop attacked the Zapatista sympathizers who were managing the toll booth. Subsequently there was a clash that killed a member of the assault troops, Marcos Moreno García, while state and federal police, supported by army troops, arrested 117 sympathizers.

“We have no problems with the owners of the restaurants that are in the area that is part of the Tumbalá Municipality. But here, where the toll booth is, is our territory, and the money belongs to us,” stated Juan Vázquez Guzmán, leader of the supporters of the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (2005) of San Sebastián Bachajón, on June 2012, to Latinamerica Press.

Less than a year later, Vázquez Guzmán, who was 32 years old and had two children, was murdered outside his home with six shots. A similar fate occurred to his friend Juan Carlos Gómez Silvano, who was shot 20 times in an ambush on Mar. 21, 2014.

Six months after the death of Gómez Silvano, three Bachajón ejido members were arrested and tortured with the charge of attempted murder of a uniformed officer, a charge based only on police officers’ testimony. “Their detention was revenge for having sought justice for our friend Juan Carlos,” denounced Domingo Pérez, spokesman for the Zapatista sympathizers of San Sebastián Bachajón, at a press conference in Sep. 2014.

What is disputed in Agua Azul is more than the control of the money charged for entering the area. Since 2000, the government has been planning to build a theme park on the banks of the waterfalls, which would be part of the Palenque-Agua Azul Waterfalls Integrally Planned Center (CIP), an infrastructure network planned as part of the Mesoamerica Project — the new name of former Puebla Panama Plan that promotes regional integration and development and coordinates the efforts and actions of the nine states that make up the Southeast region of Mexico, the seven countries of Central America, Colombia and the Dominican Republic — which the government hopes will transform Chiapas to a new Cancun.

Chiapas, the new Cancun?

According to former State Senator for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) María Elena Orantes López, the CIP would generate revenues of US$6.8 billion per year. 30,000 jobs would be created for the indigenous communities in the area, but they would “not participate in management positions, but with their labor,” as Roberto Albores Gleason, the former Secretary of Tourism of Chiapas, stated in 2008.

The firms EDSA and Norton Consulting recommended the former governor of Chiapas Juan Sabines Guerrero — who ended his term in 2012 — to finalize the acquisition of the land adjacent to the waterfalls before attracting investments. The construction of the new electrical network that will support the project is already finished, foreseen in the 2007-2012 Institutional Program of the Chiapas Secretariat of Tourism. The plan included the relocation of indigenous communities from six municipalities in the area, opposed by the support bases of the EZLN and its sympathizers.

The CIP also plans other projects, such as the construction of a new international airport in the city of Palenque, which opened in February 2014, and a superhighway between this ancient Mayan city and San Cristóbal de Las Casas. The government says that the 105-miles highway will benefit all surrounding communities, although much of the population is against the project because of the environmental damage that it would cause and because the true purpose of the highway is to accelerate the plundering of Chiapas’s resources.

In 2009, the government was forced to suspend the highway construction plan due to popular opposition, particularly from the Mitzitón community, which was victim to the violence of the paramilitary group Army of God. After five years, in 2014, technicians came back to take measurements on land that is in the path of the alleged highway, and the villagers were summoned to meetings with government officials to discuss the highway. However, the superhighway and theme park projects in Agua Azul are an enigma; they appear and disappear from official documents.

“The government does not want to provide adequate information to the communities so they do not know the extent of the damages. It does not give details because it knows that it will have a very strong social opposition,” says Ricardo Lagunes, attorney for the communal landowners of San Sebastian Bachajón, to Latinamerica Press.

Last January the ejido members of Mitzitón, following the example of communal landowners of Los Llanos (Municipality of San Cristóbal de Las Casas), filed a precautionary measure to prevent the construction of the highway. Subsequently, the authorities denied their intention to build the highway. However, the 2014-2018 National Infrastructure Program estimates an investment of 10 billion pesos ($644 million) for the construction of the highway between San Cristóbal de Las Casas and Palenque, and 1.2 billion pesos ($82 million) for “CIP support projects.”

The post Mexico: The Agua Azul Dispute appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan headed to Tehran Tuesday, the Associated Press reported, despite mounting tensions over the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen, which has targetting Shiite Houthi rebels positions and for which Erdogan has expressed support.

Though his nation is not taking part, Erdogan’s voiced support for Saudi’s airstrikes across the war-torn country, mounting new fronts with Tehran.

Last month, the Turkish leader slammed Iran for what he said were attempts to “dominate the region,” accusing the Shiite-led nation of flaring tensions and testing the limits of Arab leaders.

Iran, meanwhile, has been accused of arming the Shiite Houthis, who stormed Yemen’s capital Sanaa last September and ran out Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur, whose leadership the Saudi coalition is attempting to restore. Iran has repeatedly denied the claims, and accused the airstrike campaign of flaring up regional tensions of its own.

Original article

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Although the Iran nuclear talks are narrowly-focused on the nuclear issue, the non-nuclear issues such as regional security issues are bound to be impacted both directly and indirectly by the evolution of those talks — that has yielded a framework on the general principles together with some specific details in the form of Lusanne statement.

On the one hand, the Saudi-led Arab bloc has warmed to the latest breakthrough and conceivably this could mean the beginning of a new thaw in the currently icy Iran-Saudi relations. With the long-standing Saudi concerns about Iran’s “nuclearization” effectively put to rest by a near-future nuclear deal along the lines envisioned in the Lusanne statement, the stage could be set for an improved Persian Gulf climate conducive to normal neighborly relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council states headed by Riyadh.

On the other hand, a paradoxical state of affairs can also mushroom, one in which Saudi optimism about future relations with Iran would be tampered with the cynicism toward a perceived “Iran unshackled” that could spell a new regional rivalry due to Iran’s release from the international sanctions and its ability to assume a leading role in regional affairs. In this scenario, the passage of Iran proliferation concerns would lead to a new conventional arms race as the GCC states would bolster their defenses through fresh multi-billion dollar arms purchases, ostensibly to balance against Iran’s regional “hegemony.”

Thus, the question of which side will have the upper hand, cooperation or competition, could depend on a number of closely related factors, including the nature of U.S.-Iran relations, which is a topic of considerable guesswork at the moment. A clue to the latter, whereas Iran’s President Rouhani has openly expressed hope that the nuclear talks can lead to detente with the West, the U.S. officials have been less than enthusiastic about this prospect and have, for now, at least, denied that the nuclear talks can have broader implications. If the U.S. decides that its geopolitical interests have shifted in favor of a rapprochement with Tehran, then obviously one can expect to witness a concerted U.S. effort to bring its regional allies on board this objective, perhaps even as far as Washington playing mediator between Tehran and Riyadh. The success of such a noble effort would depend on Washington’s good will, as well as the Saudis willingness to give peace and tranquility with Iran a chance, which has been supplanted for sometime with a tense and potentially worsening Iran-Saudi rivalry involving proxies.

The U.S.’ “fact sheet” on the framework agreement specifies that the UN sanctions on Iran’s missiles and military hardware would continue, albeit under a new guise, which essentially means that the U.S. plans to be on the side of “containment” rather than any “post-containment.” There are, however, a few problems with this approach.

First, the history of UN sanctions show that they were imposed over the nuclear issue and therefore any deal calling for their removal would lack the justification for extending aspects of those resolutions in a new form.

Second, assuming that somehow, i.e., through a “separate letter,” parties consent to this exception to sanctions removal, then there is a possibility of a growing conventional asymmetry in a regional arms race undermining Iran’s national security.

Third, the fact that under the framework agreement Iran would allow extensive inspections of its facilities would be another potential stab at its national security, particularly if Iran and the IAEA fail to resolve the outstanding issue of “Possible Military Dimensions” which, in turn, raises the issue of Iran’s missiles, “suspicious sites,” and so on. Since the U.S.’ fact sheet refers to the PMD as one of the criteria of IAEA verification before any sanctions relief materializes simply means that in effect a Pandora’s Box has been opened that could certainly backfire on Iran.

In light of the above-said it is imperative for Iran to seek transparency in terms of the parameters of verification, otherwise the high risk of snags in the future lifting of sanctions can be anticipated. Through tough diplomatic positioning in the next three months, Iran can address these concerns and find viable solutions for the sake of a final deal. The big question is if the U.S. would consent to Iran’s demands or try to achieve a one-sided deal that does not reflect Iran’s prime national security interests? This is a question delegated to the future. What is certain, however, is that the existing gaps can be insurmountable and cannot be overcome without the benefit of a new U.S. “post-containment” approach that is not premised on the limits of cooperation by the existing security paradigms in Washington dictating traditional balancing and even “maximum deterrence.” These paradigms are to some extent overtaken by the changing facts on the ground, marking important regional and geopolitical shifts, yet may persist simply because of their entrenched nature as well as vested American interests.

Whether or not a much-needed paradigmatic shift will accompany a final deal with Iran is certainly too early to tell, although it is fairly given that a good deal of policy incoherence will follow if the U.S. decision-makers do not make the necessary adjustments, but the question is if they will make the right ones? The same question applies, mutatis mutandis, to Iran’s Arab neighbors, above all Saudi Arabia.

The post Regional Security Dimension Of Iran Nuclear Deal – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Why do some resistance movements remain non-violent while others do not? Charles Butcher believes that a society’s level of industrialization may be the key variable, as illustrated by the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya during the once promising Arab Spring.

By Charles Butcher*

Citizens have resisted dictatorship for as long as there have been dictators. The nature of this resistance has varied considerably, however – at least in the last 60 years. Some regimes must battle violent insurgencies, while others confront nonviolent, civilian uprisings. President François Bozizé, for example, was overthrown by a coalition of rebel groups that stormed the capital of the Central African Republic, Bangui, in March 2013. President Mohammed Morsi, by contrast, was overthrown by a mass, nonviolent uprising of Egyptian citizens in the same year. What explains this variance? Why does collective dissent take the form of violent insurgency in some countries, at some times, and nonviolent ‘civil resistance’ in others?

Answering this question is important from a policy perspective. The economic and social costs of civil wars are enormous and higher than the costs of civil resistance movements, on average. Regime transitions affected by nonviolent tactics are also more likely to result in democratic states, post conflict. Moreover, civil wars make other forms of extreme violence more likely, such as genocides and mass killing campaigns. Uncovering the conditions that channel collective dissent into nonviolent forms of ‘civil resistance’ can help prevent civil wars and create structures that make the emergence of peaceful, democratic states more likely.[1]

Why, then, does civil resistance start? Does ‘modernization’ affect the chances that nonviolent or violent movements seeking regime change or territorial independence will emerge? Indeed, as the ‘Arab Spring’ seems to suggest, industrialization in particular may play an important role in triggering non-violent rather than violent conflict.

Modernization and civil resistance?

Put yourself in the shoes of an imaginary dissident who wants to overthrow a dictator. You can choose between resisting the government with violent tactics, resisting the government with nonviolent tactics, or not initiating a resistance campaign at all. Assuming that you are rational and responsive to incentives, the question is this: under what circumstances will you consider nonviolent tactics superior to violent ones?

What would the ‘ideal’ civil resistance movement would look like? Research tells us that successful civil resistance movements are big, have support from sectors upon which the government depends, and can withstand severe repression. Ideal civil resistance movements, in other words, are big, they hurt and they survive. When you – the dissident – believe that you have a good chance of creating such an ideal movement, it stands to reason that you will be more likely to initiate a civil resistance campaign instead of a violent insurgency. Under what circumstances, then, are you likely to believe that such an ideal civil resistance movement can be built? Recent findings suggest that ‘modernization,’ and industrialization in particular, may be what tips the calculus in favor of civil resistance.

Modernization is a multifaceted process of economic and social transformation. Three processes that are often considered part of modernization include: industrialization, increasing education, and urbanization. Broadly, industrialization is a transition from the production of primary goods (such as agricultural goods or natural resources) to secondary goods (i.e, manufacturing). Industrialization tends to coincide with rising levels of education as governments create national education systems to fill the demand for an educated workforce. In turn, modernization also creates urbanization as people relocate from rural areas in the hope of realizing job opportunities in the cities.

Industrialization may be associated with the onset of nonviolent conflict for three reasons. First, industrialization breaks down parochial bonds and replaces them with (mass) shared bonds of experience in wage labor. These networks tend to be geographically and socially extensive, and to cross social divides of ethnicity, gender, and religion. Extensive social networks are critical for mass mobilization, especially networks with the capacity to mobilize ‘moderates’ as opposed to extremists . In other words, extensive social networks are important if your movement is going to be big.

Second, it is costly for the government when organized labor joins (or initiates) civil resistance. These costs include lost taxation revenue, lost trade in manufactures and the dysfunction of critical infrastructure such as ports, railways and public transport. Kurt Schock calls these costs ‘leverage’ and you need leverage if your movement is going to hurt.

Third, organized labor can withstand repression, what Schock calls resilience. Labor-based social networks often coalesce into (formal or informal, legal or illegal) institutions, such as independent trade unions. These decentralized but expansive networks and leadership structures make it hard for governments to target a single leader or location. Organized labor also excels at conducting strikes, which are useful under repression because participants are dispersed and difficult to target. You need resilience if your movement is going to survive.

Industrialization, organized labor, and the Arab Spring?

This helps to explain why civil resistance movements seem to emerge more frequently in industrialized states. Based on a global sample between 1960- 2006 (using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data), states with higher proportions of manufacturing to GDP were more likely to see the onset of civil resistance. This effect is plausibly independent of other factors such as population size, income, and democracy, and other aspects of the modernization process, such as urbanization. The effect appears to be strongest in the most authoritarian states, suggesting that when dissidents believe that they can withstand (almost certain) government repression, they are more likely to initiate civil resistance. In the global sample over this period, education (measured as the average years of schooling) had the strongest positive effect on the probability that nonviolent conflict would occur. On the other hand, there was not a strong relationship between urbanization and the onset of nonviolent conflict.

A similar pattern is discernible in a sample of African states between 1990 and 2009. Higher levels of manufacturing to GDP were correlated with the onset of nonviolent pro-democracy movements, although there was not the same strong relationship between education and the onset of civil resistance.

Importantly, industrialization was not positively related to armed conflict onset in either sample. This means that industrialization does not appear to increase the probability of dissent in general (violent and nonviolent) but specifically nonviolent forms of conflict.

Reading these quantitative findings in conjunction with the acknowledged role of organized labor can shed light on the contours of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. In 2008 (the last year that the World Bank has data), value added manufacturing accounted for just 4% of Libya’s economy. Tunisia, on the other hand, had a relatively strong manufacturing sector, accounting for 18.2% of GDP in 2010, and Egypt had a similar level – 16.8%. Moreover, the Tunisian General Labor Union was central in the resistance against the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, and Egyptian workers played a crucial role in the last days of the Mubarak regime. Indeed, there is also evidence that civil resistance movements that attract the participation of organized labor are bigger, more successful, and more likely to create post-conflict democracies.[2]

Of course, the quantitative study of civil resistance is at an early stage. Industrialization, education and urbanization are closely intertwined, making it difficult to tease out the precise causal processes that link modernization to nonviolent conflict. This causal complexity makes it hard to derive clear policy recommendations. It would appear, however, that the transition from an economy dependent upon primary commodities (which may be correlated with the onset of civil war) where the population is largely uneducated, to an economy characterized by educated workers and the manufacture of goods (and potentially services) also entails that grievances will be more likely to manifest as nonviolent forms of dissent.

Overall, this emerging research into civil resistance points to a central role for organized labor in channeling collective action away from organized violence. Recently, the idea of a ‘responsibility to assist’ dissents using nonviolent tactics to resist dictatorship has arisen. Strengthening the ability of labor to organize independently of the state may make nonviolent tactics more attractive, more common, and ‘safer’ in the sense that post-conflict societies are more likely to be democratic. This suggests that supporting the work of the International Confederation of Labor, and the International Labor Organization, for example, may have important externalities that help create a more peaceful and democratic world.

* Dr. Charles Butcher is a Lecturer at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies and Coordinator of the Masters Program at the Unversity of Otago in New Zealand. He received his PhD from the University of Sydney.

[1] This is not to say that ‘civil resistance’ is harmless. It is not. By mobilizing huge numbers into collective dissent, failed civil resistance movements may be more likely to transition into civil wars. Successful civil resistance movements are sometimes also followed by continued spells of authoritarianism. Civil resistance is something of a gamble – the ‘dice’ may be loaded in terms of regime transitions and democracy when compared with the ‘dice’ for violent insurgency, but by rolling in the first place this also (probably) makes other adverse outcomes more likely.

[2]This working paper is in the International Studies Association online archive. If you would like to request a copy, please email the author (charles.butcher@otago.ac.nz).

The post Manufacturing Dissent? Why Civil Resistance Starts – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Senior politicians from all around the world assessed a framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program as an important political and diplomatic milestone; but the deal is broader in scope than many ever anticipated.

The deal brings to the agenda a number of disputes, the first of which is its effect on energy market.

The agreement between Iran and the group known as P5+1 — the U.S., U.K., Russia, China, France and Germany — announced on April 2 in Lausanne doesn’t commit either side to action and is merely an outline agreement which will need to be fleshed out over the next three months.

The agreement stipulates the removal of economic sanctions that have crippled the Islamic Republic’s economy, and this eventually will bring the Persian Gulf nation closer to the European gas market.
Since the Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, Iran has made clear it stands ready to enter the gas race and open its vast reserves in the Caspian Basin to the EU and Turkey. Where Iran’s expansion plans were hindered by strict sanctions before, a lifting of the economic and financial embargo on the Islamic Republic would mean that Tehran is back in the energy game.

Bruce Pannier, an expert and energy researcher at RFE/RL said Iran, being able to export its own gas, and act as a transit country for gas from the Caspian Basin, would be a huge loss for Russia.

Europe, which relies on Moscow for about 30 percent of its supplies, has been seeking to diversify its sources of energy imports for several years now and especially decrease the amount of gas the EU purchases from Russia.

The expert noted that although Russia will continue to be a major supplier of gas to Europe for at least the next decade, Europe’s ability to access gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and other countries would represent a huge financial loss for Russia.

“As much as 25 percent of Russia’s revenue has reportedly been coming from the gas producer Gazprom. Admittedly that figure is certain to go down since the price of gas is following the price of oil downwards,” Pannier said in an e-mail to AzerNews.

The expert reminded that Russia is already re-orienting its gas exports toward Asia, particularly China but that will take a few years to really take hold. “That being said, by the time Europe starts receiving Iranian and Caspian Basin gas Russia should be in a position to export its gas to Asia,” he said.

The Southern Gas Corridor linking the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline is the first route that will bring gas from the Caspian Basin and later from Middle East to Europe.

Azerbaijan will be the initial supplier of gas through the SGC but the EU needs to find other gas suppliers if Brussels is serious about reducing Europe’s dependence on the Russian gas.

Pannier said Iran and Turkmenistan combined have more gas than Russia does, adding “if Iranian gas were to also enter the world market, Europe could in theory replace Russia as a supplier entirely.”

“That would take probably more than a decade because first, there is the question of how soon sanctions affecting Iran’s ability to sell gas and those sanctions prohibiting Western companies from investing in Iran can be lifted. Then there is the construction of the pipelines and other infrastructures necessary to carry gas to Europe,” he said.

Tehran would face several obstacles that will slow Iran’s entry into Europe’s gas markets: the need to produce more gas on the one hand and the need to build infrastructure to get it to Europe on the other hand. Iran is consuming a large proportion of natural gas and it imports gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Also, natural gas production requires much larger investments and the signing of investment contracts generally takes a number of years.

Speaking about possible repercussions on Russian-Iranian ties, the expert noted that it is “a big question”.

Russia has been a major supporter of Iran over the past few years; Moscow has used its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to prevent Iran from being subjected to even harsher sanctions than those already imposed upon the Islamic Republic.

However, Pannier said, Iran will want to burst into the international market and start turning its economy around, something Russia at the moment is in no position to help with.

“The relationship between Tehran and Moscow will remain good but there will be “real politik” at work here and Moscow will have to accept that Iran will be seeking, and finding, new partners in the international community. If Moscow cannot accept Iran’s new place in the international community, Tehran would opt to reduce its ties with Russia rather than appease an ally that cannot help Iran recover from decades of sanctions,” he said.

Pannier believes that Iran’s relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus should improve quite a bit since the major obstacles to better regional ties with Iran have always been international sanctions and knowledge on the part of countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia that pursuing better ties with Tehran would mean losing Western support and investment.

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By Uma Purushothaman*

The framework for a deal between the P5+1 (US, UK, Russia, France, China and Germany) and Iran vis-à-vis Iran nuclear programme could be one of the few truly transformative moments in global politics. It attempts to end to Iran’s isolation, paves the path for further rapprochement between it and the US and enables it to integrate with the world. Importantly, the deal represents one of the rare instances of cooperation between the world’s major powers to solve a global problem. The last time the major powers in the world came together on an issue in the Middle East, it was to create the state of Israel in 1948. This was undoubtedly a moment when the politics of the Middle East and the world was turned on its head.

Joint diplomatic efforts to solve issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme started in 2003 by what was then termed the EU+ 3 countries i.e. UK, France and Germany. Europe was joined in 2006 by the remaining members of the UN Security Council i.e. the US, Russia and China, creating the P5 plus 1 framework for negotiations with Iran. The UNSC over the years has been more or less united on the need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It has passed six resolutions sanctioning Iran for continuing to pursue its nuclear programme.

The fact that the P5 plus 1 remained united during the negotiations is probably what has ensured that a deal has been reached. If there had been any major disagreements among them, Iran would have been able to exploit the fissures to extract concessions.

Each of the P5+1 has something to gain from resolving the Iran issue. For one, for all of them, a resolution to the crisis is a shot in the arm for the global non proliferation regime and ensures that they remain the sole possessors of nuclear weapons in the world. None of the P5 plus 1 wants another nuclear power in the world for various reasons. The West does not want a nuclear Iran because of the threat this would pose to its closest ally, Israel. For Russia especially, its claims to being a great power today rest on its status as a permanent member of the UNSC and its nuclear weapons arsenal. China, for its part, worries about the effect a nuclear Iran would have on the intentions of its neighbours like Japan and Taiwan with which the latter has tensions and which have the capability to go nuclear. All of these countries are aware of the regional and global threat that a nuclear weapons-armed Iran would pose. A nuclear Iran could have a domino effect in the Middle East. Countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, with whom Iran competes for regional dominance, would seek to build their own nuclear weapons to counter the perceived threat from a nuclear Iran as well as to prevent Iran from becoming the regional hegemon.

Third, the end of sanctions would mean that it would be easier for them to do business with Iran. After decades of isolation, Iran will need finance and technology to modernise its industries, particularly its oil and gas industry. This is where the major powers sense an opportunity. Moreover, Tehran will also be able to export more oil and gas to the West. This would help the West, particularly Europe, which will have to reduce its dependence on Russian gas due to the sanctions imposed on Russia because of the Ukraine crisis. Fourth, resolving an issue which had so far seemed intractable will significantly add to the political weight and influence and add to the credibility of the UN Security Council in solving difficult problems.

Thus, the Iran deal was reached because of a happy coincidence of interests among the great powers and despite the current stand-off between the West and Russia. However, an unintended consequence of the deal is that it will bring down oil prices further, strengthening the Western sanctions against Russia.

The deal with Iran should boost efforts to do an Iran with North Korea’s nuclear programme as well. This would be more difficult given the authoritarian nature of the regime in North Korea but is still an idea worth pursuing. The major powers should carry forward the momentum and energy from resolving the Iran issue into solving other matters in the strife-ridden Middle East like fighting the ISIS, bringing peace to Yemen, etc.

From India’s point of view, while this rare instance of cooperation is welcome, it would wish that New Delhi is also made an integral part of such processes in the future, commensurate with its status as a rising power.

*The writer is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

The post Can Great Powers Now Do An Iran On North Korea? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Said Moshagheb, a mesmerizingly charismatic, under-educated and unemployed leader of a prominent group of militant, well-organized, and street battle-hardened soccer fans, staged a coup five years ago against the founders and original leaders of the Ultras White Knights (UWK), the storied support group of Zamalek SC, one of Egypt’s most celebrated clubs.

The impact of the takeover is today increasingly evident on the embattled campuses of Egyptian universities and in poorer neighborhoods of Egyptian cities, the focal points of protest against the military coup in 2013 that toppled Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, and brought general-­-turned-­-president Abdel Fattah Al-­-Sisi to power.

It is also obvious in the UWK’s most recent history and that of Mr. Moshagheb personally, both of which are reflections of a generation that has progressively lost hope and is potentially prone to radicalization. If anything, their histories serve as warning signs that frustration sparked by the success of the military and the security forces in rolling back the achievements of the 2011 popular revolt that forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign after 30 years in office coupled with Mr. Al-­-Sisi’s even more repressive policies is fuelling radicalization rather than returning Egypt to stability and equitable economic growth.

Mr. Moshagheb staged the first phase of his takeover during a historic match between Zamalek and Tunisia’s Club Africain, the first encounter between two teams whose supporters months earlier had played important roles in the toppling of their countries’ leaders.[1]

Emboldened by the fact that he and thousands of militant fans or ultras for the first time in four years of pitched battles against security forces in stadia, found the pitch virtually devoid of police and themselves in control of the stadium, Mr. Moshagheb led an invasion of the pitch three minutes into stoppage time after the referee disallowed a Zamalek goal because the scoring player was offside. The violent invasion left five Tunisian players injured and UWK’s founding leaders in shock.[2]

To many of the ultras, the ceding of control of the stadium symbolized their victory two months earlier as part Mr. Mubarak’s overthrow. Mr. Moshagheb and his ultras arrived the day of the match at the Cairo International Stadium braced for another battle with security forces who had long tried to prevent the fans from bringing their flares, smoke guns, and often politically-loaded banners into the arena. Police had repeatedly advised the UWK in the 24 hours prior to the match that they would be blocked from entering with their paraphernalia that is a staple of ultras performances worldwide.

Yet, when the ultras got to the stadium the gates were unmanned and police and security forces were absent but for some 30 unarmed officers dressed in light blue training suits deployed to protect a small group of visiting Club Africain supporters. Police and security forces, Egypt’s most brutal and despised institution because of its brutal role as the strong arm of the repressive Mubarak regime, had opted not to engage in another clash with what had become one of Egypt’s foremost social movements, in a bid to avoid further tarnishing of their image. Moreover, a breakdown of law and order would illustrate the need for a security force that ensures safety and law and order.[3]

In effect, Mr. Moshagebh and his followers walked into the security forces’ trap. Their failure to recognize the strategy of a security force whose training and experience had taught them little more than repressive tactics represented a generational shift among the ultras from a highly politicized leadership to one of disaffected youth whose vision went little beyond deep-seated hatred of the police and distrust of the state.

To the founders of various groups of ultras in Egypt, the battle for the stadia in the Mubarak years constituted a struggle for public space in a country governed by a regime that tolerated no uncontrolled public spaces. The ultras constituted the only group willing to not only challenge government control of public space but also to putting their lives on the line in staking their claim. They derived their title to the stadium from their analysis of the power structure of the sport that positioned ultras as the only true supporters of the club as opposed to a corrupt management that was a pawn of the regime and players who were mercenaries who played for the highest bidder.

In doing so, the ultras challenged the Achilles Heel of the regime given that stadia alongside mosques were the two public spaces that the government could not simply shut down because nothing evoked the kind of deep-­-seated passion that soccer and religion did. As a result, the government eager to crush the threat to its authority while wanting to reap the political benefits of association with one of the most important things in the lives of Egyptian men, saw little alternative but to fight for control.

And that was what attracted the likes of Mr. Moshagebh who was representative of the thousands of young, under-­-educated and un-­-or under-­-employed men who joined the ranks of the ultras in the waning years of the Mubarak regime because the fans were the only organized group that persistently and physically stood up to corrupt and brutal security forces who made their lives difficult in the stadia as well as in the neighborhoods where they lived.

An action-­-oriented new generation

Mr. Moshagheb’s pitch invasion symbolized the side lining of the UWK’s founding leadership who had a far more worked out ideological concept of who the ultras were and what their role as a movement was. Mr. Moshagebh finalized his takeover months after the pitch invasion by brutally pushing out the UWK’s founders, some of whom were attacked and injured by his knife-­-wielding followers.

“This is a new generation. It’s a generation that can’t be controlled. They don’t read. They believe in action and experience. They have balls. When the opportunity arises they will do something bigger than we ever did,” said one of the group’s founders who has since distanced himself from the UWK. The founder cautioned against repeating the mistake of the Mubarak era when policymakers and analysts underestimated the groundswell of anger and frustration among youth that was bubbling at the surface.[4]

To be sure, UWK has issued blistering statements since some 20 of its members were killed in February in a stampede outside Cairo’s Air Defence stadium in an area surrounded by military-owned land and facilities. The stampede was sparked by security forces who corralled spectators seeking access to the first match for the better part of three years that was open to the public and used tear gas and birdshot against a crowd that had no escape route.[5] Similarly, little UWK action is expected when 16 ultras and alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood go on trial on April 18 in connection with the stampede.

“Nothing will happen. Standing up to the regime amounts to suicide. The question is how long that perception will last. The closing of the stadia shuts down the only release valve. Things will eventually burst. When and where nobody knows. But the writing is on the wall,” said a source close to the ultras.[6]

The UWK has been equally restrained since the arrest last month of Mr. Moshagebh. He has been kept incommunicado since his detention on charges of founding an illegal organization. Mr. Moshagebh was however acquitted in late March in a case in which he was one of eight UWK members accused of attacking Zamalek president Mortada Mansour with acid that the ultra say was urine.

Mr. Moshagheb’s case lifts the veil on a process of radicalization at the fringe of the ultras fuelled by policies of the Al-Sisi government that are more restrictive and repressive of those of the toppled Mubarak regime. It also puts into perspective the war being waged against the UWK by Mr. Mansour, a larger than life figure who has twice failed to persuade a court to outlaw the ultras as a terrorist organization on the grounds that the group tried to assassinate him and prides himself on having requested the police action against fans in February that sparked the stampede. The case also positions widespread student anti- government protests in the last two years on university campuses and in popular neighborhoods in which members of the UWK and Ultras Ahlawy, the support group of Zamalek arch rival Al-Ahli SC, play a key role.

Sources close to the ultras said Mr. Moshagebh was suspected by authorities of having been involved in violent resistance to the Al-Sisi government. They said the UWK leader had been under surveillance for some time during which he had been smuggling arms into Cairo from Sinai, the setting for an armed insurgency that is being fuelled by neglect of the region by successive governments and a brutal military crackdown. The sources said that AK-47s had been found in the homes of friends of Mr. Moshagebh some two weeks before his arrest.[7]

Mr. Moshagebh was arrested after he and another ultra, Hassan Kazarlan, allegedly set fire to a Cairo convention fire. Sixteen people were injured in the incident. Mr. Kazarlan fled to Turkey after the arson attack.[8] He was persuaded to return to Egypt after security forces detained his father as a hostage and immediately detained upon his arrival. Sources close to Mr. Kazarlan’s family said he had told authorities that he had wanted to travel from Turkey to Syria. They said he provoked security force ire by accusing his interrogators of being infidels.[9]

If he had made it to Syria, Mr. Kazarlan would have followed in the footsteps of Rami Iskanderiya, a former leader of Ultras Ahlawi in the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria, who joined the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, and married a Syrian woman in the group’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa.

Tarek M. Elawady, a lawyer for the UWK, said Mr. Kazarlan had led security forces to Mr. Moshagebh’s when he revealed his whereabouts under torture. Mr. Elawady was careful to insist that he represented the UWK and Mr. Moshagebh only in as far as his legal problems were related to the ultras.

“Mortada wanted to drive a wedge between the UWK rank and file and its leaders who may have had political affiliations. Mortada provoked them to be violent… His actions are part of a government plan to weaken any youth group that opposes the state… The problem is that Mortada is playing the security forces’ game. He acts as their agent provocateur,”[10] Mr. Elawady said, speaking in his office close to the brooding headquarters of the Mukhabarat, the term broadly used for intelligence and law enforcement that is surrounded by grimy walls, barbed wire and watch towers that give it a dark and sinister look.

The targeting of ultras is evident not only in Mr. Mansour’s campaign as well as the judicial crackdown on militant soccer fans but also in the military where conscripts are asked after being drafted whether they are members of an ultras group. Those that respond affirmatively are singled out. “They were immediately ordered to do 100 push-­-ups during which an officer shouted at them: ‘You are the lowest creatures. You sacrifice yourselves for your club, not for your religion or country,’” a source recounted.[11]

Sources close to the ultras said Mr. Moshagebh had wanted (in late January around the fourth anniversary of the revolt that toppled Mr. Mubarak) to escalate protests in Cairo neighbourhoods like Matareya, a stronghold of the Brotherhood that was outlawed as a terrorist organization after the toppling of Mr. Mortada. Some 17 of the 74 Ultras Ahlawy members killed in 2012 in a politically loaded brawl in the stadium of the Suez Canal city of Port Said hailed from Matareya, the scene of multiple anti-­-government protests that is known for its stock piles of illegal arms, drug dealing and high crime rate.[12]

Mr. Moshagebh’s alleged failed attempt to escalate the protests in Matareya into an armed conflict coupled with flash protests that have largely moved from campuses to neighborhoods on Fridays after midday prayers because of security force control of universities reflect efforts by those segments of the ultras with access to a better education to maintain pressure on the government while preventing mounting frustration and anger from sparking nihilistic violence.

A glimmer of hope

Leaders of Ultras Nahdawy, a group of politicized soccer fans that was initially formed by members of the UWK and Ultras Ahlawy in 2012 to support Mr. Morsi but grew exponentially in the wake of the brutal ending in August 2013 of a Muslim Brotherhood sit-in on Raba’a al-Adawiya Square, one of two protest squares, in which security forces killed more than 600 people, and Students against the Coup, see themselves as forces trying to provide disaffected youth with a glimmer of hope. Ultras Nahdawy constitutes a break with the global culture of militant soccer fans that projects itself as apolitical and exclusively associated with a club.

Nahdawy with some 65,000 followers on Facebook[13] has defined itself as explicitly political and is not associated with any one club. It has long been viewed as being affiliated with the Brotherhood. “Many of us are Islamists. I am a member of the Brotherhood, but that is not why we supported the Brotherhood. We don’t want to be inside the Brotherhood or the system. We supported Morsi not because he was a brother but because we wanted a revolutionary force to be in government. The Brotherhood was the only revolutionary force that had a candidate and popular support and was part of the (2011) revolution,” said a leader of the Nahdawy, who asked to be identified only as Ahmed.[14]

A member of an ultras group that played a key role in the popular revolt on Cairo’s Tahrir Square in 2011 who has since been expelled from university for organizing anti-­- government protests and sentenced twice in absentia to long-­-term incarceration, Ahmed is a fugitive who moves around Cairo in a protective cocoon, speaks in a low voice to avoid being overheard, and regularly looks furtively over his shoulder. Like during the revolt on Tahrir, Ahmed and his fellow ultras form the front-­-line defense against security forces in protests on campuses and in neighborhoods. Their ultras-­-rooted tactics of chanting, jumping up and down and using flares and fireworks are evident in the protests. Some 17 members of Nahdawy that has branches in most Egyptian universities have been killed in clashes with security forces in the last two years.

Yusuf Salheen, a 22-year old leader of Students Against the Coup, a group that was formed in the wake of the Raba’a al-Adawiya crackdown that has a presence not only in universities but also in vocational institutions, said some 3,000 students had been arrested in the past two years, 1,500 of which were still in detention. Mr. Salheen, a student of Islam at Cairo’s prestigious Al Azhar University, who positions himself as an Islamist but not a member of the Brotherhood, said that some 2,000 students had been expelled from university because of their opposition to the Al-Sisi government. Mr. Salheen successfully defended himself against an effort to expel him from Al-Azhar. He said university dormitories like stadia were being shut down to deprive students from using them as a protest rallying point.[15]

“We are looking for alternative outside the campus. We have managed to do so in neighbourhoods and smaller universities that are less controlled. We’re looking at new strategies and options given that the risk is becoming too high. We are absolutely concerned that if we fail things will turn violent. Going violent would give the regime the perfect excuse. We would lose all public empathy. We hope that Egyptians realize that there are still voices out there that are not giving up and are keeping protests peaceful despite all that has happened,” Mr. Salheen said.

“We don’t like violence but we are not weak. Hope keeps us going. We believe that there still are options. We created options on Tahrir Square. This regime is more brutal but there still are options. Success for us is our survival and ability to keep trying. The government wants to provoke us to become violent. Two years later, we are still active. Politics is about making deals; revolution is putting your life on the line. We are the generation that staged the revolution. The new generation no longer cares. Our role is to get the new generation to re-join the revolution. The government markets itself with promises and the power of the state. We can promise only one thing: we will stay on the street. To us football is politics, politics is in everything. That’s why we tackle politics,” Ahmed added.

A catalyst of Islamist change

Steeped in the history of the ultras, the student movement and the Brotherhood, men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen see themselves not only as opponents of what they view as a dictatorial regime but also of agents of change within the Islamist movement. They base themselves on the history of a student movement that since the crackdown on the Brotherhood by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the visionary Egyptian leader who toppled the monarchy in 1952 and became a symbol of Arab nationalism, was the Brotherhood’s catalyst for adaptation.

“The Muslim Brotherhood of the early 1970s was a shell of its former self. Many of the surviving activists, numbering barely one hundred members, were not even certain that they wanted to resurrect the organization’s mission upon their release from prison. The real story of this era revolves around a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities. Even as they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth of this period were the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased urbanization to greater access to education. They found in their Islamic identity a response to the post-­- 1967 crisis, even as they adopted the modes of popular contention that had emerged under Nasser. The student movement was notable for the fluidity it displayed on the ideological level and the dynamism it exhibited on the organizational front,” said historian Abdullah Al-­-Arian, author of Answering the Call, Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, in an interview with Jadaliyya.[16]

“The real story of this era revolves around a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities. Even as they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth of this period were the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased urbanization to greater access to education. They found in their Islamic identity a response to the post-­-1967 crisis, even as they adopted the modes of popular contention that had emerged under Nasser. The student movement was notable for the fluidity it displayed on the ideological level and the dynamism it exhibited on the organizational front,” Mr. Al-­- Arian said.

The scholar went on to say that his book looks “at the parallel developments occurring across the student movement broadly and internally within the re-emerging Muslim Brotherhood. The book weaves together a narrative that examines critical moments where these forces intersected and traces the path taken by the bulk of the student movement’s leadership as it ultimately ‘graduated’ to take on the Muslim Brotherhood’s mission and adopt its organizational model. One of the study’s key findings is that, even as they attempted to reassert the Muslim Brotherhood’s traditional hierarchical structure, senior figures like Mustafa Mashhur, Kamal al-­-Sananiri, and Umar al-­- Tilmisani could not help but adapt their mission to the changing landscape of Islamic activism.”

For men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen it’s less about the Brotherhood and more about aligning Islamists and revolutionary forces that run the gamut from liberal to conservative, from left to right and from secular to religious in a united front against autocracy. “It’s not about Morsi, we have bigger fish to fry than Morsi. Most of us no longer believe in the slogan in returning Morsi to office. Thousands are suffering. I don’t give a damn about Morsi. Anything is better than this regime. There are two approaches, the reformist and the revolutionary one. We have seen dramatic shifts since 2011. Both Tahrir Square and Sisi’s junta were dramatic twists. I and many like me believe that another twist is possible even if that will take time,” Mr. Salheen said.

Repression fuels radicalism

Messrs. Ahmed and Salheen are the first to admit that they are fighting multiple uphill battles in which the odds are stacked against them. Their space to maneuver is increasingly being curtailed while their effort to stem radicalization and keep the momentum of peaceful protest is being stymied by policies by Mr. Al-­-Sisi, who seeks to project himself as an effective bulwark against jihadism.

“Unfortunately the idea that Sisi will be an effective ally against Islamic terrorists is misguided. He has, in fact, become one of the jihadists’ most effective recruiting tools. The simple truth is that, since Sisi took power, the frequency of terrorist attacks in Egypt has soared; there have been more than 700 attacks over 22 months, as opposed to fewer than 90 in the previous 22 months. Harder to measure is the number of young people radicalized by Sisi’s repression, but we can assume it is significant and growing… In this environment, is it surprising that reports surface regularly about the trend of radicalization of Egyptian youth, including previously peaceful Islamists? Sisi’s brutal actions speak far louder than his few words about reforming Islam; to believe that he, or the religious institutions of his government, can have a positive impact on young people susceptible to radicalization is beyond wishful thinking. It would be laughable if it were not dangerous self-­-delusion…” commented scholars Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne.[17]

Radicalization is both a product of the brutality of an unreformed security force and a military whose brutal tactics have turned a local Bedouin population into allies of militants influenced by the Islamic State and other jihadist groups. “In Cairo, the police are idiots. They have perfected the art of ensuring that people hate them. One is told in the military that we are the good guys and the police are the bad guys. But in the Sinai, the military is under siege, it moves in convoys that are focused on self-­-protection and not being blown up by improvised explosive devices. Locals no longer wear traditional Bedouin dress and don western clothing to avoid being detained and harassed by the military who sees the Bedouin as the enemy. Locals used to inform on the jihadists, they no longer do, they look the other way. There is no solution. It’s a battle till death,” said a soccer fan who recently returned from northern Sinai.[18]

As a result, uncritical engagement with the Al-­-Sisi government by the Obama administration and European nations serves to perpetuate a situation in which men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen resemble Hans Brinker, the eight-­-year old fairy tale Dutchmen who stopped a flood by putting his finger in a hole in the dike. Endorsement of Mr. Al-­-Sisi as a regional pillar of stability and a bulwark against radicalization amounts to legitimization of the failure of Egypt’s successive post-­-revolt governments, both those backed and/or populated by the military as well as that of Mr. Morsi, that opted to cater to the security forces rather than exploit opportunities to introduce long-­-overdue reforms that would have been crucial for democratization and restoring political stability.

In the case of Mr. Morsi, the attempt to ensure that the security forces would not turn against him backfired. Mr. Morsi’s interior ministry, under which the security forces resorted, played a key role in laying the groundwork for his removal from power and the rise of a state more repressive than that of Mr. Mubarak.

The failure to push for security sector reform granted the security forces time to regroup and exploit instability, deteriorating security, and increased political violence to ensure their immunity to calls for change. Egypt “presents the most egregious example of the consequences of failing to undertake far-­-reaching security sector reform,” Carnegie Middle East Center scholar Yezid Sayigh noted in a recent study of the politics of police reform in the two post-revolt countries.[19]

“Ministries of interior remain black boxes with opaque decision-making processes, governed by officer networks that have resisted meaningful reform, financial transparency, and political oversight. Until governments reform their security sectors, rather than appease them, the culture of police impunity will deepen and democratic transition will remain impossible in Egypt and at risk in Tunisia” Mr. Sayigh said.

The death in February of the 20 UWK members was but one example of the consequences of the failure to implement security reform. So was the worst incident in Egyptian sporting history when 74 members of Ultras Ahlawy died in 2012 in the Port Said stadium. Eye witnesses reported at the time that scores of unknown men armed with identical batons had been among those that attacked the Ahli supporters.[20]

The presence of those men fit the pattern of senior security officers and governors hiring thugs called baltageyya to cooperate in violation of the law with security forces. The practice was expanded in popular neighborhoods where security forces have advised residents to take the law into their own hands by hiring baltageyya. The approach meant that criminal groups often replaced the security forces in neighborhoods. Overall, stepped up brutality by the security forces and their associates has cost the lives of some 1,400 people since the demise of Mr. Morsi.

The security force strategy is backfiring not only in its inability to stymie radicalization but also in the fact that militant soccer fans and students who take to the streets in popular neighbourhoods often are joined by locals. “Take Alf Maskan,” said an ultra and student activist. “Alf Maskan is a traditionally conservative, Islamist neighbourhood. Youth have nothing to look forward to. They are hopeless and desperate. They join our protests but their conversation often focuses on admiration for the Islamic State. They are teetering on the edge. We are their only hope but it’s like grasping for a straw that ultimately is likely to break.”[21]

This article appeared in RSIS’ Middle East Perspectives

Notes:
[1] James M. Dorsey. 2011. Zamalek Ultras Disrupt African Soccer Match in Stunning Display of Nihilism, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, April 3, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2011/04/zamalek-­- ultras-­-disrupt-­-african-­-soccer.html

[2] Ibid. Dorsey

[3] Ibid. Dorsey

[4] Interview with the author, March 29, 2015.

[5] James M. Dorsey. 2015. Soccer deaths raise stakes for Egypt’s general-­-turned-­-president Al-­-Sisi, The

Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, February 9, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2015/02/soccer- deaths-raise-stakes-for-egypts.html

[6] Interview with the author, March 29, 2015

[7] Interviews with the author, March 28, 29, 30 and 31, 2015.

[8] Yara Bayoumy, Stephen Kalin and Ahmed Tolba. 2015. Sixteen injured in fire at Cairo convention center, Reuters, March 4, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-egypt-fire-idUSKBN0M015R20150304

[9] Interviews with the author, March 28 and 29, 2015. 10 Interview with the author, March 31, 2015.

[10] Interview with the author, March 31, 2015.

[11] Interview with the author, March 28, 2015

[12] Interviews with the author March 28, 29, 30 and 31, 2015

[13] https://www.facebook.com/Nahdawy.un12?fref=ts

[14] Interview with the author, March 2015.

[15] Interview with the author, March 30, 2015.

[16] Jadaliyya. 2014. New Texts Out Now: Abdullah Al-Arian, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in

Sadat’s Egypt, October 1, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/19390/new-texts-out-now_abdullah-al-arian-answering-the-

[17] Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne. 2015. Obama embraces the Nixon Doctrine in Egypt, The Washington. Post, April 3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-embraces-the-nixon-doctrine-in-egypt/2015/04/03/597b3be0-d986-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html

[18] Interview with the author, March 31, 2015.

[19] Yezid Sayegh. 2015. Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform in Egypt and Tunisia, Carnegie Middle East Center, March, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC49_Brief-Yezid-Egypt_Tunisia.pdf

[20] James M. Dorsey. 2012. Ultra Violence – How Egypt’s soccer mobs are threatening the revolution, Foreign Policy, February 2, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2012/02/ultra-violence-how-egypts-soccer-mobs.html

[21] Interview with the author, March 31, 2015.

The post Militant Soccer Fans: Egypt’s Hans Brink Plugs The Dam Against Radicalization – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The taboo against the use of nuclear weapons is fading as newer nuclear powers consider whether to use them as they would any other tools of war.

By David B. Kanin

The Economist recently (March 7-13) ran a cover story warning of a “New Nuclear Age.” It provided useful facts and analysis of Cold War-type nuclear theorizing, the scale of existing arsenals and goals of prospective nuclear weapons states. It told the sad tale of the tattered non-proliferation regime and of the faltering effort to get the US to set an example by scrapping its nuclear forces (as if anyone is paying much attention to American examples any more). The article came just before Russia’s President Putin told audiences of a contrived “documentary” that he considered ordering a nuclear alert as his forces prepared to recover the Crimea.

The traditional geostrategic image presented by the article and play-acted by Putin probably does not reflect how nuclear weapons actually will be used. Going forward, the threat of nuclear war more likely will be that one or more partners in dangerous dyads will use nuclear weapons as part of a more “conventional” use of force. To understand the danger of nuclear war it is necessary to stop thinking in terms of a “red line” or any concept that treats these immensely destructive things as conceptually distinct from the other weapons people continue to kill each other with in organized violence that is anything but obsolete.

The match-ups most likely to produce nuclear weapons use are North-South Korea (or North Korea-US), Iran-Israel, and Pakistan-India. Depending on the physical and political outcome of the first use since 1945, and in the absence of the sort of global management the US and former Soviet Union once provided, a second or third use could follow the first.

North Korea is the only one of the countries mentioned that both possesses some sort of nuclear weapons capability and rattles its cage like it intends to shoot something at someone. It remains unclear how workable is the North’s weapons design, but it appears that perhaps the nastiest and least effective regime on the face of the earth is beginning to realize it could well eventually face the existential decision of whether to shoot off nuclear fireworks as it collapses, or to just collapse.

The key point here is that a prospering, rising China might be getting tired of Pyongyang’s antics and might realize that it need not to worry so much that a Korea unified under Seoul’s auspices would turn out to be an ally of the United States. China’s share of South Korea’s trade is rising, and the two countries share a strong distaste for Japan’s renewed taste for nationalism. The process of unifying Korea would be costly and could eventually produce a rich and active player in regional security, but however it turned out create a major improvement north of the 38th parallel.

American decline plays into whatever happens in northeast Asia in two ways. First, South Korea has less need of an American lead, and Washington’s weaker influence on Japan’s regional policies arguably leaves China as a more reliable security partner. Second, North Korea could perceive an opportunity to jawbone a dysfunctional US national security elite.

If faced with internal unrest (that more likely means disputes among the top tier of civilian and military officials than some sort of uprising from below), the North could give the US an ultimatum in which it would threaten to launch Nodong 2 ICBMs against the US homeland unless Washington pulls its troops out of South Korea. Sure, the North would face the threat of annihilation, but if the regime comes to believe it is being abandoned by China and gobbled up by its fraternal enemy its masters could come to believe they have nothing to lose, and that the threat of nuclear war might lead Washington finally to open the bilateral dialogue Pyongyang has sought for so long.

The Iran-Israel dyad is the one that has gotten the most attention lately. It is clear the United States and European Union see their nuclear talks with Iran as the only chance for some sort of success in a region where their declining stature and inertial diplomacy have produced nearly nothing. Even the once-touted Western intervention in Libya has led only to civil war and state collapse on the Iraqi/Syrian model. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, demonstrating what is a general lack of respect in the Middle East for the US and its foreign policy, dropped by to tell the US Congress a truth—Iran has succeeded in moving the West to a position in which any agreement would only provide warning of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, not stop it.

Iran is following the example of its Israeli enemy by simultaneously developing a nuclear weapons program and an ability to plausibly deny it. This sticks Israelis with the latest in a series of strategic ironies. Their founding generation disregarded religion as a political factor and created political conditions under which now nothing can be done in Israel without much feuding between secular and religious parties and between hardline settler enthusiasts and their opponents within both camps. The Jewish state’s strategists disregarded Islam as a strategic actor, and so helped create HAMAS as a counter to Yassir Arafat’s PLO. You can see how that has worked out. Now, the Israeli decision to quietly develop and deeply nuclear weapons has supplied a blueprint to a regime that might well some day engage with them in a nuclear exchange.

In my view, Pakistan is the most likely of the second-tier nuclear powers to use its arsenal in combat. Islamabad knows it cannot defeat its Indian enemy in a conventional war. It also blames India for its own internal problems and for unrest in Afghanistan. Like North Korea, Pakistan faces the real possibility of systemic collapse. Unlike North Korea, Pakistan believes—with reason—it has a more advanced and more potent nuclear arsenal than its adversary. A belief in their nuclear superiority could lead Pakistani decision makers to refuse to swallow another conventional military defeat.

The Pakistan-India dyad also is prone to possible miscalculation. The two countries have been to the brink a number of times, for example after Pakistan-based militants attacked the Indian parliament in 2001 and stormed Mumbai in 2008. Kashmir remains an open sore. India’s far brighter economic prospect deepens Pakistan’s frustration. Washington’s flirtation with New Delhi over the past few years and frictions with Pakistan over US military action in Afghanistan (and drone attacks inside Pakistan itself) very likely has convinced Islamabad that China is a more dependable ally than is the US. In addition, Pakistan knows as well as anyone that China is the rising power—and that China does not share the Western concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability.

There is no point predicting the exact scenario under which one of these disputes involving nuclear or soon-to-be nuclear weapons states might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The point is that the dynamics involved in these relationships threaten to trump the Cold War legacy of the norm against using nuclear weapons. Once used, “The Day After” might not be as cataclysmic as postulated in Dr. Strangelove, but it would still be terribly destructive and deeply disorienting to the survivors. It would not be a bad idea if governments and would-be responders begin to give that Day After some thought.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The post The Future Of (Nuclear) War – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fouad Farhaoui

The Yemeni crisis is a reflection of transformations in Saudi Arabia’s decision-making processes as a result of the rise of Iran’s role in the Gulf of Aden. As is known to all, before the death of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, those who controlled the Saudi state’s decision-making mechanism were Head of the National Guard and son of the king Mutaib bin Abdullah and King Abdullah’s personal secretary Khalid et-Tuveycrî. This axis tried to exclude then-crown prince Salman bin Abdulaziz and his Sudairi axis.

When the Mutaib-Tuveycrî axis succeeded in overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, it turned to Yemen, where the Yemen Reclamation Party (the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) had started to gain a voice in the Yemeni government. The plan of the Mutaib-Tuveycrî axis was to support Ali Abdullah Saleh’s coalition with the Houthis in order to topple the Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi government, and therefore to initiate a dialogue by silencing the Muslim Brotherhood and replacing it with the Houthis.

As is known, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s influence in the Yemeni military apparatus has been extended to his son Ahmed, who is currently the head of Yemen’s National Guard. At the time when Houthis were approaching the capital, it was expected that they and the Yemen Reclamation Party would collide. However, the Muslim Brotherhood rejected such a collision and instead chose to withdraw. The Yemeni Military then intervened to stop the Houthi advance that was politically and logistically backed by Iran and the Mutaib-Tuveycrî axis, which both used the Houthis to position themselves as the main determinants of Yemen’s future.

After the death of King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, remodeled the country’s decision-making mechanisms as well as its centers of power. He placed Khalid et- Tuveycrî under house arrest and appointed Muhammed b. Nâyif, who is a member of the Sudairi axis, as a deputy crown prince. The new king made no changes to the position of the head of the National Guard, held by Crown Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah. Nonetheless, he disbanded some national guards which consisted of Bedouins who were loyal to the former king. Moreover, he allocated a great amount of ammunition and equipment to the Defense Ministry, whose minister is his own son.

After these transformations within the Kingdom, and as a result of Iran’s activities in Yemen, war against the Houthis and the country’s relations with political Islamists, including the Yemen Reclamation Party, were reconsidered by Saudi Arabia. In this context, political bureau chief of Hamas Khalid Meshaal requested that King Salman bin Abdulaziz mediate with the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood in order to create a new axis.

Ali Abdullah Saleh now finds himself opposed by the Saudis as Riyadh has started to arm Sunni tribes, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in order to realize its new vision for Yemen. At the same time, Riyadh has come to lead a coalition of Arab countries, in addition to Pakistan, against the Houthis under the name “Operation Decisive Storm”. All Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, barring the Sultanate of Oman, are participating in the coalition, including Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Pakistan.

After the declaration of Operation Decisive Storm, the Arab League organized a summit in which an agreement on the establishment of the United Arab Force was reached based on the principle of fighting terrorism and ensuring the security of Arab countries. However, the lack of mandatory participation points to the existence of countries’ different perspectives on the motivations for the establishment of the force. Nevertheless, it is observed that the Saudis insist on the creation of a multilateral military force, regardless of whether or not some Arab countries approve of such action. The fact that Pakistan has also been included in Operation Decisive Storm indicates a signal that the Saudis’ are to allow non-Arab Muslim countries to participate in the events. Iraq, Algeria, Syria and the Sultanate of Oman’s refusal to participate in the Saudi-led operation is also quite telling with regard to the latter’s relations with Iran and the overall balance of power in the region. Libya is divided on the topic. Even though Hafter supported the Tobruk government and Egypt support Operation Decisive Storm, the Trablus government, having lost both international legitimacy and support of the Algerian government, opposes the military intervention conducted by the Saudis and its allies in Yemen.

It could be inferred that after Operation Decisive Storm, the intentions of Saudi Arabia are limited to two main objectives, the first of which is to control Yemen’s domestic political environment by initiating national dialogue between all parties, including the Houthis. Secondly, Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent Iran from becoming an important actor in Yemen by way of the Houthis. Amidst these complex interactions, the West-China equation in the region cannot be overlooked. Japan’s decision to establish a permanent military base in Dijbouti, and therewith, its subsequent entrance into Yemen’s political and security scene is related to Washington’s concerns over China’s control of the critical Bab-el Mendeb Strait. In this context, the Houthi’s dominance over the Strait does not constitute a serious problem compared with the Chinese challenge. In reality, the Houthis presence in the region will actually function to block China’s path to the Mediterranean. Indeed, this would also function to isolate China from the Near East as the Afghanistan-Pakistan axis blocks the country’s entrance to the region in cooperation with Iran.

The post A Pre-Reading Of Operation Decisive Storm In Yemen – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

(Peterson Institute, April 7, 2015) — Good morning. Thank you, Adam, for your kind introduction. I am very pleased to return to the Peterson Institute today. We always appreciate your willingness to provide a setting for informed discussion of global economic issues.

While the IMF Spring Meetings are just around the corner, we are not here to talk about the global economy. Rather, our focus today is Ukraine. Going into the meetings, many will want to have a clear picture of the situation in that country as they seek to understand the risks facing the world, and Europe in particular.

David Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

This audience is fully aware of the importance that the IMF places upon helping Ukraine to achieve financial stability and a return to growth. Less than a month ago, the Fund approved $17.5 billion of financing to Ukraine as part of a four-year program under our Extended Fund Facility. The goals of this program are simple, yet challenging: to stabilize Ukraine’s deeply destabilized finances; to restore growth that has been stagnant for several years; and to support the long-overdue modernization that has lagged behind peers in the region since independence 23 years ago.

I know some have questioned the Fund’s decision to support Ukraine—including here in Washington—and have doubts about the government’s commitment to reform after so many years of delay. So I would like to lay out for you today what Ukraine faces, how the authorities are aiming to address their problems, and why the IMF stands with Ukraine in this time of economic crisis. I would like to do this by reviewing three themes:

• The uneven evolution of Ukraine’s economic transformation since achieving nationhood;
• How a set of serious, but manageable economic difficulties descended into full-blown crisis in the face of the confrontation in the country’s eastern region;
• And Ukraine’s response to that crisis—both the immediate efforts to stabilize the situation and the longer-term program to restore growth and transform the economy.

Ukraine – The Past

So let’s begin by talking about how Ukraine has reached this turning point.

Ukraine generally enters the global news cycle when it is the story of the day: independence in 1991; the Orange Revolution a decade ago; the Maidan protests early last year; and then the conflict with Russia. Of course, what happens when the world is not watching is often just as important.

Sadly, Ukraine since independence has been a story of too many lost opportunities and too much disappointment; economic mismanagement and half-hearted reforms holding back growth; corruption and oligarchy undermining the market economy; and episodes of voter fraud and abuse of power undercutting democracy. The comparison with many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe is striking. Since 1991, Ukraine has had spurts of growth, but has not been able reach a point where reform truly took hold. Ukraine’s per capital income at independence was higher than Poland’s; in 2013, even before the current crisis erupted, the standard of living had fallen more than 60 percent behind Poland. During this interval, Ukraine entered into eight IMF programs, none of which achieved the objective of prompting sustained reform.

After the most recent 2009/10 program, which ended unsuccessfully, Ukraine’s macroeconomic problems intensified. For several years, wages and costs rose, but productivity did not. Eventually competitiveness had slipped so much that GDP stopped rising and exports stagnated. Budget imbalances and gas sector deficits widened enough to add another drag on growth. In early 2013, I visited Kiev to urge the government to address these issues and to warn that Ukraine was slipping toward crisis. Action then might have been possible without crisis and destabilization, but there was not the political will.

Now, Ukraine has the political will, but it has to contend with full-blown economic and financial crisis. And for the first time in a long time a political window of opportunity has opened. The country has elected leaders who are approaching economic policy making with purpose and commitment. President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk are in sync on the main economic issues. And they can call on a more united political class and general public, now more ready to accept changes they had resisted before.

But since taking office, the government has faced a dangerous and rapidly deteriorating economic situation. Last year’s sharp output decline was driven in large measure by the loss of Crimea, the conflict in the Donbass, and a deep recession elsewhere in the Eastern part of the country. As a result, industrial production and construction, retail sales, and household income all have fallen. Unemployment is approaching double digits. Uncertainty has deterred investment. In the fourth quarter of 2014, GDP contracted 14.8 percent from a year earlier.

Ukraine’s financing needs surged. The conflict imposed direct costs, both in terms of output losses and budgetary deterioration. But there also were indirect costs as uncertainties hit the finances of banks and the public sector, and as the foreign exchange market became destabilized. Exports were hit hard by the disruption of trade with Russia and low international prices for grains and steel, major exports. External private financing dried up and capital outflows accelerated. Foreign exchange reserves declined and the exchange rate depreciated sharply. The hryvnia lost two-thirds of its value in the past 15 months. Inflation spiked above 40 percent, reflecting the depreciation but also rising energy prices.

The banking system has come under extreme stress because of fundamental weaknesses in some institutions, but also due to more general financial uncertainty. Deposits fell by 28 percent by end March of this year—and nonperforming loans soared to nearly 20 percent of all loans at the end of 2014. Profitability and liquidity were squeezed, and several banks failed.

The government tried to keep a lid on this very difficult situation. The budget stayed well within its 2014 deficit target. Measures were taken to stabilize the banking system. And governance and structural reforms were initiated. However, the escalation of the conflict in August 2014 and again early this year led to a significant loss of confidence and further disrupted economic activity. Despite gas price increases, the burden of supporting the state-owned energy monopoly Naftogaz and funding energy subsidies equal to more than 7 percent of GDP threatened to drown the government in red ink.

Ukraine – The Present

Following this deterioration, it became increasingly clear that Ukraine’s balance of payments and adjustment needs were more than what could be achieved under the original two year stand-by agreement with the IMF. Responding to the challenges, the government put together an impressive reform blueprint building on its existing macroeconomic program and extending its structural reform effort. The IMF has supported this with a new program approved by the Executive Board on March 11.

From a financing standpoint, the objective of the program is to cover Ukraine’s external financing needs, estimated at about $40 billion over the next four years. While large—equal to nearly one-third of estimated 2014 GDP—most of it is already pledged by the international community, and the rest will take the form of a debt operation under discussion with creditors. This financing will help triple Ukraine’s official reserves to about $18 billion at the end of this year from just $5.6 billion before agreement was reached with the Fund. Reserves then should reach $35 billion by end-2018—slightly more than 100 percent of the Fund’s reserve adequacy metric. This will be an important boost to confidence and should cushion the economy against future external shocks.

This is exactly where IMF financing under the new program is so important. But to release that financing, we needed to see a clear path out of the crisis—and a demonstrated willingness to follow it.

The first economic goal of the program is to stabilize Ukraine’s finances:

That began with the task of restoring stability to the foreign exchange market. By anchoring the program with appropriately tight monetary targets and temporary administrative measures, the hryvnia has stabilized. Using a monetary anchor is the same approach used decisively during the Asian financial crisis and in other successful stabilizations. Recently, the drain on reserves has reversed. With the financing that is already pledged, reserve cover for imports is likely to reach three months by June compared with less than one month’s cover before the IMF agreement. This will result from front loaded Fund disbursements, and bilateral loans and swaps now being arranged.

In addition, a tight monetary stance supported by other policies will help inflation recede toward single digits by end 2016 once the one-off effects from depreciation and gas price hikes subside.

Stabilization will also be supported by addressing the uncertainties that come from Ukraine’s onerous debt burden. The talks that the government is conducting with its creditors to restructure external debt are aimed at that objective. Public and publicly guaranteed debt is projected to peak at 94 percent of GDP in 2015. The aim of the restructuring would be to secure $15 billion in additional financing over 2015-18 to bring debt below 71 percent of GDP by 2020, and avoid bunching the repayment schedule after the Fund-supported program ends.

Ukraine – The Future

But stabilization alone is not enough to address the crisis. Ukraine also needs to restore growth.

The crucial challenge is to restore the competitiveness that was undermined by an overvalued exchange rate. The combination of exchange rate depreciation and flexibility at the hryvnia’s new level is an important step. It is creating the basis for Ukrainian businesses to compete again on international markets.

Similarly, the spending constraints built into the Ukrainian program should restrain the deficits that were crowding out the private sector. This means both the public deficit and the quasi-fiscal deficit imposed by Naftogaz. This, too, is essential to restoring competitiveness.

Here, action on energy prices has been essential. As I’ve indicated, the government has significantly increased household gas prices and heating tariffs. This is important because Ukraine’s gas prices have stood at or below 20 percent of cost recovery. That is well below other energy-importing countries in the region. The remaining 80 percent of costs has added to the broad public sector deficit, and this will now end. To keep this reform from hurting vulnerable members of society, new and strengthened targeted programs are being put in place.

The final step to restore growth is to bring the banking system back to health. The government is working to resolve insolvent banks, including through recapitalization and liquidation. Recapitalization needs are provided for in the program architecture. Going forward, the government will also see that large financial institutions are kept well capitalized by their owners. This should help to reopen the taps to provide sustainable levels of credit to the business community and consumers.

These are all important measures that must be put in place this year. But there are also long-term challenges if Ukraine is to achieve sustained growth into the future and reach a level of development on par with its more successful neighbors. These are the structural reforms needed to create a modern economy that can give renewed confidence to the business community and the general public, and attract needed investment.

For example, there are key structural impediments in the banking system. These include an ownership structure that too often funnels excessive lending to insiders—often with sweetheart deals. The government is starting to address this issue with a strengthened regulatory and supervisory framework intended to bring the banking system into line with international best practices.

There are also a set of needed reforms affecting the business climate. Key policy measures in these areas relate to governance: deregulation and reform of tax administration, transparency, and reforms of state-owned enterprises. Central to this effort will be an independent audit of Naftogaz’s receivables, and a restructuring of the company to separate its transmission and distribution arms.

Finally, nothing is more important than a commitment to tackle corruption. As much as any other grievance, it was this problem that brought the Ukrainian people into the streets during the Maidan protests. The government is addressing the issue with strengthened anti-corruption legislation and measures to enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary. It is also worth noting the recent steps to curb the influence of Ukraine’s oligarchs.

This is an expansive and complex reform effort. Clearly, it will take time and effort to achieve. It is also inevitable that questions will arise about whether the agenda will continue to have the support of the Ukrainian people, particularly those who have been hardest hit by the crisis.

I am impressed that the government has taken steps to address the most vulnerable. Total spending on social assistance programs will reach 4.1 percent of GDP this year, an increase of 30 percent from 2014. Assistance with energy bills—which I mentioned earlier—will in fact quadruple from 6 billion hryvnia in 2014 to 24 billion hryvnia in 2015. Meanwhile, unemployment benefits will rise 15 percent. All this is essential, but at the end of the day it will be sustained and equitable growth that will be most beneficial to the Ukrainian people.

So what about the risks? There is no point in glossing over the situation on the ground in Ukraine. If the conflict in the East of the country intensifies—and we all certainly hope it won’t—then one has to be concerned about the sustainability of the expected recovery. So we can only urge Ukraine and Russia to work with all parties to continue the peace process.

Here in Washington, we are already hearing from critics who question the wisdom of supposedly putting Fund resources at risk in such an uncertain situation. There is only one answer. The Fund’s job is to support members in crisis provided they are trying to put themselves right.

That goal may be hard, but it is not unrealistic. To achieve it, Ukraine must pursue its reform program, and the international community must support that effort. The government has the right plan and the determination to follow through. The program has the backing of the Ukrainian people. So it is only right that we are standing with them. Thank you.

The post The Case For Supporting Ukrainian Economic Reforms – Speech appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena’s visit to Pakistan is a testimony to the strong bonds of friendship between the two countries, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said addressing a joint press conference on Monday.

Prime Minister Sharif said Pakistan and Sri Lanka enjoy excellent relations, based on mutual respect and shared interests. Relations are marked by cordiality and commonality of views on major regional and global issues. Pakistan will further deepen and broaden relations with Sri Lanka in all fields of importance, he said.

Sharif said, “during our talks, President Sirisena and I, reviewed the whole range of Pakistan-Sri Lanka multifaceted bilateral relations. The talks were marked by full trust and complete understanding. Both sides reached a broad consensus on ways and means to further strengthen our bilateral cooperation in a comprehensive manner.”

Sharif  emphasized the need for regular political exchanges between Pakistan and Sri Lanka, including high level visits.

“Sri Lanka enjoys the special position of being the first country with which Pakistan had a Free Trade Agreement (August 2002). The present volume of trade does reflect the true potential. We have agreed to re-invigorate our effort to realize the goal of achieving US$ 1 billion bilateral trade target within the next few years,” Sharif said.

“We discussed cooperation in the field of defence. Sri Lanka has been participating in defense exhibitions in Pakistan, while our naval ships have regularly called on the Sri Lankan ports,” Sharif  said

Sharif  added, “We agreed on the importance of tourism and the people-to-people contacts between our two countries. Sporting ties, especially in Cricket, have created special bonds between our two peoples.” “We discussed the regional situation and the need for the cooperation between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. I informed the President that Pakistan is focused on growth and development to ensure prosperity to our people. To this end, we want peaceful relations with all our neighbors,” he said.

“The meeting also allowed us to discuss cooperation between Pakistan and Sri Lanka at the multilateral forums, especially SAARC,” the Prime Minister said.

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During an interview on the “Las Mañanas” program broadcast by RNE, Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said he feels “very happy” with the unemployment and National Insurance data from the month of March, which were released on Monday.

In Rajoy’s opinion, “there has been a change in trend”. As regards economic growth for 2015, Mariano Rajoy said it would be “wonderful” if the forecasts from the Bank of Spain were attained, which suggest a figure of 2.8%.

Rajoy explained that the 160,000 new National Insurance contributors in March represent “the best result since current records began”. He went on to add it is “sensational” that 60,000 people left the unemployed lists in the same month. In his opinion, these data offer “justified hope of finding a job to all those who have yet to do so”. He stressed that the data are good even when analysed in seasonally-adjusted terms.

As regards the quality of the jobs being created, Rajoy underlined the fact that “approximately 75% of all people with a job in Spain have a permanent employment contract”. He recalled that some jobs, such as those in the hotel and catering industry or farming, are seasonal jobs where permanent employment contracts are hard to find.

Unemployment rose by 9.2% in 2011, while it is falling by 7.2% in 2015

Rajoy said that the positive National Insurance and employment data from March can be added to the results from the two previous months (January and February), which were also highly positive, even though these months are traditionally the worst for finding a job. However, “for the first time in many years, the first three months of 2015 are proving positive”.

The Prime Minister stressed that, when his government came to power, unemployment was growing at a rate of 9.2%, whereas it is now falling at a rate of 7.2% because “there has been a change in trend”.

Even though “we are on the right path”, Rajoy said that “we need to persevere” to achieve the target he himself set – for over 500,000 jobs to be created in 2015. Hence, between 2014 and 2015, one million people would be able to leave the unemployment lists. “If we keep this up, in the next four-year legislature, we can reach the figure of 20 million people in work”. He explained that this employment growth is bringing increased revenue for the Social Security system and the State, meaning that “services will improve”.
Economic growth above 2.4% in 2015

Rajoy said that the economic forecasts to be sent to Brussels at the end of April will include a growth figure of over 2.4%. The forecast from the Bank of Spain is 2.8% and, should this achieved, “it would be wonderful growth, the best anywhere in the European Union”, he said.

Furthermore, Rajoy said that he was forced to take “tough decisions” because of a shortfall of 90 billion euros between what was being spent and what was being collected in revenue, among other reasons. Spain was having problems obtaining financing and stood on the brink of bankruptcy. Taxes were increased as a result, although some have started to come down in 2015 and will continue to do so in 2016. As regards the so-called cultural VAT, he said that “no decision has yet been taken” because it will depend on the revenue figures.

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Even though a decision has not been reached on a precise date for the general elections, Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said they will “more than likely” be held at the end of the year because “legislatures must reach their full term”.

In this regard, Rajoy added that he wants “to try and stand as a candidate,” for Prime Minister because “what matters most to me right now is to be able to maintain the economic policy we have put in place and that is working in our country, into the future.”

Rajoy made the comments during an interview on the “Las Mañanas” program broadcast by RNE on Monday.

As regards the new political forces that have emerged on the Spanish political stage, Rajoy said that the economic crisis has led EU citizens to seek answers beyond the scope of the traditional parties. France has the party led by Le Pen. The United Kingdom has the anti-European UKIP. Italy has a party led by comedian Beppe Grillo and Greece has Tsiriza.

Nonetheless, Rajoy noted, “PP and PSOE came first and second” in the most recent elections.

In this regard, the Prime Minister said that “governing is very difficult; on the other hand, talking and commenting is quite a bit easier”. Rajoy went on to add that anything new “enjoys the benefit of the doubt”, although “it would not be the best idea to commit to parties whose ideology is entirely unknown”.

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By Veeramalla Anjaiah*

Is Vietnam a friend of China or a foe? Given more than a thousand years of a “love-hate” relationship, it is difficult to say, but this week’s historic visit of Vietnam’s Communist Party Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong to China will certainly determine the course of their capricious relations.

After China’s illegal deployment of a large oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea last May and subsequent protests and violent riots against Chinese companies in Vietnam, the 65-year-old relationship reached its nadir. Trong’s visit will be the first step in repairing those strained relations.

Surprisingly, it can be noted that it was none other than the powerful Chinese Communist Party chief and China’s President Xi Jinping who invited Trong to Beijing. Trong is currently in China for a four-day visit from April 7 to April 10.

There is another dimension to the visit, which comes just ahead of Trong’s first ever historic visit to Vietnam’s former foe, the United States, and US President Barack Obama’s visit to Hanoi later this year.

This year, Vietnam’s Communist Party will be hosting its 12th National Party Congress. So the outcome of Trong’s visits to Beijing and Washington will later become major input for the congress to set the country’s future policy goals.

What is at stake? Why this sudden change in China’s foreign policy?

Despite numerous disputes and two wars (1979 and 1988) with China over the disputed South China Sea, Vietnam has always sincerely wanted good and friendly relations with its giant neighbor. It does not want a confrontation with China. In line with its twin tenets of foreign policy, doi tac (objects of cooperation) and doi tuong (objects of struggle), Vietnam strongly supports multilateralism in internal relations and would like to have an independent foreign policy as well as friendship with all countries.

Since the normalization of its diplomatic relations with China in 1991, Vietnam opened its doors to Chinese investors, traders and tourists. Bilateral trade ballooned to US$21 billion in 1998 from a mere $23.23 million in 1991.

Putting aside the oil rig deployment saga and violent protests, China remained Vietnam’s biggest trading partner in 2014 with a record high of $58.76 billion in bilateral trade, which was higher than Southeast Asia’s biggest economy – Indonesia – with $48.23 billion in bilateral trade with China in the same year. But like Indonesia, Vietnam also suffered a huge trade deficit of $28.96 billion with China as Vietnam’s exports to China stood at $14.90 billion while imports were $43.86 billion last year.

Both China and Vietnam are ruled by communist parties, which are the biggest in the world. They do not want to lose control of government due to rapid economic development in recent decades, because of their adoption of capitalist free-market economic policies.

It was not the first time that President Xi had made a friendly gesture to his Vietnam counterpart. First, Xi sent a special envoy, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, in mid-June 2014 to Hanoi to break the ice. After the removal of the Chinese rig from Vietnamese waters, the Vietnamese Communist Party sent its politburo member Le Hong Anh to Beijing in August 2014 to mend ties. Since then, both countries softened their stances and reduced rhetoric on the South China Sea issue.

Another gesture came from Xi early this year when he had a telephone conversion with Trong directly on Feb. 11 to convey China’s intentions to boost bilateral relations and congratulate the Vietnamese Communist Party on its 85th anniversary as well as convey Lunar New Year greetings.

During his conversation, Xi emphasized the 4Gs – good neighbors, good friends, good comrades and good partnership. He further said that China wanted to push the bilateral relationship forward under the motto of “friendly neighbors, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability and future visions”.

From China’s perspective, Vietnam is a key neighboring, strategic and communist country. That is why the Chinese Communist Party began providing aid to Vietnam for its liberation in 1949. During the 1950-1978 period, based on Chinese estimates, Beijing provided up to $20 billion worth of assistance to Vietnam.

China always wanted a close relationship with Vietnam. But Hanoi did not like big brother’s behavior on many issues. Among them, China’s nine-dash line – the mother of all disputes and tensions in South China Sea – was the most visible. China’s aggressive and unilateral policy on the South China Sea turned communist neighbors into adversaries. Otherwise, both would have enjoyed more productive relations.

Yet, both China and Vietnam in recent years have wanted to build a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership”.

Trong’s visit and China’s rapprochement come at critical juncture. China was alarmed by Obama’s so-called “Pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia in 2011.

Beijing was also not happy with fast-growing strategic relations, both in economic and defense fields, between Hanoi and Washington. Due to China’s growing assertiveness in line with its economic weight and military might, more foreign powers like the US, India, Australia and New Zealand entered the fray to take on China in the pretext of law-based code of conduct and freedom of navigation in South China Sea.

China’s other neighbor, Japan, a former foe and world’s third biggest economy, is also actively helping ASEAN countries to formulate a common stand on maritime security and a rule-based regional security architecture, in which China considers that Japan has been gathering all of ASEAN’s members against it.

ASEAN and Indonesia consider Trong’s visit as a breakthrough in cooling tensions. The good relations between Vietnam and China are good for not only themselves but also the entire region.

Apparently, Vietnam has been playing a smart diplomatic game, which is called “diplomatic balancing”. Hanoi has been sending strong signals to Beijing that if China continues its assertiveness, it will look west to seek strong support from the US and Japan. If China makes concessions like a legally-binding code of conduct and
provides “strategic trust”, Vietnam will be ready to forge a new friendship and strategic partnership with China.

Vietnam is always cautious when dealing with China. It feels that its growing relations with global powers will not affect its traditional ties with Beijing.

China, on the other hand, is not in a mood for a major conflict, which could badly affect its rise as a new global power. Xi’s move to invite Trong to Beijing is the right step in the right direction. If both Xi and Trong agree on putting aside their differences on the South China Sea issue, focusing on strengthening bilateral ties and push forward new initiatives to maintain peace and security in the region, it will certainly boost the image of both Xi and China.

*The writer is an author and a senior journalist living in Jakarta.

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