By Sheel Kant Sharma*

Is the spectre of a nuclear armed Iran set to vanish – as signalled by the diplomatic breakthrough achieved last Thursday in Lausanne between Iran and its interlocutors comprising the P5, Germany and the European Union? The understanding reached by them on the parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is truly historic as a triumph of diplomacy.

Eight days of hard negotiations hounded by uncertainty and suspense about an impending stalemate finally yielded the announcement by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on Thursday evening formalising the promise of a comprehensive agreement by June 30; an agreement to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme, to be scaled down substantially, would remain exclusively peaceful, fully transparent and subject to intensive monitoring and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The US and EU would in turn lift nuclear related sanctions against Iran in a phased manner and would also revoke the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Iran would reduce the capacity to enrich uranium by two thirds, keep it only at one location at Natanz; reduce its stockpile of low 3.6% enriched uranium from nearly eight tons to just about 300 kilograms, redesign its heavy water research reactor at Arak to cut risks of plutonium production and stop enrichment in its deep underground facility at Fordow. The phased relaxation of sanctions in return for these steps would be snapped back if constant monitoring and inspections by the IAEA revealed any discrepancies in implementation of the commitments made by Iran. All restrictions and transparency obligations on Iran will be in force for at least 10 years, though longer duration of 15 years and beyond also figure in certain aspects.

The statements made at the highest level by US, France, UK and Iran have since reinforced the promised breakthrough which is strongly welcomed by China, Russia and most world leaders except Israel and some of Iran’s Gulf neighbours. Considering that just two years back war clouds loomed large over the Middle East as some kind of inescapable option to prevent an Iranian bomb, it marks an extraordinary success of constructive and fruitful engagement of the world powers with Iran for a negotiated settlement of all the issues involved. Parallels are drawn on the one hand with far reaching landmark accords like Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972 while on the other hand domestic critics of President Barack Obama, in sync with Israeli leaders, are busy pouring scorn over the understandings as capitulation to Iran’s deceptions and abetting of an Iranian bomb.

President Obama in his statement described the achievements made by the negotiators in Lausanne in most reassuring terms by affirming how this outcome is preferable to the other two options of going to war or persisting with more sanctions on Iran. He also emphasized that the success of this breakthrough would absolutely depend upon the intrusive verification and monitoring by the IAEA of Iranian commitments to an exclusively peaceful program. These commitments are to last longer than the ten year period during which the severe restraints on Iran’s enrichment capacity will remain in force so as to ensure that the so called break out period would be at least a year. President Obama expressed confidence that the world would know in case any attempt were made by Iran to break out during this period.

Since almost all obligations arising out of these understandings will apply to Iran, its acceptance in return for lifting of sanctions shows the critical importance of what it expects from the promised deal. Iran is looking to joining the international community as a normal nation free of the restrictions on trade, investment, banking and personnel that were put in place under various sanctions. Iran has bargained for its oil exports returning to a normal level and removal of banking blockade on revenues earned. Iran’s people, particularly the young, welcome the breakthrough in the expectation of getting connected to the world in multiple ways. The phasing and pace of the relaxation of sanctions therefore will be critical to the success of the entire arrangement of drastic scaling down of their nuclear programme under strict monitoring and verification.

The understanding at present will hopefully facilitate hard work over the next three months to remove ambiguities and persisting gaps in mutual expectations of both sides. As declared separately to their respective audiences by both US and Iranian leaders, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. At the same time, the past 18 months since November 2013 have demonstrated how the interim arrangements have worked well as borne out by the periodic reports of the IAEA and scrupulous releases of promised funds per accepted schedule. There is no reason to doubt that this experience has created a positive bias for success of the ensuing process and would endure.

Both sides have maintained that the outcome of their negotiations is focused only on the nuclear issue but repeated assertion of this aspect may reflect a double entendre in tacit admission of the larger implication of such a diplomatic breakthrough between Iran and the West. Its impact on a major transformation of the strategic orientation and geopolitics of the Middle East cannot be obscured any longer.

Iran’s entry in the global oil market will stabilize crude prices at lower levels. Iran’s joining the global economy will bring a large resource rich country on board and may in due course help growth. Iran’s cooperation can be critical in meeting the challenges of the ISIS brand of brutality and terror that menaces the region.

As seen from Delhi and as promptly welcomed by the government of India a successful deal with Iran promised in Lausanne is more likely to be beneficial to regional stability and global economy and the apprehensions about its future praxis may well turn out to be ephemeral .

*Sheel Kant Sharma is a former ambassador. He has served as secretary general of the SAARC Secretariat based in Kathmandu; Permanent Representative to UN Office in Vienna & IAEA and as Indian Governor to IAEA Board of Governors (2004-2008) . He can be contacted at sheelkant@yahoo.com

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By Amit Dasgupta and Britta Petersen*

Ever since he took over ten months ago, PM Modi has rejuvenated Indian business and international interlocutors with his personal interest in projecting India as a credible global player. But, more importantly, it is his innate ability to establish personal equations with his counterparts that has surprised everyone. This has come as a welcome change from the near standstill performance of UPA2 when India slipped in the international pecking order. Today, once again, there is genuine enthusiasm on the opportunities thatIndia, under an assertive Prime Minister, can offer.

Later next week, PM Modi will be in Germany, where India is the Guest Country at the Hannover Trade Fair. He would receive a genuinely warm welcome. Chancellor Merkel has made it apparent that she looks forward to the visit and in further intensifying cooperation with India. This is good news because there is much to learn from the Germans and furthermore, Germany has proved itself, over the years, to be a reliable partner.

The personal rapport that PM Modiis able to establish with Chancellor Merkel and especially with German business and industry may well provide the much-needed support for his flagship Make in India project. When German Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble was in India earlier this year, he was fully supportive of the project and saw win-win opportunities, especially, in the manufacturing and automotive sector for German and Indian industry. The automotive components manufacturers could, indeed, receive a huge fillip in addition to software companies, particularly dealing with GPS. There are many other areas of common interest such as green technologies, renewable energies and the rapidly growing demand for skill development in India.

It bears recalling that, following independence, India’s fledgling vocational training sector was, in fact, built through the significant support it received from the German company Siemens. Siemens had entered the Indian market in 1867 and continues to grow. In the early years, German engineers would man even the floor shops. Following the introduction of the Marshall Plan, Germany required its own engineers to rebuild its war-ravaged cities and economy. Consequently, it could no longer afford to send its engineers to India and needed to rely on Indian engineers to service its factories here. This led to a massive training programme that also saw lathe machines and other equipment being shipped to India. The objective was to enable German-trained engineers and operators to start imparting training in India to build a cadre of qualified operators and supervisors thereby ensuring continuity in technical personnel for Siemens factories in India. This was the real birth of India’s vocational training programme.

Once when Heinrich von Pierer, the then Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Siemens, was asked how the company viewed India, he said matter-of-factly that Siemens believed in building long-term relationships with reliable partners, which was why they had been in India for well over 150 years. Today, it is this tried and tested relationship that PM Modi needs to deepen, intensify and consolidate. The Make in India project might well emerge as the next best thing that happened to Indo-German relations, given the German penchant for training, performance and quality. But for this to happen, certain factors need to be kept in mind:

First, it needs to be recognized that the current discussion on whether one should make for or in India is a non-starter because neither is mutually exclusive. PM Modi is not advocating increasing exports and decreasing imports through the make in India policy but rather that Indian technical standards and quality assurance be raised substantially to conform to global standards. In today’s rapidly globalizing world, no country can cater to domestic consumers through its own manufacturing sector. Imports, in other words, will always take place but the Make in India project will considerably flatten the playing field and enable the manufacture of quality products in the domestic market, including for export;

Second, the Modi government needs to urgently clarify the contours of its project because, at present, considerable fuzziness exists as was embarrassingly and publicly acknowledged at the recent Aero India show. The project is currently perceived as a technical barrier to market access and could act as a disincentive to FDI and joint ventures in view of enhanced cost implications, as US industry complained during US Secretary Kerry’s visit. For the defence sector, in particular, there will be ramifications that need to be ironed out at the earliest, so that supply and manufacture of defence equipments are not delayed;

Third, the Prime Minister’s project may well trigger the much-required next generation reforms in India’s vocational training and skilling programme, where both quality and outreach will be the key. India’s much-touted demographic dividend is in grave danger of becoming a demographic drawback if her young are not skilled to contribute to the development story. Indeed, large numbers of unemployable youth could well become a security problem, as they could fall easy prey to criminal and terrorist activities.

India does not have a robust apprenticeship programme, which is also a sector that has, for social reasons, received scant attention. Stigma attached to blue-collar jobs has tended to allow government focus to be directed to higher education. Today persons would join polytechnics only if they were unable to join an engineering institution. Consequently, not only has the apprenticeship sector been largely ignored but also poor quality institutions that claim to offer an engineering degree have mushroomed. The majority of these institutions produce graduates who are unemployable. They are also supply, rather than demand, driven.

Countries that enjoy a strong growth story, such as Germany, Japan, Australia and others, recognize the importance of a strong apprenticeship sector. In the Philippines, for instance, which is presently registering the highest growth in the ASEAN region, the government regularly conducts apprenticeship workshops for plumbers, fitters, masons, carpenters and others, including for those in the service sector, such as, care-giving, nursing, housekeeping, hair-dressing, cooking, serving tables, bartending and domestic help. This enables the production of a quality workforce. But this also requires a fundamental shift in the mind-set where the service sector is accorded respect and not seen as some kind of menial activity that does not require investment in quality skilling.

For an India desirous of entering the global market as a credible player, this is unacceptable. The situation can only be reversed if compromises on quality are not made to cater to the high demand for jobs. Indeed, as per current estimates, India needs to create 1 million new jobs every day. Furthermore, over the next few years, India will require 1 million teachers, 1000 new universities and 55,000 polytechnics. This is easier said than done. The government needs to recognize that this is, even theoretically, an insurmountable challenge, unless the sector is aggressively opened up for foreign participation.

For the Make in India project to succeed, PM Modi needs to focus first on skilling India. One can only make if one is skilled enough to do so. Furthermore, it is the vocational education and skilling sector that is likely to absorb the maximum number of job seeking individuals and those who could play a critical role in ensuring the success of PM’s flagship project; and

Fourth, the Germans have the proven qualifications to engage strongly with India to create a robust apprenticeship programme that would cater to India’s development demands in terms of qualified personnel. The country has a long history of successful skill development through it’s so called “Dual System” that involves business and industry in the training of its workforce as well as state run and private schools. As a result, Germany has the lowest unemployment rate among youth in the European Union. Furthermore, although companies have to spend for the education of their trainees, they are usually able to recoup a substantial portion of this investment by getting the skill set they set out to achieve to be competitive in the global market.

It might not be possible to replicate the German system but elements could be incorporated into the Indian approach. Earlier this year, a fact finding mission of the German “Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit” (GIZ) visited Delhi to discuss, how the bilateral cooperation could include industry participation.
In February, the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce (IGCC) in Pune together with the Don Bosco Private Industrial Training Institute (DBPITI) launched a pilot project for the training of metal workers that includes some of the member companies of IGCC. It would be in India’s interest if the Germany visit saw a concrete programme charted out in consultation with the German government, business and industry to introduce the next generation of training in India’s vocational and apprenticeship sector.

The German Chancellor is hoping the visit will see stronger bilateral partnership. The Prime Minister has already demonstrated his willingness to transform the Indian economy. Collaboration on his flagship project may well take the relationship to a substantially higher level. In any case, unless India takes bold and decisive steps in this field, transformational change will continue to be elusive.

*Amit Dasgupta was Deputy Ambassador of India in Berlin from September 2002 – January 2007. He currently heads the Mumbai campus of the SP Jain School of Global Management; Britta Petersen is the former South Asia correspondent of the German Financial Times and a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi

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Despite a mutual desire for cooperation, relations between Washington and Beijing will remain tense for the foreseeable future. Today, Denny Roy cites two reasons why – 1) Beijing doesn’t appreciate how the existing East Asian order has contributed to its prosperity, and 2) its historical fear of encirclement has decreased.

By Denny Roy*

It should not be surprising that China is demanding more influence over its external environment as its relative power increases. This has presented the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies with a difficult challenge. This bloc of states upholds a particular regional order—a collection of institutions and norms that regulate international affairs. The current order reflects American values and interests, but most Asia-Pacific states have supported the arrangement because it affords them prosperity and security.

Both China and the United States want very much to avoid conflict. US officials have consistently said they “welcome” a stronger and more prosperous China, and in fact actual US policy does not inhibit China’s rise (although US policy does provide for an insurance policy of security cooperation should China threaten US allies). PRC officials tout a “new type of great power relations,” which begins with the hope of avoiding great power military conflict. War would clearly be disastrous for both sides, as well as for many other countries in the region. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why China may seek to dismantle the existing order: 1) Beijing fails to recognize the importance of the existing regional order to its prosperity, and 2) its fear of encirclement is decreasing. This means that a sustained period of high tension between Beijing and Washington remains likely.

Collision course?

Despite the mutual desire that cooperation rather than conflict should define the US-China relationship, bilateral strategic relations continue to gradually deteriorate. Essentially, the PRC is not satisfied with the extent of US accommodation for its rise as a great power, even though that accommodation is greater than Washington usually gets credit for. Some analysts blame the United States for seeking too much control over a region too far from the US homeland. Most Chinese would take this position, arguing that, contrary to US rhetoric, the attempt to dominate Asia serves only American interests and, on balance, increases insecurity and injustice in the region. Beijing was especially dismayed at the Obama Administration’s announcement of a strategic ‘pivot’ to Asia (later called the ‘re-balance’) in the midst of a financial crisis that Chinese hoped would finally undermine the United States’ superpower status and bring about a multipolar world.

While the United States insists on maintaining its leadership position as supporter and enforcer of the liberal regional order, China implicitly demands a leadership position and deferential treatment in its own neighborhood. The immediate and most serious manifestation of this clash is increased pressure throughout the region to accept Chinese sovereignty claims in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and over Taiwan, matters in which many Chinese perceive the United States to be “interfering.” More broadly, China intends to pursue its own interests in contravention of at least some important aspects of the US-led regional order. Although China participates in the global free trade regime, its violations of World Trade Organization principles are frequent and extensive, and its compliance appears to be tactical rather than reflective of a deep commitment to liberal trade. China has signed international covenants on protecting human rights and preventing WMD proliferation but has not lived up to these covenants. Unlike the Western countries, China is not generally supportive of democratization and good governance in the developing world. Beijing also uses coercion against smaller neighbors with which it has political or strategic disputes.

There are at least two reasons why it may not be possible to deter China from undermining the current order. First, Beijing does not necessarily value the current order as highly as do US friends and allies in the region, especially when a possible alternative order would be China-centered. This is despite the fact that the rise of China is largely made possible by the free trade and secure environment underpinned by the regional order. Foreign investment and the export of Chinese goods to foreign markets have fed the remarkable GDP growth rate of about 8 percent annually since the beginning of the post-Mao era, which began in earnest in 1978. The United States, in particular, has done more than any single country to abet China’s rise. Washington currently tolerates a staggering annual trade deficit with China of $600 billion (an issue whose political salience in America has faded even as the deficit grows larger). If China believes the current regional order and a cooperative relationship with the United States are essential to Chinese economic development, Beijing will have a powerful incentive to avoid jeopardizing these relationships. After the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 by a US aircraft, the PRC’s Politburo Standing Committee under Jiang Zemin reportedly considered taking a confrontational posture toward the United States, but decided China’s most pressing interests compelled Beijing to stay the course.

Yet most Chinese today do not credit either the United States or the regional order for their recent prosperity. Rather, they routinely accuse the United States of trying to suppress Chinese growth and development, emphasizing that the regional order is a product of Western power and was made largely without Chinese input.

A second reason why China feels freer to oppose current order is that China’s fear of encirclement is decreasing. From the beginning of China’s ‘rise’ in the Deng era, Beijing has had a keen grasp of the historical problem of an upstart great power being militarily encircled by its fearful neighbors. The strenuous efforts of Chinese officials to assure other countries in the region that a stronger China will not be a threat to their autonomy or security demonstrate that avoiding encirclement has been a high Chinese priority. The late Deng Xiaoping advised his successors in the Chinese leadership to keep a low profile while building up the economic foundation of Chinese power. Specifically, he counseled Chinese leaders to defer from taking the lead in international affairs, to stay calm in the face of foreign impudence, and to avoid confrontations with adversaries as much as possible. His advice implied that at some future time, when the rebuilding period was accomplished, a bolder Chinese posture would be appropriate and feasible. Until recently, outsiders could rely on the fear of encirclement to moderate Chinese foreign policy behavior.

China’s is now the world’s second-largest economy and is expected to surpass the size of the US economy within a few years. China is the largest trading partner of most of the Asia-Pacific countries. In the minds of most observers, an unofficial “G2” effectively exists in Asia. Chinese and many others believe US power is in inexorable decline. Although China still values a constructive relationship with America, the Chinese are far less dependent on US goodwill for the achievement of their basic goals than they were in the 1990s. The relationship is far more equal now, with the Chinese more confident in demanding accommodation and concessions.

China’s moment?

In recent years many Chinese elites have called for Deng’s advice to be retired now that China is a major power. As part of the trend, demanding stronger Chinese input into the management of international issues is apparently one of the main points of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s agenda. Xi’s foreign policy thus far has included a call for the United States to cease “interfering” and let Asians provide for Asia’s security, strong unilateral steps to increase China’s claim to some (unspecified) level of ownership over the South China Sea (including building military bases on reclaimed land), and a willingness to take risks as a way of pressuring Tokyo over territory in the East China Sea disputed between Japan and China.

Many Chinese commentators now argue that the time has come to teach ‘disrespectful’ foreigners such as the Japanese, Americans, Vietnamese, Indians and Filipinos a lesson about Chinese strength and resolve. Some jarring Chinese moves, including the declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea (Overlapping Japan’s), were arguably in response to acts by China’s rivals. But other Chinese activities go beyond keeping pace with potential adversaries. China’s dispatch of a deep-water oil-drilling rig, ringed by an armada of protective escort ships, to the waters inside Vietnam’s EEZ to assert China’s disputed claim of sovereignty seemed a premeditated step designed to extend the political boundary markers in China’s favor. After a 2012 incident at disputed Scarborough Shoal, which is inside the Philippines’ EEZ in the South China Sea, China permanently occupied the feature, a change from the previous status quo. China’s military budget has seen increases of 10 percent or more nearly every year for two decades, and China’s officially reported defense spending (significantly understated, according to experts) is on track to surpass the combined military budgets of all the Western European countries combined by 2024. The recent confirmation by Chinese officials that China plans to build a second aircraft carrier was a contrast to the secrecy and denials surrounding the acquisition of what became the Liaoning, China’s first carrier. The inescapable conclusion is that Beijing worries less than before about alarming other governments by flexing its muscles. There seems to be less emphasis on assurance and more on signaling to other countries that the time has come to shift their allegiance.

Under the present conditions, the outlook is a long period of high tension, ultimately resolved either by war, by one side acquiescing due to lack of confidence that it will ultimately prevail, or by the two sides gradually reaching compromises over the main issues that divide them.

*Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

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By Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy*

Since the Yemen crisis escalated and Saudi Arabia launched its ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ on the Houthi rebels in Yemen, India, with the combined effort of its navy, air force (IAF) and Air India, and complemented by impeccable coordination between the Ministry of External Affairs, state governments and the Indian Railways, have successfully evacuated over 3,000 Indian nationals and some foreign nationals to safety through its ‘Operation Raahat’.

This is not the first time India has successfully carried out large-scale evacuations of its citizens. In fact, India has maintained an impeccable record in this area – be it successfully evacuating over 176,000 Indians from Iraq during the first Gulf War, over 10,000 individuals during the 2006 Lebanon crisis, and most recently in 2014, from Iraq after the Islamic State overran some of its territories, among others. Therefore it is unsurprising that New Delhi was able to mobilise and act swiftly in record time at short notice, especially given the easy access to the Gulf of Aden.

This brings to fore the credibility of the assertion that India is a ‘Net Security Provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

In record time, India deployed INS Mumbai, INS Sumitra, INS Tarkash, MV Corals and MV Kavaratti for rescue via sea; and the IAF’s three C-17 Globemaster aircraft and three Air India passenger planes for rescue via air. Simultaneously, the Ministry of External Affairs has been in close communication and negotiations with Saudi Arabia to aid evacuation efforts.

The flawless execution of this operation comes at a time when New Delhi has been ramping up its engagements and relationships with Indian Ocean littoral countries, most recently made evident in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s March 2015 visits to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. The Maldives too was on the original agenda, but due to Maldivian domestic issues, Modi chose to skip the country.

This is India’s ‘Net Security Provider’ moment. New Delhi must seize this moment and establish itself as a responsible, credible, and reliable actor in the IOR; and must do so via action more than words – as it has demonstrated in the country’s stellar performance in the evacuation efforts in Yemen.

According to MEA spokesperson Syed Akbaruddin, as on April 7, India has helped evacuate 232 nationals from 26 countries from Yemen. While doing so, India has shown its capability to act towards what it vocalised that it aims for. The Yemen evacuation will definitely go a long way in building a favourable reputation of India in the IOR littoral countries – that which India has been vigorously attempting to achieve, in the light of China’s inroads in the region.

As far as IOR island nations are concerned, India already has several active engagements vis-à-vis maritime security purposes such as patrolling, counter-piracy operations, data-sharing, and search and rescue operations. India also serves a shared responsibility of maintaining the security and stability of and in the IOR via multilateral platforms such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

In the past few years, the significance of the Indian Ocean has risen dramatically, and India has been struggling to compete with China’s forays in the region. Though New Delhi might find it difficult to match Beijing’s economic inroads in the region’s littoral countries, there is one area it has advantage over the latter.

With a strong navy, assisted by sheer geographical advantage, for New Delhi, employing its strong naval capabilities to ensure order at sea, and for aid during times of humanitarian crises and similar scenarios is the only way and only credible area where it can demonstrate its importance as greater than China’s, in the IOR. Without coming across as aggressive. India must leverage it. Additionally, the responsiveness shown by the Indian side in the Yemen evacuation towards rescuing nationals from almost all IOR littoral countries (and other non-IOR littorals), including Pakistan (to which they amply reciprocated in a similar measure) exhibits New Delhi’s willingness to keep bilateral differences aside and coordinate effectively in times of humanitarian crisis.

To that end, India must build on this moment and intensify cooperation with other navies in the region – especially in specific areas such as information sharing, and via institutionalised coordination by identifying common minimum agendas in the IOR. From what has transpired in the IOR over the past few years, it appears that there indeed exists a substantial common minimum and a credible intent to cooperate with each other towards achieving those goals. But it also appears that despite the ubiquity of useful security mechanisms both individual national and collective, and active interaction, there is a consistent absence of coordination – caused due to several conveniently resolvable hiccups. The most important among them is the absence of a collective regional institutionalisation of the various maritime security-related mechanisms and processes put in place by different IOR countries.

At a time when almost all regional actors, including Australia, are in the process of revamping their naval capacities/strategies, thoughtful progress on this front will go a long way in weeding out potential spoilers. And given the relevance at the moment, this would be a good time to set in motion procedures that would simplify for all IOR countries the maintenance of maritime security and stability in the region through whose sea lanes trillions of dollars worth of trade takes place.

Lastly, this would also be a good time for India to lie low or even scrap its stance of opposing the presence of foreign navies in the region. The time is to appear confident, not insecure, and we have good reasons for the former; but while doing so, New Delhi would do well to remember to not be overbearing towards any entity – first, to ensure civility, and second, because it is simply unnecessary.

*Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy is Research Officer (IReS), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS). She can be reached at RajeshVvari@gmail.com

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By James Borton*

The South China Sea remains at the epicenter of one of the most volatile maritime areas in the world, with little or no agreement on sovereignty claims to the ownership of atolls, submerged banks, islands, reefs and rocks. Yet South China Sea fishermen, marine biologists, and policy shapers agree that without an end to unsustainable fishing practices and urgent adoption of environmental protection measures, a catastrophic marine biodiversity and fishery collapse is imminent.

Beijing’s accelerated land reclamation over these specks of rock in the roiling sea is increasing friction among other claimants like Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, the Chinese-directed Spratly Island building expansion on the Johnson, Cuarteron, and Gaven reefs wrecks rich fishing grounds and valuable coral reefs in the archipelago.

The daily dumping of landfill with sand dug from nearby reefs by Chinese laborers, “upsets the marine ecology of the region, completely destroying the formed coral reefs that are hundreds of millions years old. At the same time these actions destroy the habitat of many marine species. Protecting the marine ecological environment is a global issue and citizens all over the world are responsible for that,” claims Dr. Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute for Strategy and Science and a recognized expert on the South China Sea.

Flashpoints continue in the Scarborough Shoals with critical potential at the Paracel Islands, (China occupied, Vietnam claimed). At this desolate rock formation of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Chinese vessels violently ram Filipino fishermen boats and illegally remove endangered giant clams.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) senior fellow Gregory Poling believes “anxiety and the expanded patrol and surveillance capacity that Beijing is constructing with facilities, docks, and probably at least one airstrip in the Spratly Islands will complicate the disputes in the South China Sea.” Satellite images confirm the Middle Kingdom’s illegitimate territorial expansions, raising fresh concerns from the United States and Asia.

Last year, the international media was drawn to the standoff between China’s $1 billion forty-story oil rig parked approximately 120 miles from Vietnam’s coast, near islands claimed by both countries. This test of geopolitical limits resulted in China removing its rig but not its resolve.

China Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s claims, “we are in this boat together with more than 190 other countries. So of course we don’t want to upset the boat, rather we want to work with other passengers to make sure this boat will sail forward steadily and in the right direction.” This diplomatic metaphor does nothing to diminish the Middle Kingdom’s worsening coastal fishing crisis that propels their streamlined steel trawlers into deeper contested waters. In response, Vietnam’s fishermen have been granted generous soft loans to replace their traditional wooden boats with steel hulls. Hanoi recently trumpeted that the country will have 30,000 new trawlers plying the East Sea and beyond by 2020.

Policy shapers and researchers believe whether or not there is a repeat appearance of the oil rig HD 981 or redeployment of the Hainan Baosha 001, a 32,000 ton fish factory vessel with its four processing plants and 600 workers, it “ raises legitimate questions about the basis of China’s claim to fish in the East Sea,” claims, Youna Lyons, a senior research fellow at National University of Singapore. After all, exhaustion of fish stocks belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines are a direct violation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Marine science and geopolitics are converging more than ever in the South China Sea.

The food security and renewable fish resource challenges are clear. According to a World Bank Fisheries Outlook, “Fish to 2030: Prospects for Fisheries and Aquaculture,” China will increasingly influence the global fish markets. A baseline model projects that China will account for 38 percent of global fish consumption by 2030.3The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) confirms that the South China Sea accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish catches. A clear trend is emerging: overfishing and widespread destruction of coral reefs.

Marine scientists express concern for the plight of the region’s hard and soft corals, parrot fish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks. From Vietnam’s coastal areas to Hainan Island, the region has a 60 percent coral life and 50 percent fish species decline respectively. El Nino (2008) caused short-term increases in water temperature, resulting in widespread coral bleaching and death of precious coral formations.

A perfect storm is swiftly blowing across the region, like a fast moving typhoon. The litany of intractable issues mount daily: global warming, destruction of reefs, overfishing, destructive fishing practices, advancing technology, an increase in the number of state-of–the-art fishing boats, unregulated fisheries, and population growth.

Bill Hayton’s The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia asserts that overfishing remains one of the major issues that must be addressed in the region since China encourages its fishermen to trawl through contested waters. “During the 2012 (fishing) ban, the Hainan Province Department of Ocean and Fisheries organized the largest-ever Chinese fishing fleet to reach the (Spratly) islands: 30 vessels including a 3,000 ton supply ship.”

Since 1985, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have included large-scale explosive and cyanide fishing operations in the Spratlys. Marine biologists estimate that fishing will need to drop by 50 percent to sustain target species.

Where are the regulatory bodies to sanction all trawlers, purse seines, gill nets, drift nets, castnets, beach seines, surface long lines, bottom long lines, trolling lines, hook and lines, fish pots and destructive fishing practices like using cyanide and dynamite?

Advocates for Marine Peace Parks, (MPAs) vital sanctuaries safe from oil and gas exploration, mining, and assorted commercial fishing nets, agree there is a history of South China Sea marine science cooperation.

“In some cases, it might be easier to set-up informal international activities by sponsoring participation in scientific and conservation research by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that can affect protection with seasonal and zonal restrictions,” claims John McManus, biologist and director of the National Center for Coral Reef Research (NCORE).

There are recent historical markers for such cooperative scientific research efforts. For example, the intergovernmental, multinational Coral Triangle Initiative (2009) encompasses Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. In this area hosting more than 600 species of coral, 3,000 fish species, and the world’s largest mangroves, this initiative enables regular marine science dialogue and effective political cooperation despite its non-legal character.

Last year’s Global Oceans Action Summit for Food Security and Blue Growth, held in The Hague, brought together global leaders, ocean practitioners, scientists, NGOs, and international agencies like the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and others. They acknowledged that 3 billion people currently depend on fish for twenty percent of their average per capita intake of animal protein. Also, between 660-820 million livelihoods or almost 12 percent of the world’s population are dependent on fisheries.

The challenges are hard to ignore: how to feed over 9 billion people by 2050, in the face of climate change, increased competition for marine resources, overfishing, habitat change and coastal pollution. The problems warrant faster solutions.

Why not call for a South China Sea environmental summit; a collaborative strategy established by a joint South China Sea Marine Blue Commission made up of marine scientists and policy shapers to address trans-boundary issues, to create regional fishery bodies, to promote designated marine reserves, especially in the Spratlys, and to encourage citizens to petition their governments to adopt the necessary marine conservation practices now before it is too late.

Put simply, perhaps this message from John Gruver of the United Catcher Boats Association is what the South China Sea fishermen need to practice: “The fisherman of the future isn’t going to be measured by the fish he does catch, but by the fish he doesn’t catch.”

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com.

The post Science And Geopolitics Converging In Troubled Waters Of South China Sea – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Saudi Arabia is not at war with Iran, said Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal during a joint press conference with his French counterpart Laurent Fabius.

Prince Saud also expressed hope that Tehran’s nuclear deal with the US and other Western powers would reinforce regional peace.

Prince Saud said Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman had discussed a number of major regional and international issues with the visiting French minister, adding that Paris has voiced its support for the Kingdom’s efforts to restore legitimacy in Yemen.

“Saudi Arabia is not at war with Iran and we hope Tehran would stop supporting the Houthi militias in Yemen. The Iranian intervention has worsened the problem and increased violence in Yemen,” the Saudi chief diplomat said, adding that Tehran never had any role in Yemen’s development.

The post Saudi Arabia Stresses Not At War With Iran appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

The violent attacks against liberal and secular writers continue unabated in Bangladesh. In the latest assault, Washiqur Rahman, a 27- year-old blogger was brutally murdered in Dhaka on March 30.

It was the second incident only five weeks after prominent writer Abhijit Roy was killed in an identical manner. Police caught two assailants from the spot red-handed and said the blogger was killed following a conflict over “ideological differences”.

During the last few years, a number of free thinking bloggers and writers have been targeted by religious extremist forces whose ulterior motive is to form a state based on Shariat in Bangladesh. Rahman’s strong criticism of “irrational religious beliefs” and open questioning of writings in the Quran infuriated the Islamic hardliners. Reports suggest that Rahman used to write satirical columns on Islamic fundamentalism.

The ideological rivalry between the secular-nationalists and orthodox religious groups has been heightened in Bangladesh ever since the Awami League (AL) government instituted the International Crimes Tribunal to try the alleged collaborators and war criminals of 1971. The polity is now sharply polarised between the two antagonistic camps, and the killing of three bloggers in the recent period demonstrates the gravity of the situation. A section of clergy owing allegiance to radical Islamic ideology is pressing for the blasphemy law to ensure that nobody can undermine Islam’s holy book and the Prophet, while the young secular bloggers have been consistently demanding ban on fundamentalist organisations and religion-based politics in Bangladesh. Editor of the Dhaka Tribune, Zafar Sobhan, observes that some fringe Islamic militant groups view the secular bloggers as their ideological enemies and Bangladesh is currently witnessing an “ideological battle” between the secularists and Islamic hardliners.

The death of yet another blogger has raised fresh concerns over the security of independent writers and freedom of speech in Bangladesh. It may be noted that writing has never been a safe profession in the country. The writers and journalists criticising religious extremists are often attacked. Freedom of press still remains a critical area for Bangladesh. Media group Reporters Without Borders rated Bangladesh 146th among 180 countries in a ranking of press freedom in 2014.

Rahman’s killing evoked strong reactions from domestic as well as international human rights groups. The head of Online Activists’ Network of Bangladesh felt Rahman was murdered due to the existence of a “culture of impunity” while the Amnesty International said the “horrifying murder” should be a “wake up call” to the government on the “need to create a safe environment” for the writers and journalists to express their views independently.

Bangladesh’s civil society is seriously worried about the safety of writers after seeing two consecutive gruesome murders. Many young bloggers fear that they could be targeted any time. Some of them have already stopped writing blogs and stayed indoors in recent months after receiving threats. The religious extremists have vowed to carry out exemplary punishment of so-called atheists and reportedly prepared lists of bloggers and writers they believe are anti-Islam. It appears that the Islamists are better organised than the secular bloggers. The latest murder has clearly indicated this.

Unlike Roy, who is well known among the Bangladeshi intellectuals and received numerous death threats, Rahman was a “low-profile online activist”. Even after concealing his real identity, he was attacked just 500 metres away from his home located at the heart of Dhaka. All the murders were planned meticulously and executed through henchmen. The preliminary investigations conducted by the Detective Branch (DB) of police revealed that at least 11 people, predominantly madrassa students, were involved in Rahman’s killing.

The role of police has come under the scanner in the last few weeks. Roy’s family claims that the police personnel on duty near the scene did nothing to stop the machete-wielding attackers while the assailants of Rahman were caught by the bystanders when they tried to flee and subsequently handed over to police. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s secular government has also been criticised by many quarters for not taking appropriate steps to ensure the security of writers, especially those facing the wrath of religious bigots and dogmatic clergy.

The varying perceptions of the government and the civil rights activists regarding repeated violent assaults on bloggers and writers are a matter of concern. The government considers these murders as stray incidents. The young bloggers and their supporters on the other hand are questioning the commitment of the AL towards safeguarding the secular ethos of the Bengali nation that triumphed over religious dogmas during the Liberation War.

In another significant development on March 18, Dhaka’s Metropolitan Sessions Court indicted Muslim cleric and head of radical Islamic outfit ‘Ansarullah Bangla Team’, Mufti Jasimuddin Rahamani and six others for their involvement in the murder of atheist blogger Ahmed Rajib Haidar on February 15, 2013. The police investigation report said Rahmani incited seven students to kill Haidar to protect Islam. The DB police suspect that obscure group Ansarullah was also involved in the killing of Roy.

The recent killings are to be seen against the backdrop of the ongoing political impasse. The suspected Islamists killed Roy and Rahman when the ruling AL and the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had been locked in a fierce power struggle. The continued street violence and transport blockade not only created an ambience of political uncertainty and but also endangered the security of the common people in Bangladesh. The religious fanatics and reactionary forces, which had been marginalised in the polity after the convictions of top Islamic ideologues for committing heinous crimes in1971, are making desperate efforts to take advantage of the political turmoil. The national security experts of Bangladesh say the attacks on secular bloggers are not isolated incidents but rather well-directed endeavours of the fundamentalists to “control the future of Bangladesh”.

Many in Bangladesh maintain that the recent assaults on secular bloggers and writers had been carefully orchestrated by the Islamist parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, to further polarise the country and increase their influence. Besides, the mushrooming of Islamic seminaries across Bangladesh has led to the radicalisation of several youths. They are eventually recruited by various religious extremist groups and Islami Chhatra Sibhir, the militant student wing of Jamaat.

It is imperative that the Bangladeshi political elite address the lingering disagreements over the role of religion in the polity. The need of the hour is to look at these killings beyond the realm of law and order problems. The mainstream political parties, including AL, cannot ignore that the killing of secular practitioners and independent writers is hurting the image of Bangladesh as a liberal democratic South Asian nation.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Another Blogger Killed: Bangladesh’s Ideological Conflict Intensifies – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C Uday Bhaskar*

Three developments of different nature that occurred in Iran, Yemen and Kenya last week (April 2) draw attention to the potential of major changes in the prevailing regional strategic and security framework, even as radical extremism and related terrorism remains an abiding challenge.

The first development is the much-heralded breakthrough between Iran and the US-led P 5 plus 1 grouping (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) over the contentious nuclear ambitions of Tehran. Through a series of tweets, both sides announced that a preliminary agreement had been reached in Lausanne, Switzerland, wherein Iran would roll back its opaque nuclear programme and accept stringent inspection protocols and commit itself to a path that would preclude the possibility that it could acquire nuclear weapons. In return, the US-led major power combination agreed to gradually lift the crippling economic sanctions and support the return of Iran to the global comity as a ‘normal’ state.

However, it must be added that this is a very preliminary and tentative agreement and the two sides are mandated to reach a final accord by June 30. Domestic opposition to this agreement that will dilute the deep hostility which now exists between the US and Iran is very strong. The Republican faction in the US legislature has threatened to block this initiative by President Barack Obama and the Israel factor in US politics also plays a part in this tussle. It was in this context that the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to address the US legislature despite strong opposition from the White House at the time. US allies like Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies have their own anxieties about a US-Iran rapprochement.

In Tehran, hard liners have also been vocal in denouncing the Lausanne agreement – though not as openly, and reaching a consensus on the technical details of the final agreement and the nature of the intrusive inspections that Tehran will have to accept may prove to be elusive. So in summary, this Lausanne agreement has the potential to alter the geopolitics of the region but is not a done deed.

The current agreement comes after decades of deep animosity and contestation between Iran and the US and the political leadership on both sides views the ‘other’ as the embodiment of all things evil – and there is a mirror image of two Satans glowering at each other! Hopefully the Obama-Kerry combine, (who are to be commended for staying the course over the last 18 months, despite the venomous brickbats they have received at home ) and the Iranian leadership will be able to agree on the fine print by end June. If so, the emergence of Iran as a ‘normal’ state that is no longer ostracized by the US and its allies will be a reality.

The second development that merits notice, and which has visible Indian relevance is the spurt in violence in Yemen. Over the last week, Saudi-led air strikes against the Shia Houthi rebel groups have resulted in the death of over 100 people and thousands who are fleeing the country, including expatriate workers. Consequently Delhi has deployed Indian Naval ships and other assets to evacuate stranded nationals.

Concurrently, even as the spiral of violence is increasing and Saudi Arabia is soliciting the support of all its Islamic allies – including Pakistan – this mini-war runs the risk of sliding into a sectarian Sunni versus Shia character with Saudi Arabia and Iran representing the two poles on either side of the tangled geo-politics of the Islamic world.

The West Asian region is already reeling under the death and destruction that began in Syria four years ago and in Iraq more than a decade ago, and has become increasingly unstable. Radical ideologies as represented by the Al Qaida and the Islamic State have received opportunistic support from major powers and interest groups. The manner in which external powers that include the US, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Iran have cynically advanced their short-term interests has led to more instability, bloodshed and mayhem.

The repercussions of the West Asian struggle that combines venal politics with emotive religious fervor and deeply embedded ethnic strife has been felt in Africa too. And this brings one to the third development of April 9 – the massacre of innocent students by Islamist terrorists in the Garissa University College in Kenya. The al-Shabab group in Somalia has claimed responsibility for this dastardly attack which can be compared to the attack on the Peshawar school by similar ideologues in December 2014. While Kenya has vowed to take harsh action against the perpetrators, the defiant al-Shabab has warned of more such attacks against the non-Muslim citizens in the area.

The return of Iran to the global fold has long term implications that go beyond the nuclear issue. Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and the emergence of the clergy-led Shia leadership in Tehran, the US and its allies have sought to both demonize and ostracize Iran. Consequently the geo-politics of West Asia and the Islamic world have been dominated by the Saudi-led Sunni constituency with its many proxies that also sought to propagate a certain brand of Islam. Iran in turn has practised a path that combined defiance with pragmatism while consolidating its own influence in Syria, the Gulf and now Yemen.

If Iran is accepted a normal stake-holder in regional affairs, the balance of power in the West Asian region will change radically. This has implications for the sub-continent and Afghanistan. For India the outcome of a normal Iran will have a positive bearing on energy security and land-sea connectivity options. However, it needs to be borne in mind that Delhi has been used to dealing with a Tehran that has been under US-led opprobrium since 1980. The return of a ‘normal’ Iran could be a very different ball game.

Iran has internalized the DNA of its imperial Persian heritage and this is now leavened with a distinctive theological certitude that shrouds its politico-religious elite. This trait, in all likelihood, will become more pronounced after June 30 – if the Lausanne agreement reaches its most positive resolution.

*Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar (Retd), is Director of the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at cudaybhaskar@spsindia.in

The post Iran Nuclear Agreement And Turmoil In West Asia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

When a missile or meteor strikes the earth, the havoc above ground is obvious, but the details of what happens below ground are harder to see.

Duke University physicists have developed techniques that enable them to simulate high-speed impacts in artificial soil and sand in the lab, and then watch what happens underground close-up, in super slow motion.

In a study scheduled to appear this week in the journal Physical Review Letters, they report that materials like soil and sand actually get stronger when they are struck harder.

The findings help explain why attempts to make ground-penetrating missiles go deeper by simply shooting them harder and faster have had limited success, the researchers say. Projectiles actually experience more resistance and stop sooner as their strike speed increases.

Funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the research may ultimately lead to better control of earth-penetrating missiles designed to destroy deeply buried targets such as enemy bunkers or stockpiles of underground weapons.

To simulate a missile or meteor slamming into soil or sand, the researchers dropped a metal projectile with a rounded tip from a seven-foot-high ceiling into a pit of beads.

During collision, the kinetic energy of the projectile is transferred to the beads and dissipates as they butt into each other below the surface, absorbing the force of the collision.

To visualize these forces as they move away from the point of impact, the researchers used beads made of a clear plastic that transmits light differently when compressed. When viewed through polarizing filters like those used in sunglasses, the areas of greatest stress show up as branching chains of light called “force chains” that travel from one bead to the next during impact, much like lightning bolts snaking their way across the sky.

The metal projectile fell into the beads at a speed of six meters per second, or nearly 15 miles per hour. But by using beads of varying hardness, the researchers were able to generate pulses that surged through the beads at speeds ranging from 67 to 670 miles per hour.

Each impact was too fast to see with the naked eye, so they recorded it with a high-speed video camera that shoots up to 40,000 frames per second. When they played it back in slow motion, they found that the branching network of force chains buried in the beads varied widely over different strike speeds.

At low speeds, a sparse network of beads carries the brunt of the force, said study co-author Robert Behringer, a professor of physics at Duke.

But at higher speeds, the force chains grow more extensive, which causes the impact energy to move away from the point of impact much faster than predicted by previous models.

New contacts form between the beads at high speeds as they are pressed together, and that strengthens the material.

“Imagine you’re trying to push your way through a crowded room,” said study co-author Abram Clark, currently a postdoctoral researcher in mechanical engineering at Yale University. “If you try to run and push your way through the room faster than the people can rearrange to get out of the way, you’re going to end up applying a lot of pressure and ramming into a lot of angry people.”

The post What Happens Underground When A Missile Or Meteor Hits appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Russia’s Rosatom plans to open a regional centre in China “as early as” the middle of this year, the Russian state nuclear corporation announced yesterday. The announcement followed a decision taken by the company’s committee on strategic partnerships, alliances, mergers and acquisitions.

“The activities of the [planned] regional office are designed to strengthen Rosatom’s current position in the Chinese market, as well as to be a reference point for the further development of our business in that country,” Rosatom said.

This applies not only to the construction of new reactors at the site of the Tianwan nuclear power plant in China’s Jiangsu Province, Rosatom said, but also to the promotion of products and services offered by the company’s subsidiaries in the Chinese market, as well as to closer cooperation with Chinese partners in “non-nuclear activities”, Alexander Merten, president of Rusatom International Network, said in the same statement.

Sergey Demin has been appointed regional vice president of Rusatom International Network for China and Japan.

Rusatom International Network already has regional offices in the Czech Republic, France, Singapore, South Africa and Ukraine. It says on its website that it has plans to open offices “in all the major economic centers: in the Middle East, Asia and the Americas”.

The third of four Russian-produced steam generators was delivered to the construction site of Tianwan unit 3 last month. It was produced by Russian heavy equipment manufacturer ZIO-Podolsk – a subsidiary of Atomenergomash, which is part of Rosatom. Tianwan 3 is an AES-91 VVER-1000 unit designed by Gidropress and supplied by Rosatom. AtomStroyExport is the main contractor, supplying the nuclear island.

First concrete for the unit was poured in December 2012. It is scheduled to begin operating in February 2018. Two similar reactors (units 1 and 2) began operating at the site in 2007, while construction of a fourth began in September 2013. Each of the VVERs is rated to produce 1060 MWe.

The post Russia’s Rosatom Plans Chinese Expansion With New Office appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shastri Ramahandaran*

All these years, if India could bat above its league on the world stage, it is not only because of being favoured – over other, more powerful developing countries – by the Anglo-American axis. The dominance of English and, rightly or otherwise, the values and versatility associated with India’s English-speaking elite, including officials, have contributed greatly to India’s acceptance at high tables.

More than any of the above, India’s distinctive edge in world affairs is because it is a robust, if flawed, democracy: a liberal, tolerant, pluralistic Union with enviable political, social and cultural diversity. India may be a “Third World” economy, but it is valued as being home to minds and human resources that can match, if not excel, the best in “advanced countries”.

So when Narendra Modi rode to office on the promise of development and growth, the expectation abroad was that India would now add to its democratic strengths and attractions by improving economic performance and minimising corruption.

Understandably, in the first months after taking office, Prime Minister Modi was well received and feted in the many world capitals and regional and international forums to which he travelled. Change is refreshing and his foreign interlocutors were impressed by what he said and the way he conducted himself.

However, in recent weeks Modi’s shine is wearing off, and the ruling BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) seems to be losing the perception battle. To make matters worse, the BJP finds itself not only on the losing side but also on the wrong side by any standard of liberal, democratic and pluralistic values.

After President Obama’s rebuke on religious tolerance and the dubious gains of his Sri Lanka trip soon after President Sirisena’s visit to India, the BJP seems to be hostage to undiplomatic antics that do little credit to India’s image in the eyes of the world. Minister of State VK Singh, celebrating his own avowed dilemma of being caught between “duty and disgust” after attending Pakistan’s National Day reception in that country’s high commission in Delhi, was inappropriate and undiplomatic.

Further away, at the United Nations, in the General Assembly, India voted against the proposal to recognise gay marriages and relationships for UN officials. In this issue involving private (sexual) choice and personal freedom, India voted with Russia and China. At the least, India could have abstained. That would have saved the Modi Administration from exposing itself to charges of being anti-freedom, authoritarian and intolerant. It is not necessary to be a nation or party of gays to vote against discrimination on grounds of a person’s sexual preference.

Close on the heels of this came the stink of racism. In a crude racist slur aimed at Sonia Gandhi, Union Minister Giriraj Singh insulted Nigerian women by implying that they were inferior to women of other colours and races. The Nigerian High Commission has sought an “apology” for the Minister’s unacceptable comment.

Meanwhile, Singh is facing charges under IPC (Indian Penal Coe) sections 153 A (promoting enmity between classes), 295 A (maliciously insulting religion or religious beliefs of any class) and 298 (uttering any word or making any sound in the hearing or making any gesture, or placing any object in the sight of any person, with intention to wound his religious feelings).

But such conduct tarnishes India’s image and hurts Indian diplomacy. Giriraj’s remarks come even as preparations are afoot to host the India-Africa Summit, for which Syed Akbaruddin, Ministry of External Affairs’ Spokesman, would be the Chief Coordinator. He is one of India’s ablest diplomats and, perhaps, the best government spokesman in a long time: smooth but not evasive; forthcoming and accessible, he is no spin-doctor. Modi is said to have wanted him as Spokesman in the PMO, which offer he declined.

Akbaruddin is a face, and voice, of Official India, of which the nation can be proud. At some point the PM has to choose which face of India – Akbaruddin or Giriraj Singh –would serve the country better.

*The author is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator. This article first appeared in DNA on April 8, 2015 and is being reproduced by arrangement with the writer.

The post Crude Antics Dent India’s Image Abroad – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

During the inauguration of the EU-Southern Neighborhood Ministerial Summit in Barcelona, Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy expressed a commitment to cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean on the orderly management of migratory flows and combating the threat posed by Jihadi terrorism.

After saying that the Mediterranean “unites us rather than separates us” and that we should “look after it together and responsibly”,  Rajoy added that “only the implementation of common projects and resources will enable us to overcome the challenges we face on both shores” because “the stability and well-being of us all is at stake”.

The Spanish Prime Minister defended the value of unity over separation in the changing world we inhabit today. “Contemplation of that which we have in common rather than that which separates us and the reaffirmation of our common values” are the basis on which “to move forward with a passion on future projects in the best interests of all our compatriots”, he said.

European Neighbourhood Policy

Rajoy stressed that the European Neighborhood Policy is “an excellent tool” that should be modernized and refined “to better fulfill its role” in a changing environment characterized “by the magnitude of both the challenges and opportunities”.

Rajoy explained that the goal of the Ministerial Summit in Barcelona is to further develop relations of friendship and cooperation, “making them more flexible and effective”. This means “reaffirming the European commitment to the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean commitment to Europe”, he added.

Ordered management of migratory flows in the Mediterranean

Rajoy said that the Mediterranean must deal with two major challenges: illegal immigration and Jihadi terrorism. Regarding the first, Rajoy advocated “ordered management of migratory flows” with a view to ending the “heart-breaking” drama that leads to thousands of victims.

He added that development aid, job opportunities and training opportunities should be increased for the younger members of society in their own countries. He also said there is a need to increase investment and trade with the region, as well as foster immigration through legal channels and bilateral and multilateral dialogue.

In this regard, the Prime Minister said said that “Europe should use all the tools it has available to create a genuine space for prosperity between the two shores of the Mediterranean” because “we have been called to act with greater commitment to governments and peoples experiencing moments of instability”.

Fight against Jihadi terrorism

After remembering the victims of Jihadi terrorism, Rajoy stressed that this is the main challenge we must tackle because it represents “a direct threat to the security of our countries, of our people”. He insisted that the “deluded” words that describe “Jihadism as a representation of Islam” cannot be accepted because “the Islamic world is just as much a victim of the terrorist scourge as everyone else”.

Rajoy explained that international cooperation is the best way to combat Jihadi terrorism. “We are stronger together”, he said. He went on to say that this fight not only requires actions that are closely linked to security but also preventive diplomacy, intercultural dialogue and control of financing sources.

The Prime Minister said that he is convinced that “a shared commitment from the two shores of the Mediterranean will enable us to defeat the terrorist barbarity and foster a common space for freedom, stability and prosperity”.

The post Spain: Rajoy Highlights Need For ‘Large Space Of Security’ In Mediterranean appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Foreign Affairs Ministers Laurent Fabius, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Paolo Gentiloni, José Manuel García-Margallo, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Philip Hammond, and Secretary of State John Kerry welcomed the resumption of Libyan political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General Bernardino León on 15 April in Morocco and the meeting of political parties on Monday, 13 April, in Algeria.

Following is the complete statement:

We strongly urge all those involved in the dialogue to negotiate in good faith and take this opportunity to reach agreements regarding the formation of a national unity government and the measures necessary for an unconditional ceasefire. Only through compromise can Libya progress towards a safer, more stable and more prosperous future.

We urge all parties to end the confrontation and hope that Libyan leaders can fully support Bernardino León and participate in the political dialogue being facilitated by the UN. In particular, we ask for an immediate end to air attacks and terrestrial offensive manoeuvres. Such provocative actions stifle the talks mooted by the UN and jeopardise any chances for reconciliation. We reiterate that those who threaten peace, stability and security in Libya, or jeopardise the successful conclusion of the political transition, may be identified by the United Nations Sanctions Committee. All groups in Libya must now move forward under a spirit of compromise. Delaying a political agreement further deepens the divides in Libyan society and emboldens those trying to take advantage of the current conflict.

The growing threat of terrorism in Libya is cause for great concern among the international community. Extremists are using the lack of order for their own gain, causing more suffering and bloodshed both within Libya and abroad. We urge the parties involved in the dialogue mooted by the UN to form a united front against the terrorists and the underlying root causes of the problem in a coherent fashion, which should include offering the people of Libya a peaceful, stable and prosperous vision of Libya, and the provision of essential services. The international community is willing to fully support a unity government as it tackles the challenges faced by Libya.

The post Joint Communiqué Issued On Libya appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Colin Dueck*

Over the past decade or more, leading academic foreign policy realists have argued for US strategic retrenchment. Retrenchment is a strategy designed to reduce a country’s international and military costs and commitments.^[1] This can be done by cutting defense spending, withdrawing from certain alliance obligations, scaling back on deployments abroad, or reducing international expenditures.  Retrenchment does not necessarily involve the avoidance of all strategic commitments. But the desired direction with retrenchment is one of lowered cost and reduced commitment.

The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford University Press, 2015), by Colin Dueck.

One especially stark version of strategic retrenchment, championed by political scientists such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Pape, and Christopher Layne, is the concept of offshore balancing.^[2] According to its leading advocates, a strategy of offshore balancing would still try to ensure that no one major power dominates Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf.  But it would make others assume the main burden, and rely on local powers to balance one another, while stationing US military forces over the horizon, either offshore or within the United States. An offshore balancing strategy would embrace sharp reductions in the size of the US Army and Marines, avoid counterinsurgency operations altogether, and abstain from international projects involving the military occupation or governance of developing countries. For the most part, it would avoid foreign wars. American forces would come onshore only if local powers proved unable to maintain regional balance of powers on their own. With the threat checked, US troops would then exit and go back over the horizon. According to Mearsheimer, offshore balancing would allow the United States to disband existing alliance commitments in Europe and East Asia, and cut defense spending to about 2 percent of America’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The scaled-back US military presence overseas would further undercut support for anti-American terrorism, and reduce the need for other powers to develop their own weapons of mass destruction. At least, these are some of the benefits claimed for offshore balancing by its proponents.^[3]

Retrenchment Tested

The Obama years provide an interesting test case for the consequences of an incremental and partial strategic retrenchment.  To be sure, American grand strategy under Obama has multiple aspects, and sometimes contains assertive elements. After all, this is the president who hunted down Osama Bin Laden, announced a US pivot to Asia, and escalated the use of unmanned drone strikes against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Nor has Obama adopted anything like a pure strategy of offshore balancing.  Advocates of offshore balancing would have neither surged into Afghanistan in 2009-2010, nor toppled Qaddafi, nor maintained in the end so much of the George W. Bush institutional legacy in counter-terrorism. The United States today still operates a worldwide alliance system far beyond what offshore balancers would want. Still, a modest form of strategic retrenchment has been a major component and aspiration of American grand strategy under Obama, even in cases where the US asserts itself rhetorically or temporarily, and on this the President has repeatedly made his priorities very clear.

The move toward retrenchment in recent years is visible for example in patterns of US military spending, force posture, and security strategy.  The Budget Control Act of 2011 in particular, together with subsequent sequestration, resulted in roughly $1 trillion in defense cuts over a ten-year period currently underway. This was on top of previous cuts from Obama’s first two years under then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The cuts showed up in reduced numbers of weapons, personnel, soldiers, Marines, ships and aircraft since 2010.  In real terms, defense spending has gone down significantly as a proportion of the US federal budget since that year, while domestic spending has gone up.^[4]  This shift away from defense is also true in relation to national economic activity.  In 2010, defense spending constituted almost 5 percent of GDP. By the time Obama leaves office, that number is projected to be roughly 3 percent.  So there has been a striking decline in the proportion of national effort devoted to military affairs, just as intended and called for by the President. In terms of explicit security strategy, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance helped clarify key assumptions of retrenchment, abandoning the pretense that the United States be able to fight two major regional contingencies simultaneously. That document de-emphasized heavy-footed counterinsurgency or ground campaigns, stating that the US armed forces would “no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations.”  The call instead was for “innovative, low-cost and small-footprint” approaches.^[5]  One leading scholarly advocate of offshore balancing, Christopher Layne of the George H.W. Bush School at Texas A&M, rightly noted that the 2012 Strategic Guidance represented a significant move in an offshore direction.^[6]  The 2015 National Security Strategy does not reverse the President’s demonstrated preference for a retrenched approach, but instead claims it is working, and calls for “strategic patience” in its continuation.^[7]

Is Retrenchment Working?

In truth, retrenchment in US military spending, force posture, and security strategy under President Obama has had several consequences he probably did not intend.  First, while there is less immediate expense in maintaining a smaller-sized force, sized to handle only one major regional contingency at a time – and with no intention of engaging in large-scale ground campaigns – there is obviously a trade-off here in terms of cost and risk.  Naturally, when the United States downsizes its presence overseas, this tends to unnerve allies and encourage adversaries. Allies depend upon believable, material indicators of American commitment, including a strong military presence together with a credible readiness to use it. Adversaries are deterred by the same. Some leading strategic statements issued by the administration, such as the new National Security Strategy, do not really spell out or concede any such trade-off between cost and risk. Instead, they simply take it for granted that the increased risk is manageable.  In effect, current plans assume or perhaps hope that international adversaries will not take advantage of America’s scaled-back ability to handle a range of possible challenges. US adversaries may not be so forgiving. They might also misperceive the true extent of American commitment and resolve, under the impression the US won’t respond. Indeed this is how many of America’s wars have begun in the past.  So a smaller force, together with indicators of limited US capabilities, is hardly a guarantee of peace, either for the United States or for others. On the contrary, it has often preceded the outbreak of war.^[8]

Second, as pointed out by a wide range of American officials, independent panels, and congressional leaders from both parties, even the current and relatively modest force posture outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is incompatible with actual levels of defense spending since sequestration entered into force. In this very basic sense, capabilities and commitments are not at all aligned in American grand strategy today. The Defense Strategic Guidance was written under the assumption of roughly $500 billion in military cuts. The actual cuts in effect are twice that number. One practical implication of this shortfall, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is that the US armed forces may be incapable of handling even one major regional contingency with confidence.^[9]  How this could be productive for the security and stability of democratic order internationally remains something of a mystery.

The administration’s preference for retrenchment, and the unintended consequences of such a preference, have also been visible in numerous regional cases over the past six years. Take the handling of US disengagement from Iraq in 2011. The Obama administration’s position was, and is, that negotiations with Baghdad regarding a continued US base presence in Iraq broke down that year over the issue of legal immunity for American troops. No doubt this was a major issue in some very difficult negotiations. But in truth, as even sympathetic chroniclers such as James Mann have documented, the Obama White House really had no desire to maintain a significant number of troops in Iraq – and the Iraqis knew it. In Mann’s words:

US military leaders had worried about the impact of a complete withdrawal from Iraq. But in political terms, making a clean break was much better for Obama than leaving some American troops in the country.  Getting out of Iraq had been the central theme in the campaign that brought him to the White House….Any decision to extend the American troop presence there would be portrayed as a violation of these promises and of the “dumb-war” views on which Obama’s career in national politics had been based.^[10]

In other words, Obama clearly favored US retrenchment from Iraq, apart from legal immunity issues. This meant that a 2011 base security agreement was improbable, because Iraqi leaders were not inclined to invest their own political capital in an agreement without clear support from Washington.^[11] Toward the end of 2011, consequently, US troops left Iraq in a hurry.  Far from considering this a setback, the Obama administration celebrated the outcome in 2012 as a fulfilled promise to “end the war in Iraq.”^[12] Retrenchment won the day. One unintended consequence was that Al Qaeda affiliates and splinter groups, notably ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) were able to stage a violent resurgence inside Iraq once US forces had left.  The world saw this most vividly during the summer of 2014, when the Iraqi army collapsed throughout large parts of the country in the face of the ISIS advance. Of course, the continuing inability or unwillingness of Iraq’s central government to manage internal sectarian resentments had a great deal to do with these shocking developments. But so did the absence of US forces.  President Obama seems to have concluded during 2011 that the United States possessed little ability to shape events inside Iraq, and to a certain extent that assumption of American powerlessness became self-fulfilling.^[13]

Sometimes, Obama emphasizes his overarching desire for retrenchment, even when he temporarily asserts US military power.  This has certainly been true in Afghanistan.  In December 2009, after a lengthy policy review, Obama announced an escalated US troop surge to that country, but at the same time indicated strict limits on that escalation, including a start date for American withdrawal. After the death of Osama Bin Laden in the spring of 2011, the Obama administration took the opportunity to argue for American retrenchment from Afghanistan, on the argument that Al Qaeda was finally on its last legs.  Claiming that “the tide of war is receding,” Obama announced a series of US troop withdrawals for 2011-2012. The impression of then-Secretary of Gates was that the President remained set on retrenchment from Afghanistan, apart from any military arguments: “for him, it’s all about getting out.”^[14] Washington has since signed a basing security agreement with Kabul, and the number of American troops in Afghanistan for next year has been tweaked, but US combat forces remain set to exit that country by the end of 2016. Clearly, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and sympathetic forces look to take advantage of American withdrawal through escalating attacks on the existing government. Preventing a safe haven for terrorism was the excellent reason for US intervention into Afghanistan in the first place. Yet President Obama has often signaled profound ambivalence regarding a continued US presence there. The unintended consequence of US retrenchment would naturally be and is an Afghan ally both weaker and more unnerved in the face of jihadist attacks.

Other examples of recent American retrenchment and its unintended consequences abound. Predictably, the combination of verbal assertions with material retrenchment or de facto non-intervention has produced some especially incoherent and disturbing policy outcomes at regional levels.

• President Obama announced a pivot or rebalance of American power toward Asia, but at the same time has overseen deep cuts to the US Navy, the armed service most responsible for giving that pivot some teeth.  In absolute terms, the Navy’s presence in the Asia-Pacific is not much stronger than it was six years ago, and in relative terms compared to China the American naval presence is considerably weaker. It seems unlikely that the Chinese have not noticed this material reality, in contradiction to US rhetoric.
• The President supported US intervention in Libya to topple Muammar Qaddafi during 2011, but followed a de facto policy of American disengagement after that. Libya is now a failed state and a playground for militias, organized crime, and jihadist forces including ISIS.
• Obama embraced the goal of regime change in Syria by calling on Bashar al-Assad to “step aside,” drew a “red line” suggesting US military action against the regime’s use of chemical weapons on civilians, and announced American support for non-jihadist rebels in Syria, but then refused to enforce or implement any one of these three demands in a serious way.

Altogether, and in spite of rhetorical assertions to the contrary, the reality of American strategic retrenchment under President Obama – together with his persistent search for diplomatic accommodation with Iran, China, and Russia – have disconcerted numerous US allies in East Asia, the Middle East, and Central-Eastern Europe. The question on everyone’s mind is whether the US will actually support its allies in a crisis situation. To be sure, the President says that it will.  But since these words exist alongside powerful indicators of American retrenchment, together with repeated presidential declarations that the US must focus on domestic priorities, there is frequent confusion abroad as to whether the United States is coming or going. The consequent feeling in allied capitals is that America is stepping back from its traditional international role. This may actually encourage violent conflict.  In a way, it already is. In the case of core allies such as NATO, Israel, and Japan, the US will have to act to defend those allies should it come to that. But if the US gives the impression of endless ambivalence or disengagement, this could cause serious misunderstandings, whereby adversaries believe the US will never act forcefully, when it fact it eventually will.

The Alternative to Retrenchment

Overall, US foreign policy under Obama has been characterized by a clearly declared unwillingness to engage in further large-scale ground campaigns overseas; relatively deep cuts in defense spending; a deep aversion to putting boots on the ground; and a keen preference for US allies to take the lead in facing pressing security challenges. The goal has been to retrench US military power overseas without undue risk to basic American interests, and to refocus on domestic policy priorities, or as the President puts it: “nation-building right here at home.”^[15] This approach has achieved some of its intended consequences, but it has held unintended ones as well. Specifically, American retrenchment has left multiple international security threats to germinate in ways dangerous to US interests. Leading actors including the governments of Russia, China, and Iran, together with Islamist militants inside the Arab world and beyond, have naturally interpreted the long-term trend as one of American disengagement, creating power vacuums they are happy to fill. President Obama for his part has never fully appreciated the possible costs, risks, and downsides of strategic retrenchment, and there is little indication he ever will.

The unintended negative consequences of US retrenchment under Obama ought to raise questions about the case for offshore balancing. Academic proponents of offshore balancing do not dispute that Obama’s regional and functional foreign policy strategies have frequently been incoherent in their specifics. Nor do advocates of offshore balancing dispute that current spasmodic attempts at retrenchment have often been half-hearted and poorly executed. But notice what the offshore balancers argue next: that the answer to any unexpected downsides of existing American strategic retrenchment, must be further and more profound retrenchment.

Traditionally, foreign policy realists have recognized that a strategy of retrenchment is not in itself a guarantee of success. Like any other strategy, retrenchment must be implemented with considerable skill, prudence, and rigorous self-awareness, and in the arena of international power politics this is no small thing. Moreover there are certain inherent risks to retrenchment, even at the best of times. There are tradeoffs. Scholars of grand strategy have long understood that strategies with less immediate cost may also involve greater eventual risk, and vice-versa.^[16] When a great power retrenches, this is easily taken as a sign of growing weakness. The desire to reduce short-term costs may trigger increased strategic and international risk, eventually imposing even greater costs. To put it bluntly, retrenchment doesn’t always work out as planned.  In one of the great realist scholarly works of the past half-century, War and Change in World Politics, Princeton University Emeritus Professor Robert Gilpin discussed the inevitable downsides of strategic retrenchment. Here is what he said:

Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on allies and rivals. Sensing the decline of their protector, allies try to obtain the best deal they can from the rising master of the system. Rivals are stimulated to “close in,” and frequently they precipitate a conflict in the process. Thus World War I began as a conflict between Russia and Austria over the disposition of the remnants of the retreating Ottoman Empire.^[17]

This recognition of inevitable tradeoffs with any strategy remains a central insight of classical foreign policy realism. Yet today, the word “realism” is often attached to a proposed course of endless American retrenchment, with little explicit recognition of any possible downside. At the very least, we ought to recognize that offshore balancing is only one possible strategy with a realist or geopolitical logic. Another option, less commonly articulated within the academy but not entirely absent, would be a kind of forward realism, based upon the understanding that in the end a forward strategic presence on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is very useful for American interests. Indeed one might say this has been a consistent theme in US grand strategy since the 1940s, and rightly so. Now if America’s relative international capabilities were really in steep and inevitable decline, then a grand strategy of deep retrenchment or offshore balancing might be most appropriate.  But the US still holds unmatched capabilities, and their imminent demise is hardly inevitable.^[18] If anything, the risk today is that excessive and ill-managed American retrenchment in recent years feeds into a perception of US decline unnecessarily. And this is exactly what has happened under President Obama.

About the author:
*Colin Dueck is a senior fellow of the FPRI and an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. Portions of this essay are drawn from his new book, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford University Press, 2015). He will be our guest on Geopolitics with Granieri to discuss his book on May 5.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft (Princeton University Press, 2011), 13, 36-37.

The post The Strategy Of Retrenchment And Its Consequences – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shanti Nandana Wijesinghe*

Sri Lanka is recovering from thirty years of traumatic civil war, with her people craving peace and prosperity after prolonged exposure to barbaric and cruel experiences forced on them by terrorism. The government for its part is taking significant measures to undo the destructive effects of war on both material and psychological aspects of life by way of carrying out infrastructure development projects of massive proportions and facilitating harmony through special programs aimed at building peace and reconciliation among different ethnicities.

Naturally, the latter endeavor is more testing since it concerns altering thinking patterns that have for so long been conditioned by fear, mistrust, and general negativity. In order to address the issue, a host of reconciliation initiatives are being taken at the state level that tackle various dimensions of reconciliation including, but not limited to, social integration, ethnic coexistence, mutual trust, religious harmony, citizen empowerment, and grassroots leadership training.

A notable effort in this regard was taken by the Presidential Secretariat during the traditional Hindu Thai Pongul festival in January, 2013 where a select group of former female carders of the LTTE along with a group of university undergraduates engaged in the festivities associated with the event at the Leisure World Water Park. This initiative was mainly taken with the hope that both groups will for the first time be given the opportunity to interact extensively, thereby possibly deconstructing misinformed racial and religious prejudices they may entertain about each other.

The writer has specifically chosen this event due to the extensive implications it has for the social transformation process of post-war Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it suggests possibilities of a very wide scope that make it worthy of deliberation. The following theoretical concepts and definitions will be incorporated into this analysis, and the discussion will develop along lines of social integration and social capital in post-war Sri Lanka.

The article will focus on the following aspects in particular:

• How the youth of Sri Lanka can be effectively used to generate and sustain social capital in the terms of social development
• The implications of integrating the university student community with that of former LTTE carders on post-war reconciliation
• The impact of this effort on the process of social transformation as a whole

Clarification of Concepts

Social Development

The process of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation has spawned a dynamic discourse on social development. An increasing wealth of discussion on public welfare, rehabilitation, and reintegration among other things has made the situation conducive for the emergence of this distinct body of knowledge on social development. This paper attempts to contribute to it by discussing social development in terms of social integration and social capital. In this attempt, the previously mentioned Thai Pongul celebration will be used as a case study to bring into light a practical example of reconciliation and discuss the implications of such initiatives for the future of Sri Lanka.

As is the case with all concepts in the Social Sciences, ‘social development’ too lacks clarity and a universally accepted definition. The United Nations has defined it as follows: “Social Development is an approach to promoting people’s welfare that is well suited not only to enhancing the quality of life for all citizens but to responding to the problems of distorted development.”1 According to Midgley social development is “a process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic development.”2

As such, it is necessarily a multi-dimensional concept. It concerns itself with improvement in the economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental conditions of human beings in order that physical and mental development may be achieved. The development of one variable mentioned above does not ensure overall social development and hence it is essential that all these aspects are progressed simultaneously to achieve sustainable social development.

Social Capital

Social Capital is a broad concept in the field of Social Sciences and the two words were organized as a term as late as the 80s. There is an extensive body of literature on social capital built by various scholars. Coleman held that social capital is not a single entity but a variety of different entities which have two common features; first they are part of social structures and second they facilitate certain actions of actors. To quote, “Social capital is inherent in the structures of relations between actors and among actors.”3 Thus Social capital is not lodged in individuals themselves or in physical instruments of production. He presented three forms of social capital which are listed below:

• Obligations
• Expectations and trustworthiness of structures, information channels and norms
• Effective sanctions

Putnam articulated social capital in his book “Making Democracy work” as follows; “Features of social organizations such as trust, norms and network that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”4 His concept includes three components: moral obligations and norms, social values (especially trust) and social networks (especially voluntary associations).5

It can be derived from the above definitions that social capital constitutes of such components as trust, obligations, expectations, norms, networking, structures, and efficiency of society.

Social Capital is only partially a natural outcome of human social behavior because under certain circumstances – such as those found in post-war Sri Lanka- it can be consciously fostered through trust, reciprocity, and empowerment. Bourdieu’s concept of social capital puts the emphasis on conflicts and the power function. He says that “[t]he existence of a network of connections is not a natural given, or even a social given constituted once and for all by an initial act of institution…it is the product of an…effort at institution…the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies of the individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproaching social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term.”6

In this respect “investment strategies … aimed at establishing … social relationships” such as empowerment, volunteerism, and building leadership skills can be considered as effective means of fostering social capital. The case study chosen for this analysis stands as a practical instance of generating social capital across different religions and ethnicities. Since youth were the exclusive participants of the event, the writer assumes that the youth of Sri Lanka can be effectively used to generate and sustain social capital in order to achieve sustainable social development in the country. How this congregation contributed to empowerment, volunteerism and development of leadership skills of the youth who took part in it will be elaborated next.

Empowerment

Empowerment fundamentally refers to equipping people with the skills and tools necessary for them to create a better situation for themselves. In the context of post-war Sri Lanka, empowerment can be viewed as giving people the psychological and material instruments that would help them create conditions conducive for peace, harmony and reconciliation. The empowered society, thus, can be considered as a source of social development. Post-war Sri Lanka must therefore pay attention to empowering people at the grassroots by creating opportunities for economic participation, educational attainment, political empowerment and health and survival.7

In this quest it is vital to target women as the main beneficiaries of empowerment projects because they comprise more than half the country’s population and were affected to a greater degree than men by the protracted armed conflict. While men recorded higher numbers in actual deaths, it is women who were left behind; women who continued to face the battle of life; women who single-handedly raised the children; women who braved the economically and socially trying circumstances; women, therefore, who should be empowered to better handle these situations.

Sri Lanka demonstrates greater equality between men and women than most developing nations in the world. In South Asia, Sri Lanka ranks first in gender quality. She also boasts the 16th place in the Global Gender Gap Index8. However, the country’s gender equality figures are not very representative due to further inequalities created between women by the war. During the thirty year war, there has been significant advancement in gender equality and empowerment in the Southern part of Sri Lanka but women in the North experienced limited scope in this regard. Survival itself was regularly challenged, and gender equality and empowerment naturally did not assume an important place in the Northern mind.

However, the war itself was not gender neutral. Rape, battery, molestation and numerous other forms of gender-based violence happened in the war theatre sometimes as a means of avenging an injustice of the enemy, and some other times as simply a medium of venting out frustrations resulted by constant armed struggles.
Hence empowerment in the post-conflict reconstruction and development agenda should create new opportunities for women to improve their livelihoods, access finance schemes, join new groups and also to be active politically.9

Recruitment of Tamil women from Kilinochchi to the Sri Lankan army is an example of gender empowerment and equality in the post-war development programme. Most of these women are officially appointed to various parts of the country, thereby encouraging greater integration into extra-regional societies and internal mobilization in Sri Lanka. They are also monetarily well compensated, and hence they contribute to the development of both their families as well as the country. The equal recognition and acceptance of Tamil female soldiers to the Sri Lankan army will generate mutual trust between Tamil and Sinhala communities, and the respect and recognition the position affords will be a huge positive influence on the personalities of said female soldiers.

The Thai Pongul celebration discussed above was another instance of female empowerment in terms of reintegration into the society. Ex-LTTE carders (all female) were given the opportunity to leave behind their violent past and start afresh. They were also introduced to an extensive youth network from the South. The contacts they make utilizing these tools will benefit them socially and possibly even economically.

Leadership

A successful leader is usually a person with a strong will and compelling personality who can mobilize the people and cause dramatic – if not drastic – social change. This kind of person, however, can either be a positive or negative influence on the society. Generally the concept of leadership can be defined as the ability to evaluate and/or forecast a long term plan or policy and influence the followers towards the achievement of said goal.

Good leadership has the ability to change the society for the better, maintain social order and coherence during turbulent times, and sustain existing good conditions in the society. It is obviously a vital source of social capital because people will have an incentive to unite in the name of a better society.

In Sri Lanka, the general mindset of mistrust and hatred cultivated by the war that has resulted in community disintegration of unimaginable scale, grooming good leaders for the future has become a need of the hour. Towards this end, a state-sponsored reconciliation initiative called “Nena Guna Weduma: Sisu Diriya” conducts programmes at the national level to mould students with promising leadership qualities as change agents in order to contribute to the future of the country’s social development.

The special gathering of university students and newly appointed former female LTTE carders is also important in terms of leadership because both groups comprise of very strong candidates for future leadership. All attendees were young, dynamic personalities whose behavior and interaction with other social structures (schools, government and private institutions, organizations and civil society) will directly and decisively impact the future political discourse of the country. These kinds of interactions will mould leaders with a healthily nuanced and balanced approach to problems, leaders who enjoy close relations with the long segregated ethnic ‘other’, and most of all, leaders who know for themselves the destructiveness of war and therefore would have every incentive to avoid reverting to the traumatic past.

Volunteerism

Networking, trust, and reciprocity can be considered as comprising the spirit of volunteerism. It involves dedicating one’s time, effort, and interest for a collectively beneficial cause with no compensation whatsoever. It is mainly inspired by benevolence of heart.

Volunteerism also generates two forms of social capital namely ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging.’ Since a volunteer’s interest lies in serving the community at large racial, ethnic, or religious divides do not apply to him/her. Their work may thus transcend group boundaries and benefit the society in its entirety. In this endeavour a volunteer will necessarily network, form bonds, and possibly even bring together people from different groups to work for the common good. It does not take much imagination, then, to see how volunteerism can be a source of social development.

Putum described voluntary association as the most important form of horizontal interaction and reciprocity and held that it influences social interaction and co-operation between actors in several ways. Associations first “increase the potential costs to a defector in any individual transaction“; second, “foster robust norms of reciprocity”; and third, “facilitate communication and improve the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals.”10 In addition Luhmann expressed that voluntary associations can be regarded as socially organized groups based on mutual trust between the members. Trust forges and sustains relations between the members.

According to Max Weber “voluntary associations are relations of domination in two respects: first, within the association (domination exercised by the leadership upon rank-and-file members), and second, in relation to the outside world (by the organization towards the outsiders)”.11

In the case study chosen for this analysis, all participants were volunteers in that they had willingly foregone their routine commitments without any compensation in order to take part in the event. Also the level of extensive networking – in the form of both bonding and bridging – in the event ensured that the true spirit of volunteerism was preserved and promoted.

Social Integration

Social integration can be seen as a very significant aspect of post-war reconciliation and reconstruction. The main reason behind a civil war or protracted social conflict is disintegration of the society due to competing (and often supposedly incompatible) objectives and interests of two or more groups. Hence reconciling these interests to the maximum possible extent is vital to achieve sustainable peace.

Primarily, social integration programmes aim either to recreate the social order that existed prior to a conflict or build an entirely new social order on foundations of peace and harmony. This necessitates according a satisfactory degree of importance and recognition to all members of the reforming society and establishing effective support networks for the sustenance of less able individuals.

In Sri Lanka, a disturbing distinction between Sinhalese and Tamils still exists often with connotations of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the war. Ethnic snobbery and mistrust still characterize the Sinhala-Tamil relationship to a significant extent. This psychological war obviously cannot be addressed through military means and strongly calls for an undoing of mentally constructed barriers through a comprehensive social integration scheme.

Social integration in the context of post-war reconciliation is more than the return, resettlement, and employment of IDPs; it is more than the termination of armed violence; it includes bringing together the hearts and minds of people who have been separated politically, socially, culturally, and economically due to war. It is about creating defenses against the triggers of war like fragmentation, polarization and exclusion. Social integration should generate new forms of peaceful community relations, reinforce positive social norms, and rebuild social structures which provide stability, equal security and recognition to all communities.

In this context, strategies of social integration in Sri Lanka must be designed to integrate Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim communities to co-exist with faith, mutual trust and cultural understating. As such in contemporary Sri Lanka social integration should denote a “situation in which members of a community share common norms, beliefs, and goals that are structured and enforced through social institutions and a common dialogue.”12

The gathering of university students and former women soldiers of the LTTE provided an invaluable opportunity to integrate two previously divided sections of the society. University students of Southern Sri Lanka were thus far exposed only to the Sinhala interpretation of the ethnic conflict and this provided them their first personal encounter with active ex-combatants of the LTTE side.

They would have gained precious, and hitherto unknown, insights into the underpinnings of the conflict as viewed by those Tamils who were most directly involved in and affected by it. Ex-LTTE carders, on the other hand, would have come into contact for the first time with the Southern experience of war, how it affected civilian life, and what grievances Sinhalese might have regarding Tamils. The resultant mutual understanding and empathy this enables will provide a very strong foundation for social integration.

The event unwittingly enabled integration along other lines as well. University students came into contact with the security forces during this celebration and the duo have long been in a contentious relationship that has marked a bloody trail in the history of Sri Lanka. Especially the youth insurrections of the 70s and 80s (both of which were pioneered by young intellectuals) were crushed by the military with the use of blatant force. Several security force officials were also killed through coups planned by the rebels, and the combined death toll rose to heights that did not invite exploring. The tensions were periodically reinforced since then in the many minor movements organized by the university community in response to various politically heated issues. This event provided the rare luxury of a peaceful reason for these two groups to come together and even enjoy each other’s presence.

The meeting of ex-LTTE carders and members of the armed forces was another instance of integration facilitated through the event. No extensive elaboration is required to imagine the interaction between these two groups during three decades of armed conflict. However, joining hands to celebrate a cultural event afforded an atmosphere conducive for positive interaction. The event served to illustrate that joint action is not only possible, but also desirable especially in terms of reconciliation.

Hence it could be said that this gathering comprised a stepping stone towards a peaceful Sri Lanka. It set a much needed example of the potency of social integration to create a nation rich with love and friendship. The unintended but no less welcome forms of integration that were resulted by the event also show that one act of bona fide can have a multiplier effect by leading to glorious by products that will contribute towards a society less vulnerable to lapse into conflict.

Trilingual policy for social integration

Ethnic and linguistic diversity, though mostly has been a cause for strife, is actually a great resource that can boost the process of social development in the country because a collective Sri Lankan identity can be constructed by drawing from the best of every culture. For a country that has freshly emerged out of a destructive war, this proposal might appear a bit far-fetched. On a more plausible level, hence, Sri Lanka for the moment has to concentrate on accommodating the identity needs of all groups in the nation.

Language, as the most obvious manifestation of group identity, can be used to achieve this end. A tri-lingual policy is the most desirable measure that can be taken in this regard.

As a first phase educational reforms can be introduced to make the medium of instruction English. English is a neutral language that does not represent the essence of any ethnic collectivity in Sri Lanka. Hence no group will feel that they are surrendering their linguistic identity to that of another in the country. Then basic written and verbal knowledge in Sinhala and Tamil can be made compulsory. Obviously, this serves the end of increasing linguistic awareness and thereby enabling effective communication between different ethnic groups. If such an initiative is taken, future generations of Sri Lanka will enjoy increased connectivity and therefore will be at less risk to resort to violence as a means of problem solving.

A tri-lingual approach in all private and public institutions will address the issues of marginalization and restricted access to opportunities. Internal mobility within Sri Lanka will also increase if people are comfortable operating in any language. Demographics will therefore alter, possibly reducing regional segregation that demarcates the boundaries of ‘Sinhala’, ‘Tamil’ or ‘Muslim’ areas.

The current project of recruiting ex-LTTE carders and other interested Tamils to the Sri Lankan armed forces and police will also be complemented by a tri-lingual approach. This can significantly strengthen the gradually emerging ‘Sri Lankan’ consciousness that would effectively undermine all other divides. It will also speed up the reconciliation process by increasing social integration. Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha has stated that,

“I hope now that there will be active encouragement for Tamil as well as Muslim youngsters to join the forces at all levels and in particular as officer cadets. For this purpose there is need of establishing cadet corps in schools in the North and East and, though this has begun, I hope the forces at least will not fall prey to the classic Sri Lankan fault of too little, too late.”13

When implementing such a language policy, care should always be taken to avoid an increase of segregation. Learning ‘the other language’ should not so much be a weapon as it should be an asset. Therefore peace education should always accompany such a language policy to help students understand that knowledge about the other language is instrumental in reaching out to those who speak it, as opposed to penetrating their networks and extracting information. Mutual respect, if not affection, should at all times be emphasized. Encouraging, and setting examples of, interaction between diverse communities in regular activities of the civilian life can also greatly assist this kind of approach.

Extracurricular activities

Social integration programmes should be designed based on ground realities. Getting acquainted with the preferences, habits, and tendencies of the local community that benefits from such programmes is crucial to grasping the context in which to launch the effort. Towards this end, conducting extracurricular activities i.e. activities that are not immediately related to the master programme is a wise strategy to employ because it will reveal how locals interact with each other, their behavioural patterns, etc. The use of fine arts is immensely beneficial in this regard. They have universal appeal, and as such the power to connect the hearts and minds of people who under normal circumstances consider themselves divided.

The Thai Pongul celebration used this factor to the maximum advantage by having dances, songs, and other performances. All items were enjoyed by everyone gathered, and the collective response to the occurrences on the stage generated a sense of unity among the crowd. Friendships were forged, opinions expressed, and sentiments shared. The event provided participants with the opportunity to reconsider the stock notions they entertained about other ethnic and religious groups. A former female LTTE carder commented:

“My name is Consetra. I joined the Sri Lankan forced with my consent as well as the consent of my parents. All the people in here care very much for us. There are no problems with food. We are living happily with them. They treat us like their own brothers and sisters. The only difference is language, but now all Tamil children can understand Sinhala and the Sinhala children are learning Tamil from us. There is no issue between us.”

An undergraduate said:

“My name is Nadeera. I’m a Muslim. I am 23 years old and I came from Hambanthota. I am a final year student at the University of Colombo. I am very pleased to have participated in this programme because I am from South and this is the first time I’m meeting friends from the North. I am very thankful to Mr. Shaheer Mohamed for organizing this programme. Also I am thankful to His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapakshe for carrying out this programme because it has been a great opportunity for us to bond with our brothers and sisters who were always there but whom we got to meet only recently.”

The above comments clearly illustrate that social integration is a fundamental for sustainable peace and, by extension, social development. The commitment and determination of youth to sustain peace and their capacity to achieve that end needs to be systematically organized and mobilized in order for the country to benefit fully from such enthusiasm.

Conclusion

Social development is an all encompassing process which requires progressive changes in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres. Sustainable and practical approaches are necessary to ensure the viability and effectiveness of any social development initiative. Especially in a post-war context, social development is a crucial necessity because the material and psychological devastation caused by the war needs to be undone. This essay has explored a number of ways in which social development can be facilitated with special reference to contemporary Sri Lanka. It made use of a case study to illustrate how community initiatives can contribute to social development, drawing from the concepts of social capital, empowerment, leadership, volunteerism, and social integration.

The case study – a Thai Pongul celebration with the participation of a group of university students and a select batch of former female LTTE carders – is a promising event for social development because participants generated a significant amount of social capital, were empowered in terms of networking capacity, learnt about leadership skills, brought into life the spirit of volunteerism, and most importantly experienced social integration of hitherto segmented groups. As such, it can be considered as a stepping stone towards a socially more accomplished Sri Lanka.

Reconciliation after the thirty year war should be a process armed with fresh strategies and methods aimed at building sustainable peace and harmony in the country because the end of armed hostilities does by no means imply that ‘sustainable’ peace has been achieved. “It is in the minds of men that war starts and therefore it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace should be built.”

About the author:
*Shanti Nandana Wijesinghe, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.

Notes:
1. James Midgley, Social Development: The Development Perspective in Social Welfare (SAGE, 1995), accessed May 05, 2013, books.google.lk/books?id=5Ocr3qN8dyIC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=Social+Development+is+an+approach+to+promoting+people’s+welfare+that+is+well+suited+not+only+to+enhancing+the+quality+of+life+for+all+citizens+but+to+responding+to+the+problems+of+distorted+development&source=bl&ots=xD2U4Gpdrm&sig=32S1mNH35MPnE0k-4KDRnM9uBHs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=suGEUp7YKMeIrQf_ioCQBA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Social%20Development%20is%20an%20approach%20to%20promoting%20people%E2%80%99s%20welfare%20that%20is%20well%20suited%20not%20only%20to%20enhancing%20the%20quality%20of%20life%20for%20all%20citizens%20but%20to%20responding%20to%20the%20problems%20of%20distorted%20development&f=false
2. Sharon Secor, “Social Development and Family Planning,” globalpost, accessed May 07, 2013, everydaylife.globalpost.com/social-development-family-planning-20417.html
3. Adam Dinham, Faith and Social Capital After the Debt Crisis (Palgrave Mcmillan, 2012), accessed May 07, 2013 books.google.lk/books?id=hKSUhNC-_EgC&pg=PA40&lpg=PA40&dq=Social+capital+is+inherent+in+the+structures+of+relations+between+actors+and+among+actors&source=bl&ots=hp_3goaXrx&sig=XBnhyssGqFtL-j0mHgirmpY1qyg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SfOEUv6tJpDrrAf8sIGwDA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Social%20capital%20is%20inherent%20in%20the%20structures%20of%20relations%20between%20actors%20and%20among%20actors&f=false
4. “Social Capital,” Asian Productivity Organization, accessed May 07, 2013, www.apo-tokyo.org/cgi/apo_p-glossary.pl?record=88
5. Tristan Claridge, “Contemporary Authors on Social Capital,” Social Capital Research, accessed November 14, 2013, www.socialcapitalresearch.com/literature/contemporary-authors.html
6. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” 1986, accessed May 08, 2013, www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htm
7. “Sri Lanka ranks high in gender equality” Colombopage, accessed 20 May, 2013, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10B/Oct13_1286953178CH.php
8. Ibid.
9. Patti Petesch, microlinks, “Women’s Empowerment Arising from Violent Conflict and Recovery: Life Stories from Four Middle-Income Countries,” accessed 20 May, 2013, www.microlinks.org/library/womens-empowerment-arising-violent-conflict-and-recovery-life-stories-four-middle-income-cou
10. “Civic community and civic engagement,” infed, accessed May 13, 2013, infed.org/mobi/civic-community-and-civic-engagement/
11. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), accessed May 14, 2013, https://archive.org/stream/frommaxweberessa00webe/frommaxweberessa00webe_djvu.txt
12. Jennifer Hazen, “Social Integration of Ex-Combatants after Civil War,” un.org, accessed May 17, 2013, www.un.org/esa/socdev/sib/egm/paper/Jennifer%20Hazen.pdf
13. Rajiva, September 10, 2012, “Social Integration,” Rajiva Wijesinha, accessed May 18, 2013, rajivawijesinha.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/social-integration/

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The post Sri Lanka: Social Development Through Social Capital And Integration – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Teshu Singh*

Chinese investments in Sri Lanka are can be primarily found in three sectors: trade, infrastructure and defence. Infrastructural investments such as the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway, the National Theatre of Performing Arts, and the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH) are symbolic of Chinese presence in Sri Lanka. Apart from these investments, two other projects – the Hambantota port and the Colombo Port City project – have drawn attention to the nature of the Chinese investments in Sri Lanka. This article seeks to analyse the geopolitics of the recent Colombo Port City project and the larger Chinese game plan vis-a-vis such investments in the region.

The Colombo Port City Project

The Colombo Port City project was inaugurated by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014, with a budget of $1.4 billion; it is funded by China’s state-controlled China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) Ltd., a subsidiary of the China Harbour Engineering Company. The Colombo port city project aims to play a major role in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) project. With the change of government in Sri Lanka, the project is under scrutiny – for its high interest rates, corruption, environment issues and most recently on exclusive rights over the air space above the Colombo Port City land – and has been withheld at the moment.

The project has opened up divisions within the new government, a fragile alliance between parts of the old opposition United National Party, defectors from former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s ranks (including President Sirisena himself), and smaller groups. Sirisena had promised that “equal relations will be established with India, Chinaa, Pakistan and Japan…the principal countries in Asia.” This has heralded a new political process in Sri Lanka; the new government had come to power on the issue of curbing China’s increasing role in Sri Lanka, but not much has been done; Sirisena has stated that “India is a good neighbour and China is a good ally.”

Sri Lanka is balancing both countries in the unfolding geopolitics of the region. Sirisena visited india in his first international trip since assuming power and there have been four high-level bilateral visits between the two governments. Sirisena also visited Beijing in March 2015. Not much clarification was made regarding the port city project; in fact Sirisena stated that Sri Lanka “welcomes more investment from China, promising a healthy investment climate.” This is in sharp contrast to the Sri Lankan foreign minister’s statement where he reiterated that Colombo will focus on “the ‘back to the center’ foreign policy” during his visit to Beijing.

In Pakistan, apart from the geopolitics surrounding Sri Lanka’s Colombo Port City project, there are similar developments that have been affected by the domestic politics. The Karakoram Highway/ Friendship Highway and the Gwadar port built by China in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province have been affected by the latter’s domestic politics. Not much commercial activity has taken place in the Gwadar port due to domestic politics. Apart from Gwadar, two joint mining ventures at Saindak (copper) and the Duddar (zinc) are stuck due to serious contentions the between Balochi residents and Islamabad. The Baloch nationals do not want mega projects but sovereign autonomy so that they can control their own local resources.

In fact, the hashtag, #ChinaQuitBalochistan, has been trending on Twitter to express wariness towards China.

Despite the delay in these projects, the Sino-Pakistan relation still thrives.

China’s Endgame in the Region

With the aforementioned projects in process, China gets an opportunity to maintain its presence in South Asia. These investments give Beijing an opportunity to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean intermittently. Through these investments, China gets strategic and commercial space in the region. Sri Lanka has consistently supported China’s ‘One China Policy’ and has opposed any attempts in the past by Taiwan to seek membership in the United Nations. Over a period of time China-Sri Lanka relations have deepened, and with the growing economy, Sri Lanka is a readymade market for Chinese goods and services. The overall China-Sri Lanka bilateral is a win-win situation for both countries, militarily and economically.

China has made investments in many Indian Ocean littorals, and especially in Sri Lanka and Pakistan to ensure smooth transportation of its energy resources through the Ocean. To this end, Beijing needs a peaceful and stable neighbourhood to achieve ‘Comprehensive National Power’ and for this a ‘peaceful periphery’ has become a pre-requisite to Chinese foreign policy. Meanwhile, domestic politics of the host countries are playing crucial roles in shaping the geopolitics of the region.

* Teshu Singh
Senior Research Officer (CRP), IPCS

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The International Energy Agency (IEA) on Monday released a review of energy policies in 11 countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia that play a significant role in world energy security.

Four of the countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – possess substantial oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea, which offer game-changing potential for energy consumers in Europe and Asia. Other countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus are important transit countries in the region, and their stability is paramount to energy security, the report said.

The 11 countries – which also include Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan – are diverse politically and economically with distinct energy sector challenges, notes the IEA. However, lack of long-term vision and planning is common across the region, and the countries must prioritize strategic energy policy development in order to build a more secure and sustainable future.

“Isolation and rigid thinking are not in the region’s long-term best interest. The key ingredients for a sustainable energy sector in all of these countries are co-operation and evidence-based strategic planning,” said IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven as she released the report.

Officials with the European Union, which provided financial assistance for the report through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, said adopting and implementing the report’s recommendations would enhance energy security across a wide region.

“This energy compendium provides evidence-based policy recommendations for Eastern neighbourhood partner countries and Central Asia,” said Gerhard Schumann-Hitzler, Director for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations “Neighbourhood East” (DG NEAR). “These recommendations need to be taken up by partner countries in order to reform their energy sector, to be more secure, efficient and sustainable.”

Mechthild Wörsdörfer, Director for Energy Policy (DG ENERGY), stressed the interlinked nature of energy security between the EU and its neighbours. “The EU’s energy security increasingly depends on the production in and safe transit of energy goods through our neighbouring countries. At the same time, our neighbours increasingly depend on the European energy market for their own energy security – not least in the context of the Energy Community, 8221; said Wörsdörfer. “In the long term intra- and inter-regional energy interconnections (oil, gas and electricity) can help overcome political tensions and create solidarity.”

The IEA report highlights differences in the level of energy sector development among the countries since their independence, with the largest differences between producing and non-producing countries. Commendable trends, despite differences across the 11 countries, include improved energy legislation, reduced investment barriers, progressive market liberalisation and increasing energy trade. The IEA commends efforts taken by most governments to reduce energy poverty, increase energy availability and slowly phase out subsidised prices.

Oil and gas resource-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have developed their economies through oil and gas exploration over the past two decades . The standard of living is rising across the region but often the energy sector is more rigid and mostly under government control. These countries must reform and decentralise their energy sectors to encourage production efficiencies, increase market and trade competition, and promote sustainable development.

Countries unable to rely on resource-based development typically have aged and inefficient infrastructure, unreliable systems and severe energy poverty, while prices are subsidised to a very low level. These countries must fully phase out inefficient subsidies in order to recover funds for infrastructure investment. At the same time, they would benefit from diversifying energy sources, increasing regional integration and participating in competitive energy trade, the IEA said.

Recent trends for regional market integration vary. Where integration is difficult, renewable energy and energy efficiency measures are the mo st effective tools towards energy security. The report notes a significant lack of renewable energy development (non-large hydro) and demand management, despite approved legislation and available incentives in some cases. Rapid implementation of renewables and energy efficiency policies is essential to energy security of smaller economies dependent on imports, but it is also a key means for producing countries to reduce their significant carbon footprint.

Among its key policy recommendations, the IEA report calls for:

• Stronger rule of law, continued sustainable energy policy reform and effective implementation of key energy legislation.
• Enhanced energy security by: increasing conventional and unconventional fuels production; utilising renewable energy potential and maximising energy efficiency gains; and diversifying energy supplies via new interconnections with neighbouring markets.
• Continued energy market liberalisation and integration with regional markets.

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Despite an increasingly complex security environment, which includes new dangers in the Eastern Mediterranean, the rise of non-Arab Muslim powers and more, Efrain Inbar thinks that there’s still only one potential ‘game changer’ in the Middle East’s balance of power – the nuclearization of Iran.

By Efraim Inbar*

The Middle East is in great turmoil. The statist order that has underpinned the region for a century has collapsed. Several states have lost their monopoly over the use of force and are no longer able to provide law and order. This is especially true of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. Even Egypt, the only historic Arab state, has had difficulties effectively enforcing its sovereignty over its territory. Many of the militias challenging these state entities have a radical Islamist ideology, reflecting the rise in the appeal of political Islam in the Arab world. In contrast to the leaders of these states, who are inefficient and corrupt, the Islamists actually deliver services to the people and have a reputation for being brutal but honest. However, the likes of Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or the so called Islamic State (IS) are hardly the proper agents for modernizing their environments and their popularity dooms the Arab world to continuous ignorance and poverty. For this and other reasons, Israel will need to remain vigilant in the years ahead.

Outside Looking In

The decline of the Arab world has been paralleled by the rise of non-Arab Muslim powers – Turkey and Iran. Both countries fare better on development indices and display nowadays an ambitious foreign policy fueled by imperial and Islamist impulses. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ‘zero problems’approach to foreign policy, Turkey has gradually distanced itself from the West. In 2003, for example, Ankara rejected the United States’ request to open a “northern front” against Iraqi forces. More recently, Turkey has opposed sanctions levied by the United Nations and the West against Russia and Iran.

For its part, Iran has successfully advanced its nuclear program despite the displeasure of the international community. Comparatively recent developments in the Middle East and beyond have also allowed Tehran to establish a ‘Shiite Crescent’ stretching from Tehran to the eastern Mediterranean. This has provided Iran with countless opportunities to project power into the Middle East and Balkans, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and others. Indeed, the successes of Iranian Shiite proxies in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa underscore the Tehran quest for hegemony in the Middle East.

By contrast, US influence around the Middle East appears to be in decline, primarily as a result of the Obama administration’s foreign policy outlook. Correcting Washington’s overextension in the Islamic world is indeed necessary, but insensitivity to the concerns of its allies such as Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia is destructive to the regional balance of power.

In this respect, Washington’s efforts to strike a deal with Iran that basically legitimizes its nuclear breakout status and awards Tehran the role of the regional policeman will be viewed by Cairo, Riyadh and Jerusalem as a colossal strategic mistake. The inevitable result will be further nuclear proliferation as none of these countries are likely to want to stay behind in uranium enrichment capabilities. Moreover, the regional instability could lead to more bloodshed. Relying on a radical and revisionist regime in Tehran to provide stability is the height of strategic folly.

The View from Jerusalem

The implications of the Middle East’s ongoing turmoil for Israel’s security are mixed. Like Iran and Turkey, a democratic and politically stable Israel is also a rising non-Arab power and a player in the regional balance of power. The power differential between Israel’s national might and its neighbors has further increased, given that it has managed to prosper economically and develop a high-tech powerful military. In addition, the strong armies of Iraq and Syria have disappeared, decreasing the chances for a large-scale conventional encounter with Israel. Moreover, the pro-Western Sunni states such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia see Israel as an ally against a rising Iran, as well as against radical Islamist movements. This also comes at a time when the United States is viewed in many quarters as a less dependable ally.

By contrast, low intensity challenges might intensify. The domestic problems plaguing weakened Arab states make them increasingly susceptible to radical Islam and more prone to terrorist violence. As their leaders lose their grip over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Moreover, as weakened states lose control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional (and non-conventional) arms become increasingly vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of increasingly well-armed, politically dissatisfied groups that seek to harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7 anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs have reached Hamas in Gaza. The IS even fights with American weapons captured from the Iraqi army.

Similarly, in the event of the Assad regime collapsing, Syria’s advanced arsenal of conventional weapons could easily end up in the hands of Hizballah or other radical elements. This, in turn, raises the prospect of an emboldened Hizballah and Hamas – both of whom are Iranian proxies located along Israel’s borders – renewing their campaigns of violence. In recent years, the fallout from the Arab Spring has helped to detract attention away from the Palestinian issue. In addition, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international interest is also very limited. As a result, a weak PA has come under increasing pressure from the popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic miscalculation, leading to the eruption of another round of violence, is a possibility that Israel cannot ignore. Nevertheless, so far Israel has been successful in containing the threats from sub-state groups and in limiting their potential damage.

The emergence of an uncertain and unstable strategic environment is conducive to strategic surprises. Israeli intelligence is challenged by a plethora of new actors and leaders whose modus operandi is far from clear. Israel has a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Yet it is not immune to surprises. Therefore, it would be wise to prepare for worst-case scenarios, rather than succumb to rosy assessments.

Looking West (in more ways than one)

The turmoil in the Arab world is also changing the strategic landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, where elements of radical Islam are gaining control. Tunisia, Libya, Sinai in Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey all play host to groups with Islamist tendencies, thereby threatening the currently unrestricted access to this area by Israel and the West. Approximately 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via the Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for Israel’s economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy independent and a significant exporter of gas is linked to Israel’s ability to secure free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its newly discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar. These developments require greater Israeli efforts in the naval arena. Indeed, Israel is engaged in building a robust security system for the gas fields and has procurement plans for additional vessels.

As with other parts of the Middle East, the assessment in Jerusalem is that the key factor in the developing regional balance of power is Iran’s nuclearization. This would be a “game changer” that only Israel has the capability to prevent. Netanyahu’s recent electoral victory left in power the only leader that might have the political courage to order a military strike to obstruct the Iranian progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, his victory was quietly welcomed in the capitals of the moderate Arab states that are terrified of Iran and have little time for Obama. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are good examples.

Accordingly, Israel is watching with growing bewilderment the endeavor of the Obama administration to implement a “grand bargain” with Iran. This puts Jerusalem on an inevitable collision course with its most important ally. Israel continues to benefit from a large reservoir of sympathy among the populace of the United States, and most notably within the Republican controlled Congress. Yet, while Obama is not popular, as president he can extract heavy costs in the military, diplomatic and strategic arenas. The remaining 22 months until he leaves office must be weathered with minimum damage to the American-Israeli strategic partnership, particularly if Israel chooses to make good on its threat not to allow Iran to become a nuclear power. With this in mind, the American-Iranian nexus is the most dangerous challenge for Israel’s national security in the near future.

*Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

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The Uruguayan author, journalist and novelist Eduardo Galeano died this morning in Montevideo at age 74 after a battle with lung cancer. Despite his terminal illness, on March 1 he received Bolivia’s President Evo Morales at his home in Montevideo.

Eduardo Germán María Hughes Galeano, author also of the classic “The Open Veins of Latin America”, was born in Montevideo September 3, 1940. As a young man he worked as a laborer, designer, painter, typist and bank clerk, starting his career as a journalist in the early 1960s as editor of Marcha, an influential weekly journal.

After the 27 June 1973 coup, Galeano was imprisoned and later was forced to flee Uruguay. His book “Open Veins of Latin America” was banned by the dictatorships of the Southern Cone. He settled in Argentina and in 1976 was added to the lists of those condemned by the death squads under the regime of Jorge Rafael Videla.

He fled again, this time to Spain, where he wrote his famous trilogy: Memoria del fuego (Memory of Fire), returning then to Uruguay at the beginning of 1985. In October of the same year he founded the weekly Brecha, along with Mario Benedetti and Hugo Alfaro, journalists and writers who had worked with him at “Marcha”.

Between 1987 and 1989 he was part of the pro-referendum national commission for the revocation of the amnesty law – the so-called Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado – introduced in 1986 to guarantee the impunity of military and police officers involved in human rights abuses during the dictatorship. A law that was never revoked.

“His biography does not end with his death … From birth to death there are thousands of his words, written in numerous books, pronounced in conferences, speeches, quoted by thousands of youths and adults, men and women unsatisfied with their governments around the globe… said in all interviews he was conceded, repeated in his phrases circulating on internet… in all the dreams he shared to make this world a little less worse”, writes the Mexican La Jornada newspaper where  Galeano also collaborated.

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By Dr Subhash Kapila*

China’s India-policy formulations and China’s long range intentions need to be deciphered in view of Indian PM Modi’s visit to China next month. China’s long range intentions pertaining to India are neither benign nor friendly and this must never be lost sight of.

China’s India-policy seems to be premised on the following conclusions which India itself has not taken any deliberate steps to disabuse China’s mind-sets on India: (1 ) India’s political leaders lack the will to stand upto Chinese provocations and brinkmanship on the Himalayan borders (2) India’s lack of strategic and military infrastructure in the border regions and incomplete Indian military inventories limit strong responses from India, even if political will was there (3 ) India’s successive policy establishments avoid taking hard decisions against China and seek ‘soft solutions’ in crisis situations, and (4) India lacks the political will and strategic audacity to stand upto China ‘alone’ and stand strategically tall.

Contextually, in light of the above Chinese perceptions of India, it is hoped that PM Narendra Modi during his forthcoming visit to China would set right these flawed Chinese misperceptions of India otherwise and stand tall, bold and even audacious in his dealings with China. China respects boldness and audacity and it is fervently hoped that India under the stewardship of PM Modi would not be found wanting.

Indian PM Modi’s arrival in China is a month hence and China’s pronouncements at different levels and forums are already divergent from India’s expectations and defensive on the border and territorial disputes.

China’s differences on strategic and political issues with India are widely divergent. The Indian Prime Minister is looking forward to make gains in the economic relations by attracting Chinese FDI in India’s infrastructure sector in the absence of any headway on the border and territorial disputes.

Indian strategy seems to be to put aside strategic and political divergences aside and concentrate only on economic gains, presumably where there are no disputes other than trade imbalances in China’s favour.

Media reports suggest that China is not receptive to this Indian approach and insist that any momentum in China-India relations can only be made by intertwining both political and economic issues. So that is a brake on India’s economic expectations from China.

Further latest reports from China suggest that China is not willing to make any commitments on Chinese investments in India until China has studied and feels assured that Indian laws are not restrictive if trade disputes boil down to arbitration.. In other words China is not willing to press on the accelerator to at least impart momentum in the economic and trade spheres.

China’s current India-policy stands fixated on keeping India off-balance strategically, politically and militarily. There are no optimistic indicators hovering on the horizon of China-India relations which suggest otherwise.

China’s strategy to keep India off-balance is through the instrument of keeping alive the issue of disputed borders and illegal claims to large tracts of Indian Territory extending from Aksai Chin region in the North and the whole of Arunachal Pradesh in the East.

Chia is unlikely to discard this strategy or arrive at compromises which will rob China of a potent coercive weapon against India.

Regrettably, when Indian political leaders and their security advisers talk of an ‘orbital jump’ in China-India relations or ‘out-of-box’ solutions on long- shelved territorial disputes by China, both entities seem oblivious to China’s long range intentions pertaining to India.

To those in India who constantly harp on peaceful relations with China, one can only point out, that such assertions are admirable at seminars but when measured against China’s intentions as manifested on the borders with Tibet, such assertions do not pass the test of credibility.

To these China-apologists I would like to point out that the onus of ‘Orbital Leaps’ and ‘Out-of Box’ solutions to resolve China-India border issues lies squarely on the shoulders of China. It was China which needlessly generated border and territorial disputes after brutal military occupation of Tibet and it devolves on China to offer comprises which accommodate India’s security concerns.

At first instance, deciphering China’s long range intentions would require a credible answer as to whether China is ready or even remotely inclined to change its existing formulations or demands on the India-Tibet border issues and her other legally untenable demands to Indian Territory under Chinese occupation or her new-found claims to whole of Arunachal Pradesh.

China has no intention at all to arrive at any compromises or adjustments of the Indian borders with Tibet. Barring an economic upheaval in China, its Comprehensive National Power is increasing by the day. This would make China even more militarily intransigent with India on the border and territorial issues. India therefore should give up all optimism on arriving at solutions on border and territorial issue, and concentrate on improving its defensive postures on its borders with Tibet.

The acid test of China’s good intentions as a first step towards normalisation of relations with India would be to agree to demarcate the Line of Actual Control on the ground along the entire length of India’s borders with Tibet. This could help greatly in reducing border tensions and likelihood of limited armed conflict due to Chinese military intrusions which has become an irritable regular feature.

China neither currently nor in the long range future would ever agree to a physical demarcation on the ground of the Line of Actual Control between India and Tibet. Any Chinese agreement to do so would rob China of the tactical advantage of shifting constantly the Line of Actual Control into Indian Territory to China’s advantage by military intrusions.. It would also rob China of her political and military coercive power against India. Perceptional interpretations on where the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control stands, offers a plausible exit to China to get away with its military transgressions/intrusions in Indian Territory.

Besides he border and territorial issues that have escalated into unbridgeable disputes, the next weapon that China employs to keep India of-balance strategically and militarily is China’s unholy alliance with Pakistan. The sole motive of China here is two-fold. China with its massive infusion of military aid, equipment and nuclear weapons and missile technologies to Pakistan has created Pakistan as the regional spoiler state and Chinese proxy in South Asia to checkmate India.

Militarily, China has enlisted Pakistan to jointly pose a “two-front threat “to India with all its attendant security complications. Can India expect that in the overall ambit of normalisation of China-India relations and as a long range intention, would China give up its strategic stranglehold over Pakistan in which it has invested so heavily as a regional spoiler state to checkmate India albeit even with diminishing returns?

China-Pakistan relations are entering a testing phase where Pakistan with diminishing support from United States and Saudi Arabia would have to rely heavily on China. Similarly, China would seek added reliance on Pakistan in view of being strategically cornered in East Asia. Therefore the strategic marriage of convenience between China and Pakistan portends greater strengthening and reinforcement. China in no case is likely to dilute its heavily strategic relationship with Pakistan. That is a “given’ which Indian policy establishment has to accept and factor-in in its policy approaches to China. India needs to draw firm ‘Red Lines’ here.

The last issue which I would like to dwell on is the issue of Tibet. China has declared Tibet as a “Core National Interest” to be defended by military might, if required. It is also forgotten in India, thanks to Nehruvian mind-sets that “Tibet is also India’s Core National Interest” and no scope exists for India to keep on acquiescing to a historical distortion that Tibet is a part of China. PM Narendra Modi would be well advised not to reiterate this as past Indian Prime Ministers have been parroting it on their visits to Beijing.

China’s borders would never have rested on India’s borders with Tibet, had India under Nehru as Prime Minister not meekly surrendered its inalienable rights in Tibet as the successor state of British India. Tibet lies at the core of competing and adversarial relations between China and India. Is China capable of any ‘out-of-box” solution over Tibet’s future in the interests of long-term betterment of China-India relations?

Short of massive political upheaval in Tibet, China is unlikely to give up its colonial stranglehold over Tibet. Over-militarisation of the Tibetan Plateau and merging greater parts of Tibet in China Proper highlights China’s intentions. China indulged in forcible military occupation of Tibet to push China’s borders to “Strategic Frontiers” rather than adhering to centuries-old and historical borders. India has to live with the stark reality that China will continue to be an overbearing and adversarial neighbour of India.

Tibet as a ‘Core Issue’ for both China and India has generated an arms race in which both China and India are presently engaged which has both Asian security and global security implications.

The last issue that needs to be addressed in terms of China’s long-range intentions in terms of China’s India-policy is the wide chasm of “Strategic Distrust” between the two countries as the spillover of China’s perfidious 1962 military aggression against India.

Reflected in my earlier SAAG Paper was the reality of the psyche of the Indian public opinion being deeply scarred by China stabbing India in the back, despite, India in the face of international opinion, espousing China be accepted in international forums. Reflected therein was also the assertion that China would really have to make more than magnanimous amends to the Indian nation to get over the 1962 scars. Is China capable of such a magnanimous initiative?

China in her present heady ascendant power trajectories would not be inclined to attempt any initiatives that could dilute the “Strategic Distrust” that pervades heavily in China-India relations. Nor would China plagued by its self-perceptions as a superpower stoop to offer any magnanimous gestures to soothe the Indian psyche over 1962.

So what is PM Narendra Modi and his advisers left with during the China visit in May 2015? China would throw some economic sops to India at the Beijing meet and the Indian policy establishment would gloat over it seconded by the Indian electronic media in the absence of any other substantial outcome from the Beijing Meet.

The above analysis does not imply that China should not be engaged by India. India must engage in dialogues with China but not let China dictate terms in such dialogues.

Endless rounds of dialogues at various levels and with regular frequency have yielded no results for over half a century. No indicators exist to suggest that this will be otherwise in the China-India Summit Meet in May 2015. The Indian disappointment in strategic dialogues with China came out starkly during photo-ops in the recent exchange in New Delhi. The Chinese State Councillor was definitely beaming with smiles whereas the Indian National Security Adviser appeared decidedly glum and disappointed. It presents a most truthful representation of prevailing realities of China’s India-policy.

Concluding, while one concedes that the show with China must keep going-on, but with the caveat, that Indian political leaders and their advisers must never lose sight of the reality that China and India seem pre-destined to an uneasy “Cold War” or “Cold Peace” state of strategic environment in their relations, even in the long term perspective.

China’s overall strategic postures towards India and China’s intentions are not benign and politically mature. India needs to factor-in this strategic reality in its own China-policy responses.

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

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