By Gustavo Plåcido Dos Santos*

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, are becoming increasingly relevant in defense and security is- sues, with a growing number of countries acquiring and/or developing this technology: as far as it is known, 85 countries have military-grade UAVs, 78 of which have drones with only surveillance capabilities.1

On the African continent, the majority of UAVs in action are part of counter-terrorism missions led by Western powers. There are 12 African countries with UAV technology, but only four of them are currently developing it.2 Nevertheless, the number of African countries with UAVs is expected to increase, either due to the nature of present threats — organized crime, terrorism, and others — or growing competition between regional powers.

Most African countries have territories that are vast, of difficult access and sparsely populated. Thus, given that threats to security and stability in Africa are generally present in the most isolated regions and have a transnational nature, this makes their detection a complicated task. There is therefore a crucial need for developing effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacities that take into account the budget constraints affecting some African countries.

UAVs can perform long duration and dull missions in areas of difficult access without putting the lives of crew members at risk. This, in turn, makes it easier to monitor maritime resources, piracy attacks, offshore gas and oil operations, as well as illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism. Also worth noting is the fact that UAVs are less costly in the long term.3

Estimates suggest that the global market for UAVs will more than double over the next decade, from the current $6.6bn to $11.4bn.4 Considering that in 2014 Africa recorded the world’s largest growth in military spending,5 one can clearly see how attractive this market is for the UAV industry. Accordingly, if in 2005 there were 195 active UAV development programs, in 2011 that number rose to 680.6 Since, at least in theory, greater competition generates less costs, one can fairly say that more emerging countries will be able to afford this technology.

That being said, and considering that Angola’s major sub-Saharan rivals — Nigeria and South Africa — already own UAVs, it is worth asking why it has failed to follow suit. Moreover, given that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA in the Portuguese acronym) are one of Luanda’s main foreign policy vehicles, it is crucial for it to keep up with the times, i.e. to endow them with the capabilities provided by UAVs. Doing so is all the more relevant when considering that Angola’s features make the purchase of drones a rational choice.

The potential of drones in Angola

Angola has a vast and largely isolated territory, whose land borders are porous and poorly controlled. The lack of an effective border patrol is in itself a threat to stability, as it allows potentially destabilizing groups to organize. Illegal immigration is also a cause for concern, as it affects the socioeconomic order and provides a fertile ground for criminal activities.

Angola has every interest in guaranteeing security within its territory, notably in what could have an economic impact. The government’s goal to diversify the economy beyond oil requires security and stability along trade routes — both land and sea — and in those regions which are, or will be, at the core of diversification efforts. Territorial waters are particularly key to the future of Angola’s economy. With a 1,600km coast line and an Exclusive Economic Zone representing 40% of sovereign territory, the task to protect offshore oil and other sea-related economic activities is a challenging one. This is exacerbated when considering territorial disputes with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over maritime border delimitations in the Cabinda region — the source of most of Angola’s oil production.

Also relevant is security and stability along international trade routes crossing the Gulf of Guinea and the South Atlantic. The international community acknowledges Angola’s centrality in this dimension, as insecurity in Angola’s waters will have repercussions in those trade routes.

In fact, the hijacking of an oil tanker off the Angolan coast in January 2014 reveals the urgency for developing better ISR capabilities. However, that is no easy task given that Angola’s navy is by far the most limited branch of the FAA.7

Aware of these limitations, Luanda has been investing in the modernization of maritime surveillance systems, as reflected by the order of six A-29 Super Tucano planes from Brazil in 2012,8 and the government’s decision in March 2005 to go ahead with the implementation of a National System of Maritime Surveillance (Sinavim). Aimed at improving the navy’s monitoring and surveillance capabilities, Sinavim also establishes the use of surveillance drones.9

Angola is the second largest military spender in Africa, having doubled its defense spending since 2005 and recording a 6.7% growth between 2013 and 2014.10 It is likely to double again un- til 2019, driven by the rising demand for military and surveillance equipment, including UAVs.11 The huge investment in the FAA, coupled with training programs with militarily advanced countries — such as Brazil, China, EUA, Portugal and Russia — positions Angola as one of the most capable countries in Africa to operate and service this technology.

Moreover, despite the impact of low oil prices, and the resulting 17.2% cut in the 2015 budget share for defense and security,12 Luanda’s regional ambitions and security requirements require a continued investment in those sectors. In fact, Angola’s financial constraints can and should work as an additional motivation for a shift towards more cost-efficient equipment. That is even more so when considering that Angola’s security context does not call for a military force with a focus on offensive capabilities. Contrary to other African countries, Luanda does not have an immediate threat to its stability and territorial integrity. As matter of fact, Angola’s challenges require complementarity between surveillance and offensive capabilities.

A favorable international context

Together with Western powers, the United Nations intends to expand the use of drones in Africa. In 2013, UAVs were deployed to the DRC as part of MONUSCO’s operations, providing crucial imagery that ultimately helped to vanquish the M23 rebel group. Notably, the deployment of five UAVs represented a mere 1% of the mission’s annual budget. This has led a UN official to state “that drones, or the capacity for aerial visualization, is a capacity every mission should have with very few exceptions”.13 Therefore, the purchase of UAVs by Angola would represent an important strategic maneuver, boosting Luanda’s international projection and potentially consolidating it as an African security-provider. In a nutshell, owning UAVs would be a wager on the future, as it would have the potential to streamline Angola’s decision-making process regarding FAA’s participation in international missions.

Furthermore, Luanda has been promoting deeper ties with some of the major emerging powers aspiring to become key actors in the defense and security industries, namely in the promising global UAV market. Among these, one can highlight Brazil, China and Russia.

China is positioning itself to become one of the major global UAV exporters. It has been pointed out that by 2023 the Aviation Industry Corporation of China will become the world’s largest company in this sector. Regarding the African continent, in 2014 China supplied five armed drones to Nigeria and surveillance drones to unspecified African countries.14 In what concerns Angola, although there are no records of Chinese UAVs in the FAA’s inventory, one should not exclude that to happen in the future. After all, in October 2013, both countries announced their intention to strengthen military ties and boost military exchanges.

Russia is already the world’s second largest arms exporter and saw its exports jump 37% since 2005.15 Moscow’s biggest buyer of military equipment in Africa is Angola. Ties between both countries were strengthened in October 2013 with a $1bn agreement between Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and Luanda for the provision of Su-30k fighter jets, Mi-17 helicopters and other technology. At the time, Moscow showed its willingness to deepen ties, notably in the field of military technology.16 Considering that Rosoboronexport intends to increase its share in the global UAV market over the next 10 years, particularly among developing countries, it would not be a surprise to see Angola as a recipient of Russian UAVs.

Brazil has recently entered the UAV market. In 2014, FT Sistemas S.A., one of Brazil’s biggest producers of UAVs, announced its first sale to an African country, in a deal brokered by the country’s Ministry of Defense.17 The company’s chairman stated his goal to “operate more in countries where Brazil has strategic influence, political and economic alignment, and also with non-traditional ones, in terms of [this technology’s] exports”.18 Good relations between both countries — and Brasilia’s strategic interest in the South Atlantic — position Angola at the center of the company’s international focus. In light of this, one should expect this relationship to contribute to the introduction of UAVs in Angola.

Conclusion

UAVs open new possibilities in Africa’s security and stability context. This technology provides better ISR capabilities, helping to tackle threats and mitigate their impact in the fragile African economies. Such is the case with Angola. Luanda is going through a challenging economic and financial situation which calls for a shift in investment priorities, while not undermining the path taken since the end of the civil war in 2002: socioeconomic development, politico-diplomatic assertion, and the modernization, capacity-building and regional projection of its armed forces.

Economic development is contingent on securing national sources of revenue, notably oil. On the other hand, diversification efforts require a safe and stable environment. When considering the potential threats to security and stability, along with the unfavorable economic and financial conditions, one realizes that the necessary modernization of the FAA can and should involve less conventional military equipment that nonetheless ensures better and more cost-effective control over the territory.

With smaller purchase and operating costs than any manned alternative, UAVs are in line with the need to contain government expenditure. There is no need to concentrate the bulk of investment in military equipment exclusively with offensive purposes.

The UAV market offers excellent future prospects, partly ex- plaining why an increasing number of countries has shown interest in this market niche. Luanda’s good relations with some of these countries, especially in the defense and security dimensions, suggest the possibility that, in the near future, UAVs will be hovering over Angola’s most isolated and poorly controlled strategic regions.

Angola’s rise in the regional and international setting calls for its armed forces to keep up with the times, i.e. modernize and adapt to the ever changing circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa. Failure to do so would result in Angola losing ground to sub-Saharan rivals and postpone its consolidation as a regional power and security-provider.

About the author:
*Gustavo Plåcido Dos Santosm Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 175 May 2015 (PDF)

Notes:
1. Niall McCarthy, “The Countries Importing The Most Drones” (Forbes, 18 March 2015).
2. Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa. See “World of Drones: Military” (New America, 2015).
3. Paul Scharre e Daniel Burg, “To Save Money, Go Unmanned” (War on the Rocks, 22 October 2014).
4. “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile and Forecast” (Teal Group, 17 July 2014).
5. Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman e Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014” (SIPRI, April 2015).
6. Micah Zenko, “10 Things You Didn’t Know About Drones” (Foreign Policy, 27 February 2012).
7. “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa”, The Military Balance (2014).
8. Luanda also purchased seven patrol boats. “Angola busca cooperação brasileira para implementar Programa Naval” (Governo Federal do Brasil, 6 August 2014).
9. Francisco Galamas, “Angola Modernizes Navy to Protect Maritime Resources” (World Politics Review, 8 October 2014) and “Angola avança com sistema nacional de vigilância marítima e reforço de meios” (Lusa, 5 March 2015).
10. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014” (SIPRI, April 2015).
11. Oscar Nkala, “Angolan military expenditure to top $13 billion by 2019” (DefenceWeb, 28 November 2014).
12. The 2015 Budget was revised in February 2015. “Angola corta mais de 17% nas despesas com Defesa e Segurança em 2015” (Diário de Notícias, 23 February 2015).
13. Sophie Pilgrim, “Are UN drones the future of peacekeeping?” (France 24, 9 April 2015).
14. Megha Rajagopalan, “China is really interested in the military drone business” (Reuters, 30 April 2015).
15. “Trends in International Arms Transfers” (SIPRI, March 2015).
16. “Russia will supply Angola with $1 billion in weapons” (Rostec, 16 October 2013).
17. “Flight Tech Conquista Contrato Na África” (FT Sistemas, 28 July 2014) and “Brasileira vence concorrência para exportar drone à África” (Valor Económico, 8 August 2014).
18. “Empresa vê mercado promissor para drones no exterior” (Agência de Notícias Brasil-Árabe, 10 September 2014).

The post The Case For Surveillance Drones In Angola – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

At least six people were killed in fighting in the Arauca department near the border with Venezuela between Colombian army units and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas.

Based on a reconstruction by a military spokesman, the victims include three guerrillas, two soldiers and an officer. A special unit tasked with protecting key oil facilities also participated in the fighting.

Despite the peace talks in Cuba, tension escalated this month between Bogota and FARC. At least 40 guerrillas were killed over the past week, causing the FARC to suspend a unilateral truce.

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Incumbent FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter was re-elected Friday for a fifth term of office by the 65th FIFA Congress held in Zurich.

After the first ballot (206 valid votes, 133 for Joseph S. Blatter, 73 for HRH Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein), HRH Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein addressed the Congress to announce that he was “withdrawing from the race”. .

After his re-election, Joseph S. Blatter said, “First, I want to congratulate HRH Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein. He obtained a very good result. Then, I want to thank you for the trust and confidence. I take the responsibility to bring back FIFA where it should be. And I promise you: at the end of my term, I will give FIFA in a very strong position.”

In his address to the delegates in the morning, Blatter said, “Events of this week have cast a shadow on football and our Congress. But the guilty ones – if confirmed guilty – are individuals, it’s not the entire organisation! Now, we, all together, have to repair the damage. Immediately! I’m calling on you to put FIFA back on the right track. You are FIFA, and FIFA needs you.”

Following the intense mediation work led by FIFA President Blatter with the football and the highest political authorities in Israel and Palestine, the Congress approved the creation of a committee which, under FIFA regulations, will oversee different matters affecting the development of football in Palestine. This includes the movement of Palestinian and foreign players and officials within, in and out of the Palestinian territories. The decision was followed by a handshake between the presidents of both associations, Jibril Al Rajoub and Ofer Eini. Shortly before this decision, the Palestinian FA had withdrawn its proposal to suspend the Israeli FA.

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The United States said Friday it is deeply disappointed by the conviction of Rafael Marques for libel, and is concerned about the negative impact this decision will have on the freedoms of expression and press in Angola.

Jeff Rathkem Director, Office of Press Relations for the US State Department, said in a statement, “We urge the Government of Angola to respect its citizens’ constitutional right to freedom of expression and end prosecutions against those who exercise this right.”

Rathkem said that respect for human rights and good governance is a core value of the United States, adding “We have regularly made clear our concerns on human rights, press freedoms, governance, and corruption to the Angolan Government, and will continue to do so as part of our ongoing bilateral dialogue.”

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The US State Department on Friday removed Cuba from its blacklist of countries sponsoring terrorism.

The move follows on the announcement made in December 2014 by US President Barack Obama that he was instructing Secretary of State John Kerry to launch a review of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. On April 8, 2015, the Secretary of State completed that review and recommended to the President that Cuba no longer be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, said Jeff Rathke, Director, Office of Press Relations for the State Department on Friday.

In a statement, Rathke said that on April 14, President Obama submitted to Congress the statutorily required report indicating the Administration’s intent to rescind Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the certification that Cuba has not provided any support for international terrorism during the previous six-months; and that Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

“The 45-day Congressional pre-notification period has expired, and the Secretary of State has made the final decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, effective today, May 29, 2015,” Rathke said.

“The rescission of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism reflects our assessment that Cuba meets the statutory criteria for rescission,” Rathke said, adding, “While the United States has significant concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant to the rescission of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation.”

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In the first quarter of 2015, the Spanish economy posted a quarter-on-quarter rise of 0.9%, two tenths higher than in the last quarter of 2014, according to the figures published by the National Statistics Institute (Spanish acronym: INE).

In year-on-year terms, GDP rose by 2.7%, seven tenths higher than in the previous quarter and the highest rate since the first quarter of 2008. The recovery of the Spanish economy is thus now more consolidated with six back-to-back quarters of growth at an increasing rate, the Spanish government said.

The contribution from domestic demand has increased by three tenths to three percentage points while the negative contribution of the foreign trade sector to GDP has fallen by four tenths to -0.3%. Employment rose for the fourth straight quarter to 2.8%, the highest rate in almost eight years. Over the last 12 months, 458,000 full-time equivalent jobs have been created.

Among the components of domestic demand, there has been a consolidation in the recovery of private consumption and investment. The expense on household consumption has grown by 3.5% in year-on-year terms, up one tenth on the previous quarter and the highest since the end of 2006. For its part, investment in fixed capital enjoyed year-on-year growth of 6%, up by nine tenths on the fourth quarter of 2014. By type of asset, materials grew in the first quarter by 6.7%, 1.2 percentage points more than in the previous quarter, while intellectual property products slowed by 1.1 points to a rate of 2%.

In turn, more dynamic performance from tangible fixed assets can be explained by investment in construction, which rose from growth of 2.4% in the final quarter of 2014 to 4.9% in the first quarter of 2015. Investment in capital goods and intangible fixed assets grew strongly at a rate of 9.4% year-on-year, albeit more moderately than in the previous quarter. For its part, consumption expenses by the public administration services increased slightly in the first quarter of the year, by 0.1% year-on-year, following a decline of 0.5% in the previous quarter.

The lower reduction in net external demand to year-on-year growth of GDP was due to both an acceleration in exports and a deceleration in imports. Hence, exports grew by 5.7%, one point more than in the fourth quarter of 2014, while imports grew by 7.4%, three tenths less than in the previous quarter.

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In Israel’s current political climate, instead of an ideological split between the ‘right’ and ‘left’, the main ideological gaps today are between two types of parties that are willing to sit in on any coalition, either with Likud or Labour or both.

By Lev Luis Grinberg*

Since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 there have been no political blocs in Israel. No left and no right, only survival combinations. Therefore, all the talk of the ‘size of blocs’ only distorted the depressing reality in Israeli politics, wherein the real issues are barely discussed. In the absence of ideological camps or any concrete debate of social, economic or political issues, political individuals, groups and parties are mainly concerned with survival, and with producing effective slogans to mobilise support. In the absence of ideological blocs, no major options to Likud rule can be expected. The new Israeli government is likely to continue expanding settlements in the occupied territories, while pretending to support peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in order to obtain international legitimacy.

Analysis

Illusionary democracy

In democratic regimes the image is that the citizens’ will is expressed by periodic elections, assuming that the imagined ‘people’ have options to choose from. The Israeli legislative elections of 2015 are apparently proof of this. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to dissolve the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), calling for new elections. They were held in mid-March. His party, Likud, came first and increased its seats in the Knesset by 50%, from 20 to 30 (out of 120), after the split of Yisrael Beiteinu.[1] The coalition formed by the Labour Party and ‘the Movement’ –called the Zionist Camp– which was openly supported by most of the media, apparently lost the elections, with only 24 seats. [2]

I will argue here that democracy in Israel is not only imagined, like most democracies, but illusory: the ‘people’ is deeply divided along ethnic, religious and national lines, and the political parties are unable to build alternative coalitions to those led by Likud. Netanyahu understood this politically-constructed reality, so his call for elections was not only effective but also took no real risks of losing his rule. However, although Netanyahu won the elections, he could not control the dynamics of the electoral campaign, leading him to form the most extreme right-wing cabinet, despite the fact that he would have probably preferred a centre-right coalition with the Zionist Camp and other ‘centre parties’, as he did in 2009 and 2013. Such a coalition could have been more stable and more legitimate in the international arena. In certain conjunctures of crisis we can expect the dissolution of the present coalition and the formation of a broader coalition even without elections, based on 2015’s electoral results.

The question here is why Netanyahu did not even try to form a centre-right coalition in 2015, as he did in 2009 and 2013. Immediately after the elections, Netanyahu was trapped by the ‘right-left’ polarisation and enmity used to mobilise support during the electoral campaign and the euphoria of the apparent victory of the ‘right’. It was an ‘apparent’ victory because there was no real option between two ideological camps, and also because what can be called the ‘extreme right’ was weakened.[3] The polarised discourse of ‘right vs left’ is very effective to mobilise support for Likud, due to the ‘danger’ of a ‘leftist’ coalition,[4] despite the fact that there is no real ‘left option’ in the present construction of Israeli politics.

Since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 there have been no political blocs in Israel. No left and no right, only survival combinations. Therefore, all the talk of the ‘size of blocs’ only distorted the depressing reality in Israeli politics, wherein the real issues are barely discussed. In the absence of ideological camps or concrete debates on social, economic and political issues, political individuals, groups and parties are mainly concerned with survival and with producing effective slogans to mobilise support.

The reason there have been no blocs since 1995 is simple: the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin was an attack on the very existence of a ‘left-wing bloc’ consisting of Labour, Meretz and the Arab parties. The message was well understood, and no such cooperation exists any longer. Since the assassination, all the Jewish parties –‘left’ and ‘right’– have had little problem sitting alongside one another in a coalition and excluding the parties representing Arab citizens. The ‘extreme leftist’ Meretz sat with the ‘extreme rightist’ National Religious Party in 1999; other coalitions included centre parties like Shinui (and its heirs Yesh Atid),[5] Kadima[6] and Labour sitting with Likud, and the extreme right wing the Bayt Yehudi.[7] Labour not only sat alongside Likud in Ariel Sharon’s governments (in 2001 and in 2004) but also under Netanyahu’s government in 2009.

The truth is that the twin leaders of the Zionist Camp –Livni and Herzog– sat in Netanyahu’s government until they were kicked out: Herzog was ousted by Ehud Barak’s split from Labour in the 2013 elections and Livni was ejected by Netanyahu himself in the latest elections. Instead of an ideological split between the ‘right’ and the ‘Left’, the main ideological gaps today are between two types of parties that are willing to sit in any coalition, either with Likud, Labour or both. The gap is between the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and Agudat Israel[8] and the ultra-secular party Yesh Atid.[9]

Ideological blocs and their termination

In the past, there were ‘right and left’ blocs that generated the biggest changes in Israeli politics. Thus, Likud took power in 1977 facilitated by the 61 members of the Knesset right-wing bloc, and Labour’s victory in 1992 was facilitated by the 61 Knesset members of the left bloc mentioned above. Likud and Labour continue speaking of blocs to this day in order to preserve their status as a ‘ruling cartel’ –namely the only two parties whose leaders are legitimate candidates to become Prime Minister–. This ‘cartelist’ political construction of reality still succeeds in preserving Likud and Labour in powerful positions, despite the fact that the two have been downgraded to ‘third party’ status in recent years (in 2006, when Likud gained 12 Knesset seats, and in 2009 and 2013, when Labour gained 13 and 15 seats, respectively).

However, in the absence of ideological blocs, no major options to Likud rule can be expected. Rather, we could expect new ‘survival combinations’ under Likud (Netanyahu) leadership. Instead of bringing about changes in foreign or domestic policy, any new government is expected to continue expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied territories while pretending to support peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in order to gain international legitimacy. The Israeli public is aware that using the ‘peace masquerade’ is necessary for external consumption but also knows that most Israelis and Palestinians do not really believe in a two-state solution after 15 years of violent confrontation.

Significant changes could take place only in the wake of serious ideological shifts that define a shared political identity of a bloc. In 1977 that was facilitated by the ideological shift of the National Religious Party, which was transformed from an historical ally of the Labour party to a supporter of the Likud’s ‘entire Land of Israel’ ideology. The new ‘right bloc’ included 61 Knesset members from Likud, NRP and the ultra-Orthodox parties. As a result of their responsibility for the future of the state, Likud became more moderate and was ready to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and to grant autonomy to the Palestinians immediately after the ‘nationalist-right’ turnabout in 1977.

In 1992 it was Yitzhak Rabin and his Labour Party who underwent a radical ideological turnabout towards negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). For the first time, Labour got the power to form a 61 Knesset-member political bloc, not only with Meretz but also with the two parties that were delegitimised until then due to their anti-Zionist ideology and Arab electorate (usually called the ‘Arab parties’): Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party. Although the latter two parties were not invited to participate in the government they signed agreements promising to give their support. Rabin’s government had the political support to recognise the PLO and negotiate the Oslo Agreements, but he was constantly delegitimised due to his ‘Arab’ supporters. In both cases, 1977 and 1992, there were political turnabouts because there were clear ideological blocs that enabled major changes in foreign policy, in signing peace agreements and also in implementing fundamental changes in Israel’s economy.

So why did Rabin’s assassination terminate the ‘left and right’ political blocs? The three bullets that killed Rabin immediately closed the political space of Israel’s Arab citizens. Rabin brought them in and his assassination pushed them out. Without the Arab citizens there is no ‘left-wing bloc’ and no need for its opposing ‘right-wing bloc’. Rabin’s public lynching, that preceded his actual killing, targeted him for relying on Arab votes to advance his policies. The main instigator was the leader of the main opposition party: Benjamin Netanyahu. Rabin’s detractors claimed that without the support of a Jewish majority he would not have a mandate to concede parts of Greater Israel. Rabin rejected these criticisms as racism. Indeed, in order to legitimise his murder, Rabin’s detractors portrayed him dressed in a keffiyeh. In other words, Rabin’s murder was a racist attack.

Since then, the racist discourse has permeated the entire Israeli political arena, not only among the ‘right’, but also in the so-called ‘left’ and ‘centre’. All of them have adopted the worldview that it is illegitimate to make concessions over the Land of Israel by relying on the political support of the ‘Arabs’. This political attitude is very similar to the national-religious claim that the Land of Israel belongs to the people of Israel, hence only the Jews have the right to decide who will rule it and if it can be partitioned or not. The practical meaning is the automatic extraction of 10% of Knesset members (and 20% of the citizens) from legitimate political participation and from potential coalitions. This is the reason why we should not be surprised when, time after time, there is no ‘left bloc’ and no need for an opposed ‘right-wing bloc’. The varied composition of coalitions since Rabin’s assassination proves that there is no political continuity and that all Zionist (Jewish) parties can be part of them. Both partners of the cartel, Likud and Labour, use the left-right polarised discourse in order to mobilise the ‘tribal hostility’ between the social groups supporting them. However, Likud has more to gain, but Labour is more successful when the left-right ‘tribal mobilisation’ is weakened by socio-economic agendas, as in the 1999 and 2006 elections.

Wrong electoral expectations

When the Israelis headed to the polls on 17 March it was a serious mistake to expect a political turnabout, but many did have illusions due to a very distorted coverage of the electoral campaign by most of the independent media, which were hostile to Netanyahu (except Sheldon Adelson’s Yisrael Hayom). After the elections there were many expressions of surprise and disappointment, with a strong feeling that the ‘right wing’ won the elections, a feeling that pushed Netanyahu to establish an extremist coalition that he will probably regret. However, both Likud and Labour were prevented from cooperating immediately after the elections, as they did in 2009-13, due to the hostile campaign and the political construction of the ‘right-wing’ success.

As a matter of fact, the ‘objective’ data show the opposite: The political power of the parties rejecting a compromise with the Palestinians was reduced (from 43 to 38) due to the new centre-party of Likud splinter Kahlon and his new Kulanu (with 10 Knesset members) and due to the split of Lieberman and his open rejection of Great Israel ideology. However, in politics what matters are not ‘objective’ facts but their public interpretation, what I have termed elsewhere[10] the political construction of reality. Given the left-right discourse, political analysts spent most of their time speculating before the elections over the different combinations that would make political survival possible for Netanyahu and Herzog. They asked whether Likud would have enough power to build a ‘right-wing’ coalition, with Jewish Home, Lieberman’s party, the ultra-Orthodox parties and Kulanu, or if Herzog would have enough power to build a ‘centre-left’ coalition with the ultra-Orthodox, Yesh Atid, Kulanu and Meretz. The ‘Arab list’ was not counted for this effect. Their exclusion was taken for granted.

The 2015 election results[11] shows that the speculative ‘right-wing’ coalition could be supported by 67 Knesset members, and 53 in opposition, while the speculative ‘centre-left’ coalition could get 69 members with only 38 members in the right-wing opposition and the 13 Arab list members with a more neutral or positive attitude. In fact, the government established by Netanyahu has only 61 Knesset members due to Lieberman’s decision to join the opposition, meaning that instability and the constant seeking of optional coalitions would be the main feature of the coming years’ politics. However, what must be clear is not only that the right-wing coalition might be weak and unstable, but most importantly that that the centre-left coalition is not (and never was) a real option.

The problem lies not in the ‘right’ or the ‘left’ but in the ‘centre’, namely the parties that are ready in principle to be part of coalitions led by Likud or Labour. The main split is between the ultra-secular Yesh Atid and the ultra-Orthodox Shas and Tora Judaism. The tension between the Ashkenazi secular parties and the ultra-Orthodox parties has divided Israeli politics since the failed attempt to form a Labour-ultra-Orthodox coalition by Shimon Peres in 1990 (the so called ‘dirty trick’). It was the main tension in Rabin’s and Netanyahu’s coalitions in the 1990s, and it brought down Ehud Barak’s government in 2000 within a year. The tension led Likud to kick out the ultra-Orthodox parties whenever they cooperated with the Lapid family in 2003 and 2013.[12] In the absence of political or economic agendas, the ‘tribal hostility’ between the ultra-seculars and the ultra-Orthodox is used to mobilise the electorate. Also, the left-right ‘tribal polarised mobilisation’ includes in its sub-text the secular vs Orthodox hostile agenda. Can Yitzhak Herzog establish a ‘centre-left’ coalition with the ultra-Orthodox parties and the ultra-seculars Meretz and Yesh Atid? This could be the only alternative to Netanyahu’s coalition within the newly elected Parliament, but it is not at all realistic. Despite the fact that both Yesh Atid and the ultra-Orthodox parties were ready to be part of a Likud or Labour coalition, they are not ready to cooperate and participate in the same coalition.

Conclusion

The government established by Netanyahu following the 2015 Israeli legislative elections has only 61 Knesset members (out of 120). This means that instability and the constant search for optional coalitions will be the main feature over the coming years. However, what must be clear is not only that the right-wing coalition might be weak and unstable, but most importantly that the centre-left coalition is not (and never was) a real option. Obviously, this could change if Rabin’s ‘trend-breaking’ step were to be followed, bringing in the Joint Arab List (13 Knesset members), either instead of Yesh Atid or the ultra-Orthodox. But such a step is very difficult to imagine at present. Indeed, the step could provoke a real political turnabout in social, economic and political terms. But in order for this to happen, a Knesset majority is not enough. Leadership and a new vision for the future of Israel are needed, both of which were severely lacking in the 2015 elections.

About the author:
*Lev Luis Grinberg, Professor at Ben Gurion University and a specialist in Israeli politics, economy and society. He also publishes his analysis of public issues in several languages and different venues. His latest books are ‘Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine – Between Democracy and Military Rule in Israel/Palestine’ (Routledge, 2010) and ‘Mo(ve)ments of Resistance – Politics, Economy and Society in Israel/Palestine, 1931-2013’ (Academic Studies Press, 2013)

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Notes:
[1]Meaning ‘Israel is our Home’. This is the party led by the former Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman, a party supported mainly by migrants from the former USSR. In the 2013 elections, Yisrael Beiteinu and Likud formed a joint list that obtained 31 seats (20 Likud and 11 Yisrael Beiteinu).

[2] In the 2013 elections they separately gained 21 seats: 15 for the Labour Party and six for the Movement. The latter is a centre party bringing together people from Ariel Sharon’s former party Kadima (Tzipi Livni and Meir Shitrit) and from the Labour Party (Amir Peretz and Amram Mitzna)

[3] The extreme national-religious party shrunk from 12 to eight Knesset members, and the extreme right of the Shas ultra-orthodox party led by Eli Yishai failed to gain the minimum 3.5% of the vote and thus disappeared.

[4] See Netanyahu’s desperate call to his voters due to the mass Arab vote.

[5] Shinui (Change) was a secular centre party established in 1999 by the journalist Tommy Lapid and was part of Sharon’s coalition in 2003, with 15 Knesset members, and disappeared in the 2006 elections. In 2013, his son, Yair Lapid, established Yesh Atid (‘There is future’) claiming they represent the secular middle class demands raised in the 2011 protest movement. It obtained 19 Knesset members and was a leading partner in Netanyahu’s coalition.

[6] The party was established by Sharon as a split from Likud, together with Shimon Peres’ split from Labour. Kadima gained 29 seats in 2006 and formed a coalition government with Labour. It obtained 28 seats in 2009 but refused to enter Netanyahu’s coalition government. They split in 2013, one small party gained two seats in the Knesset and Livni’s movement obtained six members.

[7]Meaning ‘the Jewish Home’. They are a renovated manifestation of the former National Religious Party.

[8]They jointly obtained 13 Knesset members in the 2015 elections.

[9] Its power shrank from 19 Knesset members in 2013 to 11 in 2015.

[10] L.L. Grinberg (2010), Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine – Democracy vs Military Rule, Routledge, London.

[11] Likud 30, the Zionist Camp 24, The Joint Arab List 13, Yesh Atid 11, Kulanu 10, Bayt Yehudi eight, Shas seven, Tora Judaism six, Yisrael Beiteinu six and Meretz five.

[12] I refer here to Lapid père’s Shinui party in 2003 and to his son, who gained 19 seats in 2013with a similar anti-Orthodox platform.

The post The 2015 Israeli Elections: The Non-Existent ‘Right Vs Left Reality – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkish daily publication Cumhuriyet on Friday published images and video footage purporting to show Turkish authorities shipping weapons to rebel fighters in Syria, AFP reported.

The footage shows officials opening boxes marked as containing antibiotics. Inside the boxes there appear to be mortar shells. Cumhuriyet claims the weapons were of Russian origin and included mortar shells, ammunition, as well as grenade launchers, according to AFP.

The Turkish government has in the past denied claims that it is arming rebels in Syria.

Earlier this month, Turkish authorities arrested four prosecutors who had ordered searches in a similar alleged weapons-shipping incident. The prosecutors remain in prison, awaiting trial.

Over 30 security officers involved in that incident face charges that include espionage and attempt to overthrow the government.

Political tensions are mounting in Turkey ahead of June 7 parliamentary elections, in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) aims to continue its dominance.

Original article

The post Claims Turkey Sending Arms To Syrian Rebels appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) is off and running after his formal announcement for the presidency this past Tuesday before 5,000 cheering supporters in Burlington, Vermont. He is starting from the region that launched the American Revolution and he is promising to “begin a political revolution to transform our country economically, politically, socially and environmentally,” with “the support of millions of people throughout this country.”

He will take on the corporate plutocracy and its servile political oligarchy with numerous assets. In his long, scandal-free elective career, from Mayor of Burlington to the House of Representatives to the U.S. Senate, Sanders can match his progressive rhetoric with a consistent voting record.

He has a large number of progressive supporters who are not “Ready for Hillary” because of her corporatism and militarism. This will assure his ability to raise at least $20 million, mostly in small donations, by the end of this year. He is probably near $5 million by now. This level of contributors can fund a competitive grassroots campaign drive, especially since he will be running as a Democrat – to get into the Party’s six primary debates – and won’t have to expend money and time getting on each state’s ballot.

Moreover, if you read the positions he has taken – summarized in his Burlington campaign speech – you can conclude that they already have majoritarian support in this country. Sanders’ “Agenda for America” is an outline of some key issues our country faces, complete with concrete facts to back up Sanders’ stances. The other candidates prefer to campaign with abstractions and to avoid detailed solutions to our country’s problems.

Sanders stands for a national program to repair and renovate America’s public facilities with thirteen million well-paying jobs that cannot be exported to China. He opposes the corporate-managed trade supremacy over domestic protections of workers, consumers and the environment that circumvent our open court system with literally secret tribunals. He has been a longtime challenger of the price-gouging taxpayer-subsidized pharmaceutical industry. He is advocating for a $15 an hour minimum wage “over the next few years.” He wants tuition-free college educations, full Medicare for all with free choice of doctor and hospital, “paid sick leave and guaranteed vacation time for all” – some of what Western Europe has had for decades!

He pressed for the breakup of the too big to fail banks, calling them, along with conservative columnist George Will, “too big to exist” and an end to “huge tax breaks while children in this country go hungry,” and while this “billionaire class” continues “sending our jobs to China while millions are looking for work.”

So far so good, but Bernie Sanders is not without his vulnerabilities. He can be too easily dismissed by the corporate mass media as a gadfly going nowhere, as was recent Democratic presidential candidate, former Congressman Dennis Kucinich. Sanders must ensure that his speeches stay fresh and current, while touching on regional issues that vary, depending on where he is speaking, to avoid being tedious to the dittohead press that doesn’t apply the same standards of repetitive tedium to the mainstream front runners.

His case has to be based not just on current public needs but that the American people, as workers and taxpayers, have already paid for these public needs and have been swindled out of these  long-overdue reforms.  For many, material income, adjusted for inflation, stalled in the early nineteen seventies and the vast amount of the gains from growth and productivity since then have gone to the top five percent, especially to the top one percent of the wealthiest.

Furthermore, Sanders needs to give visibility to the massive, preventable silent violence afflicting innocent undefended Americans. These include occupational trauma and disease, hospital-induced infections and medical malpractice, deadly side effects of overused or dangerous medicines, toxic, cancer-producing pollution, and product defects. He needs to show that he is ready to tackle the cycle of poverty, where the poor pay more and die earlier. All this amounts to hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths annually, along with larger numbers of preventable sickness and injuries. Many children are included in these victims of such societal conditions and others, including the continuing problem with the food industry marketing junk food and drinks directly to children.

We eagerly await his proposals for the structural shift of power from the few to the many workers, consumers, small taxpayers and voters.

Sanders’ will have a number of people and organizations bidding for his time to give him their opinions on any number of matters. He must remember to welcome advice with an open mind. Many of his political supporters have stuck with him for decades; it will be highly beneficial for him to listen to them. According to eyewitness accounts, he is not a good listener.  The late Senator Paul Wellstone provided a fine example of how to network with citizen groups for the common good. As a presidential candidate he should follow the example of Wellstone.

The nagging problem facing the Vermont Senator is the dilemma of how to compete with and challenge Hillary Clinton. Thus far, he has said that he has “never run a negative political ad” and that he respects his former fellow Senatorial colleague. Progressives may not like negative ads, but they do want a candidate who clearly articulates differences with other candidates in direct ways that draw voters away from those competitors. Assuming he is really running to win.

Sanders has to take on Hillary Clinton and the other candidates with the issues that matter – the ones that truly show the difference between their voting records and assumed positions, especially her illegal, disastrous, brute force (think Libya) foreign/military policy. Her record favors Wall Street and the military-industrial complex, He also has to, in his way, convince Democratic and Independent voters, not only that he will be good for America but that on many issues Hillary will not support shifting power and control of wealth, income and our commonwealth from the Plutocratic few to the many.

As it stands, Hillary is fully prepared to humor “my friend Bernie”, offer abstract agreement, and then sideline him.

The post Ralph Nader: Will Bernie Sanders Take On Hillary? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Timur Toktonaliev*

Muslim-majority Kyrgyzstan is becoming a more religious society, and the challenge facing the secular state is to prove it can deliver a just and inclusive society, and stand up to extremists, an expert says.

Zainidin Kurmanov, a historian and former speaker of parliament, was speaking to IWPR about how Kyrgyzstan can accommodate the demands of an increasingly vocal Muslim constituency without eroding basic principles.

Would it be unconstitutional for a political party in Kyrgyzstan to appeal to voters’ religious preferences in its election campaigning?

Not at all. Freedom of faith is a fundamental human right, and Kyrgyzstan’s constitution is founded on the European tradition. However, some people could be misled by the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a secular republic where it is against the law to set up a faith-based party. In Kyrgyzstan, religion is regaining its former position, and it is the government’s job to prevent it assuming radical forms.

Is it lawful to have members of parliament who promote only Muslim interests?

They already exist. Legislators’ religious convictions are their own affair, a matter of personal conscience. There are already two [Muslim] prayer-rooms inside parliament, as the first one wasn’t big enough for everyone who wanted to pray. Sessions are adjourned on Fridays for lack of a quorum, when legislators go to prayers…. It’s also worth noting that for the first time in Kyrgyzstan’s history, we have a president [Almazbek Atambaev] who openly identifies with Islam, builds mosques, and says prayers. This will spur Islamisation in this country.

In Muslim countries, we see a growing tendency to see Islam as “the solution” – an ideology, a way of life, and Sharia-based governance. This is regarded as a serious alternative to rampant corruption, poverty, the plunder of natural resources, and moral decadence – problems displayed by many secular governments, including Kyrgyzstan’s. However, this model is not perfect, either. Aside from oil-producing states, only two Muslim countries, Turkey and Malaysia, have seen economic success.

Where are the boundaries between the state’s secular identity and its obligation to create favourable conditions, including for the Muslim population?

It isn’t difficult to delineate the boundaries of the secular state. There are general rules that can help here. Secularism means the state is separated from the church, and is governed by civil, non-religious standards, and decisions taken by the authorities are not derived from religious principles. But the fact that many religious values have become universal can make it harder to draw the line.

In a secular state, every individual can count on living without recourse to religious institutions. For example, marriage and justice lie within the domain of the state. The secular state treats people of all faiths equally. The legislation of a secular state may be in accordance with religious precepts, but secularism presupposes the absence of a religious context rather than a conflict with it. For example, a ban on abortion is secular if it is based on medical and biological rather than religious wisdom.

The principle of secularism implies separation of the state from religious dogma, but it does not mean that religion must be kept wholly out of public life. This implies differentiating between the spheres of influence of the state and of religious organisations, while maintaining the state’s role as the principal form of public and political power.

Violating the principles of secularism to benefit Muslims could create resentment among sections of society that practice other religions – Orthodox Christianity, Protestantism and the like. Few of the members of the Jogorku Kenesh [lower house of parliament] are non-Muslims, so their voices don’t get heard. For the purpose of balance, a prayer-room should have been opened for Christians, too. But these rooms should be provided by churches, not the Jogorku Kenesh, otherwise the secular principle is undermined.

What happens when politicians in other countries flirt with Islam?

Flirting with it cannot lead to a good outcome. The word itself suggests a casual attitude.

The political parties in Kyrgyzstan flirt with the voters, with the Muslims, with Russia, the European Union, the Gulf Arab states.

The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims recently had its debts cancelled, an instance of direct political flirtation that acknowledges Islam as a rising political force. Maybe they [officials] were hoped to win support.

There’s a joke in Kyrgyzstan that the third revolution [after 2005 and 2010] will be an Islamic one. The end results of flirting with Islam are al-Qaeda, the Taleban, Islamic State and the rest.

Is it possible to create conditions where all religious communities feel comfortable under a secular government?

The experience of Turkey and other Muslim countries shows this is something that can and should be striven for. The way to achieve it is through strict adherence to the principles I mentioned.

The distinguishing feature of the Kyrgyz people in the past was tolerance, a lack of fanaticism. This trait was common to many Central Asian nomads – Mongols, Turks, Kyrgyz, Kazaks and so on. But now I see the Kyrgyz gradually losing it. The spread of radical forms of Islam has been accompanied by fanaticism, which is not one of our true qualities.

What should the state do if Muslims go beyond the law and demand more rights?  And what happens if the state takes robust action against such demands?

As radical Islam becomes embedded, there are going to be growing demands, up to and including a declaration of jihad and calls to become part of an Islamic caliphate.

There are already Kyrgyzstan nationals fighting [with Islamic State] for a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and gaining experience there. To neutralise them and to regain their loyalty, we need real economic and development successes; [better] social policies, culture, education, science, and spiritual and ethical principles; the creation of fair government, rule of law; a reduction in corruption, and more.

We must prove that secular government, too, can be fair and humane, rather than just talking about reforms.

Interview conducted by Timur Toktonaliev, IWPR’s Kyrgyzstan editor.

(This is an abridged version of a piece first published on IWPR Central Asia’s Cabar website.) Source: IWPR’s RCA Issue 761.

The post Kyrgyzstan: Islam Vs. Secularism – Interview appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran and the group of six world powers have about one month to make history and reach a comprehensive agreement to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Officials in Tehran have already indicated that they would be open to the possibility of extending the talks for some time beyond the June 30 deadline, so that there’s opportunity for negotiating if there are still points of disagreement that need to be worked out. However, the hawks and peace-haters don’t sit back idly and try their best to throw a spanner in the works of the diplomats striving for making peace and concluding one of the lengthiest diplomatic marathons in the contemporary history.

On Thursday, May 7, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly to endorse the Iran review bill that would require President Obama to submit any final deal with Tehran to the Congress for final confirmation. According to the Corker-Cardin legislation, the Congress will have 30 days to approve the agreement or vote in disapproval.

On the other corner, the Israeli government and the influential Israeli lobby in Washington are putting pressure on President Obama to compel him to leave the nuclear negotiations with Iran and pursue a military option instead.

A noted American journalist tells Iran Review that any Iran-U.S. rapprochement following the possible conclusion of the nuclear deal will weaken Israel’s influence in the Middle East and Washington, and that’s why they’re pulling out all the stops to make sure that there would be no arrangement and deal by the June 30 deadline.

“Israel and its more right-wing supporters here naturally want to weaken those states that are hostile to Israel and strengthen those states that are more friendly to it,” he said. “They fear that, given Iran’s large and relatively well-educated population, as well as its support for Hezbollah, in particular, the lifting of the sanctions regime that has been imposed against it will significantly increase its power and influence in the region to Israel’s detriment.”

Mr. Jim Lobe believes that a nuclear agreement would mean a fundamental change in the anti-Iran discourse propped up continuously in the last 4 decades.

“The fact is that Israel and the GCC have benefited tremendously over the past 35 years by U.S. efforts to oppose and isolate Iran, and the nuclear deal signals a fundamental change in their position,” he stated.

Jim Lobe runs the political blog “Lobelog” where several major diplomats, authors and analysts write on the most pressing foreign policy issues facing the United States, particularly in the Middle East. He is the Washington Bureau Chief of the international news agency Inter Press Service and is widely cited for his critical analysis of the Iran-U.S. relations.

Iran Review talked to Jim Lobe about the latest developments surrounding the nuclear talks and the repercussions of a possible agreement between Iran and the EU3+3, including the United States.

Q: The recent letter by the 150 Democratic members of the House of Representatives expressing support for diplomacy with Iran and the finalization of the nuclear agreement can be seen as an encouragement for the Obama administration to stand steadfastly and seal the deal in the face of domestic pressure. How is the balance of power in the United States, between the government and the two chambers of the Congress? Do they have the capability to take a consistent and coherent decision regarding the comprehensive agreement with Iran? President Obama’s endorsement of the bill that would oblige him to submit any deal with Iran to the Congress for approval will surely lengthen and complicate the process of finalizing the nuclear agreement with Iran, and this might sound disturbing to the Iranians. Will the Congress ruin the deal with its interventions?

A: It’s not so much a question of the balance of power between the administration and the two houses of Congress; it has much more to do with partisan politics. The Republicans, which have moved even farther to the right since the end of the George W. Bush administration, are, with a few exceptions, opposed to any agreement with Iran, and then have a majority in both houses. As a result, they can pass bills that formally disapprove of any deal that may be reached between the U.S. and Iran as part of the P5+1 process – as provided in the recently approved Corker-Cardin legislation, or make it impossible for the administration to comply with various aspects of such a deal, such as denying funding that would be needed by the administration to actually implement the deal or denying Obama authority to waive certain sanctions. If such legislation is approved by both houses, then the question becomes whether any veto cast by Obama against such legislation can be sustained in either house of Congress. Under the U.S. Constitution, a presidential veto can only be overcome if two third of each house votes to override it. Thus, if 34 or more Democrats in the Senate or 145 or more Democrats in the House of Representatives vote to sustain the veto, such legislation cannot become law. That is why the 150 (now 151) Democratic members –although several of those who signed the letter are non-voting members of Congress – who signed the letter is significant. If they vote to sustain a presidential veto, then no legislation designed to sabotage a P5+1 deal can become law, and Obama can proceed based on existing legislation and his executive authority under the Constitution.

Under the Corker-Cardin bill, which passed both houses and was signed by Obama into law last week, Obama will be unable to waive certain sanctions for at least 30 days while Congress decides if it wishes to pass a resolution disapproving or approving the prospective deal or to simply do nothing. The administration, however, is confident this will not lengthen or complicate the process of finalizing an agreement because Iran will require some time – well over one month, to actually begin to implement its provision.

Of course, it remains possible that Congress could still sabotage a deal by approving other legislation that will be supported by a sufficient number of Democrats in both houses of Congress to override any presidential veto. At this point, however, such a scenario is unlikely unless there is some unforeseen event or provocation by Iran or a third party that would make it politically impossible for Obama to either veto any deal-breaking legislation or for such a veto to be sustained by Congress. For example, if it was believed that Iran was responsible or played some significant role in a major terrorist attack against a U.S. target or that of a close U.S. ally, then any deal would likely be derailed.

Q: While you talk about a possible move by Iran that can derail the talks, I’d like to mention that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed a number of times that Iran has complied with its commitments under the terms of the Geneva interim accord (Joint Plan of Action) – the first step on the path of a comprehensive Iran-U.S. nuclear agreement, signed on November 24, 2013. So, it’s already clear to the United States that Iran will abide by what it officially agrees to. Then, why is it haggling over such details as the timing of the sanctions removal, even though the Lausanne framework deal made it clear that all the unilateral, multilateral and UNSC-endorsed nuclear-related sanctions will be terminated following the implementation of the comprehensive deal?

A: First, past compliance with one agreement does not by itself ensure future compliance with a second agreement, so, just as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has continued to express great skepticism about Washington’s good faith and compliance with any future agreement, so it is natural for the U.S. government to maintain a skeptical attitude about Iran’s future compliance as it would with any government with which it has had a mainly adversarial relationship for so many decades. Both sides have noted the existence of great distrust between them despite the apparent success of the implementation of the JPOA. Second, I believe the precise timing of the lifting of the various nuclear-related sanctions remains a subject of negotiation, although the administration appears confident that this will not prove to be a problem that jeopardizes the successful conclusion of a deal.

Q: There’s something regarding the sanctions that I’ll need to bring up. It was maintained some 3 years ago, just prior to the election of President Rouhani, that the sanctions were slapped on Iran to bring it to the negotiation table and force it into making compromises. Now, Iran is at the negotiation table, but as its officials say, not simply because of the sanctions. However, it sounds like the sanctions have turned into an end, not the means, and a bargaining chip. What has been largely overlooked is that the Iranian government is willingly cooperating with the P5+1 and is ready to come up with meaningful confidence-building and transparency measures. So, what we hear every day is that new sanctions are being imposed under different pretexts, and their removal is being conditioned on further concessions by Iran. Do you consider this loop to be fair and equitable?

A: I’m not sure what precisely you are referring to in this question. If it is a matter of additional sanctions being imposed now and then against specific companies and individuals because of their alleged violation of existing law, then that can be explained both as a legal issue and a political one. Legally, the U.S. is still applying sanctions according to U.S. laws. Politically, the continuing application of sanctions for alleged violations demonstrates to anti-Iran hard-liners in both parties that the administration remains committed to enforcing sanctions against Iran. That makes it easier for many Democrats, in particular, to remain loyal to the administration on the much bigger pending issues regarding eventual approval of or acquiescence in a comprehensive deal.

If you are referring to “new” sanctions being imposed against Iran, no new sanctions legislation has passed Congress since the Geneva agreement. New sanctions legislation has been introduced by Iran hawks – particularly those close to the Israel lobby – over the past 18 months but has not been approved due to the administration’s threat to veto any such legislation and a sufficient number of Democratic lawmakers who have opposed it. In fact, the administration has repeatedly made precisely the point included in your question: that the sanctions should be treated as a means to reach a deal and not an end in themselves. Sanctions have indeed been used as a bargaining chip to provide an incentive to Iran to make compromises, just as Iran has used its growing nuclear infrastructure as a bargaining chip to provide the U.S. and its P5+1 partners to make compromises regarding their acceptance of a sophisticated nuclear program.

Q: In one of your recent articles, you expounded the reasons why the anti-Iran group UANI, which I believe is founded upon the objective of defaming Iran and crippling its economy, not simply over the nuclear case, but also on human rights violation charges, is now distancing itself from the expert analysis of some its leaders, including Gary Samore, especially following the Lausanne framework deal of April 2, which was welcomed worldwide. If UANI, AIPAC, JINSA and others want to see Iran would not obtain nuclear weapons, then their expectation is being already fulfilled through the Geneva interim accord, and the anticipated comprehensive deal to be sealed by June 30. What more are they looking for?

A: With respect to the organizations that you cite in your question, I believe they are very much part of what we sometimes call the Israel lobby, that is very responsive to the concerns of Israel’s political leadership. As everyone knows, Netanyahu has expressed very strong, often apocalyptic concerns, about Iran’s nuclear program and its purported future intentions against Israel. These organizations have consistently echoed and amplified those concerns, although, as you point out, there are internal differences of opinion within them. Samore, for example, has been far less hawkish than the organization for which he serves as president. JINSA has an Iran task force co-chaired by a former senior Obama official, Dennis Ross, and a former Bush administration official, Eric Edelman, and, within that task force, there is some disagreement over whether the United States should acquiesce in a limited uranium enrichment program in Iran or should support Netanyahu’s more extreme demands. When you ask what more they are looking for, I think the answer is ultimately what they fear is not so much that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon that will be used to attack Israel, but rather that any rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran will weaken Israel’s influence both in the region and in Washington DC. Israel and its more right-wing supporters here naturally want to weaken those states that are hostile to Israel and strengthen those states that are more friendly to it. They fear that, given Iran’s large and relatively well-educated population, as well as its support for Hezbollah, in particular, the lifting of the sanctions regime that has been imposed against it will significantly increase its power and influence in the region to Israel’s detriment.

Q: So, you believe Israel will suffer if a comprehensive deal between Iran and the six world powers is concluded. True? There are people who believe that the peaceful settlement of the nuclear controversy will gradually turn the public attention to the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the settlement constructions. Do you agree with this premise?

A: As explained [in the previous questions], I believe Israel’s leadership fears that the end of the sanctions regime will significantly increase Iran’s power and influence in the region to Israel’s detriment. And, so long as the Islamic Republic remains hostile to Israel and supports Hezbollah and other groups hostile to Israel, Israel wants to keep it as isolated and weak as possible. Of course, your suggestion that an end to the nuclear controversy will also tend to permit a greater public focus on Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories is correct, but I don’t think that is the primary motivation for Israel’s strong opposition to a nuclear deal that could lead to a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. It is a factor; but I don’t believe it is necessarily the most important one.

Q: The Arab states in the region also share Israel’s concerns, I think. What do you think about the growing apprehension of the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf regarding the possibility of a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran? Are they afraid that the deal will lead to the rise of Iran’s economic power and political clout in the region? Was it the reason Obama tried to appease the GCC leaders in the Camp David summit and assure them relations with Iran will not be normalized soon?

A: The apprehensions of the Arab monarchies are similar to those of Israel. They believe that an end to the sanctions regime against Iran will necessarily increase its influence in the region, a development they fear for many reasons, not the least of which are historical – Persians vs. Arabs, sectarian – Shiite vs. Sunni, and the fact that these states are small, in some cases very fragile [such as] Bahrain, almost completely lacking in democratic governance, politically sclerotic, and almost entirely reliant on Western powers for security. At the same time, they are important players in the international economic and financial system; several of them host important U.S. bases that the Pentagon considers essential to retain its conventional military dominance in the region; and they have generally proved helpful in serving a variety of U.S. interests. Thus, Obama does not wish to be seen as abandoning them in favor of Iran. He has a very narrow tightrope to walk: he must reassure the GCC and Israel and its supporters here, while seeking a rapprochement with Iran in order to achieve of what he has referred to as an “equilibrium” in U.S. relations between Iran and the GCC and Israel.

Q: Finally, how do you see the political future of the Middle East in the light of the recent advancements of the ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the continued military involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers and the worrying tensions between Russia and the West?

A: I think Obama will try to achieve an “equilibrium,” as mentioned above, that will permit some greater cooperation with Iran in containing and defeating ISIS, especially in Iraq, while offering limited support to anti-Assad forces – but not ISIS or al-Nusra in Syria. He would like to bring Iran into the Geneva talks in hopes that some kind of political settlement can be reached on Syria between Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara, on the one hand, and Tehran and Moscow on the other that will eventually remove Assad, weaken ISIS, and wind down the civil war. Washington has already been pushing hard on Riyadh to reduce its air campaign in Yemen and make a serious effort to reach a political settlement there. Ultimately, I think the administration wants to create a new regional security structure that includes Iran and achieves the kind of “equilibrium” I referred to. Whether he can achieve any or all of this, however, is highly doubtful, particularly given the hawkish policies and personalities of the new regime in Saudi Arabia which appears to have significantly hardened KSA’s anti-Iranian stance in ways that appear to be aggravating tensions in the region. I think the anxieties created by a prospective nuclear deal – and the adjustments in the region that it will necessitate – are contributing significantly to these tensions. The fact is that Israel and the GCC have benefited tremendously over the past 35 years by U.S. efforts to oppose and isolate Iran, and the nuclear deal signals a fundamental change in their position. Adjusting to it will prove very difficult and is likely to result in continuing, if not even more instability and conflict in the region, at least in the short term.

The post Interview With Jim Lobe: ‘Any Iran-US Rapprochement Will Weaken Israel’s Influence’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Stuart Williams

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing an increasingly active role in Turkey’s legislative election campaign as the ruling party faces its biggest ballot box challenge since it came to power.

Latest opinion polls suggest that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) could see its vote tumble in the June 7 election from the last polls in 2011 and even lose its parliamentary majority, sparking unusual expressions of alarm in pro-government media. Erdogan, who became president in 2014 after more than a decade as premier, is supposed to be apolitical as head of state but in recent days has been campaigning with relentless vigor.

The face of prime minister and AKP leader Ahmet Davutoglu, a former foreign minister who lacks Erdogan’s populist charisma, stares out from election posters but it is Erdogan who has taken hold of the campaign, while insisting he is merely “on the side of the people.”

Erdogan on Tuesday alone gave a morning speech in Istanbul, opened alongside Davutoglu a new airport in Turkey’s southeastern Hakkari province with a speech several times longer than that of the premier, before speaking to an evening rally in Ankara. On Saturday, the president will also speak at a major rally in Istanbul with Davutoglu to celebrate the anniversary of the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul.

Such is the controversy over Erdogan’s behavior that former President Abdullah Gul, a co-founder of the AKP, has declined an invitation to attend the Istanbul rally at the weekend, the Radikal online daily reported.

The AKP prides itself on being one of the greatest election-winning machines in a major democracy, winning every poll since it pushed the ultra-secular military-rooted old order from power in 2002 elections. And it has to be on top form now, with Erdogan calling for the party to win two-thirds of the 550 seats in Parliament to change the constitution and create the presidential system that he yearns for.

“Erdogan is by definition not running in legislative elections, but the June 7 ballot is very much about him,” Marc Pierini, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe told AFP. “He is therefore very much involved personally in the campaign.”

Yet with the economy, for so long the AKP’s trump card, showing signs of fragility and Davutoglu unable to match Erdogan’s rhetorical firepower, opinion polls are indicating its vote could fall sharply from almost 50 percent in 2011 and more than 46 percent in 2007. While polls should be treated with caution in Turkey, two published in the last week made troubling reading for the AKP, with the Konda group giving it 40.5 percent of the vote and SONAR 41 percent.

The polls suggested that far from winning a two-thirds majority, the AKP could even fail to win a simple majority which would force it to form a coalition to stay in power. In an opinion piece entitled “I want to warn you before it is too late,” which gained huge attention across the political spectrum in Turkey, well-connected pro-AKP political commentator Abdulkadir Selvi said many previous AKP voters were unsure of voting for the party.

“Turkey might face waking up to a coalition on the morning of June 8,” he wrote.

Critical for the outcome in terms of seats will be whether the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) passes the tough 10 percent threshold needed to have MPs in Parliament.

“If the HDP makes it in the Parliament, this will be a game-changer and the executive presidency will be more difficult to reach” said Pierini.

Coalition politics seems an anathema for the dominant AKP but its most natural partner would be the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) set to come third rather than the second placed Republican People’s Party (CHP) secular opposition.

“This is the first election since the AKP first won a single-party majority in 2002 that there is a possibility of a coalition government,” Michael Harris of investment bank Renaissance Capital said.

The post Turkey: Will Erdogan’s Charisma Hold On June 7? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Aron Lund* for Syria Comment

On Wednesday, May 27, the Aljazeera TV network ran a 47-minute interview with Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of the Nusra Front, which is one of the most powerful rebel factions in Syria.

If you speak Arabic, have a look at the interview or read the transcript. If you don’t, then start studying or proceed straight to the commentary below.

Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani?

He’s the founder and leader of Jabhat al-Nosra, the al-Qaeda franchise that operates in Syria and Lebanon. Apart from that, no one really knows anything about him.

Is this Golani’s first interview?

No it is not. He has been interviewed by Aljazeera before. Then, his interlocutor was Aljazeera’s star reporter Taysir Allouni, a Syrian and Spanish citizen who interviewed Osama bin Laden right after 9/11 and then spent nine years in a Spanish jail accused of al-Qaeda contacts. Although no one doubts that Allouni had very tight relations with high-level jihadi figures (he hosted a certain Mohammed al-Bahaiya a.k.a. Abu Khaled al-Souri in his home in Spain and helped him apply for Spanish residency), the proceedings were marred by some really bizarre translation issues and the European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2012 that Allouni had not been given an impartial trial. Since his release in 2012, Allouni has done an excellent series of interviews with rebel leaders of all stripes in northern Syria and in Turkey for Aljazeera’s Liqa al-Yawm (Meeting of the Day). He was the first and, until Wednesday, the only person to interview Golani in December 2013.

Wednesday’s interview took place on Bila Hudoud (Without Borders), a show hosted by the well-known Egyptian anchor Ahmed Mansour. Mansour, too, is obviously some species of Islamist and he seemed pretty infatuated with Golani – more so than the sympathetically surly Allouni – so the end result was a real softball interview. It was no Frost/Nixon, more like a high school date. That may very well have been intentional. Many assume that Qatar, which owns and controls Aljazeera, is eager to see the group show it’s gentler side, now that it and other rebels are capturing territory in northwestern Syria.

Will there be another interview?

Seems like it. At the end of the interview, Mansour said he’d like a second episode to talk about Iran’s role in the region and in Syria, about relations to the Islamic State, and about Golani’s view of the future of Syria. Inshallah, said Golani.

Where did the interview take place?

In “liberated territory” in northern Syria, according to Mansour. We can’t be sure, of course, but it was probably in Idleb City, which was recently captured by a rebel coalition that includes Jabhat al-Nosra. For one thing, Ahmed Mansour posted a set of pictures of himself in Syria to the Bila Hudoud page on Aljazeera.net, some of which show that he visited the Idleb region. And if you look closely, the kitschy gilded chairs and the silly little coffee-tables seem identical to those used in the governor’s palace in Idleb City. So chances are the interview actually took place there, unless we are to believe that they carted away the furniture to some other place in order to trick us. Or maybe those chairs are very common in Idleb. I hope not.

What did he look like?

Well, we don’t know, do we? We saw more of him this time than ever before, but that’s still just two hands and a nose. He had a black scarf or cloak draped over his head and shoulders, to conceal his face and features. He looked a little pudgy, too, but that may just have been a suicide bomber’s belt under his clothes. Al-Qaeda leaders like to wear those regardless of the occasion.

The rest of his clothes were a bit out of the ordinary. He wore a pale checkered shirt and something that looked like olive army pants, plus a green waistcoat with a shiny silk back. At first I took this for an unusually cruel case of sartorial terrorism, but on closer inspection he may have been wearing a traditional Syrian costume. Those can look a little different in different areas of the country, but they often involve some sort of vest and wide-waisted billowy pants of the kind still worn by many Kurds. If so, it was certainly a conscious fashion statement: eschewing the Afghan-Pakistan Pashtun hats and Shalwar Kameez tunics that jihadis like to wear, in favor of clothes that tell you he’s a Syrian. Not just any Syrian, but a real deal genuine old-school Syrian, straight out of Bab al-Hara. Shame we didn’t get to see if he had the moustache to match.

And what did he say?

The interview was mainly dedicated to one thing, which was for Mansour to help Golani explain that he’s nothing like the Islamic State. Rather, he is a responsible and sensible jihadi leader.

In line with traditional Jabhat al-Nosra rhetoric, he said that while there can be no compromise about sharia law, that doesn’t mean that his men are a bunch of bloodthirsty extremists. He kept repeating that “for the time being” they’re only fighting those who fight them and implementing sharia, so if you don’t get in the way of that you’ll be OK. However, Golani didn’t step away from his ideology. He is a true believer and he’s not going to give the Islamic State any reason to claim he’s straying from the word of God.

Among other things, he claimed that Jabhat al-Nosra is not involved in operations against the West, following instructions from al-Qaeda’s supreme leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. That directly contradicts what the U.S. government says. It claims to have information that veteran al-Qaeda members have moved to Syria under the protection of Jabhat al-Nosra, where they are busily preparing bomb plots against Western aviation. The U.S. has dubbed this cell “the Khorasan Group,” a label that Golani ridiculed, saying there is no such thing and all the camps attacked by the  U.S. belong to Jabhat al-Nosra. He did however admit that there are people in Syria who have come “from Khorasan.” In modern jihadi parlance, that typically means Afghanistan/Pakistan, so it seems likely he is referring to people on mission from al-Qaeda’s central leadership. He also implicitly clarified that contrary to current rumors, Jabhat al-Nosra isn’t about to break ties with al-Qaeda. While he didn’t address those rumors head on, he talked about receiving instructions from Zawahiri (like it was the most natural thing in the world that a Syrian group should obey an Egyptian holed up in Pakistan) and there was a little flag on the table in front of him bearing the words “al-Qaeda in the Levant.”

Egged-on by Mansour, Golani spoke in more detail than ever before about the fate of Syria’s religious minorities, mostly to stress that Jabhat al-Nosra isn’t like Islamic State in that respect. For example, he said that Jabhat al-Nosra won’t fight those Christian villages that do not fight the Muslims (meaning the rebels), adding that only after an Islamic government has been set up will they start collecting the Jizya, and even then it will only be taken from those who can afford it … and so on. Again and again, he made the point that Jabhat al-Nosra would be totally justified in taking action against certain minorities, but has chosen not to because they are in fact un-crazy non-extremists.

In one of the interview’s more memorable moments, he said that an Alawite can surrender to Jabhat al-Nosra and as long as he repents, he won’t be killed “even if he killed a thousand of us”. You won’t hear that from the Islamic State, which proudly broadcasts videos of its soldiers shooting defenseless Alawite and Shia prisoners-of-war or slitting their throats. Indeed, those who imagine there is no room for nuances in jihadi thinking, or jihadi rhetoric, are wrong. There is already more than a glint of daylight between the classical salafi-jihadism of Jabhat al-Nosra  and the still-developing neo-jihadi ideology that was set loose by the Islamic State’s split from al-Qaeda in 2013. The difference will surely widen over time.

Then again, the basics remain the same and they’re extreme enough to be borderline genocidal, even when sugarcoated by Aljazeera. If you listened closely, Golani also said that Alawites are a people who have left Islam. He made it clear that not only must Alawites stop fighting for Assad, they must also abandon the elements of their faith that contradict Islam. And of course, by Islam he means his own salafi brand of Sunni Islam, not that they can be regular Shias or anything like that. So minus the wrapping, his core message remains the same: Alawites will be left alone as soon as they agree to stop being Alawites.

That doesn’t sound like it will convince many of his detractors?

No it doesn’t, but that was never the point. Golani isn’t addressing himself to non-Sunnis or secularists, or to the Americans or the Western media. He knows they’ll hate him whatever he says. He did what al-Qaeda-style jihadis always do, which is to preach to those they have a real hope of influencing: other Sunni Islamists, whose support or at least passive acceptance they need to survive and succeed.

In other words, if you didn’t like what you heard, he wasn’t talking to you.

Even today, globalist salafi-jihadism is not a popular ideology in Syria. Jabhat al-Nosra has grown in spite of its international links rather than because of them. Powerful foreign governments also are prodding their rebel clients to isolate and undermine Jabhat al-Nosra because of its al-Qaeda connection, even as they leave indigenous and locally-focused Syrian salafi factions alone. To avoid being isolated and made a target, Jabhat al-Nosra’s strategy has been to embed itself inside the wider Syrian rebellion, by making itself an appreciated and indispensable ally to other Sunni Islamists.

Most of the big rebel factions, especially those that work closest with Jabhat al-Nosra, are Sunni Islamists of some variety. The grassroots-level fighters in these groups are not necessarily very different from Golani’s men – they’re all politically hawkish, religiously conservative, and deeply disenchanted with if not hostile to the West. (I’m sure there are exceptions, but they’re exceptions.) But most of these Islamist groups are not committed to a global anti-Western agenda the way al-Qaeda is; indeed, most of them explicitly reject it. With time, many pro-opposition Sunni Muslims, including a significant number of Islamist hardliners who might otherwise be inclined to embrace Golani’s thinking, have come to think that Jabhat al-Nosra are too extreme. They’re particularly irked by its post-2014 behavior, when in the chaos after the Islamic State infighting and the U.S. intervention, Jabhat al-Nosra began to take a more aggressive and territorial approach to rebel politics, setting up their own courts and seizing villages for their sole control. Furthermore, they accuse the group of not being properly Syrian, since it is full of foreigners and takes orders from the Egyptian-born Zawahiri, whose agenda is global rather than Syrian. They also complain that Jabhat al-Nosra’s al-Qaeda connection has unnecessarily antagonized the West and is ruining the international reputation of the Syrian revolution.

They are of course right on all counts and that’s why Jabhat al-Nosra is so sensitive to that line of criticism. And that’s also why we now see Golani pleading innocent to these charges, hand on heart, saying that he is in fact not a loose cannon, he is not attacking the U.S., he is not slaughtering minorities, and he is just as Syrian as they are. (Hey, look at his clothes.)

In other words, what he is doing is to tell his fellow Sunni rebels, potential funders, and Islamist opinion-makers around the Middle East exactly what they want to hear, so that they’ll be able to convince themselves that the Americans must be wrong about Jabhat al-Nosra. (Because what have the Americans done for them anyway?) He tries to reassure them that he is just like them and that they shouldn’t listen to the U.S., which is making up fraudulent reasons to target him, when everyone knows that the real motivation for the American airstrikes against Jabhat al-Nosra is because Obama is secretly in cahoots with Assad and wants to prevent his fall.

Wait, the U.S. works with Assad?

Well, no, but that’s the idea among Syrian Islamists, not only on the jihadi fringe. You’d be surprised to know how many Syrian rebels and their sympathizers believe this (and no, it’s not entirely unfounded). So that was Golani’s other big theme for the night. He’s making the point that the U.S. and its allies want to abort the revolution and rehabilitate Assad, since they fear a “Muslim” victory. The corollary of that is that the U.S. airstrikes against Jabhat al-Nosra (“Khorasan Group,” remember?) are no different from Assad’s barrel-bombing of Syrian cities. Both airforces are operating in the same airspace and working for the same goal, Golani says, so anyone who takes aid from the Americans is – knowingly or not – also working to keep Assad in power.

He then lumps in the UN negotiations with the rest of this great Shia-Zionist-Yankee-Alawi plot. If the opposition drifts into any form of peace talks, such as those proposed by UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura, that can only serve to isolate the jihadi irreconcileables. So it’s no surprise that Golani insists that all the suggested peace conferences are secretly gamed to serve the international pro-Assad conspiracy. You shouldn’t listen to anyone who will take part in such talks, Golani says, and you shouldn’t accept the support of the West because they’ll just get you hooked on it and then reduce you to a tool for their own purposes. Instead, your only option is to accept that the Assad regime and the international community are two faces of the same coin and to charge at them in an uncompromising jihad.

Which, coincidentally, happens to be the product that al-Qaeda is selling.

 *Aron Lund is the editor of Syria in Crisis, a website published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The post Aljazeera Interview With Nusra Front’s Abu Mohammed Al-Golani – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Preety Bhogal*

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to South Korea marked continuity in India’s strong economic and strategic partnership with the country. South Korea is one of the four nations (including Japan, Singapore and Malaysia) in East Asia with which India has comprehensive economic partnership (or cooperation) agreements (CEPA/CECA). Taking forward India’s ‘Act East’ policy, Prime Minister Modi’s trip to South Korea was crucial due to the growing interest among the industry and policymakers in the two countries, post operationalization of the India-South Korea comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA). There are several reasons for the growing significance.

First, India has nearly completed five years since the operationalization of the agreement. While India’s total trade with South Korea has increased in the last quinquennial, there has also been an increase in India’s trade deficit with the country. This is a cause of concern for the Indian policymakers.

India’s trade with South Korea

The rise in India’s imports from South Korea has been significantly greater than the growth in India’s exports to the country. This has led to mounting trade deficit for India, which has grown by almost 200 percent over the last decade. This is largely due to the rise in import of certain mineral products from South Korea. However, the bilateral trade grew by nearly 20.9% in 2011-12 with the implementation of India-Korea CEPA; in the subsequent years, the total trade declined gradually. This decline is attributed to the constantly deteriorating exports of products like textiles, gems and jewellery and pharmaceuticals to South Korea.

A closer look at India’s pattern of trade reveals that India’s major item of import from South Korea in 2013-14 was base oil (HS 27101960) and top item of export in 2013-14 was other petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals (HS 27101990). Interestingly, in 2009-10, the product composition was slightly different. The top exported commodity from India in 2009-10 was light oil and preparation (HS 271011). The export value for this product category reduced substantially in 2013-14. This product is exempt from the obligation of tariff reduction or elimination, which implies that Indian exporters continue to face duties on this particular product category.

The India-Korea CEPA lays down a roadmap for tariff reduction/elimination over a maximum timeframe of nine years in case of India and seven years in the case of South Korea for select product categories. Tariff reduction/elimination strategy is different for different products. Both India and South Korea have committed tariff reduction by 50 percent in the case of HS 271019 product category (other petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals) by the end of the maximum committed timeframe.

As a result of different timeframes for tariff reduction, the trade agreement has led to some change in the pattern of trade between India and South Korea. The changing pattern is going strongly in favour of the latter. There are also questions on the utilization of the trade agreement.

A study published by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy has forecast that bilateral trade between India and South Korea will expand to nearly US$60 million in 2020 if tariff elimination is undertaken through India-South Korea CEPA route. The study points out that India has been a beneficiary in terms of increased exports of naphtha as tariffs for this particular product category were eliminated under the agreement. As a way forward, India, based on its current and future export potential with South Korea, should expand the list of commodities scheduled for tariff reduction/elimination.

Moreover, since India and South Korea are engaged in the negotiation of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement which also includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), any commitment under the agreement is likely to affect India-Korea relations. Most free trade agreements including the India-South Korea CEPA have a Most Favoured Nations (MFN) clause and therefore, further trade agreements have to be carefully designed as they can be contradictory to previous agreements.

In terms of investments, the cumulative direct investments from South Korea to India increased from $738 million in December 2010 to $1,527 million in January 2015. However, the share of the country in total inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in India remained more or less around 0.6 percent. It is worth mentioning that in the investment chapter, India has not taken any forward-looking commitments with South Korea and has generally followed its autonomous regime. As a result, there are no substantial gains in terms of market access to South Korean companies, apart from policy certainty.

The recent visit by Prime Minister Modi has set the stage for revisiting the agreement in a fitting way. During Modi’s visit to South Korea, a decision to commence negotiations to amend India-South Korea CEPA by June 2016 was taken. The amendment is with regard to inclusion of products such as primary agricultural commodities (rice, sesame) and textiles that at present do not fall under the net of tariff reduction/elimination. Further, to encourage investments into some strategic sectors in India, the leaders also approved the signing of revised Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). The revised tax convention incorporates source-based and residence-based taxation of different incomes and establishes provisions for exchange of information and assistance in collection of taxes between tax authorities.

It is essential for the governments of both sides to establish more liberalizing regimes and frameworks to facilitate free flow of goods, services and investments across nations. Any collaboration between Indian and South Korean firms is likely to spur innovation and improve the global competitiveness of their products.

*Preety Bhogal is Researcher, Centre for Policy Research (CPR), India. The author can be contacted at preety273@gmail.com

The post Modi Visit To South Korea: Towards More Liberal Regimes – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Clint Watts*

Two weeks back, the Washington Post published the most insightful article to date on the challenges the U.S. government has encountered battling al Qaeda, the Islamic State and jihadis writ large in social media.  The U.S. State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) has been charged with a mission impossible: countering jihadi sympathies online while also pleasing all critics inside the U.S. government and in the mainstream media.

Ten years ago, countering al Qaeda’s narrative largely rested in the hands of the Department of Defense (DoD).  Gobs of money were thrown at efforts to discredit Bin Laden and crew.  Having supported a few of these programs, I can attest firsthand that they were largely a giant waste of time; their focus was more about pleasing military commanders than actually undermining al Qaeda’s message.  The CSCC on the other hand, in concept, remains the correct approach.  What more could the U.S. ask for than culturally-informed counterterrorism experts armed with social media, building from lessons learned gained in more than a decade of observing jihadi propaganda? Apparently the system must have zero defects as well.

The Washington Post article illustrates the strange position the CSCC remains in.  The article discusses how one of the CSCC’s videos gathered more than 800,000 views.  This should have been seen as a major success, simply gaining an audience in jihadi online circles is a major first step, but instead those inside government prone to fearful bureaucratic survival immediately started undermining the effort. The CSCC played by the enemy’s rules and lost, not to the enemy, but to their own team.

As we approach the fourteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. should ask itself whether it seriously has the stomach to counter jihadis on the Internet.  For the CSCC or any government effort to be successful in the online space, they must have initiative, flexibility, capacity, autonomy and space for experimentation.  Bureaucrats, media critics, and counterterrorism pundits are unlikely to provide these things to an operation like the CSCC.

Two months ago, I questioned the renewed White House calls for countering violent extremism (CVE) against jihadis.  The U.S. government sends out these calls every few years when jihadis do bad things and little really happens afterwards beyond some conferences with nice photo ops.  My three essential questions two months back for conducting CVE were:

1. Where do you want to counter violent extremism? There are three fronts in countering jihadis flowing into ISIS: 1) The Middle East, North Africa and South Asia (MENASA) 2) Europe 3) North America.  These three fronts, in order, provide different percentages of fighters into ISIS ranks and depending on where they are located, are brought into ISIS through differing combinations of on-the-ground and online recruitment efforts.
2. Who do we want to counter? Which extremists do you want to counter? Extremists supporting ISIS come in many different shapes and sizes.  Will McCants provides the best spectrum for identifying where to focus CVE efforts.  I would recommend focusing on those already “radicalizing” to join ISIS.
3. How do you want to counter extremists? As I argued at length in past Geopoliticus posts, the U.S. has largely used the wrong messages, messengers, medium, and method to counter the bulk of those radicalizing to join ISIS (i.e., moderate voices and community engagement).  Instead, I proposed using a different message more effective for the radicalizing target audience and in particular a more effective messenger: defectors from ISIS ranks.

Having read about the struggles of the CSCC, I would like to take these questions a step further today and describe how I would recommend doing a more effective counternarrative program. As I discussed previously, CVE efforts should start online rather than on-the-ground.  Online efforts cut across all three theaters of foreign fighters being recruited to ISIS (MENASA, Europe & North America) and when done properly will illuminate the hotspots where on-the-ground CVE efforts such as community engagement and promoting moderate voices can be applied more effectively.

Engaging videos, mirroring the production format and quality of ISIS and describing the horrors experienced by ISIS defectors provide the ideal vector for engaging those in the ‘Radicalizing’ stage of ISIS recruitment.  I’d call the program “Make Villains, Not Martyrs” with the goal of exposing ISIS members for the power hungry, political criminals they are rather than the devout martyrs they claim to be.  The effort would move through four phases:

• Pinpoint Vulnerable Audiences: Identify those radicalizing online communities of ISIS enthusiasts most attracted to ISIS content.  Folks like J.M. Berger have already done the lion share of this work (just watch his Twitter feed and read his book). Social media companies who’ve finally conducted waves of shut-downs on ISIS accounts should be able to provide even greater fidelity on where those ISIS digital enclaves reside and further describe the proclivity that these accounts have for ISIS material.  This refined data would further enable the crafting of a precise counter narrative.
• Develop engaging “telenovela” style defector video content: Defector accounts, I believe, remain the most effective counter narrative, but simply filming a defector interview and then broadcasting it won’t work.  Instead, the ISIS defector content must be able to engage the radicalizing individual and sustain their attention.  I would alternatively propose the development of three dramatic retellings of actual defectors and foreign fighters lost amongst different jihadi conflicts, illuminating ISIS and al Qaeda’s betrayal of their own principles and troops.  I would script out three, “telenovela” style videos that would initially stand-alone but would later be networked together.  It’s important to note, these videos would not be fiction, but instead dramatic retellings of actual debacles involving foreign fighters.  I’d recommend the three movies, as seen in Figure 1, describe the treachery of three fratricidal jihadi campaigns:
  • Tentative Title: “Fitna” – Jabhat al Nusra & ISIS foreign fighters killing each other in Syria
  • Tentative Title: “Bandit” – AQIM’s fracturing, infighting and criminality as they are overrun by French forces in Mali.
  • Tentative Title: “Ansaris & Muhajirs” – al Shabaab’s killing off of their own foreign fighters and clan based infighting inside the group.

Each of these movies would be provided in different languages to more directly appeal to specific radicalizing audiences and they would illuminate several themes of folly and despair encountered by actual foreign fighters embroiled in these jihads.

Three videos for ISIS counternarative engagement

The scripts for these three videos would not be propaganda as the content is already written by jihadis who’ve spilled their betrayals online (Omar Hammami’s biography writes its own screenplay).  Each movie would be roughly 60 – 80 minutes in length, but told in chapters of  5 – 10 minutes suitable for dissemination in a serial trough YouTube and other video hosting sites.

Each of the videos would follow a similar build up as well (See Figure 2).  The videos would need to appear, in at least the first three episodes, to be somewhat sympathetic to joining a jihad – tracing the introduction, immersion and initial reception of a foreign fighter.  After three episodes, dreams of jihad glory would fade as softer themes undermining ISIS enter the storyline–foreign fighters participating in criminal activity for example.  As the story continues, the video would shift to real stories of horrid ISIS behavior–barbaric torture, sexual enslavement, killing of innocent women and children.  The video series would conclude with a foreign fighter watching the fratricidal killing of a fellow foreign fighter at the hands of a corrupt jihadi leader.  The foreign fighter would manage to defect from ISIS to return home, finding he had shamed his family.

Process for developing online videos

• Host and disseminate the videos: The video chapters would be released one per week.  After release of the tenth episode, the entire movie would be hosted in multiple locations in the jihadi online environment (i.e. YouTube, etc.).  The videos would then also link to the actual documentary interviews of real foreign fighters that have traveled the journey of the foreign fighters described in the telenovela serial.  The internal documents of al Qaeda, ISIS, AQIM and other terror groups detailing internal conflict and deceit (i.e., Harmony Documents, Bin Laden’s Bookshelf, etc.) would also be linked to these videos so that those on the radicalization path can see for themselves the disingenuous nature of all these jihadi campaigns.  The hosting locations would allow for comments and debate, further refining the application of other CVE programs.  These online debates along with standard social media viewer metrics would provide the basis for true measurement of online CVE efforts.
• Follow up with on-the-ground CVE efforts: Effectively engaging in the online space with these videos would reveal hot spots where other CVE efforts can be employed more effectively.  Those jihadi digital enclaves most engaged on ideological issues would be ideal for a “Moderate Voices” CVE efforts and some physical communities might also surface appropriate for the application of CVE community outreach programs.  Essentially, the videos will act as blood in the water for jihadi sharks. Engagement, regardless of whether its positive or negative, will illuminate what we currently cannot see–the fault lines in ISIS popular support that we need to exploit.

Ultimately, this type of a program will likely not make it out of the concept phase.  It will be plagued by interagency infighting and will take so long to produce through the U.S. bureaucracy it will be available right about the time ISIS collapses.

In actuality, an online defector video series like this would not take that much time or resources to execute.  The scripts are practically written and the production will be more effective and efficient if done in the Middle East or North Africa. (Off the cuff, I’d recommend looking first at Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon for video production–they’ve got some good capacity.) The online analytics, hosting, and dissemination can all be done from a few laptops armed with a couple credit cards.  So again I ask, do we really want to do online CVE?  It seems the CSCC can do it, but will we let them?

About the author:
Clint Watts is an FPRI Senior Fellow with the Program on National Security and President of Miburo Solutions, Inc. His research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a U.S. Army infantry officer, a FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC). Clint’s publications include: al Qaeda’s (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combating Terrorism Center, 2007 (Co-editor, Co-author); “Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?” Small Wars Journal, 2007 ; “Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut,” Small Wars Journal, 2009; and, “Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community,” Studies in Intelligence – CIA, 2011.(Co-author). He is also the editor of the SelectedWisdom.com blog.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

The post Are We Our Own Worst Enemy? The Problems In Countering Jihadi Narratives And How To Fix Them – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Robert Naiman

One of the most controversial aspects of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the fact that the Obama administration has tried to impose a public blockade on the text of the draft agreement.

When Congress votes on whether to grant the president “fast-track authority” to negotiate the TPP — which would bar Congress from making any changes to the secret pact after it’s negotiated — it will effectively be a vote to pre-approve the TPP itself.

Although the other negotiating countries and “cleared” corporate advisers to the U.S. Trade Representative have access to the draft TPP agreement, the American people haven’t been allowed to see it before Congress votes on fast track. Members of Congress can read the draft agreement under heavy restrictions, but they can’t publicly discuss or consult on what they have read.

Arguments against Secrecy

Alan Beattie, who is sort of the economic globalization bureau chief at the Financial Times, recently challenged what he saw as the main establishment arguments in favor of this secrecy.

Beattie noted that:

1. Keeping the negotiating texts secret isn’t keeping other countries from getting secret knowledge about the U.S. position in negotiations. They already have this information. “It’s the public that are being kept in the dark,” Beatie wrote. Who or what was harmed when WikiLeaks published the TPP chapter on intellectual property claims?
2. Interim texts are published for other important international negotiations — like on climate change. Indeed, interim texts were published on international trade agreements in the past.
3. Seeing the text at the end of the process isn’t good enough, because then it will be too late to change it. Saying that the public doesn’t get to see the text until the end is tantamount to keeping the public out of the process.
4. Unlike the Iran nuclear negotiations, the TPP is about commerce, not “national security.”

In fact, the Iran nuclear negotiations have arguably been more transparent to Congress and the American people so far than the TPP negotiations. After all, there’s been a sustained public argument over the likely provisions of the Iran deal. It’s very clear now to anyone who cares that the current P5+1 negotiations with Iran, if they succeed, will result in an agreement that allows Iran to enrich uranium. There’s no mystery about that. For those who oppose any agreement that allows Iran to enrich uranium, there’s no need to wait and see what deal emerges before criticizing.

Transparency Denied

Similarly, it’s knowable now that the Obama administration has no intention of trying to negotiate enforceable provisions against currency manipulation in the TPP.

Therefore, a yes vote on fast track now would be a vote to accept that the TPP will have no enforceable provisions on currency manipulation. But this is the kind of transparency that the public has so far been denied by officials shrouding the text and claiming that we shouldn’t talk about the details until the text has been finalized.

This example shows that the question of transparency around the TPP isn’t just a question of administration transparency. As in so many other cases, it’s also a question of congressional transparency.

The two-step process of voting on fast track now and the TPP later — when the fast track vote is in fact the key vote to approve the agreement, and when key, knowable provisions of the TPP agreement are shrouded in public fog at the time of the fast track vote — is designed to allow swing members of Congress to vote yes on fast track while pretending that they are not thereby voting yes on the TPP. Later, some of these members will vote no on passage of the TPP, just as former House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) cast a key enabling vote for fast track in 1991 and then subsequently voted against NAFTA.

Therefore, the transparency complaint should also be directed against Congress.

What Congress Can Do

Congress could, if it wants, declassify the TPP text.

Agitation to push Congress to declassify the TPP text could have the effect of putting members of Congress on the record on whether they think that the TPP text should be classified or not. If a substantial group of members supported such a move, they could pressure the administration to agree to declassification.

According to their own rules, both the House and the Senate can act unilaterally to declassify information in their possession.

As a McClatchy report noted in August 2013, the Senate version is in Section 8 of Senate Resolution 400, which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The House version is in 11(g) of the House Rule X. The rules authorize the chambers’ respective intelligence committees to vote to publicly disclose any information in the possession of the committee after concluding that the public interest would be served by such disclosure.

Both rules envision a multi-step process. First, the committee votes on whether to declassify. If the vote is yes, the president has an opportunity to object in writing, stating the reasons for the objection. If the president does not object, disclosure proceeds. If the president does object, the committee considers whether to proceed anyway, by referring the matter to the full chamber.

As the McClatchy report noted, these procedures have never been “used” in the sense of carrying them through to completion. However, they have been used as a threat to compel the administration to bargain in good faith with Congress over declassification. They were used in this way in the fight over declassification of the executive summary of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA’s use of torture.

And they could be so used in the present case. I called the Senate Intelligence Committee and confirmed that they have the power to move to declassify the TPP text if they want.

So, let’s push members of Congress who are complaining about the secrecy of the TPP to go on the record: Do you think that the intelligence committees should move to declassify the TPP negotiating text?

*Robert Naiman is Policy Director at Just Foreign Policy.

The post US Congress Can, And Should, Declassify TPP – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

One big reason America was far more equal in the 1950s and 1960s than now is unions were stronger then. That gave workers bargaining power to get a fair share of the economy’s gains – and unions helped improve wages and working conditions for everyone.

But as union membership has weakened – from more than a third of all private-sector workers belonging unions in the 1950s to fewer than 7 percent today – the bargaining power of average workers has all but disappeared.

In fact, the decline of the American middle class mirrors almost exactly the decline of American labor union membership.

So how do we strengthen unions?

First, make it easier to form a union, with a simple majority of workers voting up or down.

Right now, long delays and procedural hurdles give big employers plenty of time to whip up campaigns against unions, even threatening they’ll close down and move somewhere else if a union is voted in.

Second, build in real penalties on companies that violate labor laws by firing workers who try to organize a union or intimidating others.

These moves are illegal, but nowadays the worst that can happen is employers get slapped on the wrist. If found guilty they have to repay lost wages to the workers they fire. Some employers treat this as a cost of doing business. That must be stopped.  Penalties should be large enough to stop this illegality.

Finally – this one has been in the news lately, and if you only remember one thing, remember this: We must enact a federal law that pre-empts so-called state “right-to-work” laws.

Don’t be fooled by the “right to work” name. These laws allow workers to get all the benefits of having a union without paying union dues. It’s a back door destroying unions. If no one pays dues, unions have no way to provide any union benefits. And that means lower wages.

In fact, wages in right-to-work states are lower on average than wages in non-right-to-work states, by an average of about $1500 a year. Workers in right-to-work states are also less likely to have employer-sponsored health insurance and pension coverage.

When unions are weakened by right-to-work laws, all of a state’s workers are hurt.

American workers need a union to bargain on their behalf. Low-wage workers in big-box retail stores and fast-food chains need a union even more.

If we want average Americans to get a fair share of the gains from economic growth, they need to be able to unionize.

The post Making Economy Work: Strengthen Unions And Preempt State ‘Right-To-Work’ Laws – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Simon Bradley

FIFA’s beleaguered head, Sepp Blatter, has won his fifth presidential term, despite the eruption this week of corruption allegations during his time as chief of world football’s governing body.

Defiant Blatter, who resisted calls to resign this week as FIFA president or to postpone the election, was elected after his only challenger, Prince Ali bin Al Hussein of Jordan, withdrew after the first round. This saw Blatter receive 133 votes, falling short of the two thirds majority needed (out of 209) at FIFA’s 65th Congress in Zurich on Friday. Prince Ali got 73 votes.

In a victory speech, Blatter declared: “Let’s go FIFA, let’s go FIFA,” to a standing ovation.

He also thanked all those who voted from him and his rival, Prince Ali. “I am not perfect, nobody is perfect, but we will do a good job together I am sure,” he said.

“At the end of my term I will give up FIFA in a strong position,” he added.

Anger within Europe’s powerful regional football body UEFA and other members over the damage corruption allegations are doing to FIFA were not sufficient to topple the 79-year-old Swiss.
Reactions

While Asian, African and Latin American states had been expected to rally around Blatter, Europe had been keen for him to step aside.

“Change in my opinion is crucial if this organisation is to regain its credibility,” said Michel Platini, who heads UEFA, after the result.

American footballing officials also expressed their disappointment but said they would continue to push for change.

Peter Gilliéron, president of the Swiss Football Association, congratulated Blatter on his re-election.

“It is important and only fair that discussions are sought, and that decisions are taken and solutions found that will take FIFA and football out of the negative headlines and bring them forward,” he said.

He said Blatter had done a lot for football, but that he would not be revealing for whom he had voted.

Congratulations for Blatter came from Russia.

Crisis

FIFA has been plunged into crisis after a number of its top officials were arrested at a five-star Zurich hotel two days ago at the behest of the US Justice Department on suspicion of receiving bribes worth millions of dollars. The dawn arrests in Zurich, where the organisation is based, came hours before Swiss prosecutors announced a separate criminal investigation into the 2018 and 2022 football World Cup bids won by Russia and Qatar, respectively.

Addressing the Congress before the vote, Blatter said events on Wednesday had “unleashed a storm” but he appealed to delegates’ “unity and team spirit” to move forward together and to stamp out corruption.

“You [national associations] are the ambassadors of our football. You have the power to change the face of FIFA. You have the power in your hearts,” he said.

“Let’s get down to work. Let us not just talk about problems. Let us go and solve them. Let us show the world we are able to run our institution and we can do that together,” he declared.

Blatter said the most important points for FIFA to tackle were transparency, FIFA’s standing, the fight against corruption, match fixing and racism.

“Rampant” corruption

Triumphant Blatter is therefore extending his 17-year reign as FIFA president for another four years despite serving at the helm of a culture that American prosecutors described this week as having “rampant, systemic, deep-rooted” corruption at its core.

On Wednesday US Attorney General Loretta Lynch and heads of the FBI and Internal Revenue Service revealed a far-reaching US investigation into racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering charges of at least $151 million (CHF143 million) in bribes. Nine football officials and five sports media and promotions executives have been charged.

Blatter has sought to distance himself from the scandal, the biggest crisis FIFA has faced in its 111-year history.

“We cannot watch everyone all the time. We have 1.6 billion people directly or indirectly touched by our game,” Blatter said.

“Good future”

Before the vote, Kuwaiti Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah, one of the most powerful men in world sport, said Blatter had a “good future”. FIFA’s chief medical officer also reportedly said the 79-year-old was “as fit as a fiddle”.

While it is difficult to predict events, the Swiss faces a stormy time, however.

Several countries announced before the secret ballot that they were switching allegiance away from Blatter because of the scandal.

“This is the beginning, not the end. I think there is a lot more of this to play out,” English Football Association Chairman Greg Dyke told Sky News shortly after Blatter’s victory.

Dyke was coy about whether or not European teams might boycott future World Cups, saying England would not go it alone, but the idea of a wider boycott could be discussed.

Money worries?

Adding to the pressure on FIFA and Blatter, there are growing concerns from major sponsors, such as McDonalds, Adidas and Coca Cola, many of whom have solidly backed the organisation despite nearly 20 years of bribery and corruption allegations.

Coca Cola said after Blatter’s re-election that: “FIFA must now seize the opportunity to begin winning back the trust it has lost”. It added that it wanted to see the soccer federation take “concrete actions”.

Some observers say FIFA could learn some lessons from the International Olympic Committee (IOC). A corruption scandal in 1998 involving allegations of bribes in return for votes to get the 2002 winter Olympics to Salt Lake City triggered an avalanche of change for the Olympic movement, pushed by sponsors.

Ahead of the vote, Jens Sejer Andersen, director of the independent sports watchdog, Play the Game, was cautious.

“There is a risk that Blatter may still do some window-dressing for sponsors to show that FIFA is on the right track,” he declared.

He added that Blatter’s attempt to try to distance himself from the current scandal showed that he had lost all sense of reality.

“But he knows he won’t be able to control all the investigations or political processes,” he said.

Swiss pressure?

Mark Pieth, a Swiss professor and former head of FIFA’s independent governance committee who recommended a number of reforms for the organisation, said football’s world governing body should be regulated by Switzerland, where it has its headquarters.

“If we see circumstances like those we are currently experiencing with FIFA, then we don’t have much choice other than the government becoming involved,” Pieth said in a pre-vote interview with Swiss public radio, SRF.

As non-profit associations, the approximately 60 sporting bodies based in Switzerland, including FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), pay a far lower tax bill than private-sector corporations.

Addressing FIFA’s Congress on Thursday, Swiss Sports Minister Ueli Maurer said FIFA had a “credibility problem” but remained quiet on the host’s future plans for sporting bodies.

In the past Swiss lawmakers have been hesitant to tighten oversight on organisations like FIFA, which is an sizeable local employer and exerts a powerful lobby, but the recent corruption allegations may change some opinions.

By coincidence, the Swiss parliament is scheduled to hold a debate next week on proposed laws that would make it harder for sporting bodies to engage in corrupt activity.

Politicians will decide on whether to beef up the nation’s corruption laws to make it an automatic criminal offence for anyone to give or accept bribes, regardless of the legal status of the organisation they represent.

Last December, parliament passed new anti-money laundering laws that classifies FIFA executives, and those of other large sporting bodies, as politically exposed persons. This will allow the Swiss authorities to scrutinise the private bank accounts of such officials.

FIFA investigations

A US Justice Department investigation announced on May 27 has accused 14 international football officials or sports marketing executives of bribery, racketeering, fraud and money-laundering over two decades in connection with marketing rights worth hundreds of millions of dollars awarded for tournaments in North and South America.

The seven football officials, including Jeffrey Webb, president of the North and Central American and Caribbean regional body known as CONCACAF, were arrested in a police raid on a luxury Zurich hotel early Wednesday. They are fighting extradition to the United States.

Defendants named in the indictment face up to 20 years in prison and their questioning could reveal further evidence that leads back to Blatter’s Zurich-based organisation. Webb was a member of FIFA’s audit committee more than a decade ago.

The Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office has launched its own investigation against an unspecified number of “persons unknown”, surrounding allegations of corruption during the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cup tournaments, which went to Russia and Qatar respectively.

In this case, the investigation was prompted by FIFA itself, which issued a complaint on November 18 last year. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office is therefore treating FIFA as the “injured party”, while coordinating with the US investigation to secure suspects and evidence.

Sepp Blatter

Joseph S Blatter was born on March 10, 1936 in Visp, Canton Valais.

A football player in the amateur Swiss leagues, Blatter started his professional career in public relations with the Valais tourist board.

He was elected as General Secretary of the Swiss Ice Hockey League in 1964 before moving to FIFA in 1975 as Director of Technical Development Programmes.

Six years later, Blatter was appointed as General Secretary of FIFA and then Chief Executive in 1990.

He was first voted in as FIFA President in 1998 and won further elections in 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2015.

The post Embattled Blatter Wins Fifth FIFA Term appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Burundian police have used excessive force in a crackdown on protests against President Pierre Nkurunziza’s election bid for a third term, Human Rights Watch said Friday.

Witness accounts indicate that police have shot and beaten people, in some cases when they posed no apparent threat. The authorities have closed down a number of radio stations and threatened journalists, human rights activists, and medical personnel.

“The Burundian authorities should call a halt to the crackdown on peaceful opponents and critics,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “They should order the police to stop using excessive deadly force, investigate the deaths and beatings of protesters at the hands of police, and hold those responsible for excessive force to account.”

Restrictions on movements in the capital, and pervasive fear among the population, have made it difficult to confirm the exact number of victims. Based on interviews with medical personnel and other sources, Human Rights Watch believes that since demonstrations began on April 26, 2015, at least 27 people have been killed during the demonstrations or died from wounds inflicted during the demonstrations. Others have been killed in separate incidents. More than 300 people have been injured. It is likely that the overall number of dead is higher.

Thousands of protesters took to the streets after the murder on May 23 of Zedi Feruzi, president of the opposition party Union for Peace and Democracy-Zigamibanga (Union pour la paix et la démocratie-Zigabimanga). Human Rights Watch has not yet confirmed the circumstances of his death. A statement on the Burundian presidency’s website described it as “a despicable assassination” and promised an investigation.

Police have responded aggressively to protests, with repeated clashes in several suburbs of the capital, Bujumbura. While many protesters have been peaceful, some have used violence. Witnesses say police have shot demonstrators indiscriminately – sometimes at point-blank range – in the head, neck, and chest. Medical personnel, witnesses, and a victim of a shooting told Human Rights Watch that some people were shot in the back as they fled. Medical staff in Bujumbura are treating more than 100 people with serious injuries.

Medical personnel, journalists, and human rights defenders have received death threats and menacing phone calls, and been intimidated and harassed by the authorities. Many of those who were threatened have gone into hiding or fled the country.

Public protests began in Bujumbura, on April 26. On May 13, a group of military officers attempted a coup and announced that Nkurunziza had been dismissed. Following heavy fighting between their supporters and members of the army loyal to Nkurunziza, the coup leaders announced on May 14 that their attempt had failed and they would surrender. Several officers allegedly involved in the coup attempt have been arrested. The whereabouts of their leader, Godefroid Niyombare, remain unknown.

Following the failed coup, demonstrators resumed their protests in Bujumbura on May 18, defying government orders to stop and warnings that demonstrators would be treated as supporters of the coup attempt.

In a May 18 statement, the External Relations and International Cooperation Ministry said that “the demonstrators will be treated as accomplices of the putschists as they are obstructing investigations into the putsch attempt and deliberately disturbing public order.” In contrast, a May 19 news release from the president’s office said that the government was not planning to take revenge, and that those involved in the coup attempt would be arrested and brought to justice according to the law.

Peaceful protesters and critics of the government should not be lumped together with those who attempted to overthrow the government, Human Rights Watch said.

Since demonstrations began, Burundian police have arrested hundreds of people, according to a Burundian police spokesperson and Burundian human rights organizations. They also beat detainees, witnesses and lawyers told Human Rights Watch. The Imbonerakure (“those who see far” in Kirundi) – members of the youth league of the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – have also been implicated in beatings and threats.

Some of those killed or injured were taking part in protests while others were targeted in or near their homes. Human Rights Watch interviewed nine people with gunshot wounds who had been shot in various neighborhoods of Bujumbura, and obtained bullet casings from the Musaga neighborhood after police had shot at demonstrators there. A policeman confirmed to Human Rights Watch that some police had shot live ammunition and blank cartridges at protesters in Mutakura and Musaga neighborhoods during the first week of the demonstrations.

One man told Human Rights Watch that he was sitting near a road, away from protests, in the Cibitoke neighborhood on April 28 when four policemen approached him and told him to stand up. He stood up with his hands in the air. A policeman shot him at point blank range in the leg. He fell down, and the policeman said: “I got you.” The policeman picked up a stone as if to throw it at him. When other people arrived, the policemen fled. In another case, a victim said police shot him, then stomped on his head and body. He survived.

Some demonstrators have thrown stones and Molotov cocktails at the police, and used slingshots with stones, marbles, and other projectiles. Demonstrators have attacked people perceived to be Imbonerakure and policemen they accused of targeting demonstrators. Demonstrators who carry out violent attacks should be brought to justice, Human Rights Watch said.

The president’s main communications adviser, Willy Nyamitwe, told Human Rights Watch: “There are perhaps policemen who used too much force and others who were misguided. You need to recognize also that demonstrators are committing human rights abuses and they aren’t being reported.” He said some policemen had been arrested because “they used live ammunition against demonstrators” and added: “The president was clear: no act [of violence] will go unpunished. And that also goes for the demonstrators.”

The deputy police spokesman, Pierre Nkurikiye, said on May 25 that six police officers had been killed and at least 126 injured since the protests began. Nkurikiye said four policemen in Bujumbura were arrested for shooting at people. Three were provisionally released and one was still in custody. Investigations into all four cases are ongoing.

During demonstrations, the police should abide by the United Nations Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. The principles call upon law enforcement officials to apply nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force, to use force only in proportion to the seriousness of the offense, and to use lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life.

Several hundred demonstrators and onlookers have been arrested since the protests began. Police figures indicate that 892 people were arrested in connection with the protests between April 26 and May 12. The deputy police spokesperson told Human Rights Watch in a meeting that police released 568 people, the majority of them minors or bystanders. The cases of 280 detainees had been transferred to the public prosecutor’s office. During the coup attempt, people ransacked the police detention center known as Bureau spécial de recherche (BSR) and released about 50 detainees.

The Burundian government should immediately restore respect for freedom of expression and assembly, including the freedom to demonstrate peacefully, allow radio stations to broadcast, and stop harassing journalists and human rights activists, Human Rights Watch said.

Governments and intergovernmental organizations, particularly the African Union, should pursue diplomatic efforts and impress upon the Burundian government the necessity to restore respect for fundamental human rights, as a precondition to peaceful and fair elections, Human Rights Watch said.

The UN Security Council should consider conducting a new mission to Burundi and make clear to all actors in Burundi that in the event of serious or widespread human rights violations, those responsible may face sanctions.

The UN and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights special rapporteurs covering freedom of expression and opinion; freedom of assembly and association; extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and the situation of human rights defenders should urgently visit Burundi and investigate recent abuses.

Human Rights Watch also encouraged the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to increase its monitoring capacity in Burundi and keep the Human Rights Council informed of developments. The Office of the High Commissioner should document human rights violations through its country presence in Burundi and regularly and publicly report on its findings.

“Restraint is needed on all sides in Burundi,” Bekele said. “The police have the right to control crowds and may need to use force when confronted by violence, but they should do so only when strictly necessary and in a proportionate manner.”

The post Claims Burundi Police Using ‘Deadly’ Response To Protests appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

Bangladesh is currently witnessing an alarming rise in extremist violence with radical Islamic groups affiliated to the international terror networks continuing to target secular bloggers. In yet another gruesome incident on May 12, Ananta Bijoy Das, a 33-year-old banker was hacked to death in the northeastern city of Sylhet for criticising religious fanaticism and dogmas.

Progressive writers and online activists have been attacked throughout Bangladesh with disturbing regularity. Das is the third blogger to be brutally murdered this year, in what seems to be a systemic killing spree unleashed by the Islamic militants. The killing of Das took place only 10 days after the Al Qaeda in Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) claimed responsibility for the fatal attack on writer Avijit Roy. In a statement issued on May 2, a leader of AQIS said such “assassinations are part of a series of operations” launched on the orders of its chief.

Immediately after the attack, an obscure outfit Ansar al-Islam claimed that Das was killed by the AQIS. It accused Das of being an “anti-Islam atheist blogger” who regularly mocked “Allah and Islam”. It also warned of more attacks on so-called atheist bloggers.

The three Bangladeshi bloggers killed in less than four months were on a list of targets drawn up by the Islamic militants. Das’ name was included in that list and he had been receiving death threats for some time. His friends say the frequency of threats increased after the killing of Roy on February 26. Das was close to Roy and he used to write for Mukta-Mona, a blog created by the slain author.

While Das was critical of religious fanaticism and attacks on free thinkers, his writings mainly focused on issues related to science. He had authored a number of books on science and edited a quarterly magazine called “Jukti” (Logic). Fellow bloggers insist that despite being a vocal critic of religious fanaticism, Das had never ridiculed any particular religion.

The barbaric killing of Das has shocked Bangladesh’s civil society. Several organisations strongly condemned the murder and hundreds of online activists staged protest demonstrations demanding immediate arrest of the killers. The Bangladesh Online Activists Network believes that the planned killing of bloggers is part of the diabolic designs of the Islamic militants to turn Bangladesh into a “religion-based” country.

Taking advantage of the prevailing political uncertainty resulting from the protracted power rivalry between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the religious extremists and reactionary elements have been making repeated forays into the Bangladesh polity. During the last few years, a number of radical Islamic outfits have emerged under different names. In early May, the Rapid Action Battalion recovered a huge cache of arms and ammunition from some cadres of a new jihadi outfit, called Saheed Hamja Brigade.

Another Islamic militant group Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) has been making frenetic efforts to hog media limelight by taking credit for the recent killings of three bloggers. The outfit’s chief and six activists were implicated in the Rajib Haidar murder case. Blogger Haidar was murdered on February 15, 2013 when Bangladesh had been swept by the Shahbag movement vociferously demanding capital punishment of Islamist war criminals of 1971.

The ABT is a potent threat to the country’s democracy, political stability and security. In 2014, it asked “patriotic armed forces” to dismantle the current secular democratic dispensation to establish a “Caliphate” in Bangladesh. Latest reports suggest that it has threatened to kill 10 prominent personalities, including political advisor to the premier H.T. Imam and Dhaka University Vice-chancellor Arefin Siddique. Bangladesh police are yet to prove ABT’s links with the dreaded international terror groups, like Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Police recently asked the home ministry to ban the outfit.

Along with Hefazat-e-Islam, a radical Islamic group, the ABT published a hit list of 84 atheist bloggers. Nine of them have already been physically eliminated. Attacks on progressive writers and independent thinkers began in the early 1990’s. Victims of Islamist attacks include renowned poet Shamsur Rahman, writer Humayun Azad, blogger Asif Mohiuddin and Rajib Haidar.

Meanwhile, the global Islamic terror groups have stepped up their activities in Bangladesh. In 2013, Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri asked his Bangladeshi followers to wage jihad against the “atheist” Awami League government that “protects those who publicly ridicule the Prophet”. Intelligence inputs say some Bangladeshi fighters did respond to the call. In a video message, the Al Qaeda chief urged the Muslim clerics of Bangladesh to lead an “intifada” (uprising) against the present democratic system to create a “Shariah” state.

The religious extremist groups are engaged in a fierce competition with the AL government for power and influence. They have expanded their influence over the society as the Arab-funded Islamic seminaries owing allegiance to Wahabi and Salaafi schools of thought have flourished in the country in the last two decades.

The role of fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami has also come under the scanner as most of the jihadi outfits maintain close links with it. The largest Islamist party is facing an existential crisis after the conviction of its top leaders for committing heinous crimes in the 1971 war. In the prevailing circumstances, it is likely that the party would join hands with the extremists to vent its anger on the secular bloggers who are soft targets. The national security experts of Bangladesh say the party’s enormous financial assets provide incentives to many young people to join Islamist ranks.

Bangladesh has always been a moderate Muslim nation where a vast majority of people follow Sufi-inspired Islam. However, this trend has now been challenged by the radical Islamists. The growing religious intolerance in Bangladesh could be attributed to this factor. The young bloggers are pitted against religious bigots who want to strictly enforce Islamic norms and practices in a traditional society like Bangladesh.

As pointed out by international human rights groups, the space for freedom of expression has deteriorated sharply in recent years in Bangladesh. Critics say the government has not properly addressed the rising cases of bloggers’ killing. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is treading cautiously in the volatile polity and her government has restrained itself from making public statement on the issue to avoid being dubbed as “atheist” by its detractors.

The number of outspoken voices against religious bigotry and obscurantism has been steadily increasing in Bangladesh. Most of them are neither affiliated to the mainstream political parties nor organised under any strong platform. Therefore the possibility of further attacks on secular bloggers cannot be ruled out completely. It is imperative that the AL government, which vows to uphold its secular credentials, initiates concrete measures to stop such killings, provides protection to the online activists who are vulnerable and ensures freedom of thought and expression as enshrined in the constitution.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Is Global Islamic Terror Rearing Its Head In Bangladesh? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.